

**10<sup>th</sup> Worldwide Consortium of Korean Studies Centers Workshop:  
New Generations, New Ideas in Korean Studies  
Schedule**

**Friday, June 6**

- All Day                      Students to pick up dormitory room key and packet from Korea Institute Office until 11:00 p.m.  
*\*Special instructions to be provided for those arriving after 11:00 p.m.*  
CGIS South Building S228, 1730 Cambridge Street  
Cambridge, MA 02138
- 6:00 – 8:00 p.m.           Welcoming Dinner (Optional)  
Porté Seminar Room (S250), CGIS South Building  
1730 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA

**Saturday, June 7**

**Room: CGIS South S250**

- 8:15 – 8:45 a.m.            Breakfast
- 8:45 – 9:00**                    **Opening Ceremony**  
Welcoming Remarks by Sun Joo Kim  
Remarks by Takatoshi Matsubara  
Remarks by Keum Jin Yoon (TBC)
- 9:00 – 10:10**                **Session 1**  
   Chaired by Mi-Ryong Shim (Harvard University)  
   9:00 – 9:20    Student 1: Honglei Cao (Sungkyunkwan University)  
   9:20 – 9:40    Student 2: Andrew Logie (University of Helsinki)  
   9:40 – 10:10   Discussion: Yongchul Choe (Korea University)
- 10:10 – 10:30                Break
- 10:30 – 12:15 p.m.**        **Session 2**  
   Chaired by Bruce Fulton (University of British Columbia)  
   10:30 – 10:50 Student 3: Sunghee Kim (Harvard University)  
   10:50 – 11:10 Student 4: Hyejong Kang (Yonsei University)  
   11:10 – 11:30 Student 5: Daniel Pieper (University of British Columbia)  
   11:30 – 12:15 Discussion: Bruce Fulton and Young Seo Baik (Yonsei University)
- 12:15 – 1:30 p.m.           Lunch

<b>1:30 – 2:40</b>	<b>Session 3</b> Chaired by Paul Chang (Harvard University) 1:30 – 1:50 Student 6: Li Ning (Fudan University) 1:50 – 2:10 Student 7: Irina Lyan (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) 2:10 – 2:40 Discussion: Huck Ju Kwon (Seoul National University)
2:40 – 3:00	Break
<b>3:00 – 4:00</b>	<b>Mentoring Session (5 groups of 4 students with faculty mentors)</b> Topic: TBA Group 1 (S450): - Faculty: John Duncan, Young Seo Baik - Students: Aihua Jin, Bowoon Keum, Yu Muto, Jeong Yeon Choi Group 2 (S354): - Faculty: Bruce Fulton, Yongchul Choe, Takatoshi Matsubara, - Students: Eugene Lee, Daniel Pieper, Hyejong Kang, Sunghee Kim Group 3 (S250): - Faculty: Remco Brueker, Hitoshi Nakano, Li Yan - Students: Jana Hajzlerova, Alexandra Hager, Maaïke Evelien de Vries, Andrew Logie Group 4 (S250 Foyer): - Faculty: Huck Ju Kwon, Jiyong Zheng - Students: Lauren Richardson, Do Dieu Khue, Anmol Mukhia, Li Ning Group 5 (S153): - Faculty: Ruth Barraclough, Deoksoo Choi - Students: Chi-Hoon Kim, Irina Lyan, Honglei Cao
<b>4:00 – 5:00</b>	<b>Group Discussion</b>
5:15 – 7:15	Dinner Tasty Burger, 40 Kennedy Street, Cambridge MA 02138

**Sunday, June 8**  
**Room: CGIS South S020**

8:30 – 9:00 a.m.	Breakfast
<b>9:00 – 10:10</b>	<b>Session 4</b> Chaired by Sun Joo Kim (Harvard University)

- 9:00 – 9:20 Student 8: Jeong Yeon Choi (Academy of Korean Studies)  
 9:20 – 9:40 Student 9: Tommy Tran (UCLA)  
 9:40 – 10:10 Discussion: Remco Breuker (Leiden University)
- 10:10 – 10:30 Break
- 10:30 – 12:15 p.m. Session 5**  
 Chaired by Ruth Barraclough (Australian National University)  
 10:30 – 10:50 Student 10: Lauren Richardson (Australian National University)  
 10:50 – 11:10 Student 11: Eugene Lee (SOAS)  
 11:10 – 11:30 Student 12: Maaïke de Vries (Leiden University)  
 11:30 – 12:15 Discussion: Ruth Barraclough and Jiyong Zheng (Fudan University)
- 12:15 – 1:30 p.m. Lunch
- 1:30 – 3:15 Session 6**  
 Chaired by John Duncan (UCLA)  
 1:30 – 1:50 Student 13: Aihua, Jin (Peking University)  
 1:50 – 2:10 Student 14: Alexandra Hager (University of Hawaii)  
 2:10 – 2:30 Student 15: Bowoon Keum (Korea University)  
 2:30 – 3:15 Discussion: John Duncan and Li Yan (visiting professor of Korea Institute of Beijing University)
- 3:15 – 3:30 Break
- 3:30 – 5:00 Faculty Meeting**  
 Students Session to fill out Reimbursement Forms
- 6:00 – 7:30 Dinner  
[Sandrine's Bistro, 8 Holyoke Street, Cambridge, MA 02138](#)

**Monday, June 9**  
**Room: CGIS South S020**

- 8:30 – 9:00 a.m. Breakfast
- 9:00 – 10:10 Session 7**  
 Chaired by John Cho (Harvard University)  
 9:00 – 9:20 Student 16: Yu Muto (Kyushu University)  
 9:20 – 9:40 Student 17: Chi-Hoon Kim (University of Indiana)  
 9:40 – 10:10 Discussion: Yoon Sun Yang (Boston University)
- 10:10 – 10:30 Break

**10:30 – 12:15 p.m. Session 8**

Chaired by Takatoshi Matsubara (Kyushu University)

10:30 – 10:50 Student 18: Khue Do (Seoul National University)

10:50 – 11:10 Student 19: Anmol Mukhia (Jawaharlal Nehru University, India)

11:10 – 11:30 Student 20: Jana Hajzlerova (Charles University in Prague)

11:30 – 12:15 Discussion: Kyoung Park (Harvard University) and Takatoshi Matsubara (Kyushu University)

12:15 – 1:30 p.m. Lunch

**1:30 – 2:30 Keynote speech by Deoksoo Choi (Korea University)**

**2:30 – 3:00 Closing Ceremony**

3:00 – 6:00 Campus Tour/Library Tour & Free Time

6:00 – 8:00 Farewell Dinner

Remarks by Consul-General Song-jun Ohm

*Supported by the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in Boston*

Harvard Faculty Club Room 2, 20 Quincy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138

# **Social Protest Culture in South Korea Continuities and Changes since the 1980s**

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1. Introduction
2. Discourse and Discourse Analysis
3. Three Korea Protests
4. Data Collection and Analysis
5. Conclusions

***Key words: social protest culture, democracy, performance, discourse, ideology***<sup>1</sup>

As David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998) once said, we now live in a “movement society” where the movement is becoming a common and daily routine for political participation and a means of voicing political preference of advocates. In recent years, many countries have experienced an impressive rise in popularity of social movements. Korea is included as one of those countries, one that has a considerably vibrant society structure while facing dynamic changes every day.

Along with the worldwide popularity of social movement such as civil rights movements and environmental movements, studies of social movements and related fields have now turned back to the frontiers of sociology. Almost twenty years ago, the cultural approach to social movement arose within the field of social movement studies, with foci in music, art, theater, text, discourse, performances, and so forth that were embedded in the collective actions. Several great contributions with cultural perspectives have led us to a new step to systematically analyze and better understand the dynamics of social protest activities (Fine & Stoecker, 1985; Jasper, 2008; Johnston, 2009, 2002; Johnston & Klandermans, 2004; McAdam, 1994; Polletta, 1997; Sewell, 1980; Snow & Benford, 1992; Swidler, 1986, 2004; Williams, 2004).

When we refer to the culture of social protest in Korea, it is mostly used to describe the intensity and strength of protest participants, such as whether it is bloody, violent or disordered. Therefore, most related studies put their foci on how to legitimately manage violent street protests via the passing of demonstration laws and the advancement of a collective actions reporting system to the police agency, on how to improve the awareness of citizens about, and on how laws involving assemblies and demonstrations are enforced (Choi, 2006; Han, 2012; Kim, 2013; Lee, 2007; Seo, 2001; Wook, 2010; Yang, 2001). This paper is an initial attempt to collaborate the discourses analysis with Korean social protest studies by means of employing a wide scope of data collection including speeches, declarations, public letters, debates, news articles and media interviews. Considering the impracticality of covering all social protests or demonstrations over the past thirty years in a single paper, this paper will specifically examine three representative cases to analyze the dynamics of social protest culture in Korea.

### **Introduction: Culture and Social Protest Culture**

For most scholars in academia, *culture* is a concept that, like a sponge, has the capability of absorbing all the liquid. It is one of the most favorable approaches in academia to describe and explain some social phenomena and massive group behaviors. Culture as a scientific concept nowadays is a collaboration to cover everything interdisciplinary. Two traditions within sociology are mostly used to conceptualize the term culture. Some scholars follow the Weberian tradition, which overemphasizes the significance of individual actor as a fundamental unit of analysis. For Max Weber, ideas are shaped and promoted by governors or elites and have a repercussive influence on all social actions. Thus, culture shapes individual actors' behaviors in a larger context by the means of "defining what people want and how they imagine they can get it" (Swidler, 2004, p. 25).

The other tradition that many studies follow comes from Emile Durkheim. Contrary to Web's sense of taking individual actor as a unit of analysis, Durkheim defined culture as the sum total of people's collective representations to understand the uncertain and complex world. For Durkheim, culture encompasses a broad range of values, beliefs, rituals, and symbols of a natural community or group. Society restrains every individual actor into it and hypostatizes the concept of "collective consciousness" inside the group (Swidler, 2004).

Needless to say, culture influences people's actions at anytime from anywhere by dominating, constructing, bolstering and coordinating the values, symbols, and norms behind people's behaviors. As the role of government in the market, culture in society is seemingly acting as invisible hands that controls people's social behaviors. Johnston and Klandermans (2004) argued that the ruling culture in society is seemingly "stable" over periods of time and has "[...]evolved over long periods of time and, for the most part, function as the broadest and most fundamental context for social action" (p. 4).

In social science literature, the use and application of culture has been very diverse and even contested. Culture is applied as a broad and complex net that encompasses all social actors and social phenomena. In addition to that, since its influence is everywhere in a social actors' daily life, it is then commonly employed as a paramount variable to explain the social shifts in a fluid social circumstance. In the field of social protest or social movement research, on the one hand, culture as an independent variable is mostly used to inwardly explain the process of creating a collective identity, developing intrinsic solidarity, and mobilizing resources to take actions. On this viewpoint, culture is a recycling concept where participants engage themselves in the reproduction, maintenance, and even expansion to the wider scope of society (Snow & Benford, 1992; Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Benfor, 1986). On the other hand, macro-culture

analysts of social protest research illustrate the shifts in a larger cultural context which various ideological or normative backgrounds could reflect back to the process of collective actions.

Johnston (2009)'s sense of social protest culture has a threefold substructure: ideations, artifacts, and performances. These three categorizes "occur within a complex and dense network of social action, imparting an interrelated and recursive quality that makes it difficult to speak of one without invoking elements of the others" (Johnston, 2009, p. 8). For Johnston (2009), the matrix, as referred to the "complex and dense network of collective actions" (p. 8), encompasses the actors and the beliefs, ideations of the actors, the audiences, and the interactions between the actors and audiences. Therefore, the culture of social protest embraces three aspects: first is the performative aspect such as discussions, speeches, debates and other narrative performances between the actors and the audience; second, artifacts adopted by social protest actors such as music, concert, opera, poetry, and theater; third is the ideational aspect such as beliefs, spirits, cognitions, value, norms, and identities that individual actors bring into the collective and then develop to a shared commonsense inside the collective community.

In summary, social protest shouldn't be easily esteemed as cultural phenomena in an arena of collective action, but also as the consequences of collective efforts. Social protest culture, in correspondence with the background culture, varies across periods and societies. Culture in society is in flux, and this also reflects the culture embedded in the collective actions over protracted periods. As mentioned in the term culture, ideation, artifacts and performances are the three principal concepts. This paper, therefore, adopts Johnston's sense of social protest culture as a dynamic net with collective performances, ideations and artifacts produced by collective actors of a time and a place in the process of mobilizing actions.

### **Discourse and Discourse Analysis**



Regarding the term *discourse*, scholars have varying definitions of the word. Wuthnow (1989) described discourse as “[...]subsuming the written as well as the verbal, the formal as well as the informal, the gestural or ritual as well as the conceptual” (p. 16). For van Dijk (1997), a prominent scholar in the field of critical discourse analysis, discourse is “a form of language use” (p. 1) such as public speeches and debates. In addition, it could also broadly refer to those thoughts, ideas and cognition of “philosopher” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 2). For Johnston (2009), discourse is “[...]the summation of symbolic interchange, of what is being talked and written about, of the interrelations of symbols and their systematic occurrence”(p. 218) based on verbal materials produced by human activities.

When applied to social movement research, discourse means all performances involved in mobilizing actions, for instance, slogans, pickets, posters, flyers, pamphlets, records of live debates and public speeches at gatherings, media interviews and news reports of the insiders at meetings in the process of mobilizing actions. For each movement, individual participants or organizers intentionally create some symbolic and oral practices or declarations to the audience. All these symbolic and oral practices are hence regarded as discourse and become the main objects of research. As Wuthnow (1989) suggested, social movement is a “community of discourse” embedded in a broader and deeper cultural transformation. Discourse, for social movement scholars, doesn’t simply refer to written documents, but also spoken conversations that can be recorded, videotaped and dispersed. Diverse methods could be used in discourse analysis to study texts of collective’s actions.

Discourse analysis now has strong influence in multiple fields of social science, such like psychology, media studies, sociology and policy studies (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000). It is used mainly in linguistics as the study of “language use” and as the study of anything “beyond the

sentence” (Schiffrin, Tannen, & Hamilton, 2001, p. 1). Linguistic scholars put their foci on “specific instances or spates of language” (Schiffrin, Tannen, & Hamilton, 2001, p. 2) of human actions in order to figure out what is the meaning of the sentence and how people translate their sentences to others. For social movement scholars, discourse analysis has been recently adopted as the main cultural approach to social protest activities. They take interest in the intrinsic symbols and ideas within the collective action as “vehicles of the social meanings” (Taylor & Whittier, 2004, p. 182). Several empirical contributions using discourse analysis as a tool permits us a good view to discern the wide range of social movements(Gamson, 1988; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Johnston, 1991; Palmer, 1990).

Johnston (2002) suggested that discourse analysis, especially qualitative discourse analysis, has a specific focus on “movement-related texts to identify patterns, linkages, and structures of ideas”(p. 69). In other words, discourse analysis is the bridge between discourse resources and a broader culture environment. It emphasizes the “economic, political, and institutional features of late modern societies linked to the distinctive character of recent social movements” (Taylor & Whittier, 2004, p. 181).

By using qualitative analysis, this paper will focus on the discourse itself from every piece of selected discourse with three questions to answer: 1) to examine what kind of appeals did protesters ask for? 2) to probe what sort of collective identity did they have? 3) to explore how the culture inside social protest and the ideological background have changed in past thirty years. In other words, instead of giving an elaborate linguistic analysis of the usage of words and sentences of every selected text, this paper intends to figure out the background culture and ideological environment over the past thirty years in Korea.

### **Three Korean Protests**

## **Gwangju Uprising Movement**

The Gwangju Uprising Movement, also known as the May 18 Democratic Uprising, took place in Gwangju in May of 1980. It is normally viewed as the official startup of Korea's democratic transformation from a military regime to a new democratic political system. The process toward democracy was accompanied with blood and death. According to the May 18 Memorial Foundation (2012), 154 killed, 74 missing and 4,141 wounded and placed under arrest during this tragic movement.

Korea's road toward democracy had been stymied for years under President Park Junghee's dictatorship. After the assassination of President Park Junghee in 1979, the enthusiasm of the public toward democracy was awakened once again. Progressive professors and students who were suppressed in the previous regime were active in participating in several pro-democracy activities. This tendency finally led to nationwide movements, requesting political reforms towards the government ranging from freedom of the press to the end of martial law.

The uprising was first triggered by college students on May 18 in defiance of the new military regime's decision to shut down the universities and prohibit political demonstrations. The militaristic regime dispatched a special army unit to quell the protest immediately as soon as student demonstrations went out of control. Despite the crackdown by the special unit, more Gwangju citizens from all social sectors came over and joined the street demonstration.

The repression towards Gwangju citizens finally ended on May 21 after the special army unit withdrew from the city. Immediately soon, a nationwide wave of democracy expanded to every corner of Korean society. What the triumph of Gwangju or the "5.18 spirit" (Lewis, 2002,

p. 169) left us is not just a strong beginning for Korean democratic movement, but more significantly, a catalyst for the people worldwide in pursuit of democracy.

### **96-97 Labor Strike**

On April 24, 1996, President Kim Youngsam presented his “New Thought on Industrial Labor Relations for Leaping into the First Class Nation in the 21st Century” with five main principals: “maximization of public goods, participation and cooperation, balance between autonomy and social obligations, emphasis on education and humanity, and globalization of institutions and consciousness” (Joeng, 2011; Kim, 2000, p. 58). At the same time, a presidential commission to address all labor issues and conduct a complete labor reform in Korea was launched out. However, the commission’s endeavor to lead a new negotiation between the trade union and the management proved to be invalid. On November 10, 1996, the government and the New Korean Party, the ruling party, decided to promote a revision of related laws and it was finally submitted to the National Assembly on December 10. The revised new law gave employers an easier way to lay off workers in case of “administrative emergence”, which was prohibited in the previous labor law. Furthermore, the law also permitted employers to extend working hours and reduce working costs as well as policies on replacing workers on strike. Layoff and workers dispatch system became legislative, thus “effectively reducing the number of permanent employees who had to be given fringe benefits and bonuses”(Alemán, 2010, p. 95). Along with the strict prohibitions against individual worker, the influence of trade union’s role in political matters was bolstered (Alemán, 2010; Lee & Lee, 2007; Watson, 2008) .

Two principal trade unions in Korea, the KFTU and the KCTU, declared their oppositional positions to block the passage of the new law in the National Assembly and threatened a nationwide strike to guard their interests. Despite nationwide pressure from the public and the

Trade Union, at pre-dawn of December 26, 1996, the New Korea Party passed the disputed law in the National Assembly without the attendance of oppositional parties and the chairman of the National Assembly. Shocked by the “antidemocratic political enactment”, the KFTU and the KCTU called upon a general labor strike and it soon spread into a nationwide strike with thousands of workers participants in Seoul, Ulsan and Gwangju (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, 1997; Lee, 1997).

### **Candlelight Protest against U.S. Beef Imports in 2008**

On April 29, 2008, a famous TV program in Korea, “PD Notebook”, aired a special episode, alleging that reopening the Korean market to U.S. beef would expose Koreans to the threat of mad cow disease, and also featured some footage of a sick cow being led to the slaughter. It traced research on mad cow disease by Professor Kim Yong-seon, claiming that Koreans are somehow far susceptible to the human form of mad cow disease compared to Western people. Korean citizens then felt extremely angry and betrayed by the government who was responsible for promoting the U.S. beef import policy.

Immediately after the broadcast ended, massive demonstrations were held on the streets by some middle-school girls. It started as a peaceful demonstration against the import bill and soon became to a gigantic violent demonstration against the government and the newly elected President Lee Myungbak. The protest lasted for more than 100 days, with a nationwide mobilization of millions of people from different social sectors, including middle and high school students, white-collar labors, housewives, blue-collar labors, and Internet users (netizens) with various methods to express their discontents of Lee Myungbak’s administration on several social issues. It is then recorded as the largest spontaneous mass demonstration after Gwangju

Uprising Movement in 1980 (Hong, Lee, Hong, & Choe, 2009; Kim, 2009; Park, 2013; Yoo, 2011; Yun & Chang, 2011) .

### Data Collection and Analysis

In this paper, discourse is qualitatively analyzed from a general scope, pointing to those documentations that dispersed and produced by the organizers and participants but not by the authority. In other words, the audiences of all research objects basically are the public and the participants within the collective actions. For public discourse voiced from the authority, this paper will not adopt as a data resource.

Table 1. Data collection by genre of documents (by May 10 2014)

Documents genre	Audience	Number of Documents		
		Kwangju Democratic Uprising (05.13-05.23)	96-97 Labor Strike (12.26-1.18)	2008 Candlelight Protest (04.29-06.10)
Public declarations	The public	6	2	2
News reports	The public	1 <sup>a</sup>	71 <sup>b</sup>	70 <sup>c</sup> 12 <sup>d</sup>
Appeals	The authority	2	2	5
News letters, pamphlets	The public	2	23	8
Pleas	The public	18	3	1
Resolutions	The public	7	3	
Others (poems, songs, etc)	The public	1	1	8
Total		37	105	104

<sup>a</sup> *Chosun Ilbo*, keyword: *Gwangju*

<sup>b</sup> *Chosun Ilbo*, keyword: *Paeob*

<sup>c</sup> *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, keyword: *Chosbul Hyeonjang*

<sup>d</sup> *Chosun Ilbo*, keyword: *Chosbul Hyeonjang*

Table 1 sums up the numbers of variable genres of documents analyzed in this paper. For each selected case, I collected texts, speeches, publications generated in numerous communicative and open circumstances such as meetings, rallies and other public gatherings. I traced some media data from *Chosun Ilbo* and *Hankyoreh Shinmun* as well as Internet users'

broadcasting such as media interviews and live news reports. I analyzed all accessible documents, offline and online recourses I could collect. Three case selections may not be perfectly illustrative to explain the development and changes of social protest culture in thirty years, but it should at least provide a broad and general historical explanation.

Some of the documents come from trade unions and some from news agencies such as *Chosun Ilbo* and *Hankyoreh Shinmun* to keep a media balance. For each movement, I installed time limitations to narrow down and specialize every piece of concrete data. For the Gwangju Democratic Uprising, I only collected all significant protesting discourses from May 13 to May 23, 1980. In the case of the 96-97 labor strike, data from December 26, 1996 to January 18, 1997 were well gathered. At last, for the case of the candlelight protest in 2008, discourses between April 29 and June 10, 2008 are admitted as useful data in this paper. All data were then discreetly coded by using the hyper research computer program, which is widely used as an outstanding means to discern verbal discourses.

The analytical procedure of this paper involves comprehending and coding texts into detailed statements with keywords, and analyzing every piece of collected data to explore the discourse protest participants selected to shape their collective identity and its cultural background of that period. From this procedure, texts were analyzed with the every single word, not the grammar, as the unit of analysis.

### **Gwangju Democratic Uprising**

For the Gwangju Democratic Uprising, the beginning of the Korean democratic movement, this paper sees a great deal of remarkably violent performances in the selected texts. Of all 37 texts I collected, records about violent and bloody clashes are predominant. The power and anguish, as well as despair, are accurately expressed in these collected discourses. The fight

against the military authoritarian system is not only perceived as the fight for the pursuit of democracy, but also as a patriotic war to protect the nation. Several pieces of representative quotes taking the public as the audience could demonstrate this.

Text 1: The final fight has come!

<Situation report>

- 500 dead, 3,000 injured, 3,000 arrested
- The fire has been lit.
- Uprising in Seoul, Deagu, Masan, Jeonju, Gunsan, I-ri, Mokpo.
- Policemen in Jeonju and I-ri joined the uprising!
- Student army successfully captured weapons from Sangmudae

<Codes of conduct>

- Make weapons!  
(dynamites, firebombs, bombs, fire arrows, fire cans, all oils)
- Burn all government offices!
- Obtain cars!
- Capture commandos' weapons!

Ah! Brothers! Let's fight to die! The final fight comes!

*Note: Public plea made by the Pan-national Struggle Committee for Democracy and the Committee of Student Revolution on May 20, 1980*

Text 2: Country of Democracy

Till the day when pepper fog stops  
Till the day when tear gas disperses  
The people of Mujinbeol get together.  
What if someone is an intellectual?  
What if someone is a worker?  
What if someone is a peasant?  
We are all democratic citizens.

*Note: Text collected from The Country of Democracy poetized by the Assembly of Nationalism and Democratization in Jeollanam-do on May 16, 1980.*



Second, based on all 37 texts, this paper discerned a dynamic transmission of collective actions from the university campus to the open street organized mainly by college students with strong collective spirits that constitute the opposition against the authority. Campus gatherings, street demonstrations and then public meetings were the primary protesting performances for protesters. Some weapons for struggles were mentioned in most pleas, declarations and resolutions. At the beginning, the protest showed nothing more than a characteristic of a noble fight to protect human dignity against the state. In the second stage, it fully showed people's ability to create a community based on human morality. In the third phase, it showed the need to end the military authoritarian regime by demonstrating the military's savage violence to the world. The principal incentive of the massive demonstration is the pursuit for democracy, freedom, and other human rights as a brighter future, as seen in Text 3. Protest participants finally and successfully shook down the military regime's anti-democratic legitimacy and showed how universal demands of freedom, justice and democracy could be actualized through the power of people.

Text 3: Why did we come out for the street demonstration?

All my fellow citizens! We are all aware of these facts! How can we just keep still and say nothing about that? Messages from our campus demonstrations haven't been transmitted to all fellow citizens.

Rather, it was expressed as violence and disturbances. The situation now is beyond our forbearance!

*Note:* Text collected from *Why did we come out for the street demonstrations?* declared by the Student Council of Yonsei University on May 15, 1980.

To sum up, as a response to the long-lasting regime's repression, the culture of protest in the Gwangju Uprising Movement was substantially severe with clear and direct targets. Therefore, the protest culture in that period is considerably way violent and connected strongly with the universal demand for basic human rights such as democracy and freedom. It epitomized the pro-democracy ideology in the April Revolution of 1960 and other intense movements in

Korean history. Slogans evolved in the process are nothing but symbols asking for democracy and freedom for human beings. When viewed in the ideological context of Korea in that period, it best highlighted the point of achieving democracy as the most significant task for contemporary Korean society.

### **96-97 Labor Strike**

For the 96-97 labor strike, or the labor protest, the passage of the labor law and institutional reform were the two principal arguments. Slogans such as “Down with Kim Youngsam!” and “Disband the New Korea Party!” were shouted repeatedly by the participants as they marched down the streets of Myeongdong. The KCTU and the KFCU initiated the all-out stoppages nationwide and sent out over 528 trade unions into the streets in all three rounds of strikes. Despite several trade unions leaders being arrested by the police, no serious violence was reported by the media, according to the collected 105 texts. Several findings through careful examinations are revealed below.

First, less violent protest performances were found out in all 105 texts. Performances appeared in the movement were not as violent as those in Gwangju Uprising Movement. Peaceful and regular protest performances such as sit-ins, signing campaign, hunger strike, and head-shaving performances were mostly adopted by participants, as seen in Text 4.

Text 4:

Head-shaving protests have expanded to all comrades nationwide. On May 18, more than 2,000 our comrades shaved their heads in their business places. On the same day, all 41 members of the Labor Union in the Mihwa Concrete Ltd. (affiliated to the Federation of Korean Chemical Worker’s Union) shaved their heads and expanded the protest to general workers. [...] Such national head-shaving protests are a strong incentive for our labor strike as it successfully expressed our solidarity spirit to continue our struggle to the end!

*Note:* Text collected from *The White Book of Labor Strike* written by KFTU (Federation of Korean Trade Unions, 1998) .

Second, the fight to protest their class interest and fulfill the democratic procedure called upon all workers to collective actions. In Text 5, the term *woori* here not only refers to the working class who were drastically suppressed by the passage of labor law. Rather, the labor strike attempted to extend their influence to bystanders to understand what is happening and encouraged them to join the rally in the name of “protecting democracy”. The demand for repealing the law didn’t satisfy the unions and all protesters. Large waves of protest participation involving citizens from all social classes to protect “true democracy” were their attempt to constitute the collective identity, as shown in Text 5.

Text 5:

Can you hear? The voice of “Immoral labor law is invalid! Dismiss the New Korea Party! Resign Kim Yongsam!” against the Kim Youngsam coup d’état that annihilated the parliamentary democracy and trampled the constitution. The message has arrived to professors, attorneys, clergies and all citizens. We once again urge the government and the ruling party a formal apology to all citizens for ramming the passage of the labor law and invalidate the immoral labor law and the NSPA law!

*Note:* Text collected from a resolution published by KCTU on December 29, 1996.

Text 6: Down the road we must go

Where is the road we must go?  
All the comrades who traveled from afar!  
Chant your shouting together with anger!  
The sadness of all workers!  
The tyranny of all non-workers!  
Towards the shadowy sky  
The answer becomes an echo!  
All angry fellows! Stand up!  
Let’s walk forward without ceaselessness  
If we could get rid of the heavy road  
The high sky, shiny sun, and vast boulevard,  
Promises have been made.  
Let’s run and chant loudly again.  
The master of history

All working people! All laborers!

*Note:* Text collected from newsletter edited by KFTU on December 30, 1996.

In addition, as Text 6 displayed, the 96-97 strike in modern Korean society forebodes that the working class has awakened to their true political role and their actual identity as an indispensable element in the society. As many scholars discussed earlier (Jung & Kim, 2009; Koo, 2007; Kweon, 2008), the working class has been relatively marginalized for long during the historical transition in 1980s. However, during the 96-97 strike, we can see the working class started to become completely conscious of themselves as the essential agent and “master” of Korean history and society. Through the labor strike, Korean working class reunited themselves and revealed their strength to the outside.

To sum up, the 96-97 labor strike produced a new labor culture into the society context. Of particular importance is the strike marked a great political and ideological awakening of the working class in Korean society. All of the repertoires evolved in the 96-97 strike were generally peaceful. No inflammatory or bloody protesting reports appeared in the media. In addition, a great range of protesting performances were adopted in the strike such as shaving-heads and signature campaigns. When we review the history of democratization in the 1980s, the working class used to be vulnerable and commonly neglected in Korean society. What the 96-97 strike showed us, nevertheless, was the appeal of protecting democracy and the positive participation in political matters voiced by the working class. This is therefore the most remarkable achievement of the nationwide labor strike.

### **Candlelight Protest against the Import of U.S. Beef**

The candlelight protest against the import of U.S. beef, or the 2008 candlelight protest triggered by the unequal import agreement of U.S. beef to Korea, made a series of historical

records in the history of Korean social protest. As one of the most recent collective actions, the 2008 candlelight protest provides us a good opportunity to see a variety of cultural elements.

First, protest participants shouted slogans like “All candles together, till our goals achieved!” and “Lee Myungbak out!” After carefully examining all 104 texts, several symbolic characters were found out during the nationwide protest wave, for example, the creation of “candlelight girl”.

Text 7: Bobobo Song of Candlelight Girl

When daddy goes to work, oil price  
When mommy goes to the market, mad cow  
When we go to school, zero-hour class  
We only have four hours of sleep everyday  
We are democratic citizens. Candlelight girls.  
We dislike mad cow, privatization, and the Grand Canal!

*Note:* data collected from an online chatting forum *Chosko* (Chosbul Nanum, 2008).

The character of the “candlelight girls” refers to those school girls who initiated the wave of candlelight protests in Korea by using smart phones and the Internet without any apparent organization leaders. In Text 7, we can find that teenagers are self-aware of being a “democratic citizen”. The selection of this term helps the construction of a collective identity and resonates with the bystanders to understand their actions in the process of mobilizing activism. The term “democratic citizen” followed tradition in previous social movements, for instance, the Gwangju Uprising Movement. Moreover, issues listed in this text are not simply limited to mad cow issue. As displayed in Text 8, the catalyst for the following protest activities was the signing of the agreement of importing U.S. beef to Korea. Protesters were frustrated by both the government’s neglect of the voice of the people and its lack of protection to the Korean people from suspect U.S. imports. Beyond that, more public issues related to every single member of society are also mentioned in the text.

Text 8:

Agreement invalid! Withdraw the negotiation! Re-negotiation is the only solution! The president and the government stop making the crisis! Listen to the voice of the people!

Completely dismiss the import of the U.S. beef bill that 90% citizens oppose! Put forward the re-negotiation! Withdraw the education policy that suffocates students' human rights! Immediately stop the "zero-hour class plan" and the "additional self-study after school plan"!

Stop the pernicious Grand Canal Program that threatens our lives and the environment!

Stop the Cheaboh-centred economic policy that polarizes our society!

President Lee Myungbak, admit your incompetence and your responsibility for maladministration!

Apologize to all of the people!

We once again desperately hope the President, the Blue House, and the government to keep humble and give courage to the people!

Note: Text collected from the official plea announced by the People's Conference against Mad Cow Disease on May 15, 2008.

Second, in comparison to previous protests, one salient point of opposite activities in all 104 texts is the emergence of a new protesting means<sup>2</sup>. For example, the popularity of Internet-based protesting activities (café, or *tolonbang* in Korean) and one-man protests assisted in the creation of a massive mobilization. Yoo (2011) named the online sphere as "the candlelight girls' playground". This new improvement widens the scope of participation and encourages more citizens to walk out to join the rallies. One clear example is the portal forum, which has multiple activities staged without any concrete leaders such as the international petitioning and advertising campaign as seen in Text 9. The emergence of online protest or cyber activism, using online chat room or online forum as the principal basin in political and social matters, creates a new fashion of social protest culture. Such unconventional protests with diverse performances such as online grassroots journalism and online signature campaign, and online artifacts such as online posters and slogans conveyed new cultural messages to society, and more importantly, to the authority.

Text 9:

For those people who couldn't join the offline protest, hundreds of thousands of candlelights were lit online. [...] At the same time, a candlelight distribution campaign was also held online. The website sealtale (sealtale.com), conducted by several college students for venture businesses, organized the "online candlelight festival". The service designed emoticons, and as the number of distributors could also be displayed in real time. [...] Just like the hacked official website of the Grand National Party some online activists worked on positive lines as well, except the part of the "wear the candlelight" campaign. At the "Anti-Lee Myungbak" online café, a spontaneous movement was planned in order to provide the information of candlelight cultural festival and the video tape of Korean police agency's suppression against offline protesters to the well-known Oprah Winfrey Show. Online protesters attempted to connect to the bulletin board of the Oprah Winfrey Show, leaving a video message to express that "Koreans are worried about the import of U.S. beef".

Note: Text collected from *Active "Online Protests" as New Candlelights*, Hankyoreh Shinmun, June 2, 2008.

In conclusion, in the case of the 2008 candlelight protest, performances are more variable and plentiful, group or individual, than ever before. Participants, teenagers as well as housewives, showed their solidarity in the pursuit of "direct democracy". Political participation expanded to all social members no matter the background or experience. Beyond the U.S. beef importing agreement, numerous public topics were proposed by protest participants. These characteristics fairly conform to the post-materialistic culture transformation in Korea, which is more concerned about the quality of life, the environment system, the true value of democracy, and human rights over the limited focus on economic growth and security.

## **Conclusions**

Scholars have pursued issues regarding the role of culture in the deployment process of social protest for many years. Making sense of the historical dynamics of protest culture is necessary for studying social protests and movements in Korea as it reflects not only the changes of background culture, but also the historical development of the protest itself.

By using discourse analysis based on elaborate examinations on selected texts, newspaper articles, pamphlets, songs, and other verbal materials, this paper has attempted to follow up the

historical developments of protest culture by analyzing three representative cases in Korea: the Gwangju democratic uprising, the 96-97 labor strike protest, and the 2008 candlelight protest.

For the performative aspect of culture, this paper finds an apparent transformation from a wide range of violent activities to a volume of peaceful appeals. This development best illustrates the successful implanting of democratic consciousness in Korean society over the past three decades. Violent discourses were prioritized as the main means to declare their opinions and attitudes: weapon, pepper fog, tea gas and so forth. As long as political participation becoming more accessible, effective access to the political system have been found out, for example, civil organizations and petitioning system. As in the new era, protest adopted more peaceful and imperturbable performances such as one-man protests and silent protests. One reason for this change can be attributed to great economic achievements, which also bolstered the democratic consciousness and knowledge of all citizens in Korea.

Regarding to the ideological aspect, this paper confirmed a massive transition of value and belief orientations stored in participants of collective actions. It jumped from a demand for “democracy” over “true democracy” and ended at a plea for “direct democracy”. At the same time, the term “democratic citizens” greatly helps constituting the collective identity in the past three decades.

The 1980 Gwang Uprising movement featured an irresistible desire for the achievement of democracy. Protest participants shared the cognitive knowledge for democracy as “democratic citizens”. Similarly, in the case of the 96-97 strike, the ideological background is the pursuit of “true democracy” demanding political elites’ endeavor to work out those unsettled issues during the past democratic wave. The impact of the democratic wave in Korea was very vast and drastic, but several social conflicts were not well taken care of. Therefore, the strike movement is in



some way deployed as a request from those of the neglected class asking for the fulfillment of “true democracy”.

Third, the striking candlelight protest displayed a new direction of culture ideology. Demand for publicity and participation is then becoming the central theme of most new social protests in Korea, as an entire new phase and a strikingly big step forward for Korean society. This transformation, in correspondence with the cultural change from materialism to post-materialism, invokes people’s value change from economic achievement and homeland security to public issues such as the environment and public health.

Last but not least, South Korea is a dynamic society with tight ties between multiple social sectors. We don’t know how far and how good the wave of social protest will carry us in the future. However, at least one thing is very certain to us: social protest culture, a vital part of the entire background culture is changeable along with the society as well as with ideological changes. More new performances will be invented as protests proceed along with the new creation of a social protest culture under the broad culture environment in Korean society.

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### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> Data collected by May 10 2014. More will be carefully supplemented and examined sooner after the conference.

<sup>2</sup> In fact, the performance of candlelight vigil or candlelight protest itself is a newly creative protesting means since its first appearance in the Shim Mi-son and Shin Hyo-sun incident in 2002. Nationwide mourning vigils ensued immediately after the incident stirred up and it finally became one of the dominant protesting performance in most nationwide incidents. For instance, in the recent Sewol-ho ferry incident, this method is also used to express people's grieves, remembrances and mourning towards victims.

## The Course of Korean Historiography in Northeast Asia

In broadest terms of Korean historiography, two principal narratives exist describing the development of the Korean peoples from earliest times. One may be labeled the 'orthodox' narrative, the other the 'northern/Altaic'. The orthodox narrative was dominant throughout the premodern historical era whilst the northern/Altaic has come to the fore in modern times. The orthodox tradition was based on early Classical Chinese histories and largely molded by their same Sinocentric worldview; however, whilst it certainly placed emphasis on the peninsula's heritage of Classical Chinese learning, it was also inclusive of non-Sinic elements that would later constitute the northern/Altaic narrative. By contrast the latter has defined itself in reaction to the orthodox and is fundamentally revisionist in nature.

The northern/Altaic makes use of many of the same core texts as the orthodox but has been both augmented and at times challenged by the modern fields of archaeology, comparative linguistics and folkloristics. In the modern era the only additional source text to come to light has been the Gwanggaeto Stele, but the northern/Altaic will also reference well known texts widely regarded as C.20th invention.

The key differences between the two narratives lie in their description of the ancient period prior to the Three Kingdoms, in particular the notion of Old Joseon (hereafter OJ). These include: the recognition and treatment of the Dan'gun progenitor myth and Gi Ja legend; ethnic identifications of the Yan (燕) state, and usurper Wi Man; and locations of the OJ capital of Wanggeom-seong (王儉城), the Paesu river (溟水), the Liao river (遼河, and by extension Liaodong itself), the great walls of Yan, Qin and Han, and the Han Commanderies.<sup>1</sup> Another crucial matter of differentiation between the narratives is how, if at all, they explain geographic and ethnic continuity from OJ to Buyeo and the emergence of the Three Kingdoms.

The peninsula focused orthodox narrative holds some attraction in its simplicity: it locates OJ in

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<sup>1</sup> Owing to space limitations this paper omits discussion of the walls.

the region of modern North Korea with Wanggeom-seong in the position of modern Pyeongyang. It follows a lineal chronology beginning with the mythical Dan'gun abdicating in favour of a Chinese Gi Ja who arrives from the state of Yin/Shang (殷/商), introducing Chinese learning; his descendent Gi Jun is then forced from power by Wi Man, also regarded as Chinese, leading refugees from Yan. This precipitates Gi Jun's emigration south to Mahan thus bringing the lineage of Chinese learning to the southern half of the Korean peninsula from whence it diffuses to Jinhan, precursor to the eventual victor of the Three Kingdoms, Silla. Meanwhile in the north Wi Man Joseon is overthrown by the Chinese Han dynasty which establishes the so-called Four Han Commanderies, one of which, Lelang (Kor. Nangnang), located at the capital site of Pyeongyang, significantly outlives the Chinese Han dynasty itself being eventually defeated by Goguryeo only in 313CE. Periphery within the orthodox narrative are the Buyeo states to the north which provide the places of birth for the founders of Goguryeo and Baekje, implying by extension the less enlightened nature of Goguryeo and Baekje's origins compared to Silla.

The essentials of this narrative had been fully formulated by the mid to late Goryeo dynasty and the earliest surviving "dynasty-transcending" (Karlsson 2009) archetype is Yi Seunghyu's *Jewang-un'gi* (帝王韻紀 1287).

Contemporary to the *Samguk-yusa*, *Jewang-un'gi* is today celebrated by proponents of the northern/Altaic narrative for containing the only other early rendition of the Dan'gun myth as well as inclusion of Balhae; often forgotten is that this only occurs after the first half of the work has just as fully recounted Chinese history. Its treatment of the Korean Three Kingdoms period is also notable for completely ignoring Goguryeo and Baekje heroes such as Eulji Mundeok and Gyebaek and naming only the alleged villains of Yeon Gaesomun and decadent Baekje king Wija. Thus Goryeo's civilization is exclusively derived from Silla whose tradition provides the hero Kim Yusin, Confucian literati Choe Chiwon, and Buddhist masters Wonhyo and Uisang, whilst the invention of the *idu* script is also attributed to Silla calligrapher Seol Chong. That *idu*, as a vehicle for the vernacular, is included alongside the celebrated master of Chinese learning, Choe

Chiwon, demonstrates well the balance between Sinic and indigenous traditions supported by the orthodox narrative. The explicit Silla bias is, though an equally entrenched characteristic; it is therefore interesting that the Dan'gun myth associated with locations in former Goguryeo territory was so successfully adopted.

During the Joseon dynasty, under the zenith of Neo-Confucian zeal and dogma, the mainstream orthodox narrative saw a narrowing in scope with the removal of Balhae, downplaying of Buddhist tradition, and exaltation of Gi Ja over Dan'gun.<sup>2</sup> Despite this, one significant addition to appear in the narrative, was the story of Dan'gun sending his son, Buru (扶婁), to participate in the Xia king Yu's (夏禹) gathering of vassals at To-san mountain (塗山).<sup>3</sup> This legend traces back to at least the mid C15th as it is found in both Gwon Ram's *Eungjesi-ju* (應製詩註) as well as the geography treaty of the *Sejong-sillok* (世宗實錄).<sup>4</sup> The relationship between this Buru, and the Hae Buru (解夫婁) who appears as founder of East Buyeo as early as the *Samguk-sagi*, is somewhat unclear; Yu Deukgong's *Isip'ildo-hoegosi* (二十一都懷古詩 1792) quotes the *Dongguk-Munheonbigyo* (東國文獻備考 1770) as conflating them.<sup>5</sup>

By the mid C17th, certain scholars were already contributing to an emergent trend reasserting the import of Dan'gun as ethnic progenitor *alongside* Gi Ja, bringer of civilization. Early examples include Heo Mok's *Dongsa* (東事 1667) and Hong Manjong's *Dongguk-yeokdae-chongmok* (東國歷代總目 1705).

This rebalancing would culminate in unofficial works by various late 18th century Silhak scholars; Yi Jonghui's *Dongsa* (東史 1803) and additional writings, for example, emphasized a northern lineage of orthodoxy and distinguished between the Buyeo-Goguryeo-Balhae populations as

<sup>2</sup> These aspects of course trace back to at least as early as the *Samguk-sagi* but no "dynasty-transcending" surveys survive earlier than *Jewang-un'gi*.

<sup>3</sup> This is the original passage: 夏禹十八年，會諸侯於塗山，檀君遣子扶婁，朝焉。

<sup>4</sup> See Yi 2004:25n13.

<sup>5</sup> See Yu 2009:187n154 檀君之子解扶婁，爲夫餘始祖。 In the Goguryeo section of the *Samguk-yusa*, Ilyeon quotes the *Dan'gun-gi* (檀君記) claiming them to have been the same personage, however the main Dan'gun section makes no reference to Buru.

both direct descendants of Dan'gun *and* inheritors of Gi Ja's enlightenment, and the Silla people who maintained their own native customs and were, supposedly as a result, left more susceptible to the harmful excesses of Daoist and Buddhist esotericism. Another important nuance was in asserting the full autonomy of Gi Ja vis-à-vis contemporary Zhou China, an interpretation which first appears in Yi Yi's *Gija-silgi* (箕子實記 1580).<sup>6</sup>

Through vigorous parsing of the orthodox sources these scholars produced detailed studies and historical geographies often with the focus on what they regarded as a neglected northern identity; ultimately, however, no radical revisionism occurred and their enquiries remained grounded in the tradition of the orthodox narrative which melded indigenous Korean identity with both reverence for and claims over ancient Chinese learning.

Taking this northern focus as a starting point, the modern northern/Altaic narrative was created almost singlehandedly by Sin Chaeho (1880–1936), and is defined by both a shift westwards and major territorial expansion of the ancient Joseon domain. Aside from the geographical relocations of Joseon, the key characteristics of Sin's methodology and narrative were: not trusting the Chinese histories at face value and calling into question their objectivity; explicit criticism of Sima Qian and especially Kim Busik; elevation of Dan'gun, negation of Gi Ja's significance; downplaying of the Han Commanderies and finally, active rediscovery and emphasis of a non-Chinese heritage realised through deciphering lost meanings in *idu* script, historicizing mythology and placing it within the broader framework of the Altaic language hypothesis. All these represent a radical departure from the orthodox narrative and remain primary features of present day popular Korean historiography, all the way from nationalist writing and school textbooks to more dubious revisionism and largely even North Korean historiography (even if Sin himself is criticized). Only on the nationalist end of the spectrum has Sin's more virulent criticism of the *Samguk-sagi* been tempered.

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<sup>6</sup> See Yi 2004:30n51.



Weaknesses in this modern methodology are that, firstly, questioning the reliability of the Chinese histories yet relying on them for any evidence at all can quickly lead to a pick-and-mix approach, a chief fallacy of much of the revisionist pseudo history writing today. The diminution of Gi Ja and de-emphasis of the Han Commanderies, meanwhile, breaks the narrative continuity from ancient Joseon to the Three Kingdoms; this same negation of Gi Ja, however, at once automatically augments the significance of the commanderies as the sole means through which Chinese learning could have been transmitted to the peninsula, and so the premodern nativist claim to Chinese heritage is replaced by tacit acknowledgement of cultural subordination with overtones to colonial analogy. The more Dan'gun Joseon is exaggerated, the less explanation there is for why it disappeared without a trace and simultaneously it becomes more difficult to claim exclusive Korean heritage over such an expansive continental territory. Finally, invocation of the Altaic hypothesis and an untrained approach to comparative linguistics does not so much undermine the narrative itself, because 'linguistic evidence' is usually supportive rather than primary, but it does discredit the methodology and overall scholarship.

In Sin's narrative, Dan'gun Joseon splits into the Three Joseon (三朝鮮) sometime contemporaneous to the Warring States period. Sin identifies two traditions of *idu* renderings for the three states, *Jin* 眞, *Mak* 莫 and *Beon* 番 (alternatively 發 Bal), and *Jin* 辰, *Ma* 馬 and *Byeon* 弁; the latter set was also written with the suffix *han* 韓 as an *idu* term for the countries and which had originally been a term for the rulers themselves, and later would become adopted as the ethnonym for the Korean people. Hence the Three Joseon anticipate the names of the later Samhan polities that are subsequently established on the peninsula.

With the rise of the Qin, Yan and Xiongnu powers, the Three Joseon are pushed eastwards; this is the *idong-seol* migration theory (移動說) which still constitutes a central facet of the northern/Altaic narrative. The Yan expansion into Liaodong sees the disintegration of Sin Joseon at which time the Paesu river comes to form the border between Bul Joseon and Yan; Sin

identifies the Paesu as the Heon'uran (靉芋瀾) river which would appear to refer to the modern Luan River.

<b>Dan'gun Joseon (檀君朝鮮)</b>			
Capitals and modern locations:	Aseura/Asadal = modern Harbin	modern Pyeongyang	Ansi (安市) modern Yingchengzi (英城子) west of Shenyang
<b>Three Joseon (三朝鮮)</b>			
	Sin Joseon (眞 / 辰韓)	Bul Joseon (番/發 / 弁韓)	Mal Joseon (莫 / 馬韓)
<b>Yeolguk 'Multiple States' Period (列國時代)</b>			
<b>Three Buyeo (三扶餘)</b>		<u>Goguryeo</u>	<u>Nangnangguk</u>
North Buyeo (北夫餘). Capital at Asadal (Harbin)	East Buyeo (東夫餘)		<u>Samhan</u>
		South Buyeo (南夫餘)	
		<b>Four Han Commanderies</b> Former Bul Joseon	
<b>Three Kingdoms</b>			

Sin tolerates the existence of Gi Ja but discounts the substance of the legend allowing only that descendants of Gi Ja eventually emerged as rulers of Bul Joseon in time for Wi Man's usurpation. Concerning Gi Ja's introduction of the *Hongbeom-guju* (洪範九疇) which in the orthodox narrative represent articles of Chinese civilization, Sin describes that this was originally derived from the teachings of the ancient Korean belief system he terms \**Sudu-gyo* (<神檀) which had been transmitted by Buru of Dan'gun Joseon to king Yu of Xia when they met on To-san mountain. It is thus only a *reintroduction* of ancient Joseon learning though no explanation is given for how it had been forgotten in the Joseon homeland in the meantime.

Sin adapts the orthodox narrative account of Wi Man arriving from Yan and displacing Gi Jun, the revision being the *wanggeom-seong* capital Wi Man takes control of is that of Bul Joseon, outside of the Korean peninsula.

Owing then to the eastward shift, Mal Joseon has meanwhile been pushed downwards into the southern half of the Korean peninsula and it is to here that Gi Jun arrives and briefly usurps the kingdom before – according to Sin *ad hoc* – he is overthrown by a local Mahan coalition,

<sup>7</sup> As recorded in *Guanzi* (管子).

representing an ignominious end to the flawed Bul-Joseon lineage. Mal-Joseon, rebranded Mahan, thus emerges as the survivor of the Three Joseon and subsequently establishes Byeonhan (弁韓) and Jinhan (辰韓) domains in the southeast of the peninsula for the influx of refugees coming from their former continental namesakes. Thus even as the greater territory is lost, ethnic continuity is maintained alongside the transposition of the former Three Joseon names to the Samhan of the peninsula; whilst easy to dismiss as creative speculation, this remapping is central to Sin's narrative.

A major innovation of the narrative is to thoroughly distinguish the indigenous Nangnanguk (樂浪國) of Pyeongyang from the Lelang-jun (樂浪郡) commandery which Sin locates together with the other three Han commanderies all within the confines of Liaodong arguing that their names reflect only failed campaign objectives further east.

In contrast to the orthodox narrative that Hyeondo-gun was briefly established in the region of Okjeo before being removed to Imdun-gun, Sin simply has it that this never occurred. The Nangnang entity referred to in the *Samguk-sagi*, replete with a king, is the indigenous Nangnang but this, he claims, was mistakenly equated by premodern Confucian scholars with the Lelang-jun commandery. He discounts the Chinese Han artifacts then being unearthed by colonial Japanese archaeologists in Pyeongyang as articles that had arrived through trade or pillage.

	Orthodox positioning			Sin Chaeho
	According to <i>Jewang-un'gi</i> (1287)	According to Yu Deukgong's <i>Sagun-ji</i> (四郡志 c.1806) <sup>8</sup>		
Four Han Commanderies established 108BCE		Location:	Former local polity:	Failed campaign objectives:
<b>Zhenpan-jun</b> (真番郡)	South	Sap-hyeon (雪縣), north of the Yalu river.	Guryeo (句麗)	Goguryeo
<b>Xuantu-jun</b> (玄菟郡)	West	Okjeo -hyeon (沃沮縣), modern Hamheung-bu	Okjeo (沃沮)	Northeast Buyeo
<b>Lintun-jun</b> (臨屯郡)	North	Dong'i-hyeon (東曉縣), modern Gangneung-bu	Ye (濊)	southern East Buyeo
<b>Lelang-jun</b> (樂浪郡)	East	Joseon-hyeon (朝鮮縣), modern Pyeongyang	Joseon (朝鮮)	Nangnanguk

<sup>8</sup> Jeong 1998:265.

He also similarly explains the earlier Changhae-gun (滄{蒼}海郡 *Canghai-jun*) commandery as indicating falsified Han Chinese historiography which sought to hide a failed campaign to invade Southern East Buyeo that had resulted in a nine year war with Goguryeo 134–126BCE.

Another departure from the orthodox narrative Sin takes is in dating the establishment of Goguryeo some 110 years earlier, historicizing Jumong and making him a contemporary of Wi Man. Evidence for the earlier date of Goguryeo is taken from the Gwanggaeto Stele which describes Gwanggaeto as the 17th ruler and not 13th as given in the *Samguk-sagi*.

Finally, concerning identification of the Paesu river, Sin hypothesizes that Nangnang, Pyeongyang and Paesu are all various *idu* renderings of the word *\*pyeora* (피라) which could refer both to a capital and its river; he reasons that there were two Paesu rivers, the Heon'uran Paesu and the Daedong-gang Paesu which were again conflated by premodern Confucian scholars.

Through expanding the original territory of ancient Joseon, the dual benefit of the northern/Altaic narrative as first propounded by Sin, is in being able to both exaggerate the greatness of Joseon whilst undermining continental China's historical influence over the Korean peninsula. This effectively turns the tables on assertions by both colonial era Japanese scholars and present day Chinese government historians, that the Korean peninsula had been subjugated by China in ancient times.

Whilst his specific model of the Three Joseon has been quietly discarded, in the post war era until today the core tenets of Sin's northern/Altaic narrative have come to form the basis of mainstream Korean historiography, in particular enjoying renewed prominence amongst the Jaeya (在野) historians of the 1970s and '80s who today occupy posts in many regional universities and are active writers of popular history.<sup>9</sup>

Two main variants of the narrative now coexist: one incorporates OJ as the centre of a pan-Altaic confederacy, the other as a once mighty empire of which the Korean people are the

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<sup>9</sup> Song 2004:141

primary descendants; both variants continue to present OJ as an expansive continental polity that had its own indigenous culture rivaling ancient China but represent competing concerns of Altaic solidarity and Korean ethnic nationalism.

A proponent of pan-Altaicism today is popular pseudo history writer Kim Unhoe. In his recent work, *The Old Joseon We Have Learnt About is Fake* (우리가 배운 고조선은 가짜다), Kim essentially presents a 'splitist' theory, that OJ subsequently divided into two main lineages, one forming the continental Xianbei and the other Goguryeo-Balhae:

"Old Joseon existed from the legendary period of China, it was maintained in the form of such states as the Five *ba* Hegemons (春秋五霸) of the 7th century BCE Spring and Autumn period and the Seven *xiong* of the Warring States period (戰國七雄). From around the 4th century BCE it became more of an independent ancient state and competed with the Yan; from the end of the 3rd century BCE its borders faced the Qin (秦) dynasty [but] it maintained peace. In the 2nd century BCE, it thrived between the rivalry of the Xiongnu and Han dynasty; after its collapse, it was [both] succeeded and continuously revived by Goguryeo and Silla in the south and Xianbei Wuhuan (鮮卑烏桓) in the north. After the 4th century Murong clan [rulers], the descendants of Old Joseon showed a serious trait of ruling China and they began to move southwards into the Chinese continent. Subsequently the vast majority of non-Han Chinese dynasties were established by these people. However, in the process of ruling over China, they lost their unique cultural traits (固有性) of Old Joseon. These traits were largely maintained by Goguryeo, the Khitan [Liao], the [Jurchen] Jin, Goryeo and the [Manchu] Qing."<sup>10</sup>

Kim locates OJ's core territory as spanning between Beijing and the Liao river. He suggests the Paesu as being either the modern Luan (灤{灤}河) or Daling (大凌河) rivers but elsewhere conjectures that the Yeolsu river (列水), associated with the location of Wanggeom-seong, may also have been the Luan.<sup>11</sup>

Kim rejects any association between Dan'gun and OJ instead inadvertently adopting the colonial Japanese line of argument that Dan'gun was a later 13th century invention; he suggests Dan'gun was a shamanic deity local to modern Pyeongyang but indicative of a wider Siberian Tungusic

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<sup>10</sup> Kim 2012:152

<sup>11</sup> Kim 2012:206 and 89

influence centered around bear totemism towards which the Korean population was naturally predisposed on account of their ancient bronze age Tungusic ancestry.<sup>12</sup>

Concerning Gi Ja and Wi Man, Kim argues that the states of Yin (殷) and Yan (燕) were both ethnically Dong'i (東夷), and not Han Chinese. He acknowledges whilst there is some archaeological evidence of a Gi-hu (箕侯) lordship associated with a Giguk (箕國) state which may have been a predecessor to, or absorbed by OJ, there is no evidence for a Chinese Gi Ja and this Dong'i Giguk itself was located in a similar region as OJ and so never reached the Korean peninsula. Yan, meanwhile, was Dong'i but a rival state competing with OJ. Wi Man is treated as historical but his Chinese surname is dropped. If (Wi) Man came from Yan, he was thus still of Dong'i ancestry and not Chinese, but Kim further reasons that he was, in any event, likely of OJ origin given: the ready trust (Gi) Jun places in him, that he maintains Joseon following the usurpation without any major changes and that Joseon under Man has better relations with the Xiongnu than Han China, albeit the last is an argument for Man not being Chinese rather than not coming from Dong'i Yan!

No mention is given of (Gi) Jun's fate and so any connection to the usurpation of Mahan on the Korean peninsula remains unacknowledged. Kim's narrative of OJ finishes with its 108BCE overthrow and he does not discuss the Han Commanderies though clearly, according to his scheme, they would have been located in the former OJ territory and have had little to no influence over the Korean peninsula; as a result no explanation is given for how Chinese learning could have been introduced to Goguryeo and Mahan.

Kim discredits his own scholarship most through his indulgences in false "Altaic" etymologies demonstrating a general ignorance of the comparative method of historical linguistics, relying instead on mass and omni-comparisons such as the Starostin Database. The inconsistencies and disjointedness of his narrative are at once a reflection of the piecemeal fashion in which the non-Sinic peoples were treated in the surviving Chinese histories, but also demonstrate some of the inherent weakness of the Altaic narrative, namely its reliance on an unsubstantiated long-

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<sup>12</sup> Kim 2012:170-84

range language hypothesis to which the Korean peninsula has always been periphery.

A recent example of the 'empire' variant, notably from the same publisher as Kim, is *Old Joseon were Rulers of the Continent* (고조선은 대륙의 지배자였다) co-authored by Lee Deok-il and Kim Byeonggi and marked as number one in the "Correcting Our History" (우리역사 바로잡기) series. In contrast to both Sin Chaeho and the Altaic approach, this work lays strong emphasis on the *Samguk-yusa* and *Jewang-un'gi*, an approach in the spirit of Choe Namseon (1890–1957) though he cannot be explicitly accredited due to his heavily tainted record as a collaborationist. There is at once also a greater acceptance of the Korean authored *Samguk-sagi* over Chinese histories; this is in contrast to Kim Unhoe, for example, who lays weight on the histories of the non-Han dynasties, in particular the *Liaoshi* (遼史).

Another distinct feature of this particular work is that the narrative is no longer premised on Altaic etymologies; looking instead to archaeology, the territory of OJ is defined by the distribution of broad bronze dagger blades (琵琶形銅劍), Misongni type (美松里型) earthenware and dolmen megaliths whilst periodization is matched to the orthodox 'Three Joseon' of Dan'gun, Gi Ja and Wi Man albeit with the greater emphasis on Dan'gun.

As is standard practice, *dan'gun* is rationalized as a title for the rulers of OJ which the authors locate centered in the Liaoxi region between the Luan and Daling rivers; their map of OJ at its greatest extent however takes the Luan river as its western border whilst, free of historiographical rivals, in all other directions the 'empire' extends across the whole of Manchuria fully incorporating the Nen, Songhua and Ussuri river systems to the north and the Korean peninsula, including Jeju and Tsushima islands for good measure, to the south. OJ is thus presented as a Manchurian empire excluding only the Japanese archipelago.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> It is characteristic of Jaeya scholars that discussion or inclusion of ancient Japan and the peninsula origins of Japonic remain taboo.

The authors seek to actively refute the Japanese claim that Dan'gun was a 13th century creation with various problematic evidence all of which is based on subjective conjecturing.<sup>14</sup> Most dubious is the inclusion of names recorded in the *Dan'gun-segi* (檀君世紀) and *Dan-gi-gosa* (檀奇古史), the 'rediscovered' contents of which is widely regarded to be 20th century invention. At best they demonstrate there was some Dan'gun tradition by the early Goryeo period but this fails to place the myth as far back as OJ.

Seeking to substantiate the traditional dates of Dan'gun Joseon given in the *Samguk-yusa* they argue that whilst bronze age culture on the Korean peninsula "only" dates to 1000BCE, current bronze artifacts from modern Liaodong date up to 1500BCE and depending on "future excavations" will be extended further back; meanwhile the early bronze age culture of Bohai Bay (발해연안) dates as far back as 2000BCE so Il Yeon's foundation date of 2300BCE is, they claim, well supported by archaeology!<sup>15</sup>

Gi Ja is accepted as a historical person who receives a symbolic title of Gi-hu lord (箕侯) from Zhou king Wu (周武王), however, similar to Sin's narrative he was never a vassal to the Chinese state and ruled over only a portion of Old Joseon. Wi Man, meanwhile, is once more a refugee but already of OJ ancestry. Following the usurpation (Gi) Jun escapes to Pyeongyang, rather than any further south, where he establishes Mahan; this then accords with the problematic statement by Choe Chiwon recorded in the *Samguk-sagi* equating Mahan with Goguryeo.

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<sup>14</sup> Lee & Kim 2006:47-51. The evidence includes: murals from the Wu clan shrine (武氏祠) of Former Yan located in Shandong which, according to Korean interpretations (including Peter H. Lee 1997:5), portray scenes from the Dan'gun myth; a detail of the heavily deteriorated Goguryeo genre mural in Gakjeo-chong 'Tomb of the Wrestlers' (角抵塚), Jian, which supposedly depicts a bear and tiger together below a tree beside the much larger wrestlers; a record in the *Jiu-Tangshu* (舊唐書) describing the four gods worshipped in Goguryeo as Yeongseong-sin (靈星神), Il-sin (日神), Gahan-sin (可汗神) and Gija-sin (箕子神), out of which and without citing any supporting evidence, Gahan-sin is equated with Dan'gun whilst Gija-sin is ignored; a reference from the *Goryeo-sa* that a shrine to the 'Three Holies' (三聖祠 aka Hwan'in, Hwan'ung and Dan'gun) was established in 1006 on Guwol-san mountain (九月山) and that the shrine is also recorded in *Jewang-un'gi* as still existing, and finally, that one of the eight holy altars (八聖堂) established by Myocheong in 1131 was for the '*seon'in* of Guryeo-Pyeongyang' (句麗平壤仙人), which once more "of course" refers to Dan'gun.

<sup>15</sup> Lee & Kim 2006:54



The 108BCE Han invasion is premised largely a failure and so all four commanderies are located in the modern region of Shanhaiguan (山海關), the current day eastern terminus of the Great Wall. Similar to Sin, the authors distinguish the Lelang-jun commandery from the indigenous Nangnangguk state but the 313CE date of demise is matched rather to the commandery whilst Nangnangguk is conquered earlier on by Goguryeo in 32CE. The Han artifacts unearthed by Japanese archaeologists around Pyeongyang are claimed to be Later Han relics dating to an invasion of Nangnang led by Emperor Guangwu (光武帝) in 44CE which also saw the temporary establishment of a commandery; all these dates are taken from the *Samguk-sagi*.

Following the collapse of OJ which, they hypothesize, comes about more through internal problems than the Han invasion, Silla, Buyeo, Goguryeo and all other ancient states in Manchuria and Korea are established with the influx of refugees (from the core western territory) who were accepted because the indigenous populations had already been a part of the federal Joseon empire. The authors take further evidence from the *Samguk-yusa* and *Jewang-un'gi* to posit that Hae Mosu of Buyeo was of OJ royal *dan'gun* lineage and by extension, historicizing the Goguryeo foundation myth, so too was Jumong; thus they attribute exceptional status to the Buyeo→Goguryeo/Baekje→Balhae lineage within the wider break-up of OJ.

The empire interpretation does not reject the Altaic hypothesis but rather than seek anti-imperial solidarity, aims instead for Korean dominance and is unremittingly subjective towards this objective. The primary function of describing OJ as an empire is to match ancient Chinese historiography; the uncritical reliance on Korean sources is the product of ethnic nationalism inherent in the Jaeya movement which actively defines itself in opposition to the "colonial view of history" (식민사관). The authors' emphasis of the *Samguk-yusa* is precisely because it had been rejected by the Japanese and subsequent conservative historians; they decry locating the Han Commanderies within the Korean peninsula as a specific product of the colonial view of history, ignoring that this had been convention within the orthodox narrative throughout the premodern era. Even as they avoid reliance on pseudo linguistic data, in the end it is their extreme subjectivity which most undermines their discourse.

Parallel to the northern/Altaic narrative, there has also separately evolved an English language discourse which similarly both distinguishes and emphasizes the role of non-Han (漢) peoples in dynastic Chinese, as well as wider Northeast Asian history. Based on notions of interacting and competing ethno-linguistic cultural zones, comprising the China plain, Mongol steppe and Manchuria, this cyclic 'zonal/frontier' discourse has been delineated in various survey works including Lattimore, Ledyard, Barfield, and Janhunen, whilst having clear roots in prewar Japanese scholarship (e.g. Shiratori Kurakichi, Inaba Iwakichi and Mishina Shōei). If treated as a single 'Japanese-English language' historiographic lineage, then two points of contact where it has met with the Korean authored northern/Altaic narrative can be identified: early on in the output of Choe Namseon and more recently in the 'tripolar approach' of the late Wontack Hong (1940-2012).<sup>16</sup>

As both a leader of the nationalist enlightenment movement and subsequent convert to Japanese imperialism, Choe contributed to both historiographic traditions. In his earlier phase, writing in Korean, he promoted a pan-Altaic interpretation of Korea's prehistory, albeit still framed within the ethnocentrism of the Dan'gun myth; this was further expanded through his hyperdiffusionist *\*bulham* culture hypothesis premised on entirely amateur linguistic methodology.<sup>17</sup> After taking up a position at Kenkoku University in Manchukuo and switching language<sup>18</sup> he participated in the Japanese colonial discourse which defined Manchuria and Mongolia as zones distinct from China; he adopted the conceptualization of continental history as a continuous north-south struggle, but whilst Japanese scholars regarded this as the reason for a lack of cultural development, Choe argued for it rather to have been a source of stimulus and, in particular, emphasized the continued influence of the non-Sinic northern culture on China proper, an approach more closely anticipating the English language successors than that of his Japanese

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<sup>16</sup> A third current point may also be suggested to span the works of Byington (2003 and 2013),

<sup>17</sup> Chikuzo 1990.

<sup>18</sup> This is a working assumption I need to check.

counterparts.<sup>19</sup>

Bridging the divide between Western academic literature and the popular Korean Altaic narrative, Wontack Hong predominantly wrote in English in order to engage with Western scholars, and for this and other reasons might be described as an aberrant Jaeya historian. Hong's 'tripolar' narrative is most immediately a reworking of Barfield's bipolar model of interaction between the China plain and Mongolian steppe, augmented by Janhunen's treatment of Manchuria as an equally productive region.

Hong ignores Dan'gun entirely but is highly critical of Sinocentric historiography and, going a step further than Sin Chaeho even, denounces Gi Ja as a fabrication of Sima Qian. He posits that Wi Man and the state of Yan are ethnic 'Donghu Xianbei' with whom the 'Yemaek Joseon' maintain an "intimate relationship". Hong identifies the ancient Liao river as the modern Luan enabling him to shift ancient Liaodong ('east of Liao') westwards to the region of modern Liaoxi. Aberrant to Jaeya practice, however, in apparent acknowledgement of archaeological evidence, he locates the Han Commanderies inside the Korean peninsula with Lelang-jun on the Daedong-gang river; no second Nangnang kingdom is discussed but instead he questions the level of Sinicization occurring noting for example "the so-called Han Chinese style observed at Lelang sites finds no directly corresponding counterparts in mainland China".<sup>20</sup> Hong is also somewhat singular in discussing the post Han dynasty status of Lelang-jun and its southern partition Daifang, narrating the inheritance of their jurisdiction by Cao Wei (魏 220-265) and Western Jin (西晉 265-316) before finally succumbing to Goguryeo in 313. Later mention of Lelang and Daifang in the region of Liaodong he explains as administrative districts, unrelated in all but name, established by the Xianbei leader Murong Hui (慕容廆 269-333) to receive Chinese refugees escaping eastwards from the Xiongnu.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Jo 2009:123.

<sup>20</sup> Hong 2010:139 referencing Oh 2006:86

<sup>21</sup> Hong 2010:150 quoting Schreiber 1949:406-9

Hong designates OJ, Buyeo and Goguryeo as ethnically Yemaek Tungus which he identifies through the broad and narrow leafed styles of bronze dagger and northern and southern dolmen types associated with the Liaodong–northern Korean peninsula, and southern Korean peninsula regions respectively; like Kim Unhoe, he also highlights the similarity in foundation myths between Goguryeo, Buyeo and the Xianbei. He meanwhile describes the population in the southern half of the Korean peninsula constituting Jin'guk (辰國) and Samhan (三韓), as "rice-cultivating Yemaek cousins." In contrast to Janhunen and earlier Japanese, he is unwilling to more clearly distinguish a southern Koreanic element unrelated to the northern Tungusic lineage of Korean historiography though he at once, somewhat contradictorily, posits rice cultivation to have been introduced by ancient southern Chinese crossing the Yellow Sea. Quoting Nelson, he gives the earliest carbon dates for rice found on the Korean peninsula as 2400–2100BCE which, although left unmentioned, would support Il Yeon's dates for Dan'gun!<sup>22</sup>

Similar again to pan–Altaicist Kim Unhoe, Hong postulates that both the Donghu Xianbei and Yemaek Tungus belong to a "proto–Altaic speech community" sharing comb–patterned pottery (櫛文土器) and broad bronze dagger cultures ultimately tracing back to the Neolithic Hongshan culture spread between modern Chifeng city (赤峰市) in the west, the Liao river to the east and the Xar Moron river (西拉木倫) to the north, concomitant that is with the northern/Altaic narrative's location of OJ. The difference is that rather than designate this all as OJ, Hong shares the lineage from the very beginning with the ancient Xianbei/Donghu Yan.

Hong hypothesizes that the Korean language originates from Goguryeo, Buyeo and Silla whilst Manchu evolves through the Sushen–Mohe–Jurchen complex; unlike Kim he fails to address the presence of indigenous Mohe (Malgal) on the Korean peninsula. He labels Balhae 'macro Tungusic' claiming that, "only by uniting with the Yemaek people, could the Mohe–Nüzhens (Jurchen) establish a full–fledged dynasty".<sup>23</sup> Balhae is thus a mixed state after which the

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<sup>22</sup> Hong 2010:112 quoting Nelson 1995:10

<sup>23</sup> Hong 2010:241

Jurchen dominate Manchuria whilst "pure-blooded" Yemaek survive and prosper as the peninsula Koreans.

Perhaps only because their narratives tend to focus on the ancient period and/or history dispute with China, Hong also stands out from the Jaeya historians for his more active inclusion of Silla emphasizing how it absorbed Goguryeo remnants and went on to successfully drive the Tang out of the peninsula. In contrast to both Joseon dynasty scholars and Sin Chaeho, he is similarly keen to highlight Goryeo's success in defending the peninsula against Khitan and Jurchen invasion attempts rather than lament its internal weaknesses and failure to retake continental territory. He treats the 1135 Myo Cheong rebellion with surprising impartiality observing that Kim Busik likely had a more "realistic perception of the international power balance at that time".<sup>24</sup> In fact, by the medieval period, Hong has turned his back on continental pan-Altaicism viewing it rather as good fortune that any irredentist 'northern policy' ambitions failed:

"The irony of history seems to be that, had the Koreans identified themselves with their Manchurian cousins and were they actively supportive of the Manchu cause, they could have been a partner with the Manchus, as were the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, only to be buried in oblivion as inhabitants of one of those PRC Autonomous Regions."<sup>25</sup>

In this way, just as the premodern scholars believed their contemporary Joseon dynasty to be the last bastion of ancient Chinese civilization, proponents of the northern/Altaic narrative have reversed the self-conceit to present Korea today as the most successful of the Eastern Barbarian cultures, once more resisting against renewed Chinese pressures.

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<sup>24</sup> Hong 2010:315

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## The Strategy of the Speed: Kim Jong-Il (1942-2011) and Juche Literature

(속도의 전략: 김정일과 주체문학)

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In this presentation, I examine how Kim Jong-Il (1942-2011) deified his father Kim Il-Sung (1912-1994), and by so doing, legitimized his own rule. The historical fiction series *Pulmyŏl ūi hyangdo* [*The Immortal Leader*], which describes Kim Jong-Il's leadership and his outstanding achievement in his days as the heir apparent, played an important role in justifying Kim Jong-Il's succession in so far as these novels were read widely in North Korea as official history. My study focuses on this historical fiction series, *The Immortal Leader*, for example, Chŏng Kijong's *The Great River of History* [*Ryŏksa ūi taeha* (1998)] and Paek Namnyong's *The Successors* [*Kyesŭngja* (2002)]. Moreover, in so doing, this presentation sheds light on Kim Jong-Il's ruling technique. He theorized his father's military strategy, which is claimed to have been created by Kim Il-Sung's command of an anti-Japanese guerilla unit in 1930s. With this theorized strategy, Kim Jong-Il legitimized his succession and seized the cultural, ideological, and political hegemonic power in North Korea. In short, this presentation is about the theorization of the strategy that was Kim Jong-Il's primary technique for ruling. It is necessary to look not only at *The Immortal Leader*, but also at *On Juche Literature* (1992), *On Juche Ideology* (2000), and at many other books, ascribed to Kim Jong-Il, to consider the meaning of the theorization of the strategy and the tactics of Kim Jong-Il's rule.

Kim Jong-Il is remembered as the leading figure of literature, philosophy, art, and science in North Korea, since, during his days as the heir apparent of Kim Il-Sung, he attempted to place his rule within an intellectual, cultural context; He was the *mun* [문 (文); *wen* in Chinese; cultural, literary, and civilian] type of ruler. He aggressively seized the initiative in culture, ideology, and politics in the 1970s. The critical moment for Kim Jong-Il as the enlightened despot of North Korea was 1974 when he issued the

declaration of Kimilsungism (or Kim Il-Sung Thought). This was the event that demonstrated the establishment of Kim Jong-Il's cultural and ideological hegemony.

The father Kim, Kim Il-Sung's legitimacy was secured by the historical fact that he was the leader of an anti-Japanese guerilla unit. He was the only Korean military figure who succeeded in attacking the Korean Peninsula during the Japanese occupation of Korea; nobody but Kim Il-Sung dared to take the offensive against the Japanese government agencies located in the fully controlled Korean Peninsula until the last day of Japanese colonial rule. Ipso facto, he emerged as the leader of North Korea after the liberation from Japan in 1945. However, the son Kim, Kim Jong-Il lacked the opportunity to establish, confirm, and enact his legitimacy with distinguished military service as his father had done. In the 1970s, the era of peace, he had to find a field where he achieved something to certify his legitimacy. Thus, he devoted his attention to ideology, culture, and the arts. In other words, he converted the absence of his own chance to make war into the theoretical practices of his regime. Therefore, we can see the difference between the father Kim and the son Kim in terms of their types of ruling; Kim Jong-Il was the *mun* [문 (文); *wen* in Chinese; cultural] type of leader, while Kim Il-Sung was the *mu* [무 (武); *wu* in Chinese; military] type of ruler.

One of Kim Jong-Il's outstanding achievements as a *mun* type of ruler was *The Immortal History* [*Pulmyŏl ūi ryŏksa*], which had been published under his direction. Kim Jong-Il organized the April Fifteenth Writers' League [*sairo munye ch'angchaktan*] on August 1967, urged the writers to celebrate his father's life and achievements, and took the responsibility of editing, censoring, and publishing *The Immortal History*, fictionalized biographies of Kim Il-Sung. These novels describe how Kim Il-Sung fought against Imperial Japan by leading his guerilla band in the 1920s and 1930s, waged a war against the United States of America in 1950, and finally built the socialist state in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. It had been common even in pre-modern Korea that the founder of a dynasty was extolled by his descendents to confirm the legitimacy of the dynasty. For example, King Sejong (r. 1418-1450) of



Chosŏn dynasty ordered the composition of *Yonbiŏch'ŏn'ga* [*Song of the Dragon Flying to Heaven*] to celebrate Yi Sŏnggye (1335-1408), a military hero in the fourteenth century Korea and the founder of Chosŏn dynasty (McCann, 123). Kim Jong-II followed in the King Sejong's footsteps.

It is Han Sŏrya (1900-1976) who first wrote the biography of Kim Il-Sung. In 1953, Han published *Sŏlbongsan* [*Mountain Sŏlbong*] depicting Kim Il-Sung's guerilla activities. This fictional biography placed the author on the way up to the position of becoming the leading figure in the North Korean literary circle. However, his heydays did not last long; Kim Il-Sung dismissed Han from the head of the national organization of writers and sent him to a rehabilitation camp in 1962. Thereafter, Kim Il-Sung appointed his eldest son, Kim Jong-II, as the vice secretary of the Organization Department and the Agitprop (the Department of Agitation and Propaganda) in 1967. In so doing, Kim Il-Sung established the position and the image of his eldest son as the leader of culture and ideology. Here it is important to note that Kim Jong-II's role is similar to that of Andrei Zhdanov (1896-1948) in Stalin's regime. Zhdanov, the director of the Soviet Union's cultural policy, was the heir apparent of Stalin. However, he died in 1948 of heart failure before he succeeded to the Premiership of the Soviet Union; Stalin's plan for succession ended in failure. Kim Il-Sung did not make the same mistake as Stalin, since he was careful to place the responsibility of the Agitprop in the hands of his young, healthy son. As far as literature was concerned, the leadership of the literary circle passed to Kim Jong-II. The father purged the leading writers such as Han Sŏrya, Sŏ Manil, An Mak, and many others, and then the son promoted young novelists including Ch'ŏn Seborg, Kwŏn Chŏng'ung, Sŏk Yun'gi, and Ch'oe Ch'anghak to the newly organized April Fifteenth Writers' League.

Kim Jong-II was able to establish his legitimacy as the heir and the *mun* type of ruler by theorizing about his father's military strategy, as mentioned above. Chŏng Kijong's novel, *The Great River of History* (1998), one of *The Immortal Leader* series, gives us a hint of how Kim Jong-II became the coryphaeus of literature, philosophy, art, and science in North Korea.

He [Kim Jong-II] scolded O Yŏngbŏm severely. O was startled like shocked by electricity, but soon straightened his back.

The leader said:

“Why didn’t you take less time? Is that all you can do? . . . Look, it would be too late if you do it in one hour and thirty minutes. If in two hours, you would lose the half of your brigade soldiers. Why? It’s because now the enemies have the speed (can move) scores of times faster than before, and they have powerful weapons. So, you should destroy them with the speed of thunder. So to speak, both the beginning and the end should happen at the same time.” (Chŏng, 98)

“The beginning and the end . . . at the same time”

Kim Jong-II emphasizes the speed of the military action, in *Ryŏksa ūi taeha* [*The Great River of History* (1998)]. O Yŏngbŏm, one of the protagonists in this novel, is disappointed with himself because his military strategy does not come up to the Supreme Commander’s expectations. The Supreme Commander Kim Jong-II finds a weak point in O’s strategy, which might lead to a great sacrifice of soldiers. O falls into despair, crying, “Why didn’t I understand the Supreme Commander’s grand strategy?” From then onwards, O immerses himself in the study of the new military strategy without even eating or sleeping. Then one day, a great idea flashes across his mind. It is *Sŏmgwang chakchŏn* [*Operation Flash*], an operation plan which O comes up with. However, it cannot be said that it is O’s own creation, since it is a military version of *Soktojŏn*, *the Speed-Battle or the Speed-Strategy*, a national economic development project launched by Kim Jong-II in 1974. Adopting Kim’s *Speed-Strategy*, O will finish the battle as soon as he starts it; his armored brigade will destroy the enemy’s base simultaneously with crossing a river bordering the South. He has learned this strategy of *Speed* from Kim Jong-II. The only problem for O is that it takes time to understand Kim’s teaching about military strategy and speed.

In this novel, it is by Kim Jong-II that the strategy is theorized. However, it is important to note that strategy is not universal; if it is theorized, it is no longer a strategy. As Gayatri Spivak has pointed out,

strategy is generated by a constant (de)constructive criticism of the theoretical. Thus, it can be said that a theorized strategy is an oxymoron. Yet this oxymoron is the basis that determines the relationship between the leader and the people depicted in North Korean literature.

O Yŏngbŏm has learned Juche-military theory at the Military Academy. However, he is in need of help from the leader Kim Jong-Il to apply theory to practice. O can acquire knowledge about military affairs from books and teachers at the Military Academy. However, he cannot know how to apply theory to practice. The only way he can do so is by understanding Kim Jong-Il's plan and feeling sympathies with the leader. Here the strategy cannot be learned from solitary activities such as reading. O Yŏngbŏm can come up with the strategy only under the guidance of Kim Jong-Il. Generally in North Korean literature, the moment of meeting Kim Il-Sung or Kim Jong-Il is depicted as the moment when the protagonist learns how to apply theory to practice.

Thus, it is safe to say that North Korean fictions are basically *Bildungsroman* in the way that they portray the protagonist's spiritual growth. It is common that he (or she) discovers his (or her) interiority by the aid of the helper, donor, or mentor. Sin Hyŏnggi categorizes North Korean novels as *roman à these* (thesis novel), borrowing Susan Rubin Suleiman's analysis of the literary genre *roman à these*. According to Suleiman, the apprenticeship between the protagonist and the mentor is a characteristic of the genre. North Korean literature frequently transforms this form of apprenticeship into a father-son relationship. In so doing, filial piety, an important Confucian value, is resurrected. As Sin Hyŏnggi put it, *kamŭng* [sympathies] plays an important role in emotionally connecting the protagonist with the leader. This sentiment, *kamŭng*, changes even a non-biological father-son relationship into that of a political family.

Kim Jong-Il was a very filial son (Hwang, 126-127). North Korean writers took pains to describe the son Kim's filial piety. This was one of the primary tactics to legitimize Kim Jong-Il's rule and his succession. It seems that it is similar to the Confucian sage kings' means of legitimation. JaHyun Kim Haboush illustrates how King Yŏngjo (1694-1776) achieved legitimacy by practicing his filial piety

towards his mother in front of his subjects. In the same way, Kim Jong-Il needed to be depicted as a filial son in literary works. In the Confucian world, the king should not only care for his people like their father, but also demonstrate sincerity towards his parents as a means of establishing a standard for his people. In this manner, the father-son relation in the royal family is amplified to include the emotional ties between the king and the people; the state becomes a super-family.

Nevertheless, it cannot be simply said that the relationships between leader and people depicted in North Korean literature are influenced by Confucian morality. For, in the Confucian world, unlike in North Korea, the subjects did not always have to obey the king. In fact, Chosŏn kings were kept in check by the bureaucracy, the aristocracy, and the maternal relatives. Moreover, the kings were obliged to attend a royal lecture more than three times a day and in many cases learn Chinese Classics from aristocrat teachers. The institutions of remonstrance such as *Sahŏnbu*, *Saganwŏn* and *Hongmun'gwan* had the right to object to the king's decisions and force him to change them. Thus, James B. Palais saw the Chosŏn kings as *primus inter pares*.

However, there was no way that such an institution of remonstrance could exist in the North Korean government, since Kim Jong-Il (and his father) took over the absolute power of the state apparatus. Kimilsungism was the ideological foundation that enabled him to exercise despotic rule. After Kim Jong-Il defined the state ideology in 1974, he clarified the uniqueness of Kimilsungism in a lecture to the officials of the Agitprop; Kimilsungism consists of three parts: Juche Idea, the theory of how to complete the revolution after the establishment of the socialist state, and the theory of leadership. Kim Jong-Il argued that Marxism-Leninism could not provide the answer of how to further the socialist system after the revolution. Kimilsungism, Kim Jong-Il continued to say, removes the shortcomings of the previous socialist idea, by theorizing the primary strategies for how to develop the ideal socialist country and lead the people. However, in fact, the strategies are ambiguous and unclear. Nonetheless, it seems that the members of the audience at the lecture on Kimilsungism were able to grasp Kim Jong-Il's message. They

may have understood the strategy they should follow, based on the lessons from the great purges in the 1950s and 1960s. They had learned that the only way to survive under Kim's regime was to show loyalty and filial piety to the father-leader, Kim Il-Sung. Here it is interesting to notice that, in Kimilsungist framework, Kim Jong-Il is the most loyal subject and the most filial son of all Kim Il-Sung's people. In other words, Kim Il-Sung becomes the father-god and Kim Jong-Il the son-priest.

Paek Namnyong's *The Successors* (2002) begins with the dialogue between two Kims. The father Kim speaks highly of the son Kim for his "rebuilding the Workers' Party of Korea." He admires his son's efforts to make a clean sweep of the old evils that pervade the party and the government. The means by which he can make it is the new strategy, "the Anti-Japanese Guerilla's Way." He says that Kim Jong-Il "brought about innovation in the party-government and introduced the people-centered policy." This dialogue shows how Kim Jong-Il legitimized his succession: by adopting his father's military strategy, "the Anti-Japanese Guerilla's Way," as the principle of his rule over the state.

This was Kim Jong-Il's ruling technique described in North Korean literature as well as manifested in reality. Although strategy is not universal as Spivak has said, Kim Jong-Il universalized his father's military strategy as his own theory and applied it to almost all social practice.

Kim Jong-Il's *On Juche Literature* [*Juche munhangnon*] clarifies that the protagonists in North Korean literature should be loyal subjects and filial sons.

Sincerity to the leader is the basic character of the *juche* type communist and the main factor that secure the integrity of our socio-political organism. Only the person who thinks and acts on the basis of the leader's will and seeks self-fulfillment by sharing all the joys and sorrows with the leader, deserves to be called the *juche* type communist. . .

The person who, in spite of speaking poorly, keeps ardent loyalty and resolute mind, even in adversity; the person who works silently without talking a lot and spends his all energy and knowledge for the leader; the person who cannot sleep because of a guilty conscience with mental anguish and physical pain when he makes a mistake in the process of serving the leader, and who breathes the leader's thought and follows his lead: Only these types of persons can be called *chinjjabaegi ch'ungsin*, true loyalists. (Kim Jong-II, *On Juche Literature*, 161-162)

Kim Jong-II's *On Juche Literature* stipulates that the person thinking and acting only under the guidance of the leader is the paragon of juche virtue that North Korean literature should portray. This positive exemplary figure "speaks poorly" and "works silently without talking a lot." When he makes a mistake in the course of serving the leader, he is unable to sleep because of his sense of guilt. Kim Jong-II calls him *chinjjabaegi ch'ungsin*, a true loyalist.

The Kim Jong-II era is remembered as the time when discussion in the party and the government disappeared. Hwang Jang-yop [Hwang Changyöp] (1923-2010), who was the former Secretary of the North Korean International Affairs and the highest ranking defector, said that Kim Jong-II abolished free discussion in the Politburo after Kim Il-Sung died and the son Kim succeeded to his father's political leadership (Yi Chongsök, 261-262). In other words, Kim Jong-II made arbitrary decisions in the party and the government after ascending "the throne." He had nothing to fear. There was nobody who dared to remonstrate with him in North Korea. He had already laid the ideological and cultural groundwork for his despotic rule when he was the heir apparent. He theorized his father's military strategy and then monopolized every decision of how to apply it in practice. Thus, the true loyal subjects do not have to speak, for the Word of the Leader already exists and will be soon realized.

Evegeny Dobrenko argued that Socialist Realism was one of the most important social institutions of Stalinism. He thought that it produced reality in the socialist state. He concluded that, under Stalin's regime, literature and the arts were ahead of the economy, since the former were the only things that can be produced in the socialist state. In short, fiction became reality through the medium of Socialist Realism

(Dobrenko, xi-xiii; 4-6). Kim Jong-Il, the Zhdanov of North Korea, thoroughly understood the role of the arts and literature in the socialist system. Kim Jong-Il believed that Juche literature could generate reality as Russian Socialist Realism did. Reality was fictionalized, while fiction was realized.

To return to *The Great River of History*, Kim Jong-Il teaches the strategy of speed to O Yōngbōm, saying, “With the speed of thunder . . . both the beginning and the end should happen at the same time.” This was Kim Il-Sung’s military tactic in his days of the anti-Japanese guerilla band. The son Kim canonized it and adopted it for all kinds of social projects. For example, he pushed forward an economic development plan called *soktojōn*, *the Fight of Speed (or the Strategy of Speed)*, in 1974. Even after he succeeded his father in the political leadership of North Korea in 1994, he continued to adopt the strategy of speed. In 1990 when North Korea was struck by natural disasters and ravaged by famine, Kim Jong-Il attempted to go through the hard time using the strategy of speed. A North Korean poem *Sleepless Ocean* (1995) compares that situation to a submarine commanded by Kim Jong-Il.

Dear Leader acts as the commander and gives an order to the captain.

“Go straight ahead at a speed of 1,800!”

Ah! It is the maximum speed of the submarine.

It is,

It is the critical speed.

. . .

However, he speaks in a voice filled with conviction.

“That’s no problem. Just look ahead and charge!”

(Chin, 204-205)

In this poem, Kim Jong-Il is portrayed as a military commander. It is by means of literature that Kim Jong-Il becomes a military figure and converts reality. Kim Jong-Il orders the captain of the submarine to go forward a maximum speed, saying, “Just look ahead and charge!” The war was over in 1953. Thus, there was no chance for Kim Jong-Il to act as a military figure. However, literary works produced the image of Kim Jong-Il as a military leader, presenting the strategy of speed (or the theorized strategy). The *mun* type leader has finally become the *mu* type ruler! Everything is possible in fictional/theoretical works. Kim Jong-Il dominated everything in the fictional and theoretical world. By so doing, he transformed fiction into the reality of the socialist state and made his father’s military strategy universal.



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국경 너머의 일상  
-20세기 조선인의 만주 체험에 관한 기록과 공생의 한국학  
Daily life beyond the Border  
: 20<sup>th</sup> Century Records of Manchuria by Chosŏn writers and  
the Korean Studies of Coexistence

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## 1. 국경 너머 일상의 자리

중국 조선족과 광복전 재중 한인, 조선인들의 문학 자료를 체계적으로 발굴 정리, 출판하는 것은 정체(整體)적인 민족문학연구에서 대단히 중요한 작업이 아닐 수 없다.

『중국조선민족문학대계』 간행사

연세대 국학연구원은 중국 연변대 조선문학연구소와 함께 국학총서 시리즈로 『중국조선민족문학대계』(서울: 보고서, 2006~2010)를 출판하였는데, 일러두기에는 “중국 조선족의 기록, 구비문학을 비롯하여 재중 한인(韓人), 조선인이 중국 지역에서 창작한 작품들”을 모아 수록하였고, “20세기 전반기에 창작 발표된 문학작품을 일차적 선제대상으로 확정”하였으며, “한시, 현대시, 소설 산문, 희곡, 민요, 전설, 민담 순인 한국문학의 장르에 따라 배열하였다.” 등의 내용이 적혀 있다. 2005년 겨울 작성된 간행사에는, 이러한 작업을 바탕으로 한 출판의 의미를 “정체(整體)적인 민족문학연구”, 즉 민족문학을 전체적으로 잘 조망하여 연구할 수 있게 된 데에 기여했다는 점에 두고 있다.

한편, 2008년에 출판된 『재만조선인 친일문학 작품집』<sup>1)</sup>의 작품 수집 및 편집을 담당한 최삼룡은 책의 해제인 「재만조선인문학의 친일작가와 작품에 대하여」에서, 항일투쟁과 밀접한 관련성이 강조되는 공산주의 이념을 민족주의와 함께 중요한 문학적 가치를 보증하는 요소로 거론한다. 그는 중국학계에서 친일문학에 대한 비판 혹은 연구가 오랫동안 연구과제가 되지 못한 이유를 1945년 광복 후 중국공산당 정책에 의한 정치 경제 문화 등 제 분야에서 “친일분자에 대한 투쟁”이 철저하여 중화인민공화국 성립되기 전까지 복잡한 역사의 전환기에 친일청산이 이루어졌기 때문이라고 말한다. 또한, 일본제국주의자들이 만주에서 행한 조선인의 의식형태에 대한 통제나 문학예술창작에 대한 통제의 본질이 조선에서와 같았으며, “친만은 곧 친일이요, 친일은 곧 친만이라는 이 하나의 전제를 잊지 말아야”한다는 점과, “만주에서의 친일은 곧 반공과 연계된다.”라는 점을 강조하고 있다.

이처럼 20세기 재만조선인 작가와 작품의 물적 토대와 배경은 자료 접근에 있어서 다층적 조건을 만들었다.<sup>2)</sup> 물론 주지하다시피, 만주 지역에 대한 경험을 형상화한 조선인의 문학 연

1) 최삼룡, 「재만조선인문학의 친일작가와 작품에 대하여」, 『재만조선인 친일문학작품집』, 보고서, 2008.  
2) 이러한 맥락에서 편찬된 『20세기 중국조선족 문학사 자료 선집 최삼룡 항일문학편』(보고서, 2003)에서도 그는 “20세기 전반엽의 우리 역사는 항일투쟁사라고 하여도 과언이 아니다.” 라고 역설한다. 이

구에 있어서, 항일 민족 문학의 범주 안에 손꼽히는 작가나 작품만이 연구의 대상이 된 것은 아니었다. 오히려 탈근대, 탈식민, 탈민족 담론에 논의들은 토론의 토론을 거듭하며 축적되었다. 하지만, 새로운 자료가 발굴되고 호명되는 수행의 현장에서 ‘민족이라는 개념은 한국학의 주요한 추동력으로 기능한다.

‘친만’이 곧 ‘친일’라는 사실을 기억해야 한다던 최삼룡은, 『만선일보(滿鮮日報)』와 『만몽일보(滿蒙日報)』가 모두 일제와 그 괴뢰 만주국의 건국이념과 제반시책 그리고 그들의 기본이념을 대변하는 어용신문이었지만, 문학사적 시각에서 보면 그렇게 단순하지 않으며, 사실상 이 두 신문은 당시 재만 조선인 작가들에게는 거의 유일한 활동무대였다<sup>3)</sup>는 점을 설명하며 자칫 작품을 연역적으로 이념에 귀속하여 해석할 위험을 지적하지만, 한편에서는, 재만작가의 작품을 읽어내는 시선에서 “작가적 윤리”<sup>4)</sup>를 고민하는 자리가 마련된다.

이러한 가운데, 조선인의 만주 체험의 기록에 관한 연구의 경향성과 관련된 대상의 범주에서 빗겨있거나, 주요한 문예적 장르에 속하지 못하는 경우, 뚜렷한 문예적 성과로 주목받았던 작가의 작품이 아닌 이유로 호명되지 않았던 작품에서 아직 청해듣지 못한 목소리들은 더 오래 순서를 기다려야 한다.

『조선민족문학대계』 시리즈의 14, 15권인, 2010년에 출판된 『종합산문(1)』과 『종합산문(2)』에는 만주를 여행하거나 만주에 이주하여 거주했었던 조선인들이 신문이나 잡지 매체에 투고 하였던 수필류 산문이 수록되어 있다. 그 중에서 『종합산문(2)』에는 필명 이외의 정보에 대해서는 더 이상 알 수 없는 작가들이 『만선일보』에 게재했던 작품들도 적지 않게 실려 있다. 그 중에서 시대 담론을 논하는 자리에서 큰 비중이 없었거나, 주요한 당대문인으로서 관심 받지 않았던 어쩌면 비교적 ‘평범한’ 이들의 체험의 글쓰기는 삶의 기록과 고백의 어디쯤을 보여주며 더욱 더 관심의 시선에서 빗겨서 있다.

이러한 글쓰기 주체(agent) 및 거대 담론과 일상이 교직된 복합적 삶의 경험과 생존의 현장성 이 담긴 텍스트의 역동성에 대한 탐구는, 여전히 한국학에 대한 새로운 시사점을 제공할 수 있다. 특히, 이 자료들은 다양한 민족이 국경을 넘어 조우하게 된 일상의 장소로서의 제도 와 문화에 대한 자각과 의문, 만주라는 ‘환상’ 이면의 ‘일상’에 대한 실존적 고민과 공존의 문제 등을 고찰하기에 좋은 대상이다.

주요 문학 장르로 여겨지지는 않았지만, 만주기행문의 경우는 그동안 비교적 많은 연구가 진행되었다. 1930년대에 접어들면서 일본 제국주의 정책에 호응하는 만주담론의 실천적 매체<sup>5)</sup>

를 두고 “연변을 중심으로 한 조선족의 문예는 초기 역사적 지정학적 특성으로 인해 특이한 민족주의 문학 입장을 견지”하며, “항일 반제 투쟁에 의한 고유한 민족정서의 표출이라는 형태”로 나타나고, “비평의 기준 또한 여기에 준거”하며, “일제하에서 항일투쟁 민족 고유의 정서와 유민의식의 표출은 공산당 창건 이후 민족과 국가라는 상황 아래서 그 이중적 성격이 강화”된 것이라고 분석한다. 김현택, 서종택, 송창섭, 송하춘 유숙자, 이상갑, 정규화, 『재외한인작가연구』, 고려대학교 한국학연구소, 2001.

3) 최삼룡, 「재만조선인문학의 친일작가와 작품에 대하여」, 『재만조선인 친일문학작품집』, 보고서, 2008, 17쪽.

4) 최근의 연구 중, 정주아의 「재만주(국) 작가 안수길과 ‘얼되눔’의 자리-이념적 폭력의 공간에서의 글쓰기와 작가의 윤리-」(『만주연구』 제16집, 2013)의 경우도, 해방 이전 『만선일보』 기자로 일했던 안수길의 전력과 그에 따른 작품의 해석이라든가 문학 활동의 성격에 대한 평가가 한국문학사에서 그 자체로 큰 과제로 남아있다는 점을 지적하였다. 또한, 안수길이 자기응시를 통한 반성 작용 속에서 작가로서의 윤리의식을 문제 삼고 있음을 밝혀, 재만조선인 작가 안수길의 글쓰기 행위가 갖는 의의를 해명하고자 하였다.

5) 특히, 중일전쟁을 거치며 대륙침략을 도모하던 일본제국주의의 대륙정책과 만주 열풍과 만주 여행은 일본제국주의 말기를 특징짓는 대동아 공영권 담론의 일부라고 설명된다. 서경석, 「만주국 기행문학 연구」, 『어문학(語文學)』, 제86집, 2004.

로서, 만주 ‘체험’을 유도하고자 기획된 글쓰기라는 성격이 강화되었다는 점, 끊임없는 검열과 정간의 문화통치에도 불구하고 당대 조선 지식인의 글쓰기 장으로 기능했다는 사실 등<sup>6)</sup>과, 만주라는 장소복합성은 이념, 근대성의 균열지점 등을 찾아내기에 좋은 문제적 대상이었다.

그러나 일제강점기에 ‘기획된’ 만주 지역의 기록에서는 거의 언급되지 않거나 혹은 언급될 수 없었던 조선인의 만주 체험, 혹은 주목 받지 못했던 일상을 찾아내려는 작업의 필요성은 여전히 남아있다. 이는 동시에 20세기 만주라는 공간 속에서 일상을 공유하며, 때로는 삶에 대해 공감을 나누고 때로는 갈등했던 ‘타자들’의 공생에 관하여 조망하려는 시도로서, 보편담론의 소통의 장으로서의 한국학의 방법론에 새로운 시사점을 제공할 수 있을 것이다.

이를 위하여 본고는 조선인 여행자들이 쓴 만주기행문과 재만조선인의 수필류 산문 등을 아울러 살피는 과정에서 전술한 문제의식을 적용하여, 그 동안 주로 집중되어온 시대, 작가, 장르 중심의 연구 경향성에 새로운 논의를 이어갈 수 있는 기회를 삼고자 한다.

## 2. 국경이라는 환상 공간의 조선인 만주 여행자들

‘국경을 넘는 이야기’는 조선인의 만주 기행문 다수에서 공통적으로 가장 뚜렷하게 형상화된 장면 중의 하나이며, 이들 작품에서 만주로 가는 열차가 지나는 길목에 있는 압록강과 두만강<sup>7)</sup>은 대표적인 국경표상으로 등장한다. 더 이상 걸음을 내딛을 수 없는 땅 끝에서 마주치는 ‘강’은 ‘단절’, ‘죽음’의 문화적 원형이자 국경 표상이었지만, 열차는, 새로운 ‘공간의 연속성’을 ‘체험’하게 해 주었다. 그런데 이는 동시에 ‘타국’이라는 ‘상상적 비균질 공간’을 체험할 기회를 박탈하고 있었고, 조선의 땅을 넘어 타국인 만주로 들어서는 순간에 대한 호기심과 기대는 저마다 생각했던 국경의 “실재”를 확인하지 못하는 당황감으로 표현되기도 하였다.

『오! 이것이 朝鮮의 마지막 山이로군!』

『國境! 鴨綠江!』<sup>8)</sup>

한설야(韓雪夜)의 「국경정조(國境情調)」(『조선일보』 1929년 6월 12~23일)의 첫 장면에서 작자는 국경을 대하기 직전 조선의 마지막 산을 호명한다. “朝鮮의 막스는 엇더할까”라는 잔뜩 부푼 작자의 호기심은 “未知의 世界 好奇의 境地”인 타국으로 진입하는 순간, 작자가 탄 열차 “시보레”가 내쉬는 거친 “숨소리”로 묘사된다. 그러나 그는 그 국경 공간에서 ‘막끝’과 ‘처음’으로 구분되는 국가들의 분명한 실체를 확인하는 대신 균질한 자연을 마주하고 다소 당황한다.

6) 만주에 대한 조선인의 인식과 조선인의 만주기행문의 사회문화적 배경에 대해서는, 김도형 외, 『식민지 시기 재만조선인의 삶과 기억』, 연세국학총서, 선인, 2009.; 김남석외 편, 『한국 언론산업의 역사와 구조』, 연암사, 2000.; 김현주, 「근대 초기 기행문의 전개 양상과 문학적 기행문의 '기원'」, 『현대문학의 연구』 제16집, 2001 등을 참조.

7) 당시 지식인들 사이에 만주지역 고토(古土)에 대한 관심이 높아졌으며, 고토 수복론이 대두하였지만, 압록강과 두만강을 현실적인 국경선으로 이해하고 있었다. 백동현, 「한말 민족의식과 영토관」, 『한국사연구』 제129호, 2005. 134~135쪽.

8) 이 발표문의 작품 원문은 연변대학교 조선문학연구소 김동훈·허경진·허휘훈 주편, 연세대학교 국학총서, 『조선민족문학대계』 시리즈의 14, 15권인 『종합산문(1)』, 『종합산문(2)』(보고사, 2010)과 최삼룡·허경진 편, 『만주기행문』(보고사, 2010) 등에 수록된 작품을 인용하였다.

帶水를 사이하고 네 것 내 것 하는 것이 우습기도하고 또 한 便 몹시 嚴肅하게도 생각겨진다. 朝鮮이 滿洲를 달뻐다 할는지 滿洲가 朝鮮을 달뻐다 할는지 엇쟁든 鴨綠江 沿岸의 高原은 滿鮮의 그것이 다 갖다.

“우습기도하고 엄숙하기도 한” 겸연쩍은 감정은 ‘어쟁든’ 조선과 만주의 구분이 없는 압록강 연안의 고원에 대한 설명으로 옮겨간다. “단 十分사이에 滿洲와 朝鮮을 왔다 갔다”할 수 있도록 근대가 선사한 열차의 속도는 오히려 상상하던 국경의 표상에 균열을 만들어냈다.

문예잡지인 『조선문단』의 1주년을 기념하여 광고를 모집하고 만주지역에 잡지를 선전할 목적으로 만주여행을 떠난 방인근(方仁根)은 열차를 타고 “다른 나라의 땅”에 들어서려는 순간 “애써 딴 나라에 왔다는 氣分을 좀 만히 늦겨보라”하였지만 “外國이란 感想”이 나지 않는 것에 실망한다.<sup>9)</sup> 뿐만 아니라, 동포의 생활상과 독립운동의 현황을 살피기 위해 만주를 찾은 이돈화 역시, “새삼스럽게 注意”하여 “엇전지 外國”의 모습을 보려 하지만 결국 “사람의 작란(장난)으로 나온 네 나라와, 내 나라라는 것”이 만들어졌다는 결론에 도달한다. “사람의 작란”이란 시차가 생기고, 복장이 다르고 민족이 다르고 가옥이 다른 문화, 국가인 것임을, 국경의 “自然에게는 아모 內外가 업슴”<sup>10)</sup>을 통해 느끼는 것이다.

나는 朝鮮도 아니고 滿洲도 아닌 豆滿江鐵橋 한 가운데서 男負女戴하야 이 반찬거리를 나르는 조고마한 移動商人의 무리와 悠久히 흐르고 있는 豆滿江의 푸른 물줄기를 바라본다. 豆滿江은 決코 넓은 江은 아니다. 小學校 時代에 豆滿江을 鴨綠江다음가는 大江으로 듯고 배왔더니 오히려 漢江의 반만도 넓지 못하다. 너무 期待가 컷든 까닭인가!

여행자 방건두에게 “小學校時代에 豆滿江을 鴨綠江 다음가는 大江으로 듯고 배왔”던 ‘지식’을 바탕으로 ‘상상’하던 두만강의 모습은 기대와 달리 한강의 반만큼도 안 되는 좁은 강에 불과했다.<sup>11)</sup> “朝鮮도아니고 滿洲도아닌 豆滿江鐵橋 한가운데”인 국경 공간에서 응시하는 광경은 다만 유구한 자연으로서의 두만강과 생존의 현장이다. 『간도풍경(間島風景)』(『신여성(新女性)』 1932년 1월호)의 작가 강경애(姜敬愛) 역시 자신의 글에서 두만강의 넓이가 상상외로 좁다는 데에 놀라움을 나타낸다. 하지만, 강경애는 국경 너머 마주보이는 간도(間島)가 “山色조차 확연히 다른” 땅이라고 서술한다. 그 이유는 아마도 강경애에게 간도가 삶을 개척한 조선 농민의 땅이자, 저항을 위한 실천의 공간으로 기대되었기에, 분명하게 조선과 변별되는 공간이었기 때문인지도 모른다. 다만, 그에게 조선과 ‘다르지 않은’ 광경은 조선의 신문에서도 본 적 있는 중국 군벌의 옷을 입고, 평소에 동네에서 보던 중국 상인들의 익숙한 모습과 닮은 헌병이 검문을 하는 모습이였다. 강경애는 “속으로 우습이 각 치밀어 올너 움”을 겨우 참아내며, 그들의 ‘제복’으로 상징되는 이데올로기 수행의 부조리성을 드러낸다.

이러한 국경의 검문은 많은 작가에게 국경의 폭력성에 대한 공통 경험으로 서술된다. 이종정(李鐘鼎)의 글<sup>12)</sup>에서 국경은 “땀살스러운 눈동자를 좌우로 굴리면서 경계 감시하고 있는 양은 서울 있을 때에 공산당 공판정(公判廷)에서 본 정내(廷內)의 경계와 조금도 다른 감이 없”는

9) 춘해(春海), 「만주여행기(滿洲旅行記)」, 『조선문단』, 1925년 9월.

10) “山은 높고 물은 흐르고 가마귀 울고 깃치 짓고 꽃 붉고 나무 푸른 自然의 光景은, 조금도 朝鮮과 다른 것이 업슴니다.” 이돈화(李敦化), 「남만주행(南滿洲行(第一信))」, 『개벽(開闢)』 1925년 7월 1일 제61호.

11) 방건두(方建斗), 「북만주유기(北滿周遊記)」, 『조선일보』 1935년 5월 15~24일.

12) 이종정, 「만몽답사여행기(滿蒙踏查旅行記)」, 『조선일보』 1927년 10월 15일~12월 2일.

위압감이 느껴지는 공간이었다. 그는 압록강 철교상에서 “원적(原籍), 주소, 씨명(氏名), 연령, 직업, 만주행의 목적 등을 묻는 대로 일러바쳤”던 체험을 통해 압록강을 조선의 비극적 세태를 투영하여 “천추의 한을 가슴에 품고 고국을 떠나는 지사의 눈물”을 떠올린다.

「북국기행(北國紀行)」(『조선일보』 1933년 11월 26일~12월 3일)에서 한설야에게 국경을 넘는 거듭된 도강(渡江)의 경험은, 국경이란 느낌이 들지 않는 “原始的인 國境”에서 “무시무시한 光景”을 떠올리게 하는 것이었다. 두만강에는 “五里씩만큼 射擊口를 내인 돌담을 둘러친 駐在所와 武裝을 버서놀 날이 업는 驚史들”이 펼쳐졌으며, 국경 너머에는 “白衣를 입은 農夫가 “瓦家 한 집에 오막사리 百집이나 되는 到處의 소락순이는 어데나 다를 것이 업”는 피폐한 식민지 조선인의 삶이 있었다.

이 國境線은 한낱 空處이기는 너무나 만흔 눈물과 피에 영크려 잇는 무서운 現實인 것이다. 나는 「센티멘탈」해 진다.<sup>13)</sup>

김기림(金起林)의 “「센티멘탈」”은 “滿洲로 가는 移住民의 때”와 총성이 울리는 “국경의 밤”을 극적 서술로 그려낸다. 그는 시인 김동환을 떠올리며, 그의 시 「국경의 밤」에서 두만강을 건너는 남편을 떠나보낸 후 들려오는 총소리에 걱정하는 아내의 모습을 극적으로 서술하면서 국경의 폭력성을 뚜렷하게 형상화시킨다.

여행자들은 국경의 삼엄한 경계에 “官”의 권력이 얼마나 위협적으로 느껴지는지를 실감하거나<sup>14)</sup>, 국경 경비대의 엄중한 경계망으로 “세관을 통과하지 아니하고 월경(越境)하는 자는 불문 곡직하고 총살을 당하는 형편”<sup>15)</sup>이었다고 서술하고 있으며, 이는 국경이라는 비극적 공간이 만들어내는 “센티멘탈”의 이유를 잘 설명해준다.

이와는 대조적으로 김기림의 국경을 넘은지 십 여년이 지난 후 함대훈(咸大勳)<sup>16)</sup>은 압록강을 넘어 안동역(安東驛)에 도착하여 행장을 검사당하는 것이 불쾌한일이기는 하나 밀수를 엄단하기 위하여 어쩔 수 없는 세관의 일이라면서 만주건국 이후에는 이러한 불법적인 일들이 큰 문제가 되지 않는다는 설명을 덧붙이며, 국경에서의 검문을 정당화, 합리화하기도 한다. 이것은 그가 “만주 문제 특집호를 내려는 계획”으로 만주를 방문하여, 작품에서 적극적으로 만주국을 긍정하고 일본의 힘과 조선의 근대화를 역설하는 태도와 상통한다.

함대훈은 압록강을 건너며 고려시대 시인 정지상(鄭知常, ?~1135)의 한시 「送人」의 한 구절인 “大同江水何時盡 別淚年年添綠波”의 “대동강”을 “압록강”으로 바꾼 “압록강수하시진 별루 년년첨록파(鴨綠江水何時盡 別淚年年添綠波)”를 인용한 후, “여기에 뿌린 눈물도 적지 않으리라 믿고 비오는 소리에 다시 감개가 깊었다.”라고 서술한다. 그는 “눈물”의 의미를 상술하지 않고, 송별시의 이별의 슬픔을 차용하여 국경을 건너는 감상을 대신하고 있다.

반면에, 김종근은 호기심과 기대가 극에 달하던 국경의 밤에 열차의 승강 계단에서 압록강을 바라다보며 조선 동포들을 떠올리며 “끈힘업시(끊임없이) 『센티멘탈』해지다 못해 “망아(忘我)”의 상태를 경험한다.<sup>17)</sup> 이처럼 국경체험은 작가들의 민족의식을 발현시키고, 김기림과 이태준처럼 고려와 조선의 역사를 호출하기도 한다. 김기림은 자신을 “낯설은 고려의 자손”으로 칭하면서, “검푸른 강물”로 형상화된 두만강이 유랑민들의 눈물을 흘리며 강을 건너던 역사를

13) 김기림(金起林), 「국경정조(國境情調)」, 『삼천리』 제8호, 1930년 6월 2일.

14) 전무길(全武吉), 「만주주간기(滿洲走看記)」, 『동아일보』 1936년 1월 24~31일.

15) 김성진(金晟鎭), 「만주(滿洲)벌을 향(向)해-청진기 기행」, 『조선일보』 1935년 4월 9~18일.

16) 함대훈(咸大勳), 「남북만주편답기(南北滿洲遍踏記)」, 『조광(朝光)』 1939년 7월.

17) 김종근(金鍾根), 「만주기행(滿洲紀行)」, 『동아일보』 1930년 12월 5~9일.

품고 있으나 침묵하고 있는 민족의 역사적 증인이자 “북방의 애인”으로 표현하며, 이태준은 국경을 넘으며, 문득 세종의 명을 받고 한글 창제를 위해 국경을 열세번이나 넘었던 성삼문을 떠올리기도 하는 것이다.<sup>18)</sup>

이처럼 저마다의 이유를 가지고 만주로 여행을 떠난 이들에게 압록강과 두만강이라는 국경 공간이 복합적인 깨달음과 감정을 불러일으키는 공간이었던 반면, 만주에 직장을 얻어 딸에게 쓰는 편지 형식으로 1940년 『만선일보』에 게재된 리형주(李荊珠)의 글<sup>19)</sup>에서는 열차가 봉천(奉天)을 출발한 이후 북만(北滿)으로 진입할 때에 비로소 작자가 느끼는 ‘국경’이 등장한다. 그는 압록강이 현실의 국경이라는 점을 알고 있지만, 북만에 들어서며 고국과 멀리 떨어져 더 이상 돌아갈 수 없는 이국땅에 있다는 사실을 체감한다고 말한다.

이미 그는 그 전에 안동(安東)에서 세관검사를 하면서 “人爲的이나마 그 사히에 人文과 風土가 달나지는(달라지는) 外國으로 첫 발”을 들여놓았다는 생각을 갖기도 하였다. 그는 제자리에 잡히지 않는 마음으로 어두운 밤 이국의 정취를 느끼기 위해 밖을 내다보지만 잘 보이지 않았다. 대신 그가 본 것은 유리창에 서린 얼음이었다.

추위가 얼마나 되든지 나는 아직 일찍이 經驗하지 못한 溫度인 모양이다. 유리창에 어름이 여간이나 끼는(끼는) 것은 朝鮮서도 그리 듬은(드문) 일은 아니다. 어름이 차창에 몇치나 여러 부튼(얼어 붙은) 것은 아직 보지 못한 일이다. 나로서는 그 추위가 벌써 이 생소한 異國이 주는 어마어마한 示威이었다.

조국을 떠나 타국에서 새로운 삶을 살아가야 하는 작자에게 만주의 추위를 예상하게 하는 차창의 얼음 개수는 단지 타국의 기후에 대한 호기심의 차원을 넘어 생존의 문제와 맞물린 생소한 환경에 대한 걱정과 두려움을 불러일으키고 있다.

저 前燈불 아래는 사람의 生活이 잇슬 것이다. 그 生活은 國境이 달은 것이나 亦是 우리와 가튼 生活이리라. 내가 살든 그 곳에서 이렇케 멀리 와서도 사람의 生活이 잇는가 턱업는 忘想이 생긴다.

그는 목적지 신경(新京)을 향하는 열차가 정차하는 역의 풍경을 바라보며 낯선 환경에서도 역시 일상이 펼쳐질 것임을 떠올리기도 한다. 또한 그는 “驚異하고 感激하든 異國調”를 “運命의 日常으로 斷念하는 餘裕”를 갖게 되었다며 이는 “異國의 壓力現實의 冷酷에 妥協할 재조(재주)”라고 스스로를 위로하기도 한다. 그런데, 일상을 받아들이는 작자의 ‘여유’는 국경 너머의 일상을 ‘단념하며 받아들여야 하는 운명’이라는 말과 역설적으로 공존하고 있다. 그의 ‘여유’는 불안과 걱정이라는 또 다른 의미로 읽힌다. 그가 차창의 얼음에 두었던 시선은, 열차 안 이국의 지폐를 바라보는 시선과도 같았다. 조선에서는 만주를 다녀온 친구들이 보여준 구경거리에 불과했던 이 이국의 지폐는 “在來의 生活과 制度가 다를 것”을 실감하게 해주었다.

그는 열차 안에서 앞으로 펼쳐질 인생과 일상에 대해 골몰하는 과정을 겪으면서, 열차 안팎

18) 이태준, 「만주기행(滿洲紀行)」, 『무서록(無序錄)』, 1940. “중국 조정의 한림(翰林) 황찬(黃瓚)이 당시에 요동(遼東)에서 귀양살이를 하고 있었으므로 성삼문 등에게 황찬을 찾아가 음운을 물어보고 오라고 명하였는데, 성삼문은 요동을 갔다 온 것이 무릇 13번이나 되었다.” 했는데, 서거정(徐居正) 역시 자세히 기록하고 있다.” 『국역 오주연문장전산고』, 「반절(反切)과 번뉴(翻紐)에 대한 변증설」, 고전번역원 db에서 인용.

19) 그에 관한 정보는 잘 알려져 있지 않지만, 만주 도착 후 신문사 사람들이 마중을 나왔다는 것으로 보아 관련 직장을 얻었던 것으로 보인다. 리형주, 「만주초창기(滿洲草創期)-딸에게 보내는 편신(片信)」, 『만선일보』 1940년 2월 13일~15일.; 「속만주초창기(續滿洲草創期)-딸에게 보내는 편신(片信)」, 『만선일보』 1940년 2월 28일~3월 6일.



에서 들려오는 일본어에 제국의 힘에 감탄하며 이처럼 “이기고야 말아야 함”을 상기한다. 그는 미래에 대한 불안을 이겨내고, 만주를 기회의 땅<sup>20)</sup>으로 만들고 제국의 국민이 되어야 하는 것이다.

그는 만주에 도착하여 누군가에게 뺨을 맞는 느낌을 받는다. 만주의 혹독하게 추운 날씨 때문이었다. 하지만, 또 다른 이유는 다음과 같은 구절에서 찾을 수 있을 것이다.

故郷에서 맛본 生活敗北 以上の 荒涼한 敗자의 骸骨을 이 벌판에 널게 될 것이 아닐가. 몸서리 치는 일이다.

### 3. 잃어버린 말, 잃어버린 일상: ‘국제도시’ 하얼빈<sup>21)</sup>

이곳은 國際都市라 毎日 出入 하는 記者 中에도 맞다면(만나면) 눈으로만 인사만 할 뿐 말은 서로 통치 못하는 일이 각금 있다. 內地人을 비롯하여 鮮, 滿, 露-이러게 되고 보니 滿語와 露語는 방금 죽인대도 모르는 나라 그들과 毎日갓치 만나면서도 한 번도 이야기할 수 업는 것은 가슴만 답답한 일이다. 더욱이 오늘처음 만난 女記者는 滿語박게 모르고 나는 日鮮語 박게 모르고…

엄시우(嚴時雨), 「外勤기자의 하로」, 『만선일보』, 1940년 12월 15, 17일.

언어의 문제는 ‘오족협화(五族協和)’의 ‘왕도낙토(王道樂土)’ 만주국이 프로파간다로 메꿀 수 없는 현실의 문제를 단적으로 드러낸다. 『만선일보』 기자 엄시우에게 오족협화의 땅 만주국은 소통의 어려움을 겪어야만 하는 일상의 장소였다.<sup>22)</sup> 이것은 당시 타국이라는 공간에서 조선인들이 일반적으로 겪었을 어려움이기도 하였다. 예컨대, “長春, 哈爾濱 등을 부유”하는 “5.6년이나 되는 外國의 여행” 중 “露語, 漢語, 日語 세 가지”를 사용해야 하는 “지리한 여행”의 과정에서 “3國 말이 어느 것 하나 충분히 되는 것이 업”다는 토로<sup>23)</sup>에서는 언어 공간의 경계인으로서 느끼는 소외감을 엿볼 수 있다.

만주국 성립 이후 발간된 연세대학교 소장본 『大哈爾濱案内(指南)』(哈爾濱 : 大哈爾濱案内社, 昭和8[1933], 러시아어 제목은 Velikii Kharbin)를 보면 하얼빈은 31개국과 기타로 분류된 국가들로 구성된 도시였고<sup>24)</sup> 각각 동일한 내용으로 구성된 일본어, 중국어, 러시아어, 순으

20) 1931년 만주 사변 이후 조선의 병참기지화 정책의 실시와 더불어 만주와 조선에 대자본이 유입되고 특히 만주에 대한 대규모 경제투자가 이루어진, 이른바 ‘만주 붐’이 일어나자, 조선인 자본가나 일반인 모두에게 부를 축적하고 출세할 수 있는 ‘새로운 기회의 땅’으로 부각되었다. 일제 강점기 한국인의 만주인식에 대한 자세한 논의는 김도형 외, 『식민지시기 재만조선인의 삶과 기억』, 연세국학총서 102~103, 선인, 2009, 84~113쪽.

21) 줄고(拙稿), 「‘국제도시의 기억’-1920-30년대 조선인의 만주기행문 속 하얼빈(Memories of 'International City' in 20th Century: Harbin in Manchuria Travel Essays by Joseon Writers)」(『중국어학총』 Vol.34, 2011)의 일부이며, 발표문의 주제에 맞게 수정하였다.

22) 당시 만주지역에는 조선인, 일본인, 한족, 만주족, 백계 러시아인 등이 공존하고 있었다. 그러나 오족협화, 왕도낙토의 땅으로 선전된 위만주국(僞萬洲國)의 실상은 민족간 차별과 갈등이 존재하였다. 실질적으로 일제는 일본인을 제1국민으로 대우하고 민족간 등급을 나누어 차별하였고, 민족간 갈등을 유발하여 서로를 견제하도록 만들었다. 자세한 논의는 야마무로 신이치(山室信一) 지음, 윤대석 옮김, 『키메라 만주국의 초상』, 서울: 소명출판, 2009.

23) 김성룡(金成龍), 「凹面子の 夫婦旅行」, 『개벽』 제29호, 1922년 11월 1일

24) 홍종인의 글 「哀愁의 하르빈」(『조광(朝光)』 1937년 8월호)을 보면, “案内書에 써워있는 바를 보건 단 일흠이 뚜렷한 人種만도 三十四个 民族에 또 기타 어떤 種族인지 몰으지만 其他 部類에드는 種族까지있고 領事館을 가진 種族만도 十五个國、國際都市라기보다 混血의 都市이다.”라고 하여 안내서

로 합쳐진 한편으로 편집되어 있다.<sup>25)</sup> 맨 처음 부분인 일본어로 된 내용이 가장 상세하고 러시아어와 중국어로 된 내용은 부분적으로 생략된 부분이 있다. 이는 당시 하얼빈의 공간 지배력을 반영하며, 조선말은 제도 안에 존재할 수 없었다는 사실을 재확인해준다.

“하필 조선말을 하는 사람이 아편쟁이가 될게 무어람”

『만선일보』 기자였던 엄시우의 「外勤기자의 하로」(『만선일보』 1940년 12월)에서는 하얼빈의 길거리에서 군중들에 둘러싸여 싸움을 벌이는 이들의 “조선말”은 “鴨綠江 건너설 때에는 靑雲의 壯志를 품었슬 것임에 틀림업”었을 동포에 대한 안타까움과 조선인의 비참한 처지를 상기시킨다. 반면, 전무길은 “가방을 들고 自動車를 運轉시키기가 未安스럽게” 느껴졌을 정도의 “高級人種” 백인의 유창한 일본어 솜씨에 일본의 정치적 힘을 더욱 실감하고, 문득 이토 히로부미를 죽인 안중근을 떠올리며<sup>26)</sup> “感慨無量”한다.<sup>27)</sup> 이처럼 당시 조선인에게 만주국의 언어는 단순한 소통의 수단일 수 없었던 것이다.

한편, 1920년대에는 조선인들이 만주 여행 중 필담을 사용하여 언어가 통하지 않는 사람들과 직접 대화를 나누는 한자문화권의 소통의 방식이 발견되기도 하지만<sup>28)</sup>, 1930년대 ‘국제도시’ 하얼빈에서는 예컨대, “言語도 風俗도 通하지 안은 異國의 손이 큰 顧客”을 상대하는 단서가 “병어리의 웃슴”을 지으며 춤추는 순간을 “生活의 不安、情緒의 混迷를 불사르는 듯하다”고 “집작”<sup>29)</sup>하며 백계러시아인의 처지를 동정할 뿐이다. 이처럼 언어의 불통과 만주 ‘관람’을 통한 타자화의 흔적은 대부분의 하얼빈 기행문뿐만 아니라, 주지하다시피, 1930년대의 기획된 기행문에서도 많이 발견할 수 있다.

하얼빈 기행문의 주된 내용을 구성하는 하얼빈의 ‘이국정조(異國情調)’는 백계러시아인에 대한 것이 대부분이었으며, 특히 백계 러시아인 여성을 상세히 묘사하는 방식으로 반복되어 형상화되고 소비되었다. 이러한 기행문 안에서, 이들 타자화된 이들의 ‘일상’은 흥밋거리가 될 수 없었다.<sup>30)</sup>

를 참고하여 하얼빈을 여행하였음을 알 수 있다.『大哈爾濱案内(指南)』의 경우 31개 국가와 기타로 구분하고, 16개국의 영사관이 있다고 소개된 반면, 흥종인의 경우 34개 민족, 15개국의 영사관이 있다고 하여, 똑같은 안내서가 아닌 것으로 보이나, 만주국에 대한 안내서가 하얼빈 여행에 주요한 정보를 제공한 것으로 보인다.

25) 이 책에 보면 조선인은 “日本朝鮮人”으로 분류되어 일본에 소속되어 있으며, 만주국 인구 217000여 명을 제외하고, 1932년 인구의 수는 蘇聯인과 蘇聯無籍인이 48000여명으로 가장 많고, 日本內地人 2700여명, 조선인이 3200여명, 中華民國人이 1130여명이다. 만주국 성립 직후 간행한 이 안내서는 새로운 만주국 체제 하에 정비된 하얼빈을 알리기 위한 것으로 보인다.

26) 『만국부인』제1호 1932년 10월 1일자 기사를 보면, 당시 안중근을 소재로 한 극이 공연되었다는 기록으로 보아, 안중근이 하얼빈에서 이토 히로부미를 저격한 사건이 사회에 적지 않은 반향을 일으켰음을 짐작할 수 있지만, 하얼빈을 대상으로 한 기행문에서 안중근에 대한 서술은 거의 찾아보기 힘든 것은, 기행문이 신문, 잡지에 실리면서 일제의 검열을 받았기 때문인 것으로 보인다.

27) 전무길, 「만주주간기(滿洲走看記)」, 『동아일보』 1936년 1월 24일~31일.

28) 본고에서는 전통시기 동아시아의 공통 문자였던 한자를 이용한 전통적 문화교류 수단이었던 필담과 한시의 수창이 당시 만주 여행 과정에서 여전히 유용했다는 점에 주목하고, 1930년대 이전 만주 기행문을 구성하는 주요한 부분이었다고 판단하였다. 여행자들은 이러한 전통적 글쓰기를 통해 단순한 만주 ‘관광’에 머무르지 않고, 직접적으로 만주지역의 사람들과 시대적 상황에 대한 정보나 인간적 정감을 나누고자 하는 태도를 보였다. 필담은 언어적 장벽을 넘어 세대와 성별을 아우르며 교류할 수 있는 문화적 수단이었고, 자세한 내용은, 허경진·강혜중, 「근대 조선인의 만주 기행문 생성 공간-1920-1930년대를 중심으로-」, 『한국문학논총』 제57집, 2011.

29) 흥종인, 앞의 글.

30) 이는 하얼빈 기행문의 상업성과 식민지 조선인 여행자라는 특수한 입장, 즉 러시아의 문화가 숨쉬는

물론 반드시 ‘잃어버린 일상’이 ‘잃어버린 언어’ 때문만은 아니었다. 여성 작가 나혜석(羅蕙錫)은 길가에서 “形形色色 모자와 살 비치난(살이 비치는) 옷을 입은 미인들을 관찰하지만, 여성의 외모를 성적 대상으로 묘사하면서 평가하거나 혹은 경멸하는 식의 이국정조의 대상으로 집중하지 않는다. 오히려 “부녀생활과 오락기관”이라는 부분을 할애하여 여성들이 여유 있게 식사를 준비하고 낮잠을 자고, 한담을 나누고, 화장을 하고 “활동사진관, 극장, 舞蹈場”에서 문화를 즐기는 일상을 서술한다.<sup>31)</sup> 나혜석의 관심은 하얼빈 여성이 얼마나 선정적인 옷을 입었는지의 여부보다는, 하얼빈의 “婦女の衣服”을 마련하는 방식에 있으며, “여름이면 다림질, 겨울이면 다뒀이질로 一生을 虛費하는” 조선인 여성의 일상의 문제점을 꼬집기도 한다. 이는 그가 여성으로서 하얼빈의 거리를 걸으며 “사람머리만큼 돌이 깔니여 굽 높흔 구두로 거를나면 매오 힘이 든다.”는 중요한 사실을 경험하듯이, 하얼빈이 여성에게 어떠한 일상의 공간인지를 알고자 했기 때문이다.

최정옥은 조선인의 기행문에 강조된 하얼빈의 환락가의 모습에 반해, 하얼빈의 30년대를 배경으로 한 중국 작가 爵靑의 소설 「某夜」를 분석하면서, 사람들을 끌어 모으는 이국정조는 실제로 하얼빈에 거주하는 주민의 입장에서 전혀 들어맞지 않고, 그곳을 잠시잠간 지나치는 자들과 타향으로 여기는 자들에게 주어진 환상일 뿐이라고 한다. “이국정조 따위란 없다”는 것이다.<sup>32)</sup>

만주국에 장기 체류하면서 하얼빈을 여행한 것으로 추정되는 회성(晦城)의 글 「北國의 서울 哈爾濱」(『북향』, 1936)에서는 하얼빈을 방문한 조선인 여행자들이 화려하게 묘사한 “中國거리”, “키타아스카야”가 짧게 서술되고 있으며, 하얼빈의 이국정서에 호기심을 느끼는 태도도 찾을 수 없다. 그의 글에서는 하얼빈 ‘안내서’에 기획된 화려한 하얼빈 공간이 아닌, 관광객들은 잘 접근하지 않을 좁은 골목에 위치한 공간의 속소를 묘사한다. 방인근 역시 「滿洲旅行記」(『동아일보』 1925년 9월)에서 지저분한 중국인 거리를 묘사하고 있지만, 회성은 하얼빈의 어두운 현실을 직접 ‘체험’한다는 데에서 차이가 있으며, 하얼빈을 관찰하고, 화려한 도시 문화를 상세히 감각적으로 표현하던 다수의 기행문들과는 대조적이다.

그는 “새우같이 꼬부린 나그네”의 “돌같이 단단한 寢臺”가 있는 “三層 어느 구석방”, “음침한 十五號室”에 대해 상세히 묘사한다. 환락가 하얼빈의 밤이 아니라 “흐리 텅텅한 都市의 아침”의 풍경을 담아낸다. 또한, “흰 옷 빨내”와 “빨간 고초”가 널린 익숙한 풍경이지만 “음침”한 집에 사는 조선인의 생활을 묻고자 한다. 이것은 만주 기행문이라는 ‘관람’<sup>33)</sup> 안에서 소외되었던 상품화된 하얼빈의 감추어진 현실을 포착하고 기억하려는 태도이다.

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하얼빈 공간과 그 공간에서 경계인으로 살아가는 백계러시아인의 처지의 아이러니한 상황을 포착하는 태도에 기인한 것이었다. 즉, 조선인이 하얼빈에서 느끼는 “애수(哀愁)”의 감정은 국가와 고향의 부재에 대한 슬픔이 백계 러시아인들을 통해 투영된 것이었다.

31) 「쓰비엣 露西亞行, 歐米遊記의 其一」, 『삼천리』제4권 제12호, 1932년 12월 1일

32) 최정옥은 이효석이 하얼빈을 그리듯 외부 시선이 포착하는 ‘동양의 파리’와 같은 이미지와 실제 거주하는 중국인의 관점이 다른 점을 강조한다. 최정옥, 「爵靑 소설에 나타난 하얼빈의 도시 이미지」, 『만주연구』 제9집, 2009, 19쪽.

33) 이경훈은 만주가 “왕도낙토”의 슬로건과 더불어 “정의(正義) 일본”과 만주국의 근대화를 과시하기 위한 “관광낙토”였음을 지적하면서, “제국주의적인 국가의 기획”과 관련 있는 만주 관광의 성격을 분석하고 있다. 이경훈, 「식민지와 관광지-만주라는 근대극장」, 『사이 間 SAI』 제6호, 국제한국문화문화학회, 2009.

#### 4. 만주국의 조선인 운전수 조학래의 일상

앞 장에서 언급한 『종합산문(2)』에는, 재만조선인들의 정착기간이 일정 정도 지난 1930년대 말부터 1940년대의 만주국 정착기에 속하는 수필들이 적지 않게 발견되며, 이 중 다수는 『만선일보』에 게재된 것이다. 그 중에는 조학래(趙鶴來)<sup>34</sup>의 글 7편- 「잠못자는 이한밤」(1939년 12월 13일~15일 연재), 「孤淚苦-봄은 이러케 왔다 이러케 간다」(1940년 5월 8일~10일 게재), 「事故」(1940년 8월 25일), 「冬風賦」(1941년 12월 16, 17, 19일 연재), 「處置室」(1940년 1월 26일, 29일 게재) 「돈, 벗, 그老人-“處置室”의 續稿로-」(1940년 2월 1~9일 게재), 「放浪歌」(1940년 11월 17일 게재)도 차례로 수록되어 있다. 최삼룡은 『종합산문(1)』에 수록된 해제의 <4. 기타 무명문인들의 산문>에서 “동포들의 궁핍한 삶의 현장을 조명한 산문들”의 대표작으로 조학래의 「孤淚苦-봄은 이러케 왔다 이러케 간다」와 「冬風賦」를 소개한다. 그는 『재만조선인 친일문학작품집』(2008)에도 조학래의 시를 수록한 바 있는데, 이 책의 해제에서도 “압록강, 두만강을 건너온 동포들의 삶의 애환이나 망향의식을 담은 시가 다수 있어 재만조선인 문학사에 뚜렷한 흔적을 남겼다.”라고 평가하였다. 그러나 그가 1940년대 초에 이르러 「滿洲에서(獻詩)」, 「春風第一章」, 「流域」 등과 같이 “만주국의 현실생활을 미화하고 왜곡한 시를 썼다.”면서, 그를 친일작가로 분류하였다. 조학래는 이처럼 양가적 평가를 받았는데, 본고에서 주목한 『종합산문(2)』에 수록된 작품에는 노골적인 만주국 예찬에 관한 내용은 포함되어 있지 않으며, 자신의 일상의 경험과 고백이 내용의 주를 이루는 가운데, 무기력한 일상의 침울과 삶의 자극에 대한 갈망, 고향에 대한 그리움 등을 서술하고 있다.

그의 글의 주된 정서인 ‘침울’은 상실감과 무력감에 기인한다. 「잠못자는 이한밤」에서 작자는 “故郷을 떠난 이천리 타국”에서 “明朗하지도 못한 안기뿌지도 안흔 事件을 끝까지 쫓쫓드리 追憶해보려는 空想”이 “잠못자는 밤마다 밤마다 반복되는 행사”라고 말한다. 그는 “아득한 空想 속의 이를 수 업는 幻想”을 찾아 “거미줄이 複雜한 天井만 쳐다볼 뿐”이다. ‘천정’은 그의 삶을 상징적으로 설명하는 소재다. 「孤淚苦-봄은 이러케 왔다 이러케 간다」에 포함되어 있는 아버지의 편지에도 타국에 있는 아들의 그리워하며 천정을 바라본다. 아버지와 아들은 넘을 수 없는 국경 같은 “천정”을 사이에 두고 있다.

그는 스스로를 “惡魔가튼 黃金”에 울며 정을 그리워하는 “타국에 흐르는 외로운 “집씨””라고 말한다. 이룬 것 없는 자신의 현실에서 세월의 허무함 느끼고, 벗어날 수 없는 현실에서 “來日이라는 宿題”를 감내하며, “未知의 生活劇”을 “未知의 感覺”으로 “단잠에서 享受할 수 있는 사람들”의 일상을 부러워하는 일상을 반복한다.

「孤淚苦-봄은 이러케 왔다 이러케 간다」에는 고된 현실에서도 봄이라는 생동의 계절에 모처럼 “自我의 開拓한 境地를 打診”하고자 한다. 자신의 ‘봄’은 “蘇生이나 躍動的 逆境”을 외롭게 견고 있다고 생각도 해본다. 그러나 어김없이 돌아온 일요일을 보내는 그의 낮의 일상은, “지극히 사랑하는 戀人”도 없고, “親友와의 화락한 談話의 시간”도 가질 수 없으며, “구시가지 고리타분하게 건조한 거리 말뚝의 惡臭”를 맡으며 살아가는 그런 “宿命에 잠겨서” 지낼 뿐이다.

“7일 만에 돌아오는 일요일”을 “沈鬱한 宿舎에서 白晝夢을 벗삼아 枯渴”하고 만 채, 무일푼

34) 『종합산문(1)』(2010)에 수록된 「해방 전 조선족산문 개관」에 따르면, 조학래가 만주국 교통부에서 운전수로 일했으며, 해방 후 조선에서 아동문학작품과 시를 쓰고, 조선작가동맹 아동분과위원회의 지도부에서 일했다는 기록이 발견된다고 한다.

으로 거리를 나서 우울해지는 기분을 이미 예측하는 가련한 자신을 자각한다. “성장”하지 못하고 “退步로 退步로” 걷는 자신의 모습에서 벗어날 수 없는 현실 속에 문득 받아드는 아버지의 편지는 ‘삼대 독자 아들’에게 “제일 그리운 소식이면서도 제일 두려운 서신”이다.

직장을 주제로 글을 쓰라는 제안을 받고 쓴 작품 「事故」에서는 만주국교통부의 운전수인 자신의 직업이 내세울 것 없다고 말하지만, “滿洲國官廳”이라는 “제법 훌륭하기는”한 직장에 속했다는 자부심을 드러내기도 한다. 그러나 그가 몇 달 뒤에 쓴 글 「돈, 벗, 그 老人-處置室의 續稿로-」에 의하면, 그는 “관청속직실”에서 기거하는 신세“이며, 남의 눈치를 보고 속직실에 누워 있는 것보다, 입원해 있는 것이 더 편안한 처지이다. 일요일 오후에도 그는 “기름때가 배인 協和服”을 입고서 “마음이 업시” 거리로 나갔고, 이제는 고향 아닌 고향이 되어버린 그곳에서, ‘공상’과 ‘환상’과 ‘현실’이 혼돈 하는 “교차하는 정세(情勢)”아래 서 있는 스스로를 “광인(狂人)”이라 일컫는다. 그는 자신의 “가면의 생활”에 “우울이 잊었고 증오가 잊을 뿐”이며, “내 생활의 기폭이 업숨을 탄식하고 원망할 뿐”이라는 진단을 내린다. 히스테릭한 감정은 일상의 균열된 틈으로 촘촘하게 비집고 드러난다.

한편, 문학의 길을 함께 걷는 동료이자 한 여성을 두고 삼각관계에 처했던 친구에게 술을 마시고 쓰는 편지의 형식으로 작성된 「放浪歌」에 흐르는 작자의 격정적 감정의 과잉상태가, 어찌 보면 다른 작품에 비하여 일종의 생동감으로 느껴지기도 한다. “昇華된 인간의 靈은 純화된 심볼이다.”라고 시작하는 시구와 같은 구절을 맨 앞에 배치한 후, 그는 친구의 이름을 부르며 “極히 單調로운 生活이다.”라는 문장을 시작으로 글을 적어 내려간다. 지독한 사랑과 깊은 우정을 갈망했던 필자는 문학을 하는 동지이자 친구에 대한 우정을 위해 사랑을 포기한 자신의 삶을 회고하며 모처럼 삶의 “기폭”을 맞이한 것이며, 이러한 글을 쓰는 행위가 바로 그가 바라던 바의 단조로운 일상의 “기폭제”인 것이다. 비로소 그는 “방랑자”이지만 “고향이 있는 사람”으로 행복하게 ‘회고’될 수 있다. 하지만, 이는 만주의 현실에 실재하지 않고, 회상 속에서만 맛볼 수 있는 ‘환상’을 꿈꾸는 작업이다.

몇몇 작품에는, 조선인 동포뿐만 아니라, ‘滿人’에 대한 내용도 등장한다. 「事故」는 그가 滿人들의 혼잡한 시장을 가로질러 가까운 거리도 “처장이며 과장들을 모시어”다니는 성가신 일을 평소대로 수행하던 어느 날 겪은 사고에 관한 이야기다. 그는 자전거를 타고 “사이다”를 옮기던 “萬人少年”과 부딪치는 사고를 겪게 된다. 둘은 서로의 언어로 잘잘못을 따지지만 알아듣지 못한다. 조학래는 소년이 하는 만주어를 들리는 대로 기록할 뿐이다. 소통의 단절은 이미 일상이 되어버린 듯하다. 이 사건은 파출소에 가서 해결된다. 경찰은 서로의 말을 듣고, “人情으로 判斷”하자고 중재하고, 작자는 물건 값을 절반쯤 물어주기로 한다. 돈을 건네주자 그제서야 소년은 작가에게 화색이 도는 얼굴로 경례를 하고 돌아가고, 뒤숭숭한 작자는 대충 하루 일과를 마무리한다.

조학래는 입원의 경험을 풀어낸 「處置室」과 그 속편 작품에서도 만인과 함께 살아가며 소통의 불편을 겪는 일상의 모습을 그리고 있다. 입원을 위해 안과병동에 들어선 작자는 만인들이 가득한 병실에서 스스로가 “침입자” 같다는 느낌을 받고, 조선인 한사람을 발견하고는 큰 위안을 얻는다. 이들 입원 환자들은 시간이 지나면서 점차, 함께 일상을 보내며 서로 이야기를 나누는데, “滿語”를 모르는 작자 자신은 스스로를 “귀먹어리”와 같았다고 묘사하지만, 그 역시 함께 입원한 이들에게 관심을 보인다.

그는 안과 병동의 만인들이 눈이 보이지 않아 시간을 잘못 보거나, 맑은 하늘을 바라보면 눈이 온다고 말하는 상황을 등을 희극적으로 그려낸다. 눈이 보이지 않는 “滿人青年”이 서투른

일본어 발음으로 말하는 것을 그대로 적으며 “奇妙한 極彩”라는 감상평을 내놓기도 한다. 그러나 조학래는 동시에 이것이 “고단한 시간”이며, 병원의 “괴이한 풍경”은 현실에서 웃어버리지 못한 “현실의 고해”라고 토로한다.

그는 병원에서 문득 일상의 자유를 감사하게 생각하며, 일상을 보내는 창 밖 풍경 속 사람들을 부럽게 바라본다. 그리고 그 창문에 비추는 자신의 모습을 보고, “생활의 건강을 일(잃은) 細民들의 집”에 앉아 있음을 깨닫는다. 자신의 모습은 결코 “침입자”가 아니었으며, 만인들은 자신과 같은 처지의 사람들이었음을 새삼스럽게 깨닫는 단적인 장면이다.

이 글의 속편인 「돈, 벼, 그 老人-處置室의 續稿로-」에서는 필자의 슬픈 감정은 이 동질감에서 오는 ‘동정(同情)’으로 구체화된다. “一種 戲劇을 보는 感”이 있었으나 “우서버리지 못할 悲哀에 가까운 感情에 찬 것이 이 病室”이었던 이유도 이 때문이었다. 일정하게 머무를 곳이 없이, 온갖 식당을 다니며, 때로는 하루 한 끼를 먹으며 빈 주머니를 움켜쥐며 견뎠던 그는, 끼니 걱정을 하지 않고, 관청속직실과는 달리 남의 눈치를 보면서 누워 쭈뼛스러움을 느낄 필요도 없는 병실에 편안함을 느낀다. 특히 그는 병실에서 타지의 친구들에게 입원 소식을 알리고, 그 친구들로부터 간호를 해주어 미안하다는 편지와 함께 작은 위로금을 받기도 한다. 고마우면서도 어쩐지 친구들에게 미안해진 그는 “眞情의 함(‘한’의 잘못된 글자인 듯) 및바닥(밑바닥)으로 흐르는 良心의 搖動”을 견잡을 수 없이 느낀다고 고백한다.

며칠이 지나고, 같은 입원실의 사람들이 이제는 서로 이름도 알게 될 무렵, 이들은 퇴원을 준비한다. 조학래는 아직 심각한 병을 채 치료하지 못하고 퇴원 수속을 밟는 만인 노인의 친구들에게 노인의 병을 치료할 돈을 변통해보라고 “되지 안는 滿語를 두루 주어 부쳐서”소리를 질러 보지만, 결국 그 노인은 퇴원하고 만다. 조학래가 잊지 못하는 “알지 못할 말로 허리를 굽혀가면서 인사를 하고 가든 老人의 뒷잔등”에는 자신과 달리 친구들의 “同情”을 받지 못하는 안타까움과 자신과 같은 가난을 ‘앓고’ 있다는 동병상련의 감정이 투사된다.

이듬해인 1941년 겨울에 발표한 「冬風賦」에서 작자는 그해 여름부터 자신이 살고 있는 신경(新京)에서 살기 싫어졌다고 말하며, 그 이유를 자신의 “生活態度” 탓으로 돌린다.

세상에는 平凡한 事實들이 얼마든지 있다. 그러나 平凡한 속에 眞實이 있고 平凡한 속에 非凡이 생기리라. 洞察力이 세고, 主義나 觀念이 좀 더 個性적이었더라면, 그 平凡 속에서 眞實로 발견했을 터이요, 非凡한 일도 어더(얼어)보았을는지 모르지만, 哀惜하게도 今日까지 그러지를 못했다.“

「冬風賦」

그의 글에서는 스스로에 대한 자기 반성적 태도와 진정과 양심에 대한 갈망이 때때로 발견된다. 그러나 그는 7편의 수필에서 자신을 압도시킨 사회와 제도에 대한 이야기는 등장하지 않는다. 친구 R이 힘겨운 신경생활을 끝내고 고향에서 더 먼 북경으로 떠나기 전날 하염없이 울던 일을 기록하면서, 그는 “自己人生에 웃고 自己人生에 눈물을 흘리면서 結局은 自己陶醉로서 平生을 살아가는 사람들”이라고 말하며, 자신의 감정을 “靑春의 感傷”, “人生의 哀愁”, “人情의 哀愁”에 흘리는 “갑업는 눈물”이라고 치부해버린다. 그는 자신의 가장 소중한 가치인 가족과 친구, 사랑하는 사람 그리고 문학에 대한 충만한 사랑의 감정을 현실에서 끊임없이 갈구하지만, 깊은 무기력과 외로움을 느낀다.

## 5. 맺음말

이 글에 등장하는 이들의 공통점은 모두 만주로 가는 국경을 넘었다는 것이다. 그들에게 국경 체험은 각각 기대와 실망, 놀라움, 슬픔, 두려움 등을 느끼는 저마다의 '환상'의 공간을 경험하는 의식이었으며, 특히, 국경 공간은 제도에 대한 상상적 표상과 실제 사이의 균열을 새삼스럽게 인식하는 장소로 그려졌다. 조선인 여행자들에게 국경은 타국 문화의 이국적 정취에 대한 기대를 불러일으키거나, 제국의 힘을 경험하며 식민지인으로서의 좌절이나 투쟁 의지를 불러일으키는 장소였다. 또한, 그 곳을 삶의 터전으로 삼아야 했던 조선인 이주자에게는 앞으로 펼쳐질 낯선 일상의 불안과 위안의 복합적 감정을 느끼는 공간이기도 하였다.

이 글에서 다루고 있는 조선인 이주자 리형주와 조학래라는 글쓰기의 주체들은, 당대 제국주의 이데올로기에 압도당한 채 동조하며 일상의 불안에 떨고 있거나, 혹은 상처받은 현실의 무기력이 보내는 일상의 신호들을 견뎌내는 장면들을 서술하고 있다. 그런데 그들의 글에서는 자신이라는 소외된 타자를 응시하지만, 이 타자를 만들어내는 사회 구조에 대한 응시의 흔적은 지워져있다. '타자'가 만들어지는 공간에 대한 성찰 없이 소통은 불가능했으나, 서로의 일상을 무심코 '관찰'하던 공간에서 '공감'하며, '잃어버린 언어'를 찾아 소통을 시도하고자 한 흔적을 발견할 수도 있었다.

이와 같은 만주 공간에 대한 기록의 행간에서 읽어낼 거리들은 여전히 남아있다. 만주 지역을 거쳐 간 일상의 기록 속의 다종다양한 화자만큼이나 다종다양한 청자가 필요하다. 이를 위해서, 한국학 안팎의 학문적 국경을 넘는 노력도 필요하다. 이는 한국학을 형성해온 상상과 담론의 균열지점을 찾아내고, 한국학에 대한 새로운 공감의 좌표에서 '공생의 언어'와 인문성을 발견하는 시도이기도 하다.





Korean as Transitional Literacy: Language Policy and Korean  
Colonial Education, 1910 – 1919

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## Introduction

To describe modern Korean history as a transitional period marked by momentous transformations has become a cliché echoed by many scholars on East Asia. Reciting the usual list of Kapo Reform items, the string of unprecedented international treaties, or statistics on the spread of Christianity during Korea's early modern period, however, often fails to provide a nuanced picture of these transformative processes, and does less to regionally and globally contextualize Korea's modernization trajectory. One area of research that has garnered meager albeit growing attention in Korean history is the intersection of language, literacy, and education, the examination of which demands this sort of transnational perspective, as well as an interdisciplinary methodology. Within the colonial paradigm, a transnational conceptualization is indeed the only way to fundamentally grasp the linguistic configuration or landscape<sup>1</sup> as it was actualized in the colonial public school. Focusing on the first decade of Japanese colonial rule in Korea (1910-1919), I examine the interaction between the Korean language and the various other languages and écritures that constituted the colonial linguistic landscape. I argue that a multiplicity of factors influenced the formation of literacies during this period, including the interactive (and necessarily competitive) relationships between languages as well as writing practices, the development of literature and writing styles, processes of translation, and dictionary compilation. Despite the functioning of these various processes, the ultimate vector of literacy establishment and linguistic dominance was the Japanese public school and its language policies due to its primary institutional role in normalizing language legitimization. By tracing the shifting contours of the linguistic configuration from the outset of colonial rule, I attempt to reveal how the foundations of subsequent cultural hegemony were laid, while simultaneously contributing to the development of a more nuanced understanding of change and transition in modern Korean history, especially at the underexplored intersection of Korean language, literacy, and education.

Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 initiated a host of changes while accelerating the pace of ongoing transformations, most notably in the realms of language and education. Educational reforms pursued prior to annexation were terminated, disrupted, or co-opted by colonial authority, while the

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<sup>1</sup> By linguistic landscape, I mean the specific configuration of languages—both spoken and written—that populate both the discourses and the physical environment of a country or region at a specific time. Inspired by Yasuda's notion of 'language configuration' *gengohensei* (言語編制) and its military connotations, this linguistic landscape or 'configuration' implies the arraying of languages in competition with each other on a contested 'terrain.' The geophysical metaphor also implies the relative significance of certain languages (mountains) in relation to others (valleys), and the gradual transformation of this 'landscape' over time (i.e. 'erosion' of a language). Therefore, this conception of the linguistic landscape shares not only the general meaning of "the social context in which more than one language is present" implying "the use in speech or writing of more than one language and thus multilingualism" employed by Sciriha and Vassallo and Kreslins, the language in its written form in the public sphere, but also the military connotation of Yasuda's *gengohensei* terminology. In this work I employ the terms more or less interchangeably, but the usage of 'landscape' implies a slightly more neutral sense, while 'configuration' should invoke the competition of the languages in a given linguistic landscape. See Yasuda Toshiaki, *Teikoku Nihon no gengohensei* [The Language Configuration of Imperial Japan] (Tōkyō: SeoriShōbō, 1997); Gorter, *Linguistic Landscape: A New Approach to Multilingualism* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2006), 1-3.

national public school system was significantly revised. One of the most important aspects of this transformation during the first decade of colonial rule was the language policy which accompanied it, namely the designation of Japanese as the ‘national language’ (*kokugo*) and the consequential demotion of Korean to ‘local language’. While Japanese was instituted as the language of instruction throughout the curriculum, reinforcing its diffusion, Korean was maintained along with Literary Sinitic (*hanmun*, LS) in Korean language classes only, the frequency of which decreased in subsequent grades. The proportion of Japanese to Korean teachers increased in secondary and tertiary education, resulting in a further shift toward monolingual education over time. Within this educational paradigm, the Korean language acted as a kind of linguistic scaffolding, facilitating the initial phase of a transition from Korean to Japanese for illiterate and semi-literate students. Within this linguistic encounter, the sinograph (Chinese character) played a mediational role, bridging the gap between the emergent Sino-Korean mixed script style (*kukhanmunch’e*) and the more established Japanese writing style. Overall, the schizophrenic nature of colonial language policy promoted the emergence of multiple, fractured semi-literacies: the *discourse* of Japanese as national language and the curriculum which supported it collided with Korean as *actual* first language, resulting in varying degrees of semi-literacy in Korean, Japanese, and LS reading and writing.

### Previous Scholarship

As I suggested above, the configuration of languages in colonial Korea was not merely the result of authoritative language policies imposed by the Governor General of Korea (GGK), but rather the product of multiple overlapping processes and developments in education, literature, translation, and transnational linguistic circulation. Such a complex matrix requires a multi-faceted approach which, at the risk of a superficial treatment, I attempt to outline below.

### Literary and Modernity Theory

Recent theorizations of modernity and how it relates to language and literature may shed some light on Korea’s colonial period and its linguistic landscape. For example, a number of researchers have focused on the logic of temporality, which lies at the heart of the colonial encounter, and how it structures difference and inequality, including that of a linguistic nature. Dipesh Chakrabarty reminds us that this projection of notions of coexisting “discrepant temporalities” is modernity in a nutshell,<sup>2</sup> while Johannes Fabian has noted that “the denial of coevalness that structures colonial schemes of Otherness is foundational to the project of modernity.”<sup>3</sup> Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs similarly focus on the discrepant character of modernity’s discursive construction through a discussion of purifying and hybridizing language practices.<sup>4</sup> For them, modernization has been a continual process of mediation between perceived ‘pure’ (i.e. traditional) and hybrid forms, where mediation “is a structural relationship, the synthetic bringing together of two elements...in such a way as to create a symbolic or conventional relationship between them that is irreducible to two independent dyads.”<sup>5</sup> The hybrid form, on the other hand, is an antiquity, “mediating between past and present. It is rooted in the old time, but persists in appropriately distressed form into the new.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000; Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; Richard Bauman and Charles L. Briggs, *Voices of Modernity: Language Ideologies and the Politics of Inequality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

<sup>3</sup> Bauman and Briggs, *Voices of Modernity*, 307.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid 306.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid 305.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 76.

These concepts of ‘discrepant temporalities,’ ‘the denial of coevalness,’ and the notions of purifying/hybridizing practices and mediation do much to elucidate the linguistic landscape in colonial Korea. The catalyst for reforms and transformations in the Korean language—in terms of orthography, syntax, writing style, the relative status and weight of inscriptional practices<sup>7</sup>, etc.—was the real and perceived discrepant temporality or ‘gap’ between Korean and the putative models of ‘modern’ language and literature, namely Western languages and increasingly Japanese. The circulation of teleological discourses on the backwardness and stagnation of Korean cultural forms such as language in relation to the West and Japan helped to naturalize the modernist trajectory of Korea and legitimize the language reform agenda among not only Korean intellectuals but GGK officials as well, creating a convergence of interest to some extent, and even cooperation in some instances.<sup>8</sup> Within this construct, the sinograph existed as an ‘antiquity,’ a hybrid form which mediated between the past and present, rooted in the old, but ‘persisting in distressed form into the new.’ The sinograph, forming the root of the traditional Sinosphere or ‘Sinographic Cosmopolis,’<sup>9</sup> persisted into the modern in hybridized form by taking on reconfigured syntactical and semantic roles in Korean writing<sup>10</sup> and by subsuming new semantic dimensions through the processes of translation into Japanese from Western languages, the production of neologisms that attended it, and the subsequent inundation of the Korean lexicon with such vocabulary through translation into Korean.<sup>11</sup> As I will demonstrate, the overall legitimization of the language reform agenda through naturalizing discourses on linguistic modernization and progress, combined with the mediational force of the sinograph directed the course of Korean language development within the contours of the linguistic landscape. Furthermore, the GGK public school language policies facilitated the diffusion of literacy in this constantly reconfigured language, a language that, due to the functioning of the above discursive and linguistic processes, shared progressively more commonalities with the

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<sup>7</sup> Inscriptional practices (*p’yogich’e*) refers to the choice of script, in this case the relative weight of sinograph or *han’gŭl* utilization.

<sup>8</sup> Uchiyama Akiko, “Translation as Representation: Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Representation of the “Others,”” in *Agents of Translation*, ed. John Bandia Milton, (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2009), 63-83; Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Mitsui Takahashi specifically shows instances of cooperation between Korean intellectuals and educators and the GGK on the issue of Korean orthography reform. See Mitsui Takahashi, *Singminji Chosŏn ūi ŏnŏ chibae kujo: Chosŏnŏ kyubŏmhwa munje rŭl chungsim ūro* [The Dominance of Language in Colonial Korea: A Focus on the Issue of Korean Language Regulation], (Sŏul: Somyŏng Ch’ulp’an, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> Although the term Sinosphere has been used to refer to “the traditional region in East Asia that was bound by its commitment to Literary Sinitic (Classical Chinese) and sinographs (Chinese characters),” in this present work I refer to this region as the ‘Sinographic Cosmopolis,’ highlighting the “supraregional (the *cosmos*) and the political (*polis*) of Sheldon Pollock’s Sanscrit Cosmopolis in the East Asian context while sensitive to the fact that, as Ross King points out, terms such as the ‘Sinospere’ “are too China-centric in their implications while eliding the all-important role of the writing system.” Ross King, “Introduction: Koh Jongsok’s *Infected Language*,” in Koh Jongsok, *Infected Korean Language: Purity versus Hybridity*, Trans. by Ross King, (Amherst: Cambria Press, 2014), 2; Sheldon Pollock, *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006; For a wide range of works on the Sinographic Cosmopolis, see Ross King, ed., *The Language of the Sages in the Realm of Vernacular Inscription: Reading Sheldon Pollock from the Sinographic Cosmopolis*, edited volume based on the conference, “Thinking about ‘Cosmopolitan’ and ‘Vernacular’ in the Sinographic Cosmopolis: What can We Learn from Sheldon Pollock?” held at the University of British Columbia, July 2-4, 2012.

<sup>10</sup> For a detailed explanation of this process, see Im Sang-sŏk, *20segi kukhanmunch’e ūi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng* [The Formation Process of 20<sup>th</sup>-Century Sino-Korean Writing Style], (Sŏul: Chisik Sanŏpsa, 2008).

<sup>11</sup> Hwang Ho-dŏk and Yi Sang-hyŏn, *Kaenyŏm kwa yŏksa, kŭndae Han’guk ūi ijungŏ sajŏn: oegugindŭl ūi sajŏn p’yŏnch’an saŏp ūro pon Han’gugŏ ūi kŭndae*. [Concept and History, Modern Korean Bilingual Dictionaries: Viewing Korean Linguistic Modernity Through the Foreigner Dictionary Compilation Project]. (Sŏul: Pangmunsa, 2012); Lydia Liu, “Translingual Practice: The Discourse of Individualism between China and the West,” positions 1, no. 1 (1993): 160-193.

Japanese language and served as a transitional literacy when reinforced by an educational regime aimed at the atrophying of Korean over time.<sup>12</sup>

Insofar as the formation of Korean modern literature as well was an integral part of the reconfiguration of the colonial linguistic landscape (along with colonial authority, education and language policy, dictionary compilation, etc.), the inherently political nature of this formation must be recognized. Deleuze acknowledges this fundamentally political nature with his concept of minor literature, “that [literature] which a minority constructs within a major language.”<sup>13</sup> According to Deleuze, Kafka, a Jewish writer in Prague, “marks the impasse that bars writing for the Jews of Prague and turns their literature into something impossible—the impossibility of not writing, the impossibility of writing in German, and the impossibility of writing otherwise,” resulting in a minor literature (created within Prague German, Chōsen Japanese, etc) that is characterized by a “high coefficient of deterritorialization,” appropriate for “strange and minor uses.”<sup>14</sup> Due to the concentrated confines of its use, and the impossibility of *not* writing, each individual intrigue within minor literature must connect immediately to politics because “national consciousness, uncertain or oppressed, necessarily exists by means of literature.”<sup>15</sup> Thus, minor designates not specific literatures but “the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature.”<sup>16</sup> Although writing literature in the Korean language was still a possibility in the first decade of colonial rule, this period also witnessed the initial establishment of the foundations of language and literacy/literary hegemony that exerted increasing pressure (both explicit and implicit) to produce literature in Japanese (or the minor language of Chōsen Japanese).<sup>17</sup> This concept of minor literature, therefore, provides an illuminating approach to colonial Korean literature, acknowledging its subordinate position and prescribed role as necessarily political while simultaneously mobilizing this attribute as a revolutionary potential, to write against the empire on its own terms.<sup>18</sup> In other words, while public school language policy was influential in creating

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<sup>12</sup> The policies which precipitated this atrophying include the increasing concentration of Japanese teachers in higher education, the inverse proportion of curriculum hours devoted to Korean and Japanese in primary schooling, the increasing mediational weight of *kokugo kanji* in proportion to Korean *hanja*, and the removal of vernacular Korean writing and composition from secondary schooling onward.

<sup>13</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, translated by Dana Polan, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 16; Christopher Hanscom also notes the essentially political nature of colonial or minor literature in its relation to modernism, problematizing the accepted narrative that writers not promoting a nationalist or socialist agenda represented a ‘turning inward’ under the weight of colonial censorship, away from political engagement. Hanscom claims that literary modernism in Korea “is neither an escapist aesthetic practice severed from the sociopolitical context of its production nor a derivative and partial alternative to a purportedly originary or whole European modernism.” Christopher P. Hanscom, *The Real Modern: Literary Modernism and the Crisis of Representation in Colonial Korea*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 14.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Suh Serk Bae, *Treacherous Translation: Culture, Nationalism, and Colonialism in Korea and Japan from the 1910's to the 1960's*, (Seoul: California Series in Korean Studies, 2013); Kwōn Na-yōng and Chōng Chae-wōn, “Cheguk, minjok, kūrigo sosuja chakka: Singminji sasosōl kwa singminji chaehyōn nanje.” [Empire, *Minjok*, and Minority Authors: Colonial I-Novels and the Problematic Issue of Colonial Representation], in *Chōnjaeng hanūn sinmin, singminji ūi kungmin munhwa: Singminji-mal Chosōn ūi tamnon kwa p'yosang*, edited by Naoki Watanabe, Hwang Ho-dōk and Kim Ūng-gyo, (Sōul: Somyōng Ch'ulp'an, 2010), 224-256; For a discussion of the pressure exerted by colonial censorship and the literary market on the choice of language of writing, see Han Man-su, “Singminji sigi munhak kōmyōl kwa inswae chabon,” [Colonial-era Literary Censorship and Print Capitalism], in *Singminji kōmyōl: chedo, t'eksūt'ū, silch'ōn*. [Colonial Censorship: Institution, Text, Practice], *Kōmyōl Yōn'guhoe*, 137-67, (Sōul: Somyōng Ch'ulp'an, 2011).

<sup>18</sup> Paul Bandia, “African Europhone Literature and Writing as Translation: Some Ethical Issues,” in Theo Hermans, *Translating Others, Volume 1*, (Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing, 2006).

the conditions for Korean to serve as a transitional literacy to Japanese, I question any narrative that overstates the political role of the GGK or assigns it omnipotent potential in the ultimate suppression or manipulation of the Korean language.

### Writing Style (*Munch'e*) and Linguistic Interaction

Since the late 1990's some researchers in the field of Korean language and literature have increasingly turned their attention to the development of writing styles and literary practices during the first decade of the twentieth century and into the colonial period. A number have considered the socio-historical and socio-political implications of language use during this time, an approach that is more informative to my current study than research in pure linguistics. However, the conceptualization of Japan and the colonial encounter in this research varies widely, and certain approaches are much more illuminating than others. For example, researchers such as Chŏng Kwang, Yun Ho-sŏk, and Kim Kwang-hae make welcome attempts at shedding light on an underexplored area of Korean linguistics—the influence of Japanese on the historical development of Korean and the legacy in contemporary language—but the ideology-driven premises upon which their theses rest distort their arguments and reveal a strong current of linguistic nationalism.<sup>19</sup> In “The Interference of Japanese on the National Language [*Kugŏ*],” a title that betrays the author's language ideology, Kim claims that “the issue of sinographic terms (*hanjaŏ*) introduced during the colonial period will be a protracted problem due to their wide distribution, and the method for sweeping them away is still unclear. Even though there have been attempts to replace technical language with native terms in our own language, a movement which has continued for quite some time, it has met with disappointing results.”<sup>20</sup> In a similar fashion, Yun Ho-sŏk quite unilaterally designates certain colonial translation conventions from Japanese to Korean as “mistranslations” (*oyŏk*), suggesting that a single ‘correct’ or authoritative translation could actually exist, while adopting, like Kim, the position of a political advocacy group rather than a disinterested scholar.<sup>21</sup> These positions are based in a school of thought in Korean history that views culture as originally pure and Japanese (or any other) influence as ‘interference,’ contamination that is uniformly undesirable and inherently damaging, necessitating the role of the scholar in tracking down these impure contaminants and eradicating them. On the other hand, my purpose here is to elucidate the various processes that effected transformations in the colonial linguistic landscape and a shift in the literacy field, free of any ideological judgments on the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ nature of Japanese in this relationship. All languages develop through processes of interaction, and the influence of any one language cannot be characterized as ‘interference’ in an academic discussion, no matter the historical context.

Other research in this field characterizes the role of imperial Japan (or lack thereof) in Korean literature in different though slightly problematic ways. For example Im Sang-sŏk, in his excellent treatment of the formation process of Sino-Korean mixed script (*kukhanmun*), nevertheless minimizes the role of Japanese authority and the Japanese language in a process that was fundamentally based on political and linguistic interaction.<sup>22</sup> While the gradual transition from LS syntax, grammar, semantics,

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<sup>19</sup> Chŏng Kwang, “1920-30nyŏndae munhak chakp'um e poinŭn Ilbonŏ kangmun ūi yŏngnyang,” [The Influence of Japanese Writing Seen in Literary Works of the 1920's and 1930's], in *Han'gugŏhak 2* (1996): 381-398; Yun Ho-suk, “Han'gugŏ pŏnyŏk munch'e e mich'in Ilbonŏ pŏnyŏk ūi yŏngnyang,” [The Influence of Japanese Translation on Korean Translation Writing Style], *Irŏ-Ilmunhak Yŏn'gu* 40 (2001): 77-101; Kim Kwang-hae, “Chomang: Kugŏ e taehan Ilbonŏ ūi kansŏp,” [Japanese Interference on the National Language: An Overview], Mogwŏn University, *Haebang 60nyŏn, Han'guk ōmun kwa Ilbon*, (Sŏul: Pogosa, 2006).

<sup>20</sup> Kim, “Chomang,” p. 183-84.

<sup>21</sup> Yun, *Han'gugŏ pŏnyŏk munch'e e mich'in Ilbonŏ pŏnyŏk ūi yŏngnyang*.

<sup>22</sup> While Im does deal with this issue in a separate article that focuses on the 1910's, this seems to suggest that this type of Japanese influence was limited only to the colonial period, which I would argue is not the case.

and rhetorical conventions is meticulously illustrated by Im, the role of Japan is limited to the influence exerted on literary content through its censorship policy after 1910 and the indirect influence exerted by its position as a ‘training ground’ for young Korean writers among the ranks of exchange students there in the 1900’s and 1910’s.<sup>23</sup> While Mitsui Takashi likewise provides an exhaustive overview of the colonial-era Korean language movement, especially in terms of orthography reform, he admits that a consideration of the Japanese language in relation to Korean was all but excluded from his analysis.<sup>24</sup> This is especially puzzling as the premise of his book is to problematize the dominant-subordinate dichotomy prevailing in Korean language scholarship on the colonial period, arguing instead that a “dynamic relationship” (*yŏkhak kwangye*) existed between the GGK and the indigenous Korean language movement fluctuating between antagonism and collaboration depending on social transformations in the colony.<sup>25</sup> To acknowledge the dynamic relationship of political interaction that lay at the foundation of Korean language reform without considering the politically dominant role of the national language itself (*kokugo*, Japanese) and its increasing hegemony in public education, the literary market, and the circulation of ideas as manifested in dictionary publication and diffusion is to commit the same type of oversight that Mitsui warns against. Languages necessarily exist within a relationship of interconnectedness and competition with each other, and to attempt to examine the development and transformation of a language in isolation is misguided. In the colonial public school, where languages were explicitly framed in diametric opposition through curricular institutionalization, this dynamic was even more pronounced.<sup>26</sup>

A growing body of Korean language research has focused on the transformations in Korean literature and writing style from a more macrolinguistic perspective, considering the interaction of multiple languages within the Korean linguistic landscape. For example, Hŏ Chae-yŏng provides an informative diachronic overview of the changes in Korean writing style, especially the intimate constructive relationship between Japanese and Korean inscriptional practices that developed during the decade before annexation.<sup>27</sup> Mun Hye-yun details the functioning of this relationship into the colonial period, emphasizing the multiple, overlapping layers of textual literacy that distinguished colonial-era literature and the “quantitative literary proliferation and qualitative deepening of expressive style” that characterized the transition from LS to *kukhanmun* style notation, eventually laying the foundation for further vernacularization (*kungmunhwa*, 國文化).<sup>28</sup> Sim Chae-gi similarly examines the transformation of Korean writing style while considering the collision of LS writing conventions, indigenous tendencies,

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See Im, Sang-sŏk. “Chosŏn Ch’ongdokpu chungdŭng kyoyung-yong *Chosŏnŏ-kŭp Hanmun Tokpon* ūi Chosŏnŏ insik: *Sinp’yŏn kodŭng Chosŏnŏ kŭp Hanmun tokpon* ūi pŏnyŏk kwa munch’e rŭl chungsim ũro,” [The Perception of Korean in the GGK Secondary School *Sino-Korean Reader: A Focus on Translation and Writing Style* Found in the Advanced New Edition Sino-Korean Language Reader], *Han’gugŏ Munhak Yŏn’gu* 57 (2011): 185-208.

<sup>23</sup> Im Sang-sŏk, *20segi kukhanmunch’e ūi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng*.

<sup>24</sup> Mitsui Takahashi, *Singminji Chosŏn ūi ŏnŏ chibae kujo: Chosŏnŏ kyubŏmhwa munje rŭl chungsim ũro*, [The Structure of Linguistic Dominance in Colonial Korea: The Problem of Creating Norms for the Korean Language], (Sŏul: Somyŏng Ch’ulp’an, 2013), 352.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, 35.

<sup>26</sup> Mitsui likewise writes extensively on the spread of GGK and Chosŏn Hakhoe (Korean Language Society, KLS) orthographies in Japanese public schools, but next to nothing on Japanese language education in these schools.

<sup>27</sup> Hŏ Chae-yŏng, “Munja sayong pangsik e ttarŭn kugŏ munch’e pyŏnch’ŏnsa.” [The History of Changes in National Language Writing Style Depending on the Method of Character Utilization], in *Saeroun Kugŏ-sa yŏn’gu-ron*, edited by Chŏn Chŏng-ye et al, (Sŏul: Tosŏ Ch’ulp’an, 2010) 515-48.

<sup>28</sup> Mun Hye-yun, *Munhagŏ ūi kŭndae: Chosŏnŏ-ro kŭl ūl ssŭndanŭn kŏt*, [Modern Literary Language Writing in the Language of Chosŏn], (Sŏul: Somyŏng Ch’ulp’an, 2008); “Munye Tokpollyu wa Han’gŭl munch’e ūi hyŏngsŏng,” [Readers and the Formation of Han’gŭl Writing Style], *Ŏmun Nonjip* 54 (2006): 199-223.

and Japanese influences.<sup>29</sup> Sim, like Mun and Im, accurately claims that *kukhanmunch'e* was not a unified, stable writing style, but rather “a fluid, intermediary literary style [*chunggan munch'e*] that was positioned en route from one language to another.”<sup>30</sup> This is not to suggest teleologically that *kukhanmunch'e* was viewed by writers at the time as a stop-gap inscriptional practice or literary stage that had to be passed through in order to achieve literary modernity. Rather, as I will demonstrate in more detail below, the multiple stages of transformation from Literary Sinitic to vernacular style coupled with the compressed time frame in which this transformation took place resulted in the superficial development of certain initial stages of the transition and an eventual crystallization of a literary style in the 1920's more akin grammatically, semantically, and rhetorically to contemporary Korean language, though still quite removed from it. This transition had more to do with the stabilization of linguistic forms through trial and error—in consultation with Japanese and Western languages, of course—than the conscious drive toward what today seems like the logical conclusion to Korea's path to literary and linguistic modernity.<sup>31</sup> It is crucial to keep in mind the timing of this literary transition in order to understand the nature of the Japanese penetration of and influence over the language: the direct imposition of Japanese into the colonial linguistic configuration after 1910 occurred in the midst of a transitional, experimental phase in Korean literary and linguistic practice, a process that had been indirectly precipitated by Japanese/Western languages in the 1900's but accelerated with the concomitant force of political authority in colonial public schools and the press. To grasp the functioning of this linguistic landscape more comprehensively, it is crucial to examine theories of translation and transnational semantic circulation, especially from non-Western perspectives.

## Translation and Colonialism

Post colonial studies has contributed a range of theorizations on the functioning and significance of translation, suggesting conceptualizations that vary dramatically from the contemporary professionalized concept of translation in the West. For example, Niranjana Tejaswini describes translation as a process that produces “strategies of containment,” which create authorized versions of the Other and participate in the “fixing of colonized cultures, making them seem static and unchanging rather than historically constructed.”<sup>32</sup> In this way, translation functions “as a transparent presentation of something that already exists, although the “original” is actually brought into being through translation.”<sup>33</sup> This naturalizing of colonial discourse on the Other through translation commits a linguistic violence which conceals

<sup>29</sup> Sim, Chae-gi. *Kugŏ munch'e pyŏnch'ŏnŏsa*, [The Transformation Process of National Language Inscription], (Sŏul: Chimmundang, 1999).

<sup>30</sup> Im Sang-sŏk explains the evolution of *kukhanmunch'e* in the following tripartite process: Form 1: Hanmun Sentence Style (*Hanmun munjangch'e*, 漢文 文章體), Form 2: Hanmun Phrase Style (*Hanmun kujŏlch'e*, 漢文 句節體) and Form 3: Hanmun Word Style (*Hanmun tanŏch'e*, 漢文 單語體). The earliest phase of *kukhanmun* experimentation was characterized by the first form, a style of writing that was basically *hanmun* with *han'gŭl* conjunctions and particles. In the second form *hanmun* syntax was dismantled and Korean word order was observed, leaving *hanmun* phrases within a grammatically and syntactically Korean sentence, though retaining considerable *hanmun* rhetorical devices and notation. In the final form, *hanmun* remains only in the form of *hanja*, resembling its usage in contemporary Korean. In terms of the thought process involved in composition, Im characterizes the first form as ‘Hanmun-dominant’ (*Hanju kukchong*, 漢主國從) and the second and third forms as ‘vernacular-dominant’ (*Kukchu hanjong*, 國主漢從). See Im Sang-sŏk, *20segi kukhanmunch'e ūi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng*.

<sup>31</sup> Indeed, at that time it was easier for certain authors to write in *hanmun* because of their training in it, though this seems counter intuitive today. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Im Sang-sŏk, *20segi kukhanmunch'e ūi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng*; Mun Hye-yun, *Munhagŏ ūi kŭndae*.

<sup>32</sup> Tejaswini Niranjana, “Introduction: History in Translation,” In *Siting Translation: History, Post-structuralism, and the Colonial Context*, 1-46, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 3.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

linguistic difference based on the logic of translational equivalence. As a number of authors have shown, the impetus for this ‘fixing of colonized cultures’ through the establishment of translational equivalence is the perceived lack that existed in the colonized culture vis-à-vis the West in terms of semantic concepts, literary forms, etc. For example, Saliha Paker illustrates the position of perceived European literary modernity in the discourse among Ottoman writers on the direction of Ottoman translation of Western literature, where the ultimate purpose was rooted in the discrepant temporality of Ottoman “lack and belatedness.”<sup>34</sup> Michael Dodson, in his work on translation in colonial India, shows how this logic of translational equivalence pertained not only to the relationship between European languages and indigenous languages but also between the prestige, literary language of the colony (Sanskrit) and the vernaculars.<sup>35</sup> Paralleling closely the established relationship between LS and the vernaculars in Korea and indeed all of East Asia, Dodson notes that the comparison between Sanskrit and other languages of lesser prestige “led many orientalists to claim that the vernaculars possessed very little in either expressive capability or refinement which could not be traced directly to Sanskrit.”<sup>36</sup> One orientalist claimed that “the several dialects confounded under the common term *Hindi*... deprived of Sanskrit, would not only lose all their beauty and energy, but, with respect to the power of expressing abstract ideas, or terms in science, would be absolutely reduced to a state of barbarism.”<sup>37</sup> The apparent ‘lack’ in Korean vernacular language and literature in comparison to LS, Western languages and Japanese was similarly founded on this notion of translational equivalence, and through the process of translation which accelerated in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century fueled by the need to ‘catch up’ with the superiority of the West, lexical expansion<sup>38</sup> and reconfiguration took place through a complex system of transnational linguistic circulation, akin to what Lydia Liu has termed ‘translingual practice.’<sup>39</sup> Hwang Ho-dök’s intriguing examination of bilingual dictionary production in Korea will shed some light on this phenomenon.

Due to the overwhelming prestige accorded to LS noted above, historically the attention paid to vernacular Korean in terms of organization and systematization had been negligible all the way to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. In the course of Korea’s exposure to modern conceptions of language and Western languages through Japanese translation, another sort of lack came into relief: the absence of a Korean language dictionary compiled by Koreans. Hwang Ho-dök notes that, within this vacuum, bilingual/multilingual dictionaries compiled by foreigners acted as monolingual dictionaries, and the motives of foreigners became the default motives for Koreans.<sup>40</sup> Hwang describes the functioning of this linguistic hegemony as a kind of flow model: neologisms circulated “from foreigners who knew Korean, to Koreans who knew a foreign language, back to Koreans who did not know a foreign language to be utilized as a foreign loan word (*oeraeö*).” During Korea’s early modern period these foreign loans were

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<sup>34</sup> Saliha Paker, “Ottoman Conceptions of Translation and Its Practice: The 1897 ‘Classics Debate’ as a Focus for Examining Change,” in Theo Hermans, *Translating Others, Volume 1*, (Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing, 2006).

<sup>35</sup> Persian was also considered a prestige language in some ways, especially in the fields of science, law, and literature.

<sup>36</sup> Michael S. Dodson, “Translating Science, Translating Empire: The Power of Language in Colonial North India,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47, no. 4 (2005), 817.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> For a discussion of lexical expansion as a result of the perceived lack of equivalency between languages and cultures that occurs in the process of translation, see Maria Tymoczko, “Post-colonial Writing and Literary Translation,” in *Post-colonial Translation: Theory and Practice*, edited by Susan Bassnet and Harish Trivedi, 19-40, (London: Routledge, 1999).

<sup>39</sup> Lydia Liu, “Translingual Practice: The Discourse of Individualism between China and the West,” positions 1, no. 1 (1993): 160-193.

<sup>40</sup> Hwang Ho-dök and Yi Sang-hyön, *Kaenyöm kwa yöksa, kündae Han’guk üi ijungö sajön: oegugindül üi sajön p’yönch’an saöp üro pon Han’gugö üi kündae*, [Concept and History, Modern Korean Bilingual Dictionaries: Viewing Korean Linguistic Modernity Through the Foreigner Dictionary Compilation Project], (Söul: Pangmunsa, 2012), 76.



most often manifested as sinographs summoned in the service of translating Western concepts, combined into semantic reconfigurations in the form of neologisms usually created in Meiji Japan, and vernacularized within the existing language hierarchy. The Sinographic mediation of these neologisms helped to disguise their foreign origin while the mediation of *hanmun*-literate Korean intellectuals actualized their utilization, a dual mediation which facilitated the widespread importation of such terms and broadened the semantic and conceptual range of the Korean language. But on whose terms did this occur? Kim Uk-tong, in his work on translation and Korean modernity, points out that Korea's reception of Western texts and knowledge was largely dictated by the timing of its engagement with the world outside of the Sino-centric order, which meant that the vast majority of materials translated into Korean were relay translations from Japanese or Chinese.<sup>41</sup> When combined with the discrepant temporality of the Korean vernacular—its perceived immaturity and unpreparedness for “prestige literature (*kokŭp munŏ*) and lofty abstraction”—relay translation didn't merely necessitate the ‘rediscovery’ of conceptual words in the Korean vernacular, but created these words where none existed.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, the convergence of such a transnational linguistic circulation with the political will engendered in colonial education policy at a point of pronounced instability and even vulnerability in the developmental trajectory of Korean from that encoded in LS to *kukhanmun* combined to lay the foundation for a subsequent shift from illiteracy/semi-literacy in Korean to literacy in Japanese,<sup>43</sup> with Korean acting as a form of transitional literacy, and the sinograph functioning as a mediating agent. Below, I attempt to position the colonial public school within this milieu in the first decade of Japanese rule.

### The Stratification of the Linguistic Landscape and Fractured Colonial Literacies

As noted above, writing practices in Korea were in a state of flux at the time of annexation, and the commencement of Japanese rule complicated this linguistic landscape in a number of ways. James Scarth Gale, Canadian Protestant Missionary to Korea for over forty years and prodigious translator, recognized the changes that had been taking place in Korean literature during his stay there when he wrote the following in 1925:

Today we are in a confused and uncertain age as to language. The old ideals have gone from us and the new have not yet come into being. Methods of writing that were in vogue twenty years ago are no longer suitable and just what style will take their place no one can tell. An *illiterate* group, as to ancient scholarship, has taken in hand present day book making and is attempting to formulate a new style,

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<sup>41</sup> One author during the 1920's, recognizing the pitfalls of relay translations, described the practice in the following colorful way: “These days there seems to be quite a few ‘dog shit translations’ (*kaettong pŏnyŏk*) and ‘pig shit translations’ (*toyaji ttong pŏnyŏk*) in Chosŏn. ‘Dog shit’ comes from eating another's feces—recycled shit—while ‘pig shit’ comes from eating dog feces, a twice recycled shit. What are relay translations but dog and pig shit? Of course, with our language ability being what it is (*pujokhan*) this sort of translation is inevitable, but if we are going to carry out such dog shit translations we have to at least get it right. Even in the case of ‘pig shit translations,’ it is unforgivable that they end up resembling in no way the original work.” Quoted in, Kim Uk-tong, *Pŏnyŏk kwa Han'guk ūi kŭndae*, [Translation and Korean modernity], (Sŏul: Somyŏng Ch'ulp'an, 2010), 333-34.

<sup>42</sup> Hwang, *Ijungŏ sajŏn*, 28.

<sup>43</sup> This is not to suggest that this convergence caused spoken Korean to atrophy, or that textual Korean illiteracy increased in the first decade of the colonial period. Rather, these tendencies converged after 1910, heightened more or less continually throughout the colonial period and were punctuated by more draconian language policies in the late 1930's and 1940's to the point that many Korean writers during this period, though native *speakers* of Korean, were either bilingual writers who preferred Japanese or were unable to write in Korean at all, and had to retrain themselves after liberation or give up their profession altogether. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Suh Serk bae, *Treacherous Translation*; Kwŏn and Chŏng, “Cheguk, minjok, kŭrigo sosuja chakka.”

attempting even to make English the standard, forgetful of the fact that Korean is an order of speech that can never be modeled after English...What the final end will be we cannot say beyond this, that the written language and the written forms will more and more approximate.<sup>44</sup> (Emphasis mine)

This quote reveals much about the state of Korean literature at the time, but what it illustrates about the language ideologies of Gale and other ‘literati’ and the multiple overlapping literacies that existed is even more illuminating.<sup>45</sup> Gale recognized that ‘old ideals’ (LS writing conventions) were being slowly dismantled, but lamented that no tangible replacement had yet materialized, a keen observation of the unsettled state of Korean literature at the time. Importantly, Gale describes the younger generation of writers, those who would have been at the vanguard of producing what is today considered standard literary Korean, as an ‘illiterate group, as to ancient scholarship.’ In a literary report from 1924 he further disparages this generation of writers, claiming that “The young generation of today have neither the experience of the East nor the experience of the West to draw from and are bound to go blundering about for generations.”<sup>46</sup> In 1926, commenting on his personal Bible translation project, he expresses a desire that his translation “will preserve the old dignified language of Korea against the ravages of *chuks*, *sangs*, and *keus*,” referring, according to Ross King, to some newly imported “features of Japanese linguistic modernity that Gale despised: the suffixes *-chŏk* 的, and *-sang* 上, and the newfangled redeployment of pre-noun *kŭ* as a third person pronoun (‘he’).”<sup>47</sup> Not only, then, was the *kungmun*-trending *kukhanmunch’e* of the 1910’s and 1920’s in a state of instability and flux, but those who were attempting to solidify it were themselves considered illiterate due to their apparent ignorance of pure LS. On the other hand, with the increasing tendency toward *kukhanmunch’e* usage in literary magazines and Japanese public school textbooks and the gradual crystallization of this style, those steeped in the LS tradition were forced to adapt to evolving conventions or gradually silenced,<sup>48</sup> themselves rendered illiterate and ‘voiceless’ casualties of the march toward literary modernity. On top of this complex and shifting literacy field was superimposed Japanese language and literacy—its influence already apparent in ‘*chuks*’ and ‘*sangs*’—reinforced by legitimizing institutions like the public school. Keeping in mind these multiple and overlapping literacies, and their attendant language ideologies, we proceed to an examination of colonial language policies.

### Japan’s ‘Other’: Language Policy in Korea in Cross-Colonial Comparison

In order to contextualize Korea’s experience globally while highlighting several commonalities and differences with other colonial encounters, I begin with a brief comparison between Korea under Japan and India under British rule in terms of their respective linguistic landscapes and language policies. Japan’s unique position as the only non-Western colonial power has often been noted, but relatively little

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<sup>44</sup> Quoted in Ross King, “James Scarth Gale and the Christian Literature Society: Salvific Translation and the Crusade against ‘Mongrel Korean,’” Unpublished Manuscript, 9.

<sup>45</sup> In the course of Gale’s translating and language studies, he came into contact with many native Korean informants/pundits, nearly all of whom would have been highly trained in LS and deeply steeped in the conservative language ideology which attended such a literary tradition. As such, we can infer that Gale’s language ideologies here reflect the dominant current of Chosŏn-era views on language, especially the position of vernacular writing in the Korean language hierarchy. However, the earliest interactions between foreigners and Koreans during the late Chosŏn Dynasty relating to issues of language is an area of research that is shockingly under-explored. See for example, Ross King, “Western Protestant Missionaries and the Origins of the Korean Language,” *Journal of International and Area Studies* 11, no. 2 (2004), 7-38.

<sup>46</sup> King, “Salvific Translation,” 8.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>48</sup> For an illuminating discussion of this process, see Im Sang-sŏk, *20-segi Kuk-Hanmunch’e ūi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng*.

research in the way of cross-colonial comparisons between Japanese and Western colonialism has been conducted.<sup>49</sup> A cursory glance at these colonies and the language policies enacted in each reveals a number of striking similarities, as well as discrepancies. A latecomer to colonialism, Japan was very conscious of the experiences of European colonial powers, and their perceived successes and failures often informed Japanese policy in Korea. However, the timing of Japanese entrance onto the imperial stage as well as historical, linguistic, and racial actualities vis-à-vis its colonies directed an alternative course for Japan despite conscious reflection on European experiences.

As suggested above, the linguistic landscape of 19<sup>th</sup>-century colonial India mirrored in many ways the Sinographic Cosmopolis as it was manifested in Korea: in both cases a prestige literary form (Sanskrit, LS) was superposed onto vernacular languages and literatures, having been established through historical precedent and socio-linguistic stratification. In both India and Korea, the imposition of the language of the colonizer (English, Japanese) altered the linguistic hierarchy, creating an additional layer of literacy and mediation. As Naregal Veena claims, after the imposition of English, “The [local languages] were now evaluated not so much in comparison with the ‘indigenous’ high languages of Sanskrit and Persian but through their competence to extend the discursive frameworks of English. What counted against them most was their ‘unpreparedness’, which was judged as the absence of resources to articulate concepts and thought processes germane to modernity.”<sup>50</sup> This created a dilemma for the vernaculars. According to Veena, “the subordination of the vernacular under English seemed inevitable, while severance from English could now only lead to marginality and intellectual impoverishment.”<sup>51</sup> In terms of public school language policy, English emerged as the sole medium of higher learning, with the vernaculars relegated to primary education alone, instilling in the student the realization that “aspiration to intellectual merit involved something of a summary transcendence, if not outright disavowal, of vernacular literacy.”<sup>52</sup>

In a similar fashion, the setting of Japanese as the language of instruction in public schools established the language as the model for dissemination of Western knowledge. Much like in India, this became the catalyst for reform of vernacular Korean language and literature to address perceived ‘unpreparedness’ for the task of modernization. Japanese similarly became the sole medium of instruction in accredited higher education,<sup>53</sup> but in contrast to the fluctuations of English language policy

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<sup>49</sup> For an interesting comparison between language policy in Poland under German rule and Korea under Japanese rule, see Lee Yeounsuk, *The Ideology of Kokugo: Nationalizing Language in Modern Japan*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010).

<sup>50</sup> Veena Naregal, *Language, Politics, Elites, and the Public Sphere: Western India Under Colonialism*, (London: Anthem Press, 2001), 69.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, 80.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, 140-141. This was after the shift from vernacular education to instruction in English in 1858 after the well-known language of instruction debate and Macauley’s infamous minute. But the direction of language policy was evident even before this, as evidenced by the following Rules and Regulations of the Educational Establishment under the Board of Education, 1845: “6. The first class is intended to meet the wants of the great bulk of the population, who have but little time to devote to school instruction, and the information there conveyed is of an elementary character, and is conveyed in the vernacular tongue. 7. In the second class the English language...and the superior branches of education are taught.” Quoted in, Naregal, *Language, Politics, Elites, and the Public Sphere*, 140.

<sup>53</sup> This current work considers only public schools under GGK administration. Other educational institutions included *sōdang*, village schools which offered a mainly ‘traditional’ education in Confucian literature and the fundamentals of Literary Sinitic, and private schools, operated mainly by Western missionaries and independently by Koreans under various affiliations. Although their numbers were significant and their influence considerable—the number of *sōdang* actually increased in the first decade of colonial rule—they were terminal institutions that either did not lead to higher education or in the case of missionary-sponsored colleges (i.e. Pai Chai Academy) were not recognized for employment purposes by Japanese businesses or the

in Indian schools, it was instituted as the primary language of instruction in elementary education from annexation, intensifying throughout the colonial period.<sup>54</sup> This “summary transcendence,” therefore, was demanded not only of those aspiring to “intellectual merit” through higher education, but of anyone seeking modern, accredited education legitimized by colonial authority. Moreover, the prestige literary languages of Sanskrit and LS continued to function within this linguistic hierarchy but in altered form: they functioned as mediators of modernity in their role as feeder languages into the vernaculars for new Western terms and concepts.

However, crucial differences between the Indian and Korean language configurations must not be overlooked, and these will serve to highlight important divergences in Japan’s colonial experience. While Sanskrit and LS persisted as mediators of modernity, their respective manifestations contrasted due to their triangular linguistic affinities with English and South Asian vernaculars on the one hand and Japanese and Korean vernacular on the other. Although Sanskrit acted as a feeder language for many South Asian vernaculars, much as LS did for Korean (and Japanese), providing an enormous amount of vocabulary, the language itself, with its notoriously complex yet systematic grammar, resisted the kind of fundamental dismantling and reconfiguration of LS that took place through the mediation of the Korean vernacular in the 1900’s and 1910’s. LS, unlike Sanskrit on the subcontinent, had never functioned as a spoken language on the Korean peninsula, and its grammatical, syntactic, and phonological gap between Korean vernacular was such that well developed albeit cumbersome conventions for ‘reading’ LS in the vernacular had to be developed.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, the system of reading LS texts in a way that was accessible to the Korean native speaker necessitated by the disparate nature of LS and spoken Korean historically served as a precedent<sup>56</sup> for prestige and vernacular intermediation and the rapid transition to the latter

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colonial bureaucracy due to their unaccredited status. Furthermore, the sharp decline in the number of private schools and *sōdang* from the early 1920’s contrasts with the upward trend in the number of public schools, supporting my thesis of a shift to Japanese language and literacy, especially when considering the language of instruction at these institutions (Korean/English). However, private and *sōdang* education is an area which deserves much more study.

<sup>54</sup> It is unclear, however, what percentage of the classes taught by native Koreans were actually conducted in Japanese, given the low proficiency early in the colonial period. However, the increasing proportion of Japanese teachers to Korean teachers in higher grades is well documented, as is the low Korean proficiency level of these Japanese teachers. For statistics on the racial composition of Japanese public school faculty, see Dong Wōnmo, “Japanese Colonial Policy and Practice in Korea, 1905-1945: A Study in Assimilation,” (PhD diss. Georgetown University, 1965), Proquest (AAT 6512510).

; For a thorough discussion of the Korean Language Encouragement Policy among colonial officials, and the minimal encouragement and low Korean proficiency among teachers compared with police officers, see Yamada Kanto, *Shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru Chōsenjo shōrei seisaku: Chōsenjo wo mananda Nihonjin*, [Japan’s Korean Language Encouragement Policies in Colonial Korea: Japanese Who Learned the Korean Language], (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2004).

<sup>55</sup> The most common traditional method for adapting a LS text to Korean was termed *idu*, a system which was developed as far back as the Three Kingdoms but continued even after the invention of *han’gŭl* in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. According to Lee and Ramsey, when ‘translating’ a Chinese-language text into Korean using *idu*, “the scribe first changed the words of the text around into Korean syntactic order. Then he added Korean particles and verb endings and other function words using Chinese characters either phonetically or semantically to represent those function words.” See Lee Ki-moon and Robert S. Ramsey, *A History of the Korean Language*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 53.

<sup>56</sup> Yu Kil-jun, Korean Enlightenment intellectual and author of *Sōyu Kyōnmun* (西遊見聞, Things Seen and Heard in the West), was the first to employ in the modern period what he called *kukhanmun honyongch’e* (國漢文混用體), a form of *t’o* reading which employed Korean conjunctions, particles, and words mixed in a basically LS sentence, using as his precedent the *Annotations of the Chinese Classics* (*ch’ilsō ōnhae*). However, many scholars since then have claimed an even stronger influence from the work of Fukuzawa Yukichi. Regardless of the source of inspiration for Yu, there were precedents for such writing techniques in both Japanese and Korean which were developed over time out of necessity due to the foreignness of LS in each language. Hō Chae-yōng, “Munja sayong pangsik e ttarūn kugō munch’e pyōnch’ōnsa,” 531.

during the pre-colonial period and an eventual shift to Japanese language and literacy—which incorporated a similar but more refined reading system,<sup>57</sup> sinographs, syntax, etc.—under the influence of discourses on discrepant temporalities and ‘backwardness’ and the institutional force of language policy.

The more decisive contrast between the Indian and Korean cases, however, was the imposed language of the colonizer, or rather, its relationship to the language of the colonized. Theories of Indo-European language families notwithstanding,<sup>58</sup> the English language in India was a completely foreign concept, an alien imposition rooted in a similarly unfamiliar epistemological tradition. Conversely, the historical positioning of Japanese and Korean within the so-called Sinographic Cosmopolis engendered a much higher degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity. While this relationship left a deep stratum of Sino-semantic vocabulary in Japanese and Korean, additionally these two languages shared close phonological, syntactic and grammatical affinities. It was this positioning of Japanese between LS and Korean—its semanto-cultural infusion from its centuries of inclusion in the Sinographic Cosmopolis coupled with its linguistic affinity with Korean—that facilitated a shift in literacy from Korean to Japanese and left a profound legacy on the language. Therefore, whereas the injection of English into the linguistic configuration of India could be characterized more as a superimposition where English claimed hegemony in the dispersion of modern knowledge and Sanscrit was ‘compartmentalized’ as a medium only appropriate for classical texts, religious purposes, and the coining of new terms in the service of English-driven education and modernization, Japanese’ imposition was more of a reconfiguration of the existing Sinographic Cosmopolis. In lieu of a monopolistic claim to accessing modernity through education, as English possessed for some time in relation to vernaculars on the subcontinent, Japan’s linguistic capital was rooted in its ability to successfully accommodate its language (through the unification of written and spoken, neologism production, etc.) to the reception of knowledge from Western languages, and its hegemony was actualized through translation and language policy. In this way, Japanese was a double-edged sword for Korean language reformers: while reforms accomplished in Japanese offered a roadmap for change in the linguistically analogous Korean language, they also pointed the way to assimilation under the increasingly authoritative language policies of the later colonial period. Below I will examine in detail colonial language policy during the first decade of Japanese rule, drawing attention to the institutionalization of language and knowledge legitimization and its effect on the linguistic landscape of Korea.

### **The Framing of Legitimization: Language Policy and Curriculum in the First Decade and Beyond**

The first decade of Japanese colonial rule in Korea was instrumental in establishing the foundations for Japanese language ascendancy, altering the linguistic landscape and instigating an eventual shift in literacy. However, this period also represented a continuation of changes in language, literature, and politics that had been underway since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Furthermore, the processes that I have described thus far by no means ceased with the ‘liberalization’ of colonial rule in the wake of the March 1<sup>st</sup> Independence Movement and Japan’s so-called ‘cultural rule’ (*bunka seiji*). Although the initiation of this new strategy of colonial control did usher in some significant political changes in education and language—both discursively and actually—literary development, literacy shift, and transnational linguistic circulation were protracted processes impossible to limit to a brief, rather arbitrarily defined

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<sup>57</sup> For an overview of translation traditions in the Sinographic Cosmopolis, see Judy Wakabayashi, “Translation in the East Asian Cultural Sphere: Shared Roots, Divergent Paths?” in *Asian Translation Traditions*, edited by Eva Hung and Judy Wakabayashi, 17-66, (Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing, 2005).

<sup>58</sup> The following book provides an enlightening look at the development of the theory of the Indo-European language family as a product of the nexus of Indian and European traditions of linguistic analysis: Thomas R. Trautman, *Languages and Nations: The Dravidian Proof in Colonial Madras*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

period. Keeping in mind these continuities and the limits of this periodization, we focus on language policies in colonial public schools during the first decade of colonial rule (1910 - 1919), roughly coinciding with the First Rescript on Education (*Che 1 ch'a Kyoyungnyŏng*) and its period of implementation (1911 – 1922).

Because we are interested in the holistic interaction between all languages in the Korean linguistic landscape, below I present a table which shows the number of hours devoted to Korean language (*Chosŏnŏ*, *Chōsengo*), Literary Sinitic (*hanmun*, *kanbun*), and Japanese (*nihongo*, *kokugo*) across major revisions of the Rescript on Education.<sup>59</sup>

Table 1: Classroom Hours for Chosŏnŏ (C), Hanmun (H), and Nihongo (N)/Kokugo

Grade	Residency General (T'onggambu, 1907)			1 <sup>st</sup> Rescript (1911)		3 <sup>rd</sup> Rescript (1922)		4 <sup>th</sup> Rescript (1929)		7 <sup>th</sup> Rescript (1938)	
	C	H	N	Chosŏnŏ -Hanmun	Kokugo (Japanese)	Chosŏnŏ	Kokugo	Chosŏnŏ	Kokugo	Chosŏnŏ	Kokugo
1	6	4	6	6	10	4	10	5	10	4	10
2	6	4	6	6	10	4	12	5	12	3	12
3	6	4	6	5	10	3	12	3	12	3	12
4	6	4	6	5	10	3	12	3	12	2	12
5						3	9	2	9	2	9
6						3	9	2	9	2	9
Total:	24	16	24	22	40	20	64	20	64	16	64

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As the above table indicates, the first decade of colonial rule witnessed a significant transformation in language policy. During the period of the Residency General (*T'onggambu*), Korean (*Chosŏnŏ*), LS (*Hanmun*), and Japanese (*Nihongo*, *Ilbonŏ*) were taught as separate subjects, and the combined number of hours for *Chosŏnŏ* and *Hanmun* far outpaced the number of hours dedicated to *Ilbonŏ*. However, with the enactment of the First Rescript on Education, the presence of both *Chosŏnŏ* and *Hanmun* was dramatically decreased in the curriculum, while the relative weight of *Kokugo* (national language, *Ilbonŏ*) education increased considerably. Within this combined *Chosŏnŏ-Hanmun* (朝鮮語及漢文) class, *Hanmun* was given more emphasis, further diminishing the time and resources dedicated to Korean

<sup>59</sup> Because of the significance of terminology related to language during this period (i.e. the shift from *nihongo* to *kokugo* in 1911), in the following discussion I refer to the languages as they were termed in the education rescripts.

<sup>60</sup> Several different periodizations are employed when analyzing colonial Korean education. While many scholars divide the colonial era into four periods based on the major Imperial Rescripts on Education that governed them (1911-1922, 1922-1938, 1938-1943, 1943-1945), there were actually a total of ten rescripts on education. Here, following Hŏ Chae-yŏng (2009) and Kim Yun-ju (2011), I list the first, third, fourth, and seventh rescripts due to the extent of change they exhibit in curriculum hours (first, third, and seventh) and major textbook revision (fourth). This table appears in the following article: Kim Yun-ju, "Ilche kangjŏm-gi *Chosŏnŏ Tokpon* kwa *Kugŏ Tokpon* ūi pigyo: *Che 1 ch'a kyoyungnyŏng-gi pot'ong hakkyo 1,2-hangnyŏn kyogwasŏ rŭl chungsim ūro*," [A Comparison Between the Colonial-era *Korean Language Reader* and the *National Language Reader*, with a Focus on the First and Second Grade Elementary School Textbooks During the Period of the First Educational Rescript], *Uri Ōmun Yŏn'gu* 41, 2011, 141.

language education.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Japanese language served as the language of instruction in every subject of the curriculum except Korean language class, which was instrumental in diffusing proficiency in a language that had newly acquired the discursive and institutional status of national language while paradoxically functioning as a foreign language for all intents and purposes, a phenomenon that I will analyze in more detail below. The Second Rescript (1922) reduced *Hanmun* education to an optional subject,<sup>62</sup> and henceforth the propagation of *Hanmun* education was divided among *Chosŏnŏ* and *Ilbonŏ* in dismantled and reconfigured form as *Hanja* and *Kanji*.<sup>63</sup> The proportional inflation of *kokugo* education under the Second Rescript in relation to *Chosŏnŏ* education enhanced the mediational role of *kokugo kanji* in this process, affecting a shift toward *kokugo* literacy and facilitating the assimilation of Japanese terms, grammar, and writing practices to Korean vernacular. While this overview of language policy in Japanese public elementary schools (*pot'ong hakkyo*) suggests a weakening of Korean language education and a transition toward Japanese-language mediation of tradition (*hanmun*) and literary modernity, a more detailed and nuanced examination of the character and mechanics of this education is needed in order to shed some light on this crucial period.

Some researchers have interrogated the character and intention of Korean language education under Japanese rule, questioning why the GGK would institutionalize in the curriculum a subject that was from the outset minimally supported and increasingly atrophied.<sup>64</sup> This is an important question to ask, although we must be careful not to imply by this as other authors have that the provision represented any kind of 'benevolence' or 'merit' in a relationship that was inherently exploitative.<sup>65</sup> A look at the language of the Elementary School Regulations (普通學校規程, 1911) will illustrate briefly the intention of *Kokugo* and Korean language education:

Article 10: The fundamental purpose of *kokugo* is to impart the words and phrases of common language and common sense knowledge, foster the ability to express oneself with accuracy and precision, and to enlighten with knowledge and morals (*chitoku*). Therefore, the main elements are reading, speaking, composition, and writing.

Article 11: The fundamental purpose of *Chōsen-go* is to impart the words and phrases of common language and common sense knowledge, foster the ability to express oneself with accuracy and

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<sup>61</sup> Kim Yun-ju, "Ilche kangjŏm-gi *Chosŏnŏ Tokpon kwa Kugŏ Tokpon* ūi pigyo," 142; For a detailed breakdown of the *Chosŏnŏ-Hanmun* textbook content, see Pak Ch'i-bŏm, "Ilche kangjŏm-gi pot'ong hakkyo *Chosŏnŏ-kŭp Hanmun Tokpon* ūi sŏnggyŏk: Che 1 ch'a kyoyungnyŏng-gi 4-hangnyŏn kyogwasŏ ūi 'haksŭp' ūl chungsimŭro," [The Character of the Colonial-era Public School *Sino-Korean Reader*, with a Focus on Grade 4 Textbook 'Haksŭp' during the Period of the First Educational Rescript], *Ŏnŏ Yŏn'gu* 39, no. 2, 2011, 449 – 476.

<sup>62</sup> Suh, *Treacherous Translation*, 192.

<sup>63</sup> See Pak Ch'i-bŏm, "*Chosŏnŏ-kŭp Hanmun Tokpon* ūi sŏnggyŏk;" For a comparison between *Chosŏnŏ-Hanmun* class, *Hyŏndae Chinaŏ* class, and *Kokugo Kanbun*, see Yi Kŭm-sŏn, "Ilche malgi 'Hyŏndae Chinaŏ' kyoyuk ūi ūimi: *Chungdŭng Simun* ūl chungsim ūro," [The Meaning of 'Modern Chinese' Education during the Late Colonial Period, with a focus on *Chungdŭng Simun*], *Sai* (聞) 10 (2011): 257-83.

<sup>64</sup> Kim Hye-jŏng, "Ilche kangjŏmgi 'Chosŏnŏ kyoyuk' ūi ūido wa sŏnggyŏk," [The Intention and Character of Colonial-era Korean Language Education], *Ŏmun Yŏn'gu* 31, no. 3 (2003).

<sup>65</sup> Colonial modernization theory often employs this approach in proving the 'relatively liberal' nature of Japanese rule, especially in comparison to other European colonial powers. However, crediting a colonial power with surpassing its peers in building a modern education system or providing a token vernacular language education is to insinuate that some normative goal of credible domination is achievable (or desirable) in a relationship that is inherently exploitative. For examples of this qualitative dichotomy of exploitation, see Stephen Evans, "Language Policy in British Colonial Education: Evidence from Nineteenth Century Hong Kong," in *Journal of Educational Administration and History* 38, no. 3 (December 2006): 293-312; Clive Whitehead, "The Historiography of British Imperial Education Policy, Part I: India," in *History of Education* 34, no. 3 (May 2005): 321; Mitsuhiro Kimura, "Standards of Living in Colonial Korea: Did the Masses Become Better Off or Worse Off Under Japanese Rule?" in *The Journal of Economic History* 53, no. 3 (September 1993): 629-652.

precision, and to enlighten with knowledge and morals. Therefore, in the teaching of *Chōsen-go* it must always connect (*renraku*) with *Kokugo*.<sup>66</sup>

Revealingly, the purpose of Korean and *kokugo* education are identical, but the means of achieving each objective are divergent. Whereas the teaching of *kokugo* was to be based on the pedagogical methods most often employed in foreign language classrooms—reading, speaking, composition, and writing—Korean was fundamentally defined by its connection or contact with *kokugo*. Here was the implicit acknowledgement that, despite the discourse on Japanese as the national language, Korean was the first language of Korean students and efforts would have to be made to contextualize it in relation to *kokugo*. Viewed in this way, neither the purpose of language education nor the means for achieving it could be described as congruent, despite the above claim. In the absence of a relationship based on reciprocal interconnectedness, *kokugo* education was directed toward comprehensive literacy in speaking, reading, and writing, and listening comprehension due to its position as language of instruction, while the onus on Korean education was reduced to connecting with *kokugo*. Furthermore, when considering the virtual illiteracy of Korean students entering elementary school—in Korean vernacular, LS, and Japanese—the GGK language policies can be characterized as promoting the deterioration of Korean textual literacy while maintaining ‘the words and phrases of common language and common sense knowledge’ as a scaffolding device to ‘connect’ to the Japanese language and literacy promoted throughout the rest of the curriculum.

The necessity of maintaining the Korean vernacular at least temporarily was recognized by many Japanese policy makers, though there was disagreement over the pace of Japanese diffusion and the role it would play in public education. For example Mitsuchi Chūzō (三土忠造), who served as a Secretary in the Ministry of Education during the Taehan Empire, drew the following parallel between Korea and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a favorite comparison for Meiji intellectuals: “When we talk about why the present-day Austria and Hungary could not achieve true unification, the national language being divided in opposition between German and Hungarian stands out as a factor of primary importance. With this precedent in mind, *although in spoken Korean it cannot be helped*, I think we must make every effort to do away with Korean writing and the teaching thereof in this, our present opportunity” (emphasis mine).<sup>67</sup> However, as Mitsui Takashi points out, the section calling for the abolition of Korean language education was deleted from the final resolution made by the Chōsen Educational Research Conference (朝鮮□育調査□), which was instrumental in formulating the First Rescript on Education, and an internal document presumably circulated in Japanese policy making circles prior to the drafting of this Rescript criticized such “armchair theorists” as Mitsuchi for their lack of pragmatism on this issue while acknowledging that Koreans’ assimilation as Japanese would be difficult due to their absence of loyalty to the imperial household, and their being “a people who had founded a nation some 3,000 years ago, however imperfect.”<sup>68</sup> Even Hoshina Koichi (1872 – 1955), successor to the pioneering *kokugo* theorist Ueda Kazotoshi and the most strident supporter of nationalistic *kokugo* ideology and its propagation through assimilationist policies in Japan’s colonies, nevertheless conceded that the process of forming Koreans into subjects of the Japanese Empire would not occur overnight. Writing in 1914, less than a year after his return from Europe where he had witnessed first-hand Europe’s own national language-building strategies, Hoshina stated, “By promoting education that cultivates children’s understanding of morals and society through such [*kokugo*] textbooks, we will be able to Japanize their thinking, and gradually

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<sup>66</sup> Kim Hye-jōng, “Chosōnō kyoyuk’ ūi ūido wa sōnggyōk,” 440-441.

<sup>67</sup> Mitsuchi Chūzō [三土忠造], “Chōsenjin no kyōiku” [The Korean Peoples’ Education], *Kyōikukai* no. 9, Issue 12, 1925, 26, Quoted in Mitsui Takahashi, “Singmin chiha ūi Chosōnō ōnō chōngch’ihak: Chosōnō ōnō chōngch’aeak, sahoesa chaego,” [Language Politics in Colonial Korea: Chosōn Language Policy and Social History Revisited], *Hallim Ilbonhak* 20, (2012): 88.

<sup>68</sup> Mitsui, “Singminjiha ūi Chosōnō ōnō chōngch’ihak,” 88.



replace their anti-Japan sentiment with amicable surrender.”<sup>69</sup> However, in the same work he claimed, “It is urgent that normal education in Korea be done in Japanese. *At this transitional stage, we may have to allow some Korean language, but we must plan to integrate all instruction into Japanese as soon as possible. Otherwise, we could incubate irreparable trouble in the future.*” (emphasis mine)<sup>70</sup> Thus, for even the most steadfast proponents of *kokugo* diffusion as an instrument of assimilation, the initial phase of colonial rule was one of ‘transition,’ where the Korean language would have to be acknowledged in some official, institutionalized capacity. What, then, was the form that Korean language education would assume?

Much of the research on colonial language and education policy focuses on the manipulation of textbook content in the formation of imperial subjects.<sup>71</sup> For example, Lee Yeounsuk demonstrates the influence of Meiji intellectuals and *kokugo* theorists on the formation of colonial language policy, as well as the publishing of textbooks that emphasized the exploitation and suffering of the old regime compared to the positive developments and reforms brought by Japanese administration.<sup>72</sup> Yi Hye-ryŏn, on the other hand, analyzes the GGK manipulation of the Korean folktale *The Tale of Hŭngbu* which appeared in *The Elementary School Sino-Korean Reader* (보통학교조선어급한문독본, 1915-1918), claiming that the origins of the folktale were appropriated by Japan as part of a policy to geographically, racially, and culturally justify assimilation.<sup>73</sup> While the role of textbook content in assimilation and the formation of colonizing discourses is a legitimate area of concern which warrants the increasing attention it is receiving, these treatments rarely treat language itself as a central component of consideration. In my analysis, on the other hand, I am attempting to answer the following questions: What was the status of Korean language education within the colonial language configuration, and how did its specific institutional policy framing in relation to other languages effect a shift in language and literacy under ongoing and interactive influences from transnational linguistic circulation embodied in dictionary compilation and literary experimentalism mediated by Japanese and Western literature?

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<sup>69</sup> Hoshina Koichi, *Kokugo kyōiku oyobi kyōju no shinchō* [The New Wave in Education and Teaching of Kokugo], 1914, Quoted in Lee Yeounsuk, *The Ideology of Kokugo: Nationalizing Language in Modern Japan*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010), 163.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, 164.

<sup>71</sup> For a discussion of how religion was utilized in the formation of amenable Indian subjects see Dillip Chavan, “Curriculum, Ideology and Pedagogy: Moral Textbooks and Domestication of the Neo-Literate,” in *Language Politics under Colonialism: Caste, Class and Language Pedagogy in Western India*, 231-51, (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). In the Korean case see Pak Kyōng-su and Kim Sunchŏn, “Kugŏ tokpon e t’uyōngdoen Chosŏnin kyohwa yangsang,” *Ilbonŏ munhak* 50 (2011): 283-384; Chang Migyōng, “Ilbonŏ kyogwasŏro pon singminji kyoyuk: Chosŏn ‘pot’ong hakkyo kugŏ tokpon kwa Taeman ‘konghakkyo-yong kungmin tokpon’ ūl chungsimūro,” *Ilbonŏ munhak* 48 (2011): 201-220; Pae Such’an, “Ilche kangjŏmgi ‘kugŏ kyoyuk’ ūi singminji kundaesŏng yŏn’gu sŏsŏl—pot’ong hakkyo kugŏ tokponūl chungsimūro,” *Hanguk ŏnŏ munhwa* 39 (2009): 5-30; for a discussion of moral education (*susin*) and vocational education (*sirŏpkoyuk*) in particular—especially on their role in creating loyal subjects while stratifying the labor market and discouraging higher education and elevated status among Koreans, see Yi Pyōng-dam, “Chosŏn Ch’ongdokpu ch’odŭng hakkyo susin kyokwasŏ e nat’an an sirŏp kyoyuk kwa ideollogi,” *Ilbon munhwa yŏn’gu* 17 (2006): 161-182; Kim Sun-jŏn et al, *Cheguk singminji susin*, (Sŏul: Chei aen ssi (J and C) Publishing Company, 2008); Ch’oi Hye-gyōng, “Ilche kangjŏmgi pot’ong hakkyo ūi sŏllip kwa kyoyuk hwaldong: Kyōnggido Kunp’o-si chiyŏgŭl chungsimūro,” *Kyōngju sahak* 31, 151-183.

<sup>72</sup> Yee Yeounsuk, *The Ideology of Kokugo*, 163.

<sup>73</sup> Kim Hye-ryŏn, “Che 1 ch’a Chosŏn kyoyungnyōng-gi *Pot’ong Hakkyo Chosŏnŏ kŭp Hanmun Tokpon* surok chejae yŏn’gu: *Hŭngbujŏn ūl chungsim ūro*,” [Research on a Collection of Materials from the *Regular School Sino-Korean Reader* from Period of the First Educational Regime, with a Focus on *The Tale of Hŭngbu*], *Ton’amŏ Munhak* 23 (2010): 61-95.

A number of researchers have argued, as I do in this paper, that the intent of Korean language education was to function as a supplement to Japanese education. For example, Kim Hye-jöng claims that Korean language education, much like the motive of the bilingual dictionary project mentioned earlier in this work, was instituted not with the objectives of the colonized in mind but rather as a necessary functionalist tool of communication to lift the population out of a state of illiteracy and facilitate a shift to Japanese literacy in public schools.<sup>74</sup> In a similar fashion, Kim Yun-ju claims that, rather than for the purpose of Korean language education per se, “the subject of *Chosönö* was weighted toward the usage of Korean in ideological instruction as a temporary supplemental tool within an education system where Japanese could not yet function as an effective medium of communication.”<sup>75</sup> In other words, Korean language education was intended to effectively ‘connect’ (*renraku*) the vernacular to wider information dissemination in the national language, whatever the nature of that information may have been.

Other researchers have remarked on the mediational function of LS in the development of colonial literacy. In his examination of the High School Sino-Korean Reader (고등조선어급한문독본, 1913), a textbook which included many translations and adaptations of both LS and modern Japanese sources, Im Sang-sök has pointed out that, whereas ‘translations’ of *Hanmun* sources into modern Korean (*kukhanmun*) read as modified adaptations of the source text, the translations of modern Japanese texts—the proportion of which incidentally increased over time—read as more faithful renditions or even “excerpts” of the original.<sup>76</sup> This logic of translational equivalence implicitly acknowledged the modernity of Japanese literature in relation to LS while simultaneously legitimizing its position through institutional diffusion. Pak Ch’i-böm, in his comparative study of The National Language Reader (*Kokugo Tokuhon*) and the Sino-Korean Reader, points out that the greatest portion of the *Hanmun* sections of this textbook was devoted to memorization and usage of Sinographs rather than the meaning of the texts themselves.<sup>77</sup> When considering the elective status of LS education after 1922 and the official position that “the teaching of *Hanmun* in elementary schools must be abolished in the future,”<sup>78</sup> we can infer that “*Hanmun* education shifted toward an emphasis on the sinograph, which was utilized as a tool for the facilitation of *kokugo* (Japanese) education.”<sup>79</sup>

Finally, Yi Küm-sön explores a further shift toward Japanese literacy when in 1937 the already optional course Sino-Korean (*Chosönö küp Hanmun*) was removed from the curriculum entirely, replaced by Sino-Japanese (*Kokugo Kanbun*) and its foreign language equivalent Modern Chinese (*Hyöndae Chinaö*) for the purpose of East Asian amity through the ideology of ‘shared literature, shared race’ (同文同種, *tongmun tongjong*).<sup>80</sup> Thus, Yi illustrates one of the final stages in a transition that had been underway since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century in Korean language and literature, the transition from LS, through a period of *kukhanmun* experimentation—mediated primarily by *hanja* in the pre-colonial period then increasingly by *kanji* spurred by the institutionalization of Japanese language legitimacy through language

<sup>74</sup> Kim Hye-jöng, “Ilche kangjömgı ‘Chosönö kyoyuk’ üi üido wa sönggyök,” 440.

<sup>75</sup> Kim Yun-ju, “Ilche kangjömgı-gı *Chosönö Tokpon kwa Kugö Tokpon üi pigyo*,” 161.

<sup>76</sup> Im San-sök, “Chosön Ch’ongdokpu chungdüng kyoyung-yong *Chosönö-küp Hanmun Tokpon üi Chosönö insik: Sınp’yön kodüng Chosönö küp Hanmun tokpon üi pönyök kwa munch’e rül chungsim ür*,” [The Perception of Korean in the GJK Secondary School *Sino-Korean Reader: A Focus on Translation and Writing Style Found in the Advanced New Edition Sino-Korean Language Reader*], *Han’gugö Munhak Yön’gu* 57 (2011): 193.

<sup>77</sup> Pak Ch’i-böm, “*Chosönö-küp Hanmun Tokpon üi sönggyök*.”

<sup>78</sup> Hamakichi Takahashi, 1927, Quoted in Pak Ch’i böm, “*Chosönö-küp Hanmun Tokpon üi sönggyök*, 469.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, 469.

<sup>80</sup> Yi Küm-sön, “Ilche malgi ‘Hyöndae Chinaö’ kyoyuk üi üimi: *Chungdüng Simun ül chungsim üro*,” [The Meaning of ‘Modern Chinese’ Education during the Late Colonial Period, with a focus on *Chungdüng Simun*], *Sai* (間) 10 (2011): 257-83.

policy and the cultural capital of Japanese neologism circulation through translation—and finally to *kanji*'s virtual monopolization of mediation through the abolition of Sino-Korean class. Furthermore, the promotion of 'Modern Chinese' as a means of achieving "peace and amity between Japan and China" (日支親善) established it as the foreign language equivalent of LS and the legitimate embodiment of modern Sino-centric culture while simultaneously solidifying Korea's voiceless position in the Japanese empire as part of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. With the 1943 Rescript on Education, the final medium of vernacular mediation was extinguished in the public sphere as the Korean language was removed from the curriculum entirely.<sup>81</sup>

The maintenance of vernacular Korean in the public school curriculum and the gradual shift in its mediational weight and status—decreasing through subsequent grades and over time and transitioning to increased *kanji* mediation—resulted in a complex field of multiple fractured semi-literacies. The fundamental cause of this phenomenon was the schizophrenic nature of Japanese language policies, characterized by the pronounced slippage between the signifier 'national language' (*kokugo*) and the signified, the Japanese language. *Kokugo* was a term discursively constructed during the Meiji era, imbued with racial and nationalistic ideological significance, but the signified 'Japanese' resisted such meaning when applied in the colonial context. Ōtsuki Fumihiko, Japanese language scholar and one of the architects of Meiji-era *kokugo* language ideology, described *kokugo* in the following way: "*Kokugo* of a country is the symbol of the race (*minzoku*) towards the outside, and it strengthens the public sense of brethren inside. Therefore, the unification of *kokugo* is the foundation of independence and the mark of the independence [of the country]."<sup>82</sup> Thus, the semantic parameters of *kokugo*—a symbol of the Yamato *minzoku*, the ostensible symbol of not only racial and national strength but of independence itself—were strained when the concept was applied to Japanese as a foreign language under the antithetical banner of colonial subjugation. This slippage was especially conspicuous during the first decade of colonial rule, a period of nascent colonial discourse circulation and functionality, low Japanese proficiency, and lingering Korean ethnic consciousness. The manifestations of this slippage can be found in the language policy of Japanese public schools.

This discursive meaning of *kokugo* as it was understood in the late Meiji period was as the first language of the Japanese *minzoku*, a language so organically and timelessly connected to the Yamato race that it was "like the blood that flowed throughout the national body", or the "fortress of the imperial household...the loving mother of the people."<sup>83</sup> However, *kokugo* pedagogy of the 1910's did not always reflect *kokugo*'s ostensible status as the first language of Koreans, but rather its foreign status. For example *The Elementary National Language Reader* explicitly indicates non-native Japanese learners as its targeted readers, and employs foreign language teaching pedagogy thought to have been effective at the time.<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, *The Elementary Sino-Korean Reader*, supposedly a foreign language textbook, utilized pedagogy clearly aimed at learners with native proficiency in listening comprehension and speaking.<sup>85</sup> In his discussion of Japanese language pedagogy in colonial Korea, Kim Sun-jŏn demonstrates a shift from the Grammar Translation Method, with its long history of utilization between languages in the Latin Cosmopolis, to the Direct Method (*chikjŏk kyosubŏb*). During the protectorate, when Japanese was taught officially as a foreign language (*Nihongo*), though a required one, the

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<sup>81</sup> Ch'oi Yong-gi, "Ilche kangjŏmgi ūi kugŏ chŏngch'aek," [Colonial-era National Language Policy of Japan], *Han'gugŏ Munhak Yŏn'gu* 46 (2006): 9-32, 20.

<sup>82</sup> Lee Yeounsuk, *The Ideology of Kokugo*, 63.

<sup>83</sup> Quoted in Yasuda Toshiaki, "Cheguk Ilbon ūi ŏnŏ p'yŏnje: Singminji sigi ūi Chosŏn, Manjuguk, Taedonga kongyŏngkwŏn." [The Language Configuration of Imperial Japan: Colonial Korea, Manchuria, and the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere']. In *Őnŏ chegukchuŭi ran muŏt in'ga*, edited by Nobutaka Miura et al, 86-106. P'aju: Tolbegae, 2005, 88.

<sup>84</sup> Kim Yun-ju, "Ilche kangjŏm-gi Chosŏnŏ Tokpon kwa Kugŏ Tokpon ūi pigyo," 151.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

Grammar Translation Method was initially employed, but there was soon a shift in policy to the Direct Method, instituted along with the First Rescript on Education, partially based on the positive results in foreign language (Japanese) acquisition experienced in Japan's other colony, Taiwan.<sup>86</sup> The direction of Japanese pedagogy was already suggested in 1905 with the Enforcement Regulations for the Elementary School Rescript (普通學校令施行規則):

As for the Japanese language (日語) the primary purpose is to provide an understanding of simple Japanese and an ability to utilize Japanese that will be useful in daily life. Beginning with pronunciation and basic conversation, there is to be a progression to reading, writing, and composing in simple colloquial Japanese (*kōgobun*). Adapting the language to the students' level of intellect, there is to be teaching based on everyday situations and centered on practical application. Moreover, attention is to be paid to the language used (*hatsugen*, utterances) with a close consideration of its relation to *kokugo* in the process of teaching correct pronunciation.<sup>87</sup> (Emphasis mine).

To anyone familiar with the Grammar Translation Method, the above description bears very little resemblance. On the contrary, the above method shares more commonalities with the Direct Method—with its exclusion of 'first language' utilization or even reference—which would come to be employed officially in the colony soon after. This policy statement contains inherent contradictions and betrays the kind of schizophrenia that came to characterize colonial language policy. Here, there is a clear distinction drawn between Japanese (*nichigo*) and the national language (*kokugo*), a conscious distinction that figured prominently in classroom practices. However, just five years later, with the institutionalization of Japanese as *kokugo* and the ostensible closing of this discursive gap, this distinction was effaced, producing a slippage of 'Japanese' under the signifier '*kokugo*.' The above pedagogical practices which were formulated with this distinction in mind, moreover, continued, as did the nationalistic and essentializing ideologies surrounding *kokugo*. The result was the Direct Method, a self-referentializing pedagogy which attempted to imagine and recreate the conditions and methods for first language acquisition while simultaneously acknowledging the foreignness of its own discursive language as a prerequisite for its very existence. In other words, it was the *foreign language* status of the *national language* (Japanese) that necessitated a pedagogy that purported to recreate the conditions of first language acquisition. This inherent contradiction was two-fold. While on the one hand Japanese language education was progressive and expansive in nature, developed through comprehensive literacy (speaking, listening, reading, and writing) and infused into every academic subject, every age group, and every level of speech based on the premises of the Direct Method, Korean language education was atrophic in nature, where its existence was defined only in 'connection' to Japanese, resulting in the influence noted above through processes of translation, literary development, etc. Furthermore, while the discursive foreign language status of Korean limited the scope and breadth of the language in relation to Japanese in the curriculum, its unofficial but apparent first language positioning paradoxically engendered underdeveloped textual literacy in Korean based on the pedagogical assumptions of the Direct Method. The result was a field of overlapping and discontinuous literacies and semi-literacies in the various languages and écritures of the linguistic landscape, a condition that persisted throughout the colonial period and well into post-colonial North and South Korea.

### **Contextualizing Colonial (II)literacy: A Comprehensive View**

Throughout this paper we have discussed a 'shift' in colonial Korean literacy, the initial stage of a transition from Literary Sinitic to Japanese in which Korean functioned as a type of linguistic scaffolding

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<sup>86</sup> Kim Sun-jŏn and Sa Hŭi-yŏng, "Kugŏrosŏ ūi kŭndae Ilbonŏ kyoyuk koch'al," 214-215.

<sup>87</sup> Quoted in Kim Sun-jŏn and Sa Hŭi-yŏng, "Kugŏrosŏ ūi kŭndae Ilbonŏ kyoyuk koch'al," 208.

or transitional literacy. However, to give some idea of the extent of this transition, a glance at some statistics on literacy rates is needed. Many authors have pointed out what they consider to be relatively low rates of literacy in both Japanese and Korean, even with the higher public school attendance rates that marked the late colonial period.<sup>88</sup> For example, Ch'ŏn Chŏng-hwan puts the overall illiteracy rate in the early 1920's at 90-95%, with the level for women even higher.<sup>89</sup> However, in a linguistic landscape of multiple and fractured literacies—Korean vernacular, *kukhanmun*, Literary Sinitic, Japanese vernacular, *Kanbun*, reading, writing and speaking—we must refine our analysis. If colonial literacy is understood as a matrix of overlapping literacies, the overall literacy rate in the 1930's was 6.78%, this being the percentage who could read both Japanese and han'gŭl.<sup>90</sup> The GGK's own statistics put the attendance rate of school-age Korean children at Japanese elementary schools, one measure of the diffusion of proficiency in Japanese, at over 50%.<sup>91</sup> However, as Ch'ŏn accurately claims, attending and even graduating from a Japanese-language elementary school alone would not have instilled a level of literacy sufficient to read most Japanese books, and only 22%-24% of such students went on to higher education from 1930-1940.<sup>92</sup> Could this rather superficial diffusion of Japanese literacy really be termed a shift?

What these statistics on Japanese literacy rates fail to convey, however, is the geographical and social distribution of this literacy and the rapidity with which the diffusion occurred, especially when considering the ghettoization of colonial education in general. While the overall rate of Japanese literacy was quite low throughout the 1920's and 1930's, there was a rather dramatic uptick in at least some form of Japanese in the 1940's, if school enrollment figures are to be trusted. Furthermore, the overall literacy rate conceals the drastically higher rates in urban areas and among men. This is not to discount the importance of broad-based, comprehensive literacy in rural areas and among women. However, what is crucial in assessing the shift to Japanese language and literacy is not so much the number of Koreans proficient in Japanese, but rather the perceived (and actual) role of Japanese in the institutions of knowledge dissemination (schools) that had been deemed legitimate by an overwhelming majority in Korean society. Finally, the statistics on Japanese literacy conceal the multiple overlapping literacies that characterized colonial Korea, most notably a kind of latent Japanese literacy manifested in Korean as a transitional literacy, a language which shared an increasing number of commonalities with Japanese through grammatical, syntactic, and semantic influence over time in a kind of assemblage relationship that Deleuze would term 'becoming language.'<sup>93</sup> As I have claimed previously, this shift in language and literacy was the result of multiple interactive processes, and focusing on only one aspect is insufficient for

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<sup>88</sup> Mitsui Takashi, "Singminjiha ūi Chosŏnŏ ŏnŏ chŏngch'ihak," 89; Yi Myŏng-hwa, "Chosŏn Ch'ongdokpu ūi ŏnŏ tonghwa chŏngch'aek: Hwangminhwa sigi Ilbonŏ sangyong undong ūl chungsimŭro," *Han'guk tongnip undongsa yŏn'gu* 9, (1995): 277-94; Kim Puja for example claims that, due to the low attendance rates throughout the colonial period, especially among girls, the focus should rather be placed on chronic non-attendance rather than on attendance, as traditionally been the case. See Kim Puja, "Singminji sigi Chosŏn pot'ong hakkyo ch'wihak tonggi wa Ilbonŏ—1930nyŏndae chungsim ūro," *Sahoewa yŏksa* 17 (2008): pp. 39-55.

<sup>89</sup> Ch'ŏn Chŏng-hwan, *Kŭndae ūi ch'aek ilkki*, [Reading Books and Modernity], (Sŏul: P'urŭn Yŏksa, 2003). 92-93.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, 96.

<sup>91</sup> However, there was a large gender-based discrepancy in primary school attendance: for boys the attendance rate was nearly 70% in 1942, while for girls it was closer to 30%. See Chŏsen Sŏtokofu, Chŏsen Sŏtokofu tokei nenpo, [Statistical yearbooks of the Governor-General of Korea], (Keijo: Chŏsen Sŏtokofu, 1932-38, 1942, quoted in Oh Seong-cheol and Kim Ki-seok, "Expansion of Elementary Schooling under Colonialism: Top Down or Bottom Up? in Clark W. Sorenson and Kim Hyung-A ed., *Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea, 1910-1945*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013, 123-24).

<sup>92</sup> Ch'ŏn, *Kŭndae ūi ch'aek ilkki*, 96.

<sup>93</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. by Brian Massumi, (London: Continuum, 2004).

a comprehensive understanding.<sup>94</sup> With the exposure of LS to Western languages through (Japanese) translation and the concomitant circulation of discourses on discrepant temporalities and ‘backwardness’ in literature and language, LS writing conventions were gradually dismantled by the mediation of vernacular Korean in the form of an unstable écriture, Sino-Korean mixed script (*kukhanmun*). Through this contact, the semantic, grammatical, syntactical, and rhetorical parameters of the Korean language were extended or reconfigured according to the logic of translational equivalence. The convergence of such a transnational linguistic circulation with the political will engendered in colonial education policy at a point of pronounced instability in the developmental trajectory of Korean from that encoded in LS to *kukhanmun* combined to lay the foundation for a subsequent shift from illiteracy/semi-literacy in Korean to literacy in Japanese, with Korean acting as a form of transitional literacy, and the sinograph functioning as a mediating agent. With the forceful removal of Japanese from the public sphere after 1945, or at least language perceived to be Japanese by most Koreans, this ‘latent literacy’ crystallized into contemporary Korean.

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<sup>94</sup> For example, Cheon Jeong-hwan claims that, “Korea seems to have differed clearly from the West and Japan in the role and degree of importance of foreign prose fiction and school education in the formation and expansion of the readers of fiction. For colonial Korea foreign works may be considered all important while school education relatively insignificant.” However, this observation is only valid when the colonial linguistic landscape is viewed as discrete and compartmentalized, which I argue it is not. While *Korean* fiction did not play a large role in the school curriculum, due to the limitations placed on vernacular education discussed throughout this paper, *Japanese* education and the Japanese literary market were mutually reinforcing systems, and the surpassing and displacing of Korean literature by Japanese from the 1920’s illustrates the significant role played by education in the development of a Japanese readership. Furthermore, the reading and translation of these Japanese works expanded the Korean lexicon and affected its grammar (as discussed above), in turn altering the way Korean language education was conducted in public schools. Cheon Jeong-hwan, “The Process of the Formation and Diversification of the Readers of Korean Prose Fiction in the 1920’s and 1930’s,” in *Critical Readings on Korea’s Colonial Period*, edited by Hyung Gu Lynn, 687-716, (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 690.

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# The South Korean Arctic Shipping Routes Development

## Strategy: Characteristics and Restrains

In May 2013, South Korea and China together, were approved to become the official permanent observers by the Arctic Council. Since then, South Korea has launched a series of measures to participate the development of Arctic area: in July 2013, the Korean Government released the 《북극 종합정책 추진계획》; in September 2013, Korea organized the first commercial shipping test along the Arctic shipping routes; in December 2013, the Korean Government released a more detailed and complete report 《북극정책기본계획(안)》. All these measures clearly show that the Korean Government has accelerated the pace to participate the development of Arctic area, by taking the utilization of resources and shipping routes as the main content, while the shipping routes are even more important. In terms of Arctic affairs, South Korea and China have some common characteristics; both are Northeast Asian countries, geographically not directly neighboring with Arctic Ocean but having strong demands and willingness to the Arctic shipping routes and resources. Therefore, South Korea and China have both cooperation and competition in Arctic affairs. It is important to know how South Korea thinks about on the issue and to have more cooperation and avoid competition among Northeast Asian countries.

### Part 1: basic facts of South Korea's participation in the development of Arctic area

The Arctic Shipping Route is a shipping lane running across the Bering Strain between Russia and Alaska of the United States and North Pole to Rotterdam of Europe. As the global temperature continuously increases, the ice of the Arctic Ocean is getting melt more and more as well. According to the U.S. National Snow & Ice Data Center, the ice cover area of the Arctic Ocean has decreased to 4.10 million square kilometers, the lowest record in history<sup>1</sup>. Predicted by the New York Times, the Arctic Ocean would become no-ice Ocean up to 2020 and the sea ice will totally disappear. Currently, in general, there are 3 months of melt season every year and the suitable shipping time is during the four months between the July and the October, while in 2011 the suitable shipping time even expanded to 5 months from the July to November. If taking the use of icebreaker into consideration, the commercial sailing along the Arctic Shipping Route would be very probable. According to the evaluations by some experts, the average suitable sailing time of the Arctic Shipping Route would be 5 months every year for next ten years, and would become whole year till 2050<sup>2</sup>. This means the transportation fee will decrease significantly; and compared to the Suez Canal, there is no cubage limits in the Arctic Shipping Route, which even increase the attraction of it.

There are two major commercial shipping routes in Arctic area: the first is Northwest Passage, which runs along the northern coast of Canada and links the Atlantic and Pacific; the second is Northeast Passage, which runs along the northern coast of Siberia of Russia and links the Atlantic

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<sup>1</sup> <http://nsidc.org/data/seaice/pm.html>, accessed on February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Hong-Seongwon. The Arctic Route and the Development of the Arctic Sea Resource: the Cooperation between Korea and Russia and the Strategy of South Korea, 국제지역연구, Vol.15, No.4, P95-124.

and the Pacific<sup>3</sup>.

For South Korea, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which is one part of Northeast Passage, is the main shipping route that it plans to utilize. The NSR has the potential of industrial innovation for South Korea. This route will make the shipping distance from Busan to Rotterdam 36.8% shorter and the shipping time 41.6%<sup>4</sup> shorter. Having seen this great potential interest, South Korea abandoned its former “valuing more Antarctic than Arctic” policy, began substantially strengthen scientific and shipping research on the Arctic. South Korea plans to construct Busan as the shipping and transferring center of Asia through participating the development and construction of the Arctic shipping routes. On this basis, it even tries to further promote the development of its already world-class shipbuilding, sea transportation and complete sets of equipment.

The timing of South Korea’s participation into the Arctic affairs is quite late. For in the past, South Korea has been holding the idea that the Antarctica is terra nullius, and therefore different activities including scientific research would not lead to frictions with other countries. However, the Arctic area is different as the adjacent countries have already competed seriously. If South Korea cannot deal with the issues skillfully, it might face diplomatic problems. This explains why South Korea has been cautious in participation of the Arctic affairs. Though in 2002, South Korea established the DASAN Korean Arctic Station in the Arctic Pole, it was mainly for scientific research purpose. Only after the commercial utilization of the Arctic shipping routes became manifested, active efforts were done by the South Korea government. In 2012, then President Lee Myung-bak visited Russia, Greenland (Denmark) and Norway, to persuade them to agree accepting South Korea to be an official Observer State of the Arctic Council and to promote the test of commercial shipping of the Arctic shipping routes. In 2013, after taking office by President Park Geun-hye, she listed the development of the Arctic area as the 14<sup>th</sup> most important out of 140 national administrative priorities. The new administration elevated the development of the Arctic to the level of creating new engine of ocean development and clearly defined the target as development of the Arctic shipping routes. Thereafter, participating Arctic affairs, development of the Arctic shipping routes and creating new ocean development engine for South Korea’s economy have formed a hot spot in South Korean society. Almost all the major groups of South Korea, including the government, academia, industries, and even average citizens, pay high attention to the issue and prepare to promote the development of the Arctic.

In South Korea, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries(MOF) is charge of the Arctic affairs. Its affiliated institution, Korea Maritime Institute, has been closely following the development of the Arctic routes. As the major governmental research institution, the Korea Maritime Institute(KMI) would release some research reports on the Arctic issue periodically. In the report of 《A view on the change of maritime ports and the logistic flows with Arctic route became navigable》, the institution has done a very detailed research and analysis on the implications of the realization of

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<sup>3</sup> In the Statement announced by the Arctic Council in 2009, the Arctic Route was divided into three parts: Northwest Passage, NWP, which runs along the northern coast of Canada and links the Atlantic and Pacific; Northeast Passage, NEP, which runs along the north Europe and northern Eurasia where North Cape located and Siberia; Northern Sea Route, NSR, one part of Northeast Passage, which runs along Bering Strait to Kara Gate. Russia announced that because the NSR is the coastland of Russia, so it ‘s Russia’s continental waters, and it should under the rules of Russia.

<sup>4</sup> The Statistics of Busan Port in 2011.

the Arctic routes to be commercially navigable. South Korea has also held many domestic and international seminars, discussing and analyzing the strategic measures that South Korea should take on the Arctic routes. Besides, many academic institutions, including the Korea Maritime and Ocean University and the Korea Polar Research Institute and other academic institutes, have been closely following the development of the Arctic routes as well. They continuously publish research reports on the advantages and disadvantages the Arctic routes might bring to South Korea. Sometimes they would provide policy suggestions and evaluations on their official strategy and policy on the Arctic issue. As the most potential beneficiaries, the related industries have proactively give impetus to the South Korean government to make its Arctic Strategy as soon as possible, in order to have a place in the development of the Arctic area at early stage.

After becoming the Permanent Observer State of the Arctic Council in May 2013, realizing its poor policy reserve on the Arctic issue, South Korea started to actively promote its national Arctic policy planning and made specific schedule. In July 2013, South Korean government released 《북극 종합정책 추진계획》, which was a result of coordination by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries(MOF) and participation of many relevant ministries and departments. The plan clearly stated the direction, targets and major issues of South Korea's Arctic policy. Its content is concise and it clearly defines distribution of labor among different government institutions and the timeline of implementation. One fact shows the importance that South Korean government has attached to the report, that the report was formally initiated by 현오석, the Deputy Prime Minister and the minister of Ministry of Strategy and Finance, at a government ministerial conference on foreign economic issues. He determinedly declared that South Korea government in general will make serious efforts to establish a comprehensive Arctic policy to promote the development of the Arctic routes, Arctic energy and resources.

## **Part two: the main content of South Korea's Arctic Route Development Strategy**

In 《북극정책기본계획(안)》, South Korean government set four main approaches to participate Arctic development, which are respectively strengthening international cooperation, enhancing scientific and research activities, pushing forward the Arctic business models development and expanding institutional basis. As for the Arctic business model development, the development and construction of NSR is the basis and emphasis.

According to the internal statistical report of Busan Port, by navigating through NSR, its distance to Rotterdam will be shortened by 36.8% and will save ten days of sailing time. As a result, the whole transportation fees of goods can be drastically reduced (See Table 1) and this would be critical for South Korea, as it is a major import-export and shipping country. As long as the NSR can be commercially utilized, Busan Port will have great geographical advantages and potential competitiveness (See Table 2) compared to other major Asian port cities, including Singapore, Shanghai and Hong Kong, which would be greatly helpful to South Korean government as it is hoping to construct Busan Port as the Center of Northeast Asia goods transportation. Therefore, the fundamental goal of South Korea's Arctic route development strategy lies in creating new industry chain of Arctic economy, consolidating the engine of ocean development for its economy and the core target is to establish itself as the hub of transportation in the Northeast Asia and the Arctic region.

**【Table 1】 The comparison of the Korea NSR Cost (Busan Port)**

	<u>Asia-Europe</u>	<u>NSR</u>	
Route	Busan-Singapore-Rotterdam	Busan-Arctic Sea-Rotterdam	
Distance	20100KM	12700KM	36.8%(saving)
Time	24days	14days	41.6%(saving)
The ship	Normal	ICE level	
Cost of ship	Normal	+30%	
Cost of crew	Normal	Close to normal	
Insurance	Normal	+30%	
Fuel	Standard	+20%	
Running	Normal	Normal	

Resource: The Statistics of Busan Port in 2011.

**【Table 2】 The Comparison of competitiveness for Busan by NSR (to Rotterdam)**

	Distance	Distance Increase	Fuel Increase/year	Ship cost increase/year	Total cost increase/year
Busan	12700KM				
Singapore	17180KM	+4480KM	+500 million yuan	+720 million yuan	+1220 million yuan
Shanghai	13220KM	+520KM	+50 million yuan	+70 million yuan	+120 million yuan
HongKong	13978KM	+1278KM	+110 million yuan	+150 million yuan	+260 million yuan

Notice: the monetary unit is Korean yuan; every ship sailed 10 times annual and the ship cost is 50 thousands USD .

Resource: Busan Port Statistics in 2011.

In terms of working direction, South Korea's Arctic Route Development Strategy can be deemed as composed by two parts, one is internal work and the other is external work. On the internal front, at first, as it lacks of navigating experience in Arctic area, South Korea decides to strengthen navigating tests and accumulate navigating experience. Currently, the goods volume transported through the Arctic routes has maintained growth momentum, but the transportation market is generally monopolized by the big transportation companies of Europe and Russia. The South Korean transportation companies, lacking suitable cargo ships and actual experience of navigation for Arctic transportation, are very difficult to participate into the market competition. Besides, along the Arctic routes, the situation of ocean and ice is very complicated, the climate condition is terrible. So the Arctic transportation would have very high requirements to the cargo ships and crew quality. This serious challenges lead South Korean government to ask the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries(MOF) to be responsible for organizing navigation tests in the Arctic in order to prepare for real commercial navigation in the future. Between September 15<sup>th</sup> and October 21<sup>st</sup> 2013, South Korea has smoothly completed its first navigation test along NSR and



made a series of following plans based on the test results. South Korea's second internal working area is trying to increase its ports' attraction and competitiveness. South Korean government is planning to strengthening construction and upgrade of its ports, reducing the fees of using the ports and equipment, giving awards to those cargo ships which navigating along the Arctic routes. By doing this, the government hopes it can attract more and more Arctic cargo ships to stop and transfer at its ports, which can be early preparation for its future participation in development the Arctic. South Korean decides, since 2014, it will reduce 50% of fees of ports use of the Arctic cargo ships. According to this new rule, every cargo ship in average can save 6-7 million WON (South Korean currency) every year. The Government also decides to give 50 million WON award to those cargo ships if they can reach a targeted transportation volume a year. All these incentive measures will encourage the cargo ships navigating through the Arctic routes to stop or transfer in Korean ports. Besides, South Korean government decides to construct a scaled modern port of transshipment along the Arctic routes which passing by South Korea. According to the research of the Korea Maritime Institute(KMI), if the Arctic routes get formally commercially utilized, the volume of goods to be transited in South Korea will have big annual growth<sup>5</sup>. Therefore the transshipment capacity of South Korean ports must be increased substantially and their equipment and infrastructure need to be adjusted and upgraded. South Korean government is planning to increase its investment in these areas. Meanwhile, by doing this, it is trying to balance its local governments' competition to win the Arctic industry and transportation business, and promoting the development of its relatively poorer regions.

On the external front, South Korea's strategy is also clear-cut, which is to seek for place in the Arctic affairs, cultivating talents and expanding cooperation in the related areas. The first, acknowledging the fact that the countries like Norway and Russia have more authority, power and advanced technology, South Korea try to increase its exposure and power of discourse through actively promoting cooperative studies, conferences with these countries on the Arctic issue. The second, South Korea tries to cooperate with Russia to train its own talents on the Arctic transportation. As mentioned above, it is very complicated and dangerous to navigate in the Arctic and it is necessary to have experienced navigator. South Korea's Arctic navigator reserve is quite poor while Russia has very strong advantage in this area, so South Korea is planning to cooperate with Russia to train its own navigators for the icy-sea sailing. At the same time, it is actively preparing for selection of its Arctic crew members. The third, South Korea is planning to cooperate with Russia to construct a port of transshipment along the coast close to NSR. Most ports close to NSR are in the Far Eastern region of Russia. They were built in the former Soviet Union period and the equipment is already outdated and can't meet the demands of the commercial transportation along NSR. Therefore, Russia has already made the "Port Development Strategy", preparing to develop these ports and regions. South Korea, taking this as a good opportunity, actively promotes the signing of a MOU with Russia on port development. With this cooperation, South Korea can both win contracts for its construction companies and expand its own advantages in utilizing NSR.

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<sup>5</sup> The paper in the Special Seminar which held by KMI and the Korea Forum for Progress, the title is: The Arctic Sea Strategy for creating future benefit of Korea.  
[http://www.kmi.re.kr/Boards.do?command=Detail&bid=yunja404&CONTENT\\_NU=3](http://www.kmi.re.kr/Boards.do?command=Detail&bid=yunja404&CONTENT_NU=3) Accessed on February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2014.

### **Part 3: Characteristics of South Korean Arctic Shipping Routes Development Strategy**

For South Korea, the most important interests of the Arctic routes development are shipping routes and resources. As explicitly indicated by Youngsan University 海运港湾管理学科 professor hong-seongwon, the development of the Arctic is critical for South Korea's interests, because it will create new transportation routes, new energy and resources of the Arctic and the following transportation of them. South Korea is well-known to be a relatively resource poor country. Its development mainly depends on export economy. South Korea is also a peninsular nation, plus its export-import economy needs, it has great demands for sea transportation with other countries. As a result, South Korean industries of shipbuilding, sea transportation and sea equipment have gained great development, and become world class in many areas and highly internationally competitive. The potential commercial utilization of the Arctic routes provides South Korea with a broad business prospect. But in terms of participating in the Arctic affairs, South Korea has shortcomings: it is not directly adjacent to the Arctic, so it does not enjoy the special status like Norway has; it is now a big power like Japan or China, so it does not have very strong political power in participating into the Arctic affairs. In one hand, it has strong interests in participating in the Arctic route development; in the other hand, it has the above mentioned shortcomings. In order to gain the interests and overcome the shortcomings, South Korea's Arctic Route Development Strategy displays three characteristics.

The first, South Korea tries to depend on those big Arctic powers. In the past, South Korea has been paying more value and attention to the Antarctic than the Arctic, so its participation in the Arctic affairs is relatively weak. And at the beginning stage of its participation, the scientific research activities were the main content and South Korea had no strong influence on the development of the Arctic routes. Acknowledging its own weak status, South Korea adopted the dependence approach, i.e., by comprehensively cooperating with the Arctic powers bilaterally, mainly with Russia and Norway, and utilizing the advantages of them, to ensure and promote its interests and sustainable participation in the Arctic development.

In utilizing the Arctic routes, South Korea has a high dependence on Russia. As Russia deems NSR belonging to its territorial waters and it has jurisdiction over it, and so the cargo ships navigating along the NSR should accept Russia's regulation rather than international rules. This render Russia absolute regulation power over the route and it has very critical requirements on the use of ice-breaker, hydrological data, and sea ice and climate information. However, although these equipment and information are necessary for navigating in the area, South Korea itself is not good of using and collecting them. Thus South Korea has to depend on the provision of Russia, which sometimes could have negatively influence. For example, it is quite expensive to rent Russian ice-breaker in the area and price of renting sometimes fluctuates by big margin. And Russia's monopoly of the information of the sea area also brings inconvenience to other countries ships. But as the NSR is exactly the sea lane that South Korea wants to utilize, as a non-Arctic and middle country, South Korea has not been able to avoid high dependence on Russia.

The second, South Korea's Arctic development cooperation is multi-dimensional and multi-level. Although South Korea has high dependence on Russia on the Arctic route issue, its cooperation with Russia is not confined only in the route development and construction. Rather, it actively

develops and promotes multi-dimensional and multi-level cooperation with Russia and Norway, trying to balance the risk of depending too much on one country and on one specific issue. For example, it signs various agreements and MOUs with Russia on crew training, port construction on the coastal ports close to NSR, trying to deepen and broaden the bilateral cooperation. Besides, South Korea also has substantial cooperation with Norway such as exchange of information, co-sponsoring of research and seminars etc.

At the multilateral level, South Korea strengthens and broadens its links with the Arctic Council and other Observer states, actively taking part in relevant organizations and groups and increasing its status and discourse in the Arctic affairs. What needs to be especially noted is that South Korea has been proactively joined the related international law making process, the economic law in particular.

By taking this multi-dimensional and multi-level tactics, it is reasonable to say South Korea to some degree balanced its high dependence on Russia.

The third, South Korea's seeking for its own interests in the Arctic area is very committed. Since 2009, the major relevant groups in South Korea, including the government, industries, academia etc., have started to invest much into the research and discussion on the Arctic route issue and published many research reports. On the central government side, Park Geun-hye Administration has listed the Arctic route development as one of the major national administrative priority and asked the relevant ministries and departments to coordinate on the work and launched the 《북극 종합정책 추진계획》. The government's target is to use the development of the Arctic route as a new engine for the industrial development of South Korea. In the speech during her first visit to Busan, President Park Geun-hye declared South Korean Government would steadily support Busan to become the capital of sea in Northeast Asia to promote the development of the region. She said the administration will provide railing system program and financing as the specific supporting measures. This shows that the South Korean government does not deem the development of the Arctic routes as an individual industry but try to link it to domestic economic development, hoping the development of the Arctic route will accelerate the economic development of the whole region of Busan Port and its neighboring area. On the local government side, after the Park Administration declared the listing of the development of the Arctic route as a major national administrative priority, the major sea ports of South Korea in which Busan is a representative have pushed forward their own plans. Many local government officials and representatives write to the central government or deliver speeches, expressing their desires and demands to join the development of the Arctic route. With this we can see that, as South Korea is actively seeking cooperation with other countries to development the Arctic route, its domestic groups are also eagerly coordinating and cooperating to prepare for the commercial prospect, and trying to use this development as a chance to promote the development of its coastal area and inject new incentives to its economy.

#### **Part 4: the restraints South Korea is facing**

With the analysis and discussion above of the content and characteristics of South Korea's Arctic shipping route development strategy, we can see there are three main restraints for South Korea.

The first, South Korea is only a middle power and not an Arctic state either, its research capacity and reserve on the Arctic is not enough as well, which impede South Korea's efforts to join the development of the Arctic area. As a non-Arctic state, South Korea just got its Permanent Observer status in May 2013. South Korea had wanted use this opportunity to expand its activity and influence on the Arctic affairs. However, compared to other states which have joined the Arctic affairs, South Korea is not an adjacent country and not big political power either, which determines its poor rights of discourse in the affairs. South Korea, therefore, not only has to avoid offending the interests and willingness of the big political powers like Russia and the United States, but also needs to seek the adjacent countries like Russia and Norway to provide cooperation and technological support. Besides, although South Korea wishes to construct Busan as the hub of transportation of Northeast Asia, its two neighbors----China and Japan----also have similar ideas and they have strong competitiveness. South Korea will not necessarily be able to defeat China and Japan in this matter.

The second, as South Korea had been value the Antarctic more than the Arctic, its legal and institutional preparation on the Arctic affairs are not well prepared. Only recently, has the South Korean government decided to establish special government body to charge of the Arctic affairs and there are not general strategy and formal policy and legal documents to be published on the Arctic affairs even up to now. In the contrast, China and Japan have started their legal and institutional preparation for the Arctic affairs much earlier. South Korea knows that it is not enough to have only the department of transportation to join the development and preparation of its Arctic shipping route development, other sectors and departments like the foreign affairs, resources development, environment, geography and culture etc. should also take part in the international cooperation. In other countries Arctic polices, the different sectors and departments' specific policies like sea transportation, aquaculture, shipbuilding and ocean environment have been integrated under a general framework, while South Korea's work of the policy integration has not be strong enough, which has caused continuous and serious criticisms. Just in this context of pressure, South Korean government has published 《북극 종합정책 추진계획》.

The third, the thickness of the sea ice in the Arctic highlights South Korea's technological weakness. Because sea ice does not stay in the Antarctic as long as it does in the Arctic, it does not have the opportunity to grow as thick as sea ice in the Arctic. While thickness varies significantly within both regions, Antarctic ice is typically 1 to 2 meters (3 to 6 feet) thick, while most of the Arctic is covered by sea ice 2 to 3 meters (6 to 9 feet) thick. Some Arctic regions are covered with ice that is 4 to 5 meters (12 to 15 feet) thick<sup>6</sup>. So the Arctic route would demand much higher requirements for the icebreakers. Currently, South Korea does not have the technology and can only rent the nuclear icebreaker of Russia to help navigate along the NSR. However, the renting price of Russian nuclear icebreaker is quite high and it changes abruptly sometimes, which brings big uncertainties for the transportation cost of South Korea cargo ships. But in the short run, South Korea has no other choices but try to communicate and negotiate with Russian side, though the negotiation does not make too much sense.

In addition to the icebreaker and transportation cost problem, there are other difficulties for South

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<sup>6</sup> <http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/characteristics/difference.html>, accessed on February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2014.

Korea to utilize the Arctic-shipping route. According to the analysis of the testing navigation done by the South Korean sea transportation company, the adverse weather, the fragmented sea ice, the lack of coastal help centers, the difficulty of communication caused by bad weather, and incapacity to share information, all these negative factors have been challenges for South Korea's efforts to utilize the Arctic shipping routes. Some of them can be overcome by having more tests and navigations; while some other difficulties need to be resolved by communicating, coordinating and cooperating with other countries. However, the result will not be decided by South Korea, other countries' attitude and orientation of interests are important as well.

## **Part 5: conclusion**

The new administration of South Korea has listed the development of the Arctic shipping routes as one of its national administrative priorities. The target of its Arctic route strategy is very ambitious and solid: trying to utilize the shortcut sea lane linkage of Eurasia landmass, ensuring its advantage in world sea transportation market, exploring new commercial opportunities, and in the same time to promote development of its coastal area and prepare for the future import of Arctic resources and energy. South Korea has strong comparative advantages in shipbuilding, sea transportation and sea equipment manufacturing compared to other countries, which is the basis for South Korea to carry forward its Arctic strategy.

However, South Korea's political status and poor policy and technology reserve are the restraints for the implementation of the strategy. Compared to other countries like China, Japan, Russia, which are political and economic powers, South Korea is at most a middle power, though it is deemed as a developed emerging economy. Therefore, South Korea has the limits in the aspects of international political power, economic scale and influence, and the result is South Korea has to depend and try to get cooperation with other big Arctic powers in pushing forward its Arctic strategy.

As South Korea is promoting its Arctic development strategy, China is doing exactly the same thing. Together with South Korea to become the Permanent Observers, Chinese ship, Yongsheng, started from Taichang Port on August 15<sup>th</sup> 2013, navigated through the Arctic, and reached Rotterdam on September 10<sup>th</sup>, to become the first Chinese commercial ship navigating along the Northeast Route of the Arctic<sup>7</sup>. China and South Korea are both the non-Arctic and Northeast Asian countries. They have some competition in development of the Arctic area, but they have more room to cooperate in the matter: such as to establish communication channels among China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, to discuss the fees of using icebreaker, the legal and management issues; to promote the circulation of shipping products, sea transportation exchanges, shipping management facilities and cooperation and exchanges in construction of business zones; to jointly take part in develop the coastal ports of Russia. Therefore, closely following of South Korea's Arctic route development strategy and trying to learn some experiences and lessons from it, can be helpful to promote the bilateral cooperation between South Korea and China.

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.shipol.com.cn/xw/zonghexx/277021.htm>. Accessed on February 26<sup>th</sup>, 2014.

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**【Abstract】** In recent years, South Korea has revised its Pole Policy, from just focusing on Antarctic affairs to Arctic affairs as well, and actively participated the construction of Arctic Routes and resource development in Arctic area. As Arctic Routes can save much of the distance and time for South Korea's oversea export/import transportation, it has been deemed as the key part of South Korea's Arctic Development Strategy (SKADS). Internally, South Korea has begun to update its port infrastructure and accumulate transportation experience; externally, it tried to cooperate with the major Arctic countries to increase its opportunities and capacity to utilize the Arctic Routes. Up to now, SKADS is still in initial stage of implementation, restrained by limited preparation of information, technology and policy. The problems emerging from the transportation tests along the Arctic Routes also make clear that SKADS needs more improvements.

## Imagining “Korea” in Israeli-Korean R&D Joint Ventures<sup>1</sup>

이스라엘-한국 연구개발 벤처 협동과정에서 생산되는 한국의 이미지

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### **Abstract**

In the increasingly competitive international markets, the strategy of expanding and crossing cultural and geographical boundaries has become a prominent feature found in many global business organizations. International collaboration is now commonly conducted in a “third space” where multiple cultures co-exist; yet, cultural images of the “Other” are also produced and reproduced in this collaborative space. The present study examines the issue of cultural images in international collaboration by investigating how Israeli managers perceive their Korean colleagues in international R&D joint ventures that I have been exploring since 2008.

On a macro level, Israel and South Korea are miracles in the global knowledge economy. While the countries differ greatly—with Korea numbering 50 million people compared to Israel’s 8 million, and Korea boasting a GNP of over \$1.5 trillion in 2011 compared to Israel’s \$218 billion—both countries are concurrently classified as “emerging markets” and “developed.” The global knowledge economy has brought both countries to an interesting point of interaction: while the Korean conglomerates—accounting for over 80% of the Korean economy as of 2012—are seeking to elevate their creative knowledge, Israel’s successful R&D industry has built the country’s reputation as the “Start-up Nation” and a hub of high-technology production. As a result, Korea and Israel have come to be viewed as complementary, rather than competing, economies.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was generously supported by the Shaine Center at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Most cross-cultural management (CCM) research focuses on political and economic exchanges within the global North, while ignoring the discourse of uneven globalization between the global core and its periphery. Even though critical studies examine East-West power relations, Israel and Korea do not neatly fall into the categories of developed and developing and the relations between them do not display a clear-cut power hierarchy. Rather, Israeli-Korean R&D joint ventures are perceived as forms of equal economic partnership by both nations for which their respective governments provide extensive collaborative support.

On a micro level, however, these perceptions of partnership and the nation-state are formed through the process of imagining the “Other.” Korea functions as a mirror to Israeli managers when imagining their own culture and society in a global context, defining their identity as “Western-like versus Asian,” and the “Start-up Nation” versus “The Republic of Samsung.” In turn, these cultural images become important factors for Israeli firms in selecting partners, affecting group dynamics in collaborative projects, and making managerial decisions in the labor division.

It should also be noted that Korea and Koreans are (re)imagined in the Israeli context not only through Israeli-Korean business interaction; they are defined by Israeli managers in their juxtaposition of Korea with Japan, China, and Singapore. In other words, cultural images produced in Israel are attributed to individual nations and Asia as a whole. Thus, this paper examines how images of Korea are produced, circulated, and perceived in comparison to other Asian nations by the Israeli managers in Israeli-Korean R&D joint ventures.

**Keywords:** international R&D joint venture, Korean-Israeli economic relations, uneven globalization, cultural perceptions, imagination.



## Cultural Encounter and Imagination

[...] to be English is to know yourself in relation to French, to the hot-blooded Mediterraneans, and to the passionate, traumatized Russians. You know that you are what everybody else on the globe is not (Hall 1997: 174).

Following Stuart Hall's understanding of cultural self-construction, I define *cultural encounter* as a mundane, everyday interaction, physical or virtual, between people from different nations or ethnic groups in which one imagines the collective self and the other. "Imagined communities" are "*imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 1991: 6; original emphasis). In this sense, imagination plays a critical role in global processes through which people define themselves, engage with others, and construct new visions and realities across national borders. Imagination, therefore, is a collective cognitive process manifested through cultural encounter (Rizvi 2006; Popkewitz, 2000); it is a "popular, social and collective fact" (Appadurai 2001: 6).<sup>2</sup>

Cultural studies show that the comparison between people from different cultures is based on *perceptions* that are set in motion in encounters (Barth 1969). According to Adler (2008), perceptions are selective, learned, culturally determined, consistent and inaccurate. Using perceptions, one both *follows* his or her cultural map and *selects* what

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<sup>2</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) gives five definitions of imagination relating to "the power or capacity to form internal images or ideas of objects and situations not actually present to the senses"; thinking process; consideration of future and expectations; "The tendency to form ideas which do not correspond to reality"; and finally "the mind's creativity and resourcefulness in using and inventing images." These definitions however refer to imagination as an individual action. From the Oxford English Dictionary. Imagination: <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91643?redirectedFrom=imagination#eid>

to see and hear (p. 73). In this paper I argue that Israeli managers *frame* and reproduce their Korean colleagues in the stereotypical view of the “Other” through cultural perceptions. “To frame,” argues Entman (1993), “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (as cited in Frenkel et al. forthcoming).

In classifying Korean culture into fixed categories, selecting certain features of a culture to be more salient than others, measuring the similarities and differences between cultures, and predicting less or more efficient interactions between people and organizational units from two cultures, Israeli managers offer a frame through which they imagine themselves and others within the context of an international encounter. The paper demonstrates how Israeli workers’ conceptualization of their own culture and that of the Other, as well as their expectations of themselves and of the other, are shaped by: a) their underlying assumption that both Israelis and Koreans are representatives of their own national-cultural environments and, therefore, are likely to enact their cultural habitus; b) their point of references when seeking to learn more about the other’s culture is framed through a juxtaposition between Western-like self and Asian-like Other.

### **Israeli-Korean Case Study**

On a macro level, Israel and South Korea (hereafter, Korea) are miracles of the global knowledge economy. While the countries differ greatly—with Korea numbering 50 million people compared to Israel’s 8 million and Korea boasting a GNP of over \$1.5 trillion in 2011 compared to Israel’s \$218 billion—both countries are concurrently classified as “emerging markets” and “developed” (Levi-Faur 1998; Maman 2002). The global

knowledge economy has brought both countries to an interesting point of interaction: while the Korean conglomerates — accounting for over 80% of the Korean economy as of 2012 — are seeking to spring their tech creation and capacity, Israel’s successful R&D industry has built the country’s reputation as the “Start-up Nation” and as a hub of technology creation (De Fontenay and Carmel 2004; Senor and Singer 2009; Drori et al. 2013). As a result, Korea and Israel have come to be defined as complementary, rather than competing, economies: Israel’s leadership in knowledge creation, especially in elite technologies, is complemented by Korea’s superior production and marketing. Based on such an understanding, numerous governmental programs were established to encourage partnerships between the two.

These economic partnerships are ripe with intercultural exchanges that are uniquely positioned. Most cross-cultural management (CCM) research focuses on political and economic exchanges within the global North, while ignoring the discourse of uneven globalization between the global core and its periphery. Even though critical studies examine East-West power relations, Israel and Korea do not neatly fall into the categories of developed and developing and the relations between them do not display a clear-cut power hierarchy. Rather, Israeli-Korean R&D joint ventures are perceived as forms of equal economic partnership by both nations, for which their respective governments provide extensive collaborative support.

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“The Republic of Samsung.” In turn, these cultural images become important factors for Israeli firms in selecting partners; affecting group dynamics in collaborative projects; and making managerial decisions in the labor division.

It should also be noted that Korea and Koreans are imagined in the Israeli context not only through Israeli-Korean business interaction; they are defined by Israeli managers in their juxtaposition of Korea with Japan, China, and Singapore. In other words, cultural images produced in Israel are attributed to individual nations and Asia as a whole. Thus, this paper examines the ways in which images of Korea are produced, circulated, and perceived compared to other Asian nations by the Israeli managers in Israeli-Korean R&D joint ventures.

The diplomatic and economic relations between Israel and Korea are relatively new, and given the geographical distance between the two countries and the absence of a shared history between them, very few Israelis have had the chance to develop a stereotypical view of Koreans and vice versa. How then, did so many of our Israeli interviewees come to describe their Korean colleagues in such similar ways, using a narrow and very specific vocabulary?

### **Imagination in Action: Imagining “Korea” in Israeli-Korean R&D Joint Ventures**

Paraphrasing Ann Swidler’s (1986) article “Culture in Action,” I focus on a “tool-kit” of imaginative elements of culture – *cultural perceptions*. Rather than viewing culture as a sum of specific traits as proposed by CCM literature, which attempts to systematically catalog the cultural differences across national borders (Hofstede 1980; House et al.

2001; Schwartz 2004), my emphasis is on how culture is enacted through the managers' imagination. While previous studies have already demonstrated the importance of perceptions in shaping intercultural encounters (see Vaara et al. 2003, Ailon 2007; Moore 2005), these studies have commonly dealt with the encounter between two or more nations that have a long history of continuous encounters, making the knowledge of the other, or rather, the development of a stereotypical conceptualization of the other, part of the common public discourse.

For example, when workers from different Nordic countries use national stereotypes to construct their understanding of the Other, they have a long existing public discourse upon which they draw (Vaara et al. 2003). Similarly, the enduring close relations between Israelis and Americans, and the close familiarity of Israelis with Hollywood and other cultural products, provide a readymade frame through which the encounter is interpreted (Ailon 2007). In the case of Korea and Israel, such long-term relations do not exist. Even though the diplomatic relations between two countries were established at 1962, the Israeli embassy was closed at 1978 due to economic issues. Economic relations between the two countries have begun to flourish only in the 1990s with the reopening of the embassy in Seoul in 1992 and with the weakening of the Arab boycott on any company that traded with Israel (Cohen 2006; Levkovitz 2013).

The geographical distance and the general marginality of both countries in terms of the broader geopolitical map have yielded few mutual interactions and knowledge. It is against this background that both the Israelis and Koreans had to turn to CCM discourse when attempting to enter and justify such collaborative relations. Drawing upon a review of over 1,000 publications on cross-cultural organizational behavior, Gelfand et al. (2007)

define the field of CCM as dealing with “cross-cultural similarities and differences in processes and behavior at work and the dynamics of cross-cultural interfaces in multi-cultural domestic and international contexts” (p. 480). As the growing critique on CCM discourse and its users show, CCM does not only deal with cross-cultural similarities and differences, but also create them (Prasad 2003; Ailon 2008; Frenkel 2008; Özkazanç-Pan 2008).

To examine this discourse, I conducted 20 interviews with Israeli managers of Israeli-Korean R&D joint ventures about their experience working with Korean partners between 2002 and 2014. Most of the managers are familiar with the international environment, but the majority had never worked in the Korean market before. In addition, due to the large geographical distance, communication was conducted mostly virtually, via emails, phone calls and videoconferences. During the semi-structured interview that lasted between one and one and a half hours, the interviewees were encouraged to talk freely about their work experiences and to give examples of intercultural interactions.

After conducting a qualitative data analysis with the Atlas.ti program, I have distinguished four definitive narratives about Korea and Koreans based on the comparison between Israelis and Koreans: 1. “Koreans are Westerners like us”; 2. Koreans are not Westerners; 3. “Koreans are the Israelis of the East”; and 4. Israeli innovative thinkers vs. Korean doers. There is similarity and difference on both a global or Western level (stories 1 and 2) and a national level (stories 3 and 4) [See Table 1].

Table 1

	<b>Global Culture</b>	<b>National Culture</b>
<b>Similarity</b>	“Koreans are Westerners like us”	“Koreans are the Israelis of the East”
<b>Difference</b>	Koreans are not Westerners	Israeli innovative thinkers vs. Korean doers

Although the stories appear different and even contradictory, most interviewees mentioned all or at least one of them in each interview. The coexistence of four apparently contradicting narratives of Western (or global) and national differences and similarities can be explained by looking at the stories of Western-ness or globalization and of nation as *competitive powerful myths*. Myth as a conception of reality posits the ongoing penetration of the world of everyday experience by sacred forces (Berger and Luckmann 2004: 512), or in the case of Israeli-Korean R&D joint ventures, by global and national cultures. As Rizvi (2006) points out, individuals interpret and negotiate these social imaginaries in the battle over their meanings (p. 199). In what follows, I describe each narrative, its meaning and theoretical significance through CCM discourse and its discontents.

### **Western-ness: “Koreans are Westerners like us”**

The first narrative can be divided into two different stories of occupational or professional similarity and of Western-like Korean brokers. Regarding occupational similarity, the interviewees mostly highlighted the common technological or scientific language of the research and development (R&D) industry that bridges the gap of the second language – English – that is especially challenging to the Koreans. Others mentioned the standard business language in the West and norms of the international joint venture. The organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) makes all R&D firms speak a common language and it determines the norms of behavior despite cultural differences. These “world” languages, according to the institutional theory, are part of the *global culture* or world polity within nations, which is defined as shared

cognitive frames and understandings, “broad models or ‘maps’ of how people and governments ought to behave” (Schofer and McEneaney 2003: 44). Similarly, according to CCM literature, Western managerial practices become “the best practices” to follow. From a critical perspective, however, the creation, accumulation and transfer of any kind of knowledge are not neutral processes that reflect the reality or become the most efficient or rational way, but they represent a systematic classification that produces and reproduces power relations (Shimoni 2011).

In addition to occupational and business languages, the Israeli managers emphasize the importance of Western-like Koreans who studied or worked in Western countries and, therefore, they are more open, have mastered better English, adopt Western names and are easy to communicate with. These brokers were described as “totally Western” (K1, K2), “the optimal fit” (K2), “swimmers between cultures” (K3), “the anchor” (K11) and “open to the West” (K13). The CCM literature identifies them as “cultural chameleons” (Earley and Peterson 2004) or global managers (Delmestri 2014) – people with high cultural intelligence (Earley and Ang 2003) who can adapt to different cultural environments and thus improve the firm’s efficiency in an international market.

Another variation of a Western-like broker is a broker of Israeli origin, who usually works at the local Korean branch. As the CEO of an Israeli start-up describes it, since the Korean conglomerate opened the Israeli office, “the interaction is completely Western. I can call freely to ask ‘what’s up, anything new?’” (K13). This citation indicates that even though Israel is not geographically located in the West, Israelis perceive themselves as a part of it, isolated culturally, economically and politically from the Middle East due to several reasons: the Euro-American origin of many of the Jewish



immigrants, high technological development, Israel being the sole non-Muslim country in the region, and its affinity to Western allies, especially the United States (Daliot-Bul 2007).

At first glance, what unites the above stories of Western-ness is the utopian idea of a “borderless world” (Ohmae 1999), which is *compressed* (Robertson 1992) in one “global village” (McLuhan 1964) transcending national differences: people from different cultures can understand each other, behave according to the same rules, have similar names, or at least organizations can have representatives to communicate on their behalf. In international R&D collaborations it is obvious that being Western-like is necessary for the collaboration to work. In this Babylonian utopia there is no room for difference, different styles of management or work culture that are immediately labeled as non-Western. However, at the same time, these stories of Western-ness emphasize how non-Western Koreans are. According to the Israeli managers, the Korean side needs a technological language or the same professional culture or Western-like brokers due to the English language barrier or the lack of exposure to the West; in other words, Koreans need them more than the Israeli side. There is always a pretense, a sense of masquerade or of duality, of being *like* Westerners, whereas this “like” not only bring Koreans closer to the West and to the Israelis, but also separates between the West and the rest.

### **Non-Western-ness: Koreans are not Westerners**

Unlike the previous story, in the story of non-Western-ness the Israeli managers described their colleagues overtly as the Asian Other. The most repeated themes were of an English language barrier, high hierarchy, workaholism, and generous hospitality.

These are the exaggerated stories where Korea is perceived as different and even strange compared to Western countries, including Israel. These binary cultural distinctions are reflected in how the Israeli managers referred to their Korean colleagues. As the R&D project manager argues, “we are not English champions either, but their situation is much worse – it’s very difficult to communicate with them” (K6). Another manager was amazed by Koreans’ capability to work: “we finish working at 6, they go back to the hotel and continue to work there [...] and at night they would finish everything and send it by the next morning” (K1). Many interviewees were also surprised and amused by the hierarchical Korean management that was opposed to hosting in the evenings: “There is a big difference [between Israel and Korea], when the CEO walks in, everyone falls over. Very hierarchical compared to us. [In Israel] everything is less hierarchical; everyone’s a friend [...]. In Korea it’s very military style, until dinner when they start drinking and loosen up” (K3).

Unlike the amusing tone in the previous descriptions, in the case of conflicts, the Israeli managers clearly described the Korean firms’ behavior as inappropriate according to Western norms. This, for instance, includes avoiding saying “no”, non-binding contracts, and the stories of re-engineering as opposed to the Western ways of doing business. According to this critique, the success of ex-peripheries stems from their ability to imitate the West (Frenkel 2013). To put it differently, the critique marginalizes Korean firms and moves them (back) to the periphery. The joint venture with Samsung was the most salient example of non-Western-ness, as demonstrated in the following story:

I will tell you about my experience with Samsung. They asked to meet us [...], asked to meet Israeli firms. It was a very good meeting. I learned two things

from it. First, the issue of competition: mentioning their competitors is a no-no. But even though I didn't mention the competitors, I made a demo showing how my laptop will identify my voice and I chose to count from 1 to 9 in Korean. Now, in my opinion, it stopped the meeting. Although the demo was good, they stopped the meeting.

I.L.: Why?

They probably thought that I was working with their competitors. Or maybe they thought that I spoke Korean and understood their small talk [...]. It hit their most vulnerable spots. If I would demonstrate it in German, it wouldn't happen. For example, counting in German would just show that it is language independent, it wouldn't happen. But this stopped the meeting; the meeting was excellent before the demo (K13).

In the eyes of this manager, the exaggerated fear of competitors prevents Samsung to collaborate with the West. Moreover, the importance of framing in shaping the everyday intercultural encounters is further enhanced when I analyze Israeli managers' references to the East-West divide, as demonstrated in the above story that juxtaposes Korea and Germany. As was argued above, neither Israel nor Korea have ever been part of the colonial "West," but are rather both considered newcomers to the developed world. Yet, in the framing of their Korean colleagues' cultural characteristics, Israeli managers do not rely upon stereotypes associated with Korea alone, but rather turn to a more crude distinction between "East" and "West" as a reference point to the "them" and "us."

The framing through which they attempt to understand Korean culture does not come only from Western economies but also from other Asian nations. Thus, for instance, an Israeli manager places Israelis as closer to Anglo-Saxon business partners than to Asian ones (including the Koreans): “With Singaporeans, the experience is totally Western — as if I am speaking English with England or the US; with China, there are many gaps in communication. They are like Koreans but without the honor bit” (K13). In this statement, the Israeli manager constructs a cultural hierarchy of countries with which he feels comfortable interacting with and those that are more culturally distant, making the business transaction more complicated. This hierarchy is associated with Israel’s cultural proximity to Anglo-American culture. Israelis, in their view, are a natural part of this culture while Asian nations vary in their affinity to this standard-setting culture.

A different Israeli manager places Korea between China and Japan in terms of trustworthiness: “It’s something that’s structured in some kind of perception that Koreans have no cultural problem seeing the presented [by Israelis] technology and making it themselves. It’s a stereotypical perception, I think [...]. It’s a little better than the Chinese; with the Japanese, for example, [there are] no worries” (K7). This East-West dichotomy is echoed in CCM literature:

[In oriental countries, once trust] has been established (on the micro level of personal interactions), people in this type of culture place an extremely high value on trust and will react with great bitterness should it be betrayed. Business people in Oriental countries are therefore reluctant to terminate business relationships, as when an alliance no longer meets their strategic objectives,

whereas Westerners are more likely to take a less personalized view of the matter (Child 2001: 277).

By contrasting Western-like Israel and Asian-like Korea, the Israeli managers reproduce the *cultural distance*, or a degree of difference in cultural norms and values (Kogut and Singh, 1998). This in turn determines the nature of the international collaboration and power relations between the partners (Frenkel 2008). The attempts at profiling culture as “culturally different” are equated with being a stranger or a “typical other,” that being considered a stranger entails the risk of aloofness, frustration, and missed business opportunities (Frenkel et al. forthcoming). If Korea, as a part of “homogeneous” Asia or the Orient, is dismissed as the Other in both narratives of Western similarity or difference, what happens to its image in a culture-specific comparison to Israel?

### **Cultural Fit: “Koreans are the Israelis of the East”**

The same manager that highlighted the non-Westerner-ness of Koreans in the previous section emphasized the closeness between Israel and Korea:

Koreans value Israeli technology and Israeli heritage. I remember there was a billboard with a child with a kippa<sup>3</sup> in Seoul. I remember that I saw a country surrounded by enemies, the [good] relations with the US. All these things were quite similar [to Israel] [...]. [In addition, it includes], the danger from the North, and the importance of cultural tradition in general. [...] There definitely is some closeness, some common denominator that does not exist at all with other nations (K13).

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<sup>3</sup> A kippa (yarmulke) is a Jewish religious attribute.

Other managers highlighted the similarity in work practices to match their Korean partners as “the Israelis of the East” (K7). Such practices include openness, risk-taking with new technologies, aggressiveness, flexibility, and swift decision making. To explain this similarity, CCM literature uses the cultural distance construct that is low in the case of the cultural fit. What remains unexplained is how high and low distances co-exist in the same stories. Looking at the culture as the set of specific traits limits the understanding of culture as an evolving process. As mentioned above, cultural perceptions are not only followed, they are also selected (Adler 2008). Thus, both similarity and difference are constructed by the selection of certain values and norms of behavior.

Adler (2008) criticizes the cultural similarity as “projected similarity” that stems from cultural ignorance and ethnocentric positioning, especially of Western managers, as the point of comparison and the role models. In this view, it is expected and desired that Koreans imitate Israelis as their representatives in the East. Despite the seeming equality, I have never heard the reverse saying that Israelis are the Koreans of the West (or of the Middle East). As Shenkar (2001) argues, the symmetry of the cultural distance is illusive: it assumes that “a Dutch firm investing in China is faced with the same cultural distance as a Chinese firm investing in the Netherlands” (p. 523). The imagined cultural similarity, therefore, serves its creators to preserve the hierarchy regarding the subjects of the projection.

## **Cultural Difference: Israeli Innovative Thinkers vs. Korean Doers**

[The Koreans] are very pedantic, very straight; we [Israelis] are [...] very creative. I think we are much more creative than they are, in general [we are the] most creative in the whole world (K6).

These cultural stereotypes of the differences between Koreans and Israelis were echoed in many of the interviews with Israeli R&D managers as well as in the popular media. For example, an article in an Israeli national newspaper from 2012 on collaboration between Israeli start-ups and Korean conglomerates was entitled “Israeli brain invents patents to South Korea.”<sup>i</sup> In an interview with the Korean CEO of Samsung Israel in the same newspaper from 2011, the latter argued that “from a cultural aspect, people from the East are more obedient to authority, but Israelis are less fearful of authority. They have ‘ḥutspâ’ [impertinence or audacity, in Hebrew].”<sup>ii</sup>

Other interviewees brought examples of local Samsung and Israeli offices that are looking for Israeli technologies to implement in Korean products. The work division in Israeli-Korean R&D joint ventures was perceived as “natural” between technology (Israel) and its implementation (Korea) between two complementary economies. An R&D manager explains this complementarity: “The ideas come from here and not from there [from Korea]. [It includes] ideas, innovation, product definition, systems [...]. They [Koreans] are more solid with their legs on the ground. We fantasize a little, looking far and fast on what’s happening. These things can work well together” (K3). Another manager demonstrates difference on an organizational level:

I think that Korean firms have the mentality of a manufacturing company, a factory. This is the reverse mentality of the start-up company [in Israel]. A

manufacturing company is very connected, very well planned and organized, and very structural. It works with templates, with processes, everything is clear [...]. A start-up company is something impulsive, dynamic, risk-taking. These are the difficult differences in the organizational culture [...], they make [collaboration] hard (K7).

To use the colonial discourse on this binary between innovational thinking and manufacturing doing, the West brings its superior knowledge to the East, which is only capable of copying (or re-engineering) and producing it. Nevertheless, both Israel and Korea are neither a part of the colonial past, nor do they perceive their relations as hierarchical. Israeli managers emphasized that their R&D joint ventures are win-win situations with equal, “like husband and wife” (K6) relations. Both sides act ambivalently toward each other, which brings more complexity to the cultural encounter.

### **On Difference and Similarity between Global and National**

Cultural perceptions that are derived from cultural dimensions and characteristics determine the dynamics of the cultural encounter. Unlike “first world”/“third world” dichotomy, both Korea and Israel share the unique geopolitical position of imagined Western-ness as well of imagined periphery. Difference from the West is easy to explain by the East-West dichotomy: in Edward Said’s words, “the Orient is Orientalized.” It is usually, but not always, told in negative terms: the lack of language, knowledge, common norms and understandings. But the similarity to the West is more difficult to explain since it is told in a positive tone and the East-West dichotomy is disguised by the



“projected similarity.” Due to the lack of previous economic, historical and cultural relations, the Israeli managers use the pool of East-West images to emphasize self-Western-ness. Paraphrasing Edward Said, the Orient is Westernized.

A culture-specific comparison of being both similar and complementary is perceived by Israeli managers as desirable: we work in the same ways and there is a clear work division according to each other’s capabilities. Still, the comparison reduces Korean culture to specified sets of acceptable behaviors and, by extension, to a limited and distinct set of cultural codes. Israelis draw on the language used in CCM literature to describe the Other. Their experience of working, as well as decision-making processes and partner selection, are colored by the CCM themes, namely cultural differences and the Hofstede-based typology of cultural dimensions. With the intensification of trade and business relations between Israel and Korea over the past two decades, it seems that any such Israeli-Korean cultural encounter is locked into these doctrines of culture.

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<sup>i</sup> <http://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3582425,00.html>, accessed 12 May 2014.

<sup>ii</sup> <http://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3515080,00.html>, accessed 12 May 2014.

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## 조선 후기 성리학의 감정욕망에 대한 새로운 해석:

성호 이익의 심학(心學)을 중심으로

(A New Interpretation of Emotions and Desires in Neo-Confucianism of late Joseon Korea)

### 1. 서론

성리학(性理學)은 인간의 감정욕구를 적합한 상태로 조절하여 내면의 선성(善性)을 회복하는데 필요한 이론과 이와 관련된 훈련을 의미한다. 성리학자들은 인간의 감정욕구가 “심(心)”에서 발생한다고 보았고, 동시에 심 스스로가 그것을 조절할 수 있다고 믿었다. 때문에 성리학 전통에서 심은 줄곧 감정욕망을 일으키는 존재일 뿐만 아니라, 스스로 판단하고 숙고하며 조절을 실천할 수 있다는 점에서 자율적 주체로 이해되었다.

14세기 이후 중국과 조선에서 성리학이 국가의 정통학문으로 자리 잡으면서, 심의 구조와 메커니즘을 파악하는 일은 매우 중요하게 되었다. 주희의 심학을 가장 설득력 있게 해석해낼 수 있다는 말은 곧, 성리학의 정통계승자로서 국가적 권위를 얻는다는 것을 의미했기 때문이다. 조선의 성리학자들이 심의 구조와 메커니즘을 정확하게 이해하기 위해 다양한 논의를 전개한 것도 이러한 맥락에서 이해될 수 있다. 실제로 조선의 지식계에서는 “심학(心學)” 전통이 주류를 이루었고, 성리학자들은 주체의 감정욕망이 발생하는 메커니즘에 관심을 집중했다. 그들은 심학을 해석하는 과정에서 다양한 의견을 개진했는데, 그 가운데 가장 치열하게 논쟁한 지점은 바로 감정욕망의 “발생계기와 그 경로”를 해석하는 문제였다. 그리고 이에 대한 대답은 주로 성리학의 기본 구도 안에서 이루어졌다.

그런데 그들 중에는 성리학에 대한 기존의 해석이 심의 도덕적 주재력(主宰力)을 약화시킨다고 보고, 이를 보장받기 위해 성리학의 기본구도를 뒤트는 입장이 나타났다. 그 대표적인 인물이 바로 퇴계 이황(李滉, 1501~1570)이다. 그러나 그의 주장은 율곡 이이(李珣, 1536~1584)나 고봉 기대승(奇大升, 1527~1572), 그리고 이후에 지식계의 주류가 된 그들의 후계자들에 의해 성리학에서 일탈했다는 비판을 면치 못했고, 성리학이 진리로 통하는 유일한 관문인 조선 지식계에

서 퇴계의 심학은 줄곧 그 정통성을 의심받아왔다. 때문에 퇴계의 후학들은 퇴계의 심학을 성리학 전통 속에 편입시켜 그것을 정통학설로 만들고자 하는 ‘지적 움직임(intellectual movement)’을 보였는데, 그 가운데 대표적인 인물이 바로 성호 이익(李瀼, 1681~1763)이다.

이 글은 심에서 일어나는 감정육구의 “발생계기와 그 경로”를 복잡하게 재구성한 성호의 심학에 초점을 맞추고, 그가 새롭게 정초한 “도덕 주체”가 퇴계 심학을 성리학의 구조 속에 정합적으로 배치하는 과정에서 탄생한 결과라는 나의 해석을 논증하기 위해 서술되었다. 성호의 심학은 조선유학을 통틀어 전례 없이 복잡하고 또 그런 만큼 입체적이다. 기존 연구에서 그의 심학을 매우 제한적으로 다루어졌고, 또한 그에 관해 상반된 시각이 공존하는 이유 역시 그러한 학문적 특징에서 기인한다.<sup>1</sup>

성호는 퇴계의 심학을 보완하고 그것을 도학(道學)정통으로 세우기 위해 이른바 “중층(重層)적 리기론”을 구축하는 동시에 퇴계의 상제관을 발전적으로 계승한다. “중층적 리기론”이란 리와 기 개념을 각기 세분화하여 의미별로 명칭을 달리 부여하고, 다시 이들을 동일 의미끼리 재조합하여 만들어진 복수(複數)의 리기론을 의미한다. 성호는 이 “중층적 리기론”을 기반으로 퇴계의 심학을 재해석하여 성리학의 기본구도 안에 안전하게 편입시키는데 일정 정도 성공한다. 또한 그는 허용 가능한 성리학적 해석의 한계 안에서 심의 ‘주재자로서의 의미’를 극대화하여, 퇴계의 도덕 주체를 강화시킨다. 이는 성호가 퇴계의 상제관을 이론적으로 보완하는 과정을 통해 이루어진 것이라 할 수 있다. 이처럼 그는 “중층적 리기론”을 확립하고 퇴계의 상제관을 계승하여 퇴계 심학을 재해석함으로써, 외관상으로는 성리학의 기본구도를 유지하면서도 그 내용상에서는 퇴계의 심학적 특징을 온전히 담아내는 새로운 이론체계를 완성한다. 그리고 이는 사상사적 시각에서 볼 때, 성리학 전통 안에 도덕적 실천역량이 강화된 성리학적 주체가 탄생한 것이라 할 수 있다.

나는 이처럼 성호가 성리학적 개념들을 변태하게 조작하거나 그 이론체계를 복잡하게 변용한

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<sup>1</sup> 기존의 성호학 연구자들은 천인분리의 단초를 성호학에서 찾았다. 대체로 이들은 성호학이 자연학과 인간학을 분리함으로써, 주자학적 자연관을 극복하는 동시에 서양과학기술의 탐구를 적극적으로 뒷받침하는 이론체계를 확립했다고 주장한다. 하지만 구만옥의 주장과 같이 성호학에서 ‘천리(天理)’와 ‘물리(物理)’와 완전히 갈라내는 해석은 근대이행적 관점에서 보는 시각으로, 재고의 여지가 있다. 성호에게 천리는 주희와 마찬가지로 단일한 유기적 총체로서의 태극(太極)이었다. 따라서 성호의 심학에서 도덕리법과 자연리법은 여전히 하나의 천리 안에 양면적으로 공존하고 있었다. 다만 성호는 기존의 주희 심학에 중첩된 도덕리법과 자연리법을 전례 없이 선명하게 갈라보는데, 이러한 새로운 이해는 퇴계 심학을 성리학 전통 안에 안전하게 편입시키기 위한 전략이었다고 추론할 수 있다. 다시 말해 그는 성리학적 기본 구도 안에서 자연리법으로부터 도덕리법을 추출함으로써 인간이 ‘육체의 타라[人心]’으로부터 ‘도덕 주체[道心]’를 확보하여 그 실천역량을 강화시킬 수 있는 이론적 장치를 마련한 것이라 할 수 있다. 하지만 그는 결코 도덕리법을 자연리법으로부터 완전히 독립시키지 않았다. 그러므로 성호의 리 개념에는 일견 자연학과 인간학으로 분리되는 측면도 분명히 있지만, 그것을 전통 과학과이나 심학의 극복이라기보다는, 성호가 퇴계 심학을 성리학의 적통으로 확립하는 과정에서 이루어진 결과라고 보는 편이 타당할 것이다. 안영상, 「성호학과의 우주론과 도덕 실천적 심성론의 분리」 『민족문화연구』 제32호, 1999, 구만옥, 「성호 이익의 과학사상: 과학적 자연인식」 『민족과 문화』 9, 한양대, 2000 참고.



이유가 ‘심(心)의 도덕적 주재력’의 확보라는 퇴계의 해묵은 과제를 해결하기 위한 것이었다고 생각한다. 실제로 성호가 30여 년에 걸쳐 풀어낸 그 과업은 그의 손에서 『사칠신편(四七新編)』이라는 노작으로 결실을 맺는다.

이상의 내용을 전개하기 위해 나는 성호 심학의 특징을 구체적으로 서술하기에 앞서 주희 심학을 분석하여 심의 구조를 보여줄 것이다. 또한 주희 심학에서 개체의 감정욕망이 발생하는 계기와 그 경로를 설명할 것이다. 그리고 이어서 퇴계가 주희 심학의 재해석을 통해 도덕 주재의 주재력을 확보하는 데는 성공하지만, 결과적으로 성리학적 기본구도를 이탈하게 되는 문제점을 서술할 것이다. 마지막으로 나는 성호가 퇴계 심학을 성리학적 기본 구도 안에 안전하게 편입시키는 과정을 통해, 새로운 성리학적 주체를 확립하게 된다는 사실을 보여줄 것이다.

## 2. 개체의 감정욕망의 발생계기와 그 경로에 대한 성리학적 해석: 주희의 심학

성리학에서 인간의 심(心)은 리(理)와 기(氣)의 결합으로 탄생한 주체라고 할 수 있다. 그것은 기본적으로 가장 높은 순도의 기가 리를 명령 신호(code)로 수신하는 형태로 활동한다. 이는 도대체 무슨 말인가? 주희에 따르면 우주는 하나의 원기(元氣)로 가득 차 있는데, 그 자체적 운동성과 유동성으로 인해 내부적 마찰을 일으켰고, 그 결과 맺돌에서 갈려 나온 밀가루 조각처럼 천차만별의 불균질한 만물이 형성되었다. 즉 거칠게 뭉쳐진 기는 거친 사물을, 섬세하게 뭉쳐진 기는 섬세한 사물을 형성하고, 맑은 기는 가볍고 투명한 사물을, 탁한 기는 무겁고 둔탁한 사물을 형성한 것이다. 그런데 이러한 기의 정조(精粗)와 청탁(淸濁)은 달리 말하면 ‘밀도’와 ‘순도’에 관계되는 것으로, 전자는 주로 개체의 형태와 내부조직을 결정하고, 후자는 주로 지적, 도덕적 능력을 결정한다.

이러한 설명은 주희가 일기(一氣)의 질적 분화의 정도에 따라 폭넓은 스펙트럼을 그려냄으로써, 단순한 형태에 미미한 지능을 갖춘 무생물부터 복잡하고 정밀한 신체구조와 고도의 지적, 도덕적 능력을 갖춘 인간에 이르기까지의 생물학적 위계질서를 자연세계 안에 세웠다는 사실을 보여준다. 이 체계의 꼭지점은 인간이 차지하고 있다. 여기서 인간은 가장 높은 밀도와 순도의 기로 구성된 존재이다. 특히 가장 높은 순도의 기는 인간의 감정을 포함한 정신활동 일체를 수행하는데, 주희는 이를 바로 ‘심(心)’이라고 지칭했다. 그런데 성리학에서 기는 본래 비질서적 에너지로, 방향성도 규칙도 없는 유동적 존재이다. 때문에 주희는 기의 질서와 방향을 유도하는 보편 원리를 설정했고, 이것을 ‘리(理)’라고 불렀다.

리는 우주와 만물의 형태를 조직하고 그들을 일정 방향으로 변화하도록 유도하는 일종의 명령 ‘신호’이다.<sup>2</sup> 그것은 낱낱의 무수한 신호들이 서로 유기체적인 관계를 맺으며 하나의 총체적

<sup>2</sup> 리(理/li)는 주로 ‘principle’로 번역되지만 ‘pattern’, ‘law’, ‘reason’, ‘meaning’, ‘coherence’ 등으로도 다양하

패턴을 구성하고 있는데, 주희는 날개의 신호를 ‘조리(條理)’, 무수한 복수의 신호를 합쳐서 ‘중리(衆理)’, 그리고 이 리들이 유기체적 구조를 이루고 있는 총체를 ‘천리(天理)’ 혹은 ‘태극(太極)’이라고 불렀다. 이 천리는 기가 활동하는 곳 어디에나 존재하면서 기의 조직과 방향을 유도하는 역할을 담당한다.

인간의 심도 기로 구성되어 있는 이상 이러한 명령 신호에서 자유롭지 못하다고 할 수 있는데, 심에 존재하며 심을 일정 방향으로 유도하는 총체적 명령신호를 주희는 특별히 ‘성(性)’이라고 불렀다. 심은 의지와 숙고, 명상, 판단 등을 자율적으로 수행한다는 점에서 “주체”나 “주제자”라고 할 수 있지만, 그것은 본래 ‘성’의 신호를 수신하여 일정한 방향으로 사고하도록 ‘프로그램(program)’되어 있다는 점에서, 자의적이거나 임의적인 존재가 아니다. 그것은 우주에 예비된 궤도를 따르도록 결정되어 있다. 다시 말해 그것은 우주의 질서와 조화를 구현하는 주체로 존재 지워졌다.

이처럼 인간의 심은 본질상 우주적 질서와 조화에 참여하도록 되어있는 주체이기 때문에, 성의 신호만 정확하게 수신해서 활동한다면 자연법칙과 같이 완전무결한 규칙성과 방향성을 갖는다. 그리고 심이 우주에 예비된 궤도를 완벽하게 따를 때, 그것은 최고로 선한 존재가 된다. 하지만 현실세계에서 인간은 항상 선하고 완벽하지 않다. 주희는 그 이유를 기에서 찾았다.

제자가 물었다. ‘천지의 성은 선한데, 기품의 성은 선하지 않은 이유는 무엇입니까?’ 주자께서 대답하셨다. ‘리는 진정 선하지 않은 것이 없지만, 그것이 기질에 부여되자마자 맑고 탁함, 치우치고 바름, 강하고 부드러움, 느리고 빠름 등의 차이가 생긴다. 대개 기는 강하고 리는 약하기 때문에, 리는 기를 간섭할 수 없다.’<sup>3</sup>

기는 기본적으로 인간의 육체와 정신을 구성하고 운용하는 질료이자 생명력을 의미한다. 기는 자체적 에너지가 있고 유동적이기 때문에, 현실세계에 직접적인 영향력을 발휘한다. 반면에 리는 “의지나 계획을 결여하고 있고, 창조력도 없는”<sup>4</sup> 존재이기 때문에, 그것은 기를 일정방향으로 유도하는 일종의 신호로 존재할 수는 있어도 기를 자유롭게 통제할 만큼의 실질적 강제력은 없다. 따라서 기가 폭주하거나 제멋대로 요동을 쳐도 리는 그것을 제어할 수 없다. 주희가 ‘기는 리보다

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게 번역된다. 나는 이 글에서 리를 일종의 ‘신호(code)’로 이해했는데, 왜냐하면 리의 속성이 기에 구체적 정보를 전달하여 기가 그 의미를 역동적으로 구현하도록 유도하는 일종의 신호체계와 유사하다고 생각했기 때문이다. 또한 리가 기를 끊임없이 규칙적으로 작용하도록 유도하는 역할을 담당한다는 측면에서도, 그것이 신호체계와 유사하다고 생각했다.

<sup>3</sup> 《朱子語類》 4:64, “天地之性既善, 則氣稟之性如何不善?” 曰: ‘理固無不善, 纔賦於氣質, 便有清濁·偏正·剛柔·緩急之不同. 蓋氣強而理弱, 理管攝他不得.’

<sup>4</sup> 《朱子語類》 1:13, “蓋氣則能凝結造作, 理卻無情意, 無計度, 無造作.” 풍우란, 더크보드 공저 『중국사상사』의 번역을 참조하였다.

강하기 때문에 리가 기를 강제로 조절할 수 없다'고 한 말도 이런 맥락에서 이해되어야 할 것이다.

그런데 주희에 따르면 인간이 만물 가운데 가장 높은 순도와 밀도로 빚어진 존재라고 할 지라도, 인간 사이에는 다시 기의 질적 분화에 따른 차이가 존재한다. 때문에 개개인의 외모나 성격, 지성 등이 천차만별일 수밖에 없다. 인간의 심도 이러한 기의 질적 다양성에서 자유로울 수 없다. 원기(元氣)의 일부인 심 또한 개체마다 순도가 다른 것이다. 어떤 이는 심의 순도가 상대적으로 낮아서 일정 자극에 그 기가 쉽게 증폭되거나 축소되고, 어떤 이는 그 순도가 상대적으로 높아서 일정 자극이 왔을 때 가장 적절하게 작용할 수 있다. 전자는 심을 구성하는 기가 부적절하게 요동한 결과, 성의 각종 신호를 제대로 수신하지 못하고 방향성을 잃는 경우라고 할 수 있고, 후자는 심이 성의 신호를 정확하게 수신하여 적절한 정신활동을 수행하는 경우라고 할 수 있다.

주희는 이러한 기의 증폭이나 축소를 “과불급(過不及)” 혹은 “부중절(不中節)”이라고 명명했고, 바로 그것이 인간 주체가 우주에 예비 되어 있던 궤도를 이탈하여 타락하게 되는 원인이라고 주장했다. 심에서 기의 과불급이나 부중절은 주로 인간의 감정욕구의 증폭이나 축소를 의미한다. 주희는 특히 심에서 발생하는 감정욕구를 통틀어 “정(情)”<sup>5</sup>이라고 표현했는데, 경전 전통을 활용하여 그것을 “사단(四端)”이나 “칠정(七情)”이라고 해석하였다. 그는 칠정을 도덕적이지도 비도덕적이지도 않은 감정욕구 일반적으로, 사단을 그 감정욕구 가운데 특별히 도덕적인 감정욕망으로 이해했다.

주희는 문헌 곳곳에서 사단의 중요성은 재차 강조했지만, 정작 사단과 칠정의 관계는 명확하게 설정하지 않았다. 대신 그가 관심을 집중한 것은 ‘성의 신호를 정확하게 수신하여 모든 감정욕구를 적절하게 일어나도록 조절하는 “심”의 역할과 기능[心統性情]’이었다. 주희에게 있어 심의 가장 중요한 기능은 사단이든 칠정이든 일체의 감정욕구를 가장 적절한 정도로 발현시키는 일이었다. 타락은 심이 그 주재적 역할에 실패했을 때 비로소 발생하는 결과였다. 주희는 심지어 도덕적 감정욕구조차 과잉되거나 부족하면, 그 또한 타락이라고 보았다.

a. 측은(惻隱)이 지나치면 안일하고 나약한 감정에 빠지게 되고, 수오(羞惡)가 지나치면 부끄러워하지 말아야 할 것을 부끄러워하게 된다.<sup>6</sup>

b. 측은(惻隱)과 수오(羞惡) 또한 ‘적절[中節]’하거나 ‘적절하지 않는[不中節]’ 경우가 있다. 예를 들어 측은해하지 말아야 될 때 측은해하고, 수오하지 말아야 할 때 수오하는 것이 바로 적절하지 않은 경우이다.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> 이 글에서 ‘감정욕망’으로 풀고 있는 ‘정(情)’은 사실상 단순히 ‘emotion’이나 ‘feeling’, ‘desire’ 의미 이상의 개념으로 이해될 수 있다. 다시 말해 성리학에서 정은 약간의 차이는 있지만, 대체로 ‘의(意)’와 ‘지(志)’, ‘사(思)’, ‘려(慮)’, ‘시비(是非)’ 등과 같은 이성작용이나 실천능력까지 포함하고 있다. 그러므로 여기서 ‘정’ 혹은 ‘감정욕망’이라고 할 때는 인간의 정신활동 일체를 포괄하여 지칭한다고 보는 편이 타당할 것이다.

<sup>6</sup> 《朱子語類》 4:40, “但若惻隱多, 便流爲姑息柔懦; 若羞惡多, 便有羞惡其所不當羞惡者.”

<sup>7</sup> 《朱子語類》 53:36, “惻隱羞惡, 也有中節·不中節. 若不當惻隱而惻隱, 不當羞惡而羞惡, 便是不中節.”

주희는 사단조차 또한 그 “적정 수준[中節]”을 지키지 않으면, 그 역시 불완전한 선이라고 본다. 칠정 또한 마찬가지이다. 그는 ‘기쁨이나 분노, 사랑, 즐거움[喜怒哀樂]’ 등의 일반적인 감정 욕구 역시 적정수준을 지킨다면 선이지만, 증폭되거나 축소되면 악이라고 보았다. 그러므로 인간이 본성의 신호를 정확하게 수신하여 자연에 예비된 궤도로 돌아가기 위해서는, 자신을 구성하는 기의 순도를 높이는 훈련방법 밖에 없다. 그 순도는 다름 아님 “심”의 순도이며, 이 순도를 높이는 주체 역시 “심”이다. 요컨대 심은 훈련 주체인 동시에 훈련의 대상으로, 자신의 타락한 감정 욕구를 적절하게 조절하여 그것을 선한 상태로 되돌릴 수 있는 자율적 존재였다.

성리학이 조선에서 심학전통으로 심화되고 발전한 이유는, 심의 훈련을 통해 인간성을 회복하려고 했던 주희의 철학적 고민을 계승했기 때문이라 볼 수 있다. 조선 중기 이후 지식인들은 대체로 주희의 학문을 진리체계로 받아들였고, 심의 훈련을 통해 도(道)의 담지자인 성인(聖人)이 되기를 희망했다. 그리고 심을 훈련하기 위해서는 무엇보다 이론적으로 정확한 이해가 선행되어야 했고, 따라서 유교 지식인들은 그 심의 구조와 메커니즘에 대해 철저히 탐구하기 시작했다.

그런데 심에서 감정욕구가 발생하는 계기와 그 경로를 탐색하는 과정에서 조선의 신유학자들 사이에 의견이 분열된다. 고봉 기대승이나 율곡 이이는 심에서 발생하는 정(情) 일체를 동등한 인식의 지평에서 이해한 반면, 퇴계는 그들처럼 모든 정에 질적 차이가 없다고 주장한다면, ‘육체적 감정욕구’와 ‘도덕적 감정욕구’가 혼재되어 도심은 원론적으로 그 영향력을 발휘하기 어렵게 된다고 보았다. 그에게 도심 즉 도덕 주체의 약화는 인간이 악을 조절할 수 있는 자기 통제력의 상실이나 축소를 의미했기 때문에, 도덕 주체의 발현은 반드시 보장되어야 했다. 다음 장에서는 고봉과 율곡, 그리고 퇴계 사이에 벌어진 심학적 논쟁이 주희 심학에 내재되어 있던 분열의 단초에서 비롯된 것임을 밝히고, 퇴계가 주희 심학 가운데 “가치론적 의미”에 집중하여 자신의 입장을 전개하는 논리를 설명하도록 하겠다.

### 3. 도덕 주체의 역량 확보를 위한 이론적 일탈: 퇴계 이황의 심학

주희 심학에 내재되어 있던, 조선 지식계를 오랫동안 분쟁으로 이끈 분열의 단초는 심의 양면성이었다. 이는 무슨 말일까? 주희의 리기 개념 안에는 이질적 의미가 양면적으로 존재한다. 거칠게 말해 양자에는 각각 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미가 공존한다.<sup>8</sup> 이러한 이질적 의미의 공존은 주희의 심학에서는 크게 문제되지 않았지만, 가치론에 유달리 주목하는 일부 조선의 성리학자들의 입장에서 볼 때 양자는 서로 충돌할 수 있다. 이를 이해하기 위해 먼저 기 개념부터 살펴

<sup>8</sup> 자연론적 의미는 주로 인간의 육체 조건과 관련되어 있고 가치론적 의미는 인간의 도덕성과 관련되어 있다.

보자.

주희는 인간의 육신과 생리현상, 감각작용, 동물적 정신활동뿐만 아니라, 육체와 무관한 도덕적 정신활동까지 모두 기의 상대적 밀도나 순도 차이에서 발생한다고 본다. 이는 그가 육체와 정신, 동물적 감각욕구와 도덕적 감각욕구가 서로 별개의 무엇이라고 생각하지 않았다는 사실을 보여준다. 때문에 그는 상황맥락에 따라 두 의미를 자유롭게 전환해서 사용했다. 예를 들어 인간에 한정해서 보면, 어떤 맥락에서는 기를 육체로, 어떤 맥락에서는 생체 에너지로, 또 어떤 맥락에서 도덕적 정신활동으로 사용한 것이다.

인간의 심을 구성하는 기 역시 그 본질적 특성상 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미가 공존하고 있었다. 때문에 심에는 육체와 관련된 감정욕구와 도덕에 관련된 감정욕구도 양면적으로 존재한다고 볼 수 있다. 전자는 주로 형기(形氣)<sup>9</sup>의 자극을 인식하여 일어나는 정(情)으로, 동물적 감각욕구에 해당된다고 할 수 있다. 후자는 인간의 육신과 관계없이 특정 자극을 인식하여 일어나는 정으로 도덕적 감각욕구에 해당된다고 할 수 있다. 그러므로 **주희 심학에서 전자나 후자 모두 심이라는 “하나의 발생경로”를 통해 일어나는 감정욕구라고 볼 수 있다.** 이처럼 심에도 양면적 감정욕구가 공존하기 때문에, 주희는 상황맥락에 따라 심의 의미를 달리해서 사용할 수 있었다.

기뿐만 아니라 리 또한 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미가 양면적으로 존재한다. 인간을 포함한 만물은 저마다 낱알의 리가 유기체적으로 결합된 총체인 천리 혹은 태극을 하나의 본성으로 내재하고 있다. 본성의 낱알의 리에는 도덕적 명령신호도 있고 육체 관련 명령신호도 존재한다. 주희는 전자를 ‘본연(本然)의 성’이라고 부르고, 후자를 ‘식색(食色)의 성’이라고 부르기도 하였지만, 보통은 그것을 성이라고만 지칭하고 상황맥락에 따라 그때그때 다른 의미로 사용했다. 따라서 **주희의 심학에서 이 두 성은 서로 대립되거나 분리되는 관계라기보다는, 성이라는 “하나의 발생계기”의 서로 다른 측면으로 이해되어야 한다.**

이처럼 주희의 리기 개념 안에는 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미가 양면적으로 공존하고 있었기 때문에 주희는 맥락에 따라 기를 육체로, 혹은 동물적 감정욕구로, 혹은 도덕적 감정욕구로 자유롭게 전환해서 사용할 수 있었고, 리 역시 육체에 관련된 명령신호로, 혹은 도덕에 관련된 명령신호로 전환할 수 있었다. 그런데 성리학에서 리와 기의 결합이 심이라는 것을 생각해볼 때 심 역시 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미가 양면적으로 공존하고 있었다고 할 수 있다. 이는 심에서 발생하는 감정욕망의 발생계기와 경로가 각각 하나밖에 없다는 것을 의미했다. 이를 잘 증명하는 말이 주희 심학의 핵심 주장인 “성발위정(性發爲情)”이다. ‘성발위정’은 심에서 발생하는 현상으로, 심이 성의 명령신호를 수신하여 모든 정을 일으킨다는 것을 의미한다. 다시 말해 이것은 **인간의 ‘모든 감정욕구[情]’가 그 구체적 내용이 무엇이든지 상관없이, 하나의 ‘발생계기[性]’와 ‘발생경로**

<sup>9</sup> 주희에게 형기(形氣)란 기 가운데 특히 밀도가 성글고 순도가 탁한 것으로, 인간의 경우 육신과 생리현상과 감각작용을 지칭한다.

[心]'를 통해 일어난다는 뜻이다.

이처럼 심은 단일한 발생계기인 리와 발생경로인 기로 구성되어 있기 때문에, 동물적 감정욕구를 일으키는 심이나 도덕적 감정욕구를 일으키는 심 모두 하나의 심의 양면에 불과했다. 때문에 이 심들은 서로 확연히 분리되거나 대립될 수 없다. 다만 주희 심학에는 이 두 심을 적절하게 조절하는 진정한 심이 있는데, 이를 '본질적 주체', 즉 '본체'라고 할 수 있다. 이 본체로서의 심은 하나의 발생계기인 성의 신호를 정확하게 수신하여 감정욕구를 정확하게 일으키는 역할을 담당한다.<sup>10</sup> 주희는 본체의 역할이 충실하게 이루어지는 상태를 "도심(道心)"으로, 그렇지 못한 경우를 "인심(人心)"으로 보았다.

심 의 정신작용은 인심이나 도심이나 매 한가지이다. 하지만 하나의 심에서 인심과 도심이라는 두 측면이 생기는 이유는 그 심이 '형기(形氣)에서 사사로움에서 발생'하기도 하고, '성명(性命)의 바름에서 발생'하기도 하는 경우처럼, [그 심이] 인식하는 대상이 달라지기 때문이다.<sup>11</sup>

주희에게 '도심(道心)'이란 본체가 '성의 신호[性命]'를 따라 육체적 감정욕구든 도덕적 감정욕구든 모든 정(情)의 발출을 가장 정확하게 조절하는 상태를 의미하며, '인심(人心)'이란 본체가 감정욕구를 적절하게 발현시키는 데 실패한 상태를 의미한다. 물론 위의 인용문에서도 알 수 있듯이 인심은 주로 '형기의 사사로움', 즉 '육체의 자극'에서 비롯되는 동물적 감정욕구가 적절하게 발현되는 데 실패하는 것을 의미한다. 하지만 이는 모든 감정욕구 가운데 동물적 감정욕구가 적절하게 발현되기 가장 어렵기 때문에, 주희가 이를 인심의 대표적 사례로 제시한 것이라 할 수 있다. 그는 도덕적 감정욕구 역시 그 적절성을 잃으면 도심이라 할 수 없다고 보았다. 그러므로 주희 심학에서는 사단이든 칠정이든, 혹은 도덕적 감정욕구든 동물적 감정욕구든 모두 동일한 발생 계기와 경로를 통해 일어나는 것이며, 그것을 적합하게 조절할 수 있는지의 여부에 따라 인간은 선하거나 타락하거나 하게 된다.<sup>12</sup>

조선 중기의 성리학자인 고봉이나 율곡은 기본적으로 주희의 심학적 구도를 따랐다. 때문에 그들은 도덕적 감정욕구와 육체적 감정욕구가 발생하는 계기나 그 경로를 따로 구분하지 않았다. 그들에게 모든 감정욕구는 심이라는 본체 안에서 하나의 발생 계기와 경로를 거쳐 나오는 것이었다. 다만 정 가운데 육체적 자극에 과도하게 반응하여 증폭되거나 축소된 것을 칠정이라 규정하고, 이 칠정이 적절하게 발현된 것을 사단이라고 규정하는 정도로 양자를 구분했다. 주희와 마찬가지로

<sup>10</sup> 주희는 이러한 심의 특징을 『大學章句』에서 “虛靈不昧，以具衆理，而應得萬事”라고 묘사하였다.

<sup>11</sup> 《中庸章句》, “心之虛靈知覺，一而已矣。而以為有人心道心之異者，則以其或生於形氣之私，或原於性命之正，而所以為知覺者，不同。”

<sup>12</sup> 《朱子語類》 78:196. “問，人心·道心。曰，‘如喜怒，人心也。然無故而喜，喜至於過而不能禁；無故而怒，怒至於甚而不能遏，是皆為人心所使也。須是喜其所當喜，怒其所當怒，乃是道心.’”

가지로 이들도 ‘본체로서의 심’이야말로 정을 적절하게 조절하여 도심의 상태를 유지하는 역할을 담당하는 ‘진정한 주체’라고 보았다.

그러나 퇴계는 고봉이나 율곡이 주희의 심학을 오독(誤讀)하고 있다고 생각했다. 퇴계는 이들과 달리 칠정은 동물적 감정욕구이자 인심이고, 사단은 도덕적 감정욕구이자 도심이라고 정의했다. 그리고 사단이야말로 가장 순도가 높아 인심과 무관한 ‘본체(本體)’로, 끊임없이 폭주하기 쉬운 칠정을 제어하는 역할을 수행한다고 보았다. 그러므로 퇴계의 시각에서 볼 때, 고봉이나 율곡과 같이 사단과 칠정은 ‘적절성’의 차이만 있을 뿐 결국 동일한 감정욕구라고 치부하는 시각은, 인간의 동물적 감정욕구와 도덕적 감정욕구를 반성 없이 뒤섞어 놓는 행위나 다름없다.

게다가 주희의 말처럼 “기는 리보다 강하고”, “인심은 위태롭고 도심은 미약하다.” 따라서 양자가 하나의 심에서 동일하게 발생하는 감정욕구라고 한다면 이 심은 대부분 인심의 형태로만 존재하게 되며, 도심의 발현이란 현실적으로 거의 불가능하게 된다. 때문에 그는 사단과 칠정을 그들과 달리 정의하여 구분할 뿐만 아니라, 발생계기와 경로도 달리 설정하여 도덕 주체인 도심을 동물적 주체인 인심으로부터 분리해낸다. 그리고 양자 사이에 대립적 혹은 수직적 위계 관계를 설정하여 전자의 위상을 높이고 그 독자적 발현 가능성을 확보하고자 한다.

이처럼 퇴계는 주희의 심학을 철저하게 가치론적 시각에서 읽었다. 때문에 퇴계의 심학은 “심의 도덕적 주재력을 강화하여 ‘도덕적 주체를 확보’하기 위한 이론과 실천”으로 규정될 수 있다. 그리고 이 이론과 실천 가운데 그가 이론적 차원에서 전개한 전략은 다음 두 가지이다. 하나는 성의 신호를 강도 높게 증폭시키는 방법이고, 다른 하나는 사단과 칠정의 발생계기와 그 경로를 분리하는 방법이다. 전자는 이른바 ‘상제(上帝)관’으로, 후자는 ‘리기호발(理氣互發)설’이라는 학문적 입장으로 드러났는데, 양자는 서로 긴밀하게 연동하며 인간의 선성(善性)과 도덕적 감정욕망을 동물적 감정욕망의 지배로부터 해방시킨다. 나는 다음 절에서 이상 두 가지 전략의 구체적 내용을 소개하고, 이를 통해 그가 도심을 인간의 진정한 주체로 설정하는 과정을 서술하도록 하겠다.

#### 1) 상제관: 상제에 관한 해석

첫 번째 전략은 리의 여러 역할 가운데 “상제(上帝)”의 비중을 높이는 것이다. 주희의 리 개념에는 다양한 역할과 기능이 있는데, 그 가운데 하나가 상제이다.<sup>13</sup> 상제는 리의 주재적 역할을 강조하는 맥락에서 사용되지만, 리는 “의지나 계획을 결여하고 있고, 창조력도 없기” 때문에 사실상 그것의 주재력은 기를 조절할 만큼 강하지 않다. 하지만 퇴계는 주희의 리 개념을 특별히 상제로서 풀이하여 그 역할을 강화했는데, 이는 다른 아닌 주재력을 보다 높이는 목적에서 비롯되

<sup>13</sup> 《朱子語類》卷68:9, “夫天, 專言之道也... 分而言之, 以形體謂之天, 以主宰謂之帝, 以功用謂之鬼神, 以妙用謂之神, 以性情謂之乾.”

었다고 할 수 있다.

‘태극에 동정(動靜)이 있다’는 말은 태극이 저절로 동정한다는 뜻이다. ‘천명이 유행(流行)한다’는 말은 천명이 저절로 유행한다는 뜻이다. 어찌 다시 누군가가 시켜서 그리하겠는가. 다만 무극(無極) 오행이 묘합하고 응결하여 만물을 만들어내고 변화시키는 점에서 볼 때, 이처럼 만물을 주재하고 운용하며 부리는 자가 있는 듯하다. 《서경》의 이른바 ‘오직 위대한 상제께서 백성에게 본성을 내리신다’나 정자의 이른바 ‘주재를 제(帝)라고 한다’ 등이 이런 경우라고 할 수 있다. 대개 리와 기가 합쳐질 때 천명이 사물에 부여되는데, 천명의 신묘한 작용은 저절로 이와 같은 뿐이다. 그러므로 천명이 유행하는 곳에서 그것을 시키는 누군가가 따로 있다고 말할 수 없다. 이 리는 위상이 지극히 높아 대등한 존재가 없기 때문에, ‘사물에 명을 내리지만 사물에게는 명을 받지 않는’ 것이다.<sup>14</sup>

퇴계에 따르면 태극과 천리는 역동성, 즉 힘이 있다. 그들은 저절로 ‘움직인다[動靜/流行]’다는 점에서, 리는 인격적 존재인 상제의 이미지로 표현된다. ‘저절로 만물을 주재하고 운용하는 자체적 역량을 갖고 있다’는 말도 이 이미지에서 연상된 것이라 할 수 있다. 원래 성리학 전통에서 천리는 그 역할에 따라 ‘천’, ‘귀신’, ‘건곤’, ‘상제’ 등으로 명명되기도 하였는데, 그 중 상제는 세계에 대한 천리의 주재력을 강조할 때 쓰는 표현이었다. 그런데 퇴계가 천리의 여러 의미 가운데 오직 상제로서의 역할만을 선택하고 이를 곧장 천리로 설정한 것은, 그가 주재자의 역할을 천리의 핵심적 의미로 간주한 것이라 볼 수 있다.

그러나 ‘천리가 자체적 역량을 가지고 있다’는 말이 곧 천리가 인격적 존재처럼 세계에 직접 개입할 수 있다는 의미는 아니다. 성리학에서 천리는 오직 현실을 구성하고 움직이는 질료이자 힘인 기를 통해서만이 간접적으로 자신을 증명할 수 있기 때문이다. 퇴계는 주희의 학설을 진리로 수용하고 이를 충실히 계승하고자 한 사람이다. 때문에 나는 그가 리를 ‘움직인다’고 표현하거나 ‘상제’로 재해석했다고 해서, 그것을 기처럼 현실 세계를 움직이는 실질적 동력으로 봤으리라 생각하지 않는다. 다만 그는 이런 표현과 재해석을 통해 리의 주재력을 강화한 것이라 생각한다. 이는 달리 말해 도덕적 본성의 명령신호의 강도를 대폭 강화한 전략으로, 심이 그 신호를 더 정확하고 민감하게 수신할 수 있는 이론적 장치가 마련된 것이라 할 수 있다. 그리고 심이 신호를 정확하고 빠르게 수신할수록, 인간은 선을 실천할 수 있는 확률이 더 높아지는 결과로 이어졌다.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> 《退溪集》 〈答李達李天機〉, “太極之有動靜, 太極自動靜也. 天命之流行, 天命之自流行也. 豈復有使之者歟. 但就無極二五妙合而凝, 化生萬物處看, 若有主宰運用而使其如此者. 卽書所謂惟皇上帝, 降衷于下民, 程子所謂以主宰謂之帝, 是也. 蓋理氣合而命物, 不可謂天命流行處亦別有使之者也. 此理極尊無對, 命物而不命於物故也.”

<sup>15</sup> 물론 퇴계는 상제를 우주적 질서나 법칙으로 정도로 생각하지 않았다. 그는 상제에서 기계적 법칙 이상의 신성(神性)을 보았다. 퇴계의 여러 글에는 그가 인격적 이미지로 표현되는 신성을 심에서 발견하고 이와 교감하는 생생한 종교적 체험이 기록되어 있다. 〈戊辰六條疏〉, 〈夙興夜寐箴〉, 〈答趙士敬〉 등을 참조하라.



이처럼 주희의 심은 퇴계의 재해석을 거치면서 이전보다 한층 강도가 높아진 명령신호를 수신할 수 있게 되었다. 이 말은 주체의 도덕적 역량이 한층 강화된다는 것을 의미했다. 왜냐하면 퇴계는 이 신호를 철저하게 “도덕적 의미”에 한정해서 해석했기 때문이다. 그런데 문제는 앞에서 언급했듯이 주희 심학에 이 ‘상제로서의 리’는 ‘육체와 관련된 리’와 함께 ‘태극이라는 유기적 총체’ 안에 양면적으로 공존하고, 도덕적 감정욕구도 동물적 감정욕구와 함께 하나의 기 개념 안에 양면적으로 공존한다는 점이다.

고봉과 율곡은 이를 큰 거부감 없이 받아들였을 뿐만 아니라, 나아가 도덕적 감정욕구와 육체적 감정욕구를 동등한 위상을 부여했다. 그러나 퇴계의 입장에서 볼 때, 이들이 주희 심학을 해석한 것처럼 심 안에 동물적 주체인 인심과 도덕적 주체인 도심을 “뒤섞어” 놓는 한 후자는 전자의 지배로 인해 발현되지 못할 수밖에 없고, 인간은 쉽사리 타락에서 벗어날 수 없게 된다. 인간이 타락에서 벗어날 수 있는 방법은 전자로부터 후자를 분리하고 그 영역을 이론적으로 보장하는 것이다. 때문에 퇴계는 주희의 심학을 크게 두 차례에 걸쳐 재해석하여 도덕적 발생계기와 그 경로를 육체적 그것으로부터 분리해내는 두 번째 전략을 세운다.

## 2) 리기호발설: 상제와 육신의 대립

고봉이나 율곡은 칠정을 감정욕구 일반으로, 사단을 칠정이 가장 적절하게 발현된 도덕적 감정욕구로 이해했다. 반면 퇴계는 칠정을 육체적 감정욕구로 이해하고, 그것을 도덕적 감정욕구인 사단과 대립시켰다. 퇴계의 입장에서 볼 때, 외관상 이들은 감정욕구라는 동일한 정이지만, 서로 다른 ‘발생계기[所從來]’로부터 서로 다른 ‘발생 경로[血脈/苗脈]’를 통해 일어나기 때문에, 양자는 원론적으로 뒤섞일 수 없다. 처음에 그는 자신의 주장을 뒷받침할 이론적 근거로 “사단은 리의 발현이고 칠정은 기의 발현[四端是理之發, 七情是氣之發]”이라는 주희의 언설을 발견하여 이를 전면에 내세운다.

퇴계는 사단과 칠정의 ‘발생계기’를 각각 리와 기라고 보았다. 여기서 리는 상제로서의 리, 즉 도덕적 명령신호라고 할 수 있다. 감각기관을 통해 외부의 자극을 받았을 때, 인간의 심에 내재한 상제는 기의 어떠한 간섭도 받지 않고 그 구체적 의미를 심에서 그대로 드러낼 수 있다. 그리고 이 때 심에서 일어나는 감정욕구가 그 자체로 완전하고 선한 사단이다. 반면 칠정은 처음부터 끝까지 기의 주도 아래 일어나는 감정욕구라는 점에서, 사단과 그 계기와 경로를 달리한다. 퇴계의 말을 정리해보면, 육체가 외부의 자극을 받으면 각종 생리현상과 감각반응을 일으킨다. 그리고 이 때 이를 인식한 심이 즉각적으로 수많은 동물적 감정욕구를 일으키는데, 그것을 칠정이라 부를 수 있다. 이 때 칠정이 적절하게 발현되면 선하지만, 그렇지 않으면 악이라는 점에서 선이 반드시 보장되는 것은 아니다.

사단과 칠정의 발생계기와 그 경로에 대한 퇴계의 재해석은, 달리 보면 주희의 리기 개념 모두를 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미로 갈라내는 시도였다고 할 수 있다. 퇴계의 시각에서 주희

심학에 대한 기존의 해석은 오류였다. 그의 입장을 리와 기의 오류라는 두 측면에서 정리해보면 다음과 같다. 먼저 기의 차원에서 살펴보자. “인간의 도덕적 정신활동은 자연론적 의미의 기와 아무 관련이 없어야 했다. 그런데도 기존 성리학자들은 기가 육신을 구성하는 질료이자, 신체조건에서 파생된 생리활동 및 감각작용, 이를 인식하고 각종 감정욕구를 일으키는 동물적 심의 활동, 그리고 그와 상관없는 고차원적 심의 활동까지 전부 포괄하는 개념이라고 간주하는 오류를 저질렀다. 여기에는 육체와 관련된 감정욕구뿐만 아니라, 사단 같은 도덕적 정신활동까지 혼재되어 있다. 그러나 사단은 육체를 구성하고 이와 관련된 정신활동을 하는 기에서 도저히 발생할 수 없는, 전혀 다른 차원의 정신활동이다. 따라서 기존의 기에서는 육체에 관련된 정신활동인 칠정만이 발생해야 옳다.” 때문에 퇴계는 사단을 기존의 기 개념으로부터 추출해내고 그 별도의 발생경로를 이론적으로 확보하고자 하였다.

다음으로 리의 차원에서 퇴계의 입장을 정리해보자. “리는 세계를 주재하는 상제로서, 인간의 육체나 여기서 파생되는 생리 반응뿐만 아니라, 심지어 이와 관련된 정신활동과도 전혀 무관하다. 상제로서의 리는 인간의 심에 오직 인의예지(仁義禮智) 네 가지로 구성된 성으로 존재하며, 그것은 심에게 신호로 존재하여 사단을 일으키도록 유도한다. 그러므로 그것의 명령신호는 모두 도덕적일 수밖에 없으며, 그것을 수신해서 발생하는 사단 역시 완벽하게 도덕적일 수밖에 없다.” 퇴계의 이러한 입장은 성으로부터 자연론적 의미를 철저히 제거하여, 사단의 도덕적 발생계기를 이론적으로 확보하고자 한 해석이라 볼 수 있다.

하지만 칠정으로부터 사단을 추출하려는 퇴계의 전략은 주희 심학의 기본 구도를 뒤흔었다는 비판을 피할 수 없게 되었다. 예컨대 고봉은 ‘리와 기는 서로 분리될 수 없다[不相離, 不相雜]’는 주희의 입론을 근거로, 기는 사단의 존재 근거인데 사단을 기로부터 추출해 버리면 과연 사단 자체가 성립될 수 있는지 의문을 제기한다. 또한 ‘하나의 본성에서 모든 감정욕구가 발생한다[性發爲情]’는 주희의 입론을 근거로, 칠정 또한 본성에서 발생하는 것이므로 퇴계처럼 칠정의 발생계기를 성이 아닌 기로 설정하는 것은 오류라고 주장한다.

이처럼 고봉의 입장에서 퇴계의 주장은 주희의 입론을 심각하게 벗어난 것이다. 고봉에 따르면 심은 본성의 수많은 신호를 수신하여 사단과 칠정을 포함한 다양한 감정욕구들을 일으킨다. 그러므로 사단과 칠정은 동등한 인식의 지평에서 배출된 것이지, 각기 다른 발생계기와 경로를 통해 일어난 감정욕구는 아니다. 퇴계는 고봉의 이러한 비판을 부분적으로 받아들인다. 그래서 그는 다시 자신의 주장을 수정하여 원래의 리기호발설<sup>16</sup>을 “사단은 리가 발하면 기가 리를 따르고, 칠정은 기가 일어나면 리가 기에 올라탄다[四端, 理發氣隨之, 七情, 氣發理乘之]”로 수정한다.

이 말을 재해석하면 다음과 같다: 사단은 ‘상제로서의 성’이 심에 신호를 보내어 발생하는 도덕적 감정욕구이고, 칠정은 외부 자극으로 육체에 생리현상이나 감각반응이 일어나서 심이 그것

<sup>16</sup> 즉 “四端是理之發, 七情是氣之發”. 이 글 p.11 참조

을 인식할 때, 이와 동시에 ‘식색(食色)의 성’이 그에 적합한 신호를 보내어 발생하는 육체적 감정욕구라고 할 수 있다. 이는 퇴계가 주희 심학에서 양면성을 설명할 때 사용했던 ‘본연의 성’과 ‘식색의 성’을 끌어와, 사단과 칠정의 발생계기로 삼은 것이라 할 수 있다. 그런데 그가 수정한 내용에도 여전히 문제가 남는다. 먼저, 주희의 심학에서 정신활동 일체는 ‘하나의 기[元氣]에서 파생된 무수한 양상’들이기 때문에, 칠정에서 별도로 사단을 추출하여 양자를 분리하는 것은 성리학 적 구도 내에서 애당초 불가능하다. 물론 퇴계는 기에 내재된 자연론적 의미의 위태로움을 경계하여 사단을 분리해낸 것이라 할 수 있다. 하지만 그의 말대로 칠정을 기로부터 파생된 발현태라고 한다면, 사단이라는 정신활동은 기존의 기가 아닌 어떤 종류의 기의 발현태가 되겠는가?

다음으로, 그는 사단이 ‘상제로서의 성’, 즉 ‘본연의 성’에서 발생하고 칠정이 ‘식색의 성’에서 발생한다고 주장하며, 양자의 ‘발생계기’를 둘로 구분하고 있다. 그는 자신의 최초 주장과 달리 성에는 자연론적 의미도 존재한다고 인정한다. 하지만 이 또한 주희의 리 개념 안에 양면적으로 공존하던 가치론적 의미와 자연론적 의미를 분리하고 전자를 ‘본연의 성’으로, 후자로 ‘식색의 성’으로 구분하여 양자를 대립시킨 해석이다. 주희 심학에서 본성은 오직 총체로서의 ‘태극’ 하나이다. 만약 퇴계와 같이 본성조차 둘로 가르고 대립시킨다면, 이는 주희의 입론에 크게 어긋나는 오류라고 할 수 있다.

마지막으로 퇴계가 본성을 양분한 것뿐만 아니라, ‘본연의 성’에 강한 능동성을 부여한 것도 문제가 된다. 그는 성의 도덕적 신호를 이론적으로 증폭시키기 위해 유독 그것을 상제로 재해석하고, 그 주도적 성격을 강조하기 위해 “리발(理發)”이라는 표현을 사용했다. 그러나 이것은 주희의 다른 주장, 즉 “리는 의지나 계획을 결여하고 있고, 창조력도 없는” 존재라는 말과 여전히 긴장관계를 갖는다. 울곡이 비판한 것처럼 현실세계에 직접 개입할 수 있는 힘의 원천은 기이므로, 주희의 주장대로라면 리는 반드시 기의 활동을 통해서만 간접적으로 자신의 존재를 증명할 수밖에 없다.<sup>17</sup> 성리학의 기본구도 안에서는 오직 ‘기의 활동성[氣發]’만이 존재한다.

이처럼 퇴계가 고봉을 비롯한 후학들의 비판을 받으면서도 리를 상제로 재해석하여 도덕적 신호의 강도를 높이고, 이와 동시에 사단과 칠정의 발생계기와 그 경로를 갈라냈던 이유는 무엇일까. 나는 이 두 가지 전략 모두 심의 도덕적 주재력을 강화하고 그 발현 과정을 보장함으로써 “주체의 보다 강화된 도덕적 실천력을 확보”하기 위해 설정된 이론적 장치라고 생각한다. 도덕 주체의 강화는 결국 칠정과 같은 육체적 감정욕구를 조절할 수 있는 힘이 커진다는 것을 의미하며, 이는 인간의 타락을 막을 수 있는 실천 역량으로 작용한다. 퇴계는 이것이야말로 심학의 중요한 목적이었다고 보았을 것이다.

그럼에도 불구하고 주희의 학문이 진리의 척도인 조선에서 주희의 입론은 진리였고, 따라서

<sup>17</sup> 《栗谷全書》 〈答成浩源〉 “理氣元不相離，似是一物。而其所以異者，理無形也，氣有形也，理無爲也，氣有爲也... 道心原於性命，而發者氣也。則謂之理發不可也。人心道心，俱是氣發。”

퇴계의 새로운 해석은 조선 지식계에서 주희 심학을 일탈한 것으로 간주되었다.<sup>18</sup> 퇴계 역시 주희의 학문을 도학정통으로 받아들였고, 주희의 언설을 근거로 활용하며 자신의 학설을 정당화하고자 부단히 노력했다. 하지만 퇴계는 심학의 가치론적 의미를 중시하고 강화하는 과정에서, 원래 자신의 의도와 달리 성리학의 기본구도를 일탈하게 되었다. 그리하여 고봉이나 율곡이 해석한 성리학이 조선 지식계에서 진리의 시비를 가리는 척도로 남아 있는 한, 퇴계의 이론은 항상 불완전한 오류로 남아 있을 수밖에 없었다.

따라서 퇴계가 자신의 문도들에게 남긴 과제는 하나였다. **“성리학의 기본구도를 뒤틀지 않으면서도 ‘리의 능동성[理發]’을 확보하는 동시에, 사단과 칠정의 ‘발생계기[所從來]’와 ‘발현 경로[血脈/苗脈]’을 갈라내는 것.”** 그 문인들 역시 퇴계의 학설을 도학정통으로 확립하여 자신들의 학문적 정당성을 입증하기 위해서는, 이 문제에 대한 해결이 시급했다고 할 수 있다. 그리고 그들 가운데 퇴계가 남긴 해묵은 과제를 성공적으로 해결한 사람이 바로 성호 이익이다. 그는 변쇄한 개념조작과 이론적 변형을 통해 주자 심학 안에 퇴계 심학을 정합적으로 배치한다. 그가 30여년에 걸쳐 완성한 《사칠신편(四七新編)》은 바로 자신의 학문적 지평 위에서 주희와 퇴계의 주장을 새롭게 융합한 노작이라고 할 수 있다.

다음 장에서는 《사칠신편》과 관련 저작 몇 편을 중심으로 성호의 심학을 검토해보도록 하겠다. 그는 주희의 리기 개념을 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미로 세분화하고 각각에 다른 명칭을 부여하여 이들을 분류한다.<sup>19</sup> 그 다음에는 새롭게 분류한 리와 기들을 동일 범주끼리 조합하고, 이를 기반으로 퇴계의 학설을 창조적으로 재해석한다. 그의 지적 노력의 결과로, 퇴계 심학은 성호의 해석을 거쳐 성리학 전통 안에 안전하게 편입된다.

이러한 편입의 성공은 달리 말해 퇴계 심학이 비판받았던 ‘리의 능동성’과 ‘그 도덕적 발현계기 및 경로’ 문제가 성리학 전통 속에서 이론적으로 정당화된다는 것을 의미했다. 뿐만 아니라 성호의 심학은 주희와 퇴계의 심학이 창조적으로 재해석되고 융합된 결과로 구축된 것이기 때문에, 기존 성리학과는 또 다른 독특한 색채를 띠게 되었다. 그 가운데 가장 두드러진 특징이 바로 성리학 전통 속에 퇴계의 도덕적 주체의 영역을 마련해줌으로써, 전례없이 도덕적 실천역량이 강화된 성리학적 주체를 확보하게 된 것이라 할 수 있다.

#### 4. 새로운 성리학적 주체의 확립: 성호 이익의 심학

<sup>18</sup> 율곡이 ‘퇴계는 주희를 신봉했지만, 그의 리기호발설은 명확하지 못해서 주희의 입장과 어긋나는 지점이 발생했다’고 비판한 말도, 퇴계의 주장이 자신이 이해한 성리학의 기본구도에서 일탈하여 그 정당성과 정합성을 상실했다는 것을 의미한다. 상세한 내용은 《栗谷全書》〈答成浩原〉 참조.

<sup>19</sup> 미우라 쿠니오(三浦國雄)에 따르면, 주희는 인간 내면에서 결합되어 상호 작용하는 리와 기의 구체적 메커니즘에 대해 상세하게 이야기하지 않는다. 『주자와 기, 그리고 몸』, (서울: 예문서원, 2003) 참고.

### 1) “중층(重層)적 리기론”의 설정과 퇴계 심학의 재해석

성호는 총체적 천리 안에 유기체적으로 조직된 ‘날날의 리[條理]’를 크게 세 가지로 구분한다. 하나는 만물을 구성하고 그것의 성장소멸을 일정방향으로 유도하는 ‘생장의 리’, 다른 하나는 육체의 생리현상이나 감각 자극을 인식하고 반응하도록 하는 ‘지각운동의 리’, 마지막으로 개체의 ‘자기보존욕’이나 ‘감각·쾌락욕’과 무관하게 도덕적으로 반응하도록 하는 ‘성명의 리’가 있다. 이들은 ‘성즉리(性卽理)’라는 성리학의 전제에 따라, 현실세계에서는 각각 ‘생장의 성’, ‘지각운동의 성’, ‘성명의 성’으로 존재한다.

또한 그는 성과 마찬가지로 기 역시 상대적 밀도와 순도에 따라 크게 두 가지로 구분한다. 하나는 우주 전체의 질료이자 에너지로, 만물의 형체를 구성하고 그것을 성장소멸하게 하는 ‘천지유행의 기’이다. 이 기는 다시 세부적으로 우주전체를 순환하는 ‘대기(太氣)’와 개체의 형태와 내부 조직을 구성하는 ‘소기(小氣)’로 구분된다. 이 때 이 소기는 보통 “형기(形氣)” 혹은 ‘오장(五臟)의 기’로 지칭되며, 개체의 신체조건 및 여기서 파생되는 생리현상, 그리고 감각 자극 일체를 의미한다.

다른 하나는 정신활동 일체를 의미하는 ‘(광의의) 신명(神明)의 기’이다. 그것은 심을 구성하는 기로서 “심기(心氣)”라고 지칭된다. 심기는 그 자체의 순도 차이에 따라 다시 두 종류로 세분화된다. 하나는 육체적 생리현상이나 감각자극을 인식하여 육체적 감정욕구를 일으키는 ‘지각운동의 기’이고, 다른 하나는 감각기관을 통해 외부 자극을 인식하여 도덕적 감정욕구를 일으키는 ‘(협의의) 신명의 기’이다.

그런데 이 각각의 기는 밀도와 순도가 다르기 때문에, 하나의 총체적 천리에 동시다발적으로 존재하는 무수한 명령신호 가운데에서 그것들이 수신할 수 있는 내용도 저마다 다르다. 예를 들어 인간의 형태와 내부 장기 등을 만들고 생리활동을 담당하는 ‘천지유행의 기’(개체에 한정해서는 ‘오장의 기’라고도 부른다)는 그 조직밀도와 순도가 가장 낮기 때문에, 오직 ‘생장의 리’의 신호만 수신이 가능하다. “형기”에 비해 상대적으로 순도가 높은 “심기” 역시 그 내부에 순도 차이가 존재한다. 그래서 상대적으로 순도가 낮은 ‘지각운동의 기’는 ‘지각운동의 리’의 신호만 수신 가능하고, 순도가 높은 ‘(협의의) 신명의 기’는 ‘성명의 리’의 신호까지 수신 가능하다.<sup>20</sup>

성호가 이처럼 리와 기 개념을 세분화하고, 기의 순도에 따라 각기 다른 명령신호를 수신할 수 있다고 주장한 것은 퇴계의 심학을 성리학 전통에 편입시키기 위한 시도로 보인다. 나는 이렇게 세분화된 리와 기가 동일한 의미끼리 조합된 이론체계를 “중층(重層)적 리기론”이라고 부르기로 한다. 성호는 그가 구축한 이른바 “중층적 리기론”을 기반으로 퇴계의 ‘리기호발설’을 재해석한다. 다음은 『사칠신편』의 한 단락이다.

<sup>20</sup> 이하 ‘(광의의) 신명의 기’는 ‘심기’로, ‘(협의의) 신명의 기’는 ‘신명의 기’로 일괄 지칭한다.

사단은 형기의 자극과 상관없이 리에서 곧장 발생하기 때문에 리발(理發)의 경로를 따른다. 칠정은 리가 형기를 계기로 발생하기 때문에, 기발(氣發)의 경로를 따른다. 저 형기가 일어날 때조차, 리가 그 계기로 기능하지 않았던 적이 있겠는가? 퇴계에 이르러 ‘理發氣隨’, ‘氣發理乘’에 대한 논의가 있었다. 기수(氣隨)의 기는 심기를 의미하고, 기발의 기는 형기를 의미한다. 저 리승(理乘)이라는 말을 풀어보자. 리가 어디에 올라탄다는 말인가? (심)기를 탈 뿐이다. 이 기가 바로 사단의 경로인 기수의 기요, 칠정의 일차적 계기인 기발의 기가 아니다. 리가 올라타지만 (심)기가 따르지 못한다면, 또한 이 칠정이 성립될 수 없다. ‘승(乘)’이라고 말할 때에는 사실 기수라는 뜻이 그 가운데 있는 것이다. 기발의 기는 형기의 기가 틀림없는데, 기발이라 말해놓고 또 이 형기를 올라탄다고 할 수 있겠는가? 때문에 나는 “**리발기수’는 사단과 칠정의 동일 계기이자 경로이다. 그런데 칠정에는 리가 [일차적] 발생계기로 기능하기 이전에 이미 [일차적] 계기와 경로[苗脈]가 존재하기 때문에, [칠정이 발생하게 되는] 것이니, 이른바 형기의 사사로움이 이것이다**”라고 말한 것이다.<sup>21</sup>

퇴계가 최종적으로 수정한, “사단은 리가 발하면 기가 리를 따르고, 칠정은 기가 일어나면 리가 기에 올라탄다[四端, 理發氣隨之, 七情, 氣發理乘之]”는 “리기호발설”을 다시 떠올려보자. 성호의 이른바 “중층적 리기론”을 기반으로 “四端, 理發氣隨之”를 해석해보면, 사단은 ‘신명의 기’가 ‘성명의 성’의 명령신호를 수신하여 일으키는 도덕적 감정욕구라는 의미이다. ‘七情, 氣發理乘之’는 조금 더 복잡한 변형을 거쳐 해석된다. 성호는 ‘氣發理乘之’는 사실 ‘形氣發, 理發氣隨’의 축약형으로 이해되어야 한다고 주장한다. 이는 ‘신체조건에서 파생된 생리활동과 감각자극[形氣]’이 일어날 때, 심기 가운데 ‘지각운동의 기’가 그것을 인식하고 그 순간 ‘지각운동의 성’의 신호를 수신하여 일으키는 육체적 감정욕구가 바로 칠정이라는 것을 의미한다.

이상의 분석에서 알 수 있는 사실은 성호가 퇴계의 리기호발설을 재해석한 결과, 사단과 칠정의 발생계기와 발생경로는 외관상 동일하게 설정되는 동시에, 그 구체적 내용에 있어서는 양자의 발생계기와 그 경로는 사실상 달라졌다는 것이다. 다시 말해 사단이든 칠정이든 모두 외관상 ‘리발기수(理發氣隨)’<sup>22</sup>, 즉 ‘성의 명령신호를 기가 수신한다’는 메커니즘을 공유한다는 점에서 양자의 발생계기와 발생경로는 형식적으로 동일하면서도, 그 구체적 발생계기와 경로는 다음과 같이 달라지게 되었다. 즉 사단의 발생계기는 ‘인의예지(仁義禮智)’의 도덕적 본성이며, 그 발생경로 역시 ‘신명의 기’라는 순도가 가장 높은 심기의 작용이라 할 수 있다. 하지만 칠정은 이와 달리 두 차례의 발생계기와 경로를 갖는데 ‘일차적 발생계기와 경로[苗脈]’는 ‘형기의 자극과 그것에

<sup>21</sup> 《四七新編》 〈重跋〉, “四端不因形氣而直發, 故屬之理發, 七情理因形氣發, 則屬之氣發. 彼氣發, 亦何嘗非理之發乎? 至退溪有理發氣隨氣發理乘之論, 氣隨之氣, 屬心, 氣發之氣, 屬形氣, 彼理乘者, 惡乎乘? 乘氣而已. 是氣即四端氣隨之氣, 非七情氣發之氣也. 理乘而氣不隨, 則亦成此七情不得也. 謂之乘, 則氣隨在其中矣. 氣發之氣, 分明是形氣之氣也, 則既云氣發, 而又云乘此形氣, 可乎? 余故曰, 理發氣隨, 四七同然, 而若七情, 則理發上面, 更有一層苗脈, 所謂形氣之私, 是也.”

<sup>22</sup> “四端, 理發氣隨之”와 “七情 形氣發, 理發氣隨之”의 형식을 살펴보자. 양쪽 모두 ‘理發氣隨’라는 공통된 형식이 있는 것을 볼 수 있다.

대한 심의 인식'이며, 이차적 발생계기는 '지각운동의 성'의 신호이다. 그리고 그 이차적 발생경로는 심기 가운데에서 상대적으로 순도가 낮은 '지각운동의 기'의 작용이라 할 수 있다.

이처럼 성호의 심학은 외관상 주희의 입언을 따르면서도, 그 내용상에서는 사단과 칠정의 발생계기와 그 경로를 달리 할 수 있는 새로운 이론체계라는 점에서 주목할 필요가 있다. 지금까지 퇴계의 심학은 다음 세 가지 측면에서 후학의 비판을 받았다. 첫째, 그것은 '리와 기는 서로 분리될 수 없다[理氣不相離]'는 주희의 입언을 따르지 않고, 사단은 오로지 리로부터 발생하고 칠정은 오로지 기로부터 발생한다고 주장하여 리기를 갈랐다는 비판이다. 성호는 사단과 칠정 모두 외관상 '리발기수'의 단일한 형식을 통해 일어나는 감정욕구임을 증명하여 이를 반박하였다.

둘째, 퇴계는 '하나의 성에서 무수한 정이 발생한다[性發爲情]'는 주희의 주장을 부정하고, 성을 '본연의 성'과 '식색의 성'으로 양분했다는 비판이다. 성호는 '천리가 낱낱의 리들이 유기체적으로 구조화된 총체적 집합'이라는 주희의 입장을 존중했다. 그러나 동시에 그는 하나의 천리에 무수한 낱낱의 리들이 구체적 명령신호로 존재한다는 사실에 착안하여, 기의 밀도와 순도 차이에 따라 각기 다른 신호를 수신한다고 보았다. 예를 들어 심기 중에서도 순도가 낮은 '지각운동의 기'는 천리 안에 동시다발적으로 존재하는 신호 가운데 '지각운동의 성', 즉 '식색의 성'만 그 명령신호로 수신할 수 있는 것이다. 이러한 설명은 퇴계가 성을 양분했다는 비판을 반박하고, 퇴계의 이론이 조선 성리학의 주류 전통에서 이해되던 주희 심학에서 일탈되는 "과오"를 차단한 것이다.

마지막으로 리는 오직 '기의 발현[氣發]'을 통해서만 그 존재를 드러내며, 그것은 기본적으로 어떠한 의지나 행위, 창조력이 있을 수 없다는 비판이다. 성호 역시 리가 세계에 직접적인 힘을 발휘한다고 보지 않았다. 다만 리는 명령신호로서 우주와 만물을 예비된 궤적으로 유도할 뿐이다. 하지만 성호는 성리학의 해석적 한계를 넘지 않는 선에서 리의 신호를 증폭시켜, 그 주재력을 최대치로 끌어올리고자 했다. 이는 그가 퇴계의 입장을 수정하기보다 주희의 심학적 틀 안에서 보완하여 이를 강화했다는 것을 의미한다. 즉 사단이든 칠정이든 모두 "리발기수"의 메커니즘을 통해 발생하는 것으로, 일체의 감정욕구는 반드시 '리의 주도적 영향[理發]' 아래 일어난다고 할 수 있다.<sup>23</sup>

이처럼 성호는 개념의 조작과 이론의 재해석을 통해 퇴계의 심학을 보완하고 그 완성도를 높였다. 그리하여 그의 심학은 성리학적 전통 속에 퇴계 심학을 온전하게 되살리는 형태로 정초되었고, 성호는 자신의 심학을 이론적 무기로 삼아 고봉이나 율곡이 제기했던 비판을 합리적으로 반박할 수 있었다. 그런데 그의 심학은 단순히 퇴계의 심학을 성리학적 구도 안에 다시 정합적으로

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<sup>23</sup> 퇴계에게 '리발'은 오로지 도덕본성의 발현으로, 자연히 리의 다른 이름인 상제도 도덕본성의 명령신호만을 의미한다. 하지만 성호에게 '리발'은 도덕본성뿐만 아니라 육체적 본성의 발현까지 포함하기 때문에, 리의 다른 명칭인 상제 역시 육체적 본성의 명령신호까지 포함하게 되었다. 이는 상제 개념이 모든 감정욕구의 명령신호로 확대된 것이라고 할 수 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 성호 역시 대부분의 맥락에서 상제를 도덕본성이라는 의미로 사용하는 경우가 많다. 성호의 상제에 관한 보다 자세한 언급은 이 글 pp. 21~22 참조.

로 배치시키는 이론에 그치는 것이 아니다. 그가 퇴계의 심학을 창조적으로 해석하고 보완하는 과정에서, 주희나 퇴계의 심학과는 또 다른 형태의 심학을 구축하게 되었다고 할 수 있다. 다음 절에서는 주희와 퇴계의 심학이 융합되면서 탄생한 성호의 심학적 특징을, ‘도덕 역량이 강화된 성리학적 도덕 주체의 탄생’이라는 주제를 중심으로 몇 가지 짚어 보도록 하겠다.

## 2) 성호 심학의 특징: 새로운 성리학적 도덕 주체의 탄생

퇴계는 성리학적 구도를 일탈하면서까지 주희의 리기 개념에 양면적으로 공존하던 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미 사이에 균열을 만들었다. 이는 상제로서의 도덕적 본성과 그 발현 경로를 확보하여 심의 도덕적 주체로서의 역할을 강화하기 위한 목적이었다고 할 수 있다. 그리고 성호가 퇴계의 심학을 성리학 전통 속에 정합적으로 편입시키기 위해 마련한 이른바 “중층(重層)적 리기론”은 결국 주희의 리기 개념에 공존하던 두 의미 사이의 균열을 더 넓히는 결과를 가져왔다고 할 수 있다.

즉 그는 먼저 천리의 의미를 ① 생장의 성, ② 지각운동의 성, ③ 성명의 성으로 구분하였는데, ①은 인간의 정신활동과 무관한 생리적 신호이고, ②는 정신활동에 관계되는 신호이지만, 반드시 육체적 자극에 관계되는 신호이며, ③은 개체의 육체적 조건과 상관없는 도덕적 신호이다. 따라서 ‘생장의 성’이나 ‘지각운동의 성’은 인간의 육체와 관련된 명령신호라는 점에서 자연론적 의미를 함축하고, ‘성명의 성’은 육체와 상관없이 도덕과 관련된 명령신호라는 점에서 가치론적 의미를 함축한다고 할 수 있다. 성호가 리를 선명하게 가르고 세분화한 것은 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미를 구별하고 후자를 전자로부터 분리하기 위함으로 생각된다.

기 개념에서도 마찬가지이다. 성호는 기를 ‘형기’와 ‘심기’로 구분하고 전자를 다시 ‘천지유행의 기’나 ‘오장의 기’, 후자를 ‘지각운동의 기’와 ‘신명의 기’로 구분했다. 여기서 심기 가운데 하나인 ‘지각운동의 기’와 형기는 육체와 관련된 생리작용이나 정신활동이라는 점에서 자연론적 의미가 강하다고 할 수 있고, 심기 가운데 ‘신명의 기’는 개체의 자기보존욕구나 감각·쾌락욕구를 초월하는 도덕적 정신활동이라는 점에서 가치론적 의미가 강하다고 할 수 있다. 성호가 리와 마찬가지로 기도 세분화한 것은 두 가지 의미를 구별하고 후자를 전자로부터 분리하기 위함으로 생각된다.

이처럼 그가 리와 기 개념을 세분화하고 그것을 동일 의미끼리 결합시킨 것은 ‘도덕적 주체’를 추출해내기 위함이라 할 수 있다. 사실, 성호의 “중층(重層)적 리기론”이라는 것은 “중층적 심”의 다른 표현이다. 특정한 성의 신호를 특정한 기가 수신하는 것이 바로 심의 작용 원리이기 때문이다. 성호의 <심설(心說)>에 따르면, 심은 크게 세 가지로 구분된다. 하나는 ‘생장의 심’으로 머리카락이 자란다든지, 소화가 된다든지, 피부가 따갑다든지 하는 생리현상과 감각작용 일반을 의미한다. 그런데 성호는 이 심이 은유적 표현일 뿐이며 엄밀하게 말해 그것을 심이라고 부를 수 없다고 본



다. 왜냐하면 그에게 심은 정신활동을 지칭하기 때문이다. 그에 따르면 머리카락이 자란다든지 하는 것은 인간의 인식이나 사고, 의지와 무관하게 일어나는 생리현상으로, 사실상 “콩팥[腎]”에서 이루어지는 활동이다.

다른 하나는 ‘지각의 심’으로, 이것은 생리현상이나 감각작용 일부를 인식하고 개체의 ‘자기보존욕구’나 ‘감각·쾌락욕구’를 일으킨다. 예컨대 위장이 텅 비면 배가 고프다든지 화상을 입으면 쓰리다든지 하는 것은 형기에 대한 인식이고, 이로 말미암아 분노가 일어난다든지 음식을 갈구한다든지 하는 감정욕구가 그것이다. 물론 ‘지각의 심’은 인식과 이에 따른 감정욕구를 일으킨다는 점에서 정신활동이라고 할 수 있지만, 이 심은 동물적 감정욕구에만 충실하기 때문에, 인간의 진정한 주체가 될 수 없다. 그러나 <심설>의 세 번째 심, 즉 ‘신명의 기’가 ‘성명의 성’의 신호를 수신하여 도덕적 감정욕구를 일으키는 심은 인간에게만 있는 도덕 주체라고 할 수 있다. 성호는 그것을 ‘의리의 심’이라고 명명하고 매우 중시했다.

사람은 ‘생장의 심’과 ‘지각의 심’이 있다는 점에서 진실로 짐승과 동일한 측면이 있다. 그런데 사람에게서 이른바 ‘의리의 심’이라는 것도 있다. ‘지각의 심’은 생리적·감각적 자극만 인식할 뿐이기 때문에, 그 기능이 이익을 추구하고 손해를 피하는데 불과하다. 이것은 사람에게 인심(人心)으로 존재한다. 사람의 경우에는 심이 반드시 천명의 ‘일정 방향으로 되어갈 수밖에 없는 이법[所當然]’을 따라 주재한다. 때문에 특정 갈망이 생존욕구보다 클 수도 있으며, 미워하기가 죽음을 피하려는 욕구보다 심할 수도 있다. 이러한 감정욕구가 바로 도심(道心)이다.<sup>24</sup>

성호는 인간이 자연세계의 다른 존재들과 다른 이유는 ‘의리의 심’이 있기 때문이라고 본다. 그것은 사단이라는 감정욕구를 발휘할 수 있는 유일한 도덕주체이다. 이 심은 개체적 안위나 이익과 충돌하는 한이 있어도 ‘도덕적 본성[天命]’을 따른다. 성호는 퇴계와 마찬가지로 ‘의리의 심’을 “도심”으로, 그와 충돌하는 ‘지각의 심’을 “인심”으로 설정하고 양자를 대립시켰다. 이는 달리 말해 자연론적 의미와 가치론적 의미의 선명한 분리이며, 사단과 칠정의 대립구도가 형성된 것이라고 할 수 있다.

성호의 심학에서 사단과 칠정은 가치론과 자연론, 도덕과 육체의 대립뿐만 아니라, 수직적 위계도 보여준다. 성호에게 사단은 순도가 가장 높은 ‘신명의 기’의 작용이기 때문에, 증폭이나 축소 존재하지 않는다. 그것은 늘 완전한 도덕적 감정욕구로 존재한다. 반면 칠정은 상대적으로 순도가 낮기 때문에 위태로운 감정욕구라고 할 수 있다. 여기에는 항상 ‘과불급(過不及)’ 혹은 ‘부중절(不中節)’이 존재한다. 퇴계와 마찬가지로 성호도 인간이 타락하는 이유를 칠정의 증폭이나 축

<sup>24</sup> 《星湖僿說》 〈心說〉, “至於人, 其 有生長及知覺之心, 固與禽獸同. 而又有所謂理義之心者. 知覺之心, 知之覺之而止, 故其用不過乎趨利避害. 在人則人心是也. 若人者必以天命所當然者爲主宰. 而欲或甚於生, 惡或甚於死. 則道心是也.”

소에서 찾는다. 그에 따르면 칠정 그 자체는 선하지도 악하지도 않은 육체적 감정욕구 일반이다. 그러나 그것은 순도가 낮은 ‘지각운동의 기’가 일으키는 것이기 때문에, 작은 자극에도 증폭되거나 축소되기 쉽다.

‘형기’에서 발생하는 심은 원래 그 선악을 말할 것이 없다. 다만 ‘이 형기가 있기 때문에 이 심도 있다’고 말하니, 이 심은 인심을 의미한다. 인심이 있는 다음에 자신에게 이로우면 그것을 추구하고, 거슬리면 싫어하는 등의 감정욕구가 존재할 수 있으니, 이를 칠정이라 한다. **욕(欲)과 오(惡)의 증절과 부증절에 따라 선악이 갈리기 때문에, ‘인심은 오직 위태롭다’고 말한 것이다.**<sup>25</sup>

칠정 중 일차적으로 발생하는 감정욕구가 ‘욕(欲)’과 ‘오(惡)’이다. 전자는 ‘바라는’ 것이고 후자는 ‘바라지 않는/피하려는’ 것이다. 이들은 일종의 “호오(好惡)”로, 칠정의 나머지 무수한 감정욕구들은 전부 “호오”에서 파생된다. 성호는 인심 자체는 선하지만 그것이 위태로운 이유는 바로 “호오의 부증절” 때문이라고 본다. 부증절은 칠정, 특히 ‘오’와 ‘욕’이 감정적 정량을 초과하거나 미치지 못하는 사태로, 인간의 사고와 행위를 타락에 빠뜨리는 주요 요인이다. 그런데 성호가 우려하는 부증절은 주로 오욕이 그 감정적 정량에 미치지 못하는 경우가 아닌, 초과되는 상황이다.

a. 이른바 ‘위태롭다’는 이유는 인간에게 칠정이 있기 때문이다. 만약 칠정의 ‘폭주[熾烈]’가 존재하지 않았다면 나는 배고픔과 추위, 아픔과 가려움 따위가 위태롭다고 보지 않았을 것이다.<sup>26</sup>

b. 이 굶주림은 인심에 있을 수밖에 없는 생리현상이다. 따라서 도심의 조절과 전혀 상관없는 작용이니, 어찌 그것이 선하지 않은 적이 있었겠는가? 사람들이 악을 인심의 탓으로 돌리는 이유는 단지 악이 인심에서 생기기 때문이다. 그러나 인심도 맨 처음 발생할 때는 선하지 않는 경우가 없으니, 이로 보아 인심이 인욕으로 흐르면서 폭주[熾蕩]한 결과로서 악이 발생한다는 사실을 알겠다.<sup>27</sup>

성호의 심학에서 인심은 칠정의 발생뿐만 아니라, 형기의 생리활동 일체도 포함한다. 때문에 생리활동이나 그것에 대한 반응인 칠정도 인간의 생존을 위해 반드시 필요한 덕목이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 인심이 위태로운 이유는 인심에서 발생한 ‘오’와 ‘욕’이 견잡을 수 없이 증폭되면서 칠정이 악으로 전환되기 때문이다. 성호는 오욕을 포함한 칠정의 증폭을 ‘치(熾)’, ‘탕(蕩)’, ‘열(烈)’이라는 세 글자로 표현한다. 이들은 모두 어떤 형세가 극도로 활성화된 상태를 의미하는 말로, 육체적 감정욕구가 과도하게 증폭되어 있는 상태를 가리킨다. 칠정은 그 자체로 문제될 것이 없지만,

<sup>25</sup> 《四七新編》 〈圖說〉, “凡形氣上心, 其初未說到善惡地頭, 只曰有此形, 則有此心, 是乃人心也. 有此心後, 順者欲之, 逆者惡之之類, 是乃七情也. 欲惡之中不中, 而善惡於是乎分焉, 故曰, ‘人心惟危.’”

<sup>26</sup> 《四七新編》 〈七情更是人心〉, “所謂危殆者, 有七情故也. 若無七情之熾, 則飢寒痛痒, 吾未見其危殆也.”

<sup>27</sup> 《星湖僿說》 〈性善〉, “這飢也, 是人心之合有者. 不待道心之節制, 而何嘗有不善? 人之歸咎於惡者, 只繫乎人心. 而人心之最初原頭, 無有不善, 則知不善從人欲, 熾蕩而生也.”

칠정의 증폭으로 극대화된 감정욕망은 인간을 타락시킨다. 그는 인간의 과도한 감정욕구 일체를 “인욕(人欲)”이라고 규정했다.

성호에게 칠정은 인간이 타락하는 주요원인인 “인욕”을 일으킬 수 있는 가능성이 크기 때문에, 항상 주시하고 경계해야 할 대상이다. 그것을 조절할 수 있는 존재는 오직 ‘도심’인 사단뿐이다. 때문에 그는 ‘의리의 심’, 즉 실천역량이 충만한 도덕 주체를 성리학의 전통 안에 설정하여 칠정의 증폭을 억제하고자 하였다. 그리고 이것은 성호 심학에서 심의 발생계기와 경로를 분리하는 전략과 아울러, 성리학적 리 개념에서 해석을 허용할 수 있는 한계 내에서 그것의 주재력을 극대화하는 전략을 통해 이루어졌다.

앞에서도 언급했듯이, 성호는 퇴계의 “리발”과 “상제”를 계승했다. 뿐만 아니라 퇴계가 리발을 도덕적 본성에 한정된 반면, 그는 ‘지각운동의 성’까지 포함하여, 칠정조차 리가 주도하는 것임을 분명히 하였다. 따라서 성호의 입장에서 ‘리가 어느 행위도 하지 않는다’는 율곡의 ‘리무위(理無爲)설’은 본성의 신호와 그 주재력을 약화시키는 주장이나 다름없다.

그 흔적으로 말하면 리기에는 진실로 선후(先後)가 없다. 그러나 그 주재로 말하면, 리는 본래 말라 죽은 나무나 불씨가 꺼진 재가 아니다. 따라서 그것은 반드시 ‘움직이지 않으면서도 움직일 수 있어’(이는 주자가 진안경의 주장에 대답한 구절이다) 명령신호로 존재하며 기를 조절한다.<sup>28</sup>

리는 “말라죽은 나무나 불씨가 꺼진 재”와 같이 아무런 역할도 하지 않는 죽은 존재가 아니다. 그것은 분명히 간접적인 방식으로 세계의 창조와 질서에 간여하고 있다. 따라서 “움직이지 않으면서도 움직인다”는 말은 리가 세상에 직접 간여하여 자신의 존재를 드러내지는 않지만, 세계를 구성하고 운용하는 질료이자 창조력인 기에게 강력한 신호로 존재하여 세계와 만물이 우주적 궤도를 벗어나지 않도록 유도한다는 의미라고 할 수 있다. 성호는 특히 리의 도덕적 본성의 명령신호를 지칭할 때 “상제”라고 하는데, 인격적 측면을 극대화하기 위해 그것을 (서학의) 천주, (모씨의) 인격천, 조물자 등으로 재해석한다.

원래의 맥락에서 천주나 인격천, 조물자 등은 인간세계에 직접 개입하는 인격신 개념에 가깝다.<sup>29</sup> 그러나 성호는 그 성리학적 틀 안에서 개념들을 변용하여 그들로부터 세계에 직접 행사하는 힘은 제거하는 대신, 그들이 세계와 인간을 선한 방향으로 인도하는 주재자들이라는 점은 그대로 유지하였다. 그리하여 그들은 세계에 현전하여 자신의 권능을 발휘하지 않고, 오직 심에 내재하며

<sup>28</sup> 《四七新編》, 〈四七新編 附錄〉, “以其迹言, 則理氣固無先後. 以氣主宰言, 則理本非如槁木死灰. 必須未動而能動(朱子答陳安卿說), 御氣而發.”

<sup>29</sup> 성호 당시에 일반적으로 조물자는 시기와 질투를 하는 존재로, 서학의 천주나 인격천은 인간의 행위 결과에 따라 상을 내리거나 악을 내리는 존재로 이해되었다. 성호는 이 개념들을 성리학적 리 개념 안에서 변용한다. 《星湖僿說》의 〈造物忌名〉, 〈跋天主實義〉, 〈釋天〉 등을 참조하시오.

심(心)의 작용을 통해 인간과 소통하는 상제로 재해석되었다. 이는 성호가 퇴계의 상제관을 강화하여 상제의 주재력을 극대화하면서도, 성리학에서 허용할 수 있는 해석적 한계치는 초과하지 않았다는 것을 의미한다. 다음은 《중용》 첫 장의 “천명을 일컬어 본성이라 한다[天命之謂性]”에 대한 성호의 설명이다.

명은 친절하게 일러주듯 명령하는 것이 아니다. 비유하자면 선생이 책 한 권을 학생에게 주는 것과 같다. 그 가운데에 들어 있는 내용을 모두 실천해야 할 터인데, 책을 받은 사람이 그대로 따르려 하지 않으면 이것은 곧 명을 어기는 것이다.<sup>30</sup>

천명, 즉 상제로서의 리(理)는 세계에 자신을 드러내거나 인간과 직접 소통하지 않는다. 그것은 단지 도덕 본성으로 존재하며, 강력한 신호로서 끊임없이 인간의 심을 선으로 유도할 뿐이다. 인간의 심이 그 신호를 정확하게 수신하여 우주에 예비된 길을 걸어갈 때, 인간은 도덕적 주체이자 선한 존재로 살 수 있다. 그리고 그 선택은 심 그 자체의 의지와 노력에 달려 있다.

퇴계는 자신의 심학에서 시비를 판단하고 선을 실천할 수 있는 강한 도덕적 주체를 확립하려고 했지만, 이는 성리학의 이론적 틀을 일탈하는 결과로 이어졌다. 그러나 성호는 성리학의 전통 속에 퇴계의 도덕적 주체를 성공적으로 편입시킴으로써, 기존 성리학 전통에서 보기 드물게 “실천역량이 강화된 성리학적 도덕 주체”를 설정할 수 있었다. 그렇다면 그가 그토록 강력한 주체를 성리학 전통 안에 포섭하려고 한 이유는 무엇일까?

이 질문에 성호는 직접적으로 답한 적은 없지만, 그의 말을 실마리로 삼아 하나의 가설은 세워볼 수 있을 것이다. 즉 “극심하게 타락한 시대를 극복할 수 있는 도덕 주체가 필요”했기 때문이라 추론해 볼 수 있다. 성호는 당대를 타락의 시대라고 보았는데, 그 타락의 일차적 원인은 ‘기수(氣數)’의 변화에 있었다.

하물며 후세에 천지의 기수가 뒤바뀌면서 사람과 미물이 모두 변한 것에 있어서라? 때문에 인간이 [만물 가운데] 가장 맑고 순수한 기를 부여 받았음에도 불구하고, 타락한 자가 세상에 흘러 넘친다. 반면 사람을 해치는 범이나 이리, 까마귀나 까치, 뱀이나 전갈, 해충 따위만은 원래의 성이 변함없으니, 천지의 대운(大運)을 이러한 사실에서 알 수 있다... 세상이 변하고 어지러운 무렵에는 재이(災異)는 있어도 상서(祥瑞)는 없다고 나는 단정한다.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> 《中庸疾書》, “命非諄諄然命之也. 比如先生以一部書付與學子, 其中許多道理, 皆合服行. 彼受書者, 不肯行得, 則便是違命.”

<sup>31</sup> 《星湖僿說》 〈有災無祥〉, “況後世氣數乖反, 人物都變? 故稟受之清粹, 莫如人而不善者滔滔. 惟害人之虎狼烏雀蛇蝎虫蝗之屬, 不渝舊性, 天地之大運於斯可見... 余則謂衰亂之際, 有災而無祥.”

기수는 우주 전체를 유행하고 만물을 생성하는 원기(元氣)의 순도와 밀도 차이가 존재하는 것을 가리키는 용어이다.<sup>32</sup> 따라서 ‘기수의 변화’란 시간의 흐름에 따라 원기의 순도와 밀도가 변화한다는 것으로 볼 수 있다. 성호에 논리에 따르면 기수의 변화는 인간을 구성하고 운용하는 기의 밀도와 순도도 바뀐다는 것으로, 이는 기수의 타락이 심기의 타락과 밀접하게 연동된다는 것을 의미한다. 후세에 점차 기수의 순도가 낮아지면서 자연세계는 이상현상을 일으키고 인간세계는 혼란에 빠졌다는 성호의 말도 이러한 맥락 속에서 이해되어야 한다.<sup>33</sup>

이처럼 성호의 심학에서 기수의 순도는 인간의 심과 관계되어 있다. 우주 전체를 유행하는 기의 순도가 낮다는 말은 그 기에서 파생되는 인간의 심기도 애당초 순도가 낮을 수밖에 없다는 뜻이다. 이는 달리 말해 인간의 심 안에서 ‘신명의 기’가 차지하는 비율이 낮아지고 ‘지각의 기’가 차지하는 비율이 높아진다는 뜻이다. 그러므로 성호의 시대는 심기 가운데 ‘지각운동의 기’의 밀도가 지나치게 높아지고 그 순도는 지나치게 낮아져 있는 상태였고, 따라서 형기의 사소한 자극에도 칠정이 쉽게 폭주하는 일이 빈번해졌다고 할 수 있다.

칠정의 과도한 발생으로 인해 당대인의 심은 늘 개체적 감정욕구에 사로잡혀 있었고, 쉽게 인욕에 빠져 악행을 저질렀다. 이처럼 “세상이 쇠락해” 가면서 사람들은 개체적 감정욕구에 몰두했고, 개체를 넘어서 타자의 생명과 이익을 보존하고자 하는 우주적 감정욕구를 망각하게 되었다. 성호의 진단과 같이 당대의 타락이 결국 기수의 변화에서 초래된 것이라고 한다면, 인간이 선한 존재로 돌아갈 수 있는 방법은 없는 것일까? 성호는 기수의 변화가 인간의 운명을 완전히 결정한다고 보지는 않았다.

천명(天命)이 있고 성명(星命)이 있고 조명(造命)이 있다. 천명이란 기수의 길고 짧은 것과 맑고 흐린 것과 후하고 박한 것이니, 긴 자는 장수하고 짧은 자는 단명하며 맑은 자는 현명하고 흐린 자는 어리석으며, 후한 자는 부귀하고 박한 자는 비천하다. 성명이란 칠요(七曜)와 사여(四餘), 성두(星斗)의 경위(經緯)가 뒤섞이고 곱하거나 나누어져 길흉이 생기는 것이니, 후세에 명리를 추단하는 술수가 이것이다. 가끔 적중하기도 하지만, 대수(大數)는 정해져 있다. 따라서 그것은 고작 한두 가지 손익을 알아보는데 불과하니, 어찌 믿고 취할 수 있겠는가? ‘조명’이란 시세(時勢)를 만났을 때 인간의 노력이 투입되는 것이다. 이장원의 이른바 “군주와 재상이 운명을 만든다”는 말이 이것이다. 만약 천명의 차원에서만 말할 수 있다면, 착한 일이라고 상줄 것도 없고 악한 일이라고 벌줄 일도 없을 것이다. 군주와 재상만이 운명을 만드는 것이 아니다. 일

<sup>32</sup> 구만옥, 『조선후기 과학사상사 연구』 (서울: 혜안, 2004), p.369

<sup>33</sup> 성호는 소강절의 ‘원회운세(元會運世)’설에 따라 당대를 기수 가운데 양기(陽氣)가 농익어 쇠락하고 음기(陰氣)가 확대되는 “오회(午會)”의 시대에 해당한다고 보았다. 소진형의 연구에 따르면, 17세기 조선 사상계에는 당대가 양(陽)이 극성한 오시(午時), 즉 ‘오회(午會)’라는 인식이 널리 퍼져 있었다. 양이 절정에 이른 오회가 지나면, 이적(夷狄)이 융성해지고 음기가 강해지는 미회(未會)의 시대가 온다. 이는 소옹(邵雍)의 원회운세론에 기초하여 명칭 교체라는 이상 현상을 설명하고자 한 기수론적 논리였다. 이에 관해서는 다음 두 글을 참조하라. <跋天主實義>, 소진형, 『조선후기 사상계의 질서에 대한 관념과 왕권의 규정』 미발표 원고

개 학인들도 운명을 만들어나갈 수 있다. 예를 들어 부모를 모시고 자녀를 기르는 일에 노력을 기울이거나 조짐을 미리 알아 흉한 일을 피하는 것 등이 모두 [개인의 힘으로] 화를 복으로 바꿀 수 있는 일이라 할 수 있다. 말세의 일을 가만히 살펴보니, 조명이 삶에서 큰 비중을 차지하고 있었다.<sup>34</sup>

천명은 기수의 순도변화에 따라 결정되기 때문에, 그것은 인간이 개입할 수 있는 영역이 아니다. 수명과 지위, 재능과 부귀는 인간의 의지와 상관없이 외부 조건으로 주어지는 것이다. 따라서 현재의 기수가 혼탁하다면 인간의 심 역시 혼탁하게 타고나는 것이다. 그러나 인간은 아무리 이러한 말세라 할지라도, 자신의 운명을 개선할 수 있는 역량을 갖추고 있다. 성호는 이를 ‘조명(造命)’, 즉 ‘운명을 만들어 가는’ 힘이라고 말한다. 그에 따르면 조명의 주체는 군주나 재상뿐만 아니라, ‘관직이 없는 일개 학인들[士庶人]’도 될 수 있다. 그리고 그러한 주체의 확립은 성리학 전통에서 “심에 대한 훈련”을 통해서만 이루어질 수 있다.<sup>35</sup>

성호의 논리에 따르면 심의 훈련을 통해 인간이 자신을 변화시킬 수 있는 영역은 ‘생장의 심’도 ‘지각의 심’도 아니다. 전자는 인간의 노력이나 의지와 무관한 생리활동이고, 후자 역시 육신의 영향력에서 자유로울 수 없는 동물적 정신활동이다. 대신 그는 ‘의리의 심’, 즉 ‘도심’의 역량을 확충함으로써 칠정의 폭주를 조절할 수 있다고 보았다. 도심을 확충한다는 말은 도덕 주체를 강화한다는 의미라고 할 수 있다. 그리고 강화는 심기 가운데 순도가 높은 ‘신명의 기’의 비율을 높이는 훈련을 통해서 가능하게 된다. ‘신명의 기’의 밀도가 높아질수록, ‘지각운동의 기’가 차지하는 비율은 상대적으로 축소되고, 결과적으로 그 폭주도 그칠 것이다.

이처럼 도덕 주체로서의 심을 강화한다는 말은, 인간이 심기의 타락으로 오랫동안 망각했던 내면의 상제를 다시 대면하고 항상 그의 명령에 따라 살 수 있도록 훈련한다는 것을 의미했다. 사단의 영향력이 커질수록 심은 육체적 감정욕구를 조절할 역량도 커진다. 그리고 이는 ‘목소리가 한층 높아진 상제’와 ‘그것을 민감하게 들을 수 있는 의리의 심의 확충’이라는 두 조건이 동시에 충족될 때 비로소 가능하다. 인간이 개체적 감정욕망에 과도하게 몰두하도록 운명 지어진 시대 상황 속에서, 성호는 칠정의 ‘적절한 발현[中節]’을 위한 대안으로 보다 “실천역량이 강화된 도덕 주체”를 요청했던 것은 아니었을까?

<sup>34</sup> 《星湖僿說》 〈造命〉, “有天命有星命有造命. 天命者, 氣數之長短清濁厚薄, 是也. 長者壽而短者夭, 清者賢而濁者愚, 厚者貴而薄者賤也. 星命者, 七曜四餘及星斗經緯錯綜互相乘際吉凶生焉, 後世推命之術, 是也. 雖往往有中, 然有大數存焉. 不過一曲之損益, 何是信取乎? 造命者, 時勢所值人力參焉, 李長源所謂君相造命, 是也. 若專言天命則善不可賞, 而惡不可罰也. 不獨君相爲然. 能士庶亦然. 如勤力事育知幾避凶之類, 皆足以移易禍福. 嘿觀衰末之世, 此路多占.”

<sup>35</sup> 관직이 없는 사람도 운명을 개선해갈 수 있다는 말은 ‘학(學)’을 하는 사람이면, 외부 조건에 상관없이 누구라도 도덕 주체가 될 수 있다는 선언이다. 그리고 성호는 다른 성리학자들과 마찬가지로 성리학, 즉 주희의 심학만이 인간이 도덕 주체가 될 수 있는 유일한 길이라고 보았다.

## 5. 결론

성호의 심학은 주희와 퇴계의 심학 전통을 융합하여 구축한 이론 체계로, 퇴계 심학을 창조적으로 재해석하여 성리학적 틀 안에 편입시키는 과정을 통해 형성되었다. 따라서 그의 심학은 성리학적 기본 구도를 유지하면서도 퇴계 심학의 가장 중요한 특징인 도덕 주체의 영역을 확보할 수 있었고, 결과적으로 주재적 역량이 강화된 성리학적 도덕 주체를 상정할 수 있었다. 성호의 제자들이 그의 심학을 두고 “이전 학인들이 미처 생각하지 못한 독창적인 해석”으로 평가하는 동시에, “퇴계에 이어 주희 심학을 계승한 도학(道學)정통”으로 추존한 사실도 그의 창조적이면서도 융합적인 학문적 특징에 기인한 것이다.<sup>36</sup>

이처럼 성호 심학의 의의는 성리학 전통 속에 전례 없는 ‘주재력이 강화된 도덕 주체’를 설정했다는 점이다. 주희의 심학에서는 생리현상이나 감각자극에서 파생되는 감정욕망이나 타인의 이익과 생존을 보호하고자 하는 도덕적 감정욕망의 “발생계기와 발생경로”를 크게 구분하지 않는다. 다만 주체가 감정욕망을 적절하게 일으키기만 하면 그것은 모두 선하다고 본다. 주희는 사단이 도덕적 감정욕구라는 측면에서 칠정과 다른 면모가 있다고 언급하기도 하지만, 울곡이나 고봉은 사단과 칠정이 질적 차이가 거의 없다고 해석한다. 다시 말해 그들은 칠정은 감정욕구 일반이며 사단은 칠정의 적절하게 발현된 상태를 지칭한다고 주장하며, 사단과 칠정에 동등한 위상을 부여한다.

하지만 퇴계는 사단과 칠정을 동일한 감정욕구로 보는 것을 완강하게 반대했다. 그는 감정욕구라는 점에서는 양자가 동일하지만, 육체적 감정욕구와 도덕적 감정욕구는 그 내용상 질적 차원이 다르다고 보았다. 다시 말해 그는 전자보다 후자가 더 우월하고 고귀한 가치를 가지고 있으며, 따라서 전자와 후자는 반드시 발생계기와 그 경로가 구분되어야 한다고 보았다. 게다가 그의 생각에 인간은 육체적 감정욕구에 취약하기 때문에, 양자가 하나의 주체에서 발현된다고 한다면 인간은 늘 동물적 주체일 수밖에 없으며, 도덕 주체로 존재한다는 것은 불가능했다.

성호도 퇴계와 마찬가지로 인간의 사적 감정욕구의 취약성에 민감하게 반응했다. 그의 시각에서 볼 때 당대는 기수가 탁한 말세로, 기수의 일부로서 구성된 인간들은 어느 때보다도 육체적 감정욕구에 몰두했다. 때문에 그는 퇴계의 핵심적 주장이 성리학에 대한 정확한 이해라고 믿고, 퇴계의 심학을 계승하고자 했다. 그리고 이러한 계승은 그가 퇴계의 도덕 주체를 성리학 전통 안에 온전히 되살리는 과제를 풀어내는 과정을 통해 이루어졌다.

과제의 해결을 위해 그는 “중층적 리기론”을 기반으로 사단과 칠정의 발생계기와 경로를 같

<sup>36</sup> 예컨대 성호의 조카인 이병휴나 수제자인 안정복과 윤동규 등은 성호를 주희와 퇴계의 도통을 이은 성리학의 정통계승자로 추존하는 동시에, 경전 해석에 있어 “자득(自得)”의 방법을 통해 이전 사람들이 미처 이해하지 못했던 부분들을 명확하게 깨달았다고 평가하고 있다. 이병휴의 〈祭文〉과 〈自序〉, 〈家狀〉, 윤동규의 〈行狀〉, 안정복 〈祭文〉 등을 참조하시오.

라내고, 퇴계의 상제관을 보완하여 리의 명령신호를 증폭시켰다. 그리고 이 두 가지 이론적 장치를 통해 성호는 주체의 도덕 역량을 확대하면서도 퇴계와 달리 성리학적 기본 구도를 일탈하지 않는 새로운 심학을 확립할 수 있었다. 이처럼 성호의 심학은 퇴계가 남긴 과제를 해결함으로써 성리학의 적통이 되었을 뿐만 아니라, 퇴계로부터 계승한 도덕 주체의 주재력을 보다 강화하여 강한 실천력을 갖는 성리학적 도덕 주체를 확보할 수 있게 되었다.

나는 성호의 심학이 성리학 전통 속에 전례가 없는 강력한 심의 자리를 마련해 놓았다는 점에서, 그것은 조선 후기 사상사에서 독특한 의의를 갖는다고 생각한다. 만약 그의 사상사적 공로가 인정될 수 있다면, 주자학은 물론 퇴계학과도 다른 학문체계로서 그의 심학에 “성호학”이라는 고유명칭을 부여해도 되지 않을까? 그리고 이 “성호학”을 토대로 자신의 심학체계를 만들어가는 학인들을 “성호학과”라고 지칭할 수 있을 때, 한국사상사에서 여전히 논란의 중심에 있는 다산 정약용의 심학에 대한 문제들도 새로운 각도에서 이해될 여지가 생길 것이다.



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**“Nahansan” and Buddhist Memory in Cheju Island (제주도 “나한산”과 불교의 기억)**

*Abstract*

I explore the ways that Buddhist clergy in Cheju Island reconfigure Cheju’s physical, historical, and cultural space to produce places of Buddhist memory through discourse and practices involving the legend of “Nahansan” (“the Mountain of the Arhats”) and commemorations of the early twentieth century nun An Pongnyŏgwan. Though anxieties over cultural identity due to rapid urbanization since the late 1980s have inspired a surge of interest in Cheju Island’s disappearing rural traditions, academic inquiries have largely ignored the presence of Buddhism, the island’s largest religious demographic. Buddhism, officially banned in Cheju since governor Yi Hyŏngsang carried out a campaign of suppression in 1702, experienced a major revival on Cheju at the beginning of the twentieth century with the efforts of native visionary clerics including An Pongnyŏgwan, who founded Kwanŏmsa – one of the island’s most important Buddhist temples and sites of pilgrimage – on the north slope of Hallasan in 1908. The more than three hundred registered Buddhist temples that dot the island’s landscape are a testament to the religion’s resiliency and continuing appeal despite the extreme turbulence that marked Cheju Island’s transition to modernity. Self-identified Buddhists and Buddhist clergy alike reconfigure Cheju spaces in order to create their own visions of “place” for their faith in the island’s physical and cultural landscape. I discuss the distinctive perspectives of a Buddhist Cheju spiritual landscape and stories of historical memory long kept among Buddhist clergy. This presentation is based on a combination of fieldwork interviews conducted on Cheju since 2012 and the sparse secondary material available on Cheju Buddhism.

## *Introduction*

This presentation addresses Buddhist configurations of Hallasan in practices of memory regarding three particular events related to the mountain: the Arhat Bhadra's legendary arrival, the story of the nun An Pongnyŏgwan and her establishment of Kwanŭmsa in 1908, and the 1918 Mu-o Pŏpjŏngsa Uprising. These three events feature prominently in collective memories among self-identified Buddhists and especially native-born Cheju Buddhist clergy though academic accounts of Cheju history and culture curiously do not address their significance in much detail. To date, printed material on these subjects is limited to cursory descriptions in general historical accounts (Yi Y. 2004; O S. 2006) and a handful of conference papers (Yi H. 2011) presented only in the past decade. Many islanders refer to the phrase "five hundred (shamanic) shrines, five hundred Buddhist temples" (Kr: "*tang obaek, chŏl obaek*") – a phrase derived mainland-appointed governors' observations (Hyejŏn, 2007: 344) – when describing Cheju spirituality, but the presence of Buddhism in Cheju today remains largely underexplored.

My information is based on intermittent fieldwork interviews carried out on Cheju with clergy members of both the Chogye and T'aego Orders since 2012 and the sparse secondary material in the few existing publications on Cheju Buddhist histories. In this discussion, I explore the ways in which Buddhist clergy utilize spaces of Hallasan and transform them as sacred Buddhist "places" and lieu de memoire. While tourism interests, government agencies, and cultural preservationist groups are also in the process of re-inscribing Hallasan amidst the surge of cultural revivalism in the wake of the island's shift to globalism, devout Buddhists not only contest – albeit indirectly – mainstream discourse, which privileges shamanic authenticity, but also offer their own alternative visions of Cheju in increasingly pluralized discussions on what constitutes "Cheju" identity.

A paradox of Buddhism (or Buddhisms) in Korea and especially in Cheju Island is that while many Buddhists predicate their world views upon conceptions of impermanence and reincarnation, religious and philosophical acknowledgement of the transitory nature of things is conducive to an appeal to memory. Commenting on religious collective memory in his magnum opus *On Collective Memory*, Maurice Halbwachs observes that when a society transforms its religiosity, it “must persuade its members that they already carry these beliefs within themselves at least partially, or even that they will recover beliefs which had been rejected some time ago” (1992: 86). Religions and their social context exist in constant dialectic and dialogic processes of mutual transformation in which aspects of both attempt to locate themselves in one and the other, especially in a return to a past original. Though the Dharma in Buddhism is considered atemporal, one can argue that this atemporality is what enables Buddhist practitioners to locate their spirituality and the collective memory of their spirituality across space and time. In the corpus of Buddhist text and oral narrative, one is introduced not only to Śakyamuni Buddha, but a beginning-less (and not simply endless) precession and succession of Buddhas. Likewise, Buddhist practitioners in Cheju affirms Buddhism’s place within the temporal and physical space of Cheju Island within the atemporal omnipresence of the Dharma at the philosophical level and the recovery of past-life essences in the island’s historical and cultural landscape at the level of collective memory.

### *Surmounting Nahansan*

Any casual mentioning of Cheju Island may invite remarks about its so-called “Three Abundances” (Kr. *Samda*: “wind, stones, and women”) or its supposed exoticness in terms of its unique culture of women divers and shamans, but the most essential (and essentialized) metonym for Cheju is Hallasan. Covered in thick clouds for more than half of the year, the 1,950-meter

Hallasan, South Korea's highest peak and the enormous dormant shield volcano that dominates Cheju Island as it towers above all of its 368 satellite parasite cinder cones known as *orŭm*, is a spectacle to all who gaze upon it. Indeed the mountain, with its notoriously fickle weather, has attained an agency of its own as islanders and outsiders alike revered its magnitude and air of mystique. From afar Hallasan appears to present itself as a single totality, an appearance that belies its extremely variegated biological, geographical, and cultural ecosystems. According to local legend in the southern city of Sŏgwip'o, the Qin Dynasty emissary Xu Fu regarded it as the mountain of the fabled Yingzhou (Kr: Yŏngju), the isle of immortality (Nemeth 1987). The mountain also acquired itself a reputation for its paradoxical combination of harsh conditions and striking beauty among mainland Koreans, exiles and dispatched officials alike. Though governors dispatched from the Korean mainland occasionally sought to restrict local shamanic practices, they were nonetheless cautious to honor annual ceremonies to the mountain deity at Sanch'ŏndan. Even American scientist Malcolm P. Anderson marveled at the mountain's stormy weather and remarked that a sudden dispersal of the clouds upon the day he departed from Cheju seemed to be as if the spirit of Hallasan was "at last appeased" (1914: 401). And in the present, Hallasan has become a breadwinner and figurehead for the island, drawing thousands of tourists yearly while serving as a source of inspiration for local cultural revivalists. Some localist intellectuals envision the mountain as the embodiment the island's enormous pantheon of 18,000 shamanic deities, particularly the titan-goddess Sŏlmundae, who, in some versions of her myth, constructed the mountain with her bare hands (Chin S. 1958: 24-26). To some devout Buddhists, however, the essence of Hallasan is not that it is "the peak that pulls the Milky Way," but Nahansan, "the mountain of the Arhats."

When I visited Cheju in the summer of 2012 for preliminary field research on localized Buddhist practices, a friend and Buddhist nun introduced me to the abbots at Kwangmyōngsa and Chonja'am, both native-born clerics of significant standing in Cheju's Buddhist community. Both were well-respected among most local clergy due to their advanced age and extensive knowledge of the island's Buddhist history. The former is the son of a leader involved in the anti-colonial Mu-o Pōpjōngsa Uprising (Kr: Mu-o Pōpjōngsa Hang'il Undong) while the latter is known to have promoted restoration of the ancient temple of Chonja'am. First focusing on temples associated with significant historic and cultural sites, my questions were initially about the island's temples themselves since many were built only fairly late in the twentieth century. The nun and both abbots drew my attention to Chonja'am. The abbot of Chonja'am related the following:

“Chonja'am's story, it's history...In India in Śākyamuni's time, before he entered nirvana, before he passed away, Śākyamuni determined transmission among sixteen arhats. Before them, there were sixteen people and amongst them the sixth, Palt'ara chonja travelled on a ship with nine hundred Arhats to T'amnaguk. At that time, there was no name for the country. It was about 2,556 years ago.<sup>1</sup>”

“Palt'ara chonja” refers to the Arhat Bhadra and “T'amnaguk,” an ancient name for Cheju, is connected to “T'ammollaju” in the Arhat Bhadra event as it is strikingly similar to another name for ancient Cheju, “T'ammora.” The record of Bhadra's arrival is traced to the “Pōpchugi” section of the *Tripitaka Koreana*. In the course of the interview, the abbot of Chonja'am goes further to argue that the culture of early T'amna was connected to that of ancient India and also noted another legend of Chonja'am as having been created during the time of T'amna kingdom's legendary progenitors Ko, Yang, and Pu.

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<sup>1</sup> Chonja'am abbot at Pōmnyunsa temple, in discussion with author, Sōgwip'o, August 12, 2012.

The Arhat Bhadra's sacred association with Hallasan noted in the abbot's history ties this mountain in Cheju with the larger cosmology of Buddhism as "the Mountain of the Arhats." Humanoid basalt rock formations at the mountainside near Chonja'am are hence not "Obaek Chang'gun" (the "Five Hundred Generals," which relates to a Cheju legend of the five hundred petrified sons of a cannibalized goddess), but "Obaek Nahan" (the "Five Hundred Arhats), a lieu de memoire inscribed into the natural landscape testifying to Bhadra's arrival. This configuration of Hallasan as Nahansan discursively de-centers the Korean Peninsula and re-centers Cheju not only in terms of civilization but also in the spiritual cosmology of Buddhism as Cheju's purported ties with Bhadra enables its authenticity.

Chonja'am's founding legend is controversial. Colonial era historian Yi Nŭnghwa (1869-1934) made the connection between "T'ammollaju" and the "T'amna" of Cheju in his 1918 *Chosŏn pulgyo t'ongsa* (O. S., 2006: 263). Yi Nŭnghwa was not the first to make the connection as the exiled literati Kim Chŏng wrote in the early sixteenth century that the temple was connected to the three founders of the ancient T'amna kingdom. Local historian Yi Yŏnggwŏn dismisses the legend as fanciful and perhaps a reference to something else completely due to the absence of any archeological evidence and the possibility that "T'ammollaju" perhaps is a Sinicization of a Sanskrit word referring to something only in the spiritual realm (2004: 87). Factuality, however, is perhaps not the point. While one must consider Yi's point that the advertisement of Chonja'am as Korean Buddhism's first temple (Kr: "*Han'guk pulgyo ch'oech'o sach'al*") as perhaps being motivated by regional one-upmanship, one also cannot discount the ways in which people may utilize tactical essentialisms to navigate their own narrative self-representations even as "strategies" (in de Certeau's sense of the term) of power interests define the terrains. Adding to the matter is that archeological excavations have recently

uncovered the “suhaenggul” (“cave of Buddhist practice”) mentioned in Chosŏn accounts, though it does not confirm the Arhat Bhadra legend.

For at least one cleric, “Nahansan” does deliberately destabilize prevailing meanings of Hallasan. Kwangmyŏngsa’s abbot, a Cheju native and son of a leading figure in the 1918 anti-colonial Mu-o Pŏpjŏngsa uprising, argued that the “Halla” of Hallasan is a reversal of “Nahan” meaning Arhat. Although the abbot of Chonja’am accepted the general etymology of “Hallasan” as referring to 漢拏 “the peak that pulls the Milky Way,” the abbot of Kwangmyŏngsa believes that this is a much later term and that the original characters referred to “Nahan” 羅漢.

Kwangmyŏngsa’s abbot also rejects any mythical association between the titan-goddess Sŏlmundae Halmang and the humanoid basalt rock formations on the side of Hallasan known as “Obaek Changgun,” “the Five Hundred Generals.” According to a version of Sŏlmundae’s death myth, her five hundred sons turned to stone out of shock when they realized that they accidentally consumed the flesh of their mother, who fell into a gigantic cauldron of porridge. This is but one version of the Sŏlmundae story, but is one of the more widely republished in collections of Cheju folklore. While the abbot is not the only person to question the popular association today (see Hyŏn 2009: 74-78), he reconfigures the space of Hallasan referring both to Chonja’am’s legend of the Arhat Bhadra and an alternative narrative that recounts the story of five hundred bandits and thieves that converted to Buddhism by the grace of the Arhat. Thus “Obaek Nahan,” which is another term that Cheju locals use to refer the “Obaek Changgun” rock formations, refers to the pious converts. The abbot’s story has an ambiguous relation to the basalt formations as it does not explicitly claim that the thieves and bandits turned to stone, but it does seek to demystify them and insist that it served as a sort of Buddhist skillful means to utilize unusual natural formations for narratives to preach the Dharma.

When I spoke with the abbots about Chonja'am, their accounts presented a paradoxical awareness of its newness concurrent with the perception of an aged patina or at least a trace of a bygone age. That the temples in their current form are relatively new constructions is not at all disputed. In these interviews I noticed that though the long absence of an active Buddhist presence (although some question whether Buddhism was absent entirely) from 1702 until the late nineteenth century is seldom disputed, Buddhism – or at least forms of it – is considered to be ever-present in and inextricable from Cheju's spiritual landscape. Reflective of the philosophy they were intended to represent in architectural form, the importance of the current Buddhist temples derived not so much from their physical manifestations but the sense that they were a reincarnation of something far older. They are *re*-constructions.

### *Awakening*

The *re*-incarnation of Buddhism as a specific and identifiable religion in Cheju came at the end of Chosŏn Korea. While one may note the discrepancy between the insistence of a persistent Buddhist essence in the Cheju cultural landscape and the actual newness of its physical existence, there is no dispute that the efforts of a handful of determined native-born clerics at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries brought about a momentous revival of Buddhism on the island. The impact of their efforts is apparent in the pervasiveness of Buddhist temples all across the island. Some may interpret this as a sign that a strong appeal to Buddhism was latent in Cheju society despite its long absence while others credit the individual efforts of turn-of-the-century visionaries, particularly the nun An Pongnyŏgwan.

Like the dense fog that covers the peak of Hallasan for much of the year, An Pongnyŏgwan's story remains shrouded in mystery and attempts to uncover more of her story



presents more questions than answers. Hyejŏn Sŭnim, a descendant of An Pongnyŏgwan, recounted her story as follows:

“She was born in Hwabuk...in 1900...1809 she was born and...Now some monk gave her a Buddha statue and told her to place them in a room and she earnestly call to the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara. He told her that you will have the greatest happiness. And that this will continue with a number of your descendants. When you face death, if you pray, you will not die and you will be loved. And so she put the Buddha statue in a room and earnestly prayed, but since there was almost none of this for 206 years, the village youths thought An Pongnyŏgwan was crazy.”<sup>2</sup>

The version that Hyejŏn Sŭnim recounted in the summer of 2012 is an abbreviated version of a written narrative that she wrote in 2007. Hyejŏn Sŭnim, currently presiding at the historic Podŏksa temple in Cheju City, is a descendant of An Pongnyŏgwan and actively maintains the memory of An Pongnyŏgwan’s contributions to Cheju Buddhism. Her biography of her predecessor at a 2007 academic conference on Buddhism was the first time that academia was introduced to a complete narrative of An Pongnyŏgwan’s biography (Yi H. 2011: 3). A striking aspect of Hyejŏn Sŭnim’s account is the conspicuous spiritual connection between An Pongnyŏgwan and Hallasan. Although An Pongnyŏgwan is also connected to another miracle elsewhere on the island, two defining miracles occurred on the mountainside – first during her flight from persecution when a flock of crows rescued her after she fell into a ravine and second in her vision and encounter with the enigmatic “Master Un” at Sanch’ŏndan. The historical situation surrounding the second miracle has piqued the interest of a few scholars and Yi notes that some conclude that “Master Un” was in fact “Sang’un,” the Dharma name of Kim Sŏgyun, another pivotal figure in Cheju Buddhism’s revival. Reassessment of the complex interaction between the spiritual and historical aspects of An Pongnyŏgwan’s story has brought much

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<sup>2</sup> Hyejŏn Sŭnim at Podŏksa temple, in discussion with author, Cheju City, 25 August 2012. Also see Hyejŏn, 2007: 349. Hyejŏn Sŭnim probably meant “1899” and not 1900 or 1809. Her chapter on An Pongnyŏgwan indicates the year 1899 when this event occurred.

renewed interest among Cheju Buddhists as collective remembering of her efforts plays an important part in newer developments of Buddhist practice such as the recently-established “Kkora Sullye” pilgrimage walks.

Kwanŭmsa temple, founded in 1908, is situated at the northern slope of Hallasan near An Pongnyŏgwan’s meditation cave. The temple is not the first temple founded among the early twentieth century visionaries, but nonetheless maintains a strong air of mystique and memory. According to oral tradition and Hyejŏn Sŭnim’s account of An Pongnyŏgwan’s story, this was where An Pongnyŏgwan sought refuge from persecution in the beginning of her mission to restore Buddhism to Cheju. Unfortunately, Kwanŭmsa’s distant location did not spare it from the tumult of the mid twentieth century. The temple was razed during the 1948 April Third Massacre as ultra-rightwing militants of the Northwest Youth Association they slaughtered people seeking refuge near the temple – a bitter event still kept in Cheju Buddhist collective memory today. Kwanŭmsa was rebuilt in the 1960s and serves as the headquarters for the Cheju branch of the Chogye Order today. The other smaller Buddhist orders in Cheju<sup>3</sup> are not in conflict with the Chogye Order, Korea’s largest Buddhist order, but some clergy of these orders have expressed mild irritation that Kwanŭmsa is today exclusively designated as such. One cleric mentioned that before married clergy were expelled from the Chogye Order and before the separate T’aego Order was established to resolve the issue, Kwanŭmsa, emblematic of Cheju Buddhism, did not identify itself with any Buddhist order. An Pongnyŏgwan’s role in the temple’s establishment have aroused some debate as some have interpreted her activities, which are only vaguely mentioned in extant newspaper and oral accounts, to have been practices of “shamanism.” In an interview, a reporter of a local newspaper on the island explained to me that An Pongnyŏgwan’s

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<sup>3</sup> That the smaller T’aego and Pŏphwa Orders have a very conspicuous presence in Cheju is sometimes noted as a distinctive feature of Cheju Buddhism.

fundraising activities for her founding of temples including Kwanŭmsa consisted of shamanic fortune telling and rituals. This is not disputed among many clergy on the island and some also hinted pride in the matter. In this case, the spirituality of An Pongnyŏgwan and early twentieth century Cheju Buddhism percolates through the dense mists of Hallasan's gods and spirits. The sanctity of the mountain and the sanctity of the temple is mediated in the figure of An Pongnyŏgwan.

Yi Hyangsun, a professor of comparative literature at Georgia University, notes that aside from sparse newspaper accounts, much of what is known about An Pongnyŏgwan is shared through oral tradition. An Pongnyŏgwan's story parallels that of many quasi-legendary eminent Korean monks and nuns, but because of the supernatural elements associated with her, she is sometimes regarded as a "shaman." Yi Hyangsun interprets this as a reflection of power relations – as male eminent clergy are seldom referred to as such, even as they are also connected to supernatural events. Yi Hyangsun's observations are correct given that An Pongnyŏgwan appears to be the only figure regarded as such, but taken another way, one can also note the overlaps between "shamanism" and "Buddhism" in the late Chosŏn and early colonial period. Though academic observers such as Yi Yŏnggwŏn tend to assume a division between "Buddhism" and "shamanism" as two separate religions, they nonetheless note that many Cheju residents do not make such a clear distinction (Yi Y. 2004: 81-82), further problematizing categorizations. In some discussions with clergy, not a few quietly noted that some clergy in Cheju were indeed "shamans" who turned to Buddhism to cast off difficulties from shamanic "spirit sickness."

A great part of the story of Cheju Buddhism's revival is the story of An Pongnyŏgwan and her spiritual awakening on Hallasan. If it were not for An Pongnyŏgwan, the abbess of a

temple noted in an interview last year, Cheju Buddhism would not be what it is today. An Pongnyŏgwan is not as canonized as many other eminent clergy in Korean Buddhist tradition, but at least in Cheju Island she is somewhat a local saint. Regardless of differences in details of the events of An Pongnyŏgwan's life and the history of Kwanŭmsa temple, many Cheju Buddhists look to both as emblematic of Buddhism's presence and claim to lieu de memoire on the island.

### *Descent*

The other face of Hallasan is that of wrath, as Malcolm P. Anderson mentioned above noted in 1914. Centuries before Anderson's climb up Hallasan, the Chosŏn administration in Cheju decided to move Sanch'ŏndan shrine further down the slopes because of the high casualty rate for those attempting to appease the capricious deity. Hallasan is not only a site for spiritual awakening, but also a site for awakening resistance. In contrast to the gentler inclines that ring around the central bulge of the volcano, Hallasan rises up with violence the closer one approaches to the centermost point of Cheju Island and it was closer to this rugged center where a major Buddhist-led uprising erupted. While folklore of its divinity draw attention to the raw power of the mountain's (super)natural forces, in the past century, the mountain and its surrounding rugged topography served as bastions of rebellion.

In 1918, the call to vengeance against Japanese colonization came as a sudden avalanche from a mountainside temple known as Pŏpjŏngsa. Whereas An Pongnyŏgwan sought to search for spiritual awakening in Buddhism, her other colleagues sought to arouse a populist realization of a Buddhist utopia. The many deep valleys, dense forests, and rugged terrain had indeed lent itself well to the activities of anti-colonial subterfuge leading up to the outbreak of the short-

lived through notable Mu-o Pöpjöngsa Uprising of the fifth to seventh of October 1918, a few months prior to the momentous March First Movement of 1919.

A descendant of Pang Tonghwa, one of the leaders in the uprising, recounted that before the 1918 uprising, planning and preparation were long in the making at the site of Pöpjöngsa temple. While she led me on a tour of the Pöpjöngsa site as she spoke of her renowned grandfather, she pointed to particular altar and temple hall sites where Buddhist clergy utilized a clever combination of chants to communicate rebellion plans as well as to warn one another of the possible approach of Japanese authorities. Although some apocryphal accounts of An Pongnyögwon suggest that she secretly funded resistance activities, some historians surmise that she perhaps was uncomfortable with the populist brand of Buddhism that the leaders of the Pöpjöngsa uprising – Kim Yönil, Kang Ch’anggyu, and Pang Tonghwa – sought to promote (Kim K. 2005). There is no dispute that the monks of Pöpjöngsa intended to end Japanese rule in Cheju by force. The remoteness of Pöpjöngsa temple in the safety of the mountain served as a prime location for rebellious activity. By coincidence, Pöpjöngsa temple itself is located near the purported site of Bhadra’s arrival. Although the colonial record indicates Kim Yönil, a monk of mainland Kyöngsang origin, Cheju natives Kang Ch’anggyu and Pang Tonghwa – both knowledgeable of the Cheju topography and local attitudes – took active leadership once the rebellion broke out. The event is known today as “Mu-o Pöpjöngsa,” indicating the year and the mountain temple, but the actual eruption of the violence occurred far from the slopes of Hallasan as resisters, who were soon joined by some hundreds of other Cheju islanders discontent with Japanese rule, gathered together near the village of Chungmun to attack Japanese colonial police stations and free imprisoned peasants.

As with “Nahansan” and An Pongnyŏgwan, attempts to categorize the religious nature of the Mu-o Pŏpjŏngsa Uprising encounter the murky complexities of Cheju’s spiritual landscape. The rebellion consisted of a motley crew of Buddhist clergy, adherents of the syncretic Poch’ŏn’gyo (also known as “Sŏndogyo”) religious movement, and many peasants of various backgrounds. That native Cheju Buddhist figures – Kang Ch’anggyu and Pang Tonghwa in particular – led a significant rebellion consisting of people with varied religious affiliations is perhaps, as Kim Kwangsik suggests (2005: 156), a particularity of Cheju. The category of “sangha” (Korean: *sŏngnyŏ*) likely had a much broader meaning in the early decades of Cheju Buddhism’s revival than it does in current times. Finding clear-cut categories may be aside from the point altogether. Given the situation that many people even in recent decades do not – at least in practice – make a distinction between different religious forms, meaningfulness of the event is best understood from the perspectives of who maintain its memory.

For Buddhists to whom the Mu-o Pŏpjŏngsa remains meaningful to their identity especially as Cheju Buddhists, keeping alive collective memory expresses a claim to historical and physical space on Hallasan. While the Mu-o Pŏpjŏngsa Uprising is documented in Japanese colonial records, the significance of the event is maintained not through history but through memory. Japanese colonial authorities quickly suppressed the uprising and it was not until the end of the past century that the anti-colonial resisters were given official acknowledgement. Descendants of Pang Tonghwa kept alive the memory of the event and made efforts for several decades to bring the story of their ancestor and his colleagues to the public. In recent years a monument to commemorate the uprising as well as a memorial hall (in which Pang Tonghwa’s descendants preside over commemorative rituals) were built near the ruins of Pŏpjŏngsa. The

possible rift between Kwanŭmsa and Pŏpjŏngsa is largely forgotten today, but the ideals of both have come to represent a particular “Cheju” Buddhism that emerged from the slopes of Hallasan.

### *Conclusion*

“Hallasan is a natural pagoda,” the abbess of Kokwansa noted to me once. The abbess, though of mainland origin, became deeply interested in the stories, histories, and memories of Cheju Buddhism. She and several other Buddhist clergy created a series of pilgrimage walking courses across Cheju known as “Kkora Sullye” around 2007. “Kkora Sullye” incorporates collective remembering in conjunction with dialogic engagement between the Cheju Buddhist past and present as its “courses” takes participants dozens of kilometers across the island to sites and temples of historic significance as well as newer temples. While the mountain is not directly acknowledged for most of the Kkora Sullye courses, the final and most important walk goes up Hallasan to retrace the steps of An Pongnyŏgwan and her eventual awakening at the site of Kwanŭmsa. If one considers that a pagoda serves as a reliquary for the remains of important Buddhist relics or eminent clergy and saints, the abbess’s observation best encapsulates Cheju Buddhism’s relationship to the mountain. Collective memory exists in non-life and non-death (curiously similar to Nirvana) and thus can serve as both a point of return and a point of departure. Perhaps in Buddhist Cheju, especially in the past century to recent times, it is not so much the case that Buddhists attain some form of awakening on the slopes of Hallasan but more the case that Hallasan awakens to Cheju Buddhism’s reincarnation.

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*The Role of Korean-Americans in Shaping Political Outcomes  
in the “Comfort Women” Issue*

***Introduction***

The “comfort women” issue has long been a bone of contention between Japan and South Korea (hereafter Korea). Yet, why, in recent years, has it evolved to become a mainstream issue in US politics? The United States is now home to more “comfort women” memorials than Korea and presently a legislative request is pending to have a street named in memory of the women in Flushing, New York City. Most visibly, however, 2007 saw the unanimous passage of House Resolution 121—known as the “comfort women” resolution—by US Congress, urging Japan to offer an unequivocal apology to the victims. These trends are astonishing in view of the fact that Japan constitutes the US government’s principal Asian ally and each new political development in the issue is further undermining the two countries’ relations. Indeed, Japanese schools have begun to cancel student exchanges to the US in protest over the memorials.

It is not clear, however, what is driving these developments. Scholars and observers alike have explained Washington’s intervention into the “comfort women” issue in terms of strategic interests. In their view, the US government is attempting to push Japan and Korea to resolve the major stumbling block in their relations and thus pave the way for bilateral security cooperation.<sup>1</sup> This explanation appears plausible in light of the US government’s wariness over China’s rise and the escalating tensions in Northeast Asia in recent years. Yet undermining the argument that a cohesive foreign policy is at play, is that the developments in the “comfort women” have not emanated from the State Department *per se*. In fact the White House opposed House Resolution 121 and has been demonstrably reluctant to lend support to the redress campaign of the victims. Indeed, when Korean “comfort women” attempted to pursue compensation from Japan in US courts, the State Department intervened, requesting the Justice Department simply “file a brief expressing its sympathies with the women’s sufferings but urge that the case be dismissed as lacking jurisdiction.”<sup>2</sup> Rather, the developments that have occurred in relation to the “comfort women” issue in the US have

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<sup>1</sup> Author interview, Washington D.C., 2013; Author interview, Tokyo, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> “Cold Comfort,” *The Nation*, May 24, 2001, accessed at: <http://www.thenation.com/article/cold-comfort#>

derived from the legislature (Congress) and local government, both of which institutions are susceptible to influence by professional lobbyists and activists.

In this paper I reveal an alternate force behind the developments: Korean-American (*hangukgye migukin*) activists. An oft-overlooked constituency in US politics, Korean-Americans have been conspicuously absent in the literature on ethnic interest groups in the United States. Scholars have tended, rather, to privilege the more politically prominent ethnic communities, such as American Jews, Greek- and Armenian-Americans. Among Asian ethnic groups, the Chinese-American community, which is larger and more politically diverse than its Korean-American counterpart, has held the center of scholarly attention. In the few works that have examined the participation of ethnic Koreans in US politics, the focus has been their influence on US policy toward Korea.<sup>3</sup> These studies have characterized the Korean-Americans as disorganized, lacking “in internal cohesion as a political group”<sup>4</sup> and “divorced from the American body politic.”<sup>5</sup> Yet as we shall see, in the realm of US policy toward *Japan*, they have been strongly inclined to collective action and political engagement.

Korean-Americans have been similarly overlooked in the prolific literature on the international “comfort women” movement, superseded by the movement branches in Japan’s former colonies from which the women were initially recruited and many still reside. Scholarship has focused in particular on mainland Korea—the origin of the international movement,<sup>6</sup> of which Korean-American advocacy efforts have been considered a mere transnational offshoot. In this paper I demonstrate, to the contrary, that in targeting the US government—Japan’s major ally and protector—the advocacy efforts of Korean-Americans on behalf of former “comfort women” assume a critical significance in relation to the wider movement.

This study addresses these lacunae in the literature by illuminating the role of Korean-Americans in local and national US politics and locating them in the international

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<sup>3</sup> Andrew Yeo, “Is Enough at Stake? U.S. Civil Society and the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Asia-Foundation, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, December 2010;

<sup>4</sup> Katharine H. S. Moon, “Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy: Korean Americans,” *Asia Policy*, 13(1): 20.

<sup>5</sup> Bo-kyung Choi, Daniel Kim, and Jeffrey Mitchell, “The K Factor: Korean-American Attitudes Toward the Impact of U.S.-Korea Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March, 2008.

<sup>6</sup> A notable exception is: Kinue Tokudome, “Passage of H.Res. 121 on ‘Comfort Women,’ the US Congress and Historical Memory in Japan,” *The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* (2007).

“comfort women” movement. Drawing on interviews conducted during 2013 in Tokyo, Washington DC and the Koreatowns of New York, Virginia and New Jersey, it interrogates the question of to what extent can political outcomes in the “comfort women” issue, in the US, be ascribed to the activism of Korean-Americans? In so doing, it analyzes the role of Korean-Americans in the two most prominent of such outcomes—the passage of House Resolution 121 in US Congress and local government approval of the construction of “comfort women” memorials. It argues that Korean-American activists have indeed been highly influential and owe their success to both skilled maneuvering and the logic of memorialization and constituency politics in the US. Before embarking on the analysis, however, it is necessary to consider how the plight of “comfort women” first came to be a matter of domestic concern in the United States and why Korean-Americans coalesced around the issue.

### ***Historical Background***

The “comfort women” issue came to take root in the US as a result of a convergence of two factors: the feminist movement in America was coming to full fruition at a juncture in which elements of the Japanese government were embarking on, what was widely perceived as, a policy of contempt towards “comfort women.”

By the late 1980s, the feminist movement in the US had entered into a new stage of maturity and with the turn of the decade, a third-wave of feminism emerged. This entailed renewed campaigning for greater participation by women in media and politics and dealt issues that served to limit or oppress women. The movement gained traction with the “Year of the Woman,” in 1992, which witnessed a number of American women gain entry into the US Senate and shortly thereafter, the election of the first female Secretary of State and United States Attorney General. Capping off a half decade of rapid progress for feminists in the US, the Violence Against Women Act was passed in 1994, providing funds and services for victims of rape.

These domestic developments were reinforced internationally. With the enactment of a number of UN resolutions premised on the protection of women from violence, a global normative shift occurred towards the recognition of women’s rights as human rights. Hillary Clinton featured as a prominent figure in this process in her capacity as First Lady of the

United States, famously declaring in a speech at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing—“let it be that human rights are women's rights and women's rights are human rights, once and for all.”<sup>7</sup>

Precisely at this juncture in which the women's movement was becoming deeply embedded and acknowledged among media and political circles in the United States,<sup>8</sup> rightist and conservative leaders in Japan openly expressed contempt toward “comfort women,” who were becoming increasingly vocal in their demands for redress.<sup>9</sup> This was characterized by references to “Korean prostitutes,” accusations that they were liars and merely being excited by money-hungry NGOs. In the US, where romantic conceptions of Japan were otherwise rather prevalent, this behavior revealed something distasteful about Japanese political and cultural life—that there were elements of malice among the ranks of the political and academic leadership. While ordinarily the US media does not devote extensive coverage to international affairs, the stance of Japan's rightists and conservatives on the “comfort women” issue called attention. Consequently, reports of Japanese intransigence were splashed across major US news outlets, including the front page of the *New York Times*, sparking outrage among those with an interest in human rights and international affairs.<sup>10</sup> The American news coverage of the issue particularly struck a chord in many women, who perceived a certain callousness to the treatment of “comfort women” that they had experienced in their own life. The resonance of the issue was further amplified with the onset of the Bosnian War in 1992; as dramatic reports and images of the systematized rape that was occurring filtered in, the public were able to visualize the crime that “comfort women” had endured.<sup>11</sup> Sexual violence was, by now, understood in terms of power and male privilege as distinct from previous

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<sup>7</sup> Patrick E. Tyler, “Hillary Clinton, in China, Details Abuse of Women,” *The New York Times*, September 6 1995, accessed at:

<http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/06/world/hillary-clinton-in-china-details-abuse-of-women.html>

<sup>8</sup> This occurred more so on the Democrats side than the Republican side, but it was a bipartisan issue. It wasn't a major front of the culture war but it was a theme in that larger confrontation.

<sup>9</sup> It is noteworthy that there were, then and now, Japanese politicians and intellectuals in favor of apologizing and offering state compensation to former “comfort women.” This is rarely acknowledged in the in the international (or Japanese) media.

<sup>10</sup> For some examples of the *New York Times* coverage in this period, see: David E. Sanger, “Wako Journal: History Scholar in Japan Exposes a Brutal Chapter,” *The New York Times*, January 27 1992; David E. Sanger, “Japan Admits It Set Up Army Brothels,” *The New York Times*, July 7 1992; Jane H. Lii, “Inside Queens: The Memories of a Comfort Woman,” *New York Times*, September 10 1995.

<sup>11</sup> For a detailed listing of the news coverage, see Susan S. (Susan Stokes) Lambert, “Covering Rape in Ethnic Conflict: The Case of the Bosnian War, a Content Analysis of The *New York Times*' Coverage of Rape for the Years 1992 and 1993,” (unpublished M.A. thesis, Indiana University, 1996).

conceptions of women as the inevitable collateral damage to war.

### *Emergence of the US “Comfort Women” Movement*

As the plight of “comfort women” gained salience throughout the United States, the Korean-American community was getting organized and acquiring a more prominent political voice. Against this backdrop, they readily included the issue of redress for “comfort women” to their activist agendas and initiated a movement to further public awareness of the matter.

While Korean-Americans had been active in setting up associations and study groups as far back as their arrival in the United States in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>12</sup> “these groups developed in relative isolation from other community groups and outside mainstream domestic politics.”<sup>13</sup> However the LA riots of April 1992, in which many Korean businesses and residences were looted or destroyed, served to galvanize Korean-Americans as an ethnic community and spurred them to political action. In the aftermath of the riots, first and second generation Koreans mobilized and established various organizations aimed at empowering them politically.

Within eight months of the riots occurring, in December 1992, Dongwoo Lee Hahm, a Korean-American scholar-activist, spearheaded the US “comfort women” movement by calling a meeting to discuss the issue and inviting a number of Korean-Americans to attend. This became the foundation meeting for the Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues (WCCW), the first organization in the US dedicated to championing justice for the women, and Hahm was designated its president.<sup>14</sup>

Most of the Korean-Americans who came to be actively engaged in advocating for “comfort women” cite this WCCW meeting as their initial impetus. “I got involved in the ‘comfort women’ issue in 1992 when I was asked to come to a meeting by Ms. Hahm, a Korean scholar,” recalls Bonnie Oh, a retired professor.<sup>15</sup> Others became committed to the cause

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<sup>12</sup> Korean-Americans had been coming to the US since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Their presence began to expand considerably when the Korean War came to an end and also when the Immigration Act was enacted in 1965.

<sup>13</sup> Andrew Yeo, “Is Enough at Stake? U.S. Civil Society and the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Asia-Foundation, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, December 2010.

<sup>14</sup> WCCW’s website is accessible here: <http://www.comfort-women.org/executive-committee.html>

<sup>15</sup> Author (phone) interview, Bonnie B.C. Oh: retired professor, Washington DC, 2013. Oh was educated at the

after hearing the testimonies of “comfort women” during their visits to the US.<sup>16</sup> Professor Young-key Kim-Renaud relates, “I was deeply touched when I listened to the testimony of one of the Korean ‘comfort women’ who came to speak at the Elliott School at George Washington University; she was very articulate.”<sup>17</sup> Some first learnt of the “comfort women” through their activities in other Korean-American organizations. One activist, who happens to be a medical doctor by trade, had been a participant in The Korean Women's International Network (KOWIN) in DC for four years<sup>18</sup> when the organization raised the issue of “comfort women” in one of their seminars, arousing her initial interest in the issue.<sup>19</sup>

In the early stages of the US “comfort women” movement, Korean-Americans played a critical role in furthering public awareness of the issue throughout the US, primarily through organizing conferences. On September 30, 1996, WCCW and The Korea Society<sup>20</sup> jointly held the first “comfort women” conference in North America at Georgetown University where Bonnie Oh worked as a professor. Upon reading in the New York Times<sup>21</sup> that Mutsuko Miki,<sup>22</sup> the widow of former Japanese prime minister Takeo Miki, was advocating state compensation for “comfort women,” Oh invited her to give the keynote speech.<sup>23</sup> Following the conference a two-week exhibition was held and a book<sup>24</sup> was later published based on the conference proceedings.<sup>25</sup>

The impact of the conference was considerable as it served as a catalyst for many similar such conferences and exhibitions to be held at various institutions around the United States. The

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University of Chicago and her father was the first human rights lawyer in South Korea.

<sup>17</sup> Author interview, Young-Key Kim-Renaud: professor at George Washington University, Washington D.C., 2013.

<sup>18</sup> KOWIN, according to their mission statement, “is a network of women leaders of Korean descent across the world with the purpose of networking and facilitating discussion of issues concerning Korean women.” It has numerous branches around the world. KOWIN’s (DC Chapter) website can be accessed at: <http://kowindc.org/>

<sup>19</sup> Author interview with a member of KOWIN, Annandale, Virginia, 2013.

<sup>20</sup> The website for The Korea Society is accessible here: <http://www.koreasociety.org/>

<sup>21</sup> “Japan’s Fund for War’s ‘Comfort Women’ is in crisis”, *New York Times*, May 13 1996, accessed at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/13/world/japan-fund-for-war-s-comfort-women-is-in-crisis.html>

<sup>22</sup> Mutsuko Miki (1917-2012) was initially in charge on Japan’s Asian Women’s Fund (a quasi-governmental fund for “comfort women”) but resigned it protest when she realized the fund would not offer state compensation. She was an advocate of pacifism and worked to improve relations between Japan and North Korea.

<sup>23</sup> Author (phone) interview, Bonnie B.C. Oh: retired professor, Washington DC, 2013.

<sup>24</sup> Margaret Diane Stetz & Bonnie B. C. Oh (eds.), *Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II*, (M.E. Sharpe: New York), 2001.

<sup>25</sup> Author (phone) interview, Bonnie B.C. Oh: retired professor, Washington DC, 2013.

activists also promoted the “comfort women” issue through interviews on national radio.<sup>26</sup> As Oh relates, “our primary goal was to inform the American public that atrocities like the “comfort women” system occurred. [Following a radio interview I did], I received many phone calls from people around the country saying that it was the first time they had heard about the issue.”<sup>27</sup>

While Korean-American women, and in particular, female scholars, formed the backbone of the “comfort women” movement in the US, this is not to say that the movement was strictly feminist or elitist. Korean-American men also began to advocate for “comfort women” under the banner of human rights. Korean American Civic Empowerment (KACE),<sup>28</sup> an organization predominantly comprised of male lawyers with branches in New York and New Jersey, played an important role, as we shall see, in both the House Resolution 121 process and the establishment of “comfort women” memorials. As the movement gained momentum, there was also increasing grassroots involvement by Korean-Americans and other Asian ethnic groups, including Chinese and Japanese.

### ***House Resolution 121***

The first significant political outcome in relation to the “comfort women” issue in the US was the 2007 passage of House Resolution 121 (HR121). The resolution was spearheaded by congressmen Mike Honda, Lane Evans and Henry Hyde; reinforced by Senator Tom Lantos; supported by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and promoted by the Korean- and Chinese-American communities. Also involved were professional lobbyists, the Congressional Research Service and other independent researchers. Among these myriad actors, however, Korean-Americans came to play a definitive role in the resolution’s ultimate passage.

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<sup>26</sup> These have included the Holocaust Memorial and Tolerance Center of Nassau County and The Harriet and Kenneth Kupferberg Holocaust Resource Center and Archives in New York.

<sup>27</sup> Author (phone) interview, Bonnie B.C. Oh: retired professor, Washington DC, 2013..

<sup>28</sup> KACE does not exclusively deal with the “comfort women” issue. It’s aims, as outlined in its mission statement, are to (1) advocate voting rights for the Korean Americans in the Greater New York area; (2) educate and cultivate future community leaders; (3) strengthen the Korean-American community’s solidarity with Korea; (4) serve as the central coordination and resource body to address community concerns and interests. The KACE website is accessible at: <http://us.kace.org/>

By the mid-1990s, the “comfort women” issue had been percolating in the US for some time and several congressmen decided to take a stand on it. Beginning from July 1997, various democrat members began to put forth resolutions urging the Japanese government to apologize to victims of Japanese war crimes.<sup>29</sup> From 2001, these resolutions started to specifically advocate for apologies to “comfort women,”<sup>30</sup> yet each attempt languished due to a lack of congressional support. In November 2006, however, a window of opportunity was presented when the Democratic Party won a sweeping victory in the US mid-term elections, capturing the House of Representatives, the Senate, and a majority of governorships and state legislatures from the Republican Party. The election also saw the first woman, Nancy Pelosi, take up the position of Speaker of the House. Against this backdrop, on January 21, 2007, Democrat Senator Mike Honda proposed a new bill, House Resolution 121 (HR121).

Previous attempts at a “comfort women” resolution had failed to attract the support of Congress largely owing to the fact that lawmakers were hesitant to get involved in a foreign matter that had little to no apparent connection with the US. Mike Honda was critical to overcoming this congressional reluctance; having spent his early childhood in a Japanese-American internment camp in Colorado and becoming a well-known crusader of human rights, Honda had a degree of credibility and cultural authority to speak on the “comfort women” issue in the US.<sup>31</sup> Personally, the “comfort women” issue appealed to Honda’s principled interest in human rights and HR121 also presented him with an opportunity to advance his stature in Congress and expand the influence of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus (CAPAC), of which he was head.<sup>32</sup> By passing a highly visible legislation such as HR121, which targeted an increasingly important interest group—Asian-Americans, Honda would attract the attention of the House leadership and also demonstrate that he could deliver votes, money and press attention. The resolution would moreover serve to raise his visibility to his constituents and to the Democratic Party.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Senator William Lipinski proposed House Resolution 126 proposed by Democrat Senator William Lipinski in July 1997.

<sup>30</sup> House Concurrent Resolution 195, introduced by Democrat Senator Lane Evans, urged the Japanese government to apologize to the “comfort women” by Japanese troops in Asia during World War II.

<sup>31</sup> Author interview, Christopher Simpson: Professor at American University, Washington D.C., 2013.

<sup>32</sup> CAPAC is a congressional caucus that promotes the wellbeing of Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) communities.

<sup>33</sup> Author interview, Christopher Simpson: Professor at American University, Washington D.C., 2013.



In addition to Honda, a small number of congressmen supported HR121 from its inception. This support did not reflect a sectarian interest in the “comfort women” issue *per se* but an enthusiasm for human rights issues more generally. Most prominent among these supporters were Democrat Senator Lane Evans, who had previously campaigned for compensation for Vietnam War victims of Agent Orange; Tom Lantos, who had lost his family in the Holocaust and was a longtime-advocate of human rights; Republican Member Henry Hyde, a Pacific War veteran and chair of the House International Relations Committee (presently the Foreign Affairs Committee); and also, Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and first female in the US to lead a major party in Congress.

As support for HR121 gained momentum, Korean-American activists launched a sophisticated and multi-faceted campaign to promote the resolution and persuade congressmen to vote in its favor. Lawyers Chejin Park and Dongchan Kim of Korean American Civic Empowerment (KACE) focused their initial efforts on researching the individual congressional members to determine which would be suitable pressure targets. “Realizing that there were 435 congressmen and that we needed to persuade half of them [in order for the resolution to pass], we began by researching their backgrounds to determine which were members of human rights caucuses and which were sympathetic to human rights abuses like the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide. Those who were sympathetic to such issues became our targets. We didn’t want to waste our time pressuring those who had no interest in these areas.”<sup>34</sup>

From the activists’ perspective, however, the Japanese lobby presented a formidable challenge to the resolution’s passage. A professional lobbyists are paid high sums of money, are appointed to their position for a number of years and continuously assert their interests over throughout that period, they have a structural advantage over activists who typically lack resources and tend to ebb and flow in their enthusiasm for a particular cause.<sup>35</sup> Korean-Americans sought to counteract the considerable influence of the Japanese lobby through information politics.<sup>36</sup> KACE developed their own materials for lobbying congressmen and began visiting their offices. They found that the Japanese lobby had been

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<sup>34</sup> Author interview, Korean American Civic Empowerment, Flushing, New York, 2013.

<sup>35</sup> Author interview, Christopher Simpson: Professor at American University, Washington D.C., 2013.

<sup>36</sup> Author interview, Korean American Civic Empowerment, Flushing, New York, 2013.

providing Congress with materials in attempt to prove that the Japanese government had already apologized and paid money to “comfort women” in the form of the Asian Women’s Fund. The KACE members refuted this claim “by explaining to Congress that the apology and money Japan offered to the ‘comfort women’ was not official” and therefore inadequate as a redress measure.

In addition to the activities of the lawyer-activists at KACE, a grassroots campaign to promote the resolution was launched by Korean-Americans with some support from the Chinese-American community. Annabel Park, a Korean-American documentarian and former Marshall Scholar at Oxford University, initiated the nationwide campaign by creating a coalition of civic groups primarily through the internet, which she called the “121 Coalition.” The coalition consisted of approximately two hundred activist organizations including Amnesty International and the Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues (WCCW). In her capacity as National Coordinator of 121 Coalition, Annabel Park relates, “I arranged meetings, worked on strategy, and kept track of what was happening at Capitol Hill; I also organized a march in front of the White House.”<sup>37</sup>

Attesting to her political savviness, Park also created a website called “Support 121” to which she uploaded relevant materials about the “comfort women” issue, information about the coalition’s gatherings, and criticisms of the Japanese government. In order to attract co-sponsors for HR121, the 121 Coalition engaged in grassroots lobbying activities, including “writing letters, getting petitions and meeting with House Members and their staff.”<sup>38</sup> According to Park, the campaign was an inter-generational effort: “the first generation couldn’t speak English very well so we paired them up with a second-generation participant when we did the lobbying.”<sup>39</sup>

While the above-outlined campaign by Korean-Americans aimed at influence the vote on HR121 was considerable in scale and highly sophisticated in nature, it would be an exaggeration to claim that it was the definitive factor in the resolution’s ultimate unanimous passage in July 2007. That fact is that one month prior to HR121’s passage, there was still a

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<sup>37</sup> Author (phone) interview, Annabel Park, Canberra, 2014.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

significant portion of congressmen who were unsure of how they would vote. Conventional wisdom holds that what tipped these fence-sitting congress members to vote in favor of HR121 was a one-page advertisement published in the Washington Post on June 14, 2007. Entitled “The Facts” (about “comfort women”), it was signed by a number of Japanese politicians and academics. In summary the ad claimed that (1) no documents have been found to demonstrate that women were forced against their will into prostitution by the Japanese army; (2) those who forced women to become “comfort women” against their will have been punished; (3) those who were involved in forcing Dutch women into sexual slavery have been punished; (4) testimonies of former “comfort women” are not reliable; and (5) “comfort women” were professional prostitutes who earned a lot of money.<sup>40</sup> The advert drew ire at Capitol Hill, where it was perceived as an attempt by Japan to rewrite history and interfere with the resolution—which was considered a domestic matter—and thus encouraged many congressmen to vote in its favor. The fact that the advert swayed Congress to offer bipartisan support for HR121 suggests that the passage of the resolution was Japan’s own doing. However, if we consider *why* Japan decided to publish the advert in the first place, the role Korean-Americans come into play.

Japan’s advert was provoked by Annabel Park and the 121 Coalition. The Korean-American community had been concerned by comments made in the lead up to the vote on the resolution by Japan’s Prime Minister Abe, to the effect that “there was no coercion, such as kidnappings, by the Japanese authorities [in the recruitment of ‘comfort women’].”<sup>41</sup> So as to negate any influence Abe’s statement may have had on Congress members, and to inform them otherwise, Park had decided to place an advertisement in the Washington Post, in April 2007, titled “The Truth About Comfort Women.”<sup>42</sup> To raise the necessary capital for the ad (approximately \$60,000) she mobilized the 121 Coalition. As Park recalls, “the Korean-American community worked so hard to gather the money to pay for the advertisement: they were walking around neighborhoods with buckets asking people for money; they even asked all their friends to donate money.”<sup>43</sup> While originally intended only to deny Abe’s claims, as an unexpected stroke of good fortune for the activists, their advert provoked the Japanese right wing causing them to retaliate by publishing their own ad

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<sup>40</sup> “The Facts,” *The Washington Post*, June 14 2007.

<sup>41</sup> Editorial, “Support the US Sex Slave Resolution,” *The Manila Times*, August 4 2007.

<sup>42</sup> The advert detailed the testimonies of former “comfort women.”

<sup>43</sup> Author (phone) interview, Annabel Park, Canberra, 2014.

(detailed above) in June of the same year. That Japan's ad was a direct refutation of that published by the 121 Coalition, was evinced in the ad's preamble:

*The purpose of this paid public comment is to present historical facts. At the end of April, an advertisement purporting to tell "The Truth about Comfort Women" appeared in the Washington Post. The claims contained in these statements, though, were anything but the "truth." Rather than being based on "facts," they appeared, if anything, to be the products of "faith"... This public comment seeks to present a number of historical facts relating to "comfort women" that have not been adequately brought to light so as to enable the readers of this respected publication to draw their own conclusions.<sup>44</sup>*

Considering that the ad posted by Japan constituted the tipping point for many congressmen to vote in favor of the "comfort women" resolution, and this in turn had been provoked by the advert published by the 121 Coalition, it can be surmised that the influence of Korean-Americans in the passage of HR121 was indeed decisive, albeit indirect and somewhat inadvertent.

### ***The US "Comfort Women" Memorials***

The second prominent political outcome in the "comfort women" issue in the United States has been the approval by local governments of the establishment of "comfort women" memorials. This more recent development has considerably undermined Japan-US relations, evinced in two Japanese diplomatic delegations being sent to America in 2012 to urge that the memorials be removed. In relative contrast to their role in the HR121 process, Korean-Americans have exerted direct influence in shaping the process of the construction of the memorials; in fact, these memorials were, for the most part, wholly ascribable to their efforts.

The jubilation of Korean-Americans over the passage of HR121 proved to be short-lived as the resolution failed to elicit from the Japanese government the "unequivocal apology" stipulated in its text. In light of the realization that the Japanese government was unlikely to budge in its stance on the "comfort women" issue, they decided instead to focus their energies

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<sup>44</sup> "The Facts," *The Washington Post*, June 14 2007.

on ensuring that the “comfort women” would be remembered in generations to come through the construction of memorials throughout the US.<sup>45</sup> As memorial construction falls under local government jurisdiction in America, the activists adjusted their strategy in accordance with the logic of constituency representation, targeting the leaders of counties and boroughs with high concentrations of Korean-Americans: the Koreatowns of the US.

The inception for the idea to establish a memorial for “comfort women” came to Korean-Americans quite incidentally. As a member of KACE recalls, “one day as we happened to be passing the Bergen County Courthouse (in New Jersey), we noticed a group of African-Americans gathered out front. When we approached them to see what was going on we found they were unveiling a memorial dedicated to African-American slavery. This gave us the idea to construct one for ‘comfort women.’”<sup>46</sup> KACE thus began a petition to have a memorial erected in the grounds of Bergen County Courthouse. By mobilizing high school students to assist them, they managed to collect two thousand signatures in two weeks and then lodged the petition at the Courthouse. Their request, however, was denied on the grounds that there were already too many memorials at the Courthouse.<sup>47</sup> The local government officials suggested that they instead try Palisades Park, New Jersey, the municipality with the highest number of ethnic Koreans in the United States.<sup>48</sup> After lodging a petition once more, in April 2010, the Palisades Park local council granted them permission to construct the memorial in a public park. Bergen County agreed to donate the stone for the memorial and the Korean-American community was entrusted with writing the inscription for the plaque, which was still to be subject to local government approval.<sup>49</sup> The memorial was finally unveiled on October 23, 2010, attracting significant media attention. Following this success, KACE received a number of calls from Korean-American organizations throughout the US expressing a desire to construct “comfort women” memorials in their own respective municipalities. KACE readily imparted the petition forms and the know-how.

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<sup>45</sup> Author interview, Korean American Civic Empowerment, Flushing, New York, 2013.

<sup>46</sup> Author interview, Korean American Civic Empowerment, Flushing, New York, 2013.

<sup>47</sup> Author interview, Korean American Civic Empowerment, Flushing, New York, 2013.

<sup>48</sup> According to the 2010 Census, 51.5 percent of the population declare themselves to be of Korean ancestry.

<sup>49</sup> The inscription read: “In memory of more than 200,000 women and girls who were abducted by the Armed Forces of the government of Imperial Japan.1930-1945. Known as ‘comfort women’ they endured human rights violations that no peoples should leave unrecognized. Let us never forget the horrors of crimes against humanity.”

Despite the activists having had their proposal to establish a memorial at the Bergen County Courthouse officially rejected, John Mitchell, a Bergen County legislator who held strong ties with KACE and was a close supporter of the Korean-American community, began persuading other legislators to support the idea. Against this backdrop, in October 2012, Bergen County Executive Kathleen Donovan was set to embark on a business trip to South Korea and decided that whilst there, she would pay a visit to the House of Sharing—a place where former “comfort women” reside. Whilst there, she was greatly moved by her encounter with the victims and based on such, decided to approve the construction of a “comfort women” memorial in the Bergen County Courthouse grounds.<sup>50</sup> As this move by Donovan was predictably met with strong resistance from the Japanese-Americans of Bergen County and beyond, she was forced to justify her decision. “We made it clear in the community that the memorial is not against the Japanese people or government—that it was not them who were the aggressors. The purpose of the memorial is to commemorate an injustice.”<sup>51</sup> Ultimately, the members of the Korean-American community paid for and inscribed the “comfort women” memorial. To their immense pride, it was unveiled on International Women’s Day (March 8), 2013, with the inscription: “In memory of the hundreds of thousands of women and girls from Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Netherlands and Indonesia who were forced into sexual slavery by the Armed Forces of Imperial Japan before and during World War II.”

Evidently, Korean-Americans were able to exert considerable leverage at the local government level in the municipalities in which they comprise a high percentage of the electorate. In Bergen County, New Jersey, where the “comfort women” memorials were first established, ethnic Koreans constitute roughly ten percent of the population, while in the Fort Lee borough of New Jersey, they occupy four of nine positions on the Board of Education.<sup>52</sup> These demographics have parallels in Flushing, New York City. New York Councilman, Peter Koo, who has actively backed the Korean-American-led “comfort women” memorial projects, explains his engagement in the issue as follows: “The City Council of New York does not usually get involved in foreign affairs but as sixty percent of the population in Flushing is Asian, and forty percent of the Asian population is Korean, we pay attention to

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<sup>50</sup> Author interview, Kathleen A. Donovan: County Executive, Bergen County, New Jersey, 2013.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Author interview, Kathleen A. Donovan: County Executive, Bergen County, New Jersey, 2013.

issues that concern them. I first took up the issue of ‘comfort women’ when Chejin Park (a member of KACE) came to my office in 2011 and brought the issue to my attention.”<sup>53</sup>

The attempts by Korean-Americans to memorialize “comfort women” have been further facilitated by normative practices associated with ethnic groups and monument establishment in the US. In short, it has become commonplace in America for ethnic communities to erect memorials commemorating historical injustices.<sup>54</sup> In the grounds of the Bergen County Courthouse alone, there are monuments devoted to Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust, the Irish Potato Famine, and as previously noted, African-American slavery. Elsewhere, Filipinos have Batan Death March memorials, and POW monuments are also on the increase. The successful construction of a memorial represents not only the political recognition of victimhood but also marks a significant milestone in the maturation trajectory of the ethnic political group that proposed the memorial. That Korean-Americans successfully obtained permission to construct a tribute to the “comfort women” alongside monuments commemorating some of the greatest injustices in human history, signified not only an important political outcome but that they had indeed “arrived” as an ethnic political community in the United States.

Korean-American’s pursuit to construct “comfort women” memorials in the US has not proceeded unhindered, however. Plans for an additional memorial to be established in Fort Lee, New Jersey, were permanently stalled due to infighting among the various activist individuals and organizations that have become involved. The point of contention has been the memorial design and the plaque inscription.<sup>55</sup> From the outset, the policy of local governments has consistently been that the community decides the design and inscription of the memorials while the local government merely issues the final approval or rejection of their plan. The initial plans for the Fort Lee “comfort women” memorial were proposed not by Korean-American activists, but an American veteran named Jim Viola, who serves as commander of the Fort Lee Veterans of Foreign Wars in New Jersey. Under the impression that Viola’s plan for the memorial represented a general consensus among the activists involved in the issue, the local council of Fort Lee approved the design. When news of this

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<sup>53</sup> Author interview, Peter Koo: Councilman, New York City Council, Flushing, New York, 2013.

<sup>54</sup> Author interview, Mindy Kotler: Asia Policy Point, Washington D.C., 2013.

<sup>55</sup> Author interview, Svetlana Shkolnikova: Staff Writer at NorthJersey.com, Hackensack, New Jersey, 2013.

appeared in the local press, however, it sparked anger among Korean-American groups who took exception to Viola's plan for the memorial to depict a Korean girl with the Japanese Imperial flag in the background.<sup>56</sup> They objected on the grounds that the memorial should not have an implicit anti-Japan message but rather, highlight the problem of violence against women in war more broadly. They also felt that Viola's design would have the effect of framing the problem narrowly as a Japan-Korea conflict rather than in more universal terms. In response to their objections, Fort Lee mayor, Mark Sokolich, announced that the memorial plans would be halted until a consensus was reached amongst the activist. Yet as of 2013, three different proposals being put forth by the various groups and there was no agreement as to which was preferable. Thus the project remains stalled indefinitely.<sup>57</sup>

Notwithstanding such obstacles, the efforts of Korean-Americans towards memorializing "comfort women" show no signs of abating in the near future; contrariwise, their activities continue to gain momentum. According to KACE, "We are now trying to have a street named after the 'comfort women' in Flushing, New York; we have issued a legislative request to this effect and at this stage it is pending."<sup>58</sup> Simultaneously, KACE are working on establishing a memorial for the women in a park in Flushing. There are also similar memorial construction projects currently in motion in Koreatowns elsewhere in the United States.

### ***Conclusion***

The former "comfort women" stemmed largely from the underclass of Korean society and were for the most part uneducated and illiterate. No one could have anticipated that a future generation of highly educated, financially secure, and politically savvy ethnic Koreans—among the ranks of which are lawyers, Marshall Scholars and professors—would come to articulate their interests in the United States, the purported universal guarantor of human rights and major ally of Japan.

Through a diverse array of pressure tactics, Korean-Americans have exerted decisive influence—both indirect and direct, and at the local and federal government levels—in the most prominent political outcomes concerning the "comfort women" issue in the US.

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Author interview, Korean American Civic Empowerment, Flushing, New York, 2013.



Although Korean-Americans have constituted but one of several actors involved in the issue, they nonetheless have been a powerful driving force in its trajectory. While previous studies that have analyzed Korean-American's influence in relation to US policy vis-à-vis South Korea have characterized them as disorganized and lacking in political will, as we have seen, history and unfinished politics vis-à-vis *Japan* have forged ethnic Koreans as a political community and provided a lever for them to participate in US politics.

In light of the fact that the two major political outcomes in relation to the “comfort women” issue in the US have manifested from different levels of government—local and national, in accordance with different sets of logic and with minimal involvement from the White House, they should not be read as an overarching strategy on the part the American government to arbitrate the “comfort women” issue between its two major Asian allies—Korea and Japan. Rather, the developments are a reflection of domestic politics in the US and Korean-Americans utilizing their political voice.

And while beyond the scope of the analysis, recent developments in the “comfort women” issue in Australia could offer further revelation. As of April 2014, the local council in Strathfield, Sydney's Koreatown, has been considering a request by its Korean and Chinese constituents to have a “comfort women” memorial erected in the town center.<sup>59</sup> While the proposed memorials in Sydney may appear to be simply fashioned upon those in the US, a statement made in 2009 by then leader of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan—the most prominent civic group advocating redress for “comfort women” in mainland Korea— suggests this may be no mere afterthought: “Rather than pressuring Japan directly,” she stated, “we believe that it is more effective to target Japan's friends and allies... Naturally when a friend is doing something wrong you coax them to stop. We hope Japan's ‘friends,’ like Australia and the US, will do likewise.”<sup>60</sup> Perhaps then we can infer that the recent international developments in the “comfort women” issue are indeed part of an elaborate, cohesive strategy—though not one coined at a governmental level, but from “below,” by politically astute activists.

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<sup>59</sup> Matt Pearson, “Strathfield community divided over proposed tribute to ‘Comfort Women,’” *The Daily Telegraph*, April 2 2004, accessed online at: <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/newslocal/inner-west/strathfield-community-divided-over-proposed-tribute-to-comfort-women/story-fngr8h4f-1226872118302>

<sup>60</sup> Author interview, Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan, Seoul, 2009.

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**Othering and Bordering in the *Yŏnhaengnok*: A Response to Marion Eggert**  
**연행록에 나타난 타자인식과 경계인식**

**Introduction**

Over the course of Chosŏn Korea's tributary relationship with Qing China, from 1637 to 1894, Chosŏn embassies went on a total of 497 tribute missions to the Qing court.<sup>1</sup> Most of them traveled an established land route across the Yalu River, through the Liaodong region, and past Shenyang and Shanhaiguan, which would take several weeks to complete; it was not the easiest of journeys, requiring considerable fortitude, frugality and resourcefulness if they intended their provisions to last and their reserve of tradable and giftable items to result in profitable exchanges along the way. The emissaries' sojourn at the capital also lasted up to several weeks, during which time they had opportunities to engage with Qing scholars and gain exposure to Western science and technology. Extant today are approximately 294 of their travel accounts,<sup>2</sup> a strikingly large number as it is, which raises the question of why so many Chosŏn Korean emissaries, despite all traveling to the same places and at more or less the same time of year, chose to write about their trip. The vast majority of them were not obliged, in a legal or professional sense, to document their journey, much less aspire to the level of detail evidenced in their works; the fact that they did anyway, resulting in a massive body of literature commonly known as *yŏnhaengnok*, points to certain impulses, preoccupations, and writer-reader relationships that have somehow failed to take center stage in scholarly treatments of the *yŏnhaengnok* thus far.

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<sup>1</sup> Im Ki-jung, *Yŏnhaengnok yŏn'gu*, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Im Ki-jung, *Yŏnhaengnok yŏn'gu*, 29.

It is this gap I hope to fill through my current PhD research, based on my own understanding of *yŏnhaengnok* as public texts, texts that presuppose and speak to a reading public. Existing conceptions of *yŏnhaengnok* as “travel diaries”<sup>3</sup> and “private writings of a literary nature”<sup>4</sup> have proven useful for such tasks as defining the *yŏnhaengnok* as a literary genre<sup>5</sup> and drawing on a *yŏnhaengnok* text to gain insight into the author’s life and ideas,<sup>6</sup> but not for much else. Hence, I have chosen to turn the focus away from the personal and subjective aspects of travel writing so as to explore how *yŏnhaengnok* may have participated in a more public, political domain and responded to collective, rather than individual, needs. A well-established view among historians of Korea is that the fall of the Ming in 1644 signaled the end of one era and the beginnings of another:

The Manchu conquest of China in 1644 represented nothing less than “barbarian” domination of the center of the civilized world, the end of the world as Koreans knew it. Since Koreans could neither accept the new world order, despite the fact that Korea had to maintain a tributary relationship to the Ch’ing, nor change it, they felt compelled to construct a new episteme that would allow them to maintain their identity as a “civilized” people.

These new epistemes were attempts to redraw a conceptual map between self and other. There were two conspicuous features in this process. One was a Korean consciousness of a unique identity... This was related to another noticeable feature, the domestication of the structures of authority. They no longer looked outside the country to confirm the status of the Korean polity or its culture.<sup>7</sup>

In such a context, where questions of cultural and civilizational identity, the lines separating “Us” from “Them,” had taken on unprecedented importance for Chosŏn Koreans, the *yŏnhaengnok* may

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<sup>3</sup> Ledyard, “Hong Taeyong,” 63.

<sup>4</sup> Im Ki-jung, *Yŏnhaengnok yŏn’gu*, 87.

<sup>5</sup> Most scholarly treatments of *yŏnhaengnok* up until the early 1990s fall into this category and often feature comparisons with Western literature to argue the literariness of *yŏnhaengnok*. For example, see O Sang-t’ae, “*Hŏsaengjŏn kwa Gulliver’s Travels* ūi taebijŏk koch’al,” *Taegu ōmunnon ch’ong* 8 (1990), 105-119.

<sup>6</sup> Biographical studies of Pak Chiwŏn and other writers associated with the Pukhakp’a (School of Northern Learning) have been the most numerous. Notable examples include Kim Myŏng-ho, *Yŏrha ilgi yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa Pip’yŏngsa, 1990) and Kim T’ae-jun, *Hong Taeyong kwa kŭ ūi sidae: yŏnhaeng ūi pigyo munhak* (Seoul: Iljisa, 1982).

<sup>7</sup> Haboush, “The Ritual Controversy and the Search for a New Identity,” 87.



have served as one medium for reexamining and rewriting Korea's place in the world. What *yŏnhaengnok* may be able to show us, then, is that the construction of "a new episteme," referred to above, actually did not occur in one magical instant or stop Koreans altogether from looking outwards to other cultures to be reassured of their own identity. Rather, we encounter in *yŏnhaengnok* an ongoing, messy process of looking out and looking in — producing, negotiating, and challenging Chosŏn perceptions of the self and other throughout much of this latter half of the Chosŏn period.

To illustrate some of my research aims and methods in a more concrete way, in this paper I will critique and expand on Marion Eggert's study of the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region in her article, "A Borderline Case: Korean Travelers' Views of the Chinese Border." The gist of Eggert's argument is that the changed relationship between Korea and China following the Qing takeover caused Korea travelers to think differently of the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region between Korea and China as well. Eggert's study happens to be one of the very few English-language secondary sources dealing with *yŏnhaengnok* and, as such, has been cited somewhat uncritically in a number of subsequent scholarly works on Sino-Korean borders and the Chinese tribute system.<sup>8</sup> In addition to carrying some clout in this regard, Eggert's study is significant for pointing out a geographical region where othering and bordering, two conceptual themes central to my own research, can be observed in a condensed yet highly vivid form. For these reasons, I will be revisiting and offering my take on not only Eggert's three primary sources, Kim Ch'angŏp's *Nogajae yŏnhaeng ilgi* (1712), Pak Chiwŏn's *Yŏrha ilgi* (1780), and Sŏ Kyŏngsun's *Monggyŏngdang ilsa* (1855-1856), but also three other *yŏnhaengnok* texts of my choosing: the

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<sup>8</sup>For example, see Schmid, "Tributary Relations and the Qing-Chosŏn Frontier on Mount Paektu," 132-133, Schmid, *Korea between Empires: 1895-1919*, 204, and Kim, Seonmin, "Ginseng, Silver and Borders in East Asia," 6.

*Tamhŏn yŏn'gi* (1765-66) and *Ŭlbyŏng yŏnhaengnok* (1765-1766), both written by Hong Taeyong, and the *Muo yŏnhaengnok* (1799) by Sŏ Yumun.

Whereas Eggert claims to have chosen her three texts based on their literary merit and their being written at intervals of about 70 years,<sup>9</sup> I thought it would be worth looking at additional texts, especially if produced within those intervals, to see how well her argument holds. When making my choices, I also took into account the language in which the texts were originally written and the positions that the authors had held within their respective embassies, in order to ensure that I would be working with a fairly representative sample of the *yŏnhaengnok* genre. Although the majority of *yŏnhaengnok* were written in *hanmun*, the official language of court documents and histories in Chosŏn Korea, there were still those written in *han'gŭl* to consider; likewise, not all *yŏnhaengnok* writers traveled on account of their sibling or relative being a senior officer of the embassy, as some, like Sŏ Yumun, were themselves serving in the most senior positions. On the other hand, I chose to steer clear of this notion of literary merit, which I suspect had more to do with Eggert's modern bias than the opinions of the texts' original readers. Although I do not doubt that certain texts were more favorably received than others, more research would be necessary to ascertain what exactly made them more appealing: did they need to be well-written and pleasurable to read, or was it more important that they were useful? Hong Taeyong is said to have read Kim Ch'angŏp's travel account to learn the *yŏnhaeng* route and prepare for his own trip,<sup>10</sup> which suggests that Hong saw practical value in reading Kim's account. Whether Hong had thought highly of Kim's writing seems far less relevant here.

To guide my analyses of the *yŏnhaengnok* texts, I have chosen to draw on James Duncan and Derek Gregory's conception of travel writing as "an act of translation that constantly works to

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<sup>9</sup> Eggert, "A Borderline Case," 68.

<sup>10</sup> Kim T'ae-jun, *Hong Taeyong p'yŏngjŏn*, 122.

produce ‘a tense space in-between.’”<sup>11</sup> This space in-between, arising from the travel writer’s attempt to find the terms for and/or to come to terms with an “other,” is neither neutral nor innocent; it is “shot through with relations of power and of desire” that become manifest in the writer’s “domesticating” and “foreignizing” methods of representation.<sup>12</sup> Expanded from the concept of othering, domesticating is defined as the reduction of the foreign other to fit into the same system of beliefs, values, and norms with which the self identifies, thus “bringing the author home,” and foreignizing as the tendency to highlight differences and exoticize the other with the effect of “sending the reader abroad.”<sup>13</sup>

Although Duncan and Gregory’s ideas derive from Western examples of travel writing, their travel writing-as-translation approach is general enough to be applied, with due caution, to the Korean case. The impulses to domesticate and to foreignize find wide expression in all five writers’ representations of geographical, cultural, and personal encounters, especially where the prevailing sentiment is one of difference, unfamiliarity, or surprise. The difference could be real, as when Kim Ch’angö̃p tastes a lychee for the first time and marvels at its “extraordinarily sweet and refreshing” flavor,<sup>14</sup> or it could be presumed and imagined, as when one of Pak Chiwŏn’s servants claims that he would have been unhappy being born a Qing Chinese, “because Qing is a barbarous country.”<sup>15</sup> A difference, once perceived as such, gives rise to that tense space in-between, between objectivity and subjectivity, between fact and embellishment.

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<sup>11</sup> Duncan and Gregory, “Introduction,” 4-5.

<sup>12</sup> Duncan and Gregory, “Introduction,” 5.

<sup>13</sup> Duncan and Gregory, “Introduction,” 5.

<sup>14</sup> Kim Ch’angö̃p, *Nogajae yŏnhaeng ilgi* (henceforth, *NGYI*), 87d.

<sup>15</sup> Pak Chiwŏn, *Yŏrha ilgi*, (henceforth *YHIG*), 558; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 23.

I have also found it useful to treat certain descriptions of places and spaces in *yǒnhaengnok* as “bordering discourse.” By “bordering” I refer to Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen’s critical definition:

Bordering processes do not begin or stop at demarcation lines in space. Borders do not represent a fixed point in space or time, rather they symbolize a social practice of spatial differentiation. Semantically, the word “borders” unjustly assumes that places are fixed in space and time, and should rather be understood in terms of bordering, as an ongoing strategic effort to make a difference in space among movements of people, money, or products. In democratic societies borders are not “made from above,” rather they represent an implicit, often taken-for-granted, agreement among the majority of people.<sup>16</sup>

A bordering discourse, then, may be understood as a form of discursive othering directed at space so as to distinguish between home and away, between residents and non-residents, and between ours and theirs. As movements of people and goods are subject to fluctuations and change, so, too, must differences and boundaries be continually re-negotiated and re-established. Bordering discourses, therefore, are less likely to exist as isolated events than as interrelated expressions of a persisting need to differentiate along spatial lines. As I hope the following sections will demonstrate, interpreting recurring representations of the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region in *yǒnhaengnok* from this perspective may be more fruitful than Eggert’s treatment of the region as a ritualized space.

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<sup>16</sup> Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, “Bordering,” 126.

## The Ŭiju-Fenghuang Border Region as Ritualized Space

From early Ming times, Korean envoys traveling by land accessed China by crossing the lower reaches of the Yalu River in Ŭiju. The Yalu River served as a natural border between the two countries, and customs checkpoints were in operation on both sides of the river from as early as 1481.<sup>17</sup> Following the Qing takeover in 1636, however, a willow palisade extending northeastwards from Fenghuang to Kaiyuan was erected by the Manchus to fortify their border with Korea, and the land between the palisade and the Yalu was designated no-man's land, serving as an additional safeguard against trespassers and fugitives. In short, the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border was expanded from a single demarcation to comprise a tripartite border region: Korean travelers had to first cross the Yalu River, then traverse the no man's land, and then pass through the palisade gate before they could set foot on Qing soil.

It may be said that the additional measures put in place for stricter border control reflect a changed relationship between Korea and China, and that Korean travelers' perceptions of the border and their having to cross it had changed as well. Marion Eggert, in her study "A Borderline Case: Korean Travelers' Views of the Chinese Border," claims that Chosŏn travelers no longer perceived their border crossing as an act of striding forward, towards the center of culture and civilization, but rather as "suffering an osmosis... as if being sucked through a membrane into another 'state.'"<sup>18</sup> Moreover, as the act of border crossing itself was significantly extended in time and space, she suggests:

If we take ritual to have exactly this basic function, namely to lengthen a moment of passage in a way that enhances, or even renders possible, awareness of its happening, the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region can be seen as ritualized space, or ritual in a spatial instead of its usual temporal guise. The heightened awareness of

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<sup>17</sup> Eggert, "A Borderline Case," 66.

<sup>18</sup> Eggert, "A Borderline Case," 65-66.

crossing the border, expressed in detailed and often rather personal accounts of later Chosŏn travelers, may support this theory.<sup>19</sup>

In the three late Chosŏn travel accounts selected for her study, Eggert discerns a move towards “narrativization,” that is, a stronger tendency than in her earlier sample texts to portray events and experiences in detail and in an anecdotal or narrative-like form.<sup>20</sup> This stylistic turn, when taken to represent the heightened awareness of late Chosŏn travelers, certainly lends support to the idea that the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region functioned as a ritualized space, wherein travelers could prepare themselves for and reflect on their passage into Qing China. However, it is worth pointing out that Eggert makes these claims without referring to any other sources than her three primary texts. In effect, both the narrativization of the late Chosŏn *yŏnhaengnok* and the ritualization of the border space remain conjectures that would need to be explored further, and yet Eggert proceeds to focus only on her ritualization theory.

First, Eggert describes the customary course of events from Ŭiju to Fenghuang:

After arriving at Ŭiju, the embassy would rest a few (up to ten) days. This interval was used to complete and check the register of tribute goods, [to inspect] the embassy’s men and horses (which were listed with height and color), to buy supplies (esp. foodstuff) needed on the further journey, to write letters home and, for the three main envoys, to be feasted by the magistrate of Ŭiju with a farewell banquet. On the morning of departure, the magistrate would set up tents at the bank of the Yalu River to conduct the customs control... Depending on rank and connections, the embassy passed the customs controls more or less undisturbed, before boarding several ships to cross the river (they crossed it on foot or horseback when it was frozen). Persons not allowed to enter China (like servants or family members not on the register) had to be left behind at this point. The journey through no man’s land lasted for two days; the second night was usually spent in a place near Palisade Gate. A messenger was sent ahead to the gate to announce the arrival of the embassy, whereupon the magistrate of Fenghuang would proceed to the gate and open it to the embassy. People and horses entering the gate were checked individually according to the embassy’s register. While the three main envoys were allowed to ride in light sedans, all other members had to dismount

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<sup>19</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 67-68.

<sup>20</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 68.

their horses. Only after this procedure did they set foot on the soil of the Qing Empire.<sup>21</sup>

Eggert then breaks down the above information into three stages: preparations and leave-taking by the Yalu River in the first stage,<sup>22</sup> traversing the no man's land in the second,<sup>23</sup> and passing through the palisade gate and entering the other side in the third.<sup>24</sup> Not only do these stages become evident “through narrative elements reappearing in different texts, or through special treatment in one of them,” but also, she suggests, “these stages can be described in terms equivalent to the phases that Van Gennep has defined for ‘rites de passage.’”<sup>25</sup>

Arnold van Gennep's three phases, separation, limen, and aggregation, in the context of territorial passage are also referred to as the preliminal, liminal, and postliminal stages, respectively.<sup>26</sup> As a theoretical framework, these stages are intended to explain the formalities and ceremonial patterns that accompany a passage from one territory to another, most of which, in Van Gennep's view, originate from a “magico-religious” belief in the sanctity of territorial boundaries.<sup>27</sup> The preliminal stage features rites that help the traveler to break away from the ties that have bound him to his present world, the liminal stage serves as a transitional period, during which the traveler is further distanced from his place of origin and has the opportunity to reaffirm his intentions of moving to the new place, and the postliminal stage serves to formalize the traveler's acceptance and incorporation into the new place. On the applicability of these stages Van Gennep writes:

The length and intricacy of each stage through which foreigners and natives move towards each other vary with different peoples. The basic procedure is always the

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<sup>21</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 66-67.

<sup>22</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 69-72.

<sup>23</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 72-74.

<sup>24</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 74-75.

<sup>25</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 69.

<sup>26</sup> Van Gennep, *Rites of Passage*, 21.

<sup>27</sup> Van Gennep, *Rites of Passage*, 15-16.

same, however, for either a company or an individual: they must stop, wait, go through a transitional period, enter, be incorporated.<sup>28</sup>

What Van Gennep does not explicitly mention here, although his juxtaposition of “foreigners and “natives” does offer an important clue, is that his theory derives primarily from the experiences of settlers and conquerors of the earliest and “semi-civilized” societies. For them “the magico-religious encompassed what today is within the secular domain,”<sup>29</sup> and as such they serve in Van Gennep’s work as a testament to the originally magico-religious significance of borders.

Simply put, unless Eggert shared Van Gennep’s interest in the magico-religious aspect of borders or deemed his sources comparable to her own, Van Gennep’s ideas should have little to no place in her study. Still, she insists on an almost exact one-to-one correspondence between Van Gennep’s three stages of territorial passage and her three stages of crossing the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region, allowing Van Gennep’s model to influence and in some instances misguide her analyses. In the following sections, stage by stage I revisit Eggert’s findings, offer my criticisms of them, and present an alternate reading using the methodologies and additional sources introduced at the outset of this paper. As mentioned previously, Eggert focuses on recurring motifs common to all three of her primary texts; only on one occasion does she actually discuss the distinctiveness of one of the texts,<sup>30</sup> as if to suggest that by and large the supposedly ritualistic nature of the crossing in turn produced almost ritualistic, predictable responses. Consequently, Eggert succeeds in highlighting the possibility of a shared predisposition or collective identity among the Chosŏn travelers — and, just as importantly, the literary conventions that may have shaped their representations of border crossing — but fails to clearly differentiate between individual and shared experience, between personal and social outcomes, and between the

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<sup>28</sup> Van Gennep, *Rites of Passage*, 28.

<sup>29</sup> Van Gennep, *Rites of Passage*, 15.

<sup>30</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 75-77.



individuality of the authors and the conventions of the *yŏnhaengnok* genre. My own readings attempt to clarify these distinctions and account for the much more varied picture that emerges from looking at a wider range of primary sources.

## 1. Preparations and Leave-taking

### a) Preparations

When a border is expanded to encompass a region, where does one territory end and the other begin? Kim Ch'angŏp, Hong Taeyong, Pak Chiwŏn, Sŏ Yumun and Sŏ Kyŏngsun all appear to have regarded the Yalu River as a national boundary, one which at least marked off the Chosŏn political domain and differentiated “our country” (我國) here from “the other (or their) territory” (彼地) there. Crossing the river, therefore, meant taking one’s first step into foreign territory, a daunting prospect that would compel travelers to “first reassure themselves of their masculine and valiant identities.”<sup>31</sup> According to Eggert, this assertion of masculinity and valiance finds expression in the presence of *kisaeng*, who would entertain embassies with equestrian shows and sword dances as part of their send-off, and in the military uniform that the travelers would change into just prior to the river crossing. Both the *kisaeng* and the military dress would have served to boost the travelers’ morale and enabled them to perceive themselves as manly, heroic adventurers;<sup>32</sup> Eggert also suggests that the change of dress may be interpreted as a sign of transition into a state of “interstructural liminality,” where the travelers, no longer in their usual dress and devoid of other social markers, experience their rite of passage as equals.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 71.

<sup>32</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 70-71.

<sup>33</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” footnote 77.

If we take a closer look at how the *kisaeng* of Ŭiju are represented in the primary texts, however, we can find that they did not always have the desired effect that Eggert describes. For example, a *kisaeng* is assigned to Sŏ Yumun on his first day in Ŭiju, and he is immediately appalled by her lack of good manners and refinement:

The attendant *kisaeng* poured some wine into a silver cup, and I watched her bring it to me without using a tray and without any dishes to accompany the wine. Her comportment was so careless and slovenly that I could not help but feel embarrassed. Taking notice of my stares, the interpreter said to me: “This is an age-old custom of Ŭiju.” If that is so, I wondered, just how long ago did such a custom come into being? Thinking it must have come from the Chinese way of offering tea, I smiled to myself and refused the wine.<sup>34</sup>

Sŏ’s unfavorable impression of the *kisaeng* of Ŭiju does not appear to change with time. On his second to last day in Ŭiju, he describes the *kisaeng*’s somewhat aggressive display of horsemanship as “a truly bizarre sight,” which he presumes must owe to the region’s particular fondness for riding and archery.<sup>35</sup> In the same breath he expresses his increasing apprehension about having to cross the river and wonders out loud: “How else is one supposed to feel, leaving one’s home country far behind?”<sup>36</sup>

It would appear that for Sŏ Yumun, Ŭiju was already a departure from the familiar and comfortable. Far from consoling, let alone invigorating, him, his encounters with the *kisaeng* of Ŭiju expose him to new, disorientating sights and customs, which he identifies in the first instance as Chinese and subsequently as specific to the region. In both instances we can detect some reluctance on his part to identify with his discoveries, distancing himself from them and highlighting their otherness with respect to his own position as a Korean and then as a Seoul man. Had he derived any pleasure from these experiences, he might have depicted them in a more

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<sup>34</sup> Sŏ Yumun, *Muo yŏnhaengnok* (henceforth *MOYH*), 25.

<sup>35</sup> *MOYH*, 30.

<sup>36</sup> *MOYH*, 30.

flattering light — viewing them, perhaps, as more reason to love and admire his country — but it is clear he wanted nothing to do with the *kisaeng* or the gritty and rustic atmosphere of Ŭiju.

As for the military attire he changes into on the day of the river crossing, he makes no mention of it making him feel any stronger or more courageous. He merely observes that apart from the interpreters and officers in charge of supplies, all members of the embassy were in military uniform, and that the higher ranking officers wore blue overcoats and the lower ranking officers red overcoats.<sup>37</sup> In other words, not everyone changed into military clothing, and those who did were dressed according to their respective positions within the embassy. While it is still possible to interpret the change of dress as a transformation, the transformation does not appear to have resulted in a complete obliteration of social distinctions, as Eggert suggests. Rather, it may have helped to put into effect a new hierarchical organization upon which the tribute mission would operate, and as I will discuss in a later section, this new system becomes more evident when the embassy progresses to the palisade gate.

There are two further points worth considering with regard to the change of dress. Firstly, it could not have been just the embassy members who looked at each other and remarked on each other's changed appearance, as Eggert observes in Pak Chiwŏn's and Sŏ Kyŏngsun's accounts. Well-wishers and onlookers, gathering on the river bank for the ceremony and spectacle of the crossing, would have watched them closely as well; I wonder if it was at least partly on their account that embassy members would change and thus look the part of heroic travelers setting off on an important journey. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there may have been a much simpler, more practical reason for the military clothing: harsh travel conditions probably made everyday clothing less suitable. This may be one instance where Eggert's unwavering adherence

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<sup>37</sup> *MOYH*, 31.

to Van Gennepe's ideas obscures the obvious and weakens the overall credibility of her argument, and we encounter more such instances in subsequent stages of the border crossing.

## **b) Leave-taking**

Embassies were bade farewell on the river shore by relatives, friends, and the people of Ŭiju, and here, Eggert notes, "sentiments of lingering and attachment... now find wide coverage."

Indeed, Kim Ch'angöp provides a poignant description of the leave-taking:

My brother left before us and crossed the frozen river on a sled. On the other side, he sat for a moment on an elevated spot to watch the *kisaeng* racing their horses and retrieving banners in a dazzling display of horsemanship. Once across the first branch of the river, we come to the next branch. When this part of the river is crossed, we enter another land. My nephew had to leave us here and turn back; my heart ached with sorrow many times over... Beyond this point, reeds taller than men crowded either side of our path. It is said that among those traveling for the first time many shed tears here. As for those remaining behind on the frozen river, they are said to always lose their composure at the sight of the embassy's fluttering blue parasols disappearing over the horizon.<sup>38</sup>

In relating his own sadness to the collective memory of past travelers and farewell bidders, Kim alludes to a larger master narrative of border crossing, one which equates crossing the Yalu River with leaving home. It can be said that Pak, too, contributes to this master narrative, as he describes his feelings of gloom and homesickness on the day of the river crossing:

Though crossing the raging river still posed a danger, the day of departure had finally arrived and there was nothing we could do but leave. Gazing into the distance, I had a sense of steaming heat. Quietly I turned away, looking back and trying to remember my home. The distant cloud-shrouded mountain seemed so far away that I could not help feeling sad, and the momentary urge to return home crept in. But to tell the truth, I had thought of this adventure as my 'grand tour', and often told myself it was a trip I must do at least once in my lifetime. But the realization that the day had finally arrived now made this life-long yearning less important in my mind.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> *NGYI*, 22d-23a.

<sup>39</sup> *YHIG*, 552; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 4.

The above passage constitutes one of the rare instances where Pak goes into any detail about his private emotions. It is also the one point in his journey through the border region where he refers to his home with such a strong sense of attachment and longing, which lends further support to the Yalu River's apparently unique, unequivocal meaning.

Hong Taeyong, on the other hand, creates the impression that leaving home need not be such a sad and solemn affair. Whereas in the *Tamhŏn yŏn'gi*, in a section titled "Notes along the Road" (沿路記略), he states only that there were five customs checks in Ŭiju and that the Yalu River had frozen over so completely as to resemble land,<sup>40</sup> in the *Ŭlbyŏng yŏnhaengnok* he offers a vivid portrayal of the euphoria that came over him when his horse set foot on the river's frozen surface. He writes:

The Yalu River, also known as Three Rivers on account of its three branches, was all ice at this time... Though saddened beyond words to be leaving my home and country, I was living a dream. Here I was, a mere student of the Confucian classics, riding a military horse and having my lifelong wish fulfilled in one morning! I found myself waving one arm in the air in exhilaration and triumph. As if that wasn't enough, from atop my horse I burst into a madman's improvised song.<sup>41</sup>

Strikingly reminiscent of the lines "As no one knows the gladness in my heart / I sing alone a madman's song" in the *hanshi* "An Impromptu Song at Naksŏjae" (樂書齋偶吟) by Yun Sŏndo (1587-1671),<sup>42</sup> Hong's frank self-portrayal suggests that few others, if any, shared in his celebratory mood. His intense excitement is presented as a reaction to his unexpected good fortune, a personal circumstance that was probably deemed unsuitable for inclusion in the more public text of the *Tamhŏn yŏn'gi*. What we can gather from Hong's two versions, then, is that the meaning conventionally attached to the Yalu River may have remained more or less fixed, but, as with most

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<sup>40</sup> Hong Taeyong, *Tamhŏn yŏn'gi* (henceforth *THYG*), Vol. 5, 38-39.

<sup>41</sup> Hong Taeyong, *Ŭlbyŏng yŏnhaengnok*, 35-36.

<sup>42</sup> Wŏn Yong-mun, *Yun Sŏndo*, 52.

conventions, it was open to interpretation and subversion. Hong's *Ŭlbyŏng* version not only illustrates the personal significance that crossing the Yalu River held for Hong, but it also serves as a strong counterexample to Eggert's claim that the experience of crossing the Yalu River was one of helpless suffering for late Chosŏn travelers.

## 2. No Man's Land

Although the no man's land on the other side of the Yalu River may have marked the start of unfamiliar territory for the Chosŏn traveler, its physical proximity to Korean territory allowed for certain comparisons to be made with regard to the natural landscape. Or, as Eggert puts it, the travelers experience a "discontinuity of civilization" that is countered by the "continuity of physical space."<sup>43</sup> Hong Taeyong observes: "As the mountains, waters, and trees of this vacant land were like those of our Eastern Country, the path before us looked bright and beautiful."<sup>44</sup> Likewise, Kim Ch'angŏp is reminded of Korea's Kwanak Mountain upon seeing the Song-gu mountain range (松鶻山);<sup>45</sup> when Sŏ Yumun sees Jinshi Mountain (金石山), he also thinks of Kwanak Mountain.<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile, Pak Chiwŏn discovers that "the Aici River is as wide as our Imjin River."<sup>47</sup> Such continuities may have initially comforted and attracted favorable attention from the writers, but the perils and discomforts of spending the night in this part of the border region soon become the focal point for Kim Ch'angŏp and Hong Taeyong. Kim writes of the inescapable cold, the risk of tigers, and the loud blaring of trumpets that would keep more than

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<sup>43</sup> Eggert, "A Borderline Case," 72-73.

<sup>44</sup> *THYG*, Vol. 5, 39.

<sup>45</sup> *NGYI*, 23c.

<sup>46</sup> *MOYH*, 34.

<sup>47</sup> *YHIG*, 554; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 13.

just the frontier guards awake through the night;<sup>48</sup> Hong admits to being so perturbed by the frontier guards' loud trumpets and warning cries that he "did not dare sleep a wink."<sup>49</sup>

Whereas Eggert suggests that "the continuity of the landscape becomes a symbol for cultural continuity,"<sup>50</sup> I have found that by the second day in the wilderness, the travelers tend to become more critical of their surroundings. Certain geographical features, especially those of an impressive nature, begin to attract scrutiny and undercutting remarks. For example, Fenghuang Mountain, which would become visible in the distance during the last leg of the journey through no man's land, is met by most of the writers with varying degrees of ambivalence. Kim Ch'angŏp compares the size of the mountain to that of "our Surak of Yangju" but concludes that its unusual appearance is "quite unlike anything in our country."<sup>51</sup> Hong considers a few other possible Korean counterparts — "our Tobong, Kŭmgang, Ch'ŏngnyang, Wŏlch'ul, all famous for their strange appearance and towering height" — but, like Kim, decides that none of these can compare to Fenghuang's "countless pointed peaks... like ten thousand flaming torches blazing up to the sky."<sup>52</sup> Pak, on the other hand, goes to even greater lengths to qualify his assessment of the mountain's obvious stature and charm:

I am gazing at faraway Fenghuang Mountain. From such a distance it seems to rise up from level land as if it were a statue chiselled out of stone. Or like an upright finger on one's palm or a half-open lotus flower bud... However much I try, I cannot find the words to describe this mountain scenery adequately. The only drawback is that the mountain lacks rigour of clarity and brightness... The divine spirit and bright vitality of the Seoul Mountains is naturally different... I have to admit, though, that the Fenghuang Mountain is superior in being extraordinarily high and of exceptional appearance. Nevertheless, it does lack the gloss that fills the air around the mountains of Seoul.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> *NGYI*, 23d.

<sup>49</sup> *THYG*, Vol. 5, 39.

<sup>50</sup> Eggert, "A Borderline Case," 73.

<sup>51</sup> *NGYI*, 24d.

<sup>52</sup> *THYG*, Vol.5, 104.

<sup>53</sup> *YHIG*, 556-557; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 19-20.

Pak was clearly impressed by the imposing height and appearance of Fenghuang Mountain, but he repeatedly cites the mountains of Seoul to point out where it falls short. His measured treatment of a subject that could have elicited effusive expressions of wonder and admiration reflects his self-positioning and partiality as a Korean. On a more theoretical level, Duncan and Gregory may be invoked to interpret the three writers' descriptions of the mountain as examples of how the attempt to find the terms for and consequently come to terms with an other is seldom neutral or innocent. The immediate impulse to think of Korean counterparts that could equal or surpass Fenghuang Mountain points to certain relations of power and desire coming into play even in the representation of a natural landform on foreign territory.

Following in a similar vein, the no man's land's contiguity to Korea's border could also give rise to musings on Korea's former territorial boundaries and size. This tendency is evidenced most strongly in Pak's account, where Pak takes a moment to survey the no man's land from a hilltop:

This is the perfect place for a large market town or even a prefecture. But everybody has neglected it and left it vacant. It is said that, during the Koguryŏ Kingdom, the capital was close by. So this would have been the citadel of Koguryŏ. During the Ming dynasty it became the Zhenjiang Prefecture. However, when the Qing displaced Liaodong the people of Zhenjiang left the district, unhappy at being ordered to have their long hair shorn. Some went to General Mao Wenlong, and others came to Korea... a majority of those who went to Mao Wenlong were killed during the war of General Liu Hai. Thus for the last hundred years this land has been deserted.<sup>54</sup>

In addition to identifying the place as once belonging to Korea, Pak claims that its later inhabitants were Ming loyalists who chose to either fight against the Manchus or flee to Korea during the first spate of Han Chinese-led rebellions in the 1620s. These assertions provide the grounds for the no

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<sup>54</sup> *YHIG*, 556-557; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 19-20.



man's land's existence: the land was simply deserted and left vacant to signify defiance of Qing rule.

It is worth noting that Pak's explanation differs widely from those offered by Kim Ch'angöp and Hong Taeyong, both of which cite border defense as the main objective. Kim states: "From the palisade gate to the Yalu the land was kept vacant, a neutral territory that no one was to inhabit, probably to deter criminals from fleeing one country to the other."<sup>55</sup> Likewise, Hong writes that "the stretch of land before the palisade gate, measuring one hundred *li* or so, was kept empty to put some distance between the two countries' boundaries."<sup>56</sup> Whereas Kim and Hong portray the no man's land as a mutually beneficial defensive measure, which seems to imply mutual suspicion between the two countries, Pak's explanation serves to disempower the Qing court altogether by downplaying its part in the no man's land's existence. In effect, the no man's land is recast into a testament to Korea's more glorious days and to the resolute character of her Ming allies; Pak's domesticating gesture does not end here, but rather becomes even more salient as he progresses further into the Liaodong region.

Pak's preoccupation with territorial boundaries continues past the no man's land and resurfaces in Fenghuang, just beyond the palisade gate:

The scholars of our country knew only the present P'yöngyang so that, when they were told that Kija set up the capital in P'yöngyang, they believed it was their P'yöngyang... The scholars did not know that Liaodong was originally Korean territory and that many tribal states such as Sukshin, Ye, Maek and Tong'in used to belong to Wiman Chosön... Alas, posterity did not clarify boundaries such as these... Through these misplaced assumptions, Korean territory was instantly shrunk without anyone lifting a finger to preserve it.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> *NGYI*, 24a.

<sup>56</sup> *THYG*, Vol. 5, 39.

<sup>57</sup> *YHIG*, 563; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 40.

Unlike Kim, who stops at a similar spot and expresses his doubts about the land once belonging to Korea, Pak makes a significant break in his narration so that he may re-erect the territorial boundaries of old based on relevant passages from the *Han shu*, *Tang shu*, *Jin shu*, and *Weng xian tong kao*.<sup>58</sup> His digressive attempt to resize Korean territory can be interpreted as a domesticating method in the strongest sense. In supplanting existing boundaries with former, alleged ones to form a larger Korea, not only does Pak exhibit a strong nationalist tendency, but he also appears, for a time at least, to be traveling not in a foreign land but on domestic soil.

### 3. The Palisade Gate

At the palisade gate, the third and final demarcation of the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region, travelers are offered first glimpses of the other country and the people who inhabit it. Whereas the passage through no man's land appears to have entailed mostly confrontations with the natural environment and related territorial issues, the final threshold here takes on the significance of a racial, cultural, and civilizational demarcation line. By this stage, Eggert claims, "the travelers are less distinguished from each other by rank than they are distinguished from their surroundings by being Korean," and they soon find themselves entangled in various misunderstandings and awkward situations.<sup>59</sup> It certainly seems plausible that by this stage the travelers would be less concerned about their respective ranks than about their becoming foreigners or, as the Chinese would call them, *pianbangren* (people of the periphery), but Sŏ Kyŏngsun's account suggests otherwise. On the same day his embassy reaches the palisade gate, Sŏ complains about the food that is brought to him by the embassy's head stableman (*madu*). He says to the *madu*: "I may come from a poor household and have had to scrape by, but the food on our table has always

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<sup>58</sup> *YHIG*, 563-564; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 40-43.

<sup>59</sup> Eggert, "A Borderline Case," 74.

consisted of white rice and at least two accompanying dishes. Even our table is of the high-leg kind, so how can you treat me this way, giving me something too pitiful to even call food in our country?”<sup>60</sup> The *madu* snickers at Sō’s complaint and reminds him: “Our provisions of Chosŏn rice, Chosŏn food, were all carefully measured before getting loaded into carts. The military officials and the interpreters, down to the lower ranking officers, are all given a ration of one dish each; if we bend the rules even just a little, we will soon run out of food and will need to rely on our emergency funds.”<sup>61</sup>

The *madu*’s response clearly demonstrates that there remained a strong sense of order and hierarchy within the embassy, which would have been necessary to ensure the tribute mission’s successful completion and the safety of the travelers. The *madu* proceeds to explain to Sō that the rice he is being served may be of a poorer quality than Korean white rice, but that it is also cheaper and incurs no import duties. Faced with no choice but to put up with the meager rations, Sō ends the discussion with a lament: “O rice! O rice! It is rice that has truly defeated me.”<sup>62</sup> By contrast, Sō is hardly intimidated or made anxious by the sight of the palisade gate. Rather, he expresses his disappointment:

I had thought the palisade gate would be like the grand entrance to a fortress or palace, but what I saw on this day was truly underwhelming, even from the perspective of someone coming from a small country. So, I thought to myself: “Our countrymen always speak of Beijing as some place grand, but now that I have seen what the palisade gate is really like, I can guess how Beijing will be.”<sup>63</sup>

Sō’s estimation that the palisade gate was nothing to write home about serves as a reassurance, both to himself and to his readers, that there was no reason for a “small country” such as Korea to be considered inferior to the geographically larger China. Whereas Sō negotiates the underlying

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<sup>60</sup> Sō Kyŏngsun, *Monggyŏndang ilsa* (henceforth *MGDI*), 273.

<sup>61</sup> *MGDI*, 273.

<sup>62</sup> *MGDI*, 274.

<sup>63</sup> *MGDI*, 270.

power struggle in this swift and succinct manner, other accounts betray more conflicting emotions and longer deliberations.

Kim Ch'angŏp describes his first impressions when the palisade gate is opened at the instruction of the Fenghuang magistrate:

In the afternoon the palisade gate was opened and hundreds of Manchus came rushing through. Much to my surprise, most of them were large in stature and many splendidly dressed — not at all like the three barbarians I had first come across [in the no man's land].

Two local interpreters ordered their attendants to bring floor cushions for the chief and deputy envoys. The interpreters came to greet the seated envoys and then withdrew to take their positions alongside the other local officials. We presented them with rice wine, dried fruits, and dried pheasant meat among others, but the barbarians only held their cups and did not put it to their lips. Our interpreter told us that they would only drink after the envoys had taken their first sip. The two envoys reluctantly raised their empty cups in salutation.<sup>64</sup>

Far from revising his preconceptions and placing Manchus on equal footing as Koreans, Kim continues to refer explicitly to the local Fenghuang officials as “barbarians” (胡) and maintains in his description a sense of hierarchy and difference. The Manchus' robust appearance, splendid dress, and polite comportment sit uncomfortably with the Korean envoys' reluctance to drink with the local officials; whether Kim had intended to depict an unusual Manchu custom or the envoys' unwillingness to associate with the Manchus remains unclear. What Kim does make apparent, on the other hand, is his reaction to the assault of the new and unfamiliar on the other side of the palisade:

From this day on, everything that we saw and heard was new and strange to us. I was so overwhelmed and confounded that I could not speak. Only the sound of a cock's crow was just the same as in our country, which I found very amusing.<sup>65</sup>

Kim claims to have been in such a state of disorientation that only the familiar sound of a cock's crow managed to catch his attention and provide some comic relief. That the only perceivable

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<sup>64</sup> *NGYI*, 24b-24c.

<sup>65</sup> *NGYI*, 25a.

similarity between Korea and China could be found in nature suggests that his bewilderment was largely in response to the sociocultural (or human-made, to put it differently) aspects of his surroundings. Still, the narrative focus on Kim's emotions, rather than on what he had actually witnessed and experienced, casts a shroud of mystery over his first days in Qing territory. We are left with the impression of an "otherly," topsy-turvy world, where the only things a Korean might be able to make out are the barbarism of its people and the sound of a cock's crow.

In contrast to Kim's claim that "everything" was a source of confusion, Pak Chiwŏn provides a less exaggerated and more nuanced account of his first impressions:

On looking through the palisade from outside, I saw many private houses built with five high crossbeams and reed-thatched roofs with strapped ridges. They were straight as a die and it looked as if both streets were lined by the ink-brush. Unlike the perimeter willow fencing with its street gate, the boundaries of the houses are brick walled... Whichever way you looked at the houses there was nothing primitive about their construction...

This palisade is only at the fringe of the eastern border of China. Suddenly my spirit was down when I imagined what it would be like in the busier parts, with their bustling streets. My whole body was throbbing with the thought that I might call a halt here in my journey, even turn around and go home. That moment I reflected on deeply and concluded that this was because I was, fleetingly, a jealous-minded individual... Now I am in a foreign country and have not even seen one ten-thousandth of it. I could not find the reason for harbouring such a foolish emotion as jealousy.<sup>66</sup>

With his expectation to see signs of the Manchus' barbarism overturned by the sophistication of their architecture, Pak finds himself disheartened and apprehensive about what the rest of his journey has in store. He is quick to chide himself for feeling jealous, deeming it foolish and unreasonable, but then turns to his servant Changbok for a second opinion: "How would you feel if you were born in Qing China?" he asks, to which Changbok replies, "I would not like it because Qing is a barbarous country, Sir."<sup>67</sup> Pak writes no more on the matter. We are left with a tense

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<sup>66</sup> *YHIG*, 558; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 23.

<sup>67</sup> *YHIG*, 558; Choe-Wall, *Jehol Diary*, 23.

balance between Pak's conscious efforts to be rational and his biases as a Korean, which Changbok's reply serves only to complicate. Letting Changbok have the final word seems to imply some reluctance on Pak's part to question the prejudice that had triggered his negative emotions in the first place; as the passage stands, the presumed barbarism of the Manchus remains largely up to the readers to interpret and judge for themselves.

If we turn now to Hong Taeyong, who has been missing from the present discussion, we are presented with a vastly different account of the people and the sights encountered at the palisade gate. Hong leaves little to the imagination, as he offers a vivid description of almost every type of person and thing observable at the gate and in its surrounding areas:

As the palisade gate is located in a desolate and impoverished borderland, the inhabitants of this area are crude and savage. They rely solely on Chosŏn for their livelihood: whenever an embassy arrives, they ask much higher prices for all their goods and charge a lot more for accommodation as well. They maintain neighborly relations with the people of Ŭiju and stay well informed of our country's affairs; their opportunistic nature and crafty ways are just as they are the norm in our country...

[In Fenghuang,] a great many shops lined the market streets with hardly any space in between them. Items such as chairs, desks, and signboards were all so beautiful that they dazzled before our eyes, while carts and horses congested all the roads. Clearly, this was a vibrant, prospering border town...

All the Beijing government officials stationed here in Fenghuang and all the merchants coming from near and far were self-serving, despicable celebrities. The Shanxi merchants were the only exception. Gentle and generous-hearted, they were hospitable and warm towards others; their good manners meant they would also bring out tea and fruit. The Beijing officials, on the other hand, would sit with their legs stretched out before them, behave arrogantly, and yell at every whim, making them quite unapproachable.<sup>68</sup>

Hong could have been describing a different place altogether. Notwithstanding the numerous generalizations he makes about the different social and ethnic groups, his account of the border town emerges as the most comprehensive and vivid; the evident care he has taken to capture the

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<sup>68</sup> *THYG*, Vol.5, 40-41.

town's essence, its diversity and vibrancy, makes this example particularly difficult to place within any one category of othering.

I have been hesitant to interpret the above passage strictly in terms of domesticating or foreignizing, because Hong's overriding concern appears to have been to inform his readers in the fullest and most balanced manner possible. Even in the supposedly "crude" and "savage" border people Hong finds something of the Korean character and spirit, and among the generally greedy and arrogant he still identifies a group deserving of a kinder appraisal. The lines between Us and Them, between Koreans and the so-called barbarians, are blurred by the complex web of interdependence and exchange existing at the two countries' borders, a phenomenon which hardly receives any attention from the other four writers. This striking difference leads me to speculate on one of the possible limitations (or dangers) of the bordering discourse: the discursive act of making a difference in space, in order to set the self apart from the other, appears to require certain compromises and omissions in order to be considered effective and successful. Often, I would suggest, the realities of sociocultural diversity and pluralism are most at stake. Kim's and Pak's accounts of the border region may be considered particularly successful examples of bordering discourse, on account of their uses of the domesticating and foreignizing strategies. Hong's account, on the other hand, shows less interest in differentiating between Koreans and non-Koreans than in identifying the finer points that make up the Other, thus eluding the same classification. To arrive at a more conclusive picture, however, further research using a larger sample of primary texts will be needed.

## Some Final Thoughts

Despite intimating at the outset that her study would demonstrate how and why later Chosŏn travelers perceived crossing the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region as “suffering an osmosis,” Eggert proves more concerned in her final analysis with behaviors and attitudes that may be attributed to “the nature of any border: its existence in and through the minds of people alone.”<sup>69</sup> Her somewhat abrupt shift in focus to the imaginary nature of borders may be attributed to the influence of Van Gennep’s model, which dictates that rites of territorial passage, in their final stage, serve to incorporate travelers into the new world they have entered. Eggert equates this incorporation with the Chosŏn travelers’ realization, whilst still in Fenghuang, that “all these misunderstandings [encountered in Qing China] were of a mainly linguistic nature,” and that what was more important was the “common cultural sphere” to which both Chinese and Koreans belonged.<sup>70</sup> Accounts of the onward journey from Fenghuang suggest, however, that such misunderstandings did not stop once Chosŏn travelers were past the border region, nor were they interpreted in more or less the same way, as Eggert would have us believe. Various processes of differentiation, foreignizing, and domesticating can be said to characterize the travelers’ subsequent encounters, which also makes Van Houtum and Van Naerssen’s notion of bordering as an “ongoing strategic effort” more applicable in this case.

If I were to write further on the topic of the Ŭiju-Fenghuang border region, I would need to look into commercial and trade activities, which apparently did take place at the palisade gate and in Fenghuang,<sup>71</sup> but are not discussed in any of the *yŏnhaengnok* selected for this paper. I

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<sup>69</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 77.

<sup>70</sup> Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” 75

<sup>71</sup> Yi Ch’ŏl-sŏng, *Chosŏn hugi tae-Ch’ŏng muyŏksa*, 50-54.



would also look at other types of primary sources — official records of the Chosŏn court, such as the *Tongmunhwigo* (Compendium of Diplomatic Documents) and *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* (Records of the Border Defense Council), as well as maps and any other pictorial representations — to get a better sense of the *yŏnhaengnok*'s place and function in the larger discourse on Chosŏn travel and Chosŏn-Qing relations. For now, however, I would like to end with a passage from Sŏ Kyŏngsun's travel account, because it points to where my next set of inquiries will begin:

Horns were usually sounded to scare away any tigers, but sometimes, the night could pass in total silence. Deputy General Han summoned one of the Ŭiju soldiers and asked him in a chiding voice, "It's been common practice for horns to be sounded through the night. Why has that been stopped?"

"Sir, I was not aware of such a practice," was the soldier's answer.

Still, Deputy General Han insisted, "It's common practice. I know it is, because I've seen it in Pak Chiwŏn's *Yŏrha ilgi*. How come you don't know of it?" Hearing this, the others were almost rolling on the ground with laughter.<sup>72</sup>

It is clear that Deputy General Han had read the *Yŏrha ilgi* without doubting the factuality of its contents. What is not so clear is why the others laughed, and why Sŏ chose to write about this incident. As I widen my search and delve deeper into my sources, I hope that the contours of this reader community, which I have only alluded to as "a reading public," will come into sharper focus and provide some answers to such questions.

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<sup>72</sup> *MGDI*, 269.

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*Kyōngsōng Scandal's Women*  
Between Free Love and Patriarchal Nationalism

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Word Count: 11.004

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## 1. Introduction

Loose sparkling dresses, pointy shoes, bobbed and curly hair, a pale face, black eye shadow and blood red lips. This is the image that comes to mind when I think about the 1920s and 1930s: a modern girl dancing the Charleston, enjoying her freedom and propagating this by her provocative appearance. This is, however, the represented image of a modern woman I have seen in films and dramas. Nevertheless, knowing that the image is a representation triggered my interest in the real women of the 1920s and 1930s who inspired representation in mass media. In my search for an interesting research topic I discovered the Korean new women and modern girls and saw their representation in films and television dramas released in the past ten years in South Korea. I saw sparkling dresses, female singers, grim war scenes, dying Japanese officials, and finally the stark contrast between a new woman dressed in a black and white *hanbok* and a beautiful, sexy modern girl. These are the two female protagonists of the Korean drama *Kyōngsōng Scandal* that aired in 2007 (KBS). This drama caught my eye as it appeared to be a historical drama but is in fact a romantic comedy with upbeat characters, comical scenes and of course a love story. However, by juxtaposing a new woman with a modern girl an interesting story line developed; and the usual pretty but jealous rich girl of romantic comedies turns out to be a devoted independence fighter who does not try to claim the male lead character for herself. This character made me think of all the female protagonists I had seen before and I realised that the modern girl in *Kyōngsōng Scandal* broke a pattern. This prompted me to research how women in Korean dramas are represented and how this might relate to notions of gender.

When I tried to find literature on gender and representation in Korean dramas I could hardly find any material. What I did find are several publications analysing gender inequality in production teams, and some discussing the

notions of womanhood of producers and writers of dramas. There seems to be, however, no substantial research on the representation of women in relation to gender. Therefore, it is relevant to ask the question: Is the representation of new women and modern girls in *Kyöngsöng Scandal* historically correct and how does this historical representation relate to notions of gender in contemporary South Korean society?

In this thesis I argue that by juxtaposing the new woman and modern girl in *Kyöngsöng Scandal* a stark contrast is made between a proper female gender role and a deviant one. I argue that this is a reflection of patriarchal male anxiety towards female empowerment. To ground my argument I will first discuss what representation is, how this relates to gender, and how gender theories relate to Korean society. Judith Butler's theory on gender and gender performativity are the foundation for my argument concerning the construction of gender roles. In the second chapter I will examine who the historical Korean new women and modern girls were and how the two female protagonists are represented. After that I will compare the historical figures with the represented ones. The differences and similarities form the basis of the last chapter in which I will discuss how the representation of history relates to contemporary society and how this representation is used to convey a message of proper and divergent gender roles for women.



## 2. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I will discuss the literature and theories of importance for my analysis of the drama *Kyōngsǒng Scandal*. I will discuss gender, representation and patriarchal society, as I argue that the notions of gender present in Korea are shaped by patriarchal ideals and represented in Korean television dramas. First I will discuss literature concerning representation in mass media. In this section I will examine how mass media is produced and how this influences what is represented. After that I will discuss influential theories on gender and the representation of gender in visual media. Finally, I will place the gender theories in the context of Korea by explaining the ideals of Confucianism and the gender differentiation in the past and present.

### 2.1 Representation and Visual Culture

In this day and age we are surrounded by visual culture. Being surrounded by images all the time must influence us in some way. In this section I raise the questions what representation is and how the mass media influences what is represented and shown to us through visual culture. I will discuss in short how mass media is produced and examine what it reflects. I will place the emphasis of this discussion on television and soap operas, as my research concerns the analysis of the Korean television drama *Kyōngsǒng Scandal*. For this research I will make use of Theodor Adorno's *The Culture Industry* (1991) and Stuart Hall's *Representation* (2013).

In "How to Look at Television" Adorno (1991) argues that in the production of television shows a pre-described set of formulas is used to create a program that appeals to the audience. According to Adorno, this pre-described set of formulas is used to produce a multi-layered program with a hidden message that is likely to sink in the spectator's conscious (165). By looking at a television show with a

hidden message the spectator is shown what to do or not to do and how to adjust to certain situation without realizing it (163). This, however, suggests that the spectator does not have a choice whether or not to adapt to the hidden message. In contrast, Stuart Hall argues that a cultural text, such as television shows, can either reinforce power structures or challenge those structures because producing a television show and watching it is a process in which the spectator has a choice in what to accept and what not (Hall 1999). Nevertheless, both Adorno and Hall agree on the fact that a cultural text is trying to convey a message to the spectator. The message conveyed to the audience differs per genre. Each genre has its own formulas and with these formulas the reaction of the spectator can be partially predicted (Adorno 1991, 169). Furthermore, besides genre, the music and imagery of a television show play an important role in the expected experience of the audience while watching. In order to understand the genre, music and imagery the spectator has to have a certain background to be able to understand what s/he is seeing (170).

This background is the cultural background of an individual. This means that an individual has learned the conventions of a culture —a group of people or society— and therefore knows how to place images in context with the knowledge already acquired (Hall 2013, 8). Furthermore, Hall argues that the genre, music and imagery in TV programmes are part of representation, as “representation is the production of the meaning of the concepts in our minds through language” (3). This language is not a literal language but a representational system of signs —sounds, images, words, objects, etc.— that we can relate to through the culture we grew up in. These signs resemble a real thing and are used to communicate meaning to others about real objects, people or events, or refer to imaginary things (1). The meaning is not in the object or in the word; it is the construction of meaning through repetitive use of a word that

fixes the meaning to an object or person (7). If repetitive use fixes meaning then this implies that a meaning can change through time (17). In addition, the construction of meaning through repetition does not only apply to words but also to images.

Roland Barthes explains in his article *Myth Today* how representation in images can be analysed. He argues that an image is a composition of signifiers that form a set of signs and this set can in turn be interpreted in relation to a wider cultural context. This means that an image can be analysed on different levels. First, there are signifiers —forms or shapes— that we can identify. After defining the signifiers these are combined into a system of signs with a literal message (2013, 34-35). This is called the denotation of the image —identifying the set of signs on a descriptive level. The last step is to analyse the system of signs by the so-called connotation. This means that the system of signs identified in the previous step is again analysed but this time in relation to cultural themes, concepts and meanings (Hall 2013, 23). The last step gives a broader meaning to the image and therefore we lay bare how the representation present in images and mass media can be analysed.

Christine Gledhill and Vicky Ball explore how representation relates to the television soap opera and how these television programs produce and circulate cultural meaning (2013, 335). Even though soap operas are fiction, spectators often describe how 'real' the soap opera and its characters are (336). This feeling of realism is achieved by incorporating events and public debates present in society as background for the narrative of a soap opera (338). Furthermore, the reality in a soap opera is a constructed reality that follows the norms, mores and common sense by the social world outside the fiction (356). Still, the dominant group of producers and distributors of a TV programme affect what is represented and are therefore the interpretations of the producers, even if the

ideas and situations represented are taken from society (344). However, during the production process the crew keeps in mind who the intended audience is, and this affects the final product (366). As Adorno argues, there is a fixed set of formulas used for the production of soap operas. This formula includes more female characters, stereotypical characters and a fixed movement in the narrative (Gledhill and Ball 2013, 362 - 363).

To summarise, representation is a set of signs interpreted in relation to culture. The meaning of signs originates from repeated use and with our cultural background we interpret these signs. In producing images, consisting of signs, the producers control what is produced and which a hidden message is conveyed to the audience. They keep the expected audience in mind and use sets of formulas per genre to produce an appealing TV show. The audience might experience the fictional images as 'real' if these images correspond with real debates and situations in society.

## 2.2 Gender Theory

In the previous section I have discussed what representation is and how representation works. However, I have not yet discussed in detail how representation is related to notions of gender. In this section I will elaborate more upon the relation between gender and representation. However, I will first discuss Judith Butler's influential theory on gender and gender performativity because her theory can be used to relate gender to the theories of representation I have discussed in the previous section. After discussing Butler's theory, I will examine widespread ideas about gender differentiation. And finally, I will discuss the relation between gender and representation.

In her influential book *Gender Trouble* (2007) Judith Butler argues that there is no such thing as a stable gender identity. She argues that gender is constructed

by dominant systems of power that produce subjects through prohibition, regulation, control and protection, and therefore structure the way we should behave to fit into the system (3). According to Butler, the dominant system that has shaped our gender identities is a patriarchal or masculine system in which reproduction has to be stabilised out of fear for homosexuality and the subsequent incest taboo<sup>1</sup>(95). This so-called heterosexual matrix requires a heterosexual desire and therefore institutes a masculine and feminine identity and gender (24). This binary system reflects a causal relation between sex, gender and desire, and is used to naturalise subjects; our desires and gender identity should be in accordance with our sex (31). For a female body this means that it is characterised in terms of the reproductive function and a “maternal instinct” (123). The notions of gender differentiation are inscribed on the surface of our bodies through the repetition of acts, gestures and desire (185). This behaviour humanizes individuals and when someone does not act in accordance with these discrete gender roles they are punished (190). However, it is possible to lay bare the construction of gender and transform it if we deform, fail to repeat, or parody the acts, gestures and desires of the dominant binary gender differentiation (192). Therefore, Judith Butler calls this “gender performativity,” which is of importance for my research as this implies that gender, like the meaning of signs discussed above, is constructed through repetitive acts and therefore the notions of gender can be changed. This implies that there is no gender core that corresponds with someone’s sex and therefore gives the opportunity to perform different gender roles than the one assigned to one’s sex (186).

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1 Fear for homosexuality and the incest taboo both originate in the Oedipus complex. More on Judith Butler’s ideas about the incest taboo, see: “IV. Gender complexity and the limits of identification” pp. 89-97, and “V. Reformulating prohibition as power” pp. 97–106 in *Gender Trouble* 2007.

That we 'perform' gender and can shift gender positions is agreed upon by various authors who relate this to visual culture, such as John Berger (*Ways of Seeing*, 2008), Laura Mulvey ("Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," 2013, and "Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Cinema' Inspired by King Vidor's *Duel in the Sun* (1946)," 1999), and Mary Ann Doane ("Film and the Masquerade: Theorizing the Female Spectator," 1999). However, I will first discuss the ideas of the binary gender differentiation as it is of importance to be able to distinguish between masculinity and femininity before discussing behaviour and performance of gender in relation to representation.

In *Unbearable Weight* (2003) Susan Bordo argues that the gender differentiation between male and female is based on long-standing ideas that still prevail in today's society. She argues that ever since Aristotle's time the male has been associated with the spirit, which is seen as active, and synonymous for knowledge and rationality. The female, on the other hand, has been associated with the body, which is synonymous for weighing the spirit down (5). This specific example implies that the woman/body is a temptress who manipulates the man/spirit away from true knowledge towards sexual desire. This classical image of a woman is often used in soap opera as the sexual temptress (6). However, Butler argues that this differentiation between male/spirit and female/body supports the patriarchal hierarchy in the subordination of the female (2007, 17). Bordo acknowledges the grip a system or culture has on our gender identity. She argues that women learn from infancy how to be docile through the beautification of their bodies and the nurture and care for others (2003, 17). In contrast to the stereotypical sexually active, rational and aggressive male, the stereotypical female is docile, delicate, sexually passive, childlike, non-assertive, helpless without a man, and emotional (2003, 170). In recent times women have had the opportunity to transcend from the inner home

to the public sphere. Nevertheless, this has not opened up new empowering possibilities for femininity but intensified the discipline of female bodies by make-up, dress and diet, argues Bordo (166).

In Berger's *Ways of Seeing* (2008) the disciplining of female bodies is explained as a woman turning herself into an object for men to see. Her gestures, voice, opinions and clothes express how she would like to be treated by men, as they survey her and will treat her according to her appearance. This is the result of women being born within a confined space, being subjected to men and the male gaze. Women are aware of the male gaze and act upon this as is expected of them (40-41). This exemplifies Butler's ideas of a dominant system defining gender roles and the appropriate gender performativity through repetitive acts and gestures as discussed above. This tendency is also present in visual culture—in art, advertising and television. When a woman is represented this is for the spectator's pleasure and therefore conforms to the rules of the male gaze and the female object of the gaze (Berger 2008, 58).

Berger analyses art, and specific art of nudes, but the discoveries of the male gaze and the subjection of women correspond with Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (2013) in which she argues that in cinema the spectator is actively looking at the film and therefore associates with a masculine identity and gaze (383). The female characters in the narrative film are often represented as the object of the gaze of both male protagonist and spectators (384). They are represented as a "passive image of perfection"—glamorous, sexualised and on display for everyone to see. This representation is, argues Mulvey, a result of the male fear for castration and the woman who embodies this threat (385). In order to divert the threat the embodiment has to be subjected to the male rule or gaze (386). As this article was criticized as it only discussed the masculine spectator Mulvey wrote "Afterthoughts" to discuss the female spectator and female

protagonist. In this article she argues that female spectators can identify with the masculine position through the gaze (1999, 122). However, the focus of her article is on the female protagonist who is unable to achieve a stable gender identity as she is torn between two conflicting desires of becoming a correct feminine wife or an independent masculine woman (123). This conflict often ends badly for the female protagonist, as she is unable to conform to either one of these positions. Nevertheless, the female protagonist is able to surpass the gender binary (128).

Mary Ann Doane also argues that it is possible to transcend the gender binary. A woman can take up masculinity to resist patriarchy. However, as the possession of masculinity by a woman is seen as deviant, she will exaggerate her femininity and coherent gestures in order to hide her “theft” of masculinity —she uses her body as disguise (1999, 139). The excess of femininity is associated with the femme fatale and seen as deviant too, as it does not conform to the stereotypes surrounding femininity as discussed above. Bordo argues that excessive femininity can empower women as it is in stark contrast with the “virtues of her gender” (2003, 179). However, a woman who pursues personal freedom or incorporates both masculinity and femininity is often in conflict with herself or her surroundings; she is punished, as she does not conform to the dominant system. This can lead to depression and physical illness in reality (Bordo 2003, 184), and death in cinema (Doane 1999, 140). In the narrative of television soap operas and film this deviant woman holds an important position too. In the standard romance and melodrama narrative, women have been characterised as rivals for male attention (Gledhill and Ball 2013, 360). This



often disrupts the movement of a drama<sup>2</sup> (364), which can be solved by “the expulsion of a disruptive woman” (365).

As is visible through my discussion of the literature related to gender and gender representation, Butler’s theory is emphasized by the literature that discusses the ideas of a binary gender differentiation and it is agreed upon that gender identity is constructed through repeated acts. Women embody the fear of castration, which is synonymous for the loss of power by men, and therefore have to be subjected to men. The stereotypical female gender constructed within a patriarchal system is docile and (sexually) passive. However, there is also a contrasting femininity that deviates with the stereotypical docile female gender role and is therefore deemed abnormal. In contrast to the obedient and passive women, a deviant woman does not comply with the dominant system and will therefore be punished. This is represented in cinema or TV where the divergent woman is driven out of the narrative, as she cannot remain an important character.

### **2.3 Korean Patriarchal Society**

In the discussion above I included Western literature and notions of gender. However, I argue that these theories can be used to describe the predominant ideas of gender roles in contemporary Korean society as well. As Butler states, the dominant system prescribes the rules and regulations within a society and the gender roles people ought to fulfil. In Korea the dominant system has been Neo-Confucian until the end of the Chosŏn period (1392-1910) and even today the patriarchal norms of Neo-Confucianism concerning gender roles and sexuality are prevailing in contemporary South Korean society.

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<sup>2</sup> A television drama has three-part movement: equilibrium – disruption - equilibrium restored. The disruption can be the result of another woman as rival in love (Gledhill and Ball 2013, 364).

The Confucian ideology in Chosŏn Korea concerned itself with how to establish morals, such as filial piety, obedience and self-sacrifice, and a harmonious relationship between people (Jung 2014, 44). In this patriarchal system men had full authority, and the male and female sex were tied to strict gender roles (S. Kim and Kim 2014, 16). The division of gender is similar to the gender binary discussed in the previous section; men were associated with heaven, which equals superiority, and women were associated with the earth and therefore seen as inferior to men. The gender division stretched further than just the hierarchal order of patriarchal authority. A woman was confined to the domestic sphere where she had the duty to take care of the children, her husband, and his parents (Y. Kim 2005, 28). Furthermore, she was characterised in terms of bearing a son, as only a son could inherit the family name and property (Y. Kim, 29; Kendall 1996, 58). In this regard Confucianism rigidly controlled the sexuality of women. Not only by naming her reproductive function but also by her confinement to the inner sphere in order to protect her chastity—a woman's greatest virtue. From an early age on girls were separated from boys and confined to a limited space within the home (Jung 2014, 44). The government would reward women that protected their chastity at all cost. This reward often affected a woman's family as well, and therefore her sexuality became the concern of her whole family (45). This is, as Kenneth Wells argues, the gendered construction of Korean society through defining human functions, architectural design and spatial division (1999, 193).

The definition of gender roles stated above concern the Confucian ideals in Chosŏn Korea. However, some of these ideals are still visible in contemporary Korean society. Women used to be confined to the inner sphere, yet there is still a tendency to keep women out of the public area and think of their participation in the public as un-feminine (Y. Kim 2005, 33). This is particularly visible in the

workplace where male employers refrain from hiring women or do not hire women for managerial positions in order to preserve their feminine qualities. If a woman marries and starts a family she often stops working as patriarchal ideals still prescribe that the husband works and the wife takes care of the home and raises the children. Among both women and men there is a majority who believe that the woman should take care of the house and the man should provide the income (36). The strong patriarchal ideal of the role of the woman in the home is not only acted upon by the Korean population but also emphasised by the government in recent policies concerning the declining birth rate (S. Kim and Kim 2014, 90). Government policies concerning the family are a result of Confucian tradition as well. The Korean nation is seen as the extension of the family, which implies that if there is a crisis in the family, this will lead to a crisis in the nation (91). However, the most prevailing values of Confucianism are the double standard of sexuality and the virtue of bodily chastity for women (Kwon 1998, 392). In contrast to men, women are not allowed to have extramarital affairs and they don't have to be an exciting partner for their husband; a woman is supposed to be passive and ignorant about sex (Y. Kim 2005, 41-42). This corresponds with the binary gender division discussed above. Nonetheless, a sexual relationship before marriage is getting more and more accepted by the younger Korean population. However, chastity is still seen as an important virtue of women. This means that when a woman is sexually violated she will often not report this, as this is a violation of her chastity and this still bears a social stigma (43). Jung argues that the loss of chastity equals the loss of identity as this jeopardizes the future status of a woman as wife and mother (2014, 48).

The dominant ideals discussed above have been present in Korea since the Chosŏn period. As Butler has argued, the dominant patriarchal system has shaped the notion of gender roles and virtues of womanhood. The notions of

gender in Korea correspond with the notions of masculinity and femininity in Western society. In Korea these notions originated in Neo-Confucianism. Today these might not be as rigid as they used to be but it still places social constraints on women that do not apply to men in terms of profession and sexuality.

In the three sections of this chapter I have examined and discussed representation, gender and Korean patriarchal society. The methods of representation and the repetitive acts of assigning meaning to objects and persons is similar to the method of assigning gender roles in accordance with one's sex. In both, the dominant authority decides what needs to be represented and through continuous encounters with the proper behaviour and representation through visual media people start to behave as is expected of them. The 'proper' performance of gender in both Western and Korean culture is divided by a differentiation between the passive female and the active male but this binary misses out on the *kisaeng*/mistress. I would argue that the binary is more complex, but the patriarchal society is upheld by socially disempowering the women who did not comply with the docile female. In Korea the dominant authority that has shaped these notions of the binary opposition of gender has been and still is a patriarchy that originated in Neo-Confucianism. The representation of proper gender roles is often displayed in soap operas and cinema, where the proper docile woman is rewarded for her behaviour, while the deviant woman has to disappear or die. In the next chapters I will examine if the representation of proper and problematic gender roles also applies to the Korean drama *Kyöngsöng Scandal*.

### 3. Modern Girls, New Women and *Kyöngsöng Scandal*

In this chapter I will examine how the representation of the two female lead characters, Na Yögyöng and Ch'a Song Ju, is related to the historical figures of modern girls and new women, as two types are juxtaposed in this drama. In the first section I will discuss the modern girls and new women of the 1920s and 1930s in colonial Korea (1910-1945) and after that I will discuss the two female lead characters of *Kyöngsöng Scandal*. I question whether the representation of the modern girl and new woman is similar to the historical figures or whether there are differences visible. I will conclude this chapter with a comparison between the representation and history to define similarities and differences.

#### 3.1 Historical Modern Girls and New Women

At the end of the nineteenth century amidst a modernising world, Korea saw the necessity to modernise as well. Especially the rapidly modernising neighbour Japan stimulated Korea to do the same. As discussed in the previous chapter, Korean society was built on strict Neo-Confucian notions of gender division; women were confined to the inner sphere of the family and home, whereas men were allowed in the public sphere (Wells, 1999: 193). According to the Neo-Confucian ideology women were to obey their fathers, husbands, and eventually, sons; they were the property of men (Kwon 1998, 391). Furthermore, women were supposed to protect their chastity and their confinement to the home served to do just that (392). Nevertheless, Korea recognised that women in other modernising countries received education in the public sphere. It was therefore decided that the modernisation of Korea could only be achieved if Korean women would become modern through education, following the Western example. Educated women would be knowledgeable and would thus be able to raise and educate their children better, and support their husbands who could

then build the nation. This would eventually lead to the modernisation of the Korean nation. This was the so-called ideal of the good wife and wise mother (*hyŏnmo yangch'ŏ*) (Hong 2008, 43-45). However, this ideal was not to transform women into the equals of men (Jeong, 2007: 51). As the nation can be seen as an extension of the family this ideal kept traditional gender roles in place. By contributing to the development of the nation a woman would still be bound to her traditional role as serving the patriarch (H. Choi, 2012: 5). Nevertheless, education did enable women to move from the inner quarters to the outside. Some higher-class women even had the chance to study abroad (Jeong 2007, 54; Kwon 1998, 387). The women who studied abroad experienced modern culture, Western fashion, and notions of feminism first hand, whereas women back in Korea read about foreign feminism in books translated into Korean, and were introduced to modern fashion and culture through printed mass media (H. Choi 2012, 10). Furthermore, in 1910 Korea lost its sovereignty when it became a colony of Japan. This loss of sovereignty negatively affected the male authority in Korea (Jeong 2007, 41); they were not longer the centre of power in the family and the nation because they were often absent in the home as they were studying abroad, had a job in the capital city or were recruited to fight in the Pacific War (J. Kim 2008, 85). The foreign notions of feminism and emancipation, the possibility to study, the loss of sovereignty of Korea and the absence of men enabled women to speak up and criticize the patriarchal ideology and the connected unequal rules for men and women (Hong 2008, 56).

Feminist women in Korea became active in the 1910s, but the March First Movement in 1919 was the defining moment. So many women participated in this movement that the visibility of the modern woman and the notion of emancipation and gender equality became higher than ever (H. Choi 2012, 2). In the 1920s the Japanese colonial rule relaxed the regulations on censorship in

Korean mass media, which gave educated men and women the possibility to discuss a variety of topics concerning love, marriage, divorce and gender equality in printed mass media (H. Choi 2012; Lee 2011, 92). The term “New Women” originates in 1925 where it first appeared in the magazine *Sin Yŏsŏng*, used to describe the movement of women striving for emancipation (S. Kim 2005, 40).

In the 1920s the new women were associated with the image of the female student and described as educated women who actively promoted free love, free marriage, divorce, economic independence, and gender equality. Women with these kinds of feminist ideas came from all layers of Korean society (Lee 2011, 107). At the same time the phenomenon of the new woman or modern girl was also visible in other countries around the world, for instance in Japan and China (Modern Girl Around the World Research Group 2008, 2). However, Korean modern girls differed from those in for example Japan. The American flapper-style modern girl with bobbed hair, loose dress, flat body and long legs, and flashy make-up type of girl originated in the new middle class in Japan (S. Kim 2005, 43). Many women in Korea could simply not afford this style of fashion (45). The attire that most new women in Korea were associated with was a modernized *hanbok* with a white top and dark coloured one-piece skirt, and high-heeled shoes (S. Kim 2005, 44; Suyu and nŏmŏ 2005, 60). This style of dress is in fact similar to the uniform that female students of Ehwa Womans University were wearing in the 1920s and 1930s (Suyu and nŏmŏ 2005, 61). The bobbed hairstyle was popular among Korean women; they cut their hair because it was convenient, but it was thought of as defying traditional hairstyles associated with male oppression (S. Kim 2005, 48; Lee 2011, 98; Suyu and nŏmŏ 2005, 60). Besides hairstyle and fashion these women enjoyed a lifestyle in the public sphere; they visited café’s, restaurants, the theatre, and went picnicking near the Han River (Suyu and nŏmŏ 2005, 55-103).

The Korean modern women were educated and aspired to hold the same position in society as men did. In order to do so they sought economic independence through employment. Appropriate professions for women were those associated with femininity, such as teachers or nurses. Considered less appropriate were jobs such as café-girls or bus-girls, which were compared to the work of prostitutes and *kisaeng* (Hong 2008, 48; Jeong 2007, 59). Even though these women were actively trying to change the notions of gender roles and become independent from men, they hardly succeeded. The women who did in fact earn enough money often had to support their families, as the male breadwinner was absent (S. Kim 2005, 45). Furthermore, most new women could not pursue their own ideals of free love and marriage, as they usually fell in love with modern men who were already married off at an early age (Jeong 2007, 46-47).

In the 1930s the activist character of the new women had disappeared to the background. Some women were still busying themselves with emancipation but the general public was not interested anymore. During this decade the new women played an entertaining role in stories of love affairs and love triangles (S. Kim 2005, 49). In these stories they were portrayed as loose women without standards, eager to indulge in Western consumer goods. It was during this time that the term 'modern girl' was coined by conservative men to describe this 'bad' new woman (H. Choi 2012, 11). The depicted modern girl was a frivolous girl, willing to give up her chastity and leach off of a male family member or rich benefactor to obtain the newest fashion and cosmetics from the west (H. Choi 2012, 73; S. Kim 2005, 49). In reality, however, there was no clear distinction between the modern girl and the new woman in Korea. In fact both were one and the same. A Western attire and mindless consumerism could only be afforded by some high-class women and entertainers but most of the Korean women were



lower class and could only adopt some parts of the Western fads introduced to the masses through Japanese colonial rule, similar to the new women of the 1920s (S. Kim 2005, 46). The objectives of these women —free love and independence— prevailed but were deemed bad by conservative men (H. Choi 2012, 12). Therefore, they created the image of a frivolous woman without any moral standards that dominated the mass media of the 1930s.

### 3.2 *Kyöngsöng Scandal's Women*

In the Korean drama *Kyöngsöng Scandal* the historical figures of the modern girl and new woman are used to create two very different female protagonists. The first of the two women introduced is new woman Na Yögyöng. She is the owner of a bookshop where she also teaches children at night. She is the daughter of an independence fighter who died leading a revolt against the Japanese imperial rule. Yögyöng is trying to follow in her father's footsteps. She advocates the independence of Korea without unnecessary deaths. She will fight for freedom and even sacrifice her own life if necessary. As long as the country is under Japanese colonial rule she shall not marry and stay chaste, as she does not want to raise children in an occupied nation. As a spirited anti-colonial Korean woman she dons a modernised *hanbok* with a black skirt and white top, she wears her hair in a traditional braid and refrains from using cosmetics. She joins the independence movement *Aemuldan* and she only wears something other than her *hanbok* when she needs a disguise during missions or when fleeing from the police. Her dress and occupation suggest that she is a new woman but in the colonial capital represented in the drama, Yögyöng appears to be the only young woman who does not indulge in consumerism of Western fashion and cosmetics or enjoys spending time in a dancehall or café. Everyone and everything around her seems to have become modern. On the other hand,

Yögyöng disagrees with anything modern and Western as it distracts people from the reality that the Japanese government is suppressing them. Yögyöng's noticeable appearance and strong anti-colonial and anti-modern ideals have earned her the nickname "Chomaja;" Chosŏn's Last Girl. Nonetheless, Yögyöng does believe in free love and eventually falls in love with one of the male lead characters, modern boy Sŏn U Wan. Together with him she experiences dating life. However, they are perceived as an odd couple, as it is unusual for a modern boy and new woman to date. In the end, Wan joins the fight for independence inspired by Yögyöng's passionate ideals and involvement in independence movement. Whenever Yögyöng is with Wan she enjoys spending time outside but Yögyöng spends most of her time in her bookshop or at home. If she goes out this is usually because she is on her way to meet someone, to help someone out as a proper woman would do, or to execute one of her missions.

In contrast with the rather old-fashioned and stern Na Yögyöng, there is modern girl Ch'a Song Ju, a beautiful *kisaeng* and at the same time the most deadly assassin of the independence movement *Aemuldan*. Ch'a Song Ju seems to be a carefree and frivolous modern girl but she has a dark past that inspired her to become a freedom fighter. Sold by her father to a *kisaeng* pavilion to pay off his debt to a Japanese loan shark, she ends up being raped by a customer. She kills her rapist and flees to Russia to become an assassin to fight for Korean independence. After her return ten years later she has become the main assassin of *Aemuldan*. Her targets are either Japanese officials or high-ranking Koreans collaborating with the Japanese. As a disguise she works as the most beautiful and popular *kisaeng* of Kyöngsöng at the Myöngbin'gwan pavilion. This gives her the opportunity to meet her future targets and figure out how to assassinate them. When she is at the pavilion entertaining her clients, she is dressed in a traditional colourful hanbok with her hair in a traditional chignon. Whenever she

leaves the pavilion, she dresses in modern clothes, showing much skin. She puts on heavy make up and her hair is either bobbed or curled. During her missions as an assassin she wears a leather motor suit —pants, jacket, helmet, and goggles. Ch'a Song Ju dons various attires and therefore her clothing does not seem to be related to her anti-colonial ideals. In contrast with Yögyöng, Song Ju is self-assured whereas Yogyong is uncertain (of herself). This is an important additional distinction which makes Song Ju stand out and interestingly adds to the stereotype of what a proper women should be: weak. Furthermore, Song Ju enjoys spending time in the public sphere on her own or with others and it does not distract her from her leading position in the independence movement. She loves to drink coffee and cocktails, dance and sing in dancehalls and play mah-jong until deep in the night. However, in addition to her hardship in the past, Song Ju is in love with I Su Hyön the Japanese government official, who eventually reveals himself as the leader of *Aemuldan*. When they can finally be together they are caught by the police. In order to save the movement, Song Ju reveals herself as the leader of *Aemuldan* so Su Hyön can continue his work for the nation.

As made clear by the above descriptions the characters Na Yögyöng and Ch'a Song Ju differ greatly. They have different personalities, ideologies and desires, and yet they become friends and work well together in the independence movement. This shows that it is possible to compare these two women in relation to the representation of specific gender roles they fulfil.

### 3.3 Comparison History and Representation

The representation of the new woman and modern girl in the Korean drama differs from the historical figures. The historical new women and modern girls advocated free love and marriage, and gender equality inspired by Western and

Japanese feminist ideals. They wanted to pass from the inner sphere to the public area, shaking off the restraints placed on them by Neo-Confucian ideology during the Chosŏn period. Education and economic independence were thought of as potential ways to get out of the dominant patriarchal system. Fashion and hairstyle were methods to express their modern ideas. However, their progressive behaviour was not accepted without complaints. In the 1930s, conservative men started writing about the low morals of these modern women and created the stereotypical modern girl who indulges in consumerism and has low sexual morals similar to a prostitute or entertainer in contrast to the activist new women of the 1920s.

In *Kyŏngsŏng Scandal*, however, the two female lead characters are not actively advocating free love and gender equality, but participate in the underground fight for independence, in contrast to the widely visible historical new women who participated in the March First Movement of 1919. It seems as if free love is already an accepted fact of the colonial era represented in *Kyŏngsŏng Scandal*, as both Na Yŏgyŏng and Ch'a Song Ju pursue their love interests. Furthermore, the two protagonists are juxtaposed by creating two contrasting characters, one based on the activist character of new women of the 1920s and the other on the stereotypical promiscuous modern girl of the 1930s. The stereotypes are exaggerated to emphasise the contrast between the two women, for instance, by their clothing, leisure, occupation and morals. However, their representation does seem to have little relevance to the historical characters as the ideals of the women from the 1920s and 1930s already seem to be achieved or of little importance for the women in *Kyŏngsŏng Scandal*. In addition, at first the activist new woman of the 1920s is ridiculed by the representation of Na Yŏgyŏng as the only surviving anti-colonial activist woman in *Kyŏngsŏng*. However, her traditional values of anti-modernism and anti-

colonialism are rewarded with active participation in *Aemuldan* and her relationship with Sŏn U Wan, who becomes an independence fighter as well to protect Yŏgyŏng. On the other hand, Ch'a Song Ju's activism is unknown to people outside the movement, as is in line with the stereotypical modern girl of the 1930s who was thought to be indifferent to activism. Nonetheless, there is a similarity between the historical women and their representations in the drama: both women in the drama earn their own wages, as there is no male breadwinner to support them.

As discussed above there are several differences between the historical modern girls and new women and the ones represented in the Korean drama. The attire and lifestyle of the women is used to suggest a distinction between the new women and modern girls where in actuality there was no real distinction, except for the stereotypes spread by printed mass media. The women in the colonial era advocated gender equality and independence for women rather than independence for the Korean nation, whereas the drama suggests that both women are actively involved in the fight for freedom. As there are some major differences between the historical women and their representations I will examine why these differences are present in the next chapter.

## 4. Dramas and Korean Society Today

As has become clear in the comparison of the last chapter, the representation of the two female lead characters in *Kyöngsöng Scandal* is not historically correct. In this chapter I will examine why the representation differs from the historical figures by discussing theories on the representation of history in cinema and TV. Then, I will examine how the differences can be understood as a representation of proper and deviant gender roles and how this relates to the still prevailing ideals in contemporary South Korean society as discussed in the first chapter.

### 4.1 Historical Representation

The historical representation of modern girls and new women is not correct but why not? As I discussed in the first chapter, a representation includes dominant debates in society that are incorporated in TV series. This means that a historical representation is just that —a representation. However, this does suggest that there might be a reason why the colonial period is used as backdrop for the story of *Kyöngsöng Scandal*. First of all, the representation of history in a film or TV drama is a reflection of a social or cultural situation in which the visual material was produced (Landy 2001, 3). According to Younghan Cho and Kyoung-yeon Moon, this drama is produced in a period that several films and TV dramas were released with the colonial era as its backdrop. Cho argues that in recent times an anti-Japanese sentiment is often present in debates about Korea's modernisation and this is reflected in the release of several TV dramas and films including the colonial era, focussing on anti-colonial movements (Cho 2012, 647). Some of these productions made use of unconventional storylines. *Kyöngsöng Scandal* fits the description Cho gives, as it has been marketed as a "historical-fusion-drama" that combines history and contemporary customs, language and audio-visual material (Moon 2013, 348). This kind of drama can

also be called a 'retro-drama' in which history is fused with the present (Drake 2003, 188). If history in films and TV dramas is used to represent dominant sentiment and cultural situations in the society in which the drama was created, similar to representation discussed in the first chapter, this must mean that the representation of the historical figures as seen in *Kyōngsǒng Scandal* says something about the Korean society today. This raises the question how the representation of modern girls and new women is related to today's society and how this representation is used to define the notions of gender roles.

As discussed in the first chapter, there are still patriarchal regulations and ideals present in contemporary Korean society. Therefore, it can be said that women today face similar situations and attitudes as the women in the colonial era. Kim Kyeong-il writes:

"The issues raised by new women take on a different level considering the fact that women are no longer a minority, isolated, or considered passive [...] Nevertheless, the reality they face reflects the history that existed almost a century ago in one form or another. [...] the idea of equality and mutual respect between the opposite sexes is still met with certain disagreement, negation, hostility, apathy, or fatigue." (K. Kim 2008, 11)

This suggests that women today still have to deal with gender inequality and prejudices about femininity and proper gender roles. Youna Kim, Nancy Abelman, and the Korean Women's Development Institute (KWDI) among others affirm this. For instance, women these days have access to the same education as men. In fact, in South Korea more women than men graduate from university. However, there are less women attending graduate school and even less pursuing a PhD. degree (Joo, Song and Park 2014, 20). When working, women face gender inequality as well. For doing the same job as men women tend to earn far less than men, even if their qualifications are similar or better

(37-40). Therefore it is hard for women to live an economical independent life, similar to the women from the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, many women quit their job to raise their children (Y. Kim 2005, 36; Joo, Song and Park 2014, 35). The education of children is part of a woman's task while raising a child and a good educated woman makes a better educator for the child (Abelmann 2005, 106). This resonates the ideal of 'the good wife and wise mother' from the colonial era. However, the modern girls and new women did challenge the dominant patriarchal system by pursuing free love and personal independence. Youna Kim argues that young Koreans are already challenging notions of sex before marriage (2005, 43). This suggests that Korean women today might be trying to break free from the patriarchal restraints as well.

I argue, however, that defying the patriarchal system is only partially visible in the drama *Kyöngsöng Scandal*, as this is a drama created by male producers. In my opinion the drama represents male anxiety. As a dominant system fears to be challenged by another system and therefore sets its strict regulations and prohibitions, the patriarchal system in Korea fears a strong and sexual femininity, and gender equality. This has influenced the way in which the two female lead characters are represented. Na Mi-Su argues that male producers tend to represent drama in accordance with the ideal female gender role. Their female characters are often obedient, docile, noble, innocent and pure women, whereas female producers tend to represent more independent and broadminded women (2011, 177). This is also applicable to female writers but the script written still has to be accepted and revised by the production crew that often consists of only men (183). Because of this the storylines are edited to conform to the dominant male system. Therefore, the representations in dramas are shaped by the producer and extended team and hardly by the writer (Abelmann 2005, 104).



The story of *Kyōngsōng Scandal* is written by a woman, this might have influenced a part of the representation of the female characters. However, the producer is male and therefore I argue that his perspective and final editing have influenced the representation of the modern girl Ch'a Song Ju and new woman Na Yōgyōng. In the next section I will discuss several scenes and characteristics of the two female protagonists that exemplify my statement.

#### 4.2 Proper and Deviant Gendered Characters

There are several scenes in the drama that reflect the theories of gender identity, gender performance and binary gender differentiation discussed in the first chapter of this paper. In this section I will discuss specific scenes and characteristics of the two female protagonists that exemplify these theories. I argue that even though Na Yōgyōng seems to be a strong and independent woman, she represent a docile and obedient woman; a woman who meets the Korean ideals of the good wife and wise mother. Her opposite is modern girl Ch'a Song Ju, a femme fatale who is both strong in mind and body; she is the embodiment of male anxiety.

First, the attire both women wear can be associated with specific gender roles. The black and white *hanbok* Na Yōgyōng wears is historically associated with the female student and therefore with the new women. However, in *Kyōngsōng Scandal* this kind of clothing can be associated with 'old-fashioned' ideals of national freedom and chastity; Yōgyōng is not deemed attractive when wearing the *hanbok* and it is a symbol of her anti-Japanese and anti-modern ideals. The scene in which Yōgyōng dresses in a modern outfit, complete with high heels, make-up and a new hairdo, to distract a high-ranking collaborator in order to assassinate him, exemplifies this. In this particular scene Yōgyōng is transformed from a plain girl to an attractive young woman who is thought to be sexually

available (episode 6). In comparison, other young women who dress in Western clothing all appear to be sexually active (see for instance episode 1 & 9). Ch'a Song Ju changes her attire in accordance with the place she is visiting or staying at. When she spends time in the public sphere she wears Western clothing and whenever she is inside the *kisaeng* pavilion, she wears a traditional colourful *hanbok*. I argue that both kinds of dress can be associated with her sexuality. The *hanbok* she wears differs from the one Yögyöng dons. It is a piece of clothing worn by a *kisaeng* —an entertainer for men— and can therefore be associated with sexuality, whereas the Western clothes can be interpreted as a symbol of her own liberated sexuality as a stereotypical modern girl discussed in the previous chapter.

Furthermore, that Ch'a Song Ju is sexually active and Na Yögyöng is not is touched on throughout the drama. Whenever Sön U Wan tries to seduce Yögyöng, she hesitates and won't do anything else than a bit of kissing. She has also decided to stay chaste until after marriage, which will only come to pass if the Korean nation is liberated (episode 14). Her chastity is therefore bound to the fate of the nation, which suggests that Yögyöng's sexuality is still in hands of the patriarch. She is chaste and will remain this until the nation allows her to be otherwise, like a good daughter. Ch'a Song Ju on the other hand has been sexually active for a long time and even chooses her own love before the fate of the nation. In the fifteenth episode Song Ju and I Su Hyön can finally be together and consummate their relationship before the nation is liberated, defying the patriarchal system.

Also, the spaces we can associate both women with differ per character. Na Yögyöng is often in her bookshop or at home, whereas Ch'a Song Ju prefers the café or dancehall. This suggests that we can associate Yögyöng with the inner sphere, as the bookshop can be interpreted as her second home. Song Ju can be

associated with the public sphere. As the inner sphere is deemed appropriate for women and the public sphere deemed unfit, this implies that Ch'a Song Ju again defies the patriarchal system.

And finally, both female protagonists are active in the independence movement. However, their participation differs greatly. Ch'a Song Ju is an assassin who can assemble a gun in mere seconds (episode 4). She can shoot and even fight with her bare hands if necessary. She does not need protection; her protection is her position as one of the most influential *kisaeng* in Kyōngsōng and she uses her high-ranking connections to avoid prosecution. Na Yōgyōng, on the other hand, does not know how to shoot and is hardly able to protect herself. Every time she is attacked she has to be saved by either Sōn U Wan or I Su Hyōn and when they cannot protect her she gets beaten up. Na Yōgyōng's role in *Aemuldan* is not that of an assassin or active fighter but that of a teacher. She will teach the ideology of the independence movement to guerrilla fighters in Manchuria (episode 16).

I argue that Na Yōgyōng is the ideal feminine woman. She is helpless, chaste, obedient, and able to educate the guerrilla fighters in order for the nation to bloom, like a good wife and mother. Her attire and distaste of modern lifestyle represent her proper gender role as she conforms to the nation and defies sexuality. In contrast, Ch'a Song Ju is an example of a deviant woman. She is strong, independent, a killer, sexually active, and finally chooses love over nation. I argue that Song Ju expresses excessive femininity as she possesses masculine qualities and defies the patriarchal system. She is a threat for the masculine identity of men and therefore, she has to be punished. In the fifteenth episode, after her reunion with I Su Hyōn, Ch'a Song Ju is shot by the colonial police, and dies. She acts as if she is the leader of the independence movement and in this way sacrifices herself in order for *Aemuldan* and I Su Hyōn to fight on for

freedom of the nation. I argue that her sacrifice is both her punishment for her defiance and her way of accepting the patriarchy. In the end she yields and conforms to the dominant patriarchal nation. This the hidden message of the producers of the drama; it tells female viewers that if you conform to the patriarchal system you will be awarded with life and love (Yögyöng leaves to Manchuria together with Sön U Wan), whereas defying the system will result in punishment.

In this chapter I used the differences between history and the representation of history to place the two female protagonists of *Kyöngsöng Scandal* in perspective with South Korean society today. As discussed there are some similarities between Korean women today and the women from the colonial era. Furthermore, anti-Japanese sentiment dominates public debates in Korea. Because of this the colonial era is a popular background used in films and TV dramas. However, as many of the films and dramas are produced by a team of which the majority is male, the representation of female characters might reflect male anxiety instead of a liberating perspective on womanhood. By discussing several scenes and characteristics I have illustrated my argument and conclude that by juxtaposing a new woman and modern girl the male producers created two examples of femininity that they use to propagate proper and deviant female behaviour.

## 5. Conclusion

In this thesis I have argued that the representation of the two female protagonists in the Korean drama *Kyōngsǒng Scandal* represents dominant ideas of proper and deviant gender roles in contemporary Korean society. I have discussed how representation works and how producers use representation to convey a hidden message to the audience. This hidden message I have examined is the dominant notion of the binary gender differentiation that is present in both Western and Korean culture. Gender differentiation is constructed by a dominant system that turns people into subjects by prescribing prohibitions and regulations. Anyone that does not conform to the system will be punished. The dominant system that prescribes notions of gender in Korea is based on the Neo-Confucian ideology of the Chosŏn period. However, a part of the gender division made in Neo-Confucianism still prevails in Korea today. In this gender differentiation women are perceived as docile, passive, helpless, caring and associated with the inner sphere, while men are thought to be active, aggressive, rational and associated with the public.

However, new women and modern girls challenged the Korean patriarchal ideology and the related gender division in the 1920s and 1930s during the colonial era. The Korean women received education in order to become good wives and wise mothers to serve the nation and help the country modernise. However, their education enabled these women to read materials concerning foreign feminism. These ideas spurred Korean women to pursue gender equality, free love and independence. They cut their hair and adopted Western style of clothing if their budget allowed it. This in turn led to conservative men condemning the women for their progressive behaviour and turned them into a stereotype of consumerism and low sexual moral.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, women still face similar situations as the women in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. There are still restrictions placed on women participating in the public sphere and female sexuality. The ideal of the good wife and wise mother of the 20<sup>th</sup> century can still be recognised in the educated women who end up raising and educating their children. In order to change these dominant notions of gender differentiation, the circle of repetitive acts, gestures and desires has to be broken.

The producers of *Kyōngsǒng Scandal* have used two symbols of feminine activism to convey a hidden message of what they assume are proper and deviant feminine gender roles. Male producers tend to represent docile and conservative women rather than broadminded and independent women. By emphasising the stereotypes of the modern girl and magnifying the new woman's supposed role as good wife and wise mother a narrative is created in which the deviant female character has to meet her inevitable fate as is common in cinema and soap operas. The obedient and chaste woman is rewarded with a happily ever after, whereas the sexually active and independent woman is shot and dies. This conveys to the viewer that behaving obediently and choosing one's country before love is rewarded, whereas independence and sexuality are punished. The above therefore confirms my argument that a chaste and obedient woman, who serves her country and family, is the ideal gender type in today's patriarchal Korea, whereas an active and independent woman who chooses personal gain over the nation is deemed inappropriate and a threat for male authority.

In conclusion, the narrative of this particular drama has portrayed two female protagonists who are not the usual rivals in love but fight side by side for the freedom of their country. They are somewhat free to love freely, work *together* with men in *Aemuldan* and pursue personal desires. Furthermore, Ch'a Song Ju is

not portrayed in a negative way, she is independent, strong and is able to protect herself. Even though she dies at the end of the drama, this might still imply that notions of appropriate gender roles are slowly changing through the depiction of strong female characters that do not negatively influence the other female protagonist.

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# 개화파의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식변화

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개요: 근대에 이르러 서방문명이 점차 동방에 전해짐에 따라 근대 국가개념도 전 해졌으며, 이는 동아시아 사회에 매우 큰 영향을 불러일으켰다. 특히 전통적으로 조공관계에 있던 조선에 대한 영향이 막대하였으며, 점차 독립에 대한 인식도 변화 하였다. 특히 개화파는 조선왕조 말기에 갑신정변, 갑오개혁, 독립협회와 만민공동 회 등 일련의 조선 독립자주를 실현하기 위한 운동을 주도한 세력이다. 그리고 이 세 차례의 운동을 영도한 대표인물이 바로 김옥균, 김홍집, 서재필이다. 그들의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식을 고찰해보면 점차 심화되고 성숙되어가는 것을 느낄 수 있다. 애초의 단지 청나라와의 조공관계에서 벗어나는 것만이 독립이라는 인식으로부터 점차 오직 내부적인 정치개혁으로 자강을 도모함으로써 독립을 획득하여야 하는 인식, 종국적으로 사상적인 측면, 경제, 외교 등 여러 면에서 독립을 실현해야 하는 인식에 이르렀다.

본고는 김옥균, 김홍집, 서재필 등 개화파들의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식과 실천활동을 결합하여 개화파의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식이 세 단계의 변화를 거쳤음을 논하고자 한다. 즉 매 시기 부동한 실천목표를 갖고 있고, 부동한 실천방식으로 자신의 ‘독립’ 사상을 실천하였다. 또한 그들의 실천활동이 실패한 원인을 분석하고 비록 최종적으로 실패하였지만, 근대 복잡한 국제관계 속에서 나라의 자주독립을 위한 그들의 노력만큼은 긍정적인 평가를 해주어야 한다고 본다.

주제어: 개화파 , 독립 , 김옥균, 김홍집 , 서재필

## 1. 들어가는 말

새 항로가 개척됨에 따라 전 세계 각지로 서방의 세력이 확장되기 시작하였고, 그에 따라 동방의 문호도 하나, 둘씩 점차 열리기 시작하였다. 이와 동시에 서방의 정치, 경제, 문화 등 각종 새로운 문명들이 물밀듯이 몰려들었다. 이런 배경 하에 근대 국가개념이 전해짐에 따라 동아시아 사회, 특히 조공관계에 있던 한반도에 대

한 영향은 전대미문이었다. 개화파는 조선왕조 내에서 서방문물을 받아들이고 세계에 눈을 뜬 선진적인 지식인이라고 할 수 있다. 그리고 개화파 내부도 서방문명을 받아들이는 경로, 전통적인 유교에 대한 태도, 정부와의 관계 등 요소에 의하여 급진개화파와 온건개화파로 나뉜다.

특히 1876년 강화조약이 체결된 후 조선은 아무런 준비 없이 개방정책을 실시하였으며, 일본의 조선에 대한 세력침투도 점차 심각해졌다. 이런 사회배경하에 조선왕조내부의 구식군대와 일본의 훈련을 받은 신식군대간의 차별적인 대우는 결국 임오군란으로 이어졌다. 또한 이 사건자체는 중국적으로 조선왕조 내 권력쟁탈전이기도 했다. 임오군란이 폭발한 후 청나라 군대가 대원군을 납치해가고 민씨정권의 지위를 확보하였으며, 일본세력이 더욱 확장되는 발길이 잠시적으로 멈추게 되었다. 그리고 대외적으로는 청나라의 종주국으로서의 지위가 한층 강화되었다.

하지만 대원군을 체포해간 후유증은 매우 컸으며, 제일 중요한 영향이 바로 개화파가 온건개화파와 급진개화파로 나뉘어진 것이었다. 특히 김옥균을 비롯한 개화파는 조선의 자주독립을 실현하는 데 있어 청나라를 장애물로 여겼다. 김홍집을 비롯한 점진적인 내부개혁을 통하여 자강을 도모하자는 온건개화파와 길을 따로 했다.

1884년 김옥균은 준비가 충분히 이루어지지 못한 상황에서 돌연적으로 정변을 일으켰다. 이는 그가 중불전쟁이 폭발한 틈을 타서 청나라와의 조공관계를 벗어나 ‘독립’을 하루빨리 실현하려는 강한 의지에서 원인을 찾을 수 있다. 하지만 갑신정변은 실패하였고 대다수 개화파들은 처형당하거나 해외로 망명을 갔다. 한동안은 조선국내에서 ‘개화’ 또는 ‘개혁’이라는 단어를 입밖에도 꺼낼 수 없을 정도였다. 1894년 갑오농민전쟁이 폭발하자 일본군과 청나라 군대가 진입하면서 조선왕조의 민족위기는 심화되었다. 김홍집을 비롯한 온건개화파는 일본이 조선정부를 개조하려는 기회를 빌어서 새로운 정권을 출범시켜 ‘자강책’을 도모하고자 했다. 하지만 민비살해사건과 함께 고종의 ‘아관파천’이 일어나고 김홍집은 일본의 폭행에 극도로 분노한 민중에게 살해되었으며, 갑오개혁도 실패로 끝났다.

1895년 개화파 등 인물의 요청 하에 서재필은 10년 만에 다시 모국으로 돌아왔다. 그는 갑오개혁 정권에 가입하는 것을 단호하게 거절하였다. 그는 조선을 떠나기 전

까지 미국인의 신분으로 정권 밖에서 ‘독립신문’을 창간하고 독립협회, 만민공동회 등의 활동도 조직하였다. 그는 갑신정변 실패의 교훈에 근거하여 국민인식을 각성시키는 것을 매우 중시하였다. 1898년 서재필은 국내외의 압력에 부득불 조선을 다시 떠났다. 그가 정치, 경제, 외교 등 여러 영역에서 제기한 일련의 ‘독립’에 대한 주장은 민중의 ‘독립’ 사상을 깨우치는 데 매우 중요한 작용을 했다.

그 후 1910년 한일합방 이후 조선사회내부에 더는 갑신정변, 갑오개혁, 독립협회와 만민공동회 같은 영향력이 강한 ‘독립’을 실현하기 위한 운동이 일어나지 않았다. 개화파는 이런 갑신정변과 갑오개혁의 실패로 원기를 크게 상하였고, 역사적 무대에서 자취를 감추었다.

본고는 이런 역사적인 큰 배경하에 김옥균, 김홍집, 서재필 등 개화파가 제기한 ‘독립’ 주장이 어떻게 한 단계씩 업그레이드 되었고, 또한 조선의 운명을 변화시키지 못한 중요한 원인이 어디에 있으며, 점진적인 역사발전의 맥락에서 이 세 인물의 대한 평가를 해야 할 것인지 등 문제들을 살펴보고자 한다.

## 2. 김옥균의 “독립”에 대한 인식: 청나라 조공관계에서 벗어나다.

갑신정변이후 김옥균은 “自來清國之自以為屬國，誠萬無之恥亦不無，因此而國無振作之望，此是第一疑。撤退羈絆特立為獨全自主之國，欲獨立則政治外交不可不自修自強，然彼事以今政府人物萬不可得矣。”<sup>1</sup> 라는 글에서 김옥균은 ‘독립’을 실현하기 위하여 자강을 도모해야 하며, 이런 자강은 현재의 정부로서는 실현 불가능하다고 하였다. 이것이 바로 그가 갑신정변을 일으킨 제일 중요한 동기이고, 그는 청나라의 조공관계에서 탈피하여야만 진정으로 정치, 외교 등의 부분에서 ‘독립’ 국가가 될 수 있다고 보고 있었다. 때문에 그는 중불전쟁이 폭발하는 틈을 타서 돌연적으로 정변을 일으켰다. 그것은 조선에 주둔한 군대도 철수하여 중불전쟁에 투입된다는 판단이었기 때문이다.

1884년 10월 18일 (음력12월5일), 日朝報에서 새 정부의 ‘정령’ 綱要를 반포하였으며, 이는 갑신정변의 시정강령이다. 이는 “갑신일록”에 수록되었다. “第一條：

<sup>1</sup>[韩]韩国学文献研究所编《金玉均全集》[M], 首尔: 首尔亚细亚文化社出版, 1979年第一版, pp110-111.

大院君不日陪還事（朝貢虛禮議行廢止）”<sup>2</sup>이다. 갑신정변시기 개화당의 ‘3일천하’ 개혁의 근본적인 목표는 청나라 조공관계에서 탈피하여 독립자주국가가 되는 것이다. 개화당인이 선포한 강령에서 알 수 있듯이 근본적으로 정치, 외교 등의 면에서 청나라의 개입과 영향하에서 벗어나려는 의도가 매우 명확하다.

이는 같은 시기 “윤치호일기”에서도 이와 유사한 사상적 경향을 찾을 수 있다. “何以甚於人奴而不欲振作倭。”；“是日郵便報紙新聞載韓清通商條約，其大意待他記大體我君與北洋大臣同等，而全以屬藩言之，不勝傷心也。”<sup>3</sup>이 역시 임오군란이후 청나라가 의례적인 관습을 타파하고 조선내부사무에 적극적으로 개입하고 대원군을 체포하였으며, 갑신정변을 진압하고, 중조수로무역장정을 체결하는 등 일련의 행위들은 조선내부 지식인들의 거대한 반감을 샀다. 이는 조선개화파들의 대청관의 변화를 야기하였으며, 조선인의 ‘독립’ 의식이 켜기하기 시작하였음을 잘 나타내는 대목이다.

갑신정변이후, 일본으로 망명한 김옥균은 그제야 ‘독립’에 대하여 더 한층 깨닫게 되었다. “독립”은 절대로 단순한 독립을 선포하고 몇몇 친청당(親淸黨)을 처결하고, 청나라의 조공관계에서 벗어난다고 해서 실현되는 것이 아니라는 것을 인식하였다. 일본에서 망명하는 동안 일본에서 겪은 갖은 냉대는 그로 하여금 ‘독립’에 대한 인식이 커다란 전환을 가져왔다. 그는 점차 오직 청나라의 협력하에 조선의 ‘독립’이 실현 가능한 것임을 느꼈다. 1886년, 김옥균은 이홍장을 만나뵈로 상해로갔으며, “朝鮮金玉均上李鴻章書”<sup>4</sup>에서 “然則閣下何不推尊大清國皇帝陛下為天下之盟主，布公論於歐米各大國，與之連續立朝鮮為中立之國，作萬全無危之地。” 자신의 구상을 전하고자 했다.

김옥균은 일본에 머물면서 서방문명을 받아들이기 시작하였으며, 이는 그로 하여금 일본을 발전모델로 삼게 하였다. 갑신정변이 일어나고, 그 뒤 일본으로 망명하게 된 후 그는 조선의 ‘독립’에 대하여 좀더 깊은 인식을 갖게 되었다. 그의 인식

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<sup>2</sup>[韓]韓佑劬·李泰鎮：《從史料中看韓國文化史——朝鮮前期篇》[M]，首爾：一志社，2000年8月30日，第八版，p275.

<sup>3</sup>尹致昊：《尹致昊日記》，1882年11月23日；1882年11月27日。

<sup>4</sup>[日]伊原澤周著：《近代朝鮮的開港以中美日三國關係為中心》，北京：社會科學文獻中心出版社，2008年第一版，p390.

은 단순한 청나라 조공관계에서 벗어나는 것으로부터 청나라의 지지 하에 중립국의 지위를 획득하려는 것으로 발전하였다. 그리고 이 점에서 비추어보면 김옥균은 단지 일본의 세력을 끌어들이어 자신의 ‘독립’ 인식을 실현하려 하였던 것이다. 때문에 그는 자신의 명예와 지위, 사리사욕에서 출발한 친일파, 매국노와는 전혀 다른 것이다. 그는 진정한 국가의 독립을 위하여 몸을 던진 애국자라고 해도 과언이 아니며 그에 대한 평가도 다시 이루어져야 한다고 보고 있다.

### 3. 김홍집의 “독립” 에 대한 인식— “자강책(自强策)”

1880년3월 (고종17년), 김홍집은 처음으로 경신수신사 신분으로 일본에 파견되었다. 그는 원산을 개항문제, 부산 관세문제, 미곡수출 금지 문제 등 양국 간 현안문제를 해결하려고 일본을 방문했다. 하지만 일본에 머무는 동안 일본정부의 적극적인 호응을 받지 못하여 전혀 해결책을 찾지 못하였다. 결국 김홍집은 청나라의 주일공사관을 방문하고 하여장, 황준헌과의 필담에서 많은 중요한 정보를 입수하였다. 아래는 김홍집과 황준헌 필담내용의 일부분이다.

材料一：

宏集：敝邦于中朝，义同内服。近日外事纷云，蕲望更切，他乡故人之谕，实获我心。

遵宪：以仆鄙意，若得阁下常住东京，必于国事大有裨益。方今大势，实为四千年来之所未有，尧舜禹汤之所未及料，执古人之方，以药今日之疾，未见其可。以阁下聪明，闻见日拓，将来主持国是，必能为亚细亚造福也。

宏集：此行，约于数旬间竣事即还，不可常驻。宇内大势，高论诚然，敝国僻在一隅，从古不与外国毗连。今则海舶迭来，应接戛戛，而国少力弱，未易使彼知畏而退，甚切忧闷。然所恃者，惟中朝庇护之力。

遵宪：请此数语，足见忠爱之忱溢于言表。朝廷之于贵国，恩义甚固，为天下万国之所无。然思所以保此恩义，使万世无疆者。今日之急务，在力图自强而已。

宏集：自强二字，至矣尽矣，敢不敬服。

두 사람의 필담에서 알 수 있듯이 현재 세계형세가 매우 복잡해지게 되었고요, 순, 우 때부터 내려오던 방법으로 오늘의 문제를 해결할 수 없다는 것에 공감하였으며, 김홍집도 개항한 후 부단히 몰려오는 외국선박을 대처하기에는 조선이 국력이 약하여 대처하기 힘들며 청나라에서 도와주고 보호해주길 원한다는 주장을 내세

왔다. 황준헌은 김홍집의 청나라에 대한 마음에 감사를 나타내면서 ‘만세에 국토를 지키려면 여전히 자강을 도모하는 것이 급선무다.’ 라고 하였다. 김홍집도 ‘자강’만으로 족할 것이고 당연히 자강을 도모해야 한다는 것에 공감하였다.

材料二：

上曰，俄羅斯欲向中國，當由何路雲耶。

對曰，彼中所聞概聞，由我國東南海路，轉入中國矣。

上曰，察其動靜，彼國（倭）於我國，果無怨意耶。

對曰，以今所見，姑無近慮，臣以此事，問於清使，亦以爲實情則然矣。

上曰，然則可以永保無他乎。

對曰，此事，臣未能質對，向後，惟在我應接之得其道而已，以是也，故清使亦以自強相勉矣。

上曰，自強，是富強之謂乎。

對曰，非但富強，將自強修我政教，保我民國，外讐無從，此實自強之第一先務。<sup>5</sup>

위의 내용은 바로 김홍집이 귀국한 후 고종과의 대화내용이다. 여기에서 그는 하 여장과 황준헌이 조선에서 ‘자강책’을 도모할 것을 권유한 점을 고종에게 아뢰었다. 여기에서 “자강”은 단지 부강이 아니고 정치적인 개혁을 실시하고 군사적으로 강토와 백성의 안전을 지켜서 외래침략을 막는 것이 그 기본적인 내용이었다. 이 역시 한 나라의 독립자주를 유지하는 제일 기본적인 요구가 아닐 수 없었다.

이런 사상은 김홍집의 부친인 김영작(金永爵)이 ‘삼정의(三政議)’에서 이미 제기한바가 있다. “三政之弊極矣，世皆曰非更張莫可釐，而願今國綱不振，民志未靖，即躬行美制易致譏訛，恐不如仍舊而，約畧通變之為當也，田制不可不丈量耳。”<sup>6</sup> 즉 조선말기의 삼정 문제가 심각해진 것은 꽤 오래되었다. ‘更張(경장)’만이 이 문제를 진정으로 해결하고 나라의 기강을 바로 잡을 수 있으며, 민중이 불안하고 좋은 제도를 실시해도 문제가 생길 수 있기에 옛 제도대로 하는 것보다 못하다고 생각하고 변혁을 포기할 지도 모르지만 田制는 반드시 측량해야 한다. 여기에서 알 수 있다시피 김영작은 조선의 삼정 폐단에 대하여 매우 잘 알고 있고, 그 폐단에 대하여 점

<sup>5</sup>[韩]高丽大学中央图书馆编：《金弘集遗稿》[M]，首尔：高丽大学出版部，1976年版，pp302-304.

<sup>6</sup>金永爵：《邵亭文稿》卷一，三政議·壬戌，pp19-21.



진적인 개혁을 해야 함을 주장하는 것이다.

부친의 영향하에 김홍집도 조선의 삼정, 더 나아가서 내부개혁의 필요성에 대하여 잘 알고 있으며. 일본에서 하여장, 황준헌과의 필담에서 내부개혁으로 자강을 도모하는 것에 대한 확신이 서게 되었다.

1894년 5월23일, 동학농민봉기를 진압하기 위하여 청군과 일본군이 조선왕조에 진입하였으며, 서로 철수하지 않고 대치상태에 들어섰다. 일본은 극력 조선국왕 고종에게 일본의 모든 개혁제의안을 받아드리기를 요구하였다. 고종과 영의정 심순택(領議政沈舜澤)은 일본의 정치, 군사 개입을 피하기 위해 개혁건의안을 받아들이는 것을 완강히 반대하였다.

하지만 당시 판중추부사(判中樞府事)김홍집은 일본의 개혁주장을 받아들이자고 주장하였다. “臣曰連伏承更張之教矣，大抵更張雲者，即就其政法之有病<sup>疾</sup>，變而通，以合其宜，即時措之義也。漢臣之言曰，琴瑟不調，則必解而更張之，此以調琴，論理國也，若有不容不更張之事，則何可膠守舊規，苟為姑息之<sup>事</sup>乎，自頃匪撓以來，德音屢降，聖諭懇摯，允在瞻聆，孰不感誦，而尚未聞減一椽、草一弊，明措而言者，雖欲行更張，不可得矣，必先實惠示信，收回民心然後，始可議更張，民苟不信，則雖有良法美規，徒為文具而止耳，見今急務，莫先於使民孚信而感恮矣。”<sup>7</sup>

즉 그는 경장은 바로 정치제도면의 병이 있는 곳을 치유하여 통하게 하는 것이고 시대에 부합되는 일이다. 악기가 조율이 되지 않을 때도 조율을 해서 통하는 것이 나라를 다스리는 법과 같으니라. 만약 경장을 용납할 수 없는 일이 있다면 낡은 제도를 왜 답습하고 방치할 것인가? 이번 농민전쟁이래 덕음이 낮아지고 상전께서 진지하게 대하여도 백성이 듣지 않으면 소용이 없는 것이다. 만약 경장을 실현하려고 하면 제일 먼저 민심을 회복한 후에야 경장이 가능할 것이다. 아무리 좋은 제도를 시도하여도 백성이 믿지 않으면 아무런 소용이 없을 것이다. 때문에 오늘날의 급선무는 바로 정부에 대한 백성의 믿음을 얻는 것이다.

김홍집은 바로 이런 논리로 고종을 설득하고 김홍집 제1차내각을 소집하고 동학농민군의 요구를 기본적으로 받아들인 13개 조항의 개혁안을 반포하였다. 김홍집은

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<sup>7</sup>[韩]高丽大学校中央图书馆编：《金弘集遗稿》卷八，甲午 5月25日條 [M]，首尔：高丽大学出版社，1976年版，p223.

점진적인 내부개혁으로 조선을 자강의 길로 이끌어가고 하겠지만 일본군의 개입과 친러파들의 영향으로 모든 일이 결국 수포로 돌아갔다. 특히 민비살해사건은 고종을 비롯한 백성의 친일이라는 죄명에서 벗어나지 못하고 비참하게 최후를 마감하였다. 그는 비록 4차례나 내각을 구성하고 총리직을 담당하였지만 한평생 근검절약하고 소박한 삶을 지내왔다.

“我是朝鮮的總理大臣，能為朝鮮人而死是我的天命。如被救於其他人手裡，將不會乾淨。…國家已這番景象，有必要逃避並保住性命嗎？”<sup>8</sup> 결국 자신은 백성의 손에 죽을 운명을 택하고 다른 나라와 군대의 도움으로 목숨을 부지하려 하지 않았다. 비록 갑오경장은 실패하였지만 그의 나라에 대한 우국충정은 재평가되어야 한다고 보고 있다.

#### 4. 서재필의 독립에 대한 인식—국민인식의 각성

갑신정변에 참여한 적이 있는 서재필의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식도 갑신정변의 실패를 겪고, 일본에 망명한 후 그곳에서 얻었던 냉대와 미국에 넘어가서 흡수한 민주사상으로 인하여 매우 큰 변화를 가져오게 하였다.

갑신정변이 실패한 최대 원인은 국민의 의식을 각성시키지 못하여 국민 동원에 실패한 것이었다. 때문에 갑오경장 때 김홍집을 비롯한 개화파가 그를 청하여 돌아와서 정권에 가입하길 원했지만 그는 거절하고 외국인 신분으로 독립신문을 창간하고 독립협회와 만민공동회를 조직하고 독립문, 독립공원을 건설하는데 주력하였다.

1896년3월1일에 한문으로 된 ‘독립신문(獨立新聞)’을 창간하였으며, 1896년4월7일에 ‘(독립신문)獨立新聞’ 창간호를 발표하면서 조선왕조와 민중에게 큰 충격을 안겼다. 그의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식도 줄곧 변화되는 양상을 보였다. 그의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식을 아래의 몇 가지로 나뉘어 구체적인 주장과 변화하는 과정을 살펴보고자 한다.

##### (1) ‘독립’의 개념에 대하여

독립의 개념에 대하여 서재필은 조선독립이 단지 청나라에 조청관계에서 벗어

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<sup>8</sup>郑濟愚：“金弘集의生涯和开化思想” [J], 史学研究, 第38号, 韩国史学会, 1983年版, 第185-186页。

났다고 해서 독립이 얻어지는 것이 아니며, 일본을 비롯한 러시아 등 여러 나라의 통제하에서 벗어나야만 진정한 독립을 얻을 수 있다고 보았다. 특히 그가 갑신정변이 실패한 후 얻은 경험에서 알 수 있듯이 조선의 독립이 절대로 청나라 통제에서 벗어나서 실현된 것이 아니라는 것을 독립신문에서 나타냈다.

“일본이 청국과 싸운 후에는 조선이 독립이 되었다고 말로는 하였으되, 실상일인 즉 일본 속국이 된 것인지라. 조선에 청과 외교하는 정치를 모두 쥐고, 일본놈의 나라 사신이 그 나라 정부 일을 결정 하는 나라도 또 있는지 우리는 듣고 보지 못하였노라. 이것은 일본 사람만 책망 할 것이 아니라 조선 사람들이 조처한 일이요.”<sup>9</sup>

그는 자신이 이해한 조선이 처한 국제정세를 비유적으로 나타내며 어느 나라에도 절대로 의지해서는 되지 않는 것을 강하게 나타냈다.

“대한 사람들은 남에게 의지하고 힘 입으라는 마음을 끊고 청국에 의지 말라, 종이나 소환에 지나지 못하리로다. 일본에 의지 말라, 나중에 내장을 잃으리라. 로국(러시아)에 의지 말라, 필경에는 몸둥이까지 삼킴을 받으리라. 영국과 미국에 의지 말라, 청국과 일국과 로국에 원썩을 맺으리라. 이 모든 나라에 의지하고 힘 입으려고는 아니 할지언정 친밀히 하지 아니치는 못하리라. 대한 사람들의 성질은 의뢰치 아니한즉 거절하여 나라 일이 밟도 죽도 아니 되리로다.”<sup>10</sup>

1897년1월2일, 일본이 “The Kobe Chronicle” 에서 조선의 ‘독립’ 이 의심스럽다는 글을 발표하자 서재필은 즉시 “조선은 독립자주적인 국가이다.” 라는 글로 반박하였다. 하지만 오랜 시간이 흘러간 뒤인 1948년3월, 신민일보 사장인 신영철(申永喆)과의 대화 속에서 서재필은 그제야 자신의 ‘독립’ 에 대한 인식을 비교적 완벽하고 체계적으로 제시하였다. 이는 그의 ‘독립’ 에 대한 인식이 수많은 실천과 시행착오를 겪으면서 부단한 발전을 가져왔음을 말해주고 있다.

9 《独立新闻》第一卷影印版(1896.4-1896.12), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1896年5月16日, p69.

10 《独立新闻》第三卷影印版(1898.1-1898.07), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1898年1月20日, p29.

“ ‘독립’ 은 피 흘려서 찾는 것이고 그래야 하는 것인데, 한국 사람들은 ‘독립’ 은 외국에게 받는 것이라고 생각하고 있는 듯합니다. 1895년에 하관에서 열렸던 청일강화조약에서 일본은 한국에 독립을 주었습니다. 그러나 그것은 결국 일본을 위하여 주었던 것이 드러났습니다. 지금 한국문제를 해결하려고 내조한 유엔위원단이 정부를 수립한다고 하는데. 그 정부도 한국사람이 세우는 것이 아니므로 오래 지속되지는 못할 것입니다.’ 독립’ 이란 말은 내가 지어낸 말인데, 나는 당시 한문을 잘 알지는 못하였습니다. 말하자면 앵무새처럼 흉내를 내는 정도였습니다. 그래서 남에게 의지하지 말자는 정신에서 ‘혼자서자’ 는 의미로 ‘독립’ 이라는 말을 만들었던 것입니다. 그러나 ‘혼자 선다’ 는 것은 결코 ‘고립’ 이나 ‘유아독존’ 을 의미하는 것은 아닙니다. 실은 ‘자립’ 인 것입니다.’ 자립’ · ‘자주’ · ‘자율’ 이것이 독립정신인 것입니다, 한국 사람들에게는 이것이 결핍하여 있다는 것입니다.”<sup>11</sup>

## (2)사상적인 측면에서 ‘독립’ 이다.

서재필은 조선백성이 사상적인 측면에서 ‘독립’ 인식이 부족하다는 것에 대하여 이렇게 논하였으며, 이런 사상적인 독립인식을 강화하기 위하여 일련의 주장을 내세웠다.

우선 한 나라의 독립을 상징하는 군주가 다른 나라 군주와 동등한 위치에 처하여야 한다고 주장하였다.

“조선인민이 독립이라하는 것을 모르는 까닭에 외국 사람들이 조선을 업시여겨도 분한 줄을 모르고 조선 대군주 폐하께서 청국 군주님에게 해마다 사신을 보내서 칙령을 타오시며 공문에 청국 년호를 쓰고 조선 인민은 청국에 속한 사람들로 알면서도 원썩을 생각은 아니하고 속국인체 하고 있었으니.그 약한 마음을 생각하면 불상한 인간이 아니리오. 백성이 높아지려면 나라가 높아져야 하는 법이요.나라와 백성이 높아지려면 그 나라님군주가 놈의 나라님군주와 동등이 되셔야 하는 것이다.”<sup>12</sup>

다음으로 그는 ‘군주뿐만 아니라 백성들도 독립국가의 권리를 잘 행사하여 다

<sup>11</sup> 新民日报, 1948年3月14日。

<sup>12</sup> 《独立新闻》第一卷影印版(1896.4-1896.12), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1896年6月20日, p129.

른 나라에게 빼앗기지 않게 노력하고 군주를 잘 보필하여서 시민의 도리를 잘 행하여야 한다.’ 라는 주장을 내세웠다. 즉 군주뿐만 아니라 모든 백성들이 하나가 되어 노력해야 함을 제기하였다.

“몇백 년을 조선대군주 폐하께서 청국님군주보다 낮은 지위에 있었으되 그 밑에서 벼슬하는 신하들과 백성들이 한번도 그것을 분히 느끼는 생각이 없어서 조선대군주 폐하를 청국과 타국님군과 동등이 되시게 한번을 못하여 보고 삼년전 하느님이 조선을 불쌍히 느끼여서 일본과 청국이 싸움이 된 까닭에 조선이 독립국이 되어 지금은 조선대군주 폐하께서 세계각국 대왕들과 동등이 되시고 그런 까닭에 조선인민도 세계 각국 인민들과 동등이 되었는지라.……독립된 그 권리를 잃지 말고 권리가 더 늘어나고 견고하게 대군주 폐하들을 사랑하여 일을 행하는것이 신민의 도리요.”<sup>13</sup>

마지막으로 그는 ‘애국심’을 키우는 것이 자못 중요함을 느끼고 조선백성들의 애국심과 민족인식을 높이기 위해 자국의 역사 즉 ‘국사(한국사)’를 배우는 것을 강조하였을 뿐만 아니라 ‘국문교육(한국어 교육)’을 보급할 것을 주장하였다.

그는 자국의 역사 즉 ‘국사’를 배우는 문제에 대하여 아래와 같이 논하였다.

“다른 나라에 의지하여 그 나라 접대를 받아야……아는 것은 무슨 외국 학문만 없어 그런것이 아니라 본국 서기를 자세히들 모르는 고로 대한 사람들이 본국 인종을 서로 업신여긴다. 대한 사람 가지고는 중흥하는 사업을 못할줄노 알아……대한인민들이 대한 사기속에 유명한 충신 열사들을 자세히 공부하여 그대들과 같이 용맹하게 일을 하거드면 의심없이 대한도 세계에 대접을 받을터이다. 대한 사기에 유명한 충신들은 충무공 이순신씨와 조중봉씨와 임경업씨의 사적들을 비화 그대들 하던 사업과 그대들 가졌던 용맹을 본받으면 대한도 중흥을 누릴 수 있을터이다.”<sup>14</sup>

그 외에 그는 국민인식을 각성하기 위해 반드시 적극적으로 국문교육을 보급해야 함을 주장하였다. 그 핵심이 바로 한문이 아닌 언문교육이었다. 그가 창간한

<sup>13</sup> 《独立新闻》第一卷影印版(1896. 4-1896. 12), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1896年6月20日, p129.

<sup>14</sup> 《独立新闻》第三卷影印版(1898. 1-1898. 07), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1898年03月08日, p109.

‘독립신문’은 전부 국문(한국어)로 작성하였으며, 서재필은 독립신문의 창간호에서 국문으로 택한 그 원인을 밝히기도 하였다.

“우리가 독립신문을 오늘 처음으로 출판하는데, 조선속에 있는 내외국 인민에게 우리 주의를 미리 말씀하여 아시게 하노라. 우리는 첫째 편벽 되지 아니한고로 무슨 당에도 상관 없이 없고 상하귀천을 달리 대접 아니하고, 모두 조선사람으로만 알고 조선만 위하여 공평히 인민에게 말 할 터인데……우리가 이 신문 출판하는 것이 취리하라는 게 아닌고로 값을 헐허도록 하였고 모두 언문으로 쓰기는 남녀 상하귀천이 모두 보게 함이요. 또 구절을 뛰여 쓰기는 알아보기 쉽도록 함이라.”<sup>15</sup>

### (3) 경제면에서의 ‘독립’이다.

서재필은 국가의 자주독립을 공고하기 위하여 정치면에서만 자주독립을 추구할 뿐만 아니라 경제적인 측면에서도 자주독립을 추구해야 함을 재차 강조하였다. 그는 외국이 조선의 이권을 쟁탈하고 앞다투어 약탈하는 행위를 반대하였다. 즉 “외국사람 중에 여기 와서 돈만 모아서 가지고 고국으로 돌아가며 조선 흥망을 상관치 않고 외국 사람은 곧 조선에 거머리와 같은지라.”<sup>16</sup>

그는 러시아가 ‘러한은행’을 건립하는 것을 적극 반대하였다. 이는 러시아가 조선의 재정대권을 장악하려는 의도가 있기 때문이다. 그리고 일본화폐가 마치 정식 화폐마냥 아무런 제한 없이 자유자재로 유통되는 것을 비판하였다.

“조선정부에서 일본 돈을 믿지 말고 조선화폐를 학문있게 간편히 창설하는 것이 인민에게 큰 사업이요. 외국 장사가 차차되야 같지라. 정부에 직장을 맡은 관원들은 응당 벌써 이런 방식을 생각하여 조선 천하가 세계에서 자주독립이 되게 하였을터이어나와 우리는 우리 생각대로 가게 하노라.”<sup>17</sup>

그리고 그는 또 “화폐도 대한에서 대한 화폐를 지어써야 의례히 옳은 일이나”<sup>18</sup> 라는

<sup>15</sup> 《독립신문》第一卷影印版(1896. 4-1896. 12), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1896年04月07日, p1.

<sup>16</sup> 《독립신문》第一卷影印版(1896. 4-1896. 12), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1896年5月21日, p77.

<sup>17</sup> 《독립신문》第二卷影印版(1897. 1-1897. 12), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1897年3月30日, p145.

<sup>18</sup> 《독립신문》第三卷影印版(1898. 1-1896. 07), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1898年4月14日, p174.

주장을 거듭 강조하였다.

서재필은 조선정부가 러시아나 일본의 차관을 받는 것을 반대하였다. 이 시기 그는 조선이 외국에서 차관을 받는 대가로 여러 가지 국내 정치에 관여하는 정치조건을 내걸어 맞바꾸는 것을 반드시 거절해야 한다고 생각하였다. 그래서 그는 재정지출 절약을 강조하였고, 절약하는 재정수입으로 일본이나 러시아 등 여러 외국의 차관을 빨리 돌려주어야만 조선의 자주독립을 유지하고 수호할 수 있다고 보았다.

서재필은 “아라샤(러시아)와 일본이 서로 비밀리에 약조를 하였는데 그 중에서 조선 재정이 곤란하게 되어 외채를 얻어야 할 지경이 거든 아 일 양국이 서로 조선을 도와 외채를 얻게 하여 주자하였으니 감사하기는 매우 감사하나 우리 생각 같으면 조선에서 이런 일에 인연하여 외국에 신세 질 무리가 당초에 없는 것이라. 정부에 들어오는 돈이 일년에 사백 만원이 된다니 아무쪼록 그 돈만 가지고 아주 견뎌가고 그 속에서 절약하여 매년에 얼마큼씩 남기여 이왕에 졌던 빚이나 차차 감파 가는 것이 제일 상책이라. 아 일 양국이 돈을 빌려주마고 약조하였다고 조선정부에서는 좋다고 하고 돈 빌 생각을 안하지 않는 것이 옳은 획책일거라.”<sup>19</sup>

#### (4) 외교적인 ‘독립’ 이다.

서재필은 자주독립을 실현하기 위해서는 반드시 중립외교를 철저히 실시해야 한다고 주장하였다. 그는 어느 나라에게도 치우치지 않고, 공평하고 공정하게 중립외교를 유지하여 제국주의 세력의 침투를 방지하고 자주독립의 조건을 만들어가야 한다고 하였다.

“만일 싸움이 일어나게 되면 조선은 누가 이기던지 없어지는 노릇이니 그렇게 보면 조선에 상식은 아무쪼록 조선 까닭에 다른 나라들이 싸움 아니 하도록 일을 하여야 할지라 그건 무엇인고 하니. 세계 각국을 이종과 등분이 없이 공평하게 모두 친구로 대접하고 내 권리는 조금이라도 남의 나라에 뺏기지 말며, 내 일은 물을 쥐여 먹어가며 하여 내자리를 튼튼히 되도록 만들고 있으시면 그때는 아무 넘려가 없을터이라.”<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> 《独立新闻》第二卷影印版(1897.1-1897.12), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1897年3月04日, p101.

<sup>20</sup> 《独立新闻》第二卷影印版(1897.1-1897.12), 全九卷, 甲乙出版社, 1897年8月10日, p380.

서재필은 바로 이런 국제관계의 세력균형 원리를 적용하여 ‘자강’을 도모하는 것을 주장하였다. 즉, 어느 날 이런 세력균형이 타파되어 군대들이 진입해도 대한민국은 자신의 세력으로 외래침략을 막고 자주독립지위를 지킬 수 있다고 하였다.

위와 같이 서재필은 ‘독립’의 개념을 다른 나라의 힘에 의거하지 않고 자체적인 힘으로 얻어지는 것이며, 절대로 쉽게 얻어지는 것이 아니고, 피를 흘리며 노력해야 얻어지는 것이라고 하였다.

또한 사상적인 측면, 경제, 외교적인 측면 등에서 조선백성들이 ‘독립’에 대한 인식을 강화하고, 자국 화폐를 만들고, 타국의 차관을 받아들이지 말고 절약하여 외국의 빚을 전부 갚음으로써 독립을 실현하자는 주장과 중립외교를 실행하자는 폭넓은 ‘독립’에 대한 이해를 역설하였다.

이는 김옥균과 김홍집의 독립에 대한 인식보다 훨씬 발전된 것이었으며, 그 당시 조선사회에서는 지나치게 진보적인 사상이 아닐 수 없었다. 결국 그의 이런 독립주장과 독립협회, 만민공동회 활동도 국내의 세력의 반대로 실패하게 되었다. 하지만 그의 이런 시도는 조선사회 독립운동의 활발한 전개를 위해 매우 좋은 기초를 마련하였다. 서재필은 비록 미국시민이 된 몸이었지만 그의 모국에 대한 조국애는 재평가되어야 한다.

## 5. 나오는 말

개화파는 갑신정변, 갑오개혁, 독립협회와 만민공동회를 거치면서 대다수가 숙청되거나 해외로 망명하는 등 방식으로 역사의 무대에서 자취를 감추게 되었다. 비록 김옥균, 김홍집, 서재필의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식은 조선의 운명을 바꿀 수 없었지만 개화파의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식이 시대의 변화에 따라 점진적인 변화를 가져왔음을 한눈에 볼 수 있다. 그들의 이런 독립에 대한 인식도 조선 개항기 역사의 시대적 흐름과 걸음을 같이 한 점에서 매우 중요한 역사적 의미를 갖고 있다. 또한 그들의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식과 실천에서 그들의 실패한 주요한 원인은 아래 몇 가지로 분석할 수 있다.



우선, 김옥균은 급진적인 개화파로서 그 ‘독립’의 목표는 청나라의 조공관계에서 벗어나는 것이지만, 구체적으로 어떻게 벗어나야 하며, 그 후과에 대하여 심도 깊은 사고가 부족하였다. 그리고 갑신정변에 참여하는 인원구성에서 볼 때 주로 중인계층으로 구성되었으며 그들은 국가의 군권과 강력한 자금지원 등도 확보하지 못했다. 단지 고종의 일시적인 신임으로 정권을 장악하고 내정개혁을 시도하려고 한 자체가 제일 큰 문제점이었다. 그리고 광범한 대중을 동원하지 못한 것도 정변의 종국적인 실패의 중요한 원인이다.

다음, 김홍집은 온건개화파로서 그의 ‘독립’의 목표는 점진적인 개혁을 실행함으로써 자강을 도모하고 종국적으로 민족적 위기에서 벗어나는 것이었다. 하지만 갑오개혁시기 일본이 조선정부의 내정개혁을 압박하고 있는 시대적 배경으로 봤을 때 안정적 내정개혁을 실시할 수 있는 양호한 국내외 여건이 구비되지 못하였다. 또한 김홍집은 어디까지나 봉건사회에서 최고집권자가 아니었기에 고종의 시종일관적인 지원을 받지 못하며 개혁을 추진하기란 매우 힘들었을 것이다.

마지막으로 서재필의 ‘독립’에 대한 인식은 애초에는 김옥균의 영향을 받은 것이었고, 그로 인해 갑신정변에 참여하게 되었다. 그 후 정변이 실패한 후 그는 미국으로 망명하며 3권 분립 등의 민주사상을 받아들였고, 갑신정변 전후를 기준으로 매우 큰 변화를 보였다. 그래서 그는 ‘독립’의 개념, 사상적인 측면과 경제적인 측면, 외교적인 측면에서 자기 나름대로의 ‘독립’에 대한 이해와 그 실현방식을 구체적으로 제시하였다. 비록 그는 비교적 완벽하고 체계적인 독립주장을 제기하였지만 이런 주장은 당시 조선의 현실과 거리가 멀고, 너무 앞선 진보적인 주장이었기에, 현실성이 부족했으므로 결국 실패하게 되었다. 또한 그가 미국인 신분으로 국가정권에 참여하지 않았기에 전폭적인 정부의 지원을 받지 못하였고, 또다시 미국으로 떠날 수 밖에 없었다.

결과적으로 보면 ‘독립’은 정변을 일으키거나 내정개혁을 실시하거나 사상적인 측면에서 국민인식을 제고시킨다고 실현될 수 있는 것이 아니다. 여러 가지 복잡다단한 요소가 종합적으로 작용하여야만 실현되는 것이다. 개화파의 독립주장을 실현하기 위한 노력들이 실패한 원인에서 당시 조선실정에 부합되는 ‘독립’의 길을 찾지 못한 것이 제일 중요한 원인일 것이다. ‘독립’을 실현하는 데는 당연히 양호한

국외환경과 최고 통치자인 고종의 지지를 받거나 광범한 인민대중의 옹호를 받는 내부개혁을 실시하여야만 실현 가능했을 것이다.

개화파들의 이런 점진적인 사상적인 변화는 그 당시 일부 지식인들의 사상적 경향도 반영하였고, 조선왕조 말기의 역동적인 역사를 축약적으로 보여주었다. 특히 김옥균, 김홍집, 서재필 등 세 인물에 대한 적극적이고 긍정적인 평가를 해야 한다.

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## **The Evolution of Korean Enlightenists’ “Independence Theory”** (School of Foreign Languages Ph.D Student Jin Aihua)

**Abstract:** Korean society had been influenced by the concepts of western modern countries since Korea entered modern times. Thus the appeal of independence had gradually emerged. Korean Enlightenists were the dominant force at the end of Joseon Dynasty. Their understanding of “Independence” took on a gradually deep and perfect evolution process. As representatives of Korean Enlightenists, Kim okgyun, Kim Hongjip and Philip Jaisohn dominated three historic climax of realizing “Independence” at the end of Joseon Dynasty. Although these revolutions were in vain, it had important historical value. They were different from other sects, for they accepted Western civilization in different channels, they held different attitudes towards traditional Confucian ideology, and they had different relationships with the government of Joseon Dynasty. However, their respective interpretation and practice of “Independence” in different periods was an deepening evolution process, i.e. to gain “Independence” by opposing subordinate relations between China and Korea in Qing Dynasty; to gain “Independence” by innovating the society and improving the strength of Korea; to gain comprehensive “Independence” by raising the national consciousness and promoting politics, economy and diplomacy. In a sense, the evolution process of the “Independence” theory is the epitome of modern Korean fighting for independence.

**Key Words:** Korean Enlightenists; Independence Theory; Kim okgyun; Kim Hongjip and; Philip Jaisohn



영화 색채와 색채의 상징성이 관객에게 미치는 심리적·감성적 영향

-박찬욱 감독의 <스토커>를 중심으로-

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## The Psychological and Emotional Aspects of Color and Color Symbolism in Film

### -Focusing on Park Chan-wook's *Stoker*-

The introduction of color remains one of the biggest changes to come to filmmaking since its advent. Color has provided filmmakers with a vast and complicated set of tools for stylistic and symbolic expression. It has become such an integral part of the movie making process that its absence alone carries significant implications for a film. Despite the important stylistic and symbolic implications of color, it remains a relatively under studied aspect of the filmmaking process. While existing research focusing on color in cinema has centered on color's symbolic usage, there is another aspect of color in film that poses an interesting subject for research. That is the psychological aspect of color usage in film. While there has been some research on the use of color to represent the central character's psychological state, there has been little research into the use of color to impact the emotions or psychological state of the viewer.

Although colors emotional and psychological effects have been widely researched within the fields of color theory and color psychology, these effects have yet to be researched in relation to the filmmaking and film viewing process.

This paper looks at the development of color technology and the awareness of color's various symbolic and psychological effects by filmmakers. It uses color theory and existing research on color psychology to posit that the use of color has an emotional and psychological impact on the viewer, and that filmmakers use their awareness of color's psychological effect to enhance the viewer's perception of such emotions as fear, sadness, and anxiety within a film. Using Korean director Park Chan-wook's most recent film *Stoker*, this paper examines both Park's symbolic use of color as well as his use of color for its psychological effect on the viewer. Of particular interest is director Park's technique of filling the frame with shades of a single

color using either tinting or elaborate set design, thereby enhancing the psychological impact of such colors on the viewer. This paper focuses on the use of this technique with the colors blue and red to increase the audience's perception of anxiety, tension, fear and horror throughout the film.

## 1. 서론

역사적으로 영화산업에 가장 큰 영향을 미치는 기술적 발전을 꼽으라면 소리가 영화에 도입된 유성 영화가 가장 먼저 언급되고, 그다음으로 언급되는 것이 영화의 색채 기술이다. 영화 초창기에 손으로 한 프레임 한 프레임씩 색채를 넣은 것을 포함하면 영화 제작자와 감독들은 색채 영화를 발전시키기 위해 수없이 많은 시도를 해왔다. 무성 영화 시기에 프랑스 영화 제작의 개척자 조르주 멜리에스 (Georges Melies)는 색채 틴트<sup>1</sup>를 통해 영화의 환상적인 느낌을 강조했다. 미국 영화감독 D.W. 그리피스 (David Lewelyn Wark Griffith)는 그의 1915 년 <국가의 탄생(Birth of a Nation)>에서 색채 틴트를 통해 장면의 감정적인 분위기를 전달했다(Parkinson 2012). 색채는 감정적, 현실 및 비현실적, 그리고 상징적인 요소로서 당시와 현대의 영화감독에게는 중요하면서 복잡한 도구로서의 역할을 한다.

색채의 복잡함은 영화 사용에서만 뿐만 아니라 일상생활에서조차도 이해하기 어렵다. 색채는 각 사회에서 문화적 특징 및 상징적 의미를 지니고 같은 색채라도 사람마다 다르게 인식이 된다. 그래서 연구의 대상으로서 색채는 매우 어려운 주제이다. 그것은 사람마다 사회마다 다른 부분을 어떻게 이해하고 분석해야 할지에 관한 문제이다. 그러나 색채는 어려운 만큼 영화의 이해에 있어서 매우 중요한 요소이다. 영화 요소로서의 색채의 중요한 역할에도 불구하고 장르, 소리, 오토르주의 (Auteurism) 등 다른 영화학 분야에 비해 색채에 대한 연구는 활발하지 않았다(Vacche and Price 2006). 현재까지 영화 색채를 분석하고 이해하고자 하는 연구는 색채의 상징적인 의미 및 표현을 중심으로 했으며 그것은 감독들이 전달하고자 하는 상징적인 의미를 이해하기에 아주 중요한 연구였다. 한편 영화 색채 연구의 또 다른 분야인 색채심리학에 대한 연구는 주로 색채가

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<sup>1</sup> 틴트필름이라는 용어는 수작업에 의한 착색, 또는 현상소에서 컬러를 입힌 흑백필름을 말하며, 이 논문에서는 틴트는 전체 화명을 한 색상으로 구성하는 것을 의미한다.

수용자에 미치는 일반적 영향에 관한 연구였다. 이런 연구는 영화 속에서의 색채의 사용이 관객의 심리에 영향을 미칠 수 있다는 것을 증명하고 있으나 그 영향에 대해 구체적으로 분석한 연구는 거의 없었다. 색채를 통해 영화가 관객에게 미친 심리적·감성적 영향도 영화의 이해를 위해서 필요한 중요 연구 대상이다.

본 논문은 색채심리학에 관한 선행 연구를 적용하여 영화 색채의 상징성뿐만 아니라 그 색채가 관객들에게 어떠한 심리적·감정적 영향을 미칠 수 있는지를 살펴보고자 한다. 이를 위해 역사적으로 영화 속 색채 사용 및 그의 변화와 영화 및 색채의 이론적 배경을 감안하여 감독들은 어떤 경우에 어떤 이유로 색채를 사용하는지를 파악하고자 한다. 필자는 선행 연구 및 언론에서 나타난 감독과의 인터뷰 그리고 영화 이론을 바탕으로 감독의 색채 사용에 대한 의도를 파악하고 색채심리학에 관한 연구를 통해 관객에게 미치는 영향을 분석하고자 한다.

색채에 관한 기존 연구를 보면 실험적이거나 독특한 색채 사용으로 유명한 감독들 몇 명이 자주 언급된다. 그중 영국의 알프레드 히치콕, 중국의 장이모, 박찬욱 등 다수의 감독이 색채에 관한 연구의 주요 대상이 되었다. 영화 기술을 발전해 온 서양 사회에서 프랑스의 영화감독 고다르, 영국의 앨프리드 히치콕, 미국의 우디 앨런과 마틴 스콜세즈 등 다양한 감독들은 실험적인 색채 사용에 인해 영화계의 주목과 인정을 받았지만, 그들을 중심으로 하는 색채에 관한 연구는 찾기 어려울 정도로 적다(장미영 2007). 아시아에서도 감독의 색채 사용을 분석하는 연구는 찾기 어려우며 주로 중국의 장이모 감독을 중심으로 이루어져 왔다. 박찬욱 감독은 한국이나 해외에서도 인지도가 높은 편이지만, 그의 독특한 시각적 스타일에도 불구하고 그의 색채 사용을 분석하는 연구는 많지 않다.

박찬욱 감독은 뚜렷한 색채, 독특한 화면 구성과 관객들을 불쾌하게 만드는 잔인한 장면을 사용하기로 유명한 감독이다. 그의 독특한 스타일에 대한 연구 중 박찬욱 감독의 <친절한 금자씨>를 분석하는 초보군의 <영상 색채의 심리적 표현과 서사구조와의 관계>(2009)는 본 논문의 목적과 유사한 선행연구다. 이 연구는 기호학을 바탕으로 색채가 영화 분위기와 주인공의 심리 상태 및 변화를 표현하고 영화의 이야기를 진행한다고 주장한다. 이에 따라 영화 제작 시 감독, 촬영감독 등의 제작진은 색채에 의미를 부여하며 의도적으로 화면의 색채를 통해서 특정 의미를

전달한다(초보군 2009). 김향란(2006)은 영화의 내러티브와 분위기, 그리고 전달하고자 하는 상징적인 의미와 색채를 연결해 색채가 영화의 내러티브 요소로서 스토리에 감정을 관객에게 전달한다고 주장한다. 이러한 연구는 감독들이 색채의 내면적인 의미 및 상징을 통해 관객과 소통을 한다고 주장하고 있다. 본 논문에서는 감독이 이러한 상징적 의사소통과 더불어 색채의 심리적 영향을 인식하고 이를 통해 관객들에게 무의식적 영향을 준다는 것을 말하고자 한다. 이러한 무의식적 영향이 선행연구에서 언급한 분위기를 생성하며, 색채심리학 연구를 통해 관객이 인식하는 분위기의 근원을 이해할 수 있다.

## 2 이론적 배경

### 2.1 영화 색채의 기술 발전

색채 영화 기술은 영화 초창기부터 수많은 도전과 발전을 거듭해왔다. 색채 기술의 발전은 영화 제작자에게 추가적인 표현 도구를 제공하기 위한 것이며 동시에 영화 기술 자체처럼 사람들의 세계를 더 정확하게 재현하기 위해서이다. 이러한 욕망은 현대 사회의 끊임없는 그래픽 디스플레이(LCD, OLED 등) 또는 컴퓨터 그래픽(CG) 기술 발전에서도 볼 수 있다. 이러한 기술의 발전으로 인해 영화 제작자의 표현력이 점점 향상되었으며 영화 제작 시 고려해야 할 요소도 많아졌다.

오늘날의 색채 기술은 50년 전에 사용된 기술과 많이 다르다. 그동안 영화 발전에서의 색채에 관한 시행착오는 현대 색채에 대한 인식 및 형식에 많은 영향을 미쳤다. 그래서 영화 색채를 이해하려면 우선 영화 색채의 역사를 어느 정도 알아야 한다.

영화 색채 기술은 각각 시대의 색채 스타일에 큰 영향을 미쳤다. 영화 초기에는 기술의 한계로 인해 틸트 방식을 통해 한 장면 전체에 한 가지 색채만 넣을 수 있었으며 당시 색채는 주로 분위기를 전달하기 위해서 사용되었다. 그리고 한 가지의 색채를 넣는 또 다른 방식이 있었다. 그것은 서론에서 언급했던 것처럼 손으로 한 프레임 한 프레임씩 색을 입히는 것이었다. 이런 방식은



에이젠슈테인의(Sergei Eisenstein) <전함 포템킨(Battleship Potemkin)>에 빨간색 깃발처럼 상징적인 의미를 전달하는 방법이였다 (Parkinson 2012). 현재 영화 기술이 완전히 다름에도 불구하고 비슷한 색채 사용 형식을 볼 수 있다. 박찬욱 감독의 영화 <스토커>(2012)에서 전체 화면이 파란색 틴트가 있는 장면이 있으며 이러한 틴트는 차갑고 무서운 분위기를 형성한다. 한편 주인공 인디아 스토커의 생일 선물을 꾸미는 노란 색 리본, 노란 색 침대 등 영화에서 나타난 노란색 모티프는 달걀의 노른자처럼 인디아의 어린 시절을 상징한다.

색채 기술이 급속히 발전하던 1930년대에는 3원색 필름이 사용되면서 더 많은 색상을 보여줄 수 있었다. 그러나 사용할 수 있는 색채가 많아지면서 새로운 문제들이 나타났다. 그 중 하나는 관객들의 색채에 대한 인식이었다. 1930년대 테크니컬러 3원색 방식의<sup>2</sup> 높은 제작비용으로 인해 테크니컬러를 사용할 제작사를 찾기 어려웠다. 월트 디즈니는 이런 3원색 방식의 테크니컬러를 사용한 제작사였다(Vacche and Price 2006). 디즈니는 테크니컬러 방식을 애니메이션 시리즈에 적용해서 <실리 심포니스(Silly Symphonies)>를 통해 컬러 영화의 가능성을 보여주었다. 그러나 이와 같은 영화로 인해 색채 영화는 애니메이션, 뮤지컬 등과 같은 장르만 다루게 되었고 환상 및 멋진 광경을 묘사하는데 사용된다는 인식을 갖게 되었다. 오늘날과 달리 당시 흑백 영화는 진지한 주제와 어울리며 색채는 애니메이션, 뮤지컬, 웨스턴 등 장르와만 어울린다는 인식이 지배적이었다. 최근에 제작된 <이상한 나라의 앨리스(Alice in Wonderland)> (Tim Burton 2010)와 <아바타(Avatar)> (James Cameron, 2009)를 보면 이러한 인식이 아직 남아있다는 것을 보여준다.

1940년대에 테크니컬러는 색채 영화 제작 방식에 대해 독점권을 가지고 있었으며 테크니컬러 방식 사용 시 제작사는 테크니컬러사(社)<sup>3</sup>가 보내는 기술자 및 컬러 고문을 써야 했다. 당시 테크니컬러의 컬러 고문이 나탈리 칼머스(Natalie M. Kalmus)였으며 당시 제작된 색채 영화는 대부분 그녀의 영향을 받았다. <색채의식(Color Consciousness)>에서 칼머스는 영화 색채가 자연스러워야 한다고 주장했다. 칼머스는 관객들의 색채에 대한 심리적인 반응을 지적한다.

<sup>2</sup> 테크니컬러 3원색 방식은 테크니컬러사가 개발한 3개의 네거티브필름을 통해 3색분해 촬영방식을 말한다. 1932년에 개발된 “Three-strip Technicolor” 촬영기술은 1950년대까지 미국에서 가장 많이 사영된 색채영화 기술이었다.

<sup>3</sup> 테크니컬러사(社)는 1914년에 설립된 영화기술 개발회사 Technicolor Motion Picture Corporation 을 말한다.

단조로운 소리를 들을 때 빠진 반곡점을 찾으려 하는 것처럼 색채가 자연스럽지 않을 때 사람은 무의식적으로 이에 적응하려고 한다. 그러나 그 과정에서 불편을 느낄 수 있다. 칼머스는 흑백이 단조로워서 사람의 관심을 끌지 못하는 반면, 컬러는 눈부시지 않을 때 흑백보다 훨씬 흥미롭고 다양할 수 있다고 주장한다. 이어서 칼머스는 색채의 심리 및 상징적인 힘을 설명한다. 색채를 통해 영화 제작자는 관객에게 분위기 및 감성을 전달하고 관객은 이를 통해 내러티브에 더 심도 있게 몰입할 수 있다(초보군 2009).

칼머스에 따르면 감독은 모든 장면에서 나타난 모든 색깔을 인식하고 다른 색깔과 충돌하지 않거나 뒤로 사라지지 않도록 색채를 결정해야 한다. 동시에 감독은 색채를 통해 관객에게 의미, 감정, 분위기 등을 전달하고자 한다.

할리우드처럼 한국 영화산업은 초기부터 표현력을 강화시키기 위해서 영화에 색채를 도입하려는 시도가 있었음을 볼 수 있다. 나운규 감독의 <병어리 삼룡>(1929)에서 “칼로 사람을 베는 장면을 붉고 푸르게 착색하여 부분적인 색채효과를 내었다”(강민수 2010). 그러나 한국 영화산업 자체처럼 색채영화에 관한 시도도 역시 많은 실패를 거듭했다. 한국의 최초 색채 극영화로 알려진 <여성일기>(최성관 1957)는 이러한 색채시도 실패작의 대표적인 예다. <여성일기>는 색채영화로서 관심을 많이 받았지만, 개봉 후 일주일 만에 종영되었다. <여성일기>의 실패는 영화 촬영방법에서 찾을 수 있다. 강민수는 이렇게 설명했다. “색채 영화에 대한 상식이 전혀 없이 영화와 마찬가지로 작업한 것이 문제였다.” 조명이 정확해야 하고 필터를 필요로 했으나 당시 컬러 리버설 필름을 필터 없이 부족한 조명 환경에서 촬영하여 <여성일기>의 색채는 제대로 재현되지 않았고 칼머스가 주장한 것처럼 보기 불편했다. 이러한 실패는 테크니컬러가 강조한 컬러 고문과 같은 영화 제작진에서 색채를 인식하고 담당하는 사람이 필요함을 증명했다.

<여성일기> 이후 한국 색채영화의 본격적인 시작까지는 거의 10년이 걸렸다. 1961년에 제작된 신상옥 감독의 <성춘향>은 이스트먼 코닥 필름으로 촬영하여 일본에서 현상되었다. <성춘향>은 처음으로 한국영화를 통해서 색채의 다양한 표현력과 예술성을 관객에게 보여주었고 관객의 반응이 제작사에 색채영화의 상업성을 입증했다. 이후 국내 영화시장에서 색채영화의

점유율이 지속적으로 상승했다. 이러한 발전 과정에서 한국 영화산업은 칼머스와 테크니컬러의 영향을 받지 않았다. 그래서 <성춘향>과 같은 색채영화는 할리우드와 달리 원색 및 밝은 색상을 피하지 않았고 다양한 장르의 영화가 색채로 촬영되었다.

미국에서 1950년대 테크니컬러는 독점권을 잃고 TV의 출현과 컬러 영화의 제작 비용의 감소로 인해 영화산업이 변화하기 시작했다. 1960년대 들어서 컬러 TV가 도입되면서 색채영화는 처음으로 흑백 영화보다 더 많이 제작되었다. 한국에서도 1960년대에 경제 발전과 산업화로 인해 영화산업이 짧은 시간 내에 색채영화로 전환되었다. 1980년대에는 컴퓨터 기술을 통해 더 많은 컬러를 표현할 수 있게 되었고 과거의 흑백으로 촬영된 영화를 컬러 판으로 다시 제작할 수 있게 되었다. 이후 컴퓨터 기술과 화면 및 모니터 기술이 발전되면서 훨씬 더 많은 색상을 보여줄 수 있게 되었고 이전의 필름 기술과 달리 상영하면서 발생하는 필름 손상 및 색상 왜곡이 더 이상 발생하지 않았다(초보군 2009). 이 덕분에 현재 영화 색채에 관한 연구도 가능하게 되었다.

## 2.2 색채 이론

영화에 나타난 색채나 일상생활에서 보이는 색채를 이해하고 분석하려면 색채이론에 대한 이해가 선행되어야 한다. 색채는 고대 그리스부터 아리스토텔레스와 같은 철학자가 고려하는 대상이며 당시부터 발전해 온 이론은 색채가 무엇인지, 색채를 어떻게 구별하고 부르는지, 그리고 각각 색채가 무엇을 상징하는지에 대해서 다룬다. 과학과 기술의 발전을 통해 색채가 무엇인지에 대한 답을 알게 되었다. 색채를 정의 하자면, “빛이 1 초에 30 만 km의 속도로 공간을 직진하면서, 어떤 물체에 부딪치거나 투과할 때 빛이 분해되면서 우리 눈에 보이는 (가시광선) 빛이 색채이다”(김성식 2003). 그러나 아직 색채에 대한 의문이 많이 남아 있으며 그에 대한 논의는 활발하게 진행되고 있다.

우선 본 논문에서 쓰인 색채를 구별하고 부르는 방법을 이해하기 위해 색채 명에 대한 논의를 살펴본다. 무지개에 나타난 일곱 가지 빨강, 주황, 노랑, 초록, 파랑, 남색과 보라 색상 외에 널리



<그림 1>  
공공디자인색채표준가이드  
2009

인정되고 합의된 표준색채 이름은 없다 (Bleicher 2005). 언어에 따라 색채 명이 달라지고 상업적인 이유로 색 이름이 변하기도 한다. 한국에서는 국가표준인증종합정보센터의 색동코리아라는 사업을 통해 ‘국민색채감성 향상과 산업계 색채표준 활용을 위해 색채표준 체계 및 정보를 제공’하며 색채에 관한 정보를 표준화하고자 한다. 색동코리아가 제공하는 표준색 공공디자인색채표준가이드(2009)는 표준색이름, 색상, 평도, 채도 등 각 색채에 대한 색 값 정보를 통합하여 산업과 디자인계를 위한 표준을 정한다. 이러한 표준은 어떤 색채를 지적하려고 하거나 색채를 정확하게 측정, 전달, 구현 등을 하기 위한 것이다. 제공된 표준은 <그림 1>에서 보이는 것처럼 한국 산업표준에 따라 색 삼 속성기호 (Hue Value/Chroma 즉 색상 명도/채도)와 표준색 이름과 색 표로 구성된다(2009). 본 논문은 색동코리아가 제공하는 색채분석 프로그램을 통해 화면 캡처를 분석하며 제공된 표준색 이름에 따라 색채를 지적한다.

다음으로 현대 사회에서 나타난 색채의 특징을 살펴본다. 현대 사회에 나타난 색채에 대해서 연구하는 색채 이론가 다윗 배첼러 (David Batchelor)는 그의 <Chromophobia>에서 색채가 어떻게 변했는지와 영화 색채의 경향을 살펴본다(Bleicher 2005). 배첼러는 영화 화면은 사람들이 색상을 선택하는 방식을 바꿨으며 색채에 대한 인식도 평면적으로 바뀌었다고 주장했다. 이러한 변화의 원인은 컴퓨터 기술의 발전과 동시에 일어난 색채의 디지털화이다. 배첼러는 미술계의 전통적인 튜브 그림물감과 컬러 팔레트와 현대 사회의 캔 페인트 및 색 표를 비교한다. 전통적으로 미술가는 컬러 팔레트에서 손으로 색채를 섞었으며 전통적인 색상환(color circle)과 같은 색채이론에 영향을 미쳤다. 반면, 오늘날 색채를 선택할 때 컴퓨터에서 색표, 컬러 피커, 색 견본 등 색채 기술을 사용해서 원하는 색채를 정확히 선택할 수 있다. 그러나 이러한 기술로 인해 각각 컬러 간의 관계에 대한 인식이 사라지고 있으며 위에 언급한 색채 표준 가이드처럼 색 견본에서 색채는 다른 색채와 분리해서 인식된다.

배첼러가 주장하는 색채에 관한 변화는 특별히 디자인과 컴퓨터 그래픽 분야에서 볼 수 있으나 관객이나 일반 사람이 화면에 나타난 색채를 인식할 때 무의식적이라 할지라도 색채 간의 관계를 인식한다. 이것은 어렸을 때 색상환과 보색대비와 같은 기본적인 색채이론의 개념을 배우기 때문일 수도 있다. 박찬욱 감독의 영화 속에서 색채 간의 복잡한 관계를 이용하는 것을 볼 수 있다. 특히

파란색과 빨간색을 더 눈에 띄게 하는 효과를 <친절한 금자씨>, <박쥐>와 <스토커>에서 사람 간의 차이, 강력한 경고, 눈에 띄는 대비 등을 위해서 사용하는 것을 볼 수 있다. <스토커>에서 또 하나의 인물이 된 스토크 가족의 집의 다양한 색상은 박찬욱 감독과 제작진의 색채 관계에 대한 인식을 보여준다. 예를 들어 스토크 가족의 집에서 계단과 입구의 벽 색깔은 파란과 초록 사이에 있는 청록색이며 조명에 따라 파란색처럼 보이기도 하고 초록색처럼 보이기도 한다. 이러한 장면은 색채 관계뿐만 아니라 색채와 조명의 관계를 잘 보여준다.

### 2.3 색채의 상징성

많지 않은 영화 색채에 관한 연구 중 본 논문을 포함해서 대다수는 색채의 상징적인 의미에 대한 연구이다. 그만큼 색채가 영화 요소로서 상징적 의미를 위해 사용되며 영화를 분석함에 있어 중요하게 생각된다. 그러나 색채의 상징적인 의미를 분석하려고 할 때 항상 주의해야 할 것이 있다. 그것은 각각 색채의 상징적인 의미는 문화적 특징이 있을 수도 있다는 점이다. 그래서 어떤 작품을 분석하려면 그 작품이 만들어진 배경부터 살펴봐야 한다. 또한, 색채의 문화적 특징에 있어 작품을 시청하는 사람이 인식하는 상징적 의미와 작품을 만든 사람이 전달하려고 한 의미에 차이가 있을 수도 있다.

본 논문은 상징적인 의미는 어디서 발생하는지를 살펴본다. 각 색채는 다양한 의미를 가질 수 있으며 색채가 의미를 가지게 하는 원인 중 하나는 사람의 경험이다(Bleicher 2005). 아이는 어느 한 색채를 처음 볼 때 경험이 없으므로 그 색채가 무슨 색채인지 또는 그 색채가 어떤 의미를 지니는지를 모른다. 그러나 경험을 통해서 아이는 그 색채를 지닌 사물과 그 색채와 연결된 감정을 알게 되어 색채의 상징적인 의미를 인식하기 시작한다(초보군 2009). 어떤 상징적인 의미는 전 세계 사람의 일반적인 생활에서 나타나기 때문에 전 세계적으로 비슷하게 인식된다. 예를 들자면 빨간색은 위험, 죽음, 애욕, 정열, 사랑 등과 같은 의미를 지닌다. 비슷하게 파란색은 바다와 하늘의 색깔로서 자연, 물, 공기 등이 연상된다. 그러나 이러한 보편적인 의미 외에 문화에 따라 특별한

의미 즉 의미 차이가 있다. 예를 들어 인도에서는 서양 사회와 반대로 검정은 결혼식에서 사용하여 그러한 상징적인 의미를 지니고 흰색은 장례식에 사용해서 죽음을 상징한다 (Bleicher 2005).

색채는 문화뿐만 아니라 종교, 시대, 나이, 성별, 지역, 개인 등에 따라 연상되는 상징적 의미가 달라진다. 색채 연상은 개인의 경험에 의존하는 것이며 색채 기호는 인도 결혼과 장례식 색채처럼 사회적 통념으로 인한 상징적인 의미이다. 한국의 근대 역사만 봐도 사회 통념, 역사 등과 색채 인식의 밀접한 관계를 볼 수 있다.



2002년 월드컵을 위한 'Be the Reds 캠페인' 티셔츠

전통적으로 빨간색(적색)은 파란색(청색)과 같이 한국 문화에서 중요하게 여기는 색채였다. 홍(紅), 주(朱), 황(黃)색을 비롯해 빨간색을

지적하는 다양한 어휘는 이것을 증명한다. 그러나 빨간색이

6.25 전쟁 및 북한과 연상되면서 한국 사회에서 부정적인 이미지를 가지게 되었다(김기정 2004). ‘빨갱이’와 같은 단어는 빨간색의 사회주의 및 공산주의에 대한 연상을 증명하며, 2000년대까지 빨간색의 이미지는 불안하고 부정적이었다. 2002년 월드컵으로 인해 한국 사회의 빨간색에 대한 인식이 다시 변하게 되었으며 밝고 긍정적인 이미지를 가지게 되었다. 이러한 인식변화는 세대 색채에 대한 인식차이로 나타난다.

연상과 기호를 통해 색채는 사람에게 의미와 감성을 전달할 수 있으며 그러한 사실을 이용해서 예술 제작자는 색채를 통해 작품에 더 다양한 의미를 넣는다. 이러한 의미는 색상이 다양한 만큼 그 색채가 전달할 수 있는 상징적인 의미와 감성도 다양하다. 표 1 과 2 (초보군 2009)는 색채 변화와 감성 또는 상징적인 의미의 관계를 보여준다. 표 1 과 2 와 같이 색상의 명도에 따라 전달하는 감성과 의미가 크게 달라진다. 예를 들어 밝은 빨간색은 행복, 봄, 젊음 등을 전달할 수 있으며 어두운 빨간색은 힘, 답답함, 무거움 등을 전달한다.

표 1. 무채색 연상언어 통계표

흰색	청순, 결백, 신성, 웨딩드레스, 청정
회색	평범, 소극적, 차분, 쓸쓸함, 안정, 스님
검은색	밤, 악함, 강함, 신비, 정숙, 슬픔, 불안, 상복, 모던, 장엄함,

표 2. 유채색 연상언어 통계표

색상/톤	밝은 색의 경우	순색의 경우	어두운 색의 경우
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빨간색	행복, 봄, 온화함, 젊음, 순정	기쁨, 정열, 강열, 위험, 혁명	힘, 답답함, 무거움
주황색	따뜻함, 기쁨, 명령, 애정, 희망	화려함, 약동, 무질서, 명예	가을, 풍요, 칙칙함, 노후됨, 엄격, 증후
노란색	미숙, 활발, 소녀	황제, 환희, 발전, 노폐, 경박, 도전	신비, 풍요, 어두움, 음기
연두색	초보적인, 신록, 목장, 초원	생명, 사랑, 산뜻, 소박	안정, 차분함, 자연적인
초록색	양기, 온기, 명령, 기쁨, 평화, 희망, 건강, 안정, 상쾌, 산뜻	희망, 휴식, 위안, 지성, 고독, 생명	침착, 우수, 심원함 (깊은 숲, 바다, 산 등 연상)
파란색	젊음, 하늘, 신(神), 조용함, 상상, 평화	희망, 이상, 진리, 냉정, 젊음	어두움, 근심, 쓸쓸함, 고독, 반성, 보수적
남색	장엄, 신비, 천국, 환상, 차가움	차가움, 영국, 왕실, 이해	위엄, 숙연함, 불안, 공포, 고독, 신비
보라색	귀인, 고풍, 고귀, 우아, 부드러움, 그늘, 실망, 근엄	고귀, 섬세함, 퇴폐, 권력, 도발	공포, 불안, 무거움
자주색	도회적, 화려함, 사치, 섹시	궁중, 황관, 권력, 허영	신비, 증후, 견실, 고풍, 고뇌, 우수, 칙칙함

&lt;표 1, 2&gt;(초보군 2009)

물론 표 1 과 2 에서 언급된 색상과 상징보다 더 많은 상징적·감성적인 의미를 가질 수 있으나 영화 색채를 분석할 때 제작자가 어떤 의미·감성을 전달하기 위해서 어떤 색채를 사용했는지를 이해하기 위한 기본적인 근거가 될 수 있다. 본 논문은 표 1 과 2 를 바탕으로 박찬욱의 <스토커>에서 나타난 색채의 상징적·감성적 의미를 해석하고자 한다. 그러나 색채 분석 과정에서 또 하나의 요소를 살펴봐야 한다. 그것은 색채의 심리적인 영향이다.

## 2.4 색채심리학

색채 연상언어로서 위의 표에서 많은 감정이 언급되었다. 색채와 감정의 관계는 주로 피카소의 청색 시대처럼 제작자의 감성 또는 영화의 경우처럼 영화 속 인물의 감정과 같은 축에서 분석된다. 그러나 영화 색채에는 또 다른 분석 대상이 있으며 그것은 색채가 관객의 감정에 미치는 심리적

영향이다. 뉴욕 영상예술 대학교수 페티 벨렌토니(Patty Bellantoni)는 <If It's Purple Someone's Gonna Die> (2012)에서 영화와 색채심리학을 연결시켜 여러 영화를 분석하였다. 벨렌토니는 대학 강의를 하면서 색채 사용에서 색채의 심리적·감성적 영향에 대한 인식과 의도를 학생에게 알리기 위해서 실험을 했다. 학생들에게 다음 수업에 빨간 것을 가져오라고 했고 다음 수업에서 놀라운 결과를 관찰했다. 많은 학생은 예상할 수 있는 빨강 페인트, 색 견본 등을 가져왔는데 어떤 학생들은 매운 계피 맛 사탕과 뜨겁게 느낀 파스 등의 빨간색 느낌을 주는 것을 가져왔다. 또한, 이 ‘레드데이(Red Day)’ 수업에서 학생들은 긴장, 화, 흥분 등의 ‘빨강’ 행동들을 보이기 시작했다. 벨렌토니 교수는 이와 같은 실험을 다른 수업 학생들과 그리고 다른 색채를 통해 몇 번 했다. 할 때마다 학생들이 가져온 것들과 각 색채가 학생에게 미치는 영향이 놀라웠다(Bellantoni 2012). 벨렌토니 교수는 심리학자가 아니고 그가 실행한 실험은 과학적이라고 보기가 어렵지만 이런 실험을 통해 색채의 심리적 및 생리적 영향을 이해하기 쉽게 보여준다. 이 실험이 보여 주는 심리 및 생리적 영향은 심리학 주제로서 연구가 많이 되어 있으며 인테리어 디자인에서 많이 사용되고 있다.

벨렌토니가 언급한 인테리어 디자인 즉 실내장식과 더불어 의학에서도 색채의 심리적·물리적 영향에 대한 연구는 오래 전부터 하기 시작했다. 1957년에 국제색채학회 (I.A.C.C)가 색채심리학, 색채 치료, 생리학, 생물학, 물리학, 디자인 등 다양한 분야에서 색채에 관한 연구를 발전시키기 위해서 설립되었다 (Mahnke 1987). 이어서 국가별로 다양한 색채학회가 설립되어 색채에 대한 연구, 색채 표준화 등 색채에 대한 다양한 노력이 이루어졌다. 이 중에 색채심리학은 색채 치료 병원, 공공시설 등의 실내장식과 같은 분야에서 많은 발전을 이루었다. 그러나 벨렌토니 교수처럼 색채심리학을 예술 및 미디어와 연결하는 연구가 여전히 적었다. 1987년에 출판된 <Color and Light in Man-Made Environments>에서 프랑크와 루돌프 마안케(Frank H. and Ruldoph H. Mahnke)는 주요 색상의 심리적 성격과 연상 및 영향을 살펴보기 위해 건물 바닥, 천장, 벽에 사용되는 색상에 따라 미치는 심리적 영향을 분석했다. 그들의 연구에 따르면 색상과 명도, 채도 등에 따라 색채의 심리적 영향이 달라지는 것뿐만 아니라 노출 시간과 색채의 위치에 따라 영향이 달라진다고 주장했다. 예를 들어 영향이 강한 빨간색은 짧은 동안 노출이 될 때 자극적인 영향을 미쳐 맥박수를 높이고




긴장감을 일으킬 수 있으며 이러한 영향은 시간이 지날수록 줄어들고 오히려 표준보다 낮은 맥박수를 보였다(Mahnke 1987).

마안크의 연구에 따르면 색채의 선호, 내포, 감성적 연상 등은 집단 내에서 비슷하게 나타나며 특별한 문화 특성상 연상을 제외하면 여러 나라와 여러 민족을 비교할 때 일반적이고 공통적인 결과가 나타난다. 그래서 특히 빨강, 파랑, 초록 등 주요 색상의 경우에는 심리학적 영향은 사람의 문화와 배경에 따라 크게 달라지지는 않았다. 빨간색(특히 밝은 경우)은 자극적이며 열정, 열렬, 활동, 강력 등 긍정적인 연상이 있고, 공격적이고, 극심, 잔인 등 부정적인 연상도 가지고 있다. 모든 면에서 빨강의 반대인 파란색은 편안함, 내성적인 색채이다. 긍정적으로 파란색은 침착, 안전, 편안, 사색 등과 연결되고, 반면 공포, 우울, 차가움 등의 부정적인 연상과도 관련이 있다. 초록색은 파란색과 비슷한 영향을 미치며 초록의 부정적인 의미는 파랑과 조금 다르다. 긍정적으로 초록색은 자연과 연상되어 조용함, 상쾌함으로 인식이 되지만, 부정적으로 초록색은 유죄, 부패, 질병 등을 떠오르게 한다(Mahnke 1987). 마안크의 연구처럼 대부분 색채에 대한 심리적 연구는 물리적 공간 또는 물건이나 제품의 사용에 관해서 이루어졌으며 디지털 기술이 발전되면서 디지털 영상에서 나타난 색채에 대한 연구도 이뤄지기 시작했다.

현대 사회에서 사람은 “다양한 매체로부터 끊임없이 영상자극으로부터 색채의 영향을 받는다”(김성식, 2003). 이 영향은 단순한 물체에 대한 정보 전달이 아니라 다양한 감정, 심리 및 신체적 영향도 말한다. “색은 심리적, 생리적으로 인간에게 영향을 미치는 에너지를 지니고 있다”(김성식 2003). 물론 색채는 역사적 및 사회적으로 상징적인 의미로 인해 심리적 영향도 미칠 수 있지만, 색채는 에너지를 지니는 빛으로서 사람 신체의 근육, 정신, 그리고 신경 작용에 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 극단적인 예이지만 1997년 일본에서 600여명 아이가 포켓몬이라는 애니메이션을 보면서 간질 발작(epileptic seizure)을 일으켰다. 나중에 이 사건의 원인은 한 에피소드에서 미사일에 맞아 큰 폭발을 일으키면서 빨간색과 파란색 빛이 빠른 속도로 점멸하는 장면 때문이었다는 것이 밝혀졌다. 색채는 심리적으로 사람들이 보는 물질, 공간 등에 대한 온도 감각, 무게, 소리, 시간 등의 지각에 영향을 미친다(Mahnke 1987). 영화에서 이러한 영향을 통해서 진지함, 공포, 긴장 등

감성적인 느낌을 줄 수 있고 속도, 시끄러움, 조용함, 깊이 등 장면의 감각적인 요소를 지각하는데에 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 이에 대한 가장 대표적인 예는 빨간색 자동차가 더 빠르게 보이는 것이다.



<그림 2> (Lin et al. 2012)

색채가 감각과 심리에 미치는 영향 때문에 각각의 영화 장르에서 색채 사용에 관한 경향을 볼 수 있다. 행복, 가벼움, 시끄러움, 정열 등을 전달하는 빨간색과 노란색이 로맨스와 코미디 영화에서 가장 많이 사용되고 있고 이 장르에서는 색채의 포화도도 다섯 가지 대표 장르 중 가장 높다. 공포 영화에는 잔인한 장면이 많아서 빨간색이 많을 것이라는 예상과는 달리 파란색이 가장 많이 사용된다고 한다(Lin et al. 2012). 박찬욱 감독의 영화는 대부분 스릴러 영화로서 분류되며 여러 장르를 결합하기 때문에 <그림 2>에서 지적한 다섯 장르에 없지만, 그의 영화는 공포 영화와 비슷한 경향을 보인다.

### 3. 연구 범위 및 방법


위에 언급한 바와 같이 색채에 관한 연구는 많은 분야에서 겹치는데 색채 이론은 대부분 디자인, 미학, 기호학 등 측면에서 연구되며 색채 심리학, 신경 과학, 의학, 광학 등 과학적인 관점에서도 연구된다. 본 논문은 색채의 다양한 측면을 감안해서 영화에서의 사용을 분석하고자 한다. 특히

색채가 지닌 상징적인 의미와 감성적인 영향을 파악하려고 한다. 독특하고 창의적인 색채 사용에 대해 고려할 때 먼저 떠오르는 감독 중 한 분은 한국의 박찬욱 감독이다. 특히 그의 영화는 다양한 감성과 상징을 담고 있어서 이러한 연구에 좋은 대상이 될 수 있다고 생각했다. 그래서 본 논문은 언론에서 영상이 자주 언급된 그의 최신작 <스토커>(2013)를 중심으로 영화 색채 추세를 분석하여 위에 언급된 색채 심리학에 관한 선행연구를 적용해서 영화 색채가 관객에게 미칠 수 있는 감성적인 영향을 파악하려고 한다.


영화 색채를 분석할 때 가장 기본적이고 심리적 영향이 가장 큰 빨간색과 파란색을 대상으로 한다. 여기서 빨간색이나 파란색이라고 할 때 그 색채로 구성되는 여러 색상을 포함한다. 예를 들면 빨간색은 빨간 검정, 밝은 빨강, 흐린 빨강<sup>4</sup> 등의 빨강의 다양한 명도와 채도를 포함한다. 심리적 영향과 상징을 분석하기 위해서 이러한 다양한 색상을 표 1 과 2 처럼 밝은 색, 순색, 어두운 색으로 나누어 분석한다. 화면의 색채 구성을 알리기 위해 두 가지 프로그램을 사용했다. 우선 전체 화면의 주요 색채를 파악하기 위해서 마틴 크리빈스키(Martin Krzywinski)의 이미지 색채 분석 사이트 ([http://mkweb.bcgsc.ca/color\\_summarizer/?analyze](http://mkweb.bcgsc.ca/color_summarizer/?analyze))을 사용한다.

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<sup>4</sup> 국가표준인증종합정보센터가 제공한 <공공디자인색채표준가이드>(2009)에 따라 표준색이름.



<그림 3>Mkweb Image Color Summarizer



<그림 4> 한국표준색 색채분석 (Korean Standard Color Analysis)

이 사이트에 화면캡처 파일을 올려서 프로그램에서 이미지를 300 픽셀로 바꾸면 위 <그림 3>과 같이 평균과 중간 치의 색상, 명도, 채도, RGB, 색 값이 제공된다. 이러한 색 값과 동시에 ‘어두운 순수 파란색’과 같은 이미지에 대한 색채 묘사가 제공된다. 본 논문은 이 색채 묘사와 색 값을 통해 장면이 전달하는 심리, 감정, 상징 등의 요소를 분석한다.

이미지의 정확한 색채 구성을 알기 위해 <그림 4>에서 볼 수 있는 색동코리아가 제공하는 한국표준 색 색채분석(KSCA)이라는 프로그램을 사용한다. 이 프로그램을 통해 빨강과 파랑 색채가 전체 화면에 얼마나 차지하는지 그리고 화면의 색상 구성을 파악한다. 본 프로그램은 화면 색상을 56 색 이하로 감소시킨 다음 각각 색채의 비율, 표준 색 이름과 RGB 등 색채 구성 정보를 제공한다. 이러한 정보를 통해 본 논문은 심리적 영향의 강도와 색채 사용에 관한 경향을 분석하고자 한다.

영화 색채 분석을 위해 화면캡처 방법을 사용하는데 화면캡처를 선택하는 방법은 다음과 같다. 우선 다음 영화 분석 부분에서 설명하는바와 같이 영화의 일반적인 주제와 주요 상징성을 분석해서 전, 중, 후반으로 나누었다. 영화를 두 번 보면서 주요 상징, 주제 그리고 강력한 감정과 관련된 장면에서 화면을 캡처했다. 총 383 화면캡처 중에서 색채가 화면에서 중요 역할이나 강력한 영향을 미치는 화면과 색채가 영화의 주요 상징을 표현하기 위해서 사용하는 화면을 선택했다. 이제 선택한 화면캡처 총 61 개를 위에 언급한 Color Summarizer 를 통해 화면에 관한 색채 묘사를 얻었다. 이러한 정보를 통해 위의 표 1 과 2 에서 표시된 상징적, 감성적 의미와 마안크가 언급한 심리적·감성적 영향을 전, 중, 후반의 주요 상징, 감성과 내러티브의 맥락에 따라 분석하였다.

### 3.1 영화 분석

박찬욱 감독의 <스토커>(2012)<sup>5</sup>는 그의 첫 할리우드 진출로서 흥미로운 연구 대상이다. 미국 배우 웬트워스 밀러가 쓴 각본으로부터 박찬욱 감독이 존경하는 히치콕 감독의 영향이 크다. 그래서 <스토커>는 시각적, 청각적 요소를 통해 긴장감과 공포심이 가득한 영화라고 말할 수 있다. 미국과 한국 언론에서 <스토커>는 예술성이 높고 박찬욱의 독창적인 스타일을 보여주는 작품으로

<sup>5</sup> <스토커>(2012)제작:20 세기폭스 서치라이트 픽처스(20<sup>th</sup> Century Fox Searchlight Pictures), 감독: 박찬욱, 출연: 미아 와시코브스카 Mia Wasikowska(인디아 스토커 역), 매튜 구드 Matthew Goode (삼촌 찰리 스토커 역), 니콜 키드먼 Nicole Kidman( 이블린 스토커 역), 재키 위버 Jacki Weaver (숙모 그웬들린 스토커 역)

좋은 평가를 받았다. <스토커>는 할리우드 제작제도에서 제작된 작품이면서도 <친절한 금자씨>와 <박쥐>처럼 박찬욱 감독과 정정훈 촬영감독이 협력한 작품이기도 하다. 그래서 스토커는 할리우드의 영향에도 불구하고 그들의 시각적인 스타일을 유지한다. 또한, <스토커>에서 박찬욱 감독이 내러티브 및 인물의 일부를 표현하기 위해서 상징적인 요소를 사용하는 것도 한국에서 제작된 영화와 마찬가지로 보인다.

<스토커>는 주인공 인디아(미아 바시코브스카 분)의 성장에 대한 이야기이며 관객에게 악은 태어났을 때부터 가지고 있는 유전적인 것인지 환경의 영향으로 가지게 되는 것인지라는 질문을 던진다(Treifenbach, 2013). <스토커>의 이야기를 요약하자면 주인공 인디아는 18 살 생일날 갑작스런 사고로 아빠를 잃으며 찰리(매튜 구드 분)라는 존재조차 몰랐던 삼촌이 나타난다. 인디아의 엄마 이블린(니콜 키드먼 분)은 젊은 시절 남편처럼 생긴 찰리를 반갑게 받아들이며 세 명의 인물 사이에 긴장이 가득한 관계가 시작된다. 찰리의 등장과 동시에 스토커 가족 주변의 사람이 사라지기 시작하고 인디아는 자신에 대해서 새로운 것을 알게 된다.

영화 속 상징 및 모티프를 살펴보면 각각 인물에게 부여된 색채와 반복된 상징적인 이미지가 있다. 영화 전반에 순수한 소녀인 인디아에게 노랑색이 부여된다(이주현, 2013). 이 색채와 같이 새알의 이미지가 반복된다. 박찬욱 감독은 한 인터뷰에서 새알과 새 모티프의 상징적인 의미를 설명했다. <스토커>에서 주인공 인디아가 성장하는 과정이 새가 알에서 부화하는 것과 비슷하며 동시에 인디아가 영화 내러티브에서 사냥감에서 포식자로 변하는 것도 상징한다(Smith 2013). 비슷한 면에서 영화에서 자주 나타난 초록색은 사냥이 일어날 숲을 상징한다. 이러한 상징적인 요소처럼 박찬욱 감독은 노골적인 표현보다 은근한 상징적인 표현을 선호한다(Bisley, 2013). 그래서 그의 영화를 이해하려면 색채를 포함한 상징적인 요소를 분석해야 한다. 본 논문은 다음과 같이 <스토커>의 색채 사용을 분석한다.

### 3.2 영화 색채

박찬욱 감독만큼 영화 속에서 색채를 가지고 노는 감독이 없다는 생각이 든다. 그의 영화를 살펴보면 <복수는 나의 것>부터 최신작 <스토커>를 비롯해 색채가 중요한 역할을 하지 않은 영화는 없었다. 특히 복수 3 부작의 마지막 편 <친절한 금자씨>는 박찬욱 감독의 심리 및 상징적 도구로서 색채에 대한 관심을 증명하는 대표적인 작품이라고 말할 수 있다. 국내 극장 개봉 시 <친절한 금자씨>는 두 가지 버전이 상영되었다. 일반 상영관에서 컬러 버전이 상영되는 한편, 디지털 상영관에서 컬러와 흑백이 전환되는 버전이 상영되었다. 그의 최신작 <스토커>도 상징적인 측면에서 색채를 강조한다. 흑백 그림에 초록색만 넣는 홍보 포스터부터 엔딩 크레딧의 에밀리 웰스의 <Becomes the Color>라는 노래까지 색채는 영화에서 중요한 존재이다.

<스토커>를 전, 중, 후반으로 나누면 전반은 찰리의 도입과 세 주인공의 관계 형성으로 구성된다. 이 때문에 전반에 파란 톤처럼 전체 화면이 한 색채로 구성되는 장면은 거의 없으며 그러한 장면은 주로 찰리의 정체성을 암시하기 위해서이다. 전반 부분의 색채 특징 중 하나는 인디아의 젊음과 순수함을 상징하는 노란색이 자주 보인다. 시간이 지날수록 노란색이 나타난 장면이 줄어들게 되고 파란색과 어두운 빨간색 장면이 늘어난다. 전반의 긴장감은 오히려 음악, 대사, 프레임잉(framing)<sup>6</sup> 등을 통해 만들어진다. 시각적으로 청록색 집 안의 애매하고 묘한 색상과 조명은 이러한 긴장감을 높인다.

중반은 찰리가 사냥하는 부분이며 인디아가 찰리의 정체를 파악하기 시작한다. 영화의 중반에서 긴장감은 제일 높고 화면 톤트가 제일 많이 사용된다. <스토커>의 중반을 대표하는 장면은 찰리가 스토커 집에 갑작스럽게 등장하는 인디아의 숙모 그웬들린을 사냥하고 죽이는 장면이다. 파란색 톤트가 가장 이 장면에서 가장 많이 사용되며 두 가지 빨간색이 이 부분에 나타난다. 첫째는 파랑 및 초록과 대비한 진한 빨간색이며 둘째는 엄마 이블린의 방에 존재하는 붉은 색 (빨간 검정색/진홍)이다. 이 빨간색은 다양한 역할을 한다. 심리적으로 이 빨간색은 관객의 긴장 또는 맥박수를 높이는 영향을 주었으며 그 방에서 일어난 장면들에 긴장감이 가득하게 만든다. 또한, 이 색채는 이블린과 인디아 각각의 욕망을 표현하며 동시에 스토커의 피를 가지고 있지 않은 이블린의 위태로운 위치를 상징한다.

<sup>6</sup> 프레임잉은 화면의 구도와 구성을 말한다.

노란색이 영화 전반에 중요한 역할을 했으며, 위에 언급한 빨간색은 영화 후반에 중요한 역할을 한다. <스토커>의 후반은 이야기의 결론이며 인디아가 성인이 되는 부분이다. 인디아는 자신에 대해서, 찰리에 대해서 그리고 아빠의 죽음에 대한 사실을 발견하면서 자신을 위한 길을 스스로 선택하게 된다. 인디아가 성인이 되는 것을 상징하고 표현하는 색채는 이전에 언급된 빨간색이다. 영화의 마지막 장면에 빨간색의 중요한 역할은 이를 증명하는 것이다. 이와 같이 인디아가 자신의 길을 선택하는 장면에서도 빨간색은 중요한 역할을 한다. 빨강이 인디아가 스스로 찾고 선택하는 ‘자신의 색깔’이라고 생각하면 전체 영화에서 나타난 노랑과 빨강의 대비는 새로운 의미를 가지게 된다. 영화의 첫 장면과 마지막 장면을 비교하면 이러한 변화를 볼 수 있다.

각각 주요 인물에게 부여된 색채를 다시 살펴보면 위에 언급한 세 가지 원색 노랑, 빨강, 파랑은



**<캡처-2,3>** <스토커>의 오프닝 장면에서 도로의 노랑선을 건너면서 인디아가 자신의 이름을 지운다. 영화 결론에서 같은 장면이 나타나면서 인디아가 찢은 보안관의 피가 노랑선에 떨어진다.

각각 스토커 가족에 있는 인물에게 부여된다. 인디아는 노랑이며 찰리는 파랑이고 이블린에게 빨강이 부여된다. 노랑은 인디아의 젊음을 상징하며 파랑은 다른 사람과 잘 관계하지 못하는 찰리의 차가움 또는 반사회적인 인격장애를 상징한다. 영화에 가장 일반적인 인물 이블린은 빨강으로부터 보호를 받으며 동시에 빨강은 이블린의 정열을 표현한다. 그러나 <스토커>에서 색채는 이러한 상징적인 의미만으로 사용되는 것이 아니다. 색채는 전체 화면의 절반을 차지하게 되면서 영화 분위기 즉 관객에게 심리적인 영향을 미친다. 다음 부분에서는 가장 큰 영향을 미치는 파랑과 빨강 색상의 심리적인 사용을 분석한다.



3.2.1 파란색

어둡고 바랜 파랑색 (Dark Faded Blue)	
상징, 감성	어두움, 근심, 쓸쓸함, 숙연함, 불안, 공포, 신비
심리 영향	공포, 우울함, 추위를 느끼게 한다
채도	색상


<색채 표 1>



<캡처-4~7>

박찬욱 감독이 심리적 영향을 위해서 많이 활용하는 색채 중 하나는 파란색이다. 특히 그의 최신 두 작품 <박쥐>와 <스토커>에서 파란색은 어떤 장면에서 눈에 띄게 전체화면을 채운다. 일반적으로 파란색은 편하거나 침착하게 하는 영향을 미치지만, 어두운 경우에 오히려 공포심과 긴장을 줄 수 있어서 <그림 2>에서 보다시피 공포영화에 많이 사용된다. <스토커>도 역시 마찬가지다. 파란색은 불가사의한 찰리 삼촌을 대표하는 색채이며 그의 존재를 더 공포스럽게 한다. 이 현상을 잘 보여주는 장면은 <캡처-5>가 보여주는 장면이다. 찰리는 인디아와 대화하면서 일어난다. 전체화면의 74%는 파란 검정 (KS 5PB 2/1)이며 찰리의 묘한 표정은 파란색의 영향으로 인해 더 무섭게 보인다.

<스토커>에서 파란색의 심리적인 효과가 가장 큰 부분은 역시 파란색이 가장 많이 나타나는 중반 부분이다. <스토커>의 중반은 두 가지의 ‘사냥’ 부분으로 나눌 수 있다. 첫 번째 사냥은 찰리 삼촌이 그웬들린을 죽이는 장면이며 편집을 통해서 찰리가 사냥하는 것, 인디아가 찰리의 정체를 발견하는 것과 이블린이 적극적으로 찰리에 대한 관심을 표현하려는 것이 동시에 일어난다. 각각



<KSCA 색표-1> 찰리가 그웬들린을 죽인 장면

장면을 분석하면 찰리가 나타난 장면에서 <캡처-5, 7><sup>7</sup>과랑 틴트를 통해 흰색 부분을 포함해 전체화면이 파랑 색상으로 구성된다. <KSCA 색표-1>에서 찰리가 인디아의 숙모 그웬들린을 죽인 장면의 분석을 보여준다. 이 장면에서 화면의 90% 이상은 여러 어두운 파란색상으로 구성된다. 동시에 인디아가 찰리가 냉동고에 숨긴 스토커 저택을 관리했던 믹개릭 부인의 시체를 발견한 장면도 역시 마찬가지다. 이러한 장면에서 박찬욱 감독이 사용한 파랑 틴트는 공포심을 높이는 효과를 지니며 관객에게 추위를 표현하고 느끼게 하는 효과도 있다. 이러한 영향은 찰리가 저지른 살인행위의 차갑고 반사회적인 성격을 관객이 물리적으로 느낄 수 있게 표현한다.

<색채 표-1>에 표시된 명도를 보면 영화에서 사용된 파란색의 명도는 매우 낮다. 즉 화면을 차지한 파란색은 검정과 매우 가깝다. 이 낮은 명도는 파란색의 부정적인 심리 영향을 일어나게 한다. 파란색이 밝은 경우 또는 순수한 파랑의 경우에 <표 1, 2>에서 제시한 긍정적인 감성 및

<sup>7</sup><캡처-4~7> (시계 방향으로) 4.인디아가 믹개릭 부인의 시체를 담은 지하층 냉동고의 문을 여는장면. 5. 식탁에서 찰리는 인디아가 대화하는 장면. 6. 그웬들린의 호텔 객실 문. 7. 찰리가 그웬들린을 죽이는 장면.

심리적 반응이 발생할 수 있지만, <스토커>에서는 어두운 파랑으로 인해 파랑의 부정적인 영향만 보인다.

<스토커>의 후반에 나타난 파란색은 중반과 달리 색상 틸트가 화면 절반을 차지하는 장면이 거의 없다. 여기서 나타난 파란색은 순수 파랑이나 어두운 파랑이 아니라 초록과 섞이는 청록색이다. 그래서 후반부에서 나타난 파란색의 심리적 영향은 중반보다 더 애매하다. 영화의 후반은 주로 집안에서 진행하기 때문에 각각 방의 벽 색깔이 큰 영향을 미친다. 이중 입구와 계단의 청록색이 대표적인 예이다. 여기서 관객에게 미치는 심리적 영향보다 조명을 통해 각각 인물의 심리적 상태가 표현된다. 예를 들어 이블린이 찰리와 인디아의 관계를 발견한 뒤 주황과 어두운 파랑을 통해 정신적인 혼란과 우울함과 공포를 표현한다.

### 3.2.2 빨간색

어둡고 진한 빨강 (Dark Rich Red)	
상징, 감성	힘, 답답함, 무거움, 정열, 위험, 강열, 피
심리 영향	심리적으로 가장 자극하는 색채, 긴장, 맥박수를 높이는 영향, 눈에 가까워지는 느낌을 준다.
채도	색상

<색채 표 2>



<캡처-8~11>

빨간색은 색상 중 가장 자극적인 색채이다. <스토커>에서 나타난 빨강 색상은 파랑처럼 주로 어두운 빨강 색상이며 순수한 빨강은 눈에 띄지 않는다. 그러나 순수한 빨강색이 눈에 띄지 않더라도 <스토커>에서 나타난 빨강의 심리적인 영향은 크다. <스토커>의 독특한 빨간색은 주로 이블린의 방에 존재한다. 벨라토니의 레드데이(Red Day)나 마안크가 설명한 빨강 벽과 천장의 심리적인 영향처럼 이블린 방에서 일어난 장면들은 긴장감을 높이는 영향을 미친다. 마안크는 빨강 벽에 대해서 공격적이고 전진된 느낌을 준다고 주장했다. 이러한 <캡처-8~10><sup>8</sup>에서 확인할 수 있다. 빨강 벽과 빨강 소파, 꽃 등이 숨 막히는

압박감을 준다. 이블린의 방은 관객에게 다가오면서 좁고 작아 보인다. 게다가 장면의 강력한 빨간색은 관객을 공격하는 느낌을 주면서 긴장감을 높인다. 그래서 이 장면에서 펼친 대화는 엄마와 딸의 사이 좋은 대화가 아니라 인디아가 엄마를 공격하는 장면이다.

전체 화면을 차지하지 않더라도 빨간색은 강력한 느낌 또는 의미를 전달할 수 있다.

<스토커>에서 빨강 표시를 통해 죽음을 예시하면서 주의를 전달한다. 그웬들린의 죽음 직전 호텔의 빨강 간판과 공중전화 박스의 빨강 표시 판은 관객에게 그웬들린의 죽음을 알리는 주의 표시다. 인디아가 찰리와 함께 인디아의 급우 입을 죽이는 장면 직전 인디아가 식당 주차장에서 입을 만난다. 여기서도 식당의 간판이 두 사람에게 빨강 빛을 비치면서 펼쳐질 죽음을 예시한다. 빨강은

<sup>8</sup> <캡처-8~11> 8~10 인디아가 이블린 방에서 이블린의 머리를 빗기면서 대화하는 장면  
11. 인디아가 찰리의 관계를 발견한 뒤 전 남편과 인디아가 사냥한 새들과 새 등에 물건을 태우는 장면

강력한 만큼 조금 사용해도 눈에 띈다. 그래서 영화 제작 시 빨강을 사용하는 것은 적극적인 선택이었다는 것을 알 수 있다. <스토커>에서는 스토크 가족의 집의 빨간 문, 이블린의 옷차림, 첫 장면과 마지막 장면의 꽃에서 흘린 피 등 상징적인 사용은 심리적인 사용보다 더 많다. <스토커>에서 빨강은 피, 정열, 성인 등 다양한 것을 상징한다. 이블린의 경우 빨간색은 그를 찰리와 인디아에서 보호하는 것을 상징한다. 한편, 인디아가 그린 빨강 꽃병 무늬와 마지막 장면에서 나타난 빨강 꽃과 피는 인디아가 성인이 되어 자신의 색깔을 발견하는 것을 상징한다. <스토커>에서 나타난 빨간색은 등장한 장면수에 비해서 영화에 큰 영향을 미친다.

#### 4. 결론

색채만큼 영화의 내러티브, 분위기, 감정, 예술성 등 다양한 측면에 영향을 미치는 것은 없다. 오늘날 색채의 부재 자체는 의미를 지닌다. 그래서 영화 제작 과정에서 감독, 촬영감독, 의상 디자이너, 세트 디자이너 등 제작진은 색채에 대해서 인식하고 적극적으로 색채를 선택해야 한다. 영화 색채를 선택하는 작업에서 많은 것을 고려해야 한다. 색채의 채도에 따라 현실적이거나 환상적인 느낌을 줄 수 있다. 색채의 명도에 따라 기쁨, 슬픔, 공포 등 감정적인 분위기가 달라진다. 강력한 색채대비는 눈에 부실 수 있으면 보기 불편할 수 있으나 색채대비가 없을 때 화면이 평평하게 보일 수도 있다. 그리고 각각 색상은 사람에게 심리적인 영향을 미칠 수 있다는 점도 항상 인식해야 한다.

역사를 보면 영화 개척자는 색채의 표현력을 이용하기 위해서 색채 기술을 발전시키려는 수많은 시도를 했다. 이 과정에서 관객과 영화 제작자의 영화색채에 대한 인식이 변하게 되면서 색채는 어느새 영화의 거의 필수 요소가 되었다. 한국의 경우에는 색채를 잘 활용할 수 있게 기술, 지식과 시설을 설립하는 과정은 다른 나라보다 늦게 시작했고 많은 실패를 겪었지만 한국의 첫 성공적인 색채 영화 <성춘향> 이후 한국 영화산업은 굉장히 빠른 속도로 색채영화로 전환되었다. 현대 한국 영화계에서 독창적인 색채 사용으로 인정을 받는 감독들이 여러 명이 있으며 그 중 박찬욱 감독은 최근 할리우드에 첫 진출 작품 <스토커>를 통해 할리우드 제작체제에서도 그의

독창적인 시각적 스타일을 보여줄 수 있었다. 이 영화는 문화 차이와 상관 없이 색채는 많은 상징적인 의미와 감성을 전달할 수 있다는 것을 보여줬다.

색채심리학은 과학과 의학 측면에서 많이 연구되었다. 그러나 이러한 연구는 영화색채에 적용되지 않았다. 그래서 본 논문은 색채의 심리학 측면을 살펴보면서 영화에서 나타난 색채에 적용하고자 했다. 심리적 영향이 가장 큰 파랑과 빨강의 경우 영화 속의 사용을 쉽게 볼 수 있었다. 특히 <스토커>에서는 주로 어두운 색상을 이용해서 전체 화면을 거의 한 색상으로 채우면서 느끼는 심리적 영향이 컸다. 이러한 결과는 유지상 (Lin Chih-Hsiang)의 장르에 따른 색채 사용의 성격에 대한 연구에서 확인 할 수 있었다. <스토커>처럼 공포 영화는 주로 낮은 명도와 채도의 파란색을 사용한다. 반면 코미디와 로맨스는 채도가 높은 순수한 색채를 사용하며 빨강과 노랑을 다른 장르보다 더 많이 사용한다. 이러한 현상을 보면 무의식적이더라도 색채의 심리적 영향은 영화에서 선택한 색채에 영향을 미친다. 앞으로 이러한 현상을 더 잘 이해하기 위해 과학적인 분석이 필요하다고 생각한다. 특히 영화에서 노출된 색채가 관객에게 얼마나 큰 영향을 미치는지는 매우 흥미로운 연구 대상이 될 수도 있다고 생각한다.

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# 한국정부 수립 이후 한미 간 행정권 이양과 그 성격

(Characteristic of the Administrative Authority Transfer from US to Korea after Establishment of Korean Government in 1948)

김보운(Keum, Bowoon)

## 목 차

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### 1. 머리말

1948년 8월 15일, 한국정부는 3년 간의 미국 점령 종식과 정부수립을 선포하였다. 그러나 한국 정부는 여전히 정부를 운영할 행정권한을 갖지 못하고 있었다. 점령기간 ‘사실상의 정부’이자 주권 보유자였던 미군정부로부터 그 권한을 이양 받아야 하는 절차를 남겨두고 있었던 것이다. 한국정부는 5월 10일의 선거로 정부가 조직된 지 4개월이 지난 1948년 9월 11일, 미국과 「한미 간 재정 및 재산에 관한 최초협정」(이하 ‘재정이양협정’)을 체결함으로써 행정권 이양을 완수할 수 있었다. ‘재정이양협정’은 미군정과 한국정부의 연속성을 공식화하고, 군정의 점령정책을 승인 및 승계하며, 대한원조운영의 기반을 마련한다는 내용으로 구성되어 있었다. 한국정부에 있어 ‘재정이양협정’은 신생정부로서의 정당성을 확보하기 위한 중요한 절차였다. 1948년 수립된 이승만 정부는 분단 정부라는 한계를 갖고 있었다. 즉 한반도 전체를 대표할 수 있는 정당성을 확보하지 못하고 있었던 것이다. 또한 정부 수립 이후에도 행정권을 확보하지 못하고 있는 상황에 대해 여론의 비판을 받고 있었다. 이에 이승만 정부는 신속히 행정권을 이양 받아 국내외로부터의 정당성을 확보하고자 했다. ‘재정이양협정’의 체결과정은 1948년 신생정부이자 분단정부로서 수립된 한국정부가 정당성을 확보해 가는 과정이었던 것이다.

그러나 이승만 정부는 ‘재정이양협정’을 체결함으로써 정책운영에 한계를 갖게 되었다. ‘재정이양협정’은 미국에 의해 마련된 협정으로서 한국정부의 원조물자 운영 및 정책운영의 방향을 규정하고 있었기 때문이다. 이승만 정부는 ‘재정이양협정’ 체결 전 이에 대해 충분히 인지하고 있었음에도 이를 수용할 수 밖에 없었다. 행정권 이양이 지연되고 있는 데 대한 국내 반발을 무마하고, 국제연합으로부터 정부승인을 받고자 했기 때문이다. 이승만 정부는 ‘재정이양협정’의 발효를 위해 국회의 문제제기를 배제하였고, 협정을 발효시켰다.

본고는 1948년 8월 정부수립 이후 시작된 한미 간 ‘재정이양협정’ 체결과정을 분석하여 ‘재정이양협정’에 대한 한미 간 인식의 차이와 그 의미를 살펴본다. 이를 통해 정부수립 시기 미국의 대한 정책이 전개되는 과정 속에서 이승만 정부가 신생정부로서의 정당성을 확보하려는 움직임과 그 결과를 확인할 것이다.

한미 간 행정권 이양에 관한 연구는 최근에야 등장하기 시작했다. 한모니까는 군사부문과 재정

및 재산부분의 이양을 기준으로 정권이양을 분석하였다.<sup>1)</sup> 그러나 정권이양의 전반적인 의미를 제시하는데 주력함으로써 ‘재정이양협정’이 담고 있는 행정권 이양으로서의 의미에는 주목하지 않았다. 기존 연구에서 ‘재정이양협정’은 주로 1950년대 경제구조를 분석하는 과정에서 국가자본 형성의 계기로 설명되거나,<sup>2)</sup> 점령정책의 경제적 영향력에 주목하여 미군정 주둔비가 청산되었음을 확인하는 절차로서 제시되어 왔다.<sup>3)</sup> 그러나 행정권이 재정운영권한을 기반으로 이양되었다는 점에서 경제적 측면 외의 미군정기 재정운영권한의 성격과 의미를 검토할 필요가 있다.

본고에서 참고한 주요자료는 ‘재정이양협정’ 체결 이전에 진행된 한미 간 회담의 속기록인 RG469, Box6의 문서와 ‘재정이양협정’의 원문 및 행정부서 이양 과정문서를 엮은 RG338, Box68이다. 한국정부 수립 이후 군정의 행정권 이양 및 재정이양에 대한 국내외의 정세 및 여론을 파악하는 데에는 「국회회의록」을 비롯하여 당대 신문 및 잡지를 참고하였다.

## 2. 한미 간 ‘재정이양협정’의 체결과정과 ‘동상이몽(同床異夢)’

### 1) 미국의 원조정책과 점령정책 연속을 위한 재정이양

1948년 5월 10일 총선거 이후 이승만 정부는 조각을 진행하며 정부를 구성하고 있었다.<sup>4)</sup> 그러나 여전히 미군정으로부터 행정권을 이양 받지 못해 정부를 운영할 권한을 갖지 못했다. 국내에서는 이 같은 상황에 대한 비판이 제기되고 있었다. 이에 이승만은 주한미군사령관 하지(John R. Hodge)에게 행정권을 이양 받을 준비가 되었음을 알리는 통첩을 보냈고,<sup>5)</sup> 하지의 답신이 전달되면서 행정권 이양을 위한 한미 간 회담이 전개될 수 있었다.<sup>6)</sup>

미군정이 확보하고 있던 행정권한의 이양은 최종적으로 재정운영 권한이 이양됨으로써 완수 될 수 있었다. 미군정의 재정이양 과정은 정부 수립 이후 전개되어 오던 행정기구의 인수인계 과정의 최종단계였던 것이다. 그렇다면 왜 재정권한의 이양이 행정권한 이양의 최종 단계가 되었을까. 이는 점령기간 미군정의 재정운영권한의 활용 및 인식을 통해 확인할 수 있다.

1945년 9월, 한국에 주둔한 미군은 일본의 패배로 해방을 맞이한 한국을 “주권 없는 국가

1) 한모니가, 2013, 「1948년 대한민국 정부 수립과 주한미군의 정권 이양 과정 및 의미」, 『동방학지』 제64집, 연세대학교 국학연구원.

2) 특히 이러한 관점에서는 미군정기 귀속재산 정책의 연속성과 이를 기반으로 한 국가자본 형성 및 그 영향을 강조하며 언급되었다. 이와 같은 연구로는 이종훈, 1979, 『한국경제론』, 법문사 ; 이대근, 1987, 『한국 경제의 구조와 전개』, 창작사 ; 노중기, 1989, 「1950년대 한국사회에 미친 원조의 영향에 관한 고찰」, 한국사연구회 편, 『현대 한국의 자본축적과 민중생활』, 문학과 지성사 ; 공제욱, 1993, 『1950년대 한국의 자본가 연구』, 백산서당 ; 김기원, 1990, 『미군정기의 경제구조』, 푸른산 ; 신용욱, 2006, 『대한민국 헌법상 경제질서의 기원과 전개(1945~54년)-헌법 제·개정과 국가자본 운영을 중심으로-』, 고려대학교 사학과 박사학위논문 등이 있다.

3) Kim Jeom Sook, 2011, “Occupational Costs Incurred by the United States Forces in Korea and their Impact on the Korean Economy during the U.S. Military Occupation Period”, *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies*, vol.24, Seoul.

4) 7월 17일 「정부조직법」을 공포한 한국정부는 7월 20일 대통령으로 이승만을 선출하였다. 이승만은 8월 3일과 4일 양일 동안 내무부, 재무부, 법무부, 농림부, 교통부, 사회부, 상공부, 국방부, 체신부, 외무부, 공보부장관과 법제처장을 임명하며 조각을 진행해 나갔다. (「이화장 발표」, 1948년 8월2일, 국사편찬위원회, 1998, 『자료대한민국사』(이하 『자료』로 약칭)7, 710쪽 ; 「이화장 발표」, 1948년 8월 3일, 『자료』 7, 717~718쪽).

5) ‘Republic of Korea Office of the President’, 1948.8.9, RG338, Box68, *Records of United States Army Force in Korea, Lt. Gen John R. Hodge Official File*, p.122.

6) ‘하지가 이승만에 보내는 통첩’, 1948.8.11, RG338, Box68, 위의 문서철, p.116.

(Korean sovereignty is in abeyance)”로 규정하며<sup>7)</sup> 스스로를 일본이 한국에 대해 보유했던 주권의 계승자로 자임하였다.<sup>8)</sup> 이후 1946년부터 ‘군정의 한인화(Koreanization)’을 실시하며 한국인에게 행정실무 권한을 이양하였으나, 이때 재정운영과 관련한 권한은 한국인에게 이양하지 않거나 실행 권한이 제한되었다. 구체적으로 예산의 집행, 세입관리 등을 담당하는 재무부에 대한 엄격한 통제를 가하였고,<sup>9)</sup> 귀속재산을 담당하는 관재처, 주둔비, 물자수급관련 업무 등의 권한을 장악하고 있었다.<sup>10)</sup> 뿐만 아니라 미군이 한국에서 사용한 주둔비의 산정 및 검토 작업도 미국인 직원만이 처리할 수 있었다.<sup>11)</sup> 재정은 국가를 운영하는 재원을 의미하는 것으로 재정을 장악했다는 것은 정부운영에 대한 권한, 즉 행정권에 대한 규제권한을 장악한 것이라 볼 수 있다. 당시 국내에서도 미군정이 재정운영권한을 장악한 것에 대해 한국인이 실질적으로 주권을 갖고 있지 못하다는 비판이 제기되었다.<sup>12)</sup>

즉 미군정은 정부를 운영할 수 있는 재정을 장악하여 최종적인 운영권한을 확보하고 있었고, 한국정부 수립 이후에도 이를 유지하고자 했던 것이다. 미국정부는 미국의 대한정책이 전환되는 1947년부터 미군정의 재정이양을 준비하고 있었다. 이 시기 미국 정부는 단정 수립 이후를 위한 대비책 마련에 주안점을 두고 있었는데, 특히 한국 단독정부를 수립하는 과정에서 자유진영 국가로서의 정체성을 유지하기 위한 ‘보호장치(safeguard)’를 마련해야 한다고 인식하고 있었다.<sup>13)</sup> 재정운영권한의 이양 역시 이 같은 목적 하에 준비되었다.

이처럼 미국정부가 단정수립 이후의 대비책으로서 마련한 ‘재정이양협정’의 구체적인 내용과 성격은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 한국정부가 군정의 행정권을 승계하였음을 공식적으로 확인하는 것이다. 이는 미군정의 재정요소를 이양하며 그에 부속된 책임 및 의무도 함께 이전하는 방식으로 시행되었다. 미군정으로부터 행정권을 이양 받는 것이기 때문에 군정이 시행했어야 할 책임도 이전 받아야 한다는 미국의 행정권 승계 논리에 의한 것이었다.<sup>14)</sup>

우선 ‘재정이양협정’을 통해 이양된 재산은 전술부대와 관련된 군용재산을 제외하고 미군정이 운영하던 금융, 무역, 귀속재산 등 전반적인 재정요소였다. 금융 및 실물 재산에는 “국유재산”으로 기재된 모든 재산을 비롯하여 현금 및 은행예금, 미국정부가 점령기에 제공한 원조물자, 과도정부 부처의 모든 설비 및 물자가 포함되었다(1조).<sup>15)</sup> 이 중 현금 및 은행예금은 점령기간에 거두어진 세입과 원조물자 및 해외청산위원회에서 잉여물자로 선정한 물자의 국내 판매대금이였다. 미군정이 불하하지 않고 남겨둔 재산, 귀속재산의 임대차 및 불하대금 중 소비되지 않은 계정(5조)과 한국내의 독일, 독일인, 독일회사·조합·협회가 소유 및 관리한 재산도 이양되었다(3조).

7) Ernst Fraenkel, 1948, “Structure of United States Army Military Government in Korea”, 1999, *Ernst Fraenkel Gesammelte Schriften*, Germany, p.427.

8) E.A.J.Johnson, 1971, *American Imperialism in the Image of Peer Gynt*, University of Minnesota, p.145.

9) RG332, Box15, 「History of Department of Finance」, p.17.

10) 『HUSAFIK』 3, 둘째개, 112쪽.

11) Chief Advisor, Account Bureau, Advisor to Korean Director’, 1947.6, RG332, Box15, 위의 문서철.

12) “행정권의 핵심은 경제에 관한 사항에 있으며, 경제문제와 직·간접적으로 관련되지 않은 행정권이란 존재하지 않으므로 경제행정을 장악했다는 것은 다른 행정권도 이양하지 않은 것과 같다”고 지적되었다.(「一方的인 拘束으로 對外貿易은 不振」, 『동아일보』, 1947년 12월 14일자.)

13) 정용욱, 2003, 『해방 전후 미국의 대한정책』, 서울대학교출판부, 418쪽.

14) 1948.8.30(7차회의), RG469, Box6, *Minutes Prepared by the United States negotiating committee, Subject: Proposed Initial Financial and Property Settlement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea*(이하, 『재정이양협정회의록』), p.101.

15) ‘Disposition Form’, 주한미군 사령관 쿨터가 무초에게 보내는 문서(‘재정이양협정’의 영문·국한문본 첨부, 이하 「재정이양협정」으로 약칭), 1948. 9.11, RG338, Box68, 앞의 문서철, pp.77-82.

이와 함께 한국정부에 이양된 과도정부 및 미군정의 채무도 이양되었는데, 이는 은행부채를 비롯하여 점령기간 무역거래로 취득한 외환을 관리했던 환금은행의 자산과 채무였다(4조). 미국정부는 채무와 관련한 모든 책임을 한국정부에 이전하였다(1조). 한국정부는 귀속재산에 대한 개인의 소유권 청구 및 손실·손해보상 등의 소청에 대한 책임 역시 이전받았다. 역시 미국은 이에 대한 책임을 공식적으로 면하게 되었음을 확인하였다(5조). 뿐만 아니라 한국정부는 이양 받은 귀속재산 중 연합국 및 소속 국민 소유 재산의 반환과 보수 및 보존에 대한 의무도 갖게 되었다(6조). 한국정부가 이전 받은 책임 및 채무는 군정기간 미군정의 계획과 감독에 따라 시행된 것이었다. 즉 미군정 점령 과정에서 발생한 결과를 한국정부가 감당해야 했던 것이다.

또한 한국정부는 미군철수 과정에 소요되는 비용도 지불해야 했다. 미국정부는 한국정부에 이양되는 재산 중에서 미군이 철수하는 동안 사용할 재산을 선정하여 이를 무상 차용할 수 있다고 규정했다(1조). 미국정부가 선정한 재산의 보수 및 보존에 소요되는 비용 역시 한국정부가 지불해야 했다.<sup>16)</sup> 점령기간 군정이 새로 건설하고, 증강한 건물들을 한국정부에 이전하는데 대한 대가라는 것이었다. 미국정부가 선정한 재산은 협정문의 ‘부록’에 수록되었다. 이처럼 미군정은 군정의 자산 뿐만 아니라 이와 관련된 채무 및 군정의 정책결과 남겨진 의무를 함께 이전함으로써 한국정부가 군정 정책을 연속적으로 시행하도록 하였다.

둘째, 군정의 점령정책을 승인하고 승계하는 것이었다. ‘재정이양협정’을 통해 한국정부가 시행해야 할 군정의 정책에는 우선 미국정부는 미군정이 지불하기로 되어있던 전력대금이 있었다. 미국정부는 이를 소련과의 협정을 통해 지불 할 것이라 규정(7조)하면서도 협정 결렬시 한국정부가 지불 의무를 승계할 것이라고 결정했다.<sup>17)</sup> 또한 미군정은 점령기간 법령33호를 통해 시행한 귀속재산의 관리 및 처분을 승인하고 비준할 것을 규정하였다(5조). 군정이 시행한 귀속재산 정책에 대해서 한국정부가 수정하거나 변경할 수 없음을 강제하여 군정기의 경제정책을 유지 및 존속하고자 한 것이다. 미국정부는 귀속재산의 접수 및 관리를 담당할 별개의 정부기관 설치의무를 규정하여 한국정부가 귀속재산을 운영하는 방식에도 관여하고자 하였다(5조).

이와 함께 한국정부는 1948년 6월 30일 미군정과 미국정부가 체결한 ‘주둔비 청산협정’의 효력도 인정해야 했다(8조). ‘주둔비 청산협정’이 체결 될 당시는 5월 총선거 이후 정부기구가 조직된 시점이었으나 협정주체는 미군정이었다. 한국정부가 여전히 행정권한을 보유하지 못했기 때문이다. 미국정부와 미군정이 합의한 주둔비 지불 규정은 ‘재정이양협정’을 통해 한국정부에 이전되었다. ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환의무 역시 점령정책의 승계를 들어 이양되었다(9조).

한국정부 수립 이후 주둔 미군과 체결한 협정 역시 변경 없이 계승하게 되었다(14조). 이 협정은 미군이 철수하는 동안 국내의 군수설비 및 통신 등의 시설을 사용할 수 있으며, 이를 미군이 지정한 금액에 따라 지불한다는 내용을 담고 있다.<sup>18)</sup> 또한 1948년 8월 당시 한국에서 활동하던 연합국

16) 미국정부 측은 한국정부가 매달 유지관리비 9,538,000원을 지불할 것을 요구했다. (1948.8.18(3차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.35).

17) 1948.8.18(3차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.33 ; 결국 1945년 8월 16일부터 1948년 5월 14일 단전 이전까지 북한으로부터 공급받은 전력대금의 지불책임은 1948년 11월 ‘한미전력협정’을 통해 한국정부에 이전되었다(‘제5회 36차 국회본회의회의록’, 1948.11.9, 국회회의록 시스템, <http://likms.assembly.go.kr>(이하 생략).

18) 이와 관련한 협정은 「주한미군과 운수부 간의 협정(The United States Army in Korea and the Bureau of Rail Transportation Department of Transportation, Korea)」으로 1948년 7월 1일 과도정부 운수부장 민회식과 주한 미군 간에 체결되었다. (‘Representatives of the Korean Government Authorized to Sign Department of the Army Shipping Document in the Fame of the Government of the Republic of Korea’, 1949.5.20, RG338, Box71, *Records of United States Army Force in Korea, Lt. Gen John R. Hodge Official File 1944-1948*, pp.46-56). 미군이 철수하는 동안 한국 내 통신, 항공, 군수시설 등을 사용할 수 있다는 점은 1948년 8월 24일 「대한민국대통령과 주한미군사령관 간에 체결된 과도기에 시행될 잠정적 군사안전에 관한 행정협정(Executive Agreement Between the President of the Republic of Korea

및 소속국민의 특권도 보장되었다(12조). 이를 통해 미국정부는 미국, 영국, 호주, 캐나다 등의 석유·영화배급·무역 회사에 부여한 한국에서의 특혜를 유지시킬 수 있었다.<sup>19)</sup> 이처럼 한국정부는 미군정기 군정이 수립해 놓은 규약을 정부 수립 이후에도 연속적으로 시행해야 했다. 미국은 보다 직접적으로 “한국정부가 금지 및 개정하기 전까지 미군정 및 과도정부가 시행한 법률, 법령, 규칙을 전적으로 시행 한다”는 조항(11조)을 포함시켜 점령정책의 연속적 시행의도를 표명했다.

셋째, 미국의 대한원조 운영을 위한 기반을 마련하는 것이다. 미국정부는 대한원조를 운영하기 전 점령기간 완수하지 못했던 작업을 한국정부에 수행하게 하고, 원조물자를 관리하도록 하였다. 우선 한국정부는 이양 받은 재정요소에 부속된 책임으로서 원조물자 판매 대금 중 미수금을 회수해야 했다.<sup>20)</sup> 한국정부가 회수한 미수금은 미국의 원조기구의 관할 하에 사용될 것이었다(1조). 미군정이 이양한 물자 판매대금 중 현금은 48여억 원에 달하였던 반면, 아직 지불되지 않은 금액인 미수금은 그의 약 5배인 230여억 원에 달하였다.<sup>21)</sup> 또한 재정이양 과정에서 이양된 물자가 이후 국내에서 판매되었을 경우에도 군정기 원조물자의 판매대금이 입금되어 있는 “조선은행 특별당좌”에 입금해야 했다. 그리고 이 역시 한미 간 합의에 의해 사용될 것으로 제한되어 있었다(1조). 뿐만 아니라 미국정부의 승인 없이는 원조물자를 재수출 하거나 용도를 전환하여 사용할 수도 없었다(10조). 이와 같은 일련의 조항은 한미 간 원조협정이 체결된 후 미국의 원조기구가 사용할 수 있는 물적기반을 정비해 놓기 위한 것으로서 한국정부는 이에 대한 관리 및 통제 의무만을 갖게 된 것이다.

‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환규정 역시 대한정책의 시행기반을 마련하는 의도를 반영하고 있었다. ‘해외청산위원회 차관’은 1946년 미군정이 도입한 차관이었는데, 이를 상환해야 할 의무 역시 한국정부에 이양되었다. ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환규정을 담고 있는 9조는 모두 6개 항으로 구성되어 차관의 내용, 상환시기, 금액, 활용방안을 제시하였다. 협정에 규정된 차관의 상환방식은 “(1)양 정부가 상호협정 할 교육계획”, “(2)동산 또는 부동산, 유채 또는 무채임을 막론하고 미국정부가 관심을 가진 재(在)한국재산 및 그 첨부물의 취득”이었다.<sup>22)</sup> 이는 앞서 살펴본 바와 같이 한국에서 활동할 미국 대한원조사절단의 사무실 및 주거공간을 위한 건물과 폴브라이트 프로그램을 통한 교육교환프로그램의 시행을 의미하는 것이었다. 즉 한국정부 수립 이후 대한원조운영을 위한 자금을 마련하는 조항인 것이다.

보다 구체적으로 미국정부는 ‘9조에 대한 보충’을 첨부하여 상환규정 (2)에 해당하는 건물 및 부지를 열거하였다. 상환금에서 차감될 재산의 가격은 미국인과 한국인 각각 한 사람과 이 두 사람에게 의해 선택된 추가 1인으로 구성된 위원회를 통하여 결정 될 것이었다.<sup>23)</sup> 상환금은 원화로 지불될

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and the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters During the Transitional Period’」 제3조를 통해서도 보장되었다(RG338, Box68, 앞의 문서철, pp.109-114).

19) 12조에서 말하는 연합국의 특권은 ‘친선조약’과 ‘상업조약’을 통해 보장되는 것들이었다. 미군정은 1948년 현재 미군정의 허가를 받고 한국에서 사업을 하는 외국기업들이 한국정부 수립 이후에도 권한을 보장받으며 활동할 수 있도록 규정했다. 여기에는 미국의 중기선회사(3개), 노스웨스트 항공, 코카콜라 회사, 라디오 회사(Radio Corporation), 석유회사(3개), 중앙영화무역사를 비롯한 상사회사 및 통신회사 등 10개소, 영국의 Roy Farrell 선박회사 등 6개소, 호주의 수출입회사, 캐나다의 중개사인 사우스시 회사(the Southseas Corporation, Ltd.), 브리티시 커먼웰스 필름 회사(British Commonwealth Film Corporation, Ltd.), 중국의 회사(2개)들이 포함되었다(1948.8.20(4차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.54).

20) 점령기에 도입된 물자들 중 상공부 소속 공장이 지불해야 할 외상대금은 20억 원에 달하였다(「상공부, 행정 이양 과정에서 민간물자보급소의 미수금이 20억 원에 달함을 발견」, 『평화일보』, 1948년 12월 11일자, 『자료』9, 527쪽).

21) 1948.8.17(2차회의), 『재정이양협정 회의록』, p.21.

22) 「재정이양협정」 9조, RG338, Box68, 앞의 문서철, pp.91-93.

23) 1948.8.20(4차회의), 『재정이양협정 회의록』, p.46.

것이라 정해졌다. 미국은 이를 두고 한국정부의 상환부담을 덜어주기 위한 것이라고 설명했지만 사실은 상환규정의 용이한 시행을 위해서였다. 상환금이 한국에서 사용될 것이었기 때문에 원화로 지불받는 것이 미국정부에게도 이익이 되었던 것이다. 이때 상환금이 원화로 지불되기 위해서는 달러로 상정된 차관의 금액을 원화로 환산할 환율이 필요했다. 이에 미국은 ‘재정이양협정’에 환율설정의 근거도 규정하였다. 결과적으로 이와 같은 규정은 한국정부 수립 이후 미국이 시행할 대한원조 정책의 정책적·재정적 기반을 확보하기 위해 마련된 것이었다.

## 2) 이승만 정부의 정당성 확보 의도와 ‘재정이양협정’의 체결

미국정부가 마련한 ‘재정이양협정’의 초안은 1948년 8월 16일 ‘한미재정이양협정회담’(이하 재정회담)<sup>24)</sup>에서 한국정부 측 대표들에게 처음으로 공개되었다. ‘재정회담’은 대한민국정부 수립 선포식 다음날인 8월 16일 시작할 것으로 정해졌다.<sup>25)</sup> 이는 미국에 의해 결정되었는데, 대한민국정부 수립 선포 이후 회담을 시행함으로써 협정체결을 공식적으로 승인받고자 하는 의도였다고 볼 수 있다.

‘재정회담’은 ‘재정이양협정’이 조인된 9월 11일까지 총 10차례에 걸쳐 개최되었다. 회담은 비공개로 진행되었고, 회의록도 미국 측의 요청에 따라 영어로만 기록되었다. 이때 ‘재정회담’에 임한 한국정부와 미국정부 대표는 재정이양에 대해 상이한 인식을 갖고 있었다. 우선 미국정부 측 대표는 ‘재정이양협정’의 초안대로 협정을 체결하여 한국정부 수립 이후 실시 할 대한정책의 시행기반을 마련할 공식절차로 인지하였다. 이에 따라 한국인들이 이 협정에 대해 반발할 경우 이에 대해 가장 잘 설명해 줄 수 있는 전문가들을 참석시켰다. 이들은 협정조정가인 존슨(Edgar A. J. Johnson), 법무보좌관 프랭켈(Ernst Fraenkel)을 비롯하여 번스의 경제사절단의 일원인 존스(Owen T. Jones), 스트럼(Paul J. Strum), 재무부 고문관 로런(Allan Loren), 중앙경제위원회 의장 앤더슨(Wilhelm Anderson) 등 경제전문가들이었다. 미국 측 대표는 군정장관 헬믹(Charles G. Helmick)과 드럼라이트(Everett F. Drumright)였다.

반면 한국정부 측의 목적은 신속한 협정 체결을 통한 행정권 이양 완수였다. 협정의 성격이나 영향력보다는 그 결과로서 행정권 이양이 더욱 강조되었던 것이다. 이에 한국정부 대표인 내무부장관 윤치영, 외무부장관 장택상, 국무총리 이범석 외에 기획처장 이순탁과 법제처장 유진오만이 참석했을 뿐이었다.<sup>26)</sup> 물론 당시 기획처가 “정부의 예산과 결산, 국가경제에 관한 종합적 계획수립”을 담당할 기관으로 상정되어 있기는 하였다. 그러나 재정운영의 중심부서인 재무부의 인사가 참석하지 않았다는 것은 정부가 이 협정을 ‘경제적’인 측면에서만 바라보지 않았다는 것을 의미한다고 할 수 있다.<sup>27)</sup> 오히려 미국 측이 한국 참석자 중에 재정전문가가 참석해야 한다며 김현철<sup>28)</sup>과 홍헌표(Mr. Hong)<sup>29)</sup>를 추천했다. 한국 측은 미군정의 회계업무를 담당했던 홍헌표를 선택했고, 그는 1948년 8월 17일 열린 두 번째 회의부터 9월 8일의 아홉 번째 회의까지 참석하였다.<sup>30)</sup>

24) 당시 언론에서는 이 회담을 ‘행정권이양회담’, ‘한미회담’ 등으로 지칭하였다. 공식적인 명칭이 없었던 만큼 본고에서는 ‘한미재정이양협정회담’이라 칭하고, 약어로서 ‘재정회담’을 사용하도록 한다.

25) 「八·一五에 政府樹立 行政移讓은 16日부터」, 『경향신문』, 1948년 8월 12일자.

26) 1948.8.16(1차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.1.

27) 재무부는 1948년 8월 4일자로 김도연이 장관으로 임명됨으로써 조직을 갖추고 있었다(「재무 김도연·교통 민희식·농무 조봉암·법무 이인씨」, 『경향신문』, 1948년 8월 4일자).

28) 김현철은 1928년 도미하여 오랜 미국생활을 하였고, 미국기관에서 근무한 경력으로 미행정부와 의회의 분위기를 정확하게 감지하고 있는 ‘미국통’이었다(정진아, 2007, 『제1공화국기(1948~1960) 이승만 정권의 경제정책론 연구』, 연세대학교 사학과 박사학위논문, 146쪽 참조).

29) 홍헌표는 과도정부 재무부 사계국장을 역임했다(「立議豫算審議 十日間延期」, 『동아일보』, 1947년 10월 8일자).

앞에서 살펴보았듯이 미국정부는 ‘재정이양협정’의 각 조항에 한국정부에 대한 미국의 영향력을 존속하려는 의도를 반영하였다. 그러나 한국정부는 이에 대해 크게 반발하지 않았고, 미국의 제안을 수용하였다. 물론 한국정부가 ‘재정회담’에서 아무런 문제제기를 하지 않은 것은 아니다. 한국정부는 미국이 한국에 이양한 물자에 대한 권한을 유지하고 있음을 지적하며 실질적으로는 물자를 이전하지 않는 것과 같다고 비판하였다.<sup>31)</sup> 특히 한국정부 측 대표들은 다른 조항보다 9조에 대해 집중적으로 문제를 제기했다. 9조는 앞서 언급한 바와 같이 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환방식을 담고 있는 사항이었는데, 최종 협정문이 도착해 한미 대표가 서명을 하기 위해 모였던 9월 11일의 회의를 제외하고 매 회마다 문제제기가 되었다. 9조에 대한 논의는 총 10차례의 회담 중 6차례의 회의에서 집중적으로 전개되었다. 실제로도 9조는 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환의무를 이행하면서도 한국정부가 그 물자에 대한 권한을 갖지 못했다. 해외청산위원회 물자 및 판매대금 역시 원조물자와 마찬가지로 사용이 제한되어 있었기 때문이다. 따라서 한국정부는 상환의무 자체를 거부할 수 있는 여지를 갖고 있었다.

그러나 한국정부는 이 같은 이유보다 신생정부로서 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환의무를 갖게 된다는 부담감으로 9조에 대한 문제제기를 하였다. 이때 상환의무에 대한 부담감은 경제적 측면과 심리적 측면으로 구분할 수 있다. 한국정부는 우선 경제적 부담을 들어 협정을 수정할 수 있는지 물었고, 회계연도를 들어 한국 상황에 불리하다고 지적했다.<sup>32)</sup> 또한 상환금에 적용할 환율에 대해서도 우려하였으며, 상환시점을 늦춰 줄 것을 요구하기도 했다. 그러나 이는 수용되지 않았다.

심리적인 측면에서는 차관의 상환의무에 대한 국내적 반발이 있었다. ‘해외청산위원회 차관’은 신생국가가 보유하게 될 부채이자 부정적 여론을 발생시킬 가능성이 큰 부담스러운 요소였다. ‘재정회담’이 비공개로 진행되고 있어 회담 내용이 일반 대중에게 전반적으로 알려지지 않는 않지만 일부 언론은 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’을 쟁점으로 협정이 지연되고 있다는 것을 인지하고 있었다. 이범석은 이로 인한 반발을 무마하기 위하여 “차관과 관련된 난점은 없으며 협정은 순조롭게 진행되고 있다”고 해명하기도 했다.<sup>33)</sup> 최종 조인된 협정문에서도 차관의 성격 및 정체에 대해 명확히 제시되지 않았는데, 이는 초안으로부터 수정된 것으로 볼 수 있다.<sup>34)</sup> 실제로 한국정부는 여러 차례에 걸쳐 ‘국회에서 승인을 하지 않을 것이기 때문에 문구의 수정이 필요하다’고 주장하였다. 구체적으로 한국정부는 건물을 인수하는 대신 임대할 것(이때 보수비용은 한국정부가 지불), 교육프로그램을 시행하는 대신 건물을 인수하는 것으로 채무를 탕감할 것, 외환을 통해 일시불로 지불할 것 등의 대안을 제시했으나 모두 거절당했다.

이처럼 한국정부의 요구가 끝내 수용되지 않은 상태로 1948년 9월 11일, ‘재정이양협정’이 체결되었다. 협정에는 한국정부 대표 이범석, 장택상과 미 대통령 특사로 파견된 무초(John J. Muccio)가 조인하였다. 한국정부가 ‘재정이양협정’에 대한 문제의식을 갖고 있었음에도 이를 수용했던 것

30) 한국정부가 흥헌표를 선택한 이유는 밝히지 않았지만 과도정부 재무부의 사계국장이라는 경력이 영향을 미쳤을 것으로 보인다.(1948.8.16(1차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, pp.7-8). 또한 회담 당시 김현철은 미국에 체류하고 있었으며, ‘미국통’으로 인식되었던 만큼 한국정부의 입장을 위해 일할지 알 수 없는 상황이었다는 점도 선택의 이유로 작용하였을 것으로 보인다.

31) 1948.9.11(10차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.129.

32) ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환시점은 미국식 회계연도에 따라 결정되었는데, 이는 당해 7월 1일부터 그 다음해 6월 30일까지를 말한다. 당시 한국정부 측은 당해 4월 1일부터 그 다음해 3월 30일까지 적용되는 회계연도를 적용하고 있었다. (1948.8.20(4차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, pp.48-49).

33) 「遲延이유는 慎重에 있다」, 『경향신문』, 1948년 9월 3일자.

34) 협정문에서는 “미국정부가 해외청산위원회를 통해 한국에 제공한 재산의 판매대금을 이양하는 대가로써 2,500만 달러를 넘지 않는 금액을 지불하는 것”이라 명기하고 있을 뿐이었다. 그러나 미국 측은 ‘재정회담’의 첫 번째 회의에서 협정문의 초안을 일독하며 “점령기에 도입된 차관에 관한 상환규정”임을 명백히 제시한 바 있었다.(1948.8.16(1차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.5.)

은 정부에 대한 비판여론을 인식하고 이를 무마해야 했기 때문이다. 이 같은 비판은 ‘재정회담’이 진행되기 전부터 제기되기도 하였지만, 회담이 진행된 이후에도 국내여론의 분위기는 한국정부에 불리하게 조성되고 있었다. 언론에서는 협정의 진행이 부진하다며 한국정부를 ‘약체내각’이라 평가했다.<sup>35)</sup> 행정권 이양이 지연되는 과정에서 각 관청 업무기강이 해이해지고 있다는 비판이 제기되기도 했다.<sup>36)</sup>

이는 분단정부로 수립된 이승만 정권에 위기의식을 불러일으켰다. ‘재정회담’에서 한국정부 측은 “공산주의자 및 반정부 인사”들의 반정부 선전을 우려하며 신속한 행정권이양을 요구하기도 했다.<sup>37)</sup> 이처럼 이승만 정권은 북한에 수립 될 정부를 견제하며 정부수립의 정당성을 확보하기 위해 행정권 이양에 대한 국내 비판여론의 발생을 제지해야 했다. 당시 정부수립의 정당성을 선전하기 위한 방안으로는 국제연합으로부터의 정부승인 획득 절차가 강조되고 있었다. 이승만 정부는 국제연합의 정부승인을 받기 위해서라도 하루빨리 행정권을 이양 받아야 하였고, 행정권을 이양받기 위해서는 신속히 ‘재정이양협정’을 체결해야 했던 것이다.

### 3. 한국정부의 협정 승인과 행정권한의 제한적 수용

#### 1) 국회 내 협정에 대한 주권침해 우려 배제와 협정의 승인

‘재정이양협정’이 체결되자 비로소 한국정부는 행정운영 권한을 발휘할 수 있었다. 대부분의 행정권한의 이양은 ‘재정이양협정’이 체결된 후 5일 이내에 완료되었으나 재무부, 중앙식량행정처, 중앙물가행정처, 중앙경제위원회, 중앙토지행정처의 권한은 협정이 발효되고 나서야 이양되었다. 이에 대해 미국은 재정운영과 관련된 이들 부처들을 ‘재정이양협정’을 통해 마련된 규정을 기준으로 운영하기 위한 것이라 밝혔다.<sup>38)</sup>

따라서 한국정부는 행정권한을 완전히 이양받기 위해 ‘재정이양협정’을 발효시켜야 했는데, 이를 위해서는 국회로부터 승인을 받아야 했다. 이에 1948년 9월 13일, ‘재정이양협정’의 승인관련 안건이 국회 본회의에 발의되었다. ‘재정이양협정’ 동의안은 국무총리 이범석에 의해 ‘긴급안건’으로 상정되어 안건상정에 대한 토론은 거치지 않았다. 한국정부의 목적은 최대한 빠른 시일 내에 ‘재정이양협정’을 승인하여 행정권한의 이양을 완수하는 것이었다. 이를 위해 대통령이 직접 국회에 나서 승인을 호소할 만큼 적극적인 모습을 보였다. 이와 함께 협정 내용에 대한 국회의 반발을 줄이기 위해 협정의 내용을 구체적으로 제시하거나 설명하지 않았다.<sup>39)</sup> ‘재정회담’ 자체가 비공개로 진행되었기 때문에 국회의원들은 협정이 체결되고 나서야 그 내용을 확인할 수 있었음에도 협정을 담은 문서는 의석수에 모자라게 준비되었고, 글자도 흐리게 인쇄되어 있었다.<sup>40)</sup> 기획처장 이순탁이 국회에 나서 협정 전문을 소개하며 각 조항별로 간단한 설명을 덧붙였을 뿐이었다. 이에 대해 의원들은 협정의 중요성을 강조하며 내용을 제대로 파악한 후 논의를 지속할 수 있다고 항의하였고, 안건이

35) 「한미행정이양협정 관련 회담 성과 부진」, 『서울신문』, 1948년 8월 21일자.

36) 당시 언론은 관리들이 인계사무를 기다리는 중이라는 이유로 근무시간에 극장관람을 가고, 장기나 바둑을 두거나 백주잡담을 하고 있다며 급속히 행정사무를 정비이양하고, 인사발령을 해야 한다고 지적하였다(「紊亂해진 美 移讓官廳」, 『동아일보』, 1948년 8월 26일자).

37) 1948.8.20(4차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.55.

38) 1948.9.8(9차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.119.

39) 이범석은 ‘재정회담’에서도 의회에 협정내용을 너무 세부적으로 설명하면 승인을 받기 어려워질 것이므로 간단히 제시할 것을 대안으로 제안한 바 있다(1948.8. 25(6차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.91).

40) ‘제1회 64차 국회본회의 회의록’, 1948.9.13.



전원위원회로 넘어갔다.

전원위원회는 국회의원 전원과 대통령, 정부인사들이 참석하여 안건 자체를 본회의에 상정할 수 있는지 여부를 심사하는 회의였다. ‘재정이양협정’ 동의안에 대한 전원위원회는 1948년 9월 16일에 개최되었다. 회의는 비공개로 진행되었기 때문에 구체적으로 어떤 발언들이 오고갔는지 알 수는 없으나, ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환규정이 담긴 조항에 대한 논의가 중점적으로 이루어졌음을 확인할 수 있다.<sup>41)</sup> 9월 17일의 전원위원회 역시 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환규정이 쟁점이 되었다. 특히 미국이 상환금으로 한국 내 부동산을 취득하게 된다는 규정이 중점적으로 논의되었다. 이를 수정하지 않고 동의하면 “골수에 사무치는 을사조약의 전철을 밟게 될 것”이라는 “강경한 반대론”이 지속되었다.<sup>42)</sup> 한국정부 측은 반대의견을 설득하기 위해 한반도 문제가 국제연합 총회에 안건으로 상정되어야 한다고 하며 행정권 이양의 급박함을 강조하였다. 또한 미국이 취득할 수 있는 부동산을 제한하는 문서를 협정문에 첨부할 것에도 동의하였다. 그 결과 협정문의 수정 없이 본회의에서 논의될 안건으로 상정될 수 있었다.<sup>43)</sup>

전원위원회를 통과한 ‘재정이양협정’의 안건은 최종 승인을 받기 위해 9월 18일 ‘제69차 국회 본회의’에 단독안건으로 상정되었다. 이 회의에서 의원들은 본격적으로 의견을 개진하였는데, 논의의 쟁점은 역시 9조 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환규정에 관한 것이었다. 의원들은 다른 조항들 보다 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환금 용도를 규정한 9조 (다)항에 대한 의견을 집중적으로 제기하였다. 특히 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’에 대해 비판적인 시각을 견지하며 ‘재정이양협정’의 수정 및 재검토를 요구한 의원들은 ‘한국정부에 대한 미국의 주권침해’의 가능성을 강조하였고, 상환의무를 독립정부로서의 지위를 상하게 하는 요소로 인지하고 있었다.<sup>44)</sup> 상환의무를 갖게 된 것 자체가 아니라 상환의무를 통해 미국정부가 규정한 정책을 시행해야 한다고 강제된 것에 대한 반발이었던 것이다. 이와 같은 우려는 ‘소장파’로 분류된 의원들을 중심으로 개진되었다. 이들은 9조 (다)항의 수정 및 삭제 등을 주장하며 이를 위해 “전폭적으로 생명을 걸고 싸워야 할 우리 전 민족체의 시기”라고 격렬하게 의사를 표명하기도 했다.

구체적으로 해외청산위원회 차관의 상환규정을 수용하는 것은 외국의 간섭을 받지 않겠다고 주장했던 반탁운동의 의미를 퇴색시키는 것이라고 지적하기도 했으며, 한국정부의 의지와는 상관없이 미국의 대외정책을 시행할 근거가 된다는 점을 경계하기도 했다. 미국의 대외 정책에 따라 협정의 조항이 변용될 수 있으며, 그 경우 한국은 국제적 협정이란 이유로 그에 따를 수밖에 없다는 것이었다. 상환금이 한미 간 교육계획에 이용된다는 규정에 주목하여 “미국의 자본이 국내에 커지는 것”이라며 반대하기도 했다. 한국에 미국의 교육프로그램을 시행하여 인적기반을 닦아놓고 이후 미국의 이익을 위해 사용할 수 있다는 것이었다. 이에 상환금으로 재산을 인수하거나 교육프로그램을 시행할 것이 아니라 차라리 국채 형식으로라도 금전적으로 갚는 것이 낫다고 제안하기도 했다.

‘재정이양협정’에 대해 반대하는 의원들로 인해 승인과정이 지연될 것을 우려한 정부 관계인사들은 국회에 참석하여 적극적으로 ‘재정이양협정’에 대한 동의를 설득했다. 윤치영은 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환규정에 대한 해명으로서 헬믹이 보내온 서한을 근거 삼아 ‘외국 대사나 공사가 우리에게 와서 중요한 것을 요구하면 양보할 수 있다’고 설명했다. 이때 흥미로운 점은 헬믹의 서한은 사실상 9조에 대한 내용을 다시금 설명하는 것에 불과했다는 것이다. 이에 대해 무초는 한국정부의 문서해독 능력의 미숙함을 지적했지만,<sup>45)</sup> 그보다는 ‘재정이양협정’의 승인을 설득하는 과정에서 한

41) ‘제1회 69차 국회본회의 회의록’, 1948.9.18.

42) 『全委도 同意票決』, 『경향신문』, 1948년 9월 19일자.

43) 표결 결과 재석 인원 총 118명 중 찬성 68, 반대 44로 통과 되었다(「국회 全院委員會, 한미행정이양협정을 무수정 인준」, 『국제신문』, 1948년 9월 19일자, 『자료』8, 403쪽).

44) ‘제1회 69차 국회본회의 회의록’, 위의 회의록.

국정부가 얼마나 다급했는지 엿볼 수 있는 지점이라 할 수 있다. 미군정기 민주의원 의장시절부터 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’을 자신의 “특별한 간청”에 의해 도입한 것이라 선전했던 이승만은 국회승인 과정에서도 적극적 수용의지를 표명했다.<sup>46)</sup> 또한 차관의 상환을 위해 부동산을 제공하는 방식에 대해서도 대의를 위해서라면 기꺼이 제공할 있다고 설득하였다.

그러나 소장파 의원들을 중심으로 제기 된 ‘주권침해’ 우려는 불식되지 않았다. 이에 국회의장 신익희는 토론시간이 제한되어 있다는 이유로 토론을 중단하고 표결에 부치고자 했다. 이는 국회승인을 더 이상 미루지 않고 처리하겠다는 의도로 볼 수 있다.<sup>47)</sup> 이문원 의원<sup>48)</sup>을 비롯한 국회의원 26명이 퇴장하며 표결에 대한 반대의사를 표명했지만 국회의장은 표결을 강행했다.<sup>49)</sup> 결국 재석의원 135명 중 퇴장한 의원 26명을 제외한 109명이 무기명으로 투표한 가운데 찬성 78, 반대 28, 기권 3으로 ‘재정이양협정’ 안건은 국회의 승인을 받게 되었다.

이때 9월 18일 회의에서 퇴장한 의원 26명은 반대의사를 굽히지 않았고, 21일 ‘재정이양협정’의 수정을 요구하는 성명서를 제출하였다.<sup>50)</sup> 그러나 이는 수용되지 않았다. 국회의 승인을 받은 ‘재정이양협정’은 미국 본국에 전달되었고, 9월 23일부터 발효되었다. 같은 날 국회에서는 협정 표결에 반대하고, 성명서를 제출한 26명의 국회의원이 징계위원회에 회부되었다.<sup>51)</sup> 징계사유는 언론을 통해 “개인의 의견일 뿐인” 성명서를 발표하여 국회를 모독했다는 것이었다.<sup>52)</sup> 성명서를 발표한 의원들에 대한 징계 요구는 순조로운 행정권 이양과정을 선전하고자 했던 한국정부의 의도를 역행한 것에 대한 정치적 처분이라 볼 수 있다. 결국 ‘재정이양협정’에 대한 국내 의원들의 우려와 문제제기는 협정에 영향을 미치지 않았고, ‘재정이양협정’은 미국이 제안한 원안대로 발효되었다.

## 2) 한국정부의 협정 규정 시행과 제한적 행정권한 발효

‘재정이양협정’이 국회의 승인을 받아 발효되자 모든 행정권한이 한국정부로 이양되었다. 행정권을 갖춘 한국정부는 당면한 사회경제적 과제를 해결하기 위한 정책논의를 시작하였다. 특히 대중

45) ‘Deliberations of Korean National Assembly on Initial Financial and Property Settlement Between U.S. and Korea’, 1948년 9월 25일, 『대한민국사자료집』 25, 앞의 책, 338쪽.

46) ‘제1회 69차 국회본회의 회의록’, 앞의 회의록.

47) 국회부의장 김동원은 전원위원회 직후 이에 대한 보고에서 전원위원회의 결정에 대해서는 별다른 토의 없이 표결에 부치는 것이 통례라며 이에 협의해 줄 것을 요청하기도 했다(‘제1회 68차 국회본회의 회의록’, 1948.9.17).

48) 1948년 5월 10일 무소속 부산 을 국회의원으로 당선되었다. 1948년 9월 ‘재정이양협정’ 표결에 반대하며 퇴장하고, 성명서를 발표했다. 이유로 징계를 받아 10일간 발언정지 된 바 있다. 1949년 5월 ‘국회프락치’ 사건에 연루되어 검거되었다(백운선, 1992, 『제헌국회 내 ‘소장파’에 관한 연구』, 서울대학교 정치학과 박사학위논문; 『경향신문』, 1948년 5월 15일자, 10월 2일자, 1949년 5월 20일자 참고).

49) 퇴장한 의원은 차경모, 서용길, 김재학, 김옥주, 이성우, 김익로, 박기운, 김용재, 육홍균, 원장길, 이구수, 이진수, 김기철, 김동준, 이양, 조영규, 김인식, 노일환, 최태규, 이문원, 김상순, 박윤원, 장홍염, 황윤호, 조국현, 이양주 의원 등 26명이다. 이 중 노일환(한국민주당)을 제외하고 모두 무소속 의원이었다(『한성일보』, 1948년 9월 19일자, 『자료』8, 416쪽).

50) 성명서는 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’에 대한 내용 자체를 삭제할 것과 이것이 불가능할 경우 그 상환방법으로 제시된 ‘한국 내 재산의 인수’ 조항이라도 삭제할 것에 대한 요구가 담겨있었다. 이와 함께 미국정부가 ‘해외청산위원회 차관’의 상환금으로 취득할 수 있는 건물의 범위가 확장될 수 있음을 명시한 문구의 삭제를 요구했다. 9조와 관련된 내용 외에도 군용재산도 함께 이양할 것, 미군철수비용은 미국이 충당할 것, 재산의 수선·보존비용은 미국이 부담할 것(1조관련), 일본인 재산은 처분 이후 현금계정까지 계산하여 이양할 것, 귀속재산 처리 위한 정부기관설치 규정 삭제할 것(5조관련), 미국으로부터 들여온 물자의 재수출을 허용할 수 있다는 단서를 삭제할 것(10조관련)을 요구하는 내용으로 총 8조로 구성되어 있다(『한미행정이양협정을 반대하는 국회의원들, 성명서를 발표』, 『서울신문』, 1948년 9월 23일자, 『자료』8, 436-438쪽).

51) 「李議員만 懲委回附」, 『동아일보』, 1948년 9월 25일자.

52) ‘제1회 제73차 국회본회의 회의록’, 1948.9.23.

들의 삶과 직결되는 경제문제를 해결하기 위한 식량 및 물자수급에 대한 대책이 적극적으로 논의되었다. 이때 국회에서는 ‘계획경제’ 및 ‘통제경제’에 대한 구상이 제기되는 등 그 논의범위가 확장되어 있었다.<sup>53)</sup> 제헌국회의 정책에 대한 논의범주는 신생정부로서 직면한 사회적 요구에 따른 것이기도 했다.<sup>54)</sup> 이승만 역시도 행정권 확보 이후 적용할 경제정책에 대하여 “사회주의나 공산주의를 막론하고 대중인민의 생활정도를 발전 향상시키는데 노력할 것”이라고 밝히기도 했다.<sup>55)</sup>

그러나 애초에 국가 중심의 경제계획을 추진할 정부의 권한은 제한되어 있었다. 이는 ‘재정이양협정’ 중 물자, 외환운영, 무역에 관한 규정이 ‘한미경제원조협정’ 체결을 염두에 두고 예비적으로 마련된 것이었다는 점에 기인했다.<sup>56)</sup> 우선 무역통제권한이 제한되어 있었다. 제79차 국회 본회의에서는 ‘외국수입물 자격증 대책에 관한 건의안’이 발의되어 미군정기 무역정책으로 발원된 외국상인들의 수출입 행태를 통제하고 밀수출을 규제하고자 했다. 그러나 이와 관련한 정부의 권한은 ‘재정이양협정’을 통해 제한되어 있었다. 군정기간 사실상 무역권한을 장악하고 있던 미국 및 중국 상인의 권익이 ‘재정이양협정’을 통해 지속적으로 보장되고 있었기 때문이다. 노일환 의원<sup>57)</sup>은 무역과 관련한 문제는 정부차원에서 해결하기에는 이미 한계를 갖고 있다며 한국정부의 행정권한이 국제적 협정에 의해 제한되고 있음을 지적하였다.<sup>58)</sup> 결국 이 건의안은 결론을 도출하지 못했고, 무역권한은 1948년 12월 10일 체결된 ‘한미경제원조협정’을 통해 미국의 통제 하에 놓여졌다.<sup>59)</sup>

무역에 대한 정책 뿐 아니라 ‘재정이양협정’을 통해 이양된 물자들의 처분방안 역시 ‘한미경제원조협정’에 명기된 방안으로 대체되어 정부운영을 통제하였다. ‘재정이양협정’ 1조를 통해 한국정부로 이양된 물자 및 판매대금의 사용방안은 ‘한미경제원조협정’ 5조를 통해 대충자금 계정 및 사용방안으로 대체된 것이었다. 또한 한국정부가 이양 받은 (점령 하)한국 경제에 제공한 구호물자 및 재건물자는 ‘한미경제원조협정’에 따라 한국에 설치된 경제협조처(ECA)에 전달되어 원조 계획 하에 운영되었다. 즉, 한국정부가 미군정으로부터 이양 받은 재산 중 대부분을 차지하는 원조물자는 애초부터 한국정부의 의도대로 운영할 수 없는 재산이었던 것이다. 이는 미국의 원조운영기구가 활동을 시작하기 이전에 잠시 한국정부에 관리를 맡겨놓은 것에 불과했다.

‘재정이양협정’ 4조의 외환사용에 대한 규제 역시 ‘한미경제원조협정’ 3조를 통해 한국에서 원조 운영을 담당할 운영기관 설립규정으로 구체화되었다. 이는 ‘임시외자총국’으로서 1949년 1월 설립되었다.<sup>60)</sup> 이 기관에서 운영할 ‘임시외자총국특별회계’는 ‘재정이양협정’에 따라 신설된 것이었다.<sup>61)</sup>

원조와 관련된 조항 외에도 ‘재정이양협정’은 한국정부의 운영을 직접적으로 지시할 수 있었다.

53) 정부수립 초기 국회에서는 기획처·농림부를 중심으로 한 계획경제정책과 재무부·상공부를 중심으로 한 자유 경제정책이 논의되었다. 이 같은 경제정책 논의 과정에 대해서는 정진아, 1998, 『제1공화국 초기 (1948~1950)의 경제정책 연구』, 연세대학교 사학과 석사학위논문 참조.

54) 「信用統制와 金利政策」, 朝鮮銀行調査部, 『朝鮮銀行調査月報』, No.13, 1948년 5~7월호, 112쪽.

55) 「親日派 登用은 極力忌避, 李大統領 當面 問題 答辯」, 『동아일보』, 1948년 8월 22일자.

56) 1948.9.11(10차회의), 『재정이양협정회의록』, p.132.

57) 1948년 5월 총선거에서 전북 순창의 한민당 소속 의원으로 당선되었다. ‘재정이양협정’ 승인을 위한 표결을 거부하고 성명서를 제출한 의원 중 한명이었다. 1949년 ‘국회프락치 사건’으로 체포되었다(백운선, 앞의 논문 참조).

58) ‘제1회 79차 국회본회의 회의록’, 1948.10.1.

59) ‘한미경제원조협정’은 ‘재정이양협정’이 보장하고 있는 외국 무역상의 권리를 계속 인정하며(제2조, 바), 미국과의 합의하에 수출입 계획을 수립하고, 미국 원조대표의 승인을 받도록 규정되었다(제4조).

60) 임시외자총국은 미군정기의 민간물자 보급소 및 물자영단의 역할을 이어받고 있었다. 국무총리 산하에 설치된 이 부서는 국가의 종합적 경제계획에 의거하여 외국 원조물자의 청구, 취급, 수납, 할당, 공급 및 그 대가의 경리에 관한 사무를 관장했다(이현진, 2009, 『미국의 대한경제원조정책』, 해안, 74쪽).

61) 한국재정40년사편찬위원회 편, 1991, 『한국재정40년사』 제6권 ‘재정운영의 시대별 분석’, 15쪽.

귀속재산에 대한 처분 역시 ‘재정이양협정’에서 규정된 바대로 독립적인 정부기구를 수립하여 관리해야 했던 것이다. 애초 한국정부는 귀속재산의 접수·관리 업무를 기획처에 이관하였다. 그러나 귀속재산 업무만 관할하는 독립기구를 창설해야 한다는 ‘재정이양협정’의 규정에 따라 그 기능은 곧 정지되었다. 그리고 1948년 12월 29일 대통령령 제4호로 ‘임시관재총국’이 설치되었다. ‘임시관재총국’은 귀속농지를 제외한 재산을 관리하였는데, 미군정 하에서 준수되었던 원칙에 따라 운영되었다.<sup>62)</sup> 미국은 ‘임시관재총국’ 설치 이후에도 귀속재산과 관련한 한국정부의 부서개편을 주시하였다. 귀속기업체의 처리 문제는 근대화·산업화의 전체적인 구도를 결정하는 요소였기 때문에 이 문제를 처리하는 원칙과 방식은 경제재건, 체제운영의 방향을 결정할 정도로 주요했다.<sup>63)</sup> 그러나 한국정부는 귀속재산 관리를 위임할 부서에 대한 결정권한은 가질 수 없었다.

이처럼 ‘재정이양협정’의 규정들은 한국정부 수립 초기 제안되었던 정책들을 추진할 정부 권한을 제한하였다. 이에 대해 국회 내 소장파 뿐 만 아니라 여론은 ‘재정이양협정’에 대해 ‘주권을 침해하는 협정’이라고 평가했다.<sup>64)</sup> 특히 ‘해외정산위원회 차관’의 상환규정이 집중적으로 분석되며 ‘미군정의 정책을 존속하고, 미국의 이득을 채우는 것’이라는 비판과 함께<sup>65)</sup> 결과적으로 ‘재정이양협정’은 한국정부의 주권을 제약하는 협정이라는 지적도 제기되었다.<sup>66)</sup>

한국정부는 ‘재정이양협정’을 체결함으로써 의도한 바와 같이 1948년 12월 12일 국제연합으로부터 정통성과 국제적 지지를 부여받을 수 있었다. 물론 이는 한반도 전역에서의 통치권을 보유하고 있음을 의미하는 것은 아니었지만, 이승만 정부는 이를 근거로 ‘한반도의 유일한 합법정부’라고 선전하였다. 그러나 ‘재정이양협정’ 발효 이후 조항의 규정을 시행하며 신생정부로서 운영하고자 했던 정책에 제한을 받게 되었다. ‘재정이양협정’을 통해 일제 식민지 이후 최초로 주권이 회복되었지만 이는 제한된 범위에서의 주권이었던 것이다.

#### 4. 맺음말

1948년 분단정부로서 수립된 이승만 정부는 북한정부를 견제하며 정당성을 확보해야 했다. 이승만 정부는 정부수립 이후에도 행정권을 확보하지 못하고 있던 상황으로 인해 국내의 비판여론에 직면하였고, 국제적으로도 정부승인을 받지 못하고 있었다. 이승만 정부에 있어 미군정으로부터 행정권을 이양 받는다는 것은 정부존립의 정당성을 확보하기 위한 절차였기 때문에 신속히 행해져야 했던 것이다.

미국정부에 의해 마련되었던 ‘재정이양협정’은 미군정과 한국정부의 연속성을 공식화하고, 군정의 점령정책을 승인 및 승계하며, 대한원조운영의 기반을 마련한다는 성격을 갖고 있었다. 이승만 정부는 이 같은 규정이 한국정부의 운영을 제약할 수 있다는 것을 인지하고 있었지만 이에 동의하였다. 또한 이승만 정부는 ‘재정이양협정’의 발효를 위해 국회의 문제제기를 배제하였고, 협정을 승인하였다.

결국 ‘재정이양협정’이 발효됨으로써 이승만 정부는 행정권한을 회복할 수 있었고, 국제연합으로부터 정부승인을 받게 되었다. 그러나 정부운영의 권한이 제한되었으며 정부수립 초기 다양한 정책

62) ‘재정이양협정’에 따른 귀속재산의 이전과 한국정부의 부서 및 법령 설치 등을 통한 관리·운영에 대해서는 신용욱, 앞의 논문, 제3장 1절 귀속재산의 국가자본화와 그 역할 참조.

63) 정진아, 1998, 앞의 논문, 13쪽.

64) 이동훈, 「한미협정과 우리의 주권」, 『개벽』, 1948년 12월호, 개벽사, 23~26쪽.

65) 오기영, 「독립과 자주독립」, 『신천지』, 1948년 10월호, 10~19쪽.

66) 이견주, 「한미협정의 경위」, 위의 책, 20~25쪽.

을 수용하였던 정부운영에 대한 논의범주가 위축되었다. 한국정부는 행정권 이양을 완수하고 유엔의 정부승인을 획득하여 신생정부로서의 정당성 확보를 주장할 수 있었으나 제한된 행정권한을 수반하고 출발해야 했던 것이다.



일본 공연예술계에 나타난 조선 이미지  
-1930년~1945년 일본 본토를 중심으로-

Korean Images in the Japanese Entertainment Industry, 1930-1945

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<Abstract>

This paper investigates Korean images that appeared in the Japanese Entertainment Industry from 1930s to 1945 by analyzing the activity of the Nichigeki Dancing Team (1936-1981: renamed Toho-Buyotai [Toho Dance Group] in 1940 and operated until 1945 under that name) and Takarazuka Kagekidan (Takarazuka Revue Company). A great deal of research has been conducted about Korean Dancer Sai Shoki (Choe Seung-hui)<sup>1</sup> who played an active part in mainland Japan. However, much less attention has been given to Korean Images which were created and performed by Japanese themselves.

In the late 1930s, there were actors and dancers who did performance in military uniform on the stage to create the image of Japan as a powerful state. In those days, the Nichigeki Dancing Team staged Korean folk dance revues in the Nihon Gekijo (There was called Nichigeki. Japan Theater). They belonged to the Nihon Gekijo, one of the largest theaters in Japan at that time which had 2920 seats. They performed not only Korean folk dance revues but also traditional Japanese dances as well as Ryukyu (Okinawa), Taiwanese folk dances. These dances were called Japanese folk dance(日本民族舞踊). A large variety of Korean Folk dance programs continued to be performed by the Nichigeki Dancing Team.

The Nichigeki Dancing Team, a mixed-gender group of dancers, had great skills in group dancing which was very well under control. They mainly performed in theaters in Tokyo, but occasionally performed in provincial areas in mainland Japan, such as coal-mining towns and farming villages, as the Toho Ido Bunkatai (Toho Travelling Culture Troops). They also performed in Korea, China, and French Indochina. Records of their performances show that the Japanese Entertainment Industry never eliminated Korean culture. Instead, they used Korean images which were amusing and beautiful so that they could create unconventional shows and earn themselves a good reputation.

The Takarazuka Kagekidan, which consists of only female performers, has a

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<sup>1</sup> (최승희, Choi Seung-hee)

one-hundred-year history in Japan. They also contributed to creating Korean images during the war. They performed [Shukukoden](淑香傳 : 숙향전), [Pungyangga](豊穰歌 : 풍양가), [Nihon Meisho-Zue](日本名所圖繪 : Japan Landmark Guide).

Those Korea-related performances by the Nichigeki Dancing Team and the Takarazuka Revue Company can be regarded as an attempt by the Japanese Entertainment Industry at that time to show how the territory of the Japanese Empire was expanded. Korean images were exploited to reinforce the impression of the Japanese Empire as respecting cultural diversity. It is no exaggeration to say that those performances provided by the Japanese Entertainment Industry worked as a national strategy for creating the image of the Japanese Empire as tolerant toward cultural diversity in the colonies.



## 1. 서론

본 보고에서는 1930년대부터 1945년 이전에 일본 본토에서 나타난 조선 이미지를 그 당시 공연예술계를 통해서 살펴보는 것이 목적이다. 1930년대 일본 본토에서는 크게 나누어서 두 가지의 조선 이미지 공연이 전개되어 있었다. 하나는 일본과 조선 그리고 해외에서 인기를 끌었던 무용가 최승희를 비롯한 조선 출신 연예인들의 공연이다. 최승희는 1930년대와 1940년대에 조선의 옷을 입고, 조선의 전통적인 춤을 추어, 마치 조선을 춤을 추는 것으로 표현한 '무대 위에 조선 이미지'로서 상징적인 인물이었다. 이러한 조선 출신자들의 공연에 대해서는 한국과 일본을 중심으로 많은 관심을 모아 선행 연구도 많이 이루어져 왔다. 그러나 그 당시 조선 이미지는 조선인들로만 나타난 것이 아니다. 1930년대 후반에 들어서 더 하나의 조선 이미지가 일본 본토에서 갑자기 나타나기 시작한다. 그 조선 이미지는 일본인들이 직접 제작하고 그들이 스스로 무대에 섰다는 작품들이다. 일본인<sup>2</sup>들이 제작부터 출연까지 했던 조선 관련 공연으로서, 1938년에 일본의 신흥극단(新協劇團: 신쿄게키단)의 연극 〈춘향전〉<sup>3</sup>이 연구자들의 많은 관심을 모았다. 그러나 이번 보고에서는 그 당시 일본 본토에서 인기를 자랑하고, 어느 공연 단체보다 많은 조선 관련 공연을 전개했던 니치게키 댄싱팀(日劇ダンシング・チーム: Nichigeki Dancing Team)과 다카라즈카 가극단(宝塚歌劇團)의 작품들을 소개하며 그 당시 공연에 나타난 조선 이미지에 대해 알아보도록 한다. 먼저 니치게키 댄싱팀은 일본 도쿄에 위치하는 객석수는 약 3000석을 자랑한 일본을 대표하는 영화, 연극장인 니치게키(니혼극장)에서 주로 활동한 남녀혼성 댄싱팀이었다. 그리고 다카라즈카 가극단도 니치게키에 못지않는 대규모 극장인 다카라즈카 극장의 전속 소녀 레뷰(Revue)<sup>4</sup> 단체였다. 니치게키 댄싱팀은 1930년대부터 약 반 세기 동안 일본에서 활동한 일본을 대표하는 무용단이고, 다카라즈카 가극단은 올해 100년의 역사를 자랑하고 많은 스타를 세상에 배출한 단체다. 이러한 일본에 많은 영향을 끼친 두 단체들이 1945년 이전에 조선 이미지를 내세워서 공연을 했었다는 점에 대해서는 지금까지 포괄적으로 논의된 적이 없다.

1930년대 후반의 일본 본토에서는 전쟁에 영향이 여러 예술분야에 나타나고 있어, 공연예술계도 그 예외가 아니었다. 군사적으로 강한 일본을 표현하는 작품들이

<sup>2</sup> 식민지기 조선에서는 조선 사람들도 법률상 일본인으로 구분되어 있었으나, 본고에서는 편의상 일본에서 탄생하여 모국어는 일본어인 사람은 일본인, 반면 한반도에서 출생하여 조선어가 모국어인 사람을 조선인이라고 표현한다.

<sup>3</sup> 1938년 3월 23일부터 4월 14일까지 도쿄 츠키지소극장(築地小劇場: 객석수는 400여석)에서, 일본에서 처음으로 연극으로 공연된 춘향전. 장혁주의 〈춘향전〉을 토대로 무라야마 토모요시가 객색한 작품. 오사카 아사히 회관(1938년 4월 27일~4월 30일)과 교토 아사히 회관(1938년 5월 1일~5월 3일)에서도 공연되었다. 남자주인공인 이몽룡 역할에는 여배우인 아카기 란코(赤木蘭子)가 남자를 공연에서는 이왕직아악부가 녹음한 조선 아악을 사용했다.

<sup>4</sup> 『日本演劇辞典』에서는 레뷰는 19세기에 시사를 풍자하는 희극으로 프랑스에서 유행하여 재즈송의 발달로 급격히 발전하였다고 한다. 일본에서는 풍자적 요소는 없어지고 가요와 코미디 군무(群舞)와 행렬이 섞인 오락적 요소가 강한 쇼를 가리킨다.

만들어지고, 여자 남자는 상관없이 군복을 입은 출연자들이 무대 위로 등장했다. 이러한 시기에 조선 이미지를 가지고 공연을 제작한 것은 너무나 신기한 일이다. 일본제국은 조선에서 그들의 고유의 문화들을 배제하고 부정했다는 점은 지금까지 많은 연구자들이 거론해왔다. 그러나 그 당시 일본 본토를 비롯해서 일본인들이 조선 문화를 토대로 수많은 공연을 만들었다는 이른바 일본 공연예술계의 조선붐이 일어나고 있었다는 것이다. 이는 제국일본의 식민지하 문화에 대한 배제 구조에서 보면 정반대의 형상이라고 할 수 있을 것이다.

## 2. 니치게키 댄싱팀와 조선

### 2-1) 일본민족무용과 니치게키(日劇)

니치게키 댄싱팀이 공연한 조선 관련 공연을 소개하기 전에, 먼저 니치게키 댄싱팀에 대해서 소개하도록 한다. 니치게키 댄싱팀은 1930 년대와 1940 년대 일본 본토에서 여러 대규모 극장을 운영했던 그 당시 일본공연예술계의 대규모 회사 도호(東宝)가 만든 남녀혼성의 댄싱팀이었다. 이 일본공연예술계의 거인이었던 도호에서는 많은 스타들이 탄생하고 일본의 공연예술의 상징같은 존재인 회사다. 이러한 큰 모체에서 탄생한 니치게키 댄싱팀은 주로 니치게키 스테이지 쇼 (Nichigeki Stage Show)라는 영화 상영와 세트가 된 40 분 가량의 레뷰 쇼를 중심으로 활약했다. 영화와 세트가 되고 있었다고 해도, 영화보다 니치게키 댄싱팀의 공연을 보기 위해서 극장에 간다는 소리를 들을 만한 일본에서는 압도적인 인기와 실력을 가진 무용단이였다. 그들을 탄생시킨 자는 1940 년대에 도호의 사장이 되는 하타 토요키치(秦豊吉)<sup>5</sup>라는 사람이다. 그는 니치게키 댄싱팀의 창설 이념으로서 ‘한 명의 스타를 만들지 않고, 단원이 하나가되어 협력하는 전체주의(全體主義)를 관철하고, 일사불란의 통제하에 정연한 군무를 전개한다.’ 라고 내세웠다. 1940 년 9 월부터 1945 년까지는 이름을 도호무용대(東宝舞踊隊)로 바꾸어 활동을 했다<sup>6</sup>. 그들은 여자는 10 대 후반부터 20 대 초반까지, 남자<sup>7</sup>도 20 대 초반들로 구성되어 있었다.

니치게키 댄싱팀은 세계 각지의 무용을 레뷰(Revue)화시켜 인기를 모았다. 그들의 공연이 크게 달라진 것은 1938 년에 들어서였다. 갑자기 작품으로 나타나기 시작한 것이 조선을 비롯한 일본 식민지 통치하의 무용이나, 아시아 각국에 전통 무용들이였다. 이러한 작품을 만들기 시작한 계기는 댄싱팀을 탄생시킨 하타 토요키치가 1938 년 9 월

<sup>5</sup> 秦豊吉 : 하타 토요키치(1892~1956) 동경제국대학교 법대 졸업. 1940 년부터 도호에 사장을 역임했다. 독일 문학 번역가, 소설가.

<sup>6</sup> 이 시기에는 국가에서 적성어(敵性語 : 교전중인 국가의 언어)에 대한 단속이 실시되고 있었기 때문에 ‘댄싱팀’처럼 외래어를 사용한 니치게키 댄싱팀은 이름을 바꿀 수 밖에 없었다.

<sup>7</sup> 남자 단원들은 댄싱팀이 결성된 1년후인 1936 년 9 월에 합류했다.

도호의 스타였던 다카라즈카가극단<sup>8</sup>을 데리고 독일, 이태리, 폴란드를 비롯한 26 개국에서 해외 공연을 다녀서였다. 하타는 이 공연을 통해서 세계를 돌아다닌 것을 계기로 ‘앞으로 일본의 무대예술이 구미 각국에서 공연되어 예술비평가들의 연구 대상이 되기 위해서는 가부키도 아닌 가요도 아닌 무용, 특히 발레로 공연을 해야 된다’는 생각을 갖게 된다. 그리고 유럽에서는 각지의 무용들이 그 땅과 주민들 사이와 밀접한 관계였다는 부분에서 일본에서도 민족의 무용의 필요성<sup>9</sup>을 느끼고 ‘기존의 편협한 인습을 가진 일본 향토무용에서 새로운 일본민족무용(日本民族舞踊)을 만들겠다’는 의지를 갖게 되었다. 하타가 원하는 일본민족무용의 모습은 일본 각지의 향토무용을 그대로 공연하는 것이 아니라, 그를 정리 가공하여 새로운 형태의 일본예술무용을 만드는 것으로 탄생한다는 것이었다.<sup>10</sup>

## 2-2) 일본에 나타난 조선 이미지

1938년 5월 20일부터 6월 10일까지 니치게키 스테이지 쇼에서 공연된 〈동양의 인상〉<sup>11</sup>(東洋の印象)은 니치게키에서 처음으로 조선 무용이 공개된 공연이었다. 이 공연은 영어로는 〈Glimpses of the Orient〉라고 표현되었다. 제 1부에서는 원래 유럽에서 공연되어 있었던 작품인 〈클레오파트라〉를 〈이집트의 밤〉이라는 제목으로 바꾸어 20분간의 짧은 쇼로 재구성했다. 제 2부는 〈동양무용제(東洋舞踊祭)〉라는 제목으로 터키, 아라비아, 예루살렘으로 시작하여 인도, 자와섬, 태국, 발리섬, 하노이<sup>12</sup>, 중국, 대만, 조선, 일본의 각지의 무용을 등장시켜 35분의 쇼를 구성했다.<sup>13</sup> 이 공연을 통하여 처음으로 조선의 무용이 등장을 한 이후, 니치게키 댄싱팀은 많은 조선 무용을 쇼로 만들어나간다. 이 〈동양의 인상〉에서는 각국 무용 사이에 살짝 등장하는 정도였으나, 이 공연 이후로는 단독으로 조선 레뷰 쇼가 전개된다. 니치게키 댄싱팀은 니치게키 스테이지 쇼<sup>14</sup>에서 1938년부터 1942년까지 이르기까지 여러 조선 관련 공연을 실시했다. 어떠한 쇼를 공연했는지에 대해서 아래 〈표 1〉와 같다.

<sup>8</sup> 그 당시 이름은 다카라즈카소녀가극단(宝塚少女歌劇団)이었으나, 본 논문에서는 1940년부터 쓰여진 다카라즈카 가극단(宝塚歌劇団)이라는 표기로 통일한다.

<sup>9</sup> 1930년대 후반부터 시작된 아시아 각국의 민속무용을 이용한 쇼나 레뷰에 등장에 대해서는 津金澤聰廣『近代日本の音楽文化とタカラヅカ』(근대일본의 음악문화와 다카라즈카, 2006, p.185)에서는 그 당시 전시통제가 엄격하게 되면서 서구 문화를 배척하는 기운이 높아졌다는 사회배경을 이유로 들고 있지만, 필자는 그 이유만이 아니라고 본다.

<sup>10</sup> 佐谷功편『日本民族舞踊の研究』東宝書店、1944、p.4

<sup>11</sup> 제 42회 니치게키 스테이지 쇼

<sup>12</sup> 그 당시는 톱킹이라고 불렸다.

<sup>13</sup> 橋本与志夫『日劇レビュー史』三一書房、1997、p.44

<sup>14</sup> 니치게키 스테이지 쇼는 1935년부터 전쟁으로 공연 중지 명령이 내린 1944년 2월 25일 이후 1944년 3월 1일에 극장 폐쇄를 맞이할 때까지 공연을 계속하였다.

〈니치게키 댄싱팀 조선 관련 공연과 그들의 활동 상황〉<sup>15</sup>

〈표 1〉

공연 기간	제목 <sup>16</sup>	기타 사항 <sup>17</sup>
1938 년 5 월 20 일~6 월 10	〈동양의 인상〉 (東洋の印象)	제 2 부, 제 10 경 <sup>18</sup> 동양무용제(東洋舞踊祭) 35 분의 쇼형식으로 진행되었다. 터키에서 시작하며 태국, 대만, 조선, 일본 등 여러 장면이 번갈아 나타난다. 안무 담당은 테이코 이토(テイコ イトウ)등
1938 년 8 월 1 일~8 월 7 일	〈춤추는 니치게키〉 (踊る日劇)	제 10 부제 15 경. 제 10 경에 〈조선〉이 등장. 칭춘타령 <sup>19</sup> . 조선 부채 라인 댄스 <sup>20</sup> , 아리랑 <sup>21</sup> 을 공연. 교토 다카라즈카극장에서의 첫 공연.
1938 년 11 월 1 일~11 월 8 일 11 월 9 일~11 월 15 일 은 앙코르 공연	〈춘향전〉 (春香傳)	원작은 장혁주. 춘향 역은 이번 작품에서 처음으로 연기에 도전한 댄서 시바타 사나에(柴田早苗). 발레 형식으로 진행된 춘향전.
1939 년 10 월 21 일~11 월 초순	조선무용 연구를 위해 경성에 출장	연출...사타니 고(佐谷功) 무대 장치...시마 고세이(島公靖) 무용...미즈하시 렌코(三橋蓮子)
1939 년 12 월 13 일~12 월 28 일	〈조선 레뷰〉 (朝鮮レビュー) 제 7 경	특별 출연...김안라, 오오토리 히사코 구성, 연출, 안무...미즈하시 렌코, 마스다 다카시 장치·의상...시마 고세이 <sup>22</sup>
1940 년 6 월 1 일~6 월 5 일	〈춤추는 니치게키〉 (踊る日劇)	경성부민관에서 공연. 조선에서 처음으로 공연.
1940 년 12 월 4 일~12 월 27 일	조선무용 연구를 위해 경성에 출장	미즈하시 렌코, 오오키 기요코(大木喜代子)
1941 년	도호명인회(東宝名人)	미즈하시 렌코, 오오키 기요코 등이

<sup>15</sup> 니치게키 댄싱팀의 활동에 대해서는 지금도 조사중이기 때문에 지금까지 발견된 공연만을 목록으로 만들었다. 이 이외에도 지방 공연이나 다른 극장에서 공연된 작품도 있을 가능성이 있다.

<sup>16</sup> 원래 공연 제목은 아래에 표기된 일본어이며, 한글의 공연 제목은 필자가 번역한 제목이다.

<sup>17</sup> 니치게키(니혼극장)이 아닌 공연만 장소를 명기. 나머지 공연은 니치게키에서 니치게키 스테이지 쇼로 공연된 작품.

<sup>18</sup> 레뷰 공연에서는 각 장면이 경(景)이나 장(場)으로 나누어져 있고, 1 경 아니면 1 장이라고 표현된다. 공연마다 표현이 달랐기 때문에 그대로 표현했다.

<sup>19</sup> 이시이 히사코 안무.

<sup>20</sup> 조선의 전통 의상을 입은 여자 댄서들이 부채를 들고, 한 줄로 서서 라인 댄스를 펼 친다. 니치게키 댄싱팀이라고 하면 제일 유명한 것은 라이 댄스이며, 그 인기 춤과 조선의이 융합한 제목. 안무는 마스다 타카시.

<sup>21</sup> 노래는 후쿠모토 야스코가 담당.

<sup>22</sup> 음악...若山浩一, 조명...松村爽

2월 1일~2월 10일	회)	조선무용을 공연.
1941년 2월 18일~2월 25일	조선 발레<순라이> (春雷) <sup>23</sup> 제 3경	연출,안무...미즈하시 렌코 장치.의상...시마 고세이 <sup>24</sup>
1941년 3월 16일~3월 29일	조선무용 연구를 위해 경성에 출장	미즈하시 렌코
1941년 4월 16일~4월 21일 4월 22일부터 앙코르 공연	<조선의 봄> (朝鮮の春) 제 3경	특별 출연에 김안라가 출연하여 아리랑을 불렀다. 구성,연출,안무는 미즈하시 렌코 무대 장치는시마 고세이가 담당했다. 제 1경부터 <석인 : 石人> 2경 <버드나무 : 柳> , 3경 <기생 : 妓生> 이라는 장면으로 구성되고 있었다. 제 2경에서는 처용무(處容舞)의 수양수무 (垂揚手舞)를 찾다.
1941년 5월 1일~5월 7일	<조선의 봄> 제 3경	극장...도요코영화극장 <sup>25</sup>
1941년 6월 21일		제국호텔 (帝國ホテル)연회장에서 방일중인 중화국민정부 주석 왕성예의 환연회에서 <조선무용>을 공연. 그 이외에는 <산반소 (三番叟)>,<류큐 무용>,<동북 무용>을 공연했다.
1941년 5월 23일	미즈하시 렌코 오사카 출장	오사카 우메다 극장에서 상연될 <조선의 봄>연출, 안무 지도를 위해 출장.
1941년 7월 11일	조선무용 연구를 위해 경성에 출장	미즈하시 렌코, 시마 고세이. 와카야마 고이치
1941년 7월 30일~8월 12일	제 5회 도호 이동문화대 농촌가와 춤의 지도 <춤추는 니치게키> 17경	지바현(千葉)과 오시마(大島)등지에서 도호이동문화대 공연. 옴니버스 형식으로 진행되는 <춤추는 니치게키>에서는 <아라랑의 노래>와 <조선의 검무>를 공연했다. 그 이외에도 인도나 대만 일본 각지의 무용, 마술 등이 공연되었다.
1941년 8월 6일	중국황국위문단으로	

<sup>23</sup> 봄 벼락이라는 뜻

<sup>24</sup> 음악...와카야마 고이치(若山浩一)

<sup>25</sup> 도요코 극장의 관람료는 70 전 균일이다.

	상하이에 출발	
1941 년 8 월 31 일 ~ 9 월 25 일	〈춘향여전〉 (春香女傳) 제 3 막 6 장	예술좌 미즈타니 야에코 (芸術座水谷八重子一座)와 합동 공연.
1941 년 9 월 5 일 ~ 9 월 8 일	도호 이동문화대	도치기현에서 공연. 〈아리랑의 노래〉, 〈조선의 검무〉를 공연. 그 이외에는 〈군함행진곡〉, 류큐, 인도 태국 등의 무용을 공연.
1941 년 9 월 27 · 28 일 낮.밤	도호무용대회 (東宝舞踊大会)	미즈하시 렌코와 댄싱팀이 조선무용을 공연했다. 이 대회에서는 류큐, 대만, 일본 고전 무용 등이 공연되기도 했다.
1941 년 10 월 28 일 ~ 11 월 6 일	〈지원병〉 (志願兵) 제 3 경	안무는 미즈하시 렌코가 담당. 시마 고세이 제작, 연출, 구성.
1941 년 11 월 9 일 ~ 11 월 16 일	〈니치게키 명작집〉 제 11 경 〈반도에 춤추다〉 제 15 경	경성 다카라즈카극장에서 공연. 〈니치게키 명작집〉에서는 내선(內鮮) 무용을 테마로 조선의 고전 무용 〈태평무〉(太平舞)를 포함해 일본 무용도 공연되었다. 〈반도에 춤추다〉에서는 조선의 〈검무〉와 대만 일본 등의 무용을 번갈아 공연했다.
1941 년 11 월 28 일 ~ 11 월 29 일	〈춤추는 니치게키〉 등	평양 킨치요자(金千代座)에서 공연.
1941 년 12 월 1 일 ~ 12 월 5 일	〈춤추는 니치게키〉 〈지원병〉 등	경성 다카라즈카극장에서 공연. 일본 본토와 똑같은 관람료인 1 엔으로 공연이 가능하다고 신문 광고에서 홍보. 이 공연은 영화와 세트가 아닌 단독 공연이었다.
1942 년 2 월 11 일		니치게키 스테이지 쇼의 〈지원병〉이 제 1 회 대중연극콩쿠르에서 입상.
1943 년 2 월 8 일 ~ 2 월 18 일	도호 이동문화대	규슈지방과 야마구치현의 탄광에서 공연. 12 번 공연을 실시했다.
1943 년 3 월 7 일 ~ 4 월 2 일	도호 이동문화대	기타규슈(후쿠오카현북부)와 시코쿠 지방에서 공연. 후쿠오카현의 탄광에서 11 번 공연, 시코쿠에서는 21 번 공연을 했다. 〈조선 무용〉 〈검무〉 이외에는 군국가요와 연극, 만담, 마술 등이 공연되었다.

\*이 표는 『東寶十年史』, 『舞踊芸術』, 『東寶』 등을 참고로 필자가 작성.

### 2-3) 미즈하시 렌코(三橋蓮子)와 한성준

니치게키 댄싱팀의 조선 관련 공연에서 중요한 역할을 한 인물을 소개한다. 한 명은 니치게키 댄싱팀에 소속한 무용수인 미즈하시 렌코<sup>26</sup>가 있다. 미즈하시는 니치게키 댄싱팀에 소속한 무용수이자 니치게키에서 공연한 많은 조선 관련 공연에서 그 작품들의 대부분을 그녀가 안무와 제작을 맡았고 무대에도 중심적인 역할로 등장했던 인물이다. 그녀는 조선 무용을 습득하기 위해서 다른 제작 스태프들과 함께 여러 번 조선을 찾아갔다. 그녀가 조선에서 지도를 받은 사람은 바로 무용가 한성준<sup>27</sup>이었다. 한성준은 조선에서 점점 없어져가는 조선 무용을 발굴하고 재구성하는 등 그 당시 조선의 명고수이자 무용의 대가였던 사람이다. 한성준의 많은 무용가 제자들 중에는 무용가 최승희가 있다. 한성준에게 조선 무용을 배운 일본인으로서 미즈하시 렌코와 테이코 이토<sup>28</sup>가 있다. 미즈하시는 한성준에게서 무용을 배우는 것뿐만 아니라 무대에서 사용하는 원단이나 레코드를 찾는 것도 한성준이 같이 동행하여 골라주는 등 니치게키에서 조선 관련 공연을 하는데 있어서, 한성준은 없어서는 안 될 중요한 인물이었다는 것을 알 수 있다. 1941년 2월에 니치게키에서 공연된 〈춘라이〉(春雷)에서는 한성준에게 배운 승무(僧舞)를 미즈하시가 무대에서 공개하였다. 이 승무는 원래 혼자서 추는 춤이었지만, 니치게키 댄싱팀의 무대에서는 멤버들이 한 줄이 되어서 군무(群舞)로 변신했다. 이 군무로 변화된 승무가 공개된 무대를 직접 일본에서 관람한 한성준은 조선 무용에서는 상상도 못한 일이라고 많이 놀랐다고 한다. 니치게키의 무대에서 공개된 조선 관련 공연에서는 이러한 원래 조선 무용을 새로운 형태로 만드는 과정을 거쳤다.

미즈하시는 1941년 7월에도 한성준에게 춤을 배우러 조선으로 갔으나, 그 당시 한성준은 병으로 인해 몸이 불편한 상태이었으니 그를 대신해서 무용가인 손자 한영숙에게 무용 지도를 받았다. 몸이 아픈 상태였던 한성준도 때로는 가족의 등에 업힌 상태로 자기 집 2층까지 올라가서는 미즈하시의 춤을 보고 지도를 하기도 했다.

<sup>26</sup> 미즈하시 렌코(三橋蓮子). 본명은 小堀富子. 1914년 3월 15일 도쿄 우시고메에 탄생. 1930년에 쇼치쿠소녀각극(松竹少女歌劇)에 입단한 뒤 1936년 6월 17일에 니치게키에 입사했다. 미즈하시는 조선 무용 레뷰 이외에는 니치게키 스테이지 쇼에서 공연된 태국 무용 레뷰 안무를 실시하기도 했다. 니치게키에서는 베테랑 무용수로서 안무 지도와 무대 출연을 경험했다. 니치게키에서는 무용 베테랑으로서 중심적인 인물이었다. 한성준에게 무용을 배운 일본인으로서 일본 본토에서 많은 조선 무용 레뷰 작품에 직접 출연했다. 더 니치게키 댄싱팀 이외에도 다카라즈카 가극단이 조선 관련 공연을 했을 때는 안무 지도를 하기도 했던 도호에서 조선을 소재로 한 공연을 할 때는 없어서는 안 되는 인물이었다.

<sup>27</sup> 한성준(韓成俊)1875~1941. 조선무용연구소의 창설자. 1941년에는 모던 일본사가 선정한 조선 예술상 제2회 수상자로서 무용 부문에서 수상했다. 그 때 같이 수상한 사람으로서는 작가의 이태준과 화가의 고의동이다.

1940년 7월 28일, 29일에는 일본 도쿄 히비야공회당(日比谷公會堂)에서 처음으로 조선무용대회를 열어 무용을 선보였다. 그러나 공연 기획자들이 공연 홍보를 일본에 거주하는 조선인을 중심으로 했기 때문에 공연에는 일본인들의 모습은 적었다고 한다. (『舞踊芸術』 1940년 10월, pp.30~33)

<sup>28</sup> 1940년 5월 2일에 도쿄 구단(九段)의 군인회관(軍人会館 : 좌석수는 1550명)에서 무용회를 개최. 이 무용회에서는 한성준에게 배운 조선 무용을 공개했다.

한성준은 이 같은 해인 1941년 9월에 68세로 세상을 떠났으며, 1941년 7월이 미즈하시와의 마지막 춤 지도가 되었다. 미즈하시는 자기의 조선 무용의 선생인 한성준의 너무 이른 죽음을 애석히 여기고, 한성준에게 나머지 조선 무용을 모조리 배우고 싶었다는 아쉬움을 글에 남기고 있다.<sup>29</sup>

#### 2-4) 니치게키 댄싱팀이 선보인 무대 〈지원병〉

1938년 이후부터 조선 무용을 레뷰화시켜 공연해온 미즈하시 렌코를 중심으로 한 니치게키 댄싱팀이었으나 1941년 10월 28일부터 11월 6일에 공연된 니치게키 스테이지 쇼 〈지원병〉은 지금까지의 작품과는 색다른 공연이었다. 공연 기간은 지금까지 작품이 2주-3주 동안 이어진 것과는 달리 약 1주일간의 짧은 공연 기간이었으나 여기서 주목해야 할 점은 이 작품이 일본 본토뿐만 아니라 조선에서도 공연되었다는 점이다. 조선의 경성 타카라즈카 극장(京城宝塚劇場)에서 1941년 12월 1일부터 12월 5일까지 공연된 이 작품은, 지원병 훈련소에 입대하게 될 조선인 주인공 가네모토 후쿠세이(金本福成)의 입대 전날부터 입대 당일을 그린 무용극이다. 도호가 발간한 월간잡지인 『東寶』 1940년 11월호에 게재된 지원병 대본을 참고로 공연 내용을 살펴 보도록 한다. 주인공은 이미 일본식 성명으로 창씨개명된 이름으로 등장한다. 조선의 어느 산 기슭에 어머니와 나이 어린 남동생과 셋이서 사는 주인공 후쿠세이가 지원병 훈련소에 입대를 하루 앞두고 집에서 지내는 장면에서 이야기는 시작된다. 주인공 어머니는 자기 자식이 훈련소에 입대하게 된 것을 자랑스러운 일로 여기면서 아들에게 훈련소의 옷을 입힌다. 그러나 그 반면에서는 자식을 훈련소에 보내는 것을 마음속으로는 슬퍼하는 복잡한 심정이다. 이러한 심정의 어머니가 있는가 하면 나이 어린 동생은 자기 동생이 훈련소에 가는 것을 자랑스러운 일로만 생각하는 옛된 모습으로 묘사된다. 그리고 그 점에 대해서는 마을 사람들도 남동생과 같은 마음을 가지고 있으며 주민들이 모두가 후쿠세이를 축하하는 기운으로 마을이 가득 차 있는 모양이다. 이 무용극은 제 3막으로 나누어진 작품으로 무대가 바뀔 때마다 조명이 어두워졌다가 무대가 밝아지는 조명 형태를 취하고 있다. 때로는 무대가 회전하면서 다음 막으로 이어진다. 마을 사람들은 그를 축하하기 위해서 길거리에서 '풍년풍년'이라고 외치면서 장구나 징을 들고 신나게 노래를 부른다. 이 작품에서는 사람들이 후쿠세이에게 건네주는 세 가지의 각각 천 조각이 등장을 하며 이는 그 당시 군 입대를 맞이한 사람들에게는 아주 상징적인 물건들이자 이 무대에서도 중요한 장면을 연출하는 역할을 한다. 하나는 주인공 집에 찾아온 지계꾼이 그에게 축하를 위해서 건네준 것은 '축 지원병 훈련소 입소 가네모토 후쿠세이 군(祝志願兵訓練所入所金本福成君)'이라는 문구가 적혀 있는 한 장의 천이었다. 다음에 등장한 노란색 천은 주인공의 여자친구로

<sup>29</sup> 佐谷功편 『日本民族舞踊の研究』 1943, 東寶書店, p.275



등장하는 오쓰준(乙順)이 그에게 선물한 ‘천인침’(센닌바리 : 千人針)<sup>30</sup>이다. 마지막에 등장하는 천은 후쿠세이를 축하하는 연회장에서 한 노인이 거내주는 흰 깃발이다. 이 깃발에는 ‘축 입소 가네모토 후쿠세이 만세’(祝入所金本福成万歳)라는 붓글씨가 적혀 있다. 이 장면에서 조금씩 무대가 어두워지자 노인이 부는 피리 소리와 다듬이 소리가 들려온다. 여기서 다시 무대가 밝아져서 마지막 장면인 제 3막에 들어간다. 여기서는 마을 사람들이 ‘만세만세’라고 외치면서 나팔을 불고 행진하며 훈련소에 향하는 후쿠세이의 모습이 등장한다. 후쿠세이는 배에 오쓰준에게 받은 천인침을 입고 있다. 그리고 그를 보내는 어머니는 제 1막에서 지게꾼에게 받은 천이 깃발이 되어 현관 문 앞에 꽂아지고 있는 것을 뽑아서 문밖으로 나가려고 한다. 그러나 울음을 참지 못해 결국 집마당에서 쓰러져 버리고 만다. 그런 어머니의 모습을 발견한 후쿠세이의 여자친구인 오쓰준(乙順)은 그녀의 손을 잡고 같이 깃발을 흔들리는 장면으로 이 무대는 막을 내린다.

이 공연을 계기로 니치게키 스테이지쇼에서는 그들의 조선무용을 하나의 쇼로서 단독으로 보지는 못하게 되었으나, 그 대신 니치게키 댄싱팀이 활동한 도호이동문화대(東宝移動文化隊)<sup>31</sup>에서는 많은 작품중에 하나로서 검무(劍舞) 등의 조선 무용들이 공개되어 있었다. 이 도호이동문화대는 국가의 정보국(情報局)과 대정익찬회(大政翼贊會)가 중심이 되어 조직되었으며, 지금까지 도쿄나 다른 한정된 도시에서만 활동해 온 니치게키 댄싱팀들을 농촌, 어촌, 공장, 탄광 등이 있는 도시에서 떨어진 일본 본토 지방에서 그들의 공연을 볼 수 있게 되었다.<sup>32</sup> 때로는 중국 군부 위문공연과 베트남 공연에도 찾아가기도 했다. 이 공연에서는 옴니버스 형식<sup>33</sup>으로 조선을 비롯한 식민지하, 통치하의 문화들이 일거에 공개되어 있었다. 그것은 마치 제국 일본의 축도(縮圖)를 일본 곳곳에서 공연을 통해 널리 알려줬다고 볼 수 있을

<sup>30</sup> 천인침(센닌바리 : 千人針)은 전쟁터에 가는 군인들에게 그의 무운(武運)과 무사히 돌아올 것을 기원하며 천 명(정확하게 천 명이 아니다)의 여자들이 모여서 붉은 실로 한 땀 씩 천 개의 매듭을 지은 천이다. 군인들이 이것을 배두렁이로서 입고 다니면 방탄조끼 역할을 하고 총알에 맞지 않다고 믿고 있었다.

<sup>31</sup> 도호이동문화대는 도호에서 국민문화축진을 위해 만들어진 이동연극대이며 1940년 10월 19일 히비야 공회당에서 첫 공연을 실시했다. 일본 본토의 농촌, 어촌, 공장, 광산 등 도시에서 떨어진 지역을 중심으로 활동했다. 이동은 트럭에 무대 도구를 싣고 때로는 걸어서 그 공연장소까지 찾아갔다. 1941년 6월 9일에는 국가의 정보국(情報局)과 대정익찬회(大政翼贊會)가 중심이 되어 일본 이동연극연맹을 설립한다. 직원으로서는 정보국, 대정익찬회, 대일본산업보국회(大日本報国会), 산업조합중앙회(産業組合中央會), 대일본 청소년단(大日本靑少年團), 동경일일신문(東京日日新聞), 도호(東宝), 쇼치쿠(松竹), 요시모토(吉本), 신교(新興) 등의 공연예술계 회사들이었다.

옴니버스 형식으로 이루어진 공연에서는 조선 무용 이외에도 일본의 지방 무용, 인도, 태국, 대만, 류큐 등의 무용도 동시에 공개되었다. 이 도호이동문화대의 활동을 통해서 지금까지 도쿄나 다른 도시에서만 볼 수 있었던 댄싱팀의 공연을 지방에서도 볼 수 있게 되었으며, 일본 곳곳에서 일본제국 문화의 하나가 된 다양한 문화의 모습을 공개할 수 있게 되었다.

<sup>32</sup> 일본 오시마에서 니치게키 댄싱팀이 참가한 이동문화대의 공연을 본 마을 조합의 노인의 말. ‘이 마을에는 명랑함이 없습니다. 그러니까 이러한 공연을 해주신 것으로 마음이 밝아졌다는 것을 다행히 생각합니다. 더구나 노래도 있고 춤도 있고 연극도 있다. 춤이면 일본 춤도 있고, 서양 춤도 있고. 조선의 춤도 있고 대만의 춤도 있고 여러 종류의 춤을 보니 지루한 점이 하나도 없었습니다. 적어도 일년에 한 번 씩 와 봤으면 좋겠습니다.’(平塚廣雄『花の戦記』丹青書房, 1943, p.188)

<sup>33</sup> 니치게키 스테이지 쇼에서도 공연된 옴니버스 형식인 쇼〈춤추는 니치게키〉를 공연했다.

것이다.

이 니치게키 스테이지쇼 〈지원병〉은 니치게키가 스테이지쇼로서 조선을 소재로한 공연으로서는 마지막 작품이 되었다. 니치게키가 조선을 소재로 이러한 군국주의를 고무하는 작품을 만든 것은 이 작품을 빼고는 하나도 없었다. 이 작품은 1942년에는 제 1회 연극 콩쿠르에서 입상된다. 이 〈지원병〉은 조선 경성에서 1941년 12월 1일부터 12월 5일까지 공연되었으며, 이 공연은 니치게키 댄싱팀이 조선에서 실시하는 네 번째 공연이었다.<sup>34</sup> 이 공연에서는 원래 영화와 세트가 된 어트랙션 형식을 취한 쇼가 아니고, 이 니치게키 댄싱팀의 공연만을 선보이는 형식을 취했다. 공연은 제 3부<sup>35</sup>까지 있었으며 공연 시간은 세 시간을 넘는 니치게키 댄싱팀으로서는 아주 긴 시간의 공연을 하루에 세 번 실시하였다. <sup>36</sup> 지원병 이외에 공개된 〈춤추는 니치게키〉(踊る日劇)는 식민지 무용을 포함한 아시아 여러 지방의 무용을 유니버스 형식으로 구성한 프로그램이다. 이 조선 공연에서는 니치게키 댄싱팀(도호무용대)을 비롯해 도호극단(東寶劇團)과 도호악극단(東寶樂劇團)<sup>37</sup>이 60여 명의 출연자들이 무대에 등장했다.<sup>38</sup>

### 3. 다카라즈카 가극단(寶塚歌劇團)과 조선

니치게키 댄싱팀의 관객이 대학생들을 포함한 남성들이 팬들이었다면, 다카라즈카 가극단<sup>39</sup>에는 스타 배우들을 보러 오는 소녀 팬<sup>40</sup>들이 있었다. 다카라즈카 가극단은 모두 여성으로 구성되어 있는 가극단이다. 남성 역할은 여자가 남장을 한 모습으로 무대에 나타난다. <sup>41</sup>올해 100년의 역사를 자랑하는 다카라즈카 가극단도 1930년대와 1940년대에는 조선을 소재로 한 공연을 실시하고 있었다. 다카라즈카가 가극단이

<sup>34</sup> 니치게키 댄싱팀은 1940년 6월 1일부터 65일까지 경성일보의 초대로 경성부민관에서 공연을 했다. 이 다음해인 1941년 11월 9일부터 11월 16일까지는 경성 다카라즈카 회관에서 공연을 한다. 이 공연들은 일본과 같은 공연 스타일인 영화와 같이 공연되는 어트랙션 형식으로 공연되었다. 평양에서도 1941년 11월 28일부터 29일까지 평양킨치요자(平壤金千代座)에서 공연을 했다.

<sup>35</sup> 제 1부부터 희극 〈斷髮女中〉, 〈지원병〉, 〈보시바리(棒しばり)〉 〈춤추는 니치게키〉(아니면, 〈춤추는 東京〉)

<sup>36</sup> 관객들중에 조선 사람들이 어느 정도 와 있었는지, 이 공연에 대한 관객들의 반응에 대해서는 지금 조사중이다.

<sup>37</sup> 니치게키 댄싱팀의 자매 단체로 1940년 12월에 도호성악대로 결성. 도호성악대로 개칭. 니치게키 댄싱팀의 쇼에서 음악을 담당하는 팀이다.

<sup>38</sup> 경성일보, 1941년 11월 28일

<sup>39</sup> 다카라즈카가극단은 원래는 다카라즈카소녀가극단(寶塚少女歌劇團)이었으나 전쟁의 영향으로 인해 소녀라는 약한 이미지를 주는 단어는 못 쓰게 되었으며 1940년대에 들어서 개칭을 했다.

<sup>40</sup> 다카라즈카에서는 팬들에 인기가 있는 배우, 주로 남성 역할을 하는 배우들이었으나, 이 시대에는 그 배우의 팬들이 자살을 할 때 베개 옆의 자기 팬인 다카라즈카 배우의 사진이 있었다는 이야기가 있을 정도로 열혈한 팬을 가지는 단체였다. 일본의 소녀가극에서는 이 다카라즈카 가극단과 쇼치쿠가극단(松竹歌劇團)이 인기였다.

<sup>41</sup> 다카라즈카에서는 남성 역할과, 여자 역할을 하는 배우들로 각각 나누어진다. 여자 역할은 아가씨 역할이라고 부른다.

처음으로 도전한 조선 관련 작품은 1938 년에 공연된 〈숙향전〉(淑香傳)이다. 1930 년대에는 조선을 소재로한 공연에서 많은 인기를 지닌 문화 작품이 바로 〈춘향전〉(春香傳)<sup>42</sup> 이었다. 〈춘향전〉은 일본에서는 여러 극단들이 모티브로 한 작품이었으나 〈숙향전〉<sup>43</sup>을 일본에서 공연한 단체는 다카라즈카 가극단밖에 없다. 이외에는 다카라즈카 가극단과 일본 가극을 견인해 온 쇼치쿠 가극단이 〈심청전〉(沈淸傳)<sup>44</sup>을 레뷰 공연으로 한 적이 있다. 그 다음에 다카라즈카에서 공연된 조선 작품으로서는 1940년 1월말부터 2월말에 걸쳐서 공연된 〈日本名所圖繪<sup>45</sup>(니혼메이쇼즈에)〉가 있다. 그리고 다카라즈카가 마지막으로 도전한 조선 작품은 1941년 10월에 도쿄 다카라즈카 극장에서 공연된 〈풍양가〉(豊穰歌)이다. 이 작품은 대사가 없는 무언극(無言劇)으로 연출되었다. 공연에서는 니치게키 댄싱팀의 미즈하시 렌코가 안무를, 니치게키에서 무대 장치를 담당하는 시마(島公靖)가 제작에 참가했다. 이 작품은 다카라즈카가 처음으로 도전하는 민족무용 작품으로 소개되었다. 이 공연에는 출연자로서 80 명이 무대에 올라갔다.

여기서는 다카라즈카의 두 번째 조선 작품인 〈日本名所圖繪〉에 대해서 소개하도록 한다. 이 작품은 1940년 1월 26일부터 2월 23일까지 다카라즈카 대극장에서 공연되었다. 이 작품은 20 장에 나뉘져 있으며 조선은 제 16 장[場]과 제 17 장에 등장한다. 공연 형식은 학생과 여행 가이드 교사가 등장하여 수학여행을 하는 모습으로 나타난다. 가이드의 안내를 따라 일본 곳곳에 있는 관광 명소를 한 꺼번에 보는 공연이다. 제 1 장은 오사카성에서 시작하여 제 18 장에는 아이누족이 등장하기도 한다. 제 16 장에는 조선의 전원 풍경 속에서 다듬이질을 하면서 노래를 하는 세 명의 소녀가 등장한다. 제 17 장에는 재즈풍으로 만든 아리랑을 부르는 장면이 나온다. 그리고 천하대장군과 지하여장군의 모양이 된 옷을 입은 단원들의 군무(群舞)가 공개된다. 처음 기획 단계에서는 조선만이 아니라 대만과 가라후토도 등장시킬 예정이었으나 결국 조선만이 등장했다.<sup>46</sup> 제 20 막에서는 노래 〈일본 좋은 나라〉(日本よい国)와 〈기원 2600 년

<sup>42</sup> 일본에서 처음으로 춘향전을 무대 공연으로 만든 것은 일본의 신파극단인 신희극단(新協劇團)이었다. 1938년 3월 23일부터 4월 14일까지 도쿄의 츠키지극장에서 공연된 이후, 오사카와 교토에서도 공연되었다. 1938년 11월 1일부터는 니치게키(니혼극장)에서 니치게키 댄싱팀의 스테이지 쇼 조선레뷰 〈춘향전〉이 공연되었다. 세 번째는 1941년 8월 31일부터 9월 25일까지 니치게키에서 공연된 〈춘향여전〉(春香女傳)이다. 이 공연은 게이스쓰좌(藝術座)와 니치게키 댄싱팀들의 합동 공연이다. 1941년 10월 1일에는 나니와좌(浪花座), 11월 21일에는 야치요극장(八千代劇場), 12월에는 고베쇼치쿠극장(神戸松竹劇場)에서 희극으로 만들어진 青春劇團들의 〈웃는 춘향전〉(笑う春香傳)이라는 작품도 공연되었다. 지금까지 일본의 〈춘향전〉 공연에 관한 선행 연구에서는 신희극단과 춘향여전에 대한 언급만으로 끝나고 있으며 보다 더 많은 작품을 통해서 〈춘향전〉이 일본 본토에서 모티브가 되어 있었다는 것을 알 수 있다.

<sup>43</sup> 다카라즈카에서는 1938년 9월 1일부터 9월 30일에 다카라즈카 星組(호시구미. 호시는 일본어로 별을 뜻한다. 다카라즈카에서는 '별/달/꽃/눈'의 네 개의 조로 나누어지고 있었다.)가 다카라즈카나카극장에서, 1938년 10월 12일부터 10월 25일까지는 다카라즈카대극장에서, 1938년 11월 2일부터 11월 11일까지는 유키구미(雪組 : 눈)가 도쿄다카라즈카극장에서 공연을 했다.

<sup>44</sup> 1941년 3월 국제극장에서 공연되었다.

<sup>45</sup> 일본관광명소안내를 뜻한다.

<sup>46</sup> 歌劇発行所『歌劇』1940년 2월호, p.106

봉축가〉(紀元二千六百年奉祝歌)<sup>47</sup>를 대합창하면서 막이 내린다. 이 작품에 나타난 조선은, 일본에 완전히 포함된 조선의 모습을 공연에서 확인할 수 있는 대표적인 작품이자 일본 판도(版圖)를 가리키는 역할로 조선 이미지가 동원되었다고 할 수 있다.

#### 4. 결론

본 보고에서는 1930 년대와 1945 년이전의 일본 본토를 중심으로 공연에 나타난 조선 이미지에 대해 니치게키 댄싱팀과 다카라즈카 공연을 중심으로 포괄적으로 소개를 했다. 1930 년대 말기에 들어서는 일본 공연예술계에도 전쟁의 영향이 짙게 나타나기 시작했다. 그러한 군국 강국 일본을 내세운 일본 공연에 조선을 소재로 한 공연들이 나타나기 시작한다. 지금까지 조사한 결과로서는 일본에서 이렇게 많은 조선 관련 공연을 지속적으로 실시했던 공연 단체는 니치게키 댄싱팀 이외에는 없다고 볼 수 있다. 그 들의 활동에서는 조선을 비롯한 대만, 류큐 등의 지금까지 일본 전통 무용에서는 볼 수 없었던 식민지 지역을 포함한 각지의 무용들을 하나의 〈일본 민족 무용〉이라는 구상에 내포시키고 공연을 실시했던 실태를 알 수 있었다. 공연 형태는 조선 무용의 맛을 살리면서 새로운 무용 형태로 재구성시키는 등 조선 무용을 일본 국내에서 하나의 오락 장르로 승화시키는데 성공을 거두었다. 니치게키와 다카라즈카에서는 조선 무용을 단독 공연으로 실시할 때와 옴니버스 형식으로 일본 본토 각지의 무용, 때로는 다른 아시아 지역의 무용들과 같이 공연할 때가 있었다. 이러한 공연 형태의 차이점은 있어도 공통되는 점으로서는 조선 이미지가 공연예술계 작품 속에 동원되었다는 것이다. 일본 본토와 제국일본하의 문화들을 하나의 쇼(SHOW)로 만드는 것은 관객들에게 일본의 판도(版圖)를 가시화(可視化)하는 하나의 수단으로서 작용했을 가능성도 제기할 수 있을 것이다. 즉 일본과 조선을 비롯한 각 일본제국하의 문화들 사이의 경계선(境界線)이 보다 더 애매한 상태가 될 것을 유발할 수 있었다는 것이다. 문화적 다양성, 오락적 요소, 노스탈지아 등 복합적 요소를 갖는 조선 이미지는 그 당시 일본 공연예술계에서는 매력적인 문화 콘텐츠의 하나로서 일본 본토에서 자리를 잡았다고 해도 과언이 아닐 것이다.

니치게키 댄싱팀이 조선에서 진행된 공연을 통해서 조선 문화의 역수입 형상이 일어났으며 이에 대해 보다 더 자세한 연구가 필요하다고 본다.

#### 6. 자료

##### [니치게키 댄싱팀 멤버들의 모습]

<sup>47</sup> 천황의 즉위 2600 년을 기념하는 노래. 1940 년이 바로 그 기원 2600 년이다.



(그림 1) 〈춘향전〉(1938)에서 신랑각시 춤을 추는 모습.<sup>48</sup>



(그림 2) 〈춘향전〉(1938)에서 검무를 추는 모습<sup>49</sup>



(그림 3) 〈춘향전〉(1938)에서 춘향과 이몽룡.<sup>50</sup>

48 宝塚発行所『エスエス』(1938년 12월호)

49 宝塚発行所『エスエス』(1938년 12월호)

50 宝塚発行所『エスエス』(1938년 12월호)



(그림 4) <춤추는 니치게키(踊る日劇)> (1938)에서 조선 부채 라인 댄스<sup>51</sup>



(그림 5)한성준과 니치게키 댄싱팀의 미즈하시 렌코<sup>52</sup>



(그림 6) <순라이(春雷)> (1941)<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> 東宝書店 『東宝舞踊隊アルバム』 (1938)


<sup>52</sup> 佐谷 功 編 『日本民族舞踊の研究』 東宝書店, 1944

<sup>53</sup> 東寶書店 『東宝舞踊隊アルバム』 (1941)



(그림 7) <지원병(志願兵)> (1941)<sup>54</sup>

[다카라즈카 가극단의 조선 관련 작품들]



(그림 8) <숙향전 (淑香傳)> (1938)<sup>55</sup>

<sup>54</sup> 『京城日報』, 1941년 11월 28일

<sup>55</sup> 歌劇發行所『歌劇』, 1938년 11월



(그림 9) 〈日本名所圖繪〉(1940)<sup>56</sup>



(그림 10) 〈풍양가(豊穰歌)〉(1941)<sup>57</sup>

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Title: Crowdsourcing “Korean Food Missionaries”: The New Division of Labor in Globalizing Korean Cuisine

Food wars are no longer only fought to further economic wealth and food security of a nation but also to disseminate cultural propaganda. Increasingly, nation-states are promoting national cuisines as a nation-building strategy to enhance soft power and assert nationalism (Ferguson 2004; Morgan 2012; Pilcher 2008; Sunanata 2005; Trubek 2000; Wilson 2011). In 2008, South Korean president Lee Myung-bak announced the launch of a gastro-national campaign to globalize Korean cuisine. Overnight, Korean cuisine was touted as a solution to South Korea’s two major dilemmas: its faltering economy in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and its negative image associated with nuclear weapon-brandishing North Korea. With the goal of constructing a global Korean cuisine, the government began commodifying Korean culinary culture into a brand that connotes fun and trendiness. This strategy mainly focused on reinterpreting culinary culture as K-Food, a digital media product, to reach a global audience.

This paper explores the production and circulation of images of the Korean nation through global media such as YouTube and Facebook. By focusing on the production of K-Food content from state-led crowdsourcing competitions online, I critically examine the new division of labor created in the nation-building project. I argue that these government-funded competitions recruit average individuals as Korean food missionaries and end up reinforcing the power of the state. I will address the following questions: Why is the Korean government recruiting average individuals as Korean food missionaries who may not have a strong stake in reinforcing the Korean nation? Does the crowdsourced content articulate a coherent image of Korea as a fun and trendy country to align with the government’s goal? And who ultimately benefits from user-generated representations of Korean food?

I will first provide an overview of theoretical approaches to studying the construction of a culinary nation brand as a nation-branding strategy and situate the Korean government's campaign. I argue that the government's use of user-generated content introduces a new division of labor in promoting and reinforcing the power of the Korean nation. Next, I will trace the development of state policies of enhancing its cultural image since the 1960s. This historical overview will offer context to the government's recent shift in commodifying culinary culture into a digital *Hallyu* product. Third, I will discuss three state-led crowdsourcing competitions to trace the production, selection, and circulation of K-Food content. I will consider the narrative and performances of participants both online and offline to demonstrate how these competitions reinforce state power. Finally, I will conclude by addressing the points of conflict in this campaign and unintended consequences of recruiting participants as Korean food missionaries.

### **I. Theoretical Approaches to Studying the Construction of a Culinary Nation Brand**

The Korean government's use of crowdsourcing is an effective strategy to outsource the task of promoting Korean food directly to the target audience. Crowdsourcing is a relatively new term that has been increasingly used in the business world to more efficiently solve problems and generate ideas in the age of global media. It is defined as a "the act of outsourcing tasks, traditionally performed by an employee or contractor, to an undefined, large group of people or community (a 'crowd'), through an open call" generally using the Internet" (Roebuck 2011: 1). This business strategy turns capitalistic divisions of labor on its head for enlisting workers who will work with little or no pay. According to Jeff Howe who coined this term, "Labor can often be organized more efficiently in the context of community than it can in the context of a corporation" (2008: 8). It may seem counter-intuitive that even without clear assignment of tasks and incentives individuals are willing to participate in a community effort to produce results.

Howe further argues, “The best person to do a job is the one who most wants to do that job; and the best people to evaluate their performance are their friends and peers who, by the way, will enthusiastically pitch in to improve the final product, simply for the sheer pleasure of helping one another and creating something beautiful from which they all will benefit” (2008: 8). The concept of crowdsourcing provides a more democratic alternative in the division of labor because individuals voluntarily get involved in a common goal. However, it is also important to note that when crowdsourcing is in action, it does not completely reject the status quo of the neo-liberal marketplace. In particular, for corporate or government-sponsored crowdsourcing competitions, the call to participate is open but there are gatekeepers who define the guiding objective of the project to maximize self-interest. Moreover, these gatekeepers frequently define the basic rules of engagement and hold ultimate authority in the outcome. Therefore, in my analysis of government-initiated crowdsourcing competitions, I use the term “(in)organic production” to describe the double-sided nature of user-generated online content. I argue that the new division of labor created in nation-building projects through crowdsourcing is a hybrid between top-down and bottom-up approaches.

In order to better explain the inner-workings of this government campaign, an overview of theoretical approaches to nation-building needs to be considered. This nation-building project is an example of the reemergence of the state as a central force in the age of transnationalism. Despite some scholars’ prediction of the decline of nation-states as the primary unit of political analysis with the implosion of established borders between center and periphery and self and Other (Appadurai 1996; Giddens 1990; Hannerz 1997; Harvey 1990), nation-states remain relevant in global and transnational processes (Kearney 1995; Mahler and Pessar 2001; Sassen 2006; Tsing 2005). It is important to note that the employment of soft power has enabled nation-

states to remain relevant in global processes by reinforcing their power through persuasion rather than through coercion (Gallarotti 2010; Mattern 2005; Nye 2004). In recent years, nation-states increasingly have employed branding strategies, once reserved for corporations, to manage their images to increase soft power (Anholt 2010; Dinnie 2011). What is new in nation-building projects is the speed with which a diverse range of ideas and images of a nation becomes instantly accessible worldwide through global media. Present day nation-building can no longer rely on unidirectional projections stemming from discussions within a nation but must also consider external ones that take place in virtual space through global media outlets (Yan 2011). The Korean government's decision to sponsor crowdsourcing competitions to increase online content about Korean food can be understood within the context of its self-appointed role as brand manager of the culinary nation brand. I use the term Korean food missionaries, instead of food ambassadors, to describe average individuals who voluntarily participate in government-sponsored crowdsourcing events. While the word "ambassador" invokes a sense of neutrality and diplomatic negotiations, the word "missionary" suggests a more passionate and personal engagement. Although these competitions were simply devised to increase public engagement and promote Korean food through various media platforms, they unwittingly produced a new division of labor where individuals who were not affiliated with Korea marshalled behind the nation-building project.

The question of why average individuals all around the world voluntarily participate in the Korean government's nation-building project can be addressed with a closer examination of the nature of state power. The individuals' voluntary nature of contributing to a nation-building project can be understood through Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony. Gramsci explains that power is circulated and reproduced within society not only by force and coercion but also by

consent (1992: 205). His understanding of power allows us to regard Korean government and participants of crowdsourcing competitions as operating under a mutually beneficial agreement that ultimately reproduces social order on the Internet. Participants of these crowdsourcing competitions are usually under the age of 30, who conduct many of their daily social and economic interactions on line. Sites such as YouTube and Facebook operate under the logic that people will share and frequently over-share to form a community with people they may not know (Miller 2011). The nature of these online engagements flattens the established hierarchical order because anyone can contribute and comment as a part of their daily activities. In turn, the government uses the Internet to project state ideology to reproduce state power and interpellate participants as subjects (Althusser 1971). The Korean government's open call on the Internet creates a global community of consenting participants to create online content about Korean food, which consequently interpellates them as governable subjects. This reveals how non-state actors become mutually invested in state-driven national projects to reproduce ruling-class ideology. Through my case studies, I will demonstrate how state power works through institutions and individuals to shape behavior and ultimately marshal participants of these competitions as "Korean food missionaries" (Foucault 1979 & 1990).

## **2. Enhancing the Korean Nation's Cultural Image**

A brief overview of the government policies to elevate Korea's cultural reputation in the global marketplace will provide insight into why the government is hosting competitions to generate digital content about Korean food. I will examine the four phases of government policies since the 1960s: the periods of incubation (early 1960s-late 1970s), growth (early 1990s-late 1990s), popularization (early 2000s-late 2008), and expansion (2009-present). The government's cultural policies aimed at solidifying and promoting Koreanness will explain how

elements such as popular culture and cuisine have become commodified for global export in the past decade.

Amid policies to industrialize and modernize Korea, the first state-led national culture project was launched during the Park Chung-hee administration (1961-1978). Park implemented both economic and cultural policies geared toward redefining and reasserting national identity. Park's regime promoted anti-colonialism and anti-communism to solidify state power and national regeneration through establishing a self-reliant national economy (Kal 2012:58). Because Park usurped power through a military coup d'état, the official nationalism to legitimize the state was built on a militaristic view of the nation and a "Korean-style" modernization based on Korean traditions (Moon 1998:43, 48-49). Park's regime also turned its attention to reconstructing Korean national culture in order to achieve modernization without completely rejecting or eliminating Korean tradition. In the early 1960s, the Park administration initiated nationalistic cultural construction by identifying and designating certain cultural heritage as worthy of preservation to solidify cultural nationalism (Robinson 2005: 22). In addition to passing the first cultural preservation act in 1961 that inventoried tangible heritage sites, Park included intangible heritage elements and designated professionals such as artists, craft-makers, and performers of traditional arts as Intangible Cultural Assets (Robinson 2005:22). These types of inscriptions solidified the notion of a coherent national identity, which was essential to rally individuals to participate in the aggressive state-led economic nation-building project.

In the early 1980s, the effects of rapid industrialization and urbanization became evident. With economic development, however, Korea became obligated to participate in international trade. The opening-up of its market came at a price because the country was soon flooded with imported goods, which fueled anxieties about the dilution of Korean culture (Huang 2011: 6;



Nelson 2000: 22). The second phase of government policies focused on ensuring growth of the culture industry in response to the influx of foreign cultural influences. The Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1998) first marked the shift from nationalist projects geared toward driving economic development to commodifying popular culture for global export. However, it was not until the late 1990s during Kim Dae-jung's administration (1998-2003) that the government advanced an official policy to enhance Korea's cultural reputation. Kim designated the media and entertainment sector as one of the key growth industries and justified state sponsorship by linking the expansion of the popular culture industry to the increase in export revenue (Joo 2011:499). The government established offices and funded institutions to carry out the mission of strengthening the media and entertainment sector. For example, the Korean Culture and Content Agency was established in 2000 to promote the export of media and entertainment under the purview of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the Korean Film Council received state funds to export Korean films (Joo 2011:500). The government also decided to protect the three major television and radio broadcasting stations, Korea Broadcasting Station (KBS), Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), and Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) from foreign media content to ensure maximum airtime for Korean programs (Cho 2005: 170). The government focused on ways to fuel the growth of the culture industry, which established a base on which Korean popular culture could make a leap in the next phase.

In the early 2000s, Korean popular music, television dramas, and films began gaining mass following among Japanese and Chinese audiences. The increasing popularity of Korean cultural products in East Asia gave rise to the word "*Hallyu*," the Korean Wave, in the late 1990s. More recently, the term describes the surge of Korean popular culture around the world. What is different in this phase of Korean cultural promotion is that *Hallyu* was fueled by the

private sector rather than government policies (Kim, R 2010: 152-153). In this third phase, the government did not play a prominent role in globalizing Korean culture but provided legal, financial, and technological support to sustain the popularity of *Hallyu*. While the globalization of Korean popular culture has launched Korea as a major global cultural producer, it is difficult to point to what makes these media and entertainment products uniquely Korean. The content of Korean popular culture is based more on appropriating American, Japanese, and global cultural influences than deriving from Korean traditional culture (Joo 2011:501). Some Korean critics of *Hallyu* have voiced the need to include more Korean sensibilities and values to ensure the effective spread of Korean culture. For example, in a special report on the economic effects of *Hallyu* by the Samsung Economic Research Institute (2005), the authors assert that content that reflects the essence of Korea is called for to maximize the global export potential for Korean cultural products. The report concludes, “We need to make people interested in Korean culture through ‘a feel of Korea’ and increasing the export of Korean food, drinks, and lifestyles because they contain the essence of Korean aesthetics, emotions, traditions, and culture” (Cho 2005:169). Accordingly, in 2006, Roh Moo-hyun’s administration (2003-2008) began the HanStyle campaign to brand the nation with traditional Korean cultural elements such as dress, language, food, paper, music and architecture. According to the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, HanStyle refers to “the source of Korean culture representing and symbolizing Korea. It aims to create job opportunities and added value to boost the national image through industrializing, globalizing, and using traditional contents in everyday life” (HanStyle Website 2014). The emphasis on commodifying cultural aspects that possess uniquely Korean characteristics became the revised strategy, guiding the subsequent nation-branding project focused on food.

Among the HanStyle cultural categories, the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013) chose food as the official representative of Korea. The government set goals to make Korean cuisine the top-five world cuisines by 2017 by increasing the number of restaurants abroad and boosting agricultural exports from USD 4.4 billion in 2009 to USD 10 billion in 2012. Food was identified as an ideal candidate to enhance Korea's image with the belief that food could articulate the core qualities of Koreanness. Food is particularly useful in projecting collective identity because it is one of the primary cultural objects that encapsulate strong nationalist sentiment (Palmer 1998). More recently, the promotion of culinary culture became combined with *Hallyu* to increase digital content online after Park Geun-hye administration (2013-present) announced its official policy to support creative industries. Following this declaration, in August 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs announced its master plan to promote Korean food as a digital "culture content." The term culture content is a Korean concept with political origins dating back to the early 2000s. It is a compound word that binds culture and content together to mean "a creative software product or service that goes beyond the one-dimensional data, message, image, or videos to encompass cultural factors" (2013: 2). Culture content has been identified as an effective product to communicate cultural identity because it can satisfy intellectual and emotional curiosities (2013: 2). The next strategy in expanding the reach of Korean culture around the world has been identified as the circulation of Korean culture through social media networks, which is termed digital *Hallyu* (2013: 34). The government effort to expand its global influence through this second-generation *Hallyu* gave rise to crowdsourcing competitions.

### **3. (In) Organic Production of Korean Food Missionaries**

The official slogan for the Korean government's policy to globalize Korean cuisine is

”Discover Korea’s Delicious Secret!” Not only was this campaign geared toward introducing Koreanness to a global audience, but also Korean cuisine was framed as an asset to the entire world for its nutritious, wholesome qualities. Korean cuisine was presented as an alternative to the industrialized food system, which eventually could solve many health-related problems in the world (Korea Food Foundation 2014). The notion of a global Korean cuisine emerged to describe the campaign’s mission to normalize and standardize Korean cuisine in order to cultivate non-Koreans as avid consumers. The framing of this campaign envisioned Korean cuisine as a catalyst in promoting global integration and cooperation on Korea’s terms. The operating logic was that just by unveiling “Korea’s delicious secret,” people around the world would be converted into Korean food aficionados. In order to effectively reach a global audience, the government began commissioning online content in English, Japanese, and Chinese about Korean food in the form of blog entries, recipes, and restaurant reviews. Koreataste.org and Hansik.org were the first two government-run websites launched in 2010 to serve as an online forum about Korean food. Government-sanctioned educators, chefs, bloggers, food and hospitality industry experts, and celebrities contributed entries on these websites. While these efforts increased online content about Korean cuisine, it was only able to reach those who were actively seeking information about Korean food. To reach a broader audience, in 2013, government agencies started holding crowdsourcing competitions to recruit average individuals as Korean food missionaries.

In this section, I will examine three government-initiated crowdsourcing events to produce K-Food content that I have engaged with during my fieldwork: “My Korean Food,” the third annual 29-second film festival, sponsored by the Korea Food Foundation (KFF), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) competition “My Favorite Korean Food is... ,” and the

Seoul Metropolitan Government's (SMG) marketing campaign "Seoul! My New Fusion Recipe." I selected these three competitions to show a cross-section of events that aimed to recruit both domestic and international audiences as Korean food missionaries through discreet and overt ways. I will analyze the winning submissions to draw out the scope and content of user-generated global Korean cuisine. When possible, I will include data collected during participant observations in both actual and virtual sites of these competitions. I had varying levels of access to these events. For MOFA's "My Favorite Korean Food is...," I conducted a virtual analysis through its official website, YouTube, and social media sites. In the case of KFF's "My Korean Food," I attended a four-hour public event, which consisted of a Korean food tasting, lecture, screening of 10 finalists' submissions, and award ceremony. For SMG's "Seoul! My New Fusion Recipe," I obtained full access to the behind-the-scenes action by volunteering as a culinary tour guide for five days. I will begin my analysis with discreet recruitment of Korean food missionaries by examining competitions sponsored by MOFA and KFF before considering SMG's overt recruitment.

#### **A. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "My Favorite Korean Food Is..."**

In June 2013, the MOFA announced a video contest about Korea for foreigners to be held in partnership with Arirang TV (a Korean English-language channel). The submissions were to be three minutes long and either on the topic of Korean people or Korean food. Hence, the two prompts for the competition were "My best Korean food is..." and "My favorite Korean food is..." According to MOFA, the contest was a part of "public diplomacy aimed at improving foreigners' understanding of and closeness to Korea through social media (SNS)" (Press Release, 06/18/2013). The competition was exclusively for foreigners to introduce various aspects of Korea perceived through their eyes. The top-ten winning submissions not only would receive

airtime on Arirang TV but also be circulated through YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook. The contest instructions state, “Please introduce your favorite Korean food and tell us why it is your favorite. In addition, please share any experience you may have with cooking it or if you have your own special recipe” (Press Release, 06/18/2013). The competition also emphasized that the videos could be made with any digital device such as cellphones, digital cameras, and video cameras. The open-ended nature of the topics and low technological barriers sought to mobilize a wide range of submissions.

The competition had a total of 464 individual submissions from 85 countries. Of the top-ten winning videos, only three were about Korean food. Participants representing Guatemala, El Salvador, and the US submitted the winning videos about Korean food. I will analyze each submission, from the highest ranking, to compare and contrast the narratives of the depicted Korean food. The video from the Guatemalan contestants introduces *haemul pajeon* (scallion pancakes). The video is filmed in a small studio and features two men, Keat and Chang, who appear to be in their early twenties. Keat assists Chang in this clip by asking him to introduce the dish, ingredients, cultural significance, and a restaurant in Seoul where one can try *pajeon*. Next, Chang demonstrates how to make the dish at home and explains why it is his favorite Korean food. He says, “What I love about *pajeon* is that it is a really delicious dish, simple to make, and doesn’t take a lot of ingredients, and it’s not expensive at all. Plus, it’s a very social food. It’s great to have with your friends and great to have it with *makgeolli*!” (2:37-2:59). The cultural significance of *pajeon* is described as a comfort food that people crave on rainy days and that are paired with *makgeolli* (Korean rice wine). The recipe he shares with the viewers is a standard one consisting of prepared frying batter mix, egg, water, scallions, and squid. This submission’s presentation style is formal since the two men address the audience directly as if they are hosting

a cooking show and give information on how to make, eat, and enjoy the dish. In contrast, the submission by El Salvadorans does not provide any direct visual access to the two women who made the video. The viewer meets them only through their voices as they introduce themselves in Korean as Karla (25 year-old) and Ericka (22 year-old) from El Salvador. The video is edited to create the illusion that the ingredients of the El Salvadoran fusion gimhap (seaweed wrapped rice rolls) are turning into the dish without any human input. At first, a ball of rice rolls out onto a piece of seaweed and is flattened out to cover the entire surface. Each ingredient appears in turn and takes its place on top of the rice and then all are magically rolled together. The video explains that gimhap is Karla and Ericka's favorite Korean food because it is healthful, versatile, easy to prepare, and delicious. Compared to the two clips submitted by participants representing South American countries, the video by two American brothers, Jamin and James, offers a very personal explanation about their favorite Korean food. The video shows the two brothers in Korea eating samgyeopsal (grilled pork belly) with friends and family on various occasions while Jamin narrates the significance of this dish. Jamin states, "Samgyeopsal is more than just food. It's about showing the shared experiences that make us human. It creates friendships across age, gender, nationality, and even generations. And there is nothing more Korean than this" (2:10-2:37). The emphasis on the role of sharing samgyeopsal to reinforce bonds among individuals and groups portrays the Korean dish as a mediator of human relationships.

The common narratives that emerge in these winning videos are that Korean food is healthful, delicious, and social. The videos also feature versatile Korean foods that are likely to be localized, an appealing aspect to a global audience. For example, since *pajeon* is essentially a savory pancake, ingredients that can be added are open to the consumer's preference. Another commonality among these submissions is that young adults introduce Korean food as something

fun and easy to make. These representations are closely aligned with the government's intended brand image of Korean cuisine. Although there are no explicit explanations about the judging process, it is possible to deduce the general criteria that the winning videos about Korean food articulate a personal connection to Korea and present Korean food as approachable and universally appealing. By voluntarily participating in this competition, these average individuals assumed the role of promoting Korean food to a global audience. It is important to note that there is the fine print of the contest announcement: "Prize-winning works may be utilized for the promotion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. The copyright of the submitted works becomes the property of the Ministry" (MOFA Press Release 06/18/2013). Therefore, I argue that the participants were interpellated as Korean food missionaries to advance the government's goal to increase state-sanctioned K-Food content online. Although this competition was aimed to increase circulation of Korean food, it fell short of this goal as each of the three videos only received 128, 216, and 250 total views on YouTube, respectively.

#### **B. Korean Food Foundation: 29-Second Film Festival "My Korean Food"**

From September 27<sup>th</sup> to October 17<sup>th</sup>, KFF co-sponsored a crowdsourcing competition with Korea Economic Daily under the theme "My Korean Food." The competition was launched to increase domestic support and global awareness about K-Food. The competition was divided into two divisions: youth and general public. Since its inception in 2011, the 29-second film festival has been composed of monthly submissions using new media technologies as well as large-scale annual competitions. It operates as an open platform to discover future young directors in Korea. In 2013, KFF expanded the scope of the target participants to foreigners. In order to encourage foreign participation, the organizers provided free classes on how to produce films and operated an editing center exclusively for foreigners (29-Second Film Festival 2013).



The judging process involved both general votes cast by viewers (40%) and an expert panel of judges (60%). A total of 196 videos (78 in youth group and 118 in general group) were submitted. The guidelines for the competition instructed to create a 29-second film about what Korean food means to the participant. The sharing of personal stories in this competition discreetly hails participants as Korean food missionaries.

On October 26<sup>th</sup>, a live award ceremony took place to recognize the top-five films in each division. The ceremony consisted of a K-Food party for foreigners, raffles, lecture by a famous Korean film director, screening of 20 submissions, and three K-Pop performances. For the purpose of this paper, I will analyze the grand prize for each division: “Ms. Kim, her Fatal Charm” (youth division), which received 54 online votes, and “Spicy but Once Again” (general division), which received 72 online votes. In “Ms. Kim, her Fatal Charm,” a Caucasian man and a black man are shown fighting over the last of seaweed in a Tupperware. The black man, Lincoln, is heard saying to himself, “Man vs. man. I can’t lose now. He’s got a pretty strong grip though. Lincoln, you can do this. I have to protect Ms. Kim at all cost.” Lincoln loses the standoff and the Caucasian man snatches the seaweed and stuffs it into his mouth. According to the director, the video was inspired by a word play because seaweed is pronounced as *gim* in Korean and Kim is the most common Korean last name. In “Spicy but Once Again,” a couple, a woman who is a Korean from overseas and a Korean man, negotiates their relationship through Korean food by accommodating each person’s preference of spiciness. The woman rejects the spicy Korean stew her boyfriend serves her by saying in English, “Hey, I grew up abroad, no spicy foods. Sorry.” After some contemplation, the woman finds a recipe for *tteokbokki* (spicy rice cakes) on Taste of Korea, the official KFF website, and cooks the dish. She presents it to her boyfriend, saying, “I’ve made it for you, it’s really spicy.” The boyfriend responds by taking out

a non-spicy version (royal court rice cakes) for her. According to the director, in order to succeed at globalizing Korean food, Koreans need to consider what the world wants rather than insisting on what Koreans think appropriate.

The two winning videos are mostly in English with Korean subtitles and the only ones out of the top-ten submissions that feature the intended audience of the government's campaign to globalize Korean cuisine. The common narratives in the two winning videos are that Korean food can be eaten and enjoyed by a global audience, directly serves the government agenda. In "Ms. Kim, her Fatal Charm," the two men are native English teachers at the director's high school and in "Spicy but Once Again," the woman is portrayed as a second-generation Korean who was born and raised abroad. For "Spicy but Once Again," a direct reference to the KFF website, the official portal for the Korean government campaign, may have increased its chance of winning. The website is reported to have cost approximately USD 1 million, which has sparked intense criticism among Korean taxpayers as an example of frivolous government spending. By showing how the KFF website can be used effectively, the film validates the exorbitant cost of creating the website. In his acceptance speech, the director of "Spicy but Once Again" revealed that his strategy was to visit the KFF website to analyze its vision and activities to tailor his submission accordingly. This video legitimizes KFF's overall authority as the official institute to globalize Korean food.

### **C. Seoul Metropolitan Government: "Seoul! My New Fusion Recipe"**

From August 22<sup>nd</sup> to September 25<sup>th</sup> 2013, SMG held a crowdsourcing contest on YouTube for non-Koreans to create a fusion dish that incorporates their national cuisine with Korean food. SMG announced the criteria for winning submissions as "the number of views (30%), the number of 'upvotes' (10%), and the evaluation of an expert judging panel (60%)"

(SMG Website 2013). From approximately 100 submissions, the five finalists represented Canada, Morocco, Vietnam, Malaysia, and China. Some of the fusion dishes among the finalists were Moroccan spiced *bibimbap* and Vietnamese rice paper rolls with *bulgogi* and *kimchi*. It is important to note that all the finalists operate their own popular cooking channels on YouTube. Each finalist's video introduces the fusion dish and shows a step-by-step cooking process.

The five YouTubers and their teammates were brought to Seoul for a five-day culinary tour before the final competition, which took place at City Hall and aired live. During the tour, the finalists learned how to make *kimchi* and *pajeon*, dressed up in traditional Korean dress, and visited a traditional open-air market to purchase ingredients for the cook-off. These activities were specifically designed to cultivate these finalists as Korean food missionaries. A camera crew followed the group's every move and made it a priority to capture each member's reaction when a new food item was introduced. At each meal, different dishes were introduced to broaden the finalists' conception of Korean food. For eight participants, it was their first time to visit Korea and for five of this group even the first time tasting Korean food. Since the majority of them had no prior knowledge or experience of Korean food, they researched recipes available online before creating a fusion recipe. By the end of the trip, the participants were able to identify ingredients, types of dishes, and flavor profiles of representative Korean food. Direct exposure to the culinary culture proved effective in converting these finalists into Korean food missionaries. At the final cook-off, the Malaysian husband-and-wife team received the grand prize for their interpretation of *samgyaetang* (Korean ginseng chicken soup). While the other contestants' dishes incorporated flavors, ingredients, and presentation styles representative of respective national cuisine, the winning dish was the least "fusion." Corn and parsnip, which are not particularly Malaysian ingredients, are added to the soup instead of ginseng. The fact that the

husband is a professional chef and the couple is planning on opening a pan-Asian restaurant may have contributed to their victory because the couple is likely to show tangible results after winning the state-funded contest.

Many of the finalists expressed enthusiasm about the prospect of incorporating Korean flavors and techniques in their cooking repertoires. Some also felt a sense of responsibility for educating their YouTube subscribers to authentic Korean food. As one finalist said while posting a photo of *pajeon* on Facebook, “My fans think I am their hero! Because of me, everyone now wants to come to Korea.” The post quickly received 112 “likes” within a few hours along with words of encouragement. Other finalists sought out opportunities to collaborate with the organizers or the government. After receiving a certificate that pronounced each participant as a Korean food missionary, one finalist said, “I’d be willing to do a series that introduces Korea with the government. I think it would be a great opportunity for both parties.” Another asked with a twinge of skepticism, “Do you think the government will really follow up with us so we can play a larger role in promoting Korean food? I would really like to be a part of that but I’m not sure if they really care.” These participants’ expectations of future collaborations with the government or are not unreasonable given that they were initially contacted by a representative of SMG to participate in the competition. Follow-up interviews with the finalists also revealed that to their great disappointment, SMG had not pursued any joint projects or further communication after the competition. According to SMG officials, the competition was meant to be a one-time engagement to meet the program quotas for the year. They also explained that due to the rotation of government posts every two years, it is challenging to maintain consistency in planning events (Interviews, November 15, 2013).

#### **IV. Conclusion**

The Korean government's push to increase online K-Food content serves two major interests. The first is to enhance its image by repackaging its culinary culture to appeal to a global audience and the second is to cultivate a wider consumer base to ensure the popularity of Korean food worldwide. The official policy to meet these objectives were geared toward transforming culinary culture into a digital product to take advantage of the resources and platforms provided by the first generation of *Hallyu*. Since global media platforms were identified as the most effective way to generate a global following of Korean food, crowdsourcing competitions became part of the official government strategy.

The use of culture to brand the nation makes it difficult to discern the scope and force of state power because soft power circulates through less transparent channels and can be perceived as innocuous. In this paper, I have demonstrated how state power works through crowdsourcing competitions hosted by institutions such as MOFA, KFF, and SMG. The Korean government recruits average individuals to create the illusion that the online K-Food content is organically produced; this method seems to reflect diverse opinions and provide an open platform to construct a global Korean cuisine. Based on this fact, it is possible to argue that crowdsourcing competitions are an example of a bottom-up approach in defining global Korean cuisine. It turns out, however, that the governing agencies controlled the content and scope of the submissions to maximize their self-interest, which results in a hybrid model that melds bottom-up and top-down approaches. This hybrid model in the production of digital K-Food content generates a common thread among winning submissions that depict a fun and trendy image of Korea. This demonstrates that in these crowdsourcing events, the winning submissions were selected on the strength of their ability to reproduce the key ideologies of the state.

The new division of labor produced in state-sponsored crowdsourcing events is essentially the outsourcing of the task of promoting Korean national interests to a global netizen community. The use of the Internet ultimately expands the power of the Korean government for the possibility of reaching potential governable subjects. With new media channels, the government is able to create a common sociality, in this case a global Korean cuisine, by recruiting global subjects as Korean food missionaries from beyond its territorial boundaries. Therefore, the inclusion of non-national individuals as governable subjects has become vital to the reification and survival of the contemporary nation-state. Yet, my research shows that the production of Korean food missionaries presents a problem in official policy to globalize Korean cuisine. By submitting personally created digital content to the crowdsourcing events, individuals become not only invested in the nation-building project but also assume a sense of personal responsibilities as Korean food missionaries. In theory, this is the ideal outcome of a crowdsourcing competition, but in reality, the Korean government may incite conflict and disappointment in participants in the long run because it appears that the government is not interested in fostering collaborative relationships with them. Since the competitions are staged as a platform where individuals can freely contribute to collectively improve and create a global Korean cuisine, they may be led to believe that their participation in this community will benefit them. They do not seem to realize that these competitions are a form of cultural propaganda, initially masking the fact that the party benefiting mostly from crowdsourcing is ultimately the state.

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# **The Nixon Doctrine and Its Impacts on the U.S. Relations with Asian Allies (South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines)**

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This paper investigates the relationships between the U.S. and three of its Asian-Pacific allies – South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines – following a big shift in U.S. policy towards the region, namely the Nixon Doctrine, during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Targeted as applicants of the Nixon Doctrine, these three allies are also target countries of this paper, due to their relatively deep involvement in the Vietnam War. Since 1964, with the U.S. call upon allies for “more flags in Vietnam,” South Korean, Thai and Filipino combat troops began to be dispatched to South Vietnam to assist the Americans and Saigon government. Participating in the War was synonymous with three countries’ implications in U.S. military operations in Southeast Asian region. Consequently, unlike other U.S. allies, such as Taiwan or Indonesia, those who did not deeply involve in the War by sending troops to the country, these three allies faced problems upon U.S. new policy of military retreat from Asia and withdrawal from Vietnam.

## *The Nixon Doctrine in Asia*

With the inauguration of President Nixon, the U.S. had been committed heavily to the defense of Asians for a period of some eight-teen years. This commitment carried it into the Korean War, hostilities in the Formosa Straits, and, most importantly, a long drawn-out and controversial war in Indochina. It had involved billions of dollars in terms of military expenditures and war casualties of more than a half million Americans. By January 1969, the Vietnam War had absorbed some 530,000 U.S. military personnel and was costing on average USD 2,500 million a month.<sup>1</sup> The expenditure was causing domestic inflation and weakening the dollar year by year, and finally led to its devaluation in 1971. Yet there was neither peace nor settlement. The criticism of U.S. Asian policy had grown to the point where the election of 1968 constituted virtually a mandate that Nixon should bring the war to a conclusion. President Nixon had, in his campaign, promised to end the Vietnam War.

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<sup>1</sup> *Annual Report for Fiscal Year*, Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), p. 15.

As a result, President Nixon in 1969 in Guam announced the Nixon Doctrine. Its ultimate goal was U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam quagmire under the principle of “Asianize the Asian problems.” In the other words, Asian problems must be addressed by Asians, and the problem of Vietnam must be solved by the Vietnamese. The Doctrine’s flexibility and pragmatism was furthered by Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs’ *Realpolitik*. The Doctrine had three implications for Asian allies.

First was U.S. under-involvement and military retreat from Asia. The number of U.S. servicemen in Vietnam was rapidly declined in accordance with declined cost for the war. U.S. servicemen were withdrawn home, mainly from Thailand and the Philippines. Although the scale of U.S. forces withdrawal was not large, it was a big shock for countries sending troops to Vietnam, since they have conducted bandwagon policy towards their patron state.

However, the problem was that Nixon Doctrine sought to achieve two incompatible tasks: the decrease of American military forces and the continuation of security commitment. This paradox attribute to what Robert Litwak called the “ambiguity” of Nixon Doctrine.<sup>2</sup> Various interpretations of it led to misunderstanding. Military retreat and low involvement by the U.S. would generate fears to many Asian states, but simultaneously they would be relieved due to the guarantee of maintained commitments. Thus, there were ambivalent feelings toward U.S. foreign policy among Asian political leaders: to prepare for upcoming withdrawal of American men and diminishing engagement or to believe that the U.S. would never betray Asian friends.

Second was a call for self-reliance to Asian allies. For U.S. policymakers, the decline of influence was directly linked to giving more autonomy and independence to Asian allies. They were convinced that most of Asian states suffice to deal with their domestic problems by themselves. Based on this judgment was the remarkable growth of Asian states after achieving their sovereignty. They did not fall into Communist subversion, launched economic development, and even started to form regional organizations themselves.<sup>3</sup> This call for self-reliance was not confined to security issues, but economic self-reliance as well.

Finally was the signal of decline of Cold War confrontation and the opening of *détente*.

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<sup>2</sup> Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), pp.123-124.

<sup>3</sup> See “Message from President Nixon to the Congress, Washington, September 15, 1970,” in *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. I, No. 70.

The internal disunion within Communist bloc including the Sino-Soviet split made U.S. policymakers doubt on monolithic Communism. No longer after Kissinger's visit to China and the Sino-U.S. summit between Nixon and Mao Zedong was the Moscow visit by Nixon and U.S. delegates in May 1972. This sudden shift of U.S. policy towards Communist giants was quite sensitive problem for Asian allies, especially on China issue. Because of geographic proximity, many Asian political leaders had felt more threat or fears of Chinese Communists than the U.S.

It should be noted that not all of above three implications were well informed and consulted with Asian allies. As a result, anxiety and suspicion was raised among leaders in Asia, which actuated their responses to steps taken by the U.S. Also, the Doctrine itself carried many vague points, reflecting its flexible nature. Misunderstandings between the two sides led to allies' unwanted responses, which are demonstrated in this paper accidental results of the Nixon Doctrine.

### *Unexpected Responses from Asian Allies*

#### **a) South Korea**

The impact of Nixon Doctrine was largest for South Korea, whose security had been heavily dependent upon U.S. military presence and assistance. American presence was widely understood as the symbol of the U.S. security commitment to the country. The value South Koreans attached to it, therefore, was so great that the Park government sent its combat troops to Vietnam in 1965 primarily to prevent U.S. troops in Korea from relocating to the more urgent battlefield in Southeast Asia. Thus, the decision of the U.S. to withdraw United States Forces Korea (USFK) was a "profound shock" to President Park Chung Hee.<sup>4</sup>

As the result, South Korean sense of urgency of becoming self-reliant in national defense increased. Since early 1970, President Park repeatedly emphasized the importance of self-reliant defense, as well as of maintaining "absolute superiority to North Korea in armed strength."<sup>5</sup> Park, thus, suggested to "hurry the modernization of armed forces and intensify real-combat-like military training, establish the mobilization system of the two million-strong Homeland Reserve Force, and build defense industries."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> *FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 1*, Document No. 57.

<sup>5</sup> "President's New Year's Message: Self-Sufficiency, Pursuit of Unification Goals of '70s," *The Korea Herald*, January 1, 1970, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

Nevertheless, despite his emphasis on self-reliance of national defense, Park Chung Hee did not intend to sacrifice the alliance with the U.S. Moreover, Park demanded that the U.S. government provide massive support for the modernization of the Korean armed forces as a precondition for the reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Korea. As this demonstrates, Park knew that his policy towards self-reliance required American support and that such support could be available for South Korea only because of ROK-U.S. alliance relationship. Even though Park agreed to the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1971, his conviction that self-reliance and alliance with the U.S. should go hand in hand did not alter.

By early 1971, Park Government faced many problems in-side-out. The U.S. completed the unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 men from South Korea, bringing U.S. forces levels in Korea to 42,000, while pressuring Park to maintain more than 45,000 ROK troops in South Vietnam.<sup>7</sup> The military cutbacks were paralleled by a decline in U.S. economic aid to Korea. After the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine, economic assistance gradually shifted from mostly grants to loans. President Park, who had become dependent on preferential economic measures in order to shore up his base of popular support, realized that he must find a remedy to reserve his economic achievements.

Before Nixon's historic trip to Beijing, Park repeatedly sent senior officials to Washington to implore Nixon for a meeting prior to Nixon's arrival in China. However, what Park received was a frank refusal from the U.S. government. Park had no choice but try to save face and prevent political critics from losing American support. In December 1971, a State of National Emergency on 6 December was decreed, using Northern threat as a pretext, in order to fend off the predicted fallout of political criticism. Before the declaration of martial law on 17 October 1972, the full text of it was sent to State Department and immediately declassified by Nixon administration due to criticisms on Nixon's foreign policy. Park government then decided to remove offensive passages in the first version of proclamation to exchange for agreement of the U.S. "to make positive public statement respecting martial law declaration which was essentially internal ROK mater."<sup>8</sup> Finally martial law was declared without Park's criticism on Nixon's foreign policy and in return, the Nixon administration made no criticism of Park's turn to increased authoritarianism.

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<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense Manpower Data Center and Stanley Robert Larsen & James Lawton Collins, Jr., *Allied Participation in Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985), p.23

<sup>8</sup> Secretary's Conversation with Ambassador Kim on Martial Law, October 17, 1972," in *FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XIX, Part I*, No. 161.

On 4 July 1972, Park and North Korean officials surprised the world by publicly announcing that basic agreements had been reached concerning reunification. Whether the North-South Dialogue was an expression of moral protest against Washington's abrupt change of policy towards China, or a leverage to thwart American forces retreat from Korea, or both, it did show the U.S. how a weaker ally could challenge its patron.

In the case of South Korea, we clearly see the Nixon Doctrine's impact on President Park calculations and decisions. In the face of U.S. under-involvement in Asia, Park promoted South Korean self-reliant path of development, since it was "already over that small states solve their security problems by relying on a certain Great powers... [South Korea's] security should not be subject to the U.S."<sup>9</sup> In Park's viewpoint, security and self-reliance were inseparable. By making self-defense as a choice for self-reliance, Park was possible to fill the military vacuum, modernize Korea's defensive capabilities and show the U.S. Korea's efforts for self-reliance. By the end of 1971, Nixon was actively pursuing policies that endanger South Korea's security. The rapprochement between the U.S. and Communist China, the American retreat from Vietnam and the U.S. failure to protect China's seat in the United Nations are among the headaches which attributed for Park's initiative of North-South Dialogue and 1972 Declaration of Martial Law. Yet for all of his indignation toward Nixon and the U.S., Park still desired American political support and sensitive to American needs. Korean government made several concessions in order to preserve U.S.-South Korea alliance, since it was crucial to the country's security and overall development.

#### **b) Thailand**

Thailand, of all the Southeast Asia states outside Indochina, was most alarmed by the prospect of a diminished U.S. role in the region. The Thais feared that the U.S. troops might withdraw entirely from the area, leaving Thailand's vulnerable borders more exposed than ever. In the case of Thailand, how Thai government interpreted the Nixon Doctrine was the key to understand the country's response to it. At the time of Nixon's White House, Thanat Khoman served as Foreign Minister and Thanom Kittikachorn as Prime Minister of Thailand. The differences between these two major figures in Thai government led to contradictories in the country's foreign policies towards the U.S. Their divergent perceptions and responses towards U.S. new Asian policy also led to the 1971 military coup, which dismissed Thanat

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<sup>9</sup> "Presidential Press Conference – Questions, Answers," *The Korea Herald*, January 12, 1972, p. 2. See also *The Korea Times*, the same day.

Khoman and made Thanom Kittkachorn the new Foreign Minister of Thailand.

At first, Bangkok began casting about for alternatives to its overdependence on the U.S. Thailand announced plans to pull its forces out of Vietnam and talks were initiated to remove all U.S. forces from the country. Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman also tried to improve Thai relations with China and North Vietnam. In early 1971, Thailand announced its support for Chinese admission to the United Nations, having voted against such a move in 1966, 1968 and 1969. It also sent a trade mission to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Thais urged regional effort to help fill the vacuum being left by the departing Americans, especially in transforming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) into a regional military alliance.

Apparently contradictory to his Foreign Minister's standpoint, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn still entrusted Thai national security to the U.S. The most obvious is his policy in delaying Thai troops withdrawal from South Vietnam and not until early 1972 that the withdrawal was executed. The Bangkok government also enthusiastically supported the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970. Thanom Kittikachorn even offered to send Thai troops into Cambodia to replace US forces in April 1970 incursion.

In November 1971 Thanom Kittikachorn staged a coup against his own government and abolished the constitution. The coup reflected the turmoil in the political scene and also the determination of the military junta to pursue without hindrance a foreign policy that accord with U.S. policy. Nixon government considered the coup as a positive sign to abolish Thanat Khoman, "whose moves to make contacts with Peking have drawn criticism,"<sup>10</sup> and decided to remain silent on the 1971 coup, impulsing Thanom to the next stage of authoritarianism.

Despite the feeling of uncertainty was growing and the coming conclusion of the Paris Accords, the Thai military leaders opened the country freely to the U.S. without perceiving new political realities. It seems that the Thanom Kittikachorn government was trapped by an unequivocal commitment to the U.S. in the Vietnam War, which did not allow the Thai military to adjust themselves easily in the new situation. The Thai government still believed that the stationing of U.S. forces would obligate the U.S. to protect Thailand. Yet the October 1973 uprising, which led to the collapse of military rule in Thailand without U.S. intervention

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<sup>10</sup> "Ambassador Unger's Report on Coup in Thailand, Memorandum From Kissinger to President Nixon, November 17, 1971," in *FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XX*, No. 143.



to sustain the regime, elucidated everything.

In the Thailand case, the Nixon Doctrine brought about many changes as well as crises for Thai foreign policies and political environment. Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman saw the Doctrine a reflection of U.S. incredibility and looked to regionalism as a potential substitute for the waning American presence. He also sought reinsurance with China and Communist states. However, Thanat Khoman had failed in persuading his Prime Minister and the military of the potential Thai development and security without U.S. assistance and protection. Meanwhile, strong alliance with the U.S. was what Thanom Kittikachorn believed crucial to ensure the future of Thailand. The 1971 military coup was his solution to the problem of trust in the U.S. commitments. Thus, Thailand after the coup continued to deeply involve in the Indochina War and opened its military bases available for the U.S. even after the Paris Accords conclusion. The only convergence between two figures was their pursuit of détente with the Communist side, mostly Peking and Hanoi. This is due to considerations of Thailand's long-range interests and domestic security, which incited both Thanat and Thanom to do so, as the Americans were gradually departing from Asia. The only difference between them was their perception on Thai long-time patron and hence, their choice of remedy for the problem: self-reliance versus strong alliance with the U.S.

### **c) The Philippines**

Since the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, the U.S. had actively committed to Filipino security affairs, which consolidated the two countries' "special relationship." Faced with international changes toward thawing, President Ferdinand Marcos, a strong nationalist who had criticized Filipino overdependence on the U.S., accentuated the necessity of the Philippines in searching for new way of foreign policy. As soon as being elected, Marcos decided to rearrange the existing security ties with the U.S. He sought to accelerate self-defense program and to reassess U.S.-related security pacts. He also recognized the urgent need for a re-examination of military bases and placed national interests at the very first priority in his foreign policy after the U.S. policy change.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, although Marcos had sent more than ten thousand Filipinos to South Vietnam, he as soon as November 1969 planned to withdraw these men home. Interestingly, President Marcos also planned to "transfer" U.S. allowances in support of the PHILCAG-V (Philippine

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<sup>11</sup> Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Revolution from the Center: How the Philippines is Using Martial Law to Build a New Society*, (Hongkong: Raya Books, 1978), p. 80.

Civic Action Group-Vietnam), Philippine operations in South Vietnam, for other purposes such as “security matters.” He mentioned “peacemaking efforts, travels of emissaries (to Paris and Hanoi), efforts in South Vietnam to make contact with the Viet Cong”<sup>12</sup> as examples of such matters. This move by Marcos clearly shows his efforts to extract as much as possible U.S. money and aid for his own plans and aims.

The same to South Korea’s Park Chung Hee and Thailand’s Thanom Kittikachorn, Ferdinand Marcos implemented alternative to cope with the new situation. Martial law and an overall socioeconomic reform under the “New Society” was Philippine President’s measure due to the nation’s domestic crisis for years. Before declaring martial law in September 1972, Marcos was severely faced with dual social disorders. One was social, economic and political problems in Filipino society. The other was domestic rebellion by Communist armed forces such as New People’s Army (NPA) and Muslim insurgents. The construction of New Society was the highest rationale for him to impose martial law, overcome these two difficulties, and was fundamental for the Philippines to have self-reliant capacities to surmount its overdependence on the U.S.

The U.S. decided to make “no comment” on Marcos’ action, regarding it as a Philippine matter. To Henry Kissinger, such U.S. non-reaction “should result in [Marcos’] continued cooperation in maintaining effective access to [U.S.] bases in the Philippines and his assistance in resolving U.S. private investment problems.”<sup>13</sup> Marcos then continuously advertised the Philippines in various U.S. newspapers to attract foreign investment into his country. In similar manner, the U.S. government increased spectacularly its economic and military assistance to the Philippines.

Similarly to South Korea and Thailand, the Philippines also made similar adjustments in its foreign policy toward Communist bloc. U.S. The Philippines established diplomatic relations with Romania and Yugoslavia in 1972. Relationship with Cuba was restored in September 1975 and diplomatic contact with China was established the same year.

In the case of the Philippines, the U.S. under-involvement under Nixon Doctrine gave the Philippines insurance for internal security. It is because the U.S. government maintained the

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<sup>12</sup> “Ambassador Byroade’s Conversation with President Marcos on PHILCAG Withdrawal, Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Staff to Kissinger, Washington, November 14, 1969,” in *FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XX*, No. 198.

<sup>13</sup> “Philippine President Imposes Martial Law, Memorandum From Kissinger to President Nixon, September 23, 1972,” in *FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XX*, No. 260.

level of support and aid to Filipino government to eliminate internal threat, and continually involved in domestic situation, both before and after the proclamation of martial law. The ultimate goal of Marcos' martial law was to eradicate social chaos and to restore domestic order. Thus, it is fair to say that the continuation of military and economic assistance program by the U.S. reinforced Marcos' authoritative drive. President Marcos saw in U.S. new foreign policy towards Asia a great opportunity to adjust Philippine unequal and over-dependent relationships with the U.S. and dictate various new policies, including New Society program and enthusiastic détente with Communist countries. The Doctrine also paved the way for Marcos to turn Filipino security umbrella – the U.S. – to merely an economic one. Thus, it is not an exaggeration when saying that Marcos and the Philippines enjoyed much from the Nixon Doctrine's impact on the country.

### *Allies' Responses: Commonalities*

The Nixon Doctrine brought about three common responses among three Asian allies. The first was their efforts in building national self-reliance, which finally led to authoritarianism. In the face of U.S. under-involvement, all three countries sought to develop a self-reliant path in military and economic process. Unfortunately, the road to self-reliance ignited authoritarianism, one of accidental results of the Nixon Doctrine. There was an execution of martial law in South Korea in October 1972, a military coup in Thailand in November 1971 and another martial law in the Philippines in September 1972. All of the moves to authoritarianism prolonged and strengthened the leaders' power greatly and were consulted beforehand with as well as supported after execution by the U.S. However, such moves were absolutely out of Nixon administration's expectations. Although there was a call for self-reliance among allies by the U.S., it did not imply encouragement of dictatorship. In fact, in these three cases, allies presented the U.S. with a *fait accompli* which provided very little option for the U.S. but supporting authoritarian regimes and seeking side-benefits from it.

The second was their efforts in preserving U.S. umbrella. Nixon Doctrine's first and foremost principle is military retreat. However, beyond initial anticipation, it took the U.S. much more time and efforts to withdraw from Asia. This was mainly due to allies' efforts in preserving their long-time umbrella, which themselves considered vital to their national security and economic development. President Park Chung Hee succeeded in using hard bargain to postpone U.S. troop withdrawal from Korean peninsula for two years. Thai Prime Minister even sent troops to Cambodia and staged a military coup to prolong its special

relationship with the U.S.

For their parts, Asian allies showed willingness to meet their patron's needs and preferences. Several measures were used, which the key was delay or avoidance in withdrawing troops from South Vietnam. Not until 1973 that allied troops were completely withdrawn and South Korea's combat troops even remained in Vietnam until March 1973, two months after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. Another measure was to make available local military bases for the Americans. This kind of response made it harder for the U.S. to withdraw from Asia and somehow pushed the Nixon administration deeper in the Indochina War and military operations in the region. This is mainly because parallel with allies' enthusiasm was their efforts in bargaining and extracting U.S. economic and military aid, at the same time support for authoritarian regimes. For this reason this kind of allies' efforts may be considered unwanted by the U.S.

Final was their efforts in engaging Communist states. As described earlier, Seoul tried to come close to Pyongyang and Bangkok and Manila found ways to engage Peking and Hanoi. This was another accidental result of the Nixon Doctrine, for the significant reason that those détente efforts from allies were taken largely out of fear stemming from secret American performance in Peking. It should be also noted that the Doctrine's initial intention was to trigger regional cooperation among Asian states. The U.S. concern and unease on this trend of allied countries was reasonable, since they were among the most anti-Communist leaders and governments in Asia (accounting for America's back for them).

In short, the U.S. under-involvement followed by Nixon Doctrine and détente with China opened the opportunity for governments in Asia to rearrange their asymmetric relationships with the U.S. and to diversify diplomatic relations with other states, regardless of ideologies. The U.S. was pushed to passive situations by allies' self-movements and reacted uncomfortably with doubts and concerns.

### *Allies' Responses: Differences*

Although three cases responded to the Nixon Doctrine quite similarly, there are differences among them within the same kind of response. In self-reliant efforts, the case of Thailand reveals more complicated situation. While self-reliance in South Korea and the Philippines was initiated, upheld and improved by the same leaders, Thai efforts was interrupted and discontinued by the 1971 military coup. The coup destroyed almost Thanat

Khoman's achievements for a more dependent Thai foreign policy and overall development. Thailand since the coup became heavily dependent on and implicated in the U.S. policies for military activities in both Thailand and Indochina. The road to authoritarianism in Thailand, as a result, was somewhat different to other two cases. However, the same logic is found: Intentions of self-reliance triggered dictatorship in all three countries. Moreover, on the road to dictatorship, three countries produced different types of authoritarianism. South Korea and Thailand, due to the security vacuum in face of Communist neighbors that Nixon Doctrine brought about, produced military authoritarianism. Meanwhile, without any external threat around neighboring countries, the Philippines produced socioeconomic authoritarianism.

In efforts to preserve U.S. umbrella, the Philippines was the one who made the less endeavors in supporting American policies in Asia. The Marcos government not only sent the least combat troops to South Vietnam but also pull them back home the earliest. All in all, the Filipinos were primarily engaged in medical and other civilian pacification projects in Vietnam. What the Philippine government in fact produced was surprisingly little support for the U.S. policies in Asia and abundant plans to maximize the benefits from its alliance with the superpower, especially in economic field. Therefore, it is fair to say that because of Nixon Doctrine's impact and allies' responses to it, the U.S. still served as a military umbrella for both South Korea and Thailand, but an economic umbrella for the Philippines.

In détente efforts, South Korea was the one that stands out compare to the other two cases, due to its low level in engaging Communist states. To this study's viewpoint, the 1972 North-South Korean Dialogue did not represent President Park's ambition for genuine détente. This conclusion comes from the fact that the negotiations for peace between two Koreas following the Dialogue were short-lived and of little avail. South Korea also did not show any interest in approaching Communist states aside from North Korea. Meantime, Thailand and the Philippines actively carried out détente with various socialist countries, especially China and Vietnam.

### *Conclusion*

As clearly shown, three target countries of the Doctrine – South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines – found themselves in the face of not only a foreign policy but also security crisis. They conducted a series of diplomatic countermoves to cope with the U.S. new strategy. Surprisingly, allies produced the same responses to the Doctrine, including (1) efforts in building national self-reliance, which finally led to authoritarianism; (2) efforts in preserving

U.S. umbrella and (3) efforts in engaging Communist states. These responses were accidental results of the Nixon Doctrine, rather than logical products of it.

There are slight differences among allies' responses in the levels of efforts and types of authoritarianism, because of two exterior factors: (1) different impacts of Nixon Doctrine and (2) different degree of Vietnam War involvement. The Nixon Doctrine generated threat for South Korean and Thai security of their Communist neighbors, while created opportunity for the Philippines to balance its security relations with the U.S. The two former nations were also deeply involved in the Indochina War while the later did little in Vietnam. Thus, South Korea and Thailand advocated military-dominated authoritarianism and clung to the U.S. as their military umbrella, while the Philippines produced socioeconomic authoritarianism and made the U.S. its economic umbrella. Also, whereas Thailand and the Philippines case yielded active détente with the Communists, South Korea's efforts were relatively weak.

Here we should go deeper into the drive of such unwanted outcomes of Nixon Doctrine. It seems like Nixon government did not aware of and pay due attention to situation in each country, as well as unique features of Asian leadership. For their own survival, using their troop presence in Indochina and military benefits they brought about for the U.S., they tried to take advantage of the alliances with the superpower, at the same time voiced their opinions and ventured their own plans. While the Nixon Doctrine brought about an uneasy feeling among Asian allies, in the same logic, they challenged back the U.S. government by implementing policies without prior consultation. In short, it was the U.S. subjective attitude and neglect of situation in East Asia during the process of substantial policy shift that resulted in unanticipated outcomes.

Nixon Doctrine's first critical legacy was its impulsion of dictatorship in Asia, which is mainly due to *Realpolitik* aspects of the Nixon Doctrine. In the face of increasing militarized and authoritarian regimes in East Asia, the Nixon government silently observed without intervention to the trend. It was because to U.S. policymakers, such trend was needed to protect national stability and hence, regional stability was assured. Again, it was Kissinger's *Realpolitik* considerations that ended the military rule in Thailand in 1973 uprising, without U.S. intervention to save the Thanom government. No matter what it was authoritarianism or the fall of a pro-American regime, the U.S. might turn a blind eye due to practical calculations of certain context. Therefore, it is fair to state that the rise of authoritarianism in East Asia in the late 1960s, early 1970s was stemmed from and attributed largely to the U.S. strategic plan for the region.

However, whereas Asian authoritarianism, at least to American point of view, was vital for national and regional stability, the U.S. might unable to deny a grave legacy of Nixon Doctrine, which influences still exist nowadays: weakened confidence among allies. Mutual confidence between the allies was considerably weakened during the process of negotiating issues related to U.S. under-involvement. U.S. credibility, thus, was fallen among allies. The bitterest lesson probably belongs to Thailand. After the fall of the military regime in 1973, the Thais no longer entrusted the country's future to the Americans and a deadline for U.S. withdrawal from Thailand was instantly set up.

From above accidental results, it is arguable that that the Doctrine failed in its basis of America's military retreat from Asia, at the same time strong alliances with Asian countries. The two incompatible tasks raised and solved by U.S. new foreign policy (the decrease of American military forces and the continuation of treaty commitment) were not fully achieved. The Doctrine was too dramatic in its impact and too uncertain in its real intention for U.S. allies in Asia to accept it easily. They, therefore, produced unexpected responses which challenged the Doctrine's success.

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## Symbolic Hegemony in Fatherland Nation: Two Perspectives and One Dream in Contemporary Korean Politics

This paper aims to understand the use of symbols by North Korea and their ultimate goal in the foreign policy making. North Korea has been using the symbolic politics towards South Korea especially from the Korean War or 'Fatherland Liberation War.' Question lies why are symbols important in the politics? What types of hegemony are getting priority in the North Korean politics? Review of literature shows that symbolically North Korea is known for the Communist state with *Juche* concept to dominate the masses through various propagandas. North and South Korea both wants the unification, for which North Korean *Juche* Constitution believes in one Korea. Similarly, South Korean government also hope for the unification through *Trustpolitik*, *Korea Institute of National Unification* project etc. But North Korea symbolically dominated the masses through *Chollima* movement in 1957, eliminating *Yannan* and *kapsan facton* in 1960s, introducing "revolutionary operas" or (*hukmyung kageuk*) in 1971-1973 and in 1980s introducing nuclear programme and *Juche* ideology to separate themselves from rest of the world. Hereditary rule of Kim family rule itself is a symbolically domination in politics, economy, socio-cultural life in North Korea and they want unification with their ideology. Recently North Korea only friend China have been seen in supporting the UN resolution which resulted into focus on its limitations. Hypothetically, "more the images produced and reproduced metaphors; leaders legitimised the revolution." The paper explains the North Korean choice during the foreign policy decision making. Such as, 1) Situational Choice during the time of Korean War, 2) Conditional Choice due to the xenophobia and 3) Discretionary Choice of North Korea for being instrumental rational actor.

Theoretically, the concept of *metaphor* has been used in politics; meaning to transfer symbol to other. Gramsci concept of organic intellectual shows the formation of hegemony through various strata of education in but at the same time; Foucault ideas of knowledge-power nexus have been genealogically present to ideologically dominate the masses through various symbols. Gramsci in his *Prison Notebook* highlights the concept of *hegemony* where it is more than a domination of culture, ideas and ideology. Gramsci also stated that hegemony is regulated by intellectuals. Gramsci also elaborates that there are educational strata or *Ceti* which help in producing hegemony. The knowledge of intellectuals, in short, becomes life of politics. The intellectual will create a passion to provide the motive for political and historical activity (Hoare, Quentin and Smith, Geoffrey N. (ed.) 1999). Leaders

ideas are simply carried by its citizen through activities of organic intellectuals and followers which acts as the guiding principle in fulfilling the wish of their leaders. Structures and superstructures form an 'historical bloc' which is commonly known as ideology (Hoare, Quentin and Smith, Geoffrey N. 1999: 690). It's also means unity between nature and spirit (structure and superstructure), unity of opposites and of distinct. Thus man is to be conceived as an historical bloc of purely individual and subjective element, where the individual is active in relationship (Hoare, Quentin and Smith, Geoffrey N. 1999: 681-282). Gramsci ideas was based on the Marx's notion of 'false consciousness', in which individual are ideologically blinded and they are dominated by the ideology. Gramsci gave the concept of hegemony to the process of ideological domination. He also elaborates by showing the states use the popular culture, mass media, education and religion to enforce the ideology. Thus, individual supports the system which does not support them. The composition of whole societies is in the integral part of the state where 'political society + civil society' and 'dictatorship + hegemony' works together hand in hand. The first term represents the element of force, coercion and domination and second terms represent the element of consent, persuasion and education (Gramsci 1975: 763-64; Hoare, Quentin and Smith, Geoffrey N., 1997: 789-92; Gramsci 1994: 65-68).

While Foucault understanding of power is neither by domination neither of actor nor by structure, but there are the knowledge which produce or handle the power. In his work on knowledge/power nexus, he states that there are multiple truths which are historically grounded in creating power. Foucault also critiques the truth and says that there are multiple truths if we analyse it genealogically (Koopman 2013: 88). Foucault argues in the concept of knowledge production. Knowledge as being a conjunction of power relation and information-seeking which he terms 'power / knowledge nexus (Mills, Sara 2003: 69). It is the regime of truth which always supports the selfish knowledge in dominating the system. Genealogy allows to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactics in archaeology of knowledge (Gordon, Colin (ed.) 1980: 1). Genealogy requires patience and a knowledge of details and it depends on a vast accumulation of sources (Foucault, Michel 1997: 140). A genealogy of knowledge will never confuse itself with a quest for their 'origin,' will neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. The repeated play of domination of certain individual over other in history can be only seen through genealogical process (Foucault, Michel 1997: 150).

### **Metaphors in Hegemony**

Symbols and metaphors are used interchangeably. Etymologically, the English word 'metaphor' came from the Greek word "*metaphora*" which means to 'carry on' or 'to transfer' or 'to apply.' Metaphors 'carry' meaning from one word, image or idea to the other. Metaphor is transfer or carried only through communication. This is also, in essence, the original meaning of the word 'communication' or *communis*, common or, in other words, let others participate, though whether and to what extent you are successful is difficult to determine (Beneke 1983: 127). Altman in *Communications 23* says that in his film viewing experience, visual metaphor are not only light and shadow but they are sound as well (Nichols 1985: 528).

The Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia states that 'hegemony' means the dominance of one group over another by supporting it with its legitimating norms and ideas (<http://www.britannica.com>). The term hegemony is described as dominant position of particular sets of ideas and it becomes the common sense through the propaganda. The term hegemon is also used to understand the actor or group to exercise the hegemonic power in spreading the hegemonic ideas. In the ancient Greek there was a dichotomy between political (constitutional) and despotic (dominating) rule. Thus hegemony is seen as an alliance of groups that share similar interests under the leadership of associate groups (Ehrenburg 1964; Sinclair 1968). This group exercises leadership over its allied group's exercises domination (Hoare, Quentin and Smith, Geoffrey N. 1971: 51-58). Thus after the split of two Korea, North Korea became the playing field of Symbolic hegemony in both the sides. During the Korean War it was the combine force of North Korea-China metaphors influencing the masses to legitimate the revolutions in North Korea. Thus, hegemony represents the dual nature of power such as force and consent both of which defines political action (Hoare, Quentin and Smith, Geoffrey N. 1971: 238).

### **Fatherland Liberation War**

The Pyongyang radio broadcasts in 1951 repeatedly identified as "the year of victory" in the Fatherland Liberation War or Korean War. Kim Il Sung New Year message widely broadcast, which says that many "hardships and bottlenecks" lie ahead. There was repeated emphasis to drive the Americans out of Korea. Pyongyang maintains the fiction of voluntary cooperation from Peiping but shows no references to that cooperation. Kim Il Sung in his New Year message address to "all men and officers of the Chinese volunteer units" but there is no number of "volunteers" (*Far East Survey* 5 January 1951). His New Year message was widely broadcasts during 1 to 9 January 1951 (*Far East Survey* 18 January 1951).

International Women's Day message to Stalin, Mao and Kim Il Sung, where the Korean women express their heartfelt gratitude for the support and pledge to do their utmost to achieve the final victory (*Far East Survey* 15 March 1951).

Radio Pyongyang's primary effort was to devote in North Korean activities to ensure the final victory. Soldiers are asked to fight harder, to crush the enemy without mercy; partisans are asked to harass the enemy's rear; farmers are urged to help restore transportation facilities and produce and store more food. In this way all Korean are asked to help each other and there are repeated references of the care of orphans, refugees and families of troops (*Far East Survey* 1 February 1951). A North Korean Military ACORN message of 1 February report shows that "Lee Sang-Jo had difficulties in his negotiation with the Chinese Government," and same official was having difficulties during the transfer from China to Korea of locomotives needed for moving the North Korean VI, VII and VIII Corps (*USSR Survey* 8 February 1951).

### **Evolution of ideological symbols**

Chronologically, Korean communism started from 1920s. Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in October 1917 and Bolshevik Revolution had little impact upon Koreans when they were under the Japanese rule. In January 1918, a Korean Bolshevik Party (KBP) was formed in Irkutsk in Western Siberia and in June 1918 a Korean Socialist Party (KSP) was formed in Khabarovsk in Eastern Siberia. Both aimed at national liberation from the Japanese imperialist rule. Latter group moved to Shanghai in 1919 joining hands with other Korean nationals and in 1925 the Korean Communist Party was formed (KCP) in Seoul (Kwon 2010: 286-287). In 1927, the KCP formed a united front of nationalist and in 1930 communist spread in countryside mobilising the peasant and labour groups. Thus in 1930s anti-Japanese Kim Il Sung was fighting against Japanese imperialist under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party. During 1941 to 1945, the anti-Japanese guerrilla activities led by Kim Il Sung were mostly based in the Soviet Union (Kwon 2010: 287). Result of this Kim Il Sung made North Korea pro USSR in 1948.

Communist organisation in South Korea led Pak Hon Young was outlawed by the South Korea and many left Seoul and took refuge in North Korea. At the end of the 1948 Soviet occupation forces withdrawn from North Korea and in June 1949, a unified, Communist Party, the Korean Workers Party (KWP) was established through merging both North and South communist parties. Therefore, Kim Il Sung was named as its Chairman and

Pak Hon Young as its Vice Chairman (Kwon 2010: 288). The Party membership increased from 0.0005 per cent (4,530 members) in 1945 to 8 per cent in 1948 (725,762 members), then to 13 per cent of the population in 1969 (1.6 million members) (Kwon 2010: 290). After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung purged many of his opponents, including Hyun Jun Hyuk and Pak Hon Young of the South Korean Workers Party (SKWP). Policy disputes and theoretical controversy are shown in the pages of the Party newspapers like *Rodong Sinmun* (Kim 1975: 65-76).

At the end of 1948, Soviet occupation forces were withdrawn from North Korea. In June 1949, a unified Communist Party, the Korean Workers Party (KWP) was established through the merger of the Communist parties in North Korea and South Korea. Kim Il Sung was named as its Chairman and Pak Hon Young from the South Korean Workers Party as its Vice-Chairman. At the third anniversary of the death of the ‘Great Leader’ (Kim Il Sung), it was announced that DPRK was hereafter to use a new calendar, starting from 1912, the birth year of Kim Il Sung. The new calendar system is now found in every North Korean publication. The year 2014, according to the North Korean calendar, is thus *Juche* year 102. The messianic mission of saving the country from foreign imperialism was infused into the Workers Party and the leading core. The Party membership increased drastically from 0.0005 per cent (4,530 members) in 1945 to 8 per cent in 1948 (725,762 members), then to 13 per cent of the population in 1969 (1.6 million members). The vast majority of Party members were peasants with no previous political experience (Kwon 2010: 288-291).

**Table 1: Growth of Korean Workers Party**

Party	Year	Per cent	Members
Korean Communist Party under Pak Hong Yong	1845	0.0005%	4,530
Korean Workers Party (Kim Il Sung) and Korean Communist Party (Pak Hong Yong)	1848	8%	725,762
Korean Workers Party including <i>Yan-an</i> faction, Soviet faction, the indigenous nationalists; the domestic communists and <i>Kapsan</i> faction.	1969	13%	1.6 million

**Source:** Table drawn from Kwon’s article “State building in North Korea: from a ‘self-reliant’ to a ‘military-first’ state” (2010: 288-291).

In the formative stage of North Korean communist politics there were several competing political factions and power struggles among the communist leaders. The five major factions were: the indigenous nationalists; the domestic communists; returnees from China called the *Yan-an* faction; returnees from the Soviet Union called the Soviet faction; and Kim Il Sung's personal followers who had participated in guerrilla activities, called the *Kapsan* faction, the Partisan Group.

Kim eliminated the *Yan-an* group in 1956, the Soviet group between 1957 and 1959, and his own *Kapsan* group in 1967.<sup>1</sup> Policy disputes and theoretical controversy appeared in the pages of the Party newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*, and other theoretical journals (Kim, 1975: 65-76). North Korea, On 17 December, 1945 Kim Il Sung became head of the Korean communist party, and within two months, was Chairman of the North Korean Interim People's Committee.

### **Historical Linkages of Symbolic Hegemony: Situational Choice**

Three most common surnames are found in Korea, Kim, Lee, and Park, account for more than 40 per cent of the entire population of South Korea. The surname Kim is associated with the mythical founder of the Silla dynasty (or Yi, in Korean) is the name of the dynasty that ruled Korea from 1392 to the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 (Oberdorfer, D. 2001). Kim Il Sung was born on 15 April 1912, when in the world news the *Titanic* ship was sank (Cumings, Bruce 1997: 396). There were many communist groups in Korea who were side-lined by the Kim Il Sung *faction* and whole history of Communist party are written for the Kim Il Sung party. Kim Il Sung with his power created the knowledge of his own Some noteworthy cases include the 1967 elimination of the *Kapsan faction* leaders (Park Geum-chul and Rhee Hyo-soon) was charged of anti-Party factionist movements, and the 1969 elimination of military leaders ('People's Guardian Minister' Kim Chang-bong and KPA Political Bureau Chief Huh Bong-hak) was charged of opposing Kim's centralized authority (Cha and Sohn 2012: 4). Following the 5th KWP (Korea Worker's Party) assembly of November 1970, the North Korean leadership was made of pro-Kim Il-sung members. Kim's centralized power and his one-man rule had been completely solidified.<sup>2</sup> Thus North

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<sup>1</sup> For the chronology of purges by Kim Il Sung, see Lee (1995, pp. 17-19) Lee, I.S. (ed.) (1995) *North Korea, the Land that Never Changes: Before and After Kim Il Sung*, Seoul: Naewoe Press.

<sup>2</sup> (see world.kbs.co.kr)

Korea's 'dynastic' system was founded upon the background creating the own history for the past.

Article 3 of the North Korea Constitution shows the guiding principle of *Juche* belief and merged Kim Il Sung as "*Kimilsungism*". This merged ideology is presented by the state as a "unitary" ideological system, and it is the basis for the cult of personality, pre-1945 Japanese-style "emperor worship," or semi-deification that surrounds the memory of North Korea's Great Leader, Kim Il Sung (U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom 2005: 7). Kim Il Sung uses various metaphor for power struggle in building its own image in North Korean history. He first blames the leaders of South Korea Worker's Party known as 'Namrodang.' Metaphor of final stage of re-education was reused to the leaders like Park Hun-young, Rhee Seung-yup, Bae Chul, Kim Nam-chun etc were executed on allegation of US backed espionage. Kim Il Sung also succeeded by winning the 1956 Party Central Committee election and strongly controlled the same faction strong leaders Kim Du-bong, Choi Chang-ik, Park Chang-ok etc. In 1967 he eliminated the Kapsan faction leaders Park Geum-chul and Rhee Hyo-soon on charges of anti-party factionist movement and in 1969 he eliminated military leaders People's Guardian Minister Kim Chang-bong and KPA Political Bureau Chief Huh Bong-hak on charges of opposing Kim rules (North Korea a to z). Following the 5th KWP (Korea Workers Party) Assembly on November 1970, North Korea became strongly under the control of Kim Il Sung and his image strongly influenced the heart, mind and soul of North Koreans.

### **Symbolic Friendship**

Genealogically Symbolic hegemony in North Korea started from the relations with China. Comparing North Korea-China, at the highest level of political visit, the Cold War witnessed about 37 visits. Five visits in 1950s, two visits in 1960s, six visits in 1970s, eighteen visits in 1980s were recorded. This contacts indicated eleven 'friendly visits' (six from China); 20 'official visits' (with official friendly visits); five 'unofficial visits' were made (North Korea making three visits) including Kim Il Sung in 1982 'state visit' (Kondapalli 2006: 3-4). Symbolically, prides of the Socialist grouping are reflected in their paintings; which also captures the image of the socialist bond to the communist citizens. James Pearson in North Korea News posted that, China also presented North Korea with a life sized waxwork figure of Kim Jong Il as the sign of continuation of friendship (Pearson 2013). Both DPRK and PRC were seen as the lips and teeth relations in 1950s. Lee Kwon-mu in *Nodong Sinmun* wrote an article "Invincible Ties between the Korean and Chinese Peoples

Cemented with Blood,” where he highlights the friendship and solidarity during the patriotic liberation war of the Korean people (Daily Report, FBIS 1955). Chinese Voluntary Army was taught by Mao with patriotic nationalism and proletariat internationalism and this article states that Korean people love the volunteer as their own brothers. At the night of 19 October 1950, more than 360,000 Chinese People Volunteers crossed the Yalu River to rescue North Korea regime. On July 1961 Beijing and Pyongyang signed a ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.’ The agreement was committed to aid the other if attacked (Scobell, Andrew 2002: 278).

One of the most cherished revolutionary songs in North Korea in the Symbolic song are, *Song of Comradely Love* (1980) and *The Song of Korean-Chinese Friendship*, shows well the morality of revolutionary comradeship arising from the hardship of anticolonial partisan struggles:

*“No matter how arduous the way may be,*

*We shall climb over the hills of hardship.*

*No matter how strong the wind of fire may be,*

*We shall stay together in life and death.*

*You can’t purchase even with tons of gold,*

*The boundless love of comrades.*

*Let our resolve live forever,*

*Looking up at the Single Star”* (Kwon 2013).

*The Song of Korean-Chinese Friendship* says-

*“We are faithful brothers, blood-sharing comrades.*

*Our heart keeps intensely the amity of Korean-Chinese Friendship.*

*For our common purpose, hand in hand,*

*We march in step with each other, singing our song of friendship”* (ibid).

Other Symbolic representation of friendship can be seen in Sino-North Korean ‘Friendship Bridge’ on the Yalu River, along North Korea’s border with China. This place bustles with a fast-growing traffic of goods and raw material moving between the two countries. The bridge connects the city of Dandong (previously Andong), China’s border town in Liaoning Province, and Sinuiju, one of North Korea’s northernmost towns (ibid). The Friendship Tower (Uuitap) in Pyongyang commemorates two things. Its primary function is as a war memorial, dedicated to the Chinese martyrs of the Korea conflict. Inside the thirty-meter-high granite memorial are kept the records of 22,700 fallen Chinese soldiers. The records include a separate book that lists the names of fallen officers of the Chinese volunteer forces, including Mao Anying, Chairman Mao’s eldest son, who was killed in action in the



Korea conflict in November 1950, at the age of 28. The Friendship Tower consists of 1,025 granite and marble stones, intended to symbolize October 25th, the day the Chinese volunteer army entered the theatre of the Korean War (ibid). This friendship was also can be seen in North Korea 2010 stamp. ‘Moderate hegemony’ also guides the masses in promising the masses by State achievement through revolution.

Many people leave poem or cartoon (metaphors) as it is or underestimates it, but it had its deep meaning to convey the readers. North Korean sees their leaders as the sun. North Korean leaders have used ideological phrases as a ‘*modus operandi*’ that the livelihood and security depend on continuity in leadership (Cuming 1997). Symbolic praxis is not only in North Korea, wherever fear is increased metaphor plays rapidly in the politics. Example, All North Korean artist are member of the state own studio complexes where art it created and every artist hold the ranks. The ranks start from level C, hierarchically move towards B and A, followed by “Merited Artist”, then “People’s Artist”. According to Adrian Dannat (2009), there are around 50 “Merited Artists” and 20 “People’s Artists”. The best known artists in North Korea are Son U Yong, Kim Chun Jon, Jong Chang Mo, Li Chang and Li Gyong Nam. Most of the artists are men who work in oil, brush, excluding Kim Song Hui who also who is also well known for her brush and ink work and she comes under People’s Artist. There are rewards like Kim Il Sung Prize but the criteria is at least 50 years and above. Jong Yong Man has received the prestigious rewards of Kim Il Sung Prize.

**Table 1: Symbolic hegemony is strongly regulated in North Korea via Symbolic practices.**

Symbolic Praxis	Metaphors
Ranks of Artist in North Korea	Rank C, B, A followed by Merited Artist, People’s Artist
Famous Artist of North Korea (organic intellectual)	Son U Yong, Kim Chun Jon, Jong Chang Mo, Li Chang and Li Gyong Nam, Kim Song Hui, Jong Yong Man
Medium of Art	Brush and ink, oil, brush, watercolour
Best Award in Art	Kim Il Sung Prize
Display of Art	Pyongyang University of Fine Art, Central Art Studio, Mansudae in Pyongyang, Songhwa

Source: Author conceptualisation from Dannat article (2009).

Institution such as schools and Universities have major role in building the organic intellectuals. The top art institution is the Pyongyang University of Fine Art have played major role in building the formation of a ‘peoples art intellectuals.’ After finishing

Universities the students are selected by various state art studios, namely the Paekho or Central Art Studio (CAS). Others like Songhwa is established in 1997 for retired artists and most active studio are the Mansudae in Pyongyang. Nicholas Bonner, who runs the leading DPRK travel agency “Koryo Tours”, says that Propaganda posters are not to be signed by the artists. Therefore it is difficult for the buyers to know the original, but it is the showing of artist working for the State and not for the own (ibid). North Korea claims that its poor international image is created by the enemy’s mechanism (Jon, Halliday 1982). The book “*Chollima Korea*” says “If you do not know the history of our Leader you cannot understand our country.” In fact by understanding leader ideas it will be helpful to understand their motives as well.

### **Symbols of Media**

The Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea (1992) book says that Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) is a powerful mouthpiece of the Party and Government, where they encourage defeating enemy also in the battle of the radio waves (The Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea 1992: 7). Kim Jong Il talk in June 12, 1964 says, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) plays the role of eyes, mouth and ears of the Party and Government. He says every means and all forces of the KCNA must serve the leaders. It says ‘if it provides no service for the leaders, the KCNA is totally pointless.’ There are three key departments in the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP), personnel management as cadres for party, state, and army, public campaigns propaganda, and the National Security Agency or the spy agency (Agov 2013: 16). Moreover mutual propagandist supports mass media, in North Korea-China relations based on the principle of reciprocity (DOCUMENT No 4, *NKIDP e-Dossier no. 7*). The North’s Korean Central News Agency also said HELP University recognized Mr. Kim’s “untiring efforts for the education of the country and the well-being of its people.” On 3 October, 2013 HELP University of Malaysia awarded Kim Jong Un with Doctorate certificate in economic subject, which was attended by 35 invitees including Datuk Dr Paul Chan President of the HELP University (Choe 2013). On 1 April 2003, North Korean regime introduced the propaganda website known as *Uriminjokkiri* showing the country politics, economy, culture and ideology to the world (Cheng, Ko and Lee 2010: 656).

### **Juche Ideology in Everything: As Conditional Choice**

The term *Juche* appeared for the first time in 1955 as “independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one’s own powers, believing in one’s own strength and

displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.” The Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s over North Korea led Kim Il Sung to develop the *Juche* idea in order to avoid taking sides in their ideological conflicts and to introduce the North Korea own choice. Thus it’s also known as Kim Il Sungism to prevent revisionist ideological influence (Kwon 2010: 292).

In 1967, Kim Il Sung stated that, “our *Juche* ideology refers to the most correct Marxism-Leninism oriented philosophy designed to carry out our revolution and construction.” Moreover since 1970s, *Juche* has become the supreme doctrine overriding Marxism-Leninism, encompassing the interest and goals of North Korea and by the end of 1970s, North Korea was transformed into a *Juche* state (ibid). The North Korea Constitution, Article 4 adopted *Juche* in December 1972 states that “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea takes the *Juche* idea as the guiding principle of the republic, the ideology that creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to our own situation” (DPRK Constitution).

North Korea believed that three revolutions are the bottom of the success and it is also known as ‘three precepts of the *juche* creed.’ They are produced and represented by three banners which open the march of enormous mass movement and they are known as ideological, technical and cultural revolutions. It was believed that it can be successful if it is carried with planned. The system which rules the march was tested during the battle over the US and the Japanese imperialism. On 10<sup>th</sup> August 1946, law was promulgated by the Provisional People’s Committee of the North Korea (Fersi, Mustapha 1983: 74).

To promote the *Juche* ideas North Korea started to propagate their ideas of symbolic movement known as *Chollima* movement. Question lies to the foreigner, what does the *Chollima* means? While it is believed that *Chollima* means a winged horse and it covers ‘cholli’ (a thousand *ri*) a day and Korea is a country of three thousand *ri*) or one will cover the whole territory of Korea in three days. Symbolically ten *ri* almost equals to four kilometres. The *Chollima* Movement is the symbolically expression to the national sentiment of the North Korean people. Mustapha Fersi (1983) says that workers of Kangson Steel Plant (KSP) named as Chin Ung Won, initiated the *Chollima* work team Movement which made be conscious about the socialist construction in innovation. In other words the ultimate objective of the *Chollima* Movement was to build socialism and communism as transition from capitalism to socialism by remoulding the people (Fersi, Mustapha 1983: 21-22).

### **Revolutionary Operas (*hyeongmyeong gageuk*) and Beijing Operas (*Yangbanxi*)**

North Korea symbolic practices evolved from China, as Beijing opera came during the Cultural Revolution in China from 1966 to 1976 similarly Revolutionary Operas in North Korea were seen from 1971 to 1973. Beijing Operas and Revolutionary operas were the main medium of propaganda machinery for the North Korea and China to influence the masses through the visual culture. Beijing Operas was highly under the control of Mao's own wife Jiang Qing and Revolutionary Operas came under the leadership of Kim Jong Il. The main function of these operas was to promote the interest of the state agenda. Thus Revolutionary Operas are known as *hyeongmyeong gageuk* in North Korea and Beijing Operas were known as *Yangbanxi* in China. During the Cultural Revolution in China *Yangbanxi* operas was the only cultural artistic expression allowed to be performing in the China. Their music was produced from the folk material and their stories were all to praise their leader Mao Zedong. All this operas production was under the control of fourth wife of Mao's, Jiang Qing (Ludden 2013). There were 15 *Yangbanxi* but Chinese government only choose 8 model works focuses on the eight *Yangnanxi*. There is no consensus which is the eight amongst the following-

#### **Beijing Operas (1966 to 1976)**

- 1) *Red Detachment of Women (Hongse Niangzi Jun)*
- 2) *White Haired Girl (Baimaonu)*
- 3) *Red Lantern (Hongdengji)*
- 4) *Shajia Bang*
- 5) *Sweeping the White Tiger Regiment (Qixi Baibu Tuan)*
- 6) *Capturing Tiger Mountain by Strategy (Zhi Qu Wei Hu Shan)*
- 7) *The Harbor (Haikou)*
- 8) *Azalea Mountain (Dujuan Shan)*
- 9) *Hymn of Dragon River, Battle on the Plain, and Pan Shi Wan* (Kim, Suk-Young 2010: 350).

*Red Detachment of Women, White Haired Girl* are the Opera which was shown in stage in 1945 in Yan'an, featured film in 1951 and film of ballet production in 1972. *Red Lantern* was

film of Beijing Opera produced in 1970, *Shinjia Bang* in 1974 and *Azalea Mountain* in 1973 (Kim, Suk-Young 2010: 350).

While, Yu Huiyong was the composer of Yangbanxi and the first aspect is the role of composers, was largely responsible for shaping the musical language. The second aspect was to transform the Beijing opera into revolutionary lines which was the vision of Jiang Qing (Ludden 2013). As Communist Party sanctioned operas they were revolutionary in nature. Thus yangbanxi were the artistic centrepiece of the Cultural Revolution, and special consideration was given to its role in creating a new mass culture. In all the art form of operas Mao's quotation were included to praise him.

On the Korean Revolutionary Operas, the main aim of the propaganda practices was to create the spirit of an ongoing socialist revolution. Secondly, the aim for their production was also to promote the authority of the state leaders and the unity of the new born states by appropriating Confucian ideas regarding the nation as a patriarchal family structure with a state leader as a father of the nation and the members of the state as his obedient sons and daughters. They think this propaganda production as the national identity of their family nations (Kim, Suk-Young 2005). This help to control the psychology of the masses to act accordingly under the Symbolic hegemony. The subject are bound to function according to the body and mind combination in the revolutionary process and the leaders minds are transmitted to the subjects through the sources of this propaganda.

### **Revolutionary Operas (1971-1973)**

Like *Yanbanxi*, Revolutionary Operas in North Korea was born under the leadership of Kim Jong Il to show the leaders extraordinary image trough the culture. There were total five Revolutionary Operas such as-

- 1) *Sea of Blood (Pibada)* which came in 1971,
- 2) *True Daughter of the Party (Dang-ui cbamdoen ttal)* came in 1971,
- 3) *Flower Girl (kkotpaneun cheonyeo)* came in 1972,
- 4) *Oh, Tell the Forest (Milima iyagihara)* came in 1972, and
- 5) *Song of Geumgang Mountain (Geumgangsani norae)* came in 1973 (Kim, Suk-Young 2010: 325).

This Revolutionary Operas consists of speech, orchestral music, solo and choral singing, dancing, acting etc. Revolutionary Opera *Sea of Blood* shows the mass killing of Korean by Japanese imperialist and the feature of mother oppressed by the Japanese soldiers, when her son is taken away from her. She struggle to resist her son and it is the distinguish use of propaganda technique of the oppressor to show the reality. Japanese national's images are always shown as villains in the revolutionary operas (Kim, Suk-Young 2010: 300). As in *Oh, Tell the Forest* and *Flower Girl*, Japanese involved in wearing distinct dress codes, such as kimonos and military uniform which appears the body as hostile and distinct from the Koreans. Another is the reality performances, such as in *Flower Girl*, Hong Yeong-hui who is known as Kkot-bun in character was popular for her performance. The melodramatic performance is different from the theatre due to camera ability to capture life more realistic (Kim, Suk-Young 2010: 49-51). Also in education North Korea textbooks of various levels publish the revolutionary operas such as *Sea of Blood* and *True Daughter of the Party* and further give the meanings of revolutionary sacrifices in dramatic characters<sup>3</sup>.

### **Symbols of Father, Mother and Children in North Korea**

Basically North Korea was heavily influenced by the Confucius culture where everything is hierarchically maintained. For North Korea father was exactly as the biblical metaphor of father. Kim Il Sung parents were heavily influenced by catholic church, so was Kim during his childhood. But the metaphor of father who looked upon its children was credited to Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung became the father of state. Documentaries of North Korea show that children do not choose their parents but parents are pre-given who thinks good for their children. Similarly North Korea citizen are bound to believe Great Leader Kim Il Sung as the father of the state who have a motherly institution of Korea's Workers Party, which are Symbolically mother to the North Korean citizens. Korean Workers Party takes care of their children North Korean people to live their life in revolutionary cause of Juche. Even B. R Myers (2010) gives the example of Fatherland Liberation War as the Korean War in the North Korean dictionaries. Even during the Pyongyang farewell meeting addressed to the withdrawing fighters and commanders of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front. It says, 'a letter goes on, you shared the happiness and suffering on the Korean people and loved the Korean people as if they

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<sup>3</sup> Shown in the junior high school textbook, level 6, *Korean Literature (Joseon Munbak)*, Pedagogical Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1989: 32-40, and junior high school textbook, level 3, *Korean Literature (Joseon Munbak)*, Pedagogical Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1990: 23

were your own parents and brothers (FBIS, Daily Report 1955). Kang Chol-hwan experienced the life of imprisonment which was re-education in metaphor of North Korea (Kang 2011: 11). He was very small when he thought Kim Il Sung was a Father Christmas who provides gifts packages in his birthday (ibid: 13). According to him he was a more like god who was building the 'Edenic Socialist State.' Great Leader Kim Il Sung ambition was to live long life to rule. News media *The Telegraph* shows Kim Il Sung to live longer than the natural life. In 1979, Dr Kim So-yeon was promoted in the research institute to extend Great Leader life and 1,750 herbs of oriental medicine were analysed with experiments. Kim Il Sung also demanded blood transfusions from healthy young men (The Telegraph 2013). This also shows that it is not only that the leaders to use the metaphor to control for a long time through the image.

### **North Korea as Instrumental Rational Actor: Discretionary Choice**

It is up to the view of readers as said by North Korea writer Kim Myung Chol (North Korean living in Japan) in his famous book "Kim Jong Il: Day of Having Korea Reunified". This book was failure because during the time of Kim Jong Il Korea is still not unified as promise. Korea in 1980 had a population of approximately 54 million to 37 million living in the South and 17 million in the North. After of the Korean War of 1950-53, about 10 million people were separated from members of their family by the demarcation Line, with no contact or communication possible (McCormack 1982: 5). The of North Korea position in unification was made by Kim Il Sung in this report to the 6th Congress of the Korean Workers Party in October 1980. The ten points set out there were summarized as follows in Democratic People's Republic of Korea (20 December 1980):

- 1) adherence to independence, neutrality, non-alignment, objection to becoming a satellite of any other country;
- 2) democracy throughout Korea north and south and in all areas of society and promotion of great national unity; for example, freedom of political activity, the press, information, religious faith, freedom of travel and movement;
- 3) north-south economic cooperation and interchange and the development of an independent national economy; for instance, joint ventures and common markets;
- 4) active north-south exchange and cooperation in science, culture and education intended to ensure uniform progress in science, culture and education;
- 5) resumed north-south telephone, mail, railroads, expressway, air and sea links;
- 6) stability of livelihood for the entire population and promotion of their welfare;

- 7) an end to north-south military confrontation, formation of a combined national army;
- 8) protection of the rights and interests of overseas Koreans and their right to return home and live in any place they like;
- 9) proper treatment of the foreign relations established by the north and the south prior to reunification and coordination of the two regional governments' foreign activities with foreign economic concessions in south Korea protected;
- 10) the only diplomatic representation by the confederal government as a unified Korean state; policy of strict neutrality, non-alignment and friendship with all countries; no threat of aggression to any other country; a nuclear-free peace zone throughout the Korean Peninsula; and no foreign troops on its soil (McCormack 1982: 14).

### **Why the Central Intelligence Agency fails to understand Metaphors?**

The largest category of prisoners unaccounted for in Communist hands are former South Korea soldiers who have been indoctrinated and joined in the North Korea Army (Central Intelligence Agency report). On 13<sup>th</sup> October 1950, President meeting with congressional leaders in the cabinet room report shows, that the intervention towards Korea by China is seen as aggression. Secretary of the State Dean Acheson remarked that the Chinese communists in the United Nations would be symbols of the success of communist efforts in the Far East (Harry S. Truman Library: President's Secretary's Files 1950: 4). National Intelligence estimate 2/1, a review of the subject on 'Chinese Communist intervention in Korea', which was published on 24<sup>th</sup> November 1950, just before two days the UN agrees to be offensive into North Korea. New information was issued, such as-

- a) Maintaining China-North Korea holding operations in North Korea
- b) Maintaining or increase their military strength in Manchuria,
- c) Seeking to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means (Memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense 12<sup>th</sup> Oct-24<sup>th</sup> Nov 1950:3).

In case of failure of UN withdrawal resulted into Chinese intervention in Korea. On the other hand South Korea was highly threatened by the Communist bloc. You Chan Young, South Korean Ambassador to the US transmitted the following message of President Syngman Rhee "I quote we are informed that you are planning to come Korea shortly we are delighted and entire nation is thrilled with report please include in our invitation Mrs Eisenhower as her presence will be of great honour and encouragement to our suffering



people and UN fighting in Frontline” (W.P. Marshall President: Western Union). On 8<sup>th</sup> November, the US Embassy to Seoul remarks that there was a decrease in the number of vehicles moving from Manchuria into Korea and there were also no solid contact with the enemy in the 8<sup>th</sup> Army sector (CIA Report RDP78).

Unclassified documents of CIA report shows two strategic intelligence mistakes in Korea during 1950. With the defeat of Japan the armed forces were immediately reduced in member and defence spending was cut dramatically. Both the US and Soviet troops withdraw from the Korea. The Soviet left well equipped and trained North Korea Army, while the US provided South Korea with only light weapons. MacArther instructed General Charles A. Willoughby and his G2 to establish a secret intelligence office in Seoul known as the Korean Liaison Office (KLO) for monitoring troop’s movement in the North Korea (Cohen, Eliot A. 1950: 49).

In late 1949, KLO reported that the communist guerrillas represented a serious threat to South Korea and many of the guerrillas were originally from the South Korea. CIA analyst reports starting from 1948 to report in a *Weekly Summary* dated as 20<sup>th</sup> February 1948, 29<sup>th</sup> October 1948, 16<sup>th</sup> July 1949, shows Soviet supporting the North Korea regime to support South Korea. On 10<sup>th</sup> May 1950, the South Korea Defense Military publicly warned at the press conference, that DPRK troops were massing at the border. Moreover, on 20 June 1950, the CIA published a report that North Korea had the capability to invade South Korea and five days later at 4 am, South Korea was invaded by the North. On April 1955, regarding forthcoming consultation with senior official of the KWP CC, the send “Information on the Situation in the DPRK” which was revised with a draft note “The Main Questions for Discussion with the Korean Comrades.” It was because North Korea was pro-Soviet than China. Prominent North Korean leader, Bak Ilu and Ban Heosan, who was closely associated with the Chinese command, was removed from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs and latter from the post of rector of the North Korea Military Academy (DOCUMENT No.1, *Secret Copy N 5*).

The North Korea does not approve the factional activities of the CCP in the International Communist Workers Movement and has no relations with Maoist splinter groups in third countries. Towards Japan North Korea have different opinion. The North Korea is concerned about the Japan’s increasing militarization accompanied by the China tolerance and North Korea is sceptical towards the China in concluding friendship treaty with

Japan. The North Korea does not share China position on NATO but is right on target when condemn the latter. China openly supports the most reactionary forces of imperialism in the FRG which is not forgiven by North Korea. There is also other international problem where position of North Korea and China are different. For instance, the cases of Chile, Angola and the assessment of toots of the Middle East conflict, the North Korea does not support the China in its condemnations of Soviet policy in Africa. Furthermore, claim to improve Marxism-Leninism, as North Korea does not support “Maoism” in general, while the China also denies its support to “*Juche* Ideology” (DOCUMENT No 4, *NKIDP e-Dossier no. 7*).

Regarding territorial issues, the China officially confirmed Mount Baektusan which is the symbolic value of the North Korean territory. And it is also said that there is difference in opinion regarding the continental shelf in the Yellow Sea. Korean minority about 1 million citizens live in China and North Korea wants their autonomy which Chinese leadership is not willing to grant. Also China is no longer willing to tolerate the North Korea non-compliance with its export commitments. China is backing from unconditional support especially when the August 1976 Panmunjom Incident (axe murders), since the China is not interested in an escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula (DOCUMENT No 4, *NKIDP e-Dossier no. 7*). After Mao Zedong’s death, Chinese literature was temporarily unavailable in North Korea and only the first four volumes of Mao Zedong works in Korean language was available. The fifth volume, which contains anti-Soviet outbursts and the claim of Mao being the “greatest Marxist-Leninist,” is not on sale (DOCUMENT No 4, *NKIDP e-Dossier no. 7*). It shows that if metaphors are weak, then there is a chance of less influence to dominate the mind and psychological behaviour.

## **Conclusion**

North Korean constitution supports the unification of Korea and Article 2 of the North Korea highlights that “We want one Korea under the socialist regime for all Koreans.” North Korea is known for following ideal socialist state through the leadership of *Suryung* (or Great Leader) of the Korean Workers Party (White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 1996). And the main objective of it is to practice the *juche* ideology in unification. North Korea political party (KWP) is the only political party where a regime is controlled by the *Suryung*, so called *sine qua non*. North Korea also wants unification under the leadership of *Kimilsung* party All the white papers from 1996 to 2012 of the Korea Institute of National Unification

also reflects that the North Korea ruling ideas is derived from the *juche* constitution and the violation of the constitution is not a political execution but a legal execution.

Article 3 of the *Juche* Constitution reflects that the ruling guidelines for all the activities in the North Korea is *juche* ideology, which is human centred and a revolutionary ideology for the realisation of self-reliance, but Article 11 also clearly justifies that the North Korea carries out all its activities under the leadership of the Korean Worker's Party. The 6<sup>th</sup> party Central Committee of Korean Workers Party on 28 September 2010, declares the KWP as Kim Il Sung Party and generational rule by the Kim's. Jang Song Thaek hunger for power can't be neglected, who was also called one time 'greedy' by Kim Il Sung but without the connection of story with the party declaration and constitution, allegation against Kim Jong Un would not only be irrational but illogical. As reported by Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) on 8<sup>th</sup> December 2013 Jang Song Thaek was arrested in Political Bureau of CC (KWP) meeting. He was charged with treason and counter-revolutionary actions. Jang aim to overthrow the people's power of the DPRK and by ideologically aligning himself with enemies (North Korean Leaders perspectives) as a crime punishable by Article 60 of the DPRK Criminal Code (KCNA).

White paper on human rights in North Korea published by KINU in 1997; shows that in 1974 North Korea have promulgated a set of Codes of Individual Conduct known as the "Ten Great Principle of Unique Ideology". The Ten Principle have become the source and means of control over the people's way of thinking and way of life and ultimately it serves as a core elements in legitimising rule by the *Suryung* (KINU 1996, 1997). In 2004 and 2005, North Korea revised its Criminal Procedure Law into stricter arrest and detention procedure but in 2007 North Korea joined the international convention torture prevention (KINU 2006, 2008). Everyone has to follow the 'Ten Rules' in North Korea and if anyone violates this rule he/she would be immediately put to death by firing squad. Selected Ten points on execution in North Korea says that 'Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung's instructions must be viewed as a legal and supreme order and unconditionally realized without excuses or trivial reasons, but with endless loyalty and sacrifice'. For the execution of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung's instructions the registrar must be made, implementation of them must be standardized, taught to others and implemented without ceasing. Preamble 5 of the Ten Great principle says 'fight against those who accept our beloved leader comrade Kim Il Sung's instructions only in letter and sabotage the implementation of these instructions, show irresponsible or an incorrect attitude.'

Generally North Korean policy maker perceive South Korean leaders as close allied of the US. Therefore they say Syngman Rhee was the first President trained by the United States. He enacted the notorious National Security Law in imitation of the Japanese Law for the Maintenance of Public Order, and resorted to repressive rule. He was overthrown by the April 19 Students Uprising, and died in exile in Hawaii. His successor Park Chung Hee was shot to death by the chief of the south Korean Central Intelligence Agency at a secret banquet hall. Chun Doo Hwan, who put down the Kwangju Uprising on the orders of Wickham, commander of the US forces in South Korea, was arrested by Roh Tae Woo, who in turn was imprisoned by Kim Young Sam. Chun Doo Hwan was sentenced to death, and Roh Tae Woo was sentenced to life imprisonment. Kim Young Sam was brought to ruin by economic bankruptcy and scandal. His second son, Kim Hyon Chol, was sentenced to three years penal servitude for the crime of receiving bribes. Therefore North Korea does not wants to unify under the leadership of South Korean leaders.

White paper of 2008 published by KINU on human rights reflects that, no accurate record is available as South Korean citizens abducted to the North, especially during the Korean War. There exist significant differences between various lists and documents compiled by government agencies and private organizations. For example, the Statistics Bureau of Office of Public Information had a list of 2,438 persons abducted from the City of Seoul in 1950; the Family of Korean War Abducted Persons had compiled a list of 2,316 abducted persons in 1951; the South Korean Government published in October of 1952 a list of 82,959 abducted persons during the Korean War; the 1953 Statistical Almanac had listed a total of 84,532 abductees; in 1954 the Police Headquarters under the Ministry of Internal Affairs had put out a list of 17,940 abductees; and the Korean Red Cross had compiled a list of 7,034 persons. It also proves that shooting fire blank is to be more pessimistic in finding the results (KINU 2008).

North Korea and South Korea ideological difference have been highly politicised by the various symbols. Both Korea's ultimate goal is towards unification but the symbols of hatred have blinded the regime of North Korea. North Korea also faced the resolution passed by the UN and they suffered from the Famine (1994-1998), which they symbolically called as "Ardours March" to propagate their masses. On the other hand South Korean government have severely focused on the *trustpolitik* to develop the relationship but the metaphor produced by the organic intellectual in North Korea distracted the mind of the intellectual groups in misleading by countering through symbols.

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## Re-respecting North Korean Media: A Quest for Method

북한미디어반성 : 새방법탐구

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**ABSTRACT:** The amount of books and studies published on North Korea every year in the past decade shows the considerable attention scholars have paid to the country, both within (North) Korean Studies and in related disciplines. However, the notion of North Korea as a “known unknown” and “poorly understood” is still lingering among academia, mass media and the general public. The author of this study therefore contends that it is always beneficial to seek new possible sources of data and information about the country and employ scientific methods to analyze them. One of such sources that so far has received rather poor scholarly attention is official North Korean media content. This article suggests a new perspective for reconsidering North Korean news stories as meaningful research material, which is capable of elucidating issues of scholarly interest, such as the country's worldview and ideology. To prove this hypothesis, the present study relies on a sample of 445 Korean and English on-line news stories of the Korean Central News Agency and analyzes it using a combination of analytical tools and theoretical approaches from Media Studies. The results identify twelve narrative patterns as well as prevailing themes, including the representation of countries from around the world in the news and specific text composition techniques. These help explain the portrayal of the world as narrated by North Korea. The study shows that this narrated world is built on *conflictual*, *cooperative* and *justificative relations* between countries, and that the notion of *evil* as well as an orientation towards an *ideal world* are central to the narrated world's dynamics.

**KEY WORDS:** news content, North Korean media, narrative patterns, Korean Studies methodology

핵심주제어 : 기사 보도내용, 북한미디어, 서사패턴, 한국학 방법론

Studies on North Korea, like the rest of Korean studies and Area studies in general, as a multidisciplinary field must, in order to carry out reliable research and provide valuable results, make use of methods from various disciplines of social sciences and humanities. The recent boom in these studies in the last two decades, set aside the large part of them that

cannot be considered serious scholarship, have implemented this approach in the areas of North Korea's political science, history, economics, public administration, sociology, and even performing and visual arts; thus enhancing the understanding of what some still like to call "the poorly understood country".<sup>1</sup>

However, a key element of the North Korean regime has remained for the most part overlooked – its media. While some aspects of the country's media system, its structure and history, have been partly addressed (though almost exclusively in Korean and thus inaccessible to wider academia), media content as the core information channel coming out of the country, easily available and up-to-date, has been neglected. Perhaps due to a psychological barrier preventing us from examining the obvious or for the fear of falling into a propaganda trap, scholars have deemed North Korean media messages useless for any serious academic study. The present study will attempt to challenge these disciplinary assumptions and proposes that scholars *re-spect*, i.e. look again at,<sup>2</sup> North Korean media with the view of assessing its content as a valid source of information about the country. Precisely for the fact that North Korean media *are* a propagandistic mouthpiece of the regime, it is imperative that they are closely followed and thoroughly examined in Korean studies.

## Researching North Korea

### *Area Studies and Methodology*

The question of methodology is central to any academic endeavor. While traditional disciplines of Social Sciences and Humanities have long had their methods developed, new branches of science, such as the Area Studies, still occasionally suffer from an identity-seeking crisis. This has been the case with studies on North Korea, i.e. North Korean Studies,

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<sup>1</sup> Armstrong 2011, 358.

<sup>2</sup> The prism of *re-specting* or *looking again at* (lat. *respecere* = to look again) is borrowed here from Sonia Ryang, who argues for scholars to look again at North Korean culture (Ryang, 2012).

also known as Unification Studies in the South Korean academic environment. There has been an ongoing meta-debate about the identity of North Korean studies as a multidisciplinary field developed among Area Studies and a subject to historical and political changes.<sup>3</sup>

This uncertainty also shows the vast geographical difference between perspectives and traditions of Orientalism in Europe, the United States and Asia. In addition, for South Koreans, Unification Studies do not only qualify as Area Studies, but are a part of studying their own nation, ideally leading to solving the (many would argue) domestic issue of the nation's division.<sup>4</sup> In a diachronic perspective, this debate also inevitably is determined by the long-term tension between Area Studies and disciplinary Social Science, which results from the end of the Cold War and subsequent questioning of the relevance of Area Studies in an increasingly globalized world.<sup>5</sup>

Regardless of the problematic identity of Area Studies as a whole, one key recommendation for (North) Korean Studies seems to arise in order for the field to further advance as an academic discipline: scholars must strictly adhere to the principle of multi- and inter-disciplinary research, i.e. they must make use of research methods of various disciplines in Social Sciences and Humanities, apply these to the area they research and this way develop new theories within their field.<sup>6</sup>

### ***Boom of Studies on North Korea***

Although studies on North Korea initially emerged within the discipline of political science, which reflects the fact that Korea split in two separate political entities, we have seen a huge increase in the scale of academic interest regarding the country in the past two decades. This reflects several historical developments, including the South Korean democratization (more

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<sup>3</sup> Kim, Lee and Song 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Ko 2009, 63.

<sup>5</sup> For a summary of this debate, see for instance Tessler 1999 or Waters 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Kim, Lee and Song 2011, 99.

freedom of research on North Korea) and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc (new sources of information from North Korea's formal allies) in the late 1980s, the first US-North Korea nuclear crisis of the early 1990s, and the Sunshine Policy era of presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyon, that peaked with the first inter-Korean summit in 2000.<sup>7</sup>

As the country is under constant media spotlight, approaches to North Korea have been increasingly popularized, filling the bookstore shelves with dozens of publications written by travelers, journalists, defectors, diplomats and others.<sup>8</sup> For the on-line world, this is even more true: a number of sites have emerged in the past couple of years, some bordering with yellow journalism, others offering insightful academic analyses.<sup>9</sup> It has been argued, however, that out of this enormous boom, only a very few books, those with academic rigor and coherent research methods, can be considered serious scholarship.<sup>10</sup> Works by Haruki Wada (1998, in Japanese) in the field of history, Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig (2009) or Andrei Lankov (2007) in daily life's sociology, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland (2007) in political economy or Suk-Young Kim (2010) and Brian R. Myers (2009) in culture and visual arts, to name just a few, rightly belong to this group.

### **North Korean Media Analyzed**

There seems to be a prevailing refrain in many of the studies on North Korea, both on the academic and popular ends of the qualitative scale, which holds that North Korea is a hardly known country, from where hard data is unavailable and in which scholars cannot carry out field-based research.<sup>11</sup> It nonetheless seems reasonable to make the best use of all possible information that the country itself provides to the outside world, with the understanding that

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<sup>7</sup> Armstrong 2011, 357; Kim, Lee and Song, 89.

<sup>8</sup> For a useful overview see Clemens 2008.

<sup>9</sup> Such as [NK Nnews](#), [38 north](#), [North Korea Tech](#) etc.

<sup>10</sup> Armstrong 2011, 364.

<sup>11</sup> Some scholars have argued otherwise, such as Hazel Smith (2014) who points out at the data gathered by (and available from) the UN agencies previously working inside the country.

such information is carefully calculated and therefore may not be objective – an almost inherent feature of *any* country's official communication. However, North Korean media have not yet received such treatment.

Using Lasswell's model of communication,<sup>12</sup> media could be broken down into several areas of study in order to classify possible research topics related to North Korean media. First, it is the *communicator* and relating control analysis of the news production. Second, there is the *message* and content analysis. Next, the *medium* and *audience* can be studied. Last, the *effect* of communication can be analyzed.

### ***Studies in Korean***

There are several books written in Korean by Communication/Media Studies scholars in South Korea that have attempted to cover all of the above mentioned areas, although most of the books' content deals with the *communicator* or the *medium*. Among the recent ones are *Pukhan maesŭmitiŏlon*<sup>13</sup> (Kang 1997), *Pukhan pangsong ch'on glam* (Park 2004) or *Pukhanŭi sahoechŏk k'ŏmyunik'eisyŏn kuchowa mitiŏ* (Kwak, Lee 2011). An interesting attempt to use the insiders' perspective is (*Pukhani t'alchuminŭl t'onghae pon*) *Pukhan chuminŭi ŏnlonkwa sahoeetaehan ihae* (Lee, Kim and Kim 2011), that focuses on the question of *audience* and *effect*, using testimonies of North Korean defectors and contrasting their “media experience” with the South Korean environment. It is worth noting that none of these books has been translated into English.

These studies usually do not approach the media *message* as having relevant implications in terms of our knowledge about the country. On the other hand, there are a few academic (case) studies, dissertations or published articles analyzing North Korean media content with regard to certain phenomena. The portrayal of women in North Korean media

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<sup>12</sup> The formula unfolds as follows: *Who? / Says What? / In Which Channel? / To Whom? / With What Effect?*. See Lasswell 1948, 117.

<sup>13</sup> McCune-Reischauer romanized spelling of the Korean language is used in this study, except for generally accepted names written differently.

was analyzed in *Lotong sinmunül t'onghae pon pukhanüi yösöng* (*Portrayal of Female Boxer in Rodong Sinmun*) (Jang and Park 2005)<sup>14</sup> and in *Pukhan ch'ulp'an mitiöüi yösöngkwönt'usönsu potoe naep'otoen iteolloki yönku* (*A Study on Ideology Embedded in the North Korean Media Portrayals of Female Boxers*) (Lee 2009). Foreign affairs propaganda in the news media was covered by *Pukhan sinmunüi kukchenyusünaeyong punsök: tang taeochöngch'aek kwa kukchechöngsesönchönüi kwankyelül chungsimülo* (*Content Analysis of North Korean newspapers: Relationship between the Party's Foreign policy and Foreign Affairs propaganda*) (Kim 2005). There are also analyses of the news coverage of North Korean leaders, such as *Pukhan mitiöpoto punsökül t'onghan kimchöngil hyönchichitoyön* (*North Korean media coverage of Kim Jong-il's Local Guidance*) (Lee 2008) or *Kimchöngil könkangisangsölihu pukhan 'Tho sachin'üi pyönhwa* (*A content Analysis of North Korean Photographs on Its Political Leaders*) (Byeon 2011).

### ***Studies in English***

As mentioned above, to the knowledge of the author of this article, none of the Korean comprehensive studies on North Korean media have been translated into the English language, nor has there been any single book-length study by foreign scholars on the topic published abroad. Some aspects of the *communicator*, such as media freedom and related censorship, have been covered in annual reports of non-governmental organizations such as Reporters Without Borders or Freedom House.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, case studies have been conducted recently, focusing on structural developments with regard to the *audience* and the *medium*. Most currently, these include *A Quiet Opening: North Korean in a Changing Media Environment*, a study on the change of media-related information flow in the North Korean

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<sup>14</sup> Also in English as Jung (2009).

<sup>15</sup> See on-line at the website of [Reporters Without Borders](#) and [Freedom House](#).

society by Nat Kretchun and Jane Kim (2012) or this year's report by VOA's Korean Service journalist Yonho Kim called *Cellphones in North Korea* (2014).

Also, a few Koreanists and North Korea watchers have now and then focused on analyzing and interpreting some part of the North Korean media *message*, although their methods in use often remain undisclosed or unexplained. For instance, Ruediger Frank analyzed buzzwords related to the regime's policies, such as “socialism”, “Juche” or “nuclear”, in New Year's speeches (2014) and the Korean Central News Agency's news (2009). Moreover, NK News, an independent specialist site focusing on North Korea, has been monitoring North Korean media via several tools, i.a. the Korean Central TV Stream, NK Leadership Tracker and above all the KCNA Watch, introducing the “Kims Mention Index” or “Threat Index” as key statistical results.<sup>16</sup>

## Proposed Analysis

### *Research Question*

The portrayal of the world as narrated by the North Korea news media was defined as the core organizing idea for the presented analysis.<sup>17</sup> This study attempts to explain the recontextualizations of in-groups and out-groups identity and attitudes, social practice and world dynamics. These are encoded into various layers of language, text, and context; from phonemic microstructures through logical coherence to rhetorical strategies and narrative macrostructures. Breaking the focus of this study into four research stages, the following research questions are posed:

*RQ1:* What are the key components that news stories are built on?

*RQ2:* What are the storytelling patterns?

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<sup>16</sup> See the [NK News](#).

<sup>17</sup> It should be pointed out at this stage that this study focuses solely on news content. It does not take into consideration the news production process, especially matters related to the intended targeted audience of the news, i.e. whom the news are addressed, although the author contends that such a research, if thoroughly conducted, would yield interesting and much necessary results.

*RQ3:* What countries and themes are recurrently portrayed?

*RQ4:* What characteristic text composition techniques are used in narratives?

### ***Method and Dataset***

This study chose *Korean Central News Agency* as the researched material based on the general consensus among scholars that this is the country's main medium, which expresses the official opinions of the government and the ruling Workers' Party of Korea. Using the method of constructed week sampling and following recommendations of recent methodology studies related to this method,<sup>18</sup> two constructed weeks of news published during the first week in February (246 news stories) and second week in May, 2012 (199 news stories) were used as the dataset. These particular weeks have been carefully chosen with an attempt to avoid unbalances resulting from excessive news coverage of certain events, such as the escalation of tensions in international and inter-Korean relations or celebration of anniversaries. With a few exceptions, both Korean and English versions of the news stories were analyzed.<sup>19</sup>

The present study draws on diverse approaches to news, in an attempt to introduce a variety of media studies methods that might be successfully applied in Korean studies scholarship, suggesting the potential of these methods to add to the illumination of phenomena of interest regarding North Korea. In the first and second research stage (*RQ1*, *RQ2*), this study uses the constant comparative method<sup>20</sup> to establish a grounded theory of narrative patterns: a combination of open, axial and selective coding was performed, breaking down and categorizing data, followed by validating and redefining categories (news patterns).

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<sup>18</sup> Hester and Dougall 2007.

<sup>19</sup> The author is aware of the reservations to this approach. For purely linguistic analysis, the difference between the language versions would very likely yield diverse results. However, focusing on content, discourse and context, the author contends that type of language itself matters only to a very limited extent. This is due to the fact that the recontextualizations that this study attempts to find, are coded in the deep structure of language (For the concept of deep structure vs. surface structure see Greimas 1966).

<sup>20</sup> Glaser and Strauss 1967, 28-52.



In accordance with the structural Proppian approach to narratives,<sup>21</sup> coding was finished when no new news categories emerged.<sup>22</sup>

In the following research stage (*RQ3*), in which the author searched for recurrent themes and assessed the presence of various countries in the narratives, a combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis was used,<sup>23</sup> with the coding unit being one news story, context unit the whole dataset and unit of analysis (where applicable) being the number of references. Lastly, in the final research stage (*RQ4*), the data was analyzed using the approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA),<sup>24</sup> both on the language micro level (lexico-grammar) as well as on the level of context and ideology (discourse semantics and rhetorical macrostructures). Finally, results from each research stage are synthesized and discussed against the main matrix of the world as narrated by the analyzed news.

### ***KCNA Description***

*Korean Central News Agency (Chosŏn chungang t'ongsin)* is the official source of news from the Korean Workers Party and the government of the DPRK. Established in 1946, the agency serves as both a separate medium targeting a mostly foreign, but also domestic, audience, and as a news agency providing news content for other media in the country. KCNA news has been accessible on-line since 1996 from a text based website hosted on a server in Japan and run by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.<sup>25</sup> From 2010 onwards, KCNA has been running a site directly from Pyongyang.<sup>26</sup> Both sites are restricted when accessed from South Korea, as the content is illegal according to the country's National Security Law. KCNA Pyongyang site is accessible through the country's intranet. The government and the Party are assumed to devote considerable labor as well as financial resources into the running

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<sup>21</sup> Propp 1971.

<sup>22</sup> This moment occurred after the 127<sup>th</sup> news story was analyzed. However, the analysis continued throughout all the dataset.

<sup>23</sup> Berelson 1952.

<sup>24</sup> Fairclough 2002, Fowler 1991, van Dijk 1995.

<sup>25</sup> See the site at [kcna.co.jp](http://kcna.co.jp).

<sup>26</sup> See the site at [kcna.kr](http://kcna.kr).

of KCNA, with four language versions of news reports published daily and around 2.000 journalists and other personnel employed by the agency.<sup>27</sup>

As for the Pyongyang site, although it is not indexed by Google, it is believed to be viewed by 2.000 – 3.000 visitors per day, with huge spikes in traffic during the period of Kim Jong Il's death in December 2011. Korean language content is reportedly viewed the most, followed by the Chinese version (five times less than the Korean version) and the English version (nine times less).<sup>28</sup> The layout of the site has been gradually improving, with the inclusion of high-resolution pictures and video content, although some outside observers have continued to point out its embarrassing backwardness.<sup>29</sup> KCNA also has been repeatedly accused of retrospective management of news content.<sup>30</sup> Towards the end of last year, KCNA deleted all of its archive dating before October 1, 2013, erasing tens of thousands of articles, which is believed to be connected to the execution of Jang Song-thaek, one of the country's top officials.<sup>31</sup>

## Results

### *Narrative components and patterns (RR1, RR2)*

The first research question concerns the key components upon which the analyzed text is based. The analysis resulted in the identification of three main text components: *actors*, *events*, and *relations (RR1)*. An *actor* is the country<sup>32</sup> to which the news story relates. It is marked as **A**, **A — B** or **A — B — C**, depending on the number of *actors* in a news story. Should the *actor* be North Korea, it is marked as **K**. An *event* is the happening occurring in (or to) the particular *actor* or *actors*. An *event* has two defining qualities which are identified

<sup>27</sup> As suggested by the [NK News](#).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., [North Korea Tech](#).

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., [North Korea Tech](#).


<sup>30</sup> Ibid., [Index on Censorship](#).

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., [Index on Censorship](#). Most of these news stories are still available on kcna.co.jp, dating back to 1998.

<sup>32</sup> Or group of logically/geographically related countries, e.g. West, Middle East, UN, G77.

as *valence* and *matter* of event. A *matter* is the actual content of the event, while *valence* is a result of relation between the *event* and the *matter*. Based on these qualities, an *event* may be *negative*  $e^- (m)$ , *positive*  $e^+ (m)$ , *neutral*  $e^0 (m)$  or *conflictual*  $e^c (m)$ . The third and final component identified is *relations* that emerge between *actors* as a consequence of the *event*. The analysis distinguished three types of *relations*: *cooperative*  $A + B$ , *conflictual*  $A \times B$  and *justificative*  $A \Rightarrow B^+$ . As the term suggests, *cooperative relations* between countries emerge based on cooperation, while *conflictual relations* result from a conflict. *Justificative relations* are established when a certain aspect of an *actor* is justified<sup>33</sup> by another *actor* via the *event*. An example of components coding is to be found in Appendix A.

Figure 1: Representation of news stories in groups of narratives



The second research stage looked for storytelling scenarios. As a result of the analysis, four groups of narratives were identified, encompassing a total of twelve narrative patterns (*RR2*). The component of *actor* was used to define these groups: news stories featuring a foreign *actor* – **A**, two foreign *actors* – **A – B**, North Korea and a foreign *actor* **K – A**, and North Korea only – **K**. Figure 1 shows quantitative representation of news stories in each group. Nearly half of the news stories report about the *relations* between North Korea and a foreign *actor* and 23 % of news covers one foreign *actor*. A total of 86 articles reports about

<sup>33</sup> in a sense of legitimized, encouraged or supported.

North Korea only and 63 articles, the smallest group, feature *relations* between two foreign *actors*.

Further, all possible combinations of key components were analyzed in the text, yielding twelve narrative patterns as displayed in Figure 2. News stories featuring one foreign *actor* were found to contain *neutral*, *positive*, *negative* or *conflictual events*, dividing this group into four narrative patterns. *Conflictual events* occurring in one country cause conflictual relations between two groups of people within this country, which is marked as **A<sub>1</sub> x A<sub>2</sub>**. As for the news stories containing two foreign *actors*, the *relations* between them can be either *conflictual* (based on a *conflictual event*), or *cooperative* (based on a *positive event*); in some *conflictual relations*, *justificative relation* may emerge with a third *actor*, yielding a total of three narrative patterns in this group.

Figure 2: Narrative patterns of analyzed news stories

A : e <sup>0</sup> (m)	
A : e <sup>+</sup> (m)	[A – B] : e <sup>c</sup> (m → A x B)
A : e <sup>-</sup> (m)	[A – B] : e <sup>c</sup> (m → A x B) => C <sup>+</sup>
A : e <sup>c</sup> (m → A <sub>1</sub> x A <sub>2</sub> )	[A – B] : e <sup>+</sup> (m → A + B)
<hr/>	
K : e (m)	[K – A] : e <sup>+</sup> (m → K + A)
K : e (m) => K <sup>+</sup>	[K – A] : e <sup>+</sup> (m → K + A) => K <sup>+</sup>
	[K – A] : e <sup>c</sup> (m → K x A)

Note: → means “is causing”, [...] is used to separate group identification from actual *relations* between *actors* in particular patterns.

News stories about *relations* between North Korea and a foreign *actor* feature either *positive events* or *conflictual events*, based on *cooperative* or *conflictual relations* between North Korea and the other *actor*, respectively. In some cases, consequential *justificative relations* may emerge with North Korea. As for news stories featuring North Korea as the single *actor*,

only two general patterns were defined, based on whether the *actor* is or is not (self-) justified by the *event*.<sup>34</sup> Appendix B shows a quantitative representation of news stories in each pattern. Examples of components coding in selected patterns are presented in Appendix C and Appendix D. Appendix H includes examples of news stories in each pattern.

### ***Prevailing Themes and Composition Frames (RR3, RR4)***


As for the following research questions, the third stage examined the recurrence of countries and themes portrayed in the news stories. The results are shown in an overview summary (*RR3*) in Appendix H and interpreted in the discussion part of the article. Detailed results for selected patterns are also included in Appendix C and Appendix D. Lastly, a set of text composition techniques used in the analyzed text was defined (*RR4*) to answer the fourth research question. The CDA analysis found these techniques to be grouped in three areas: narrative timeline, logical coherence, and stylistic routines.

As for the **narrative timeline**, a frequent use of time relations through particular narrative frames was identified in the news stories. The analysis defined several related key principles. First, narratives are framed through the **cause and consequence** prism, providing explanatory background of the story. Next, narratives use the frame of **general truths** as a justifying context of the *event*, and **declared action** to provide declarative statements about the future. An example of this framing is described in Appendix E. Last, news stories portray *conflictual events* as continuous, with an origin in the past and possible continuation into the future, thus framing the narrative as a **continuity of evil**. However, based on *general truths* and through *declared action*, narratives suggest the need to discontinue this, calling for **termination of evil**. Figure 3 shows some of these principles of a narrative timeline in a selected sentence.

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<sup>34</sup> This division of the group “**K**” is not sufficient; domestic news featuring North Korea could be further coded and analyzed in terms of positive, negative or neutral events but this article will not elaborate on this further.

Figure 3: Example of the use of narrative timeline in a sentence



[...] Having driven into an abyss of ruin, completely forsaken by the public, the group is setting all reptile media in motion in a last-ditch effort to escape a stern judgment in the upcoming elections through an unlimited false propaganda and spread of misinformation and thus stay in power come what may. [...]

*Note:* Green arrows depict *continuity of evil*, *termination of evil* is marked with red.

The analysis further analyzed **logical coherence** of the text, looking for tactics of meaning distortion. In the narratives of *conflictual relations*, the criticized party may change throughout the news story. This *transposition of fault* is found in the following example: although the news story portrays Park Chung-hee as the criticized *actor*, last paragraph of the story transposes the guilt to Lee Myung-bak in this sentence:

[...] Even today **the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors in south Korea**, which **fully inherited the disposition of the past fascist dictatorship**, are getting hell-bent on the confrontation with the DPRK by concocting spy cases and other smear plots. -0-

Next, frequent **generalization** techniques were identified in defiance of logical coherence. These include generalizations of the criticized *actor*, such as “*west*” or “*imperialists*” in the case of “*USA*” (although the phrase “*USA and west*” was found as well), or the generalized collective identity of the author as seen in the following sentence:

[...] **It is well-known to every member of the nation** that the DPRK has so far made patient efforts for resumption of the north-south dialogue. [...]

In terms of introducing opinions to support the main narrative topics, the analysis found frequent *source disappearance* throughout the text. Both in the English and Korean versions, linguistic rules of indirect speech are violated (reported speech structures, quotation marks, transitivity of verbs) and citation is gradually absorbed into the general text. An example of this is explained in Appendix F.

Moving to **stylistic routines**, frequent use of *tropes and expressive language* was identified as a prevailing composition feature. Also, recurrent topics tend to be narrated through *language patterns*, resulting in nearly identical news stories. This is illustrated by Appendix G. Finally, in certain news stories, the analysis found dissonance with generally accepted journalistic news values, identifying *news-unworthiness* as a specific attribute of the analyzed news content. Appendix F shows an example of such a news story.

## Discussion

The present study analyzed the portrayal of world in the narratives of the selected sample of KCNA news stories. Based on the research findings, hypotheses about the world as seen by North Korea will be posed. The results show that this world is built on three key components: *actors*, *events* and *relations* between actors. While *actors* localize narratives in space, *relations* help set things in motion, relate actors to outside world and consequently shape its dynamics. The identified frames, through which these narratives are organized, related to narrative timeline and logical coherence, as well as stylistic routines, reveal the structure of this narrated world, values on which it is built and collective in- and out-group identity.

### *Ideal World and Dynamics*

The world as depicted by the analyzed news stories is dynamic. The results reveal the systematic use of a timeline and generalization as prevailing methods of reasoning. This is obvious in the frames of *cause and consequence*, *continuity of evil*, *general truths* and

*transposition of fault*. Based on the research findings, this study hypothesizes that dynamics of the narrated world is oriented towards the future. This orientation is systematically depicted as desired: it is *called for*, *officially declared*, one is *urged to make effort* to reach it, and it is even inevitable to certain extent. The future is described in concrete terms, always accompanied by values upon which it should be built. Based on the themes (the *matters of events – m*) and the topics found in the narratives, the *ideal world* that the narrated world's dynamics is oriented to, could be described:

*The pivot of the ideal world is nation, as an independent community of citizens whose civic needs, such as education, decent life conditions or security, are fully fulfilled by institutions of state. A nation should celebrate its sovereignty and is entitled to defend it by all means including military defense of its territory or its policies, such as nuclear or space program. There is no unemployment and the state delivers continuous economic growth. Close attention is paid to agriculture and its development through locally developed scientific technologies. Members of such a nation make every effort to contribute to the state's general progress; they are healthy, happy and friendly.*

Narratives related to the ideal world were mostly found news stories featuring one foreign actor (**A : f** group of patterns). The country most often portrayed in these narratives was **China**. In fact, whenever China is mentioned in the news stories of the **A : f** group, it is always in relations to this orientation to future. It can be therefore suggested that China plays the role of a trendsetter for North Korea. Also, in these news stories, China is always represented by state officials, most often by local government authorities. This framing presumes that the state, not private sector, is the key and the only vehicle capable of reach the ideal world.

### ***Relations and World Map***

News reports are structured through *relations* between *actors* as the narrated world is organized by relations between countries or groups of people within these countries. The



world map is stabilized and stereotyped through these relations. Out of the 445 analyzed news stories, 64 % refer to relations between two or more countries (**[A – B] : e** and **[K – A] : e** patterns). It is therefore possible to hypothesize that relations between countries, may they be good or bad, are a key structural element of the North Korea's worldview. Distribution of *cooperative* and *conflictual relations* between *actors* is fairly balanced, constituting 54,5 % and 45,5 %, of the total of news featuring relations, respectively.

### **Cooperative relations**

*Cooperative relations* are, with very few exceptions, found between **North Korea** and a foreign country. It seems therefore that the narratives portray North Korea as a leading positive force in the world, with its role as a world peace protector. There are *cooperative relations* found in the narratives, in which North Korea is described as a donor party, helping other (mostly the third world) countries, develop. On the other hand, there are also news stories featuring equal collaboration, in which the focus is on the equality of such cooperative relation, e.g. by strictly mentioning the reciprocity (foreign minister sends congratulations to foreign minister, president meets Kim Jong Il etc.). In these equally cooperative relations, various world countries (some of which never appear in other narratives) are mentioned as North Korea's partner. This, it could be argued, should enhance the position of North Korea as "normal" world country and diplomatic partner. South Korea, USA and Japan never appear in *cooperative relations* with North Korea, thus negatively correlating with their recurrent presence in the *conflictual relations*.

Very often praise and respect on the part of foreign countries for North Korea is depicted within these *cooperative relations*. It can be assumed that this plays two separate roles. First, it showcases the abundant friendly relations that North Korea purports to have with many countries. Second, it illustrates what aspects of the country are (and should be) appreciated, i.e. it is a means of the build-up of self-identity.

## Justificative relations

Identification of *justificative relations* is a key finding of this study. On average, almost every third news story of the dataset (27,5 %) portrays a *justificative relation* between *actors*. It can be described therefore as an essential composition principle, in addition to being a unique one to the analyzed text and possibly to North Korean rhetoric in general. *Justificative relations* between countries may emerge as a result of either *cooperative relations* between North Korea and another *actor* ( $[K - A] : f^+ (m \rightarrow K + A) \Rightarrow K^+$  pattern) or *conflictual relations* between two foreign *actors* ( $[A - B] : f^c (m \rightarrow A \times B) \Rightarrow C^+$ ).

Justification through *cooperative relations* consistently points at **North Korea's domestic issues**, such as its leaders, and specifically the relationship between the people and the leaders, *juche* and *songun* ideology etc. As for the narrative of *conflictual relations* causing justification, apart from rare exceptions, these also justify Korea, i. e. in most cases **C = K**. Such a justification focuses on **North Korea's foreign issues**, such as the image in the international arena, foreign policies towards certain countries, stance on the Korean unification or military defense. The underlying *conflictual relation* resulting into justification of North Korea's foreign issues is most often constructed as a direct criticism of a country **A** against South Korea (**B**).

In both of these narrative patterns, a variety of countries is introduced as the justifying *actor* (**A**). However, they are almost exclusively<sup>35</sup> represented by a DPRK-friendly association<sup>36</sup> and therefore do not represent an official position of the country. The analysis detected several mystification techniques used to enhance the legitimacy of these associations and in an apparent effort to make them appear as official voices of the particular country.

<sup>35</sup> The only two exceptions to this, recurrently found in the text, are Russia and Cuba. Official representatives of these countries are mentioned in *justificative relation* to North Korea. However, the evidence of this is not quantitatively significant so that resulting hypotheses could be made.

<sup>36</sup> We do not further elaborate on the phenomenon of these associations. A number of these is recurrently mentioned in the analyzed text, most of which cannot be verified in terms of their actual existence or activities. As for those that can be verified, however, the references made about them seem to be accurate (names of representatives, content of statements issued etc.).

These include recurrent reference of the country's name throughout the text (e.g. "*in Britain*", "*British*", "*from London*" in a single news story) or wide generalizations ("*Denmark criticizes*" instead of "*The Association of Study of Juche in Denmark*").

To conclude, quantitatively, *justificative relations* between a foreign country (represented by a DPRK-friendly association but still coming from the country) and North Korea form the largest narrative in the analyzed text. This narrative uses both a positive endorsement through collaboration of a foreign country with North Korea or open support for (and siding with) North Korea against its enemies. Consequently, it can be suggested that this narrative as well plays a crucial role in framing the in- and out-group identity: from the North Korean perspective, North Korea is a friendly peacekeeper, followed by many countries for its positive features (*Us*) and South Korea as the earmarked evil (*Them*).

### ***Conflicts and Notion of Evil***

The analysis detected *conflictual relations* between *actors* in almost every third news story (29 %), the most frequent narrative being direct criticism of a foreign country by North Korea, presented either as the medium's commentary or as a citation of other state's media. Interestingly, most *conflictual relations* do not depict two antagonistic sides with different values, opinions or interests as is expected in a conflict, but rather they focus on unveiling, describing and dealing with *evil* as the apparent cause of these *conflictual relations*. Several rhetorical strategies and frames related to the notion of *evil* were identified, such as *continuity of evil*, *transposition of guilt* or *generalization* of the criticized actor.

Based on the research findings, it could be hypothesized that this **notion of evil** is also a key structural element of the world as narrated in the analyzed text. Through the use of temporal propositions and dynamic frames, the *evil* is: 1. revealed, 2. criticized, 3. warned against, 4. doomed to be wiped out. The *evil* is frequently personalized and localized (therefore easily pointed out); it is portrayed as intended, not autogenous, but also not

inherent to mankind (which is by its nature peaceful), nor inevitable. It is considered an obstacle on the way to the *ideal world*, thus it must be removed.

Linguistically, the notion of *evil* has its specific lexicological and syntactic ways of expressions, such as specific types of emotive predicates (related to 1. – 4. above), creating negative propositional representations. Also, systematic **delegitimization of evil** is apparent. This is done both through the form of language (e.g. quotation marks in "*government*", lower case in "*south Korea*") and its meaning, such as that different groups of people are portrayed to stand out against the criticized *actor* making it “obviously” *evil* or various aspects of the *evil* are ridiculed, such as Lee Myung-bak's name as seen in Appendix F). This, again, adds to the negative propositional framing of out-group.

*Actors* which are identified as *evil* are **South Korea, USA and Japan**, in this chronological order and with statistically significant predominance over other countries. However, when closely analyzing propositional structures in the portrayal of these three countries, an implied distinction was identified between the state/government, of these countries and the people. This is most apparent in the narrative of strikes against the government in South Korea, or in the UK as well, for instance (**A : e<sup>c</sup> (m → A<sub>1</sub> x A<sub>2</sub>)** pattern): while the government is framed as *evil*, protesters are depicted in positive propositions so that it is logical to side with them. Similar framing could be found in the news stories featuring *negative events* in these countries (**A : e<sup>-</sup> (m)** pattern, example of components coding in Appendix D), such as homicide cases in Japan, violence in the USA etc.: the nation is not portrayed as bad, it is only the state that fails to provide for good life of its people and such forces people to act against their good nature.

## Conclusion

Despite the recent boom in studies on North Korea as explained above, further academic readings of North Korean cultural production is necessary, especially of cultural products available from out of the country. On North Korean cinema, for instance, there is no extended study.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, North Korean media have yet to be addressed in a scholarly manner, yielding studies available to general academia, both with focus on the country's media system as well as on the content. The present study brought up the issue of the validity of North Korean news messages as a source of information about the country. It should be noted that the research results discussed above may not be indicative of *all* the North Korean news content in diverse types of media and different time periods. Follow-up studies need to examine hypotheses developed in this article about the world as narrated by North Korean media.

To conclude, in the theory of communication, it is suggested that knowing the opponent's background, starting points, intentions and worldview, increases chances of this communication being successful, i.e. the message being conveyed. International relations *are* a form of communication, and certainly one with fatal consequences as well (its failure may cause wars). Therefore, it should be of high importance that we know North Korea as much as we can. Given this situation, it would seem rather irresponsible to ignore a main source of information from the country, easily accessible, official and providing enough research material, simply because we think it is mere propaganda.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This article draws on material in Hajzlerova Jana, "Narrative Patterns and Discourse Analysis as Methods of Ideology Decoding in the KCNA News" MA thesis (Media Studies), Charles University in Prague, 2013 (in Czech). The author would like to thank Elyssa Koren and Michal Vodrážka for their suggestions in editing this article.

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<sup>37</sup> Armstrong 2011, 369.

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## Appendices

### APPENDIX A: Example of components coding in a selected news story in [A — B] : e<sup>c</sup> (m → A x B) => C<sup>+</sup> pattern

#### DPRK FM Report Supported by Russia


Pyongyang, February 1 (KCNA) -- The **Russian Association for the Study of the Juche Idea** issued a statement on Jan. 26 in support of the report of the Disarmament and Peace Institute of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which disclosed the crimes committed by the south Korean authorities to seriously disturb peace and security in Northeast Asia. The statement **censured** the **south Korean authorities** for **having aggravated the tension in the Korean Peninsula and driven the north-south relations to the worst phase**. It hoped that all the parties in the region interested in its peace, stability and denuclearization would take positive measures to minimize the aftereffect of south Korea's Lee Myung Bak "government". -0-

- A** = Russia (*Association for the Study of the Juche Idea*)
- B** = South Korea (*south Korean authorities*)
- C** = North Korea
- e<sup>c</sup>** = (*censured*)
- m** = (*South Korea aggravated the tension in the Korean Peninsula and drove the north-south relations to the worst phase*)



**Appendix B: Representation of news stories in groups of narratives -**

**% of total (445 news stories) and number of news stories**



**Appendix C: Components coding in the narrative pattern of  $A : e^0 (m)$  –  
selected news stories related to the concept of *ideal world***

<b>A</b> (institution)	<b>e<sup>0</sup></b>	<b>↑</b>	<b>m</b>
<b>China</b> (Central Military Commission)	urged to	boost	advanced military culture
<b>China</b> (Premier)	calls for	improving	people's living standards
<b>China</b> (State Council of China)	calls for	increasing	fire-preventing capacity
<b>Group of 77</b>	made loud calls for	scale-up	global partnership to end poverty
<b>Russia</b> (Deputy Prime Minister)	calls for	developing	Space technology
<b>Venezuela</b> (President)	calls for	defending	nation's sovereignty
<b>China</b> (Minister of Public Security)	calls for	strengthening	frontier defense
<b>China</b> (Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress)	urged to	strengthen	People's Congress' work
<b>China</b> (State Council of China)	calls for	developing	agricultural science

**Appendix D: Components coding in the narrative pattern of  $A : e^- (m)$  –  
selected news stories in which  $A = \text{Japan / USA}$**

<b>A = JAPAN</b>	
<b><math>e^-</math></b>	<b>m</b>
murderer arrested	crimes
falls	net profit
reaches 2.84 Mio	jobless people
decreased	net profit
<i>(people died)</i>	heavy snow
<i>(people died)</i>	train and truck accident
falls	industrial production
falls	net profit
falls	vehicle output
logged	utilities net loss
caused	loss of net profit
found	excessive radioactive Cesium

<b>A = USA</b>	
<b><math>e^-</math></b>	<b>m</b>
cut	jobs
disclosed	air-force raptor weak point
amounted to	unemployment
is rampant	drug abuse
is bleak	economic prospects
is rampant	homicide cases
retreats	consumer confidence
<i>(people injured)</i>	casino site collapse

## Appendix E: Examples of frames related to narrative timeline and logical coherence

### General truths and generalization

[...] **It is quite natural** that the fair-minded media persons of south Korea courageously turned out in the actions against the traitors' group to make the media serve it and reactionary, deploring the miserable reality of media reduced to a despicable servant for the puppet conservative group. The media in the era of independent reunification **should be** a judge meting out punishment to the group of traitors keen on sycophancy towards the U.S. and confrontation against fellow countrymen and a bugler dynamically encouraging all Koreans in their general advance for independent reunification under the banner of "By our nation itself" **All the media persons in the DPRK** are firmly convinced that the south Korean media persons will surely emerge victorious in their actions for bringing earlier an independent and democratic society and giving steady continuity to the trend of the June 15 era of reunification. -0-

### Declared action

**A** said, **A** will not remain indifference (sic) [...]

**A** said, **A** will take proper action [...]

**A** said, **A** will never yield [...]

**A** said, **A** will not be influenced [...]

**A** said, **A** will firmly keep the independent stand [...]

**A** said, **A** will not concede the main principal for its stability and sovereignty [...]

**A** said, **A** will not retreat an iota from its rights. [...]

## Appendix F: Examples of source disappearance and news-unworthiness

### Source disappearance

#### Russia Urges U.S. and South Korea to Exercise Self-restraint

Pyongyang, February 3 (KCNA) -- Valery E.Sukhinin, **Russian ambassador to the DPRK**, at a press conference urged the United States and south Korea to consider the DPRK's concern over their projected joint military exercises on the Korean Peninsula.

This is certainly necessary for ensuring stability on the peninsula, **he said**, and **went on**: Russia calls on the U.S. and south Korea to exercise self-restraint in consideration of the Koreans' sad feelings over the passing of Kim Jong Il, chairman of the National Defence Commission.

The leadership of the DPRK declared more than once that it is its ultimate goal to denuclearize the peninsula by implementing the behest of President Kim Il Sung.

The DPRK, however, holds that an agreement should be mutually beneficial and it should not disturb the security of Korea but help strengthen it. -0-

*Note:* coded as **[A — B] : e<sup>c</sup> (m → A x B) => C<sup>+</sup>**

**A** = Russia, **B** = South Korea, **C** = North Korea

### News-unworthiness

#### S. Korea's Lee Myung Bak Satirized by School Children

Pyongyang, May 14 (KCNA) -- **Making analysis of the abbreviation for traitor Myung Bak** (MB) of south Korea has become one of plays for students of secondary schools in Pyongyang.

On May 8, KCNA heard a conversation between secondary school students in the Pyongyang Metro. They were Jang Chol Hyon (12) and Ri Kang Song (12) at Pyongyang Sangsin Secondary School.

Jang: Hey, Ri, it is said that rattish Myung Bak likes more to speak American-style English than his own mother tongue. What about making analysis of the abbreviation "MB"?

Ri: The letter M has already been believed to come from the word "mouse".

Then, what the letter B will stand for? As Myung Bak is considered to be a boss of the swarm of rats, B is appropriate to the word "boss".

Jang: But I think the word "break" is more suitable to it.

Ri: Oh, that's OK. Mouse Break! -0-

*Note:* coded as **[K — A] : e<sup>c</sup> (m → K x A)**

**A** = South Korea

## Appendix G: An example of language patterns in a selected narrative

### Birth Anniversary of Kim Jong II to Be Commemorated Abroad

Pyongyang, February 1 (KCNA) -- **A Guinean preparatory committee** and **a Norwegian joint preparatory committee were formed on Jan. 21 and 23 to commemorate the 70th birth anniversary of leader Kim Jong II.**

Riyad Chaloub, chairman of the Guinean National Committee for the Study of the Juche Idea, **was elected chairman of the Guinean preparatory committee** and Dag Norum, chairman of the Ostfold County Committee of the Communist Party of Norway, **chairman of the Norwegian joint preparatory committee.**

**The preparatory committees decided to organize various political and cultural events** on the occasion of the Day of the Shining Star. -0-

### Birth Anniversaries of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II to Be Commemorated Abroad

Pyongyang, February 2 (KCNA) -- **A British preparatory committee for commemorating the centenary of birth of President Kim II Sung and the 70th birth anniversary of leader Kim Jong II was formed on Jan. 28.**

Romanian and Ugandan **preparatory committees** and an Iranian national **preparatory committee** for commemorating the 70th birth anniversary of Kim Jong II **were formed on Jan. 18, 26 and 27.**

Andy Brooks, general secretary of the Central Committee of the New Communist Party of Britain, **was elected chairman of the British preparatory committee**, Vasile Orleanu, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Socialist Party of Romania, **chairman of the Romanian preparatory committee** and the chairman of the Al Hadi Islam Propaganda Organization of Iran **chairman of the Iranian national preparatory committee.**

**The committees decided to organize various political and cultural events** including joint seminar on the revolutionary careers of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II and their immortal exploits, remembrance meeting, round-table talks, photo and book exhibitions and film shows. -0-

*Note:* coded as **[K — A] : e<sup>+</sup> (m → K + A) => K<sup>+</sup>.**

**A** = Guinea, Norway / UK, Romania

## Appendix H: Research results – Overview

NARRATIVE PATTERN	SUBCATEGORY	EXAMPLE (TITLE)	RECURRENT COUNTRIES	RECURRENT THEMES	DYNAMICS
$A : e^0 (m)$	General statements	<i>Sri Lanka Celebrates 64th Independence Day</i>	All	Nation Agriculture	-
	Plans and Aspirations	<i>Chinese Official Calls for Strengthening Frontier Defense</i>	China		Development, Urge
$A : e^+ (m)$	Economic success	<i>Chile's Industrial Production Up 6.3 Percent in 2011</i>	Latin-America, 3 <sup>rd</sup> world countries	Employment	Development
	Plans and Aspirations	<i>Cuba Improves Railroad Services</i>	China	Agriculture Economy	Development, Effort
$A : e^- (m)$	Economic failure	<i>New Zealand Service Sector Struggles to Expand</i>	USA Japan	Unemployment	-
	Criminality	<i>Drug-Abuses Rampant among U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan</i>		Violence	Revelation
	Disasters	<i>Three Persons Die of Bird Flu in Hong Kong</i>	All	-	-
$A : e^c (m \rightarrow A1 \times A2)$	Institutionalized conflicts	<i>Protests Continue in U.S.</i>	South Korea	Illegitimate gov.	Criticism, Termination
	Criticism	<i>Plutocratic Economy Censured in S. Korea</i>			
$[A - B] : e^+ (m \rightarrow A + B)$	International cooperation	<i>Brazil to Boost Cooperation with Cuba</i>	Latin-America, 3 <sup>rd</sup> world countries	Economy, Culture	Cooperation
$[A - B] : e^c (m \rightarrow A \times B)$	Direct criticism	<i>True Colors of Human Rights Watch Exposed by Chinese Paper</i>	Pakistan vs. USA Palestine vs. Israel	hostility	Warning, Declaration, Revelation, Criticism, Termination
	Reported conflicts	<i>Iranian President Slams U.S. Pro-War Policy</i>			
$[A - B] : e^c (m \rightarrow A \times B) \Rightarrow C^+$	Support	<i>DPRK's Rejection of UNSC's „Joint Statement“ Supported in Britain</i>	North Korea (C), South Korea (B), All (A)	Illegitimate gov., Hostility to DPRK	Support
	Direct criticism	<i>Russia Rejects West's Sanctions on Iran</i>			Warning, Declaration, Criticism, Termination
$[K - A] : e^+ (m \rightarrow K + A)$	International cooperation	<i>Korean Books Donated to Cambodia</i>	3 <sup>rd</sup> world countries	Economy Culture	Cooperation
$[K - A] : e^+ (m \rightarrow K + A) \Rightarrow K^+$	Praise	<i>Nepalese Paper on Korean People's Trust in Kim Jong Un</i>	All	Leaders, Juche and Songun, Anniversaries, Diplomatic relation	Cooperation
	Documents	<i>Kim Jong Il's Brief Biography Carried in Bulgarian Bulletin</i>	All		
	Celebrations	<i>Centenary of Kim Il Sung's Birth Celebrated in Japan</i>	All		
	Congratulations	<i>Congratulations to Kim Jong Un from Various Countries</i>	All		
$[K - A] : e^c (m \rightarrow K \times A)$	Criticism	<i>Open Questionnaire of the Policy Department of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK</i>	South Korea USA Japan	Illegitimate gov., Hostility to DPRK	Warning, Declaration, Revelation, Criticism, Termination
$K : e (m) \Rightarrow K^+$		<i>Participants of Study Tours Vow Their Loyalty before Kim Jong Il's Birthplace</i>	-	-	-
$K : e (m)$		<i>Rice-transplanting Begins</i>	-	-	-