



8th ANNUAL KOREA UNIVERSITY GRADUATE STUDENT CONFERENCE

Marginalized Voices in Korean History

Friday, May 28th, 09:30 - 18:30

International Studies Hall (국제관) #321, #320, #318, Korea University

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Center for Korean History, Korea University

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8th Annual Korea University Graduate Student Conference

Marginalized Voices in Korean History

Date 09:30–18:30, Friday, May 28th, 2021
(GMT +9:00)

Venue International Studies Hall #321, #320, #318, Korea University
Zoom Online Meetings
Center for Korean History, Korea University

Sponsors Department of Korean History, Korea University
Global Human Resource Development Program in Korean History,
Korea University

09:30–09:45

Opening Remarks

International Studies Hall, #321
Zoom Meetings ID: 830 4785 7720
PW: 2021KUGS!a
Heo Eun (Director, Center for Korean History, Korea University)

09:45–10:00 Break

[Panel 1] Media, Counterculture, and Religion

International Studies Hall, #321
Zoom Meetings ID: 830 4785 7720
PW: 2021KUGS!a

10:00–12:00

Discussant: John Delury, Professor
Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University

Mass Media as a Contested Space of Historic Memory in Post-Democratization South Korea: The Anti-Chosun Movement as an Omen of South Korea's "History Wars", 1998–2004
Patrick Vierthaler (PhD Student, Kyoto University)

A Marginal Religion and COVID-19 in South Korea: Shincheonji, Public Discourse, and the Shaping of Religion
John G. Grisafi (PhD Student, Yale University)

From Scandals to the Vision of the Future: the Discourse of Counterculture in the 1960s and 1970s South Korea
Camille Sung (PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia)

Nationalizing Jianghu: Contesting Identities in Chinese Martial Arts Fiction
David Hazard (PhD Graduate, Stanford University)

Another Interpretation of the Ancient History Crisis: The Relationship to Korean New Religions
Evelyn Hyeonjeong Go (PhD Student, Korea University)

[Panel 2] Voices from the Diaspora

International Studies Hall, #320
Zoom Meetings ID: 897 8084 9334

PW: 2021KUGS!a

10:30-12:00

Discussant: Inga Kim Diederich, Assistant Professor
Colby College

The Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising: Collective Memories of the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising among
Korean-Japanese from Jeju Island

Sohee Hyun (PhD Student, Rikkyo University)

Ethnic Minority Education: Korean Schools in Japan

Sejin Cho (PhD Student, Osaka University)

The role of the Vietnamese immigrant community in the process of the formation and
development of the modern Republic of Korea

Nguyen Mau Hung (PhD Student, Hue University)

Alternative Voices of the Korean Diaspora in the United States: Korean Independence
and the Voice of America

Mi Hyun Yoon (PhD Candidate, Rutgers University - Newark)

12:00-13:30 Lunch Break

[Panel 3] Voices between the States

International Studies Hall, #321
Zoom Meetings ID: 830 4785 7720
PW: 2021KUGS!a

13:30-15:30

Discussant: Lisa Sangmi Min, Research Professor
Research Institute of Korean Studies, Korea University

African Presidents in Pyongyang: The Impact of North Korean Invitation Diplomacy
During the Cold War

Tycho van der Hoog (PhD Student, Leiden University)

A Pawn in the Great Game: Joseon' s rapprochement with the Russian Empire amidst
the British seizure of the Komun islands, 1884-1886

Daria E. Grishina (PhD Student, Academy of Korean Studies)

The Fault in Our Stars? Korea' s Strategy for Survival and Germany' s Rise, 1876-1910

Dylan Motin (PhD Candidate, Kangwon National University)

Colonial Joseon as Viewed by British Indian Cyclists: The Travel Accounts of Adi B
Hakim, Bapasola, Bhungara and Ramnath Biswas

Santosh Kumar Ranjan (PhD Candidate, GSIS, Yonsei University)

[Panel 4] Modernization and the Marginalized

International Studies Hall, #320
Zoom Meetings ID: 897 8084 9334
PW: 2021KUGS!a

13:30-15:30

Discussant: Daniel Kim, Assistant Professor
California State University, Fresno

The Public Maids on the Bus: Gendered Service of the Bus Attendants during the
1960s-70s

Minji Jo (PhD Student, Seoul National University)

The Making of an Intellectual: Yun Ch' i-ho' s Journey from Conservative Nationalist to Collaborator

Seung Soo Yoon (MA Student, Indiana University Bloomington)

'Don' t Be So Free-Willed: The Road to Gender Equality from the End of the Qing Dynasty to Contemporary People' s Republic of China

Troy Babcock (M Ed Student, Arizona State University)

Between refugees and citizens: Internal migration and changes in family relationship of rural poverty youth in the 1960s and 1970s

Gwangsoon Lim (PhD Candidate, Korea University)

[Panel 5] Contemporary Marginalized Voices and Women

International Studies Hall, #318

Zoom Meetings ID: 622 468 3149

PW: 2021KUGS!a

15:00-17:00

Discussant: Patricia Goedde, Professor
Sungkyunkwan University

Regulating Women' s Sexuality with Legislative Measures: Unmarried mothers in South Korea since the 1950s

Youlim Kim (PhD Candidate, Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

Different Faces, Same "Ville" – Population Transition in South Korea' s Camptowns

James Constant (MA Student, Leiden University)

'I would like to live the rest of my days without being ignored by others' : 'ideal' victimhood and South Korea' s 'comfort women'

Charlotte Mills (PhD Student, University of Leicester)

Forming a Sisterhood of Korean Nightingales under the Park Chung-hee Regime

Hyeseon Woo (PhD Candidate, Purdue University)

[Panel 6] Integration of Marginalized Communities

International Studies Hall, #321

Zoom Meetings ID: 830 4785 7720

PW: 2021KUGS!a

16:00-18:00

Discussant: Taejin Hwang, Assistant Professor
Kyungpook National University

Prospects for a Multicultural Korean Society: Minority Politics with a Focus on Afro-Koreans

Burcu Mirkelam (PhD Student, Education University of Hong Kong)

Integration Policy in South Korea: Beyond Multiculturalism

Felicia Istad (PhD Candidate, Korea University)

The actual conditions of Goryeo Dynasty so-people through the uprising of Myeonghakso-people

An Juyeong (PhD Student, Korea University)

Dasan Jeong Yakyoung's Perception and Reformation on the integration of Coastal Residents

Gang Won Lee (PhD Student, Korea University)

Procurement of Relief Resources and Management of Famine Relief in Suncheon-bu in 1876-1877

Lee Haengmuk (PhD Student, Korea University)

[Panel 7] Gender, Women, and Non-Normative Experiences

International Studies Hall, #320

Zoom Meetings ID: 897 8084 9334

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16:00-18:00

Discussant: Kyu Hyun Kim, Associate Professor
University of California, Davis

The Self-Diminishing Woman: Resistance through Metamorphosis in the Works of Han Kang

Cezara Miclea (MA Student, University of Bucharest)

Desire and Sin: Family Conflict in Korean Queer Cinema

Ni Sen (MA Student, Seoul National University)

“In the body of a woman” : the perception of self in the travelogues of Ŭiyudang Nam

Elsa Kueppers (PhD Student, Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

Homosexuality in the South Korean army: Human Rights and Kyriarchy

Mathilde Estevan (MA Student, Aix-Marseille University)

Decoding the Buddhist Narrative: Patronage and Salvation of Royal Women in the late 16th Century Joseon Dynasty

A Ram Park (PhD Candidate, SOAS University of London)

18:00-18:15 Break

18:15-18:30

Closing Remarks

International Studies Hall, #321

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Leighanne Yuh (Professor, Department of Korean History, Korea University)

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Mass Media as a Contested Space of Historic Memory in Post-Democratization South Korea: The Anti-Chosun Movement as an Omen of South Korea's "History Wars", 1998–2004¹

Patrick Vierthaler
Kyoto University

Introduction²

In late 2004, a group of conservative intellectuals launched a think-tank that was to mark the start of a process that constituted the first re-orientation of South Korean conservatism after 1948.³ Until 2006, a loose movement terming itself the South Korean "New Right," concerned with regaining influence over political, social and historical discourse, institutionalized itself, ultimately gaining a considerable degree of influence during the Lee Myung-bak (2008–13) and Park Geun-hye (2013–17) administrations.⁴

One key concern of these so-called New Right was "historical memory," in particular the collective memory of South Koreans concerning their modern and contemporary history.⁵ Scholars refer to South Korea in the 2000s and 2010s as a society in a "psycho-historical fragmentation",⁶ experiencing "history wars."⁷ New Right historical views were clashing with popular historical views, paving the way for intense disputes over hegemonic memory in public history, state-led and private commemoration, and high-school history textbooks.⁸

¹ This manuscript presents a research in progress. Please do not quote this manuscript without the author's explicit permission. Contact address of the author: vierthaler.patrick.54z@st.kyoto-u.ac.jp

² McCune-Reischauer Romanization is used to romanize Korean terms, except for names where different spellings are common-use in English, such as Seoul (instead of Söul), *Chosun ilbo* (instead of *Chosŏn ilbo*) or Roh Moo-hyun (instead of No Muhyŏn). However, in the bibliography, I stick to the correct transcription.

³ Park (2012: 496–497).

⁴ Cf. Vierthaler (2020a) and Tikhonov (2019) for studies on the New Right's institutionalization.

⁵ Regarding "collective memory", I construct my argument upon the German field of mnemohistory, in particular the works of Jan Assmann, Aleida Assmann and Astrid Erll. In short, I define historical struggles as disputes over "hegemonic Cultural memory", a metaphor for collective memory referring to a memory shaped by "elite carriers of memory" — historians, politicians, journalists — uniting a collective, in the modern age often a nation, around a "common past." This memory is not static, but dynamic, with a division into functional memory as "lived memory" and stored memory as a "reservoir for alternative explanations of the past" — memory stored in archives, libraries and private collections, waiting to be discovered by the historian. This allows to grasp mnemonic disputes not as ethic struggles over "right" versus "wrong", but to identify and define existing (multiple) memory communities within a given society, and to write a "social history of remembering" using memory as a heuristic device and a historical source. Cf. Vierthaler (2020b).

⁶ Kim (2019).

⁷ Kim CI (2016).

⁸ Cf. Vierthaler (2018, 2021) for two case studies concerning disputes caused by the emergence of the New Right movement and Kim CI (2016) for a study on the high-school textbook dispute.

However, to trace the emergence of historical disputes intensifying in the mid-2000s solely on the New Right neglects the structural and institutional continuities between the Fifth (1980–87) and Sixth (1987–present) Republics, in particular those in politics, media, and academia. As a result of these continuities, post-authoritarian South Korean society is generally said to be divided into two dominant political and intellectual camps, most commonly termed as “conservatives” (*posu*) and “progressives” (*chinbo*), with each camps roots in the 1960s–80s. In the author’s view, mnemonic struggles over historical memory are but one manifestation of this political and intellectual polarization.

The present study examines a hitherto overlooked, crucial cause for the increasing polarization that ultimately led to these “history wars”, namely the relationship between mass media (= journalism) and historical memory in the 1990s and early 2000s. As I will argue, examining the so-called Anti-Chosun Movement and its influence on both progressives and conservatives uncovers one significant cause for the emergence of the New Right movement. This allows to understand why, by the mid-2000s, progressives were perceiving conservative historical consciousness as a threat to their own legitimacy. In this context, I evaluate the Anti-Chosun Movement as an omen to South Korea’s “history wars” since the mid-2000s.

Early attempts at highlighting the *Chosun* issue, 1992–98

Kang Chun-man and Chosun ilbo before the Choi Incident

The emergence of *Chosun ilbo*⁹ as a disputed issue (*nonjŏm*) in South Korean society is closely tied to **Kang Chun-man**, a professor of media studies and political commentator who, in 1998, has established the monthly journal *Inmul kwa sasang*. Seeing himself neither as a progressive nor a conservative, Kang’s early interest lay in the way journalism shapes the image of politics — first in Reagan’s US (1989), later in South Korea (1992). His 1995 monograph *Kim Dae-jung chugigi* [Kim Dae-jung witch-hunt], in which he traced how Korean mass media had repeatedly attempted to paint a negative image of Kim Dae-jung, became a bestseller, turning Kang into a famous writer, who went on to publish extensively over the next decades.

In the foreword to *Kim Dae-jung chugigi*, Kang heavily criticized how, among the media conglomerates in the ROK, the *Chosun ilbo* in particular, as the country’s best-selling newspaper, was shaping public opinion in South Korean society. To Kang, *Chosun* was constituting “not just the country’s best-selling newspaper [but] the newspaper that is setting the agenda in our society”,¹⁰ a newspaper that was at the same time “fundamentally ideological

⁹ For matters of readability, I use *Chosun ilbo* and *Chosun* interchangeably to refer to *Chosun ilbo*.

¹⁰ Kang (1995: 33).

[and] commercial,” pretending “to ride on the train of democratization” while at the same time remaining a hardline, Cold War stance on the North Korea issue.¹¹ Firmly in the ownership of the *Pang dynasty*, Kang also criticizes how the owners praise themselves as constituting a constant, unchanging “evening president” as opposed to the political presidents who came and went.¹²

Already three years prior, Kang went much further in a February 1992 essay entitled “Dismantling all aspects of *Chosun ilbo*,” setting the agenda for his later crusade against the newspaper. Despite Kang’s emphasis on pointing out the issue of *Chosun ilbo* in post-authoritarian South Korea, namely in the role the newspaper played in deciding the 1992 presidential elections, Kang also calls attention to *Chosun*’s role in Korea’s modern and contemporary history, in particular to the relationship between the newspaper and the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan.¹³ By praising Chun Doo-hwan and the state’s actions in Gwangju, Kang argues, *Chosun ilbo* was able to achieve its dominant position within the South Korean media landscape after the 1980s.¹⁴

Kang supports his argument with *Chosun* articles from 1980 reporting on the Gwangju Massacre. On 28 May 1980, for example, *Chosun ilbo*’s editorial praised the military’s take-over of the city, writing: “One thing is clear at the present. The citizens of Gwangju need not feel any danger, fear or insecurity. [...] We must not forget the hard work of the military and their cautious actions”.¹⁵ In a strikingly similar fashion, Kang introduces, has *Chosun* welcomed Park Chung-hee’s coup d’état in 1961, writing that “this is an extraordinarily happy moment for the majority of our citizens”.¹⁶ In this context, Kang already in this essay points out the issue of *Chosun ilbo* as a collaborating newspaper during the colonial period, foreshadowing a latter connection of the Anti-*Chosun* discourse with the collaboration issue.¹⁷

At the same time, Kang refrains from criticizing the newspaper as “conservative”, instead stressing its nature as an “opportunistic” newspaper.¹⁸ By doing so, Kang avoids falling into the discursive trap of simplification into progressive and conservative.

In those years, it is crucial to highlight that Kang Chun-man was, despite the success of his 1995 monograph, mostly writing as a voice from outside the established intellectual spectrum. Kang’s views were a minority, but they were, as I argue below, later taken on by

¹¹ Ibid. 34–35.

¹² Ibid. 32–33.

¹³ Kang (1999 [1992]: 202).

¹⁴ Ibid. 196–198.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid. 199.

¹⁸ Ibid. 195–196.

Anti-Chosun activists. Furthermore, although Kang did criticize issues concerning the history and historical views of *Chosun ilbo*, his main interests were lying in the need for a media reform in post-authoritarian South Korea, the relationship between politicians and journalists, and the reliance of intellectuals on big media conglomerates to gain a stage for discourse.

Kang's interest in the *Chosun* issue was directly reflected in his journal *Inmul kwa sasang*, founded in May 1998, in the wake of the Kim Dae-jung's election as South Korea's first "progressive" president. From the first issue, *Chosun ilbo* was prominent in the journal, with critique of the newspaper centering, for the months from May to October, on the newspapers political reporting and the editorials of Kim Dae-jung and Ryu Kŭn-il.

KBS's Reform Documentary and Chosun ilbo, April–Sept. 1998

In addition to Kang and his pioneering role in the *Chosun* issue, an incident surrounding a documentary program at KBS in April–September 1998 brought to light the newspaper's difficult relationship with its own past. As part of a larger reform of Korea's public broadcaster, the production of a three-episode documentary to shed light on the close relationship between politics and media during the Fifth Republic, titled *Ije nŭn mal handa* [We can now speak about it], was in planning by a newly-formed journalistic team. As part of this program, in addition to critically examining KBS's own role during those years, a separate episode on *Chosun ilbo* was planned to air on 3 May.¹⁹

However, the planned episodes did not air. Instead, as an article in the progressive *Hankyoreh* from 21 April made public that pressure was put on the production team from both within KBS and from outside to change the title of the program.²⁰ Only in September,²¹ after a tumultuous back and forth, and pressure from *Chosun ilbo*, did two episodes on KBS's and *Chosun*'s past entanglement with politics during the autocratic period air, under the name of "Media and Power, Avoiding




Figure 1: A caricature printed in the progressive *Hankyoreh* on 30 April 1998, following a week of events in which it was made public that a planned KBS documentary critically examining the history of *Chosun ilbo* during the autocratic period would not be aired.

¹⁹ "‘Ije nŭn mal handa’ pangsong kongsa chŏt kohae sŏngsa “이제는 말한다” 방송공사 첫 고해성사,” *Hankyoreh* (1998.4.21).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ The author decided to shorten this section for limits of space.

Responsibility”.²² This was met, unsurprisingly, with opposition from *Chosun ilbo* and *Tonga ilbo*,²³ but no further actions from the newspaper followed. What this episode reveals is that, concerning its history, *Chosun ilbo* was determined to suppress any criticism, and Korea’s public broadcaster in mid-1998 was ready to succumb to such pressure.

The Choi Chang-jip Incident and the Origins of Anti-Chosun

Shortly after, an incident surrounding the memory and interpretation of the Korean War erupted, paving the way for *Chosun ilbo* to emerge as a widely discussed issue within society.

A Misquotation and several Defamation Lawsuits, Oct. 1998–Nov. 1999

In the November issue of *Chosun*’s monthly *Wŏlgan Chosun* [Monthly Chosun], an article concerning the scholarship of Choi Chang-jip, a distinguished historian of the Korean War and a renowned political scientist,²⁴ who in 1998 was serving as advisor to President Kim Dae-jung, was published (figure 2).²⁵ The article misquotes Choi’s scholarship that Kim Il-sung’s decision to attack the South in 1950 was a “historic step” (*yŏksajŏgin kyŏldan*) and that the biggest victims of the War were the people (= *minjung*) in the North. This was taken as proof by the author, as well as the journalist Yi Han-u in two follow-up articles in the daily,²⁶ that Choi’s historical views were damaging Southern legitimacy and constituting a “pro-North” stance — in other words punishable under South Korea’s anti-communist National Security Law. *Chosun* journalists went so far as to narrate the articles as a “thought inspection” (*sasang kŏmjŭng*), bringing back the darkest day of the Red Purge in authoritarian South Korea.²⁷

²² “KBS ‘kaehyŏk rip’ot’ŭ’ 30-il chŏt pangsong KBS ‘개혁리포트’ 30 일 첫 방송,” *Hankyoreh* (1998.7.28).

²³ “Ilbu naeyong ohae issŏ pallon podo yoch’ŏng 일부 내용 오해 있어 반론보도 요청,” *Tonga ilbo* (1998.10.11); “Pangsong sŏngjŏng kyŏngjaeng wihŏm suwi ch’ongpung tŭng p’yŏnp’a podo sim hada 방송 煽情경쟁 위험수위 銃風등 편파보도 심하다,” *Chosŏn ilbo* (1998.11.3).

²⁴ Park Myung-lim (2011: 120–128), in his study on the historiography and memory of the Korean War, evaluates Choi as a significant scholar who helped to bring new perspectives into Korean War historiography in the later 1980s and early 1990s, and who helped to foster interdisciplinary research whilst remaining a distance from both orthodox and revisionist interpretations of the War.

²⁵ U Chong-ch’ang 우중창: “‘6.25 nŭn Kim Il-sŏng ŭi yŏksajŏg kyŏldan’: ‘che-2 ŭi kŏn’guk’ ch’uchin kwa tŏburŏ chumok toenŭn Choe Chang-jip ŭi han’guk hyŏndaesa sigak “6.25 는 金日成의 역사적 결단” – ‘제 2 의 건국’ 추진과 더불어 주목되는 崔章集의 한국 현대사 시각,” *Wŏlgan chosŏn* (1998.11), pp. 206–222.

²⁶ “Han’guk chŏnjaeng kwallyŏn Choe Chang-jip wiwŏnjang nonmun palch’oe migun kwa han’gukkun ŭi 38-sŏn tolp’a ‘konggyŏkchŏk p’aengch’anguŭi ŭi pallo 한국전쟁 관련 崔章集위원장 논문 발췌 美軍과 한국군의 38 선 돌파 “공격적 팽창주의의 발로,” *Chosŏn ilbo* (1998.10.26); “Choe Chang-jip wiwŏnjang 6.25-gwan podo kwallyŏn chaeya, chosŏn ilbo sŏngt’o 崔章集위원장 6.25 觀 보도 관련 在野, 朝鮮日報 성토,” *Chosŏn ilbo* (1998.11.3); “Chosŏn ilbo chugigi 조선일보 죽이기,” *Chosŏn ilbo* (1998.11.4).

²⁷ E.g. “Taet’ongnyŏng chamun haeksim konginkŏmjŭng mattang 대통령 자문 핵심공인(公人)....검증 마땅,” *Chosŏn ilbo* (1998.10.24).




Figure 2: An article in the November 1998 issue of *Wŏlgan chosun*, which caused the Choi Chang-jip Incident. In it, Choi’s scholarship is distorted and misquoted to paint him as a “pro-North” “leftist” and to undermine his credibility as a presidential advisor.

On 23 October, Choi sued the newspaper over distorting and misquoting his historical views, demanding a prohibition of the distribution of the November issue and a compensation of five-hundred million Won.²⁸ On 12 November, the Seoul District Court reached a verdict, forcing a prohibition of distribution and *Chosun ilbo* to delete all related articles from the internet, and arguing that *Chosun*’s actions connect to constitute a defamation of Choi’s scholarship.²⁹ The newspaper filed an appeal. On 19 January, however, Choi declared that he would withdraw his lawsuit, having reached a mediation with *Chosun ilbo*.³⁰

While the Choi Incident appeared to have ended with the settlement between the two parties, criticism towards *Chosun ilbo* had been intensifying since November. In particular, Kang Chun-man and his journal *Inmul kwa sasang*, and Chŏng Chi-hwan of the progressive monthly *Mal* were fervently condemning *Chosun* in their articles. While Kang’s activities stance goes back to 1992, Chŏng and *Mal*’s *Chosun*-critical posture was a direct outcome of the dispute surrounding the KBS documentary in early 1998.

²⁸ “Choe Chang-jip kyosu ‘han’guksa yŏn’gu waegok podo’ wŏlgan chosŏn e 5-ŏk sonbaeso 최장집교수 “한국사연구 왜곡보도” 월간조선에 5 억 손배소,” *Hankyoreh* (1998.10.23); “Chosŏn ilbosa chinbo insa konggyŏk kwagŏ sarye 조선일보사 진보인사 공격 과거사례,” *Hankyoreh* (1998.10.23).

²⁹ “Choe Chang-jip kyosu nonmun ‘woegok podo’ wŏlgan chosŏn 11-wŏlho: pŏbwŏn, p’anmae kŭmji kach’yŏbun kyŏljŏng 최장집교수 논문 ‘왜곡보도’ 월간조선 11 월호: 법원, 판매금지 가처분 결정,” *Hankyoreh* (1998.11-12, page 1).

³⁰ “Choe Chang-jip kyosu sosang nonjaeng ‘pongchap’ 최장집교수 사상논쟁 ‘봉합,’” *Hankyoreh* (1999.1.19); “Choe Chang-jip kyosu sosong chwiha 최장집교수 소송 취하,” *Hankyoreh* (1999.1.20).

On 1 December, Yi Han-u of the *Chosun ilbo* announced to file a lawsuit at the Seoul District Court against Kang, Chŏng, and Kang Chun-u (publisher of *Inmul kwa sasang*), demanding one-hundred million Won compensation for defamation from each for two articles published in December 1998.³¹ Furthermore, on 11 December, Cho Gap-je, at that time the chief editor of *Wŏlgan Chosun*, also filed a lawsuit against *Mal*, demanding five-hundred million Won in compensation. After Choi's settlement with the newspaper, however, public interest in the issue faded, forcing Kang and Chŏng to fight their lawsuit without media interest.

Aggravating this difficulty was the fact that, aside from a number of articles in *Hankyoreh* (and *Chosun ilbo*), other newspapers were not reporting the developments.³² This, Han Yun-hyŏng argues, rather led to a sloppy stitch-up the incident for *Chosun ilbo*, and Yi Han-u, the involved journalist in the causa, emerged as a major figure in *Chosun*'s attempts to stir historical memory in the direction of the newspaper's official narrative.³³

Kang Chun-man's "Find your Place-Movement" and Monographs on the Chosun Issue, 1999
Another outcome of the Choi Chang-jip Incident was that Kang Chun-man, who had been a vocal critic of the newspaper for years, started a "Find-your-place-movement" (Che Mok Ch'ajajugi Undong) as well as a movement to stop buying the newspaper. At the same time, the first monographs dealing openly with the *Chosun* issue appeared. In April 1999, *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl asimnikka?* [Do you know *Chosun ilbo*?] (Kang 1999a) was published, followed by *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk* [The *Chosun ilbo* republic] (Kang 1999b) in June. At this stage, Kim Tong-min and Yu Si-min, who would later be prominent members of the Anti-Chosun movement, started to partake in *Chosun*-related activities. While Kang and Chŏng were fighting their lawsuits, such "militant writings"³⁴ began to make the *Chosun* issue gradually visible among (mostly progressive) intellectuals.

Already during the Choi Incident, on 19 November, Kang led the establishment of the Joint Measures Committee on Falsifying and Distorted Reporting in the Chosun Ilbo (Chosŏn Ilbo Hŏwi / Waegok Podo Kongdong Taech'aek Wiwŏnhoe, hereafter Joint Committee).³⁵ Loosely involving approximately forty organizations, the Joint Committee published the

³¹ "Chosŏn ilbo kija 'mal' 'inmul kwa sasang' e sonbaeso 조선일보 기자 '말'인물과 사상'에 손해소," *Tonga ilbo* (1998.12.01).

³² Reporting on the Choi Incident centered primarily on *Chosun ilbo* and *Hankyoreh*. Unsurprisingly, the two newspapers took diametrically opposed stances in their reporting.

³³ Han (2010: 94–95).

³⁴ Hong (2000: 9).

³⁵ "'Chosŏn ilbno kongdaewi' paljok '조선일보 공대위' 발족," *Hankyoreh* (1998.11.20).

pamphlet *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl haebu handa* [Dissecting Chosun ilbo]. However, mostly confined to progressive organizations, the impact of the Joint Committee remained rather weak.

Towards the Establishment of the Anti-Chosun Federation, 1999–2000

One year after the Choi Incident, on 19 November 1999, the Seoul district court reached a verdict in the three lawsuits against Kang Chun-man, Chŏng Chi-hwan and Kang Chun-u, convicting Kang and *Inmul kwa sasang* for seven million Won of compensation and Chŏng (*Mal*) of 4 million Won compensation against Yi Han-u, whose honor had been, according to the court, defamed in the December 1998 articles.³⁶ These verdicts, as time would tell, were crucial in shaping discourse towards the formation of a full-fledged “Anti-Chosun” movement.

Immediately after the verdict was made public, the bulletin board on the website of *Inmul kwa sasang* experienced a significant rise in posts, from approx. forty per day before to over two-hundred per day after the verdict.³⁷ Among the discussion, the idea to collect the compensation fee from the crowd appeared, which was eventually accepted by Chŏng.³⁸

However, the real incentive that appears to have made the issue visible can be located in a column published in the (progressive) *Hankyoreh* on 29 November. Hong Se-hwa, an expert on contemporary French affairs, wrote an article “Sue me!”, in which he compared recent court rulings in France, where the French far-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen successfully sued a critical journalist for defamation, only to outrage a large portion of the French left-wing as a result, who were crying “Sue me!” in unison. Hong, on the recent court ruling against Kang Chun-man and Chŏng Chi-hwan, argued:

My interest lies [neither in the honor of a *Chosun ilbo* journalist or the French far-right, but], to phrase it simply, in “Korea’s honor” [and] in overcoming the extremist camps in our society and their mouth piece, the *Chosun ilbo*. This is why I declare [...]: “Sue me!”³⁹

From Online to Offline: Urimodu and the Hwang Sŏk-yŏng Incident, Jan.–Aug. 2000

In the weeks following the verdict against Kang and Chŏng, and in the wake of Hong Se-hwa’s op-ed in the *Hankyoreh*, people interested in the causa started to assemble online.⁴⁰ At some point between late December 1999 and early January 2000, a bulletin board named Anti-Chosun

³⁶ In Chŏng’s case, the lawsuit against Yi would continue until 2003, when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Chŏng and against *Chosun*. Cf. Chŏng (2006: 438).

³⁷ Han (2010: 105).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ “Na rŭl koso hara! 나를 고소하라!,” *Hankyoreh* (1999.11.29).

⁴⁰ Han (2010: 118).

Urimodu [We all against Chosun] opened its doors in cyberspace. Abbreviated as *Urimodu*, this discursive space laid the institutional framework for the Anti-Chosun Movement.⁴¹ Han Yun-hyŏng argues that despite the site being rather small, over the next months, the nature of Urimodu users as “keyboard warriors” contributed significantly to the visibility of the *Chosun* issue.⁴² Directly taking on Hong’s language from the November 1999 op-ed in *Hankyoreh*, a “Sue me!”-movement took on shape, culminating in a full-page commercial page in *Hankyoreh* in the issue on 7 July 2000, paid for by Urimodu users, which in large letters said “Sue me, Chosun ilbo!” and included the names of 1,700 signees.

Against this background, in the summer of 2000, the *Chosun* issue began to gradually draw the attention of an increasing number of (mostly progressive) intellectuals. One contributing factor for this development lay in the *First North-South Summit*, which was held on 15 June 2000. While progressives were unequivocally welcoming Kim Dae-jung’s policy of détente with the North, conservatives — and in particular the *Chosun ilbo* — rallied against any such attempts.⁴³

According to Kim Tong-min, a central figure in the Anti-Chosun Movement after 2000, the atmosphere following the First North-South Summit was significantly different from that during the Choi Chang-jip Incident two years earlier, with *Chosun* increasingly “opposing reforms [and] recurring confrontationist Cold War rhetoric”.⁴⁴ This has led, Kim continues, an increasing number of intellectuals to feel the need for establishing a social movement to spread awareness of the *Chosun* issue and ultimately aims to re-shape the consciousness of Koreans regarding its media landscape.⁴⁵

A second, not neglectable factor, was the establishment of new, progressive media — the internet-based newspapers *Ddanzi ilbo* and *Oh My News*. This helped advancing the popularization of Anti-Chosun ideas, whose reporting centrally featured the issue, much more so than established (progressive) print media.⁴⁶

Around this time, a controversy surrounding a literary prize sponsored by *Chosun ilbo* took place. In May–July, *Hwang Sŏk-yŏng* (b. 1943), a progressive novelist, got involved into the Anti-Chosun discourse. Hwang, whose work in the 1970s and 80s has been shaped by

⁴¹ To date, most of the Urimodu bulletin board remains inaccessible, even with the help of tools such as the Wayback Machine.

⁴² Han (2010: 118–119).

⁴³ The influence on conservative newspaper reporting following the North-South Summit in the establishment of an Anti-Chosun civic organization was explicitly mentioned by Kim Tong-min, which to him, differed from the largely intellectual debate of the Choi Jang-jip Incident two years earlier. Cf. Kim TM (2000b: 14).

⁴⁴ Kim TM (2000b: 14).

⁴⁵ Ibid. 17.

⁴⁶ Over the next years, *Oh My News*, much more so than *Hankyoreh*, would emerge as an organ which disseminated progressive historical causes.

opposition to military dictatorship. Hwang had visited North Korea in 1989 and underwent voluntary exile in New York and Germany thereafter before returning to South Korea in 1993, where he was arrested on charges of the NSL and sentenced to seven years in prison. Hwang was only released by a presidential pardon of Kim Dae-jung in 1998.

On 7 June 2000, *Seoul sinmun* reported a decision by Hwang to turn down interviews with *Chosun ilbo*.⁴⁷ This announcement was preceded by a dispute surrounding an interview Hwang's with *Chosun* published on 18 May (the anniversary of the Gwangju Massacre),⁴⁸ after which Hwang was heavily criticized by Urimodu users. Hwang's public declaration to decline any further interviews with the newspaper was, according to the article, the first such public declaration by an intellectual. Over the next weeks, it was made public that Hwang's novel *Orae toen chŏngwŏn* [The ancient garden], his first novel since the 1980s, would be nominated for the **Tongin Literature Prize**, an award sponsored by *Chosun ilbo*.⁴⁹

In an essay published in *Hankyoreh* on 19 July, Hwang announced that he would reject the nomination for the prize, citing *Chosun*'s "collusion with the fascist military dictatorship" and its influence as an "ideologue for the establishment" as two major reasons, and further assessing the newspaper as a "prime-example of reactionary media" whose reform is a "necessary for historical development in the context of our times".⁵⁰ Placing his opposition to the newspaper (and the literary prize associated with it) in the context of historical truth and reconciliation, Hwang further emphasizes a need for a "detailed, mass movement for media reform that clearly lays out an alternative."⁵¹ Hwang's public declaration against *Chosun ilbo* consists a third factor that made the *Chosun* issue more visible in the months up to the summer of 2000.

Four Intellectuals' Manifestos and the Establishment of the Anti-Chosun Federation

On 7 August 2000, the "First manifesto of intellectuals rejecting *Chosun ilbo*" (*Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu hanŭn che-il-ja chisik'in sŏnŏn*) was made public, followed by three more manifestos on 11 October, 4 March (2001), and 20 September (2001). The intellectuals signing the manifesto

⁴⁷ "Sosŏlga Hwang Sŏk-yŏng ssi 'chosŏn ilbo wa nŭn int'ŏbyu sajŏl' 소설가 황석영씨 "조선일보와는 인터뷰 사절"," *Seoul sinmun* (2000.6.7)

⁴⁸ "Chŏhangjŏk riŏllijŭm chakka Hwang Sŏk-yŏng int'ŏbyu 저항적 리얼리즘 작가 황석영 인터뷰," *Chosŏn ilbo* (2000.5.18).

⁴⁹ "'Tong'in munhaksang' 1-ch'a simsa chakka 9-myŏng ŭi 10-p'yŏn ppoba '동인문학상' 1 차심사 작가 9 명의 10 편 뽑아," *Chosŏn ilbo* (2000.6.6)

⁵⁰ "[T'ŭkbyŏl kigo] Tong'in munhaksang hubojak ŭl kŏbu handa [특별기고] 동인문학상 후보작을 거부한다," *Hankyoreh* (2000.7.19).

⁵¹ Ibid.; Hwang's rejection of *Chosun ilbo* was the start for a separate dispute on mass media's influence over literature that would be known as the Literature Power Dispute [*munhak kwŏllyŏk nonjaeng*] later-on.

were not only concerned about an institutional media form, an issue that had been debated in post-authoritarian South Korea since at least the early 1990s, but also, and, especially, in raising awareness for the *Chosun* issue as one issue in an on-going process of democratization, historical truth and reconciliation (*kwagosa chǒngsan*), and détente with North Korea.⁵²

Criticizing an anti-reform stance of “conservative” media, the manifesto goes on to brand *Chosun ilbo* as a “flunkeyist” (*sadaejuŭi*), i.e. pro-US, newspaper that “aims, without doubt, to turn back the wheel of history.”⁵³ Out of these reasons, the signees to the manifesto swear, as “reform-oriented or progressive intellectuals [...] not to participate in this business model of *Chosun ilbo*,” ultimately demanding:

Resolution:

(1) We demand that *Chosun ilbo* repents its past and apologizes in front of the citizens and the ethnicity.

(1) Until the above is happening, we will neither publish in *Chosun ilbo* nor accept any requests for interviews with the newspaper.⁵⁴

This first manifesto was signed by 154 people, among them historian Kim Tong-chun and media studies scholar Kim Tong-min, joint representative of the CCDM. The second manifesto, signed by 152 more people, also included the renowned (contemporary) historians Kang Man-gil, Han Hong-gu and Chǒng Hae-gu among its signees. Together, the four manifestos were signed by 1,575 intellectuals.

The first manifesto was significant in that it opened up the *Chosun* issue beyond Kang Chun-man and *Inmul kwa sasang*. While up to this point, the issue had mostly received attention within a small circle of intellectuals, *Chosun ilbo* now drew the attention of a large part of South Korean society. Between late August and early October, concrete plans were made to establish a civic organization dedicated to the *Chosun* issue. In this process, Kim Tong-min would become one of the leading figures.

⁵² The (first) manifesto states: “South Korean society finally, at this time, has broken down the walls of autocracy and division and set off on a long journey towards democracy and peaceful unification. This is the time when we must, by reforming, settle the legacy that dictatorship, corruption and irrationality have left us for this transitional period. Amidst the fact that not even the remnants of the Japanese Empire have been settled, there can be no bright future without setting straight the distorted history that dictators have committed. [...] Indispensable in this process is the element of mass-media. [...] In particular, we are paying attention to *Chosun ilbo*, a reactionary newspaper loved by the establishment, that is not merely opposing any [media] reform, but openly in favor of forceful unification” (Kim TM 2000a: 7–8).

⁵³ Ibid. 9.

⁵⁴ Ibid.



Figure 3: An Anti-Chosun demonstration on 20 September 2000, shortly preceding the establishment of the ACF. Source: *Oh My News* (2000.9.20).

At first, a name emphasizing the anti-reform and anti-unification stance of *Chosun* was considered.⁵⁵ However, eventually, Federation of Citizens Opposing Chosun Ilbo (Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae, hereafter Anti-Chosun Federation, ACF) was adopted as the name of a new umbrella civil organization, assembling over 51 civic organizations under its roof. On 11 October 2000, this federation was officially established. On the same day the second manifesto was released.

While the basic contents of the statement remained largely unchanged compared to the First Manifesto, the connection of the Anti-Chosun Movement — as the movement was soon referred to — to an on-going, transitional process of historical truth and reconciliation was even more apparent in the ACF's inaugural declaration, in which the ACF emphasized

Chosun's “distortion of history” and its self-branding as a “conservative” newspaper.⁵⁶ The founders of the ACF clearly placed their opposition to the newspaper's “distorted reporting” and its “distorted historical views” in a historical context.

As such, the establishment of the Anti-Chosun Federation demonstrates the role that, for progressives, (conservative) media was perceived to play in a process of “setting history straight.” While a history textbook reform had been achieved in 1997, new findings regarding

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ The inaugural declaration states: “Now, we are shaking off the long yoke of division and dictatorship, turning towards a new age of democracy and unification. We are the point where we are turning from the Cold War towards living together as equals, from dictatorship towards democracy, from a monopoly towards equality, from conflict and feuds towards harmony and concord. However, such a future is not given to us without effort. We still have not been able to overcome the heavy shadow of a dark past cast on all areas of politics, society, economy, culture, religion and education. [...] In the face of this calling towards a transitional period, we must emphasize the liberty of the press. [...] However, at this day, the shape of media in our countries is [...] one in which [the media] stands in retrogression to the current of the times in order to protect its own company's vested interests. Amidst [this media landscape], the one which is the biggest problem is without doubt the *Chosun ilbo*. Instead of repenting its own past and devoting itself to the efforts of reforming itself as a newspaper of the people, *Chosun ilbo* is re-igniting the values of the bygone period of the Cold War and dictatorship, using this as a survival strategy and thus having become a target of public criticism. [...]. Reasons why we are opposing *Chosun ilbo*: First, [...] we point out that *Chosun ilbo* is undertaking distorted reporting on a daily basis. [...] Second, we focus on the shameless distortion of history by *Chosun ilbo*. [...] Third, we oppose the disguise used by *Chosun ilbo* to refer to its standpoint as ‘conservative.’” Source: “Chosŏn ilbo pandae simin yŏndae sŏnŏnmun 조선일보반대 시민연대 발족선언문,” *Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae* Homepage, <http://www.antichosun.or.kr/info3.htm> (2001.10.11). Accessed via the Wayback Machine.

past state violence were emerging almost on a daily basis, and the discourse on uncovering the role former “pro-Japanese collaborators” had in the ROK elite was intensifying, the issue of structural and institutional continuities in the media landscape, exemplified by the *Chosun ilbo*, unfolded as one of the defining issues in the following years.



Figure 4: The logo of Anti-Chosun, used by both Urimodu and the ACF.

progressive intellectuals publishing within the *Chosun ilbo*; (b) movements to stop buying *Chosun ilbo* or to make subscribers cancel their subscription; and (c) raising awareness through education.⁵⁷

Despite all internal discussions on the movement’s direction, raising awareness through education and other activities was to become central to the movement.⁵⁸ Primary sources from the people involved reveal that a central motivation for Anti-Chosun activists did not lie in a “negation” of *Chosun ilbo*. Rather, in an enlightenment fashion, involved intellectuals aimed to re-shape the consciousness of those Koreans who take the reporting of *Chosun ilbo* as “normal.” In the words of an editorial published in *Tangdae Pip’yŏng*, a progressive monthly, Anti-Chosun’s main aim lay in calling attention to the “reactionary Cold War that has been internalized as the ruling ideology by the people [= *minjung*] in their daily life”.⁵⁹

The above-quoted editorial for example hinted at a broader struggle not just against *Chosun ilbo*, but against the “Cold War reactionary establishment” per se.⁶⁰ To Kim Tong-min, *Chosun ilbo* did not constitute an ordinary media outlet, but the “central organ of the reactionary political camp”, and, as such, was impossible to be reformed but only a subject to be

⁵⁷ Cf. Hong (2000), Kim YI (2000), Kim CN (2000) or Kim TM (2000a/b) on these Anti-Chosun internal debates.

⁵⁸ Among the activities actually carried out by the ACF was a lecture series from October–December 2000, one-man demonstrations in front of the *Chosun* headquarters in March–May 2001, a cultural festival in September 2001, and the publication of a *Weekly Anti-Chosun* (*chugan anti-chosŏn*) after 2003.

⁵⁹ Quoted after Kim TM (2000b: 16).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

overcome.⁶¹ At the same time, among Anti-Chosun activists, however, critical voices against any type of one-sided media — i.e. the *Hankyoreh* as an equally selective media for the progressive camp — were also voiced,⁶² revealing a plurality of the Anti-Chosun camp.

Despite such internal factional struggles, Kim Tong-min evaluates the ACF's establishment to have increased visibility of the *Chosun* issue not only among a large number of progressives, but also within the general public itself.⁶³ At the same time, he argues that due to its nature as a federation closely tied to the CCDM, the ACF was tied by institutional constraints that prevented it from gaining more influence in the following years.

Reconstructing the whole development of the Anti-Chosun Movement would go far beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, in the next sections, I will focus on the three following key issues: (a) Anti-Chosun's possibilities and limits on a local level; (b) Anti-Chosun's politicization in its connection with the rise of Roh Moo-hyun; and (c) Anti-Chosun as a transitional movement of "settling the past."

Anti-Chosun's Possibilities and its Limits: the "Okch'ŏn Struggle"

While Anti-Chosun on a national level remained loose in its structure and organization, the movement was most successful on a local level, in the county of Okch'ŏn, located east of Daejeon in South Chungcheong Province. A week after the First Manifesto was proclaimed, **O Han-hung**, president of the local newspaper *Okch'ŏn sinmun*, on 15 August 2000, formally declared "independence" from *Chosun ilbo* in Okch'ŏn,⁶⁴ establishing the Okch'ŏn Civil Gathering to Properly Understand Chosun Ilbo (Chosŏn Ilbo Paro Pogi Okch'ŏn Simin Moim, abbrev. deliberately as "Chosŏn Pabo" [= lit. "Chosun idiots"]) on the same day.⁶⁵ First catching attention of the issue in 1998, when, as outlined above, the CCDM released a pamphlet to raise awareness of the newspaper in the wake of the Choi Chang-jip Incident, O began to focus his actions to raise awareness of *Chosun ilbo* in the county in particular in the context of the on-going collaborator discourse.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Kim TM (2002a: 138–139).

⁶² Ko (2000).

⁶³ Kim TM (2002a: 128).

⁶⁴ The full text of the inaugural proclamation can be retrieved in: "Chosŏn ilbo ro putŏ ūi Okch'ŏn tongnip sŏn'ŏnsŏ chŏnmun 조선일보로부터의 옥천독립선언서 전문," *OhmyNews* (2000.11.28).

⁶⁵ "'Chosŏn ilbo paro pogi Okch'ŏn simin moim' kongsik ch'ulbŏm '조선일보바로보기 옥천시민모임' 공식 출범," *OhmyNews* (2000.8.22).

⁶⁶ "'Ŏllon paro seuryŏmyŏn Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok haengwi kyumyŏng put'ŏ' "언론 바로 세우려면 조선일보 반민족행위 규명부터," *Hankyoreh* (2020.3.23).



Figure 5: A commemorative photo to proclaim the “independence” of Okch’ön from *Chosun ilbo* in order to create a “beautiful world without *Chosun ilbo*”. 15 August 2000.
Source: *Oh My News*.

Activists involved in the Okch’ön group began referring to themselves as “*mulch’ong* [water gun] independence army” (abbrev. *mulch’ong*). The local Anti-Chosun movement was soon known as the “Okch’ön Struggle” (*Ok’chön t’ujaeng*) in the rest of South Korea.

The language used in the local Anti-Chosun movement in Okch’ön was military and historical in its connotations (figure 5). O did proclaim “independence” (*tongnip*) on 15 August, the day South Korea commemorates its liberation/independence from Japanese colonial rule. As such, the influence of *Chosun ilbo* on South Korean society was syntactically compared to being under colonial rule. Activists referred to themselves as (water) “guns”, and the local movement was termed a “struggle.” This, Kim Tong-min argues, was no coincidence: instead, Anti-Chosun in Okch’ön was crucially connected to the collaborator discourse.⁶⁷ In Okch’ön, *Chosun ilbo* was primarily perceived as a pro-Japanese, i.e. anti-national, treacherous newspaper. With “*chiniil*” as its only slogan, Anti-Chosun was able to capture a significant amount of attention in the county.

Kim asserts that the local success of Anti-Chosun in Okch’ön was made possible only by the presence of a strong local newspaper, i.e. O Han-hun’s *Okch’ön sinmun*. Unlike in most regions of South Korea, in which the big conglomerates dominate the market, Okch’ön

⁶⁷ Kim TM (2002a: 131-133).

possessed a strong local media and, on top of that, a president who was heavily interested in the Anti-Chosun discourse from a historical perspective.

This primarily *local* Anti-Chosun movement was quite successful, reducing the number of *Chosun* subscriptions from approx. 1,200–1,500 to 370 in a county of roughly 60,000 inhabitants.⁶⁸ Furthermore, over the next years, events such as an “Anti-Chosun Marathon” were held in Okch’ŏn in October 2003 and 2004.

With this local success, aims to form *mulch’ong* on a national scale appeared,⁶⁹ but the success of Okch’ŏn was not reciprocated elsewhere. The case of Okch’ŏn, with the presence of a strong regional newspaper, and a connection to the collaborator discourse, both reveals the prospects and limits of Anti-Chosun in early 2000s South Korean society.

Roh Moo-hyun and the Politicization of Anti-Chosun, 2002–2004

MDP Party Primaries and Anti-Chosun

In hindsight, we know that, after a tumultuous year, Roh Moo-hyun, narrowly defeating Lee Hoi-chang (Yi Hoe-ch’ang) of the Grand National Party, emerged victorious from the sixteenth presidential elections held in December 2002. Despite Roh’s eventual victory, however, even his candidacy on the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) ticket seemed unclear until late into November the same year.⁷⁰

In April–May 2002, the MDP was holding party-internal primaries, the first such in South Korean history allowing ordinary party members to participate in the electoral process. At that point, Yi In-jae or Chung Tong-yŏng seemed as likely candidates for the ticket. However, in the second and third primaries in Ulsan and Gwangju on 10 and 16 March, Roh managed to defeat his opponents. Particularly in Gwangju, Roh was making a strong showing, and, despite Yi victories in Daejeon and South Chungcheong, Roh carried most of the remaining primaries. Rhetoric in the primary contests was at times fierce, and throughout the elections, an influence of Anti-Chosun discourse on ordinary party members was apparent. Roh himself had, already in mid-November 2001, announced to boycott any interviews with *Chosun ilbo*, adopting one of Anti-Chosun’s key demands of boycotting the newspaper.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Kim TM (2002a: 129–130).

⁶⁹ “‘Tongnipgun undong, ‘Mindŭllae’ ch’ŏrŏm chŏnguk hwaksan ŭl’ ‘독립군 운동, ‘민들레’처럼 전국 확산을,’” *Okch’ŏn sinmun* (2000.11.28).

⁷⁰ Cf. Lee (2002) for a brief overview over the 2002 presidential election.

⁷¹ “No Mu-hyŏn komun, Chosŏn ilbo int’ŏbyu kŏbu 노무현 고문, 조선일보 인터뷰 거부,” *OhmyNews* (2001.11.14).

On 6 April, in his speech for the MDP Incheon primary (which Roh carried with 51.9% of the vote), Roh explicitly criticized *Chosun ilbo* (and other conservative media) in a speech that did not just heavily attack his party-internal opponent(s), but clearly reveals how Anti-Chosun had an effect on his political views:

Conspiracy theories. Red Purge. Unfounded schemes. Stop these now! It is tough to defend yourself against the badmouthing of the GNP and *Chosun ilbo* kissing each other's heads. [...] I never said, not now and not in the past, to nationalize media. [Yet,] I am attacked [by conservative media] because I am not bending to pressure to abandon owner share limitations. I must not become a president who [...] is submissive to the media. [...] *Tonga ilbo*, *Chosun ilbo*: keep your hands off the MDP primary!⁷²

At the background of this speech lay a primary in which Yi, Roh's major rival to the party ticket, denounced Roh as “red”, “leftist”, and “pro-North”, and in which the three major newspapers (*Chosun ilbo*, *Tonga ilbo*, *Chungang ilbo*) took a decisive pro-Yi, anti-Roh stance in their reporting on the MDP primaries.⁷³

Furthermore, Yu Si-min, a trusted aid of Roh, former legislator (2003–2008), author and present chairman of the Nosamu Foundation, has examined in a monograph released in mid-April 2002 how Roh's conflicting relationship with *Chosun ilbo* dated back to the late 1980s, when the young Roh Moo-hyun made his name as a critical human rights lawyer in the process to reveal historical truths regarding the past autocratic regimes and was first elected to parliament in 1988.⁷⁴

The Establishment and Activities of Joase

During the MDP party primaries, a new stream of Anti-Chosun began to emerge. Aiming “to transform and spread Anti-Chosun as a movement into daily life”,⁷⁵ A Beautiful World Without Chosun Ilbo (*Chosŏn [= Joseon] Ilbo Ōmnŭn Arŭmdaun Sesang*, abbrev. Joase) was established in March–April 2002. Institutionally connected to the Nosamu Foundation,



Figure 6: Anti-Chosun activists at an MDP primary, 16 March 2002.

⁷² “No Mu-hyŏn hubo Inch’ŏn kyŏngsŏn yŏnsŏl chŏnmun 노무현 후보 인천경선 연설 전문,” *OhmyNews* (2002.4.6).

⁷³ This has been analyzed by Kang (2001, 2003a, b).

⁷⁴ Yu (2002: 28–68).

⁷⁵ “Choase e tae hayŏ 조아세에 대하여,” *Chosŏn ilbo ōmnŭn arŭmdaun sesang*, <http://www.joase.org/subb/b-joase.htm> (last accessed 2020.12.23).

Joase's creation was a direct result of the Roh-critical reporting in South Korea's major newspapers. As Kim Tong-min evaluates, Joase's name was certainly influenced by O Han-hung's proclamation of "independence" on 15 August 2000.⁷⁶ Joase from the start had, due to its connections with Nosamu, branches all over South Korea as well as abroad.⁷⁷

In its establishment manifesto, Joase laments how the big media conglomerates in South Korea, in particular *Chosun*, abuse their position of power to advance their interests.⁷⁸ To Joase, *Chosun ilbo* was the "mouthpiece of the Japanese Empire and the military dictatorships."

Joase focused its activities on spreading Anti-Chosun's message in the streets. Most prominently, Joase produced a pamphlet entitled *Ttak!* (figure 7), which was distributed in public places to over 400,000 people. Joase also compiled their own newspaper, and was holding speeches in urban areas. By doing so, Joase hoped to raise awareness to the *Chosun* issue where the mostly intellectual-centered branches of of Kang/*Inmul* and Urimodu/ACF had failed. Like Urimodu, however, Joase boasted an energetic community of netizens that, to some extent, remains active to the present day.⁷⁹ The success of Joase in distributing their views through pamphlets and the internet apparently raised the caution of *Chosun ilbo*, who directly sued the NGO.⁸⁰



Figure 7: *Ttak*, a pamphlet produced by Joase, distributed roughly 400,000 times.

From digitally available materials, it can be deduced that despite the movement's aim to disseminate "Anti-Chosun views" into daily life, similarly to *mulch'ŏng* in Ok'chŏn, the collaborator discourse took a central stage in Joase's activities.⁸¹

The Roh Moo-hyun Administration, Anti-Chosun, and the Emergence of the New Right

Roh Moo-hyun remained his critical stance towards conservative media even after he was inaugurated president. In October 2004, following a GNP-orchestrated impeachment and a decisive victory of newly-created Uri Party earlier in the year, his government announced the

⁷⁶ Kim TM (2002b: 133–134). For matters of space, the author has left out the section on Anti-Chosun as a local movement as seen in the case of Okch'ŏn and the *Okch'ŏn sinmun*.

⁷⁷ HP. However, the precise nature of these branches remains unknown to the author as of today.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Unlike the websites of Urimodu and the ACF, Joase's materials are still available online.

⁸⁰ However, at present, the author has not yet carried out further research into detailed Joase activities or the nature of the trial against the organization.

⁸¹ It remains to be analyzed how (and if) Joase influenced Roh Moo-hyun, and how Joase further shifted the focus of Anti-Chosun as a whole towards the collaborator discourse.

will to undertake a significant media reform — something that Kim Dae-jung in 2001 had spectacularly failed to carry out.⁸²

Despite a majority in the legislative, the anticipated reform of 2004 failed as well. As argued in a prior paper, Roh's attempted media reform and his on-going critical stance towards "conservative" media partly contributed to the rise of South Korea's New Right movement in late 2004 and early 2005.⁸³ Despite the GNP being involved in an extensive corruption scandal in 2003–04, the Roh administration's incorporation of Anti-Chosun into government agenda angered the South Korean establishment. As a result, the three major newspaper, in particular the *Tonga ilbo*, heavily pushed the New Right as an alternative to both the "old" GNP and Roh's "failed" government, providing them with a crucial space to dissent their views into South Korean society, and ultimately being able to influence the GNP under Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye.

Of course, Anti-Chosun was by far the only factor in this rise — the on-going collaborator discourse and Roh's push for a state-led truth and reconciliation commission, as well as attempts to reform the country's private education system all contributed to a sense of frustration among conservatives — but Anti-Chosun as a movement was significant that its rhetoric and goals were supported by a large share of progressive intellectuals, and key goals of Anti-Chosun activists — such as shedding light on the relationship between media, politics and historical memory, and further "democratizing" South Korean society by uncovering continuities within the ROK establishment — were ultimately also visible in mnemonic disputes following the rise of the New Right such as the 2008 Foundation Day Dispute,⁸⁴ the dispute surrounding the construction of a National Museum of Contemporary History,⁸⁵ or the decade-long struggle over high-school history textbooks, their approval process and contents.⁸⁶

Anti-Chosun and Historical Memory

Kim Tong-min, one of the intellectuals most actively involved in raising awareness of the *Chosun* issue in regards to history and historical memory, emphasized the function of Anti-Chosun in the wider context of historical truth and reconciliation as follows:

⁸² For matters of space, I left out how Kim Dae-jung's will to carry out a media reform and a tax investigation in major media conglomerates in June 2001 was one factor of Anti-Chosun throughout 2001.

⁸³ Vierthaler (2020: 41–45).

⁸⁴ Cf. Vierthaler (2018).

⁸⁵ On the construction of the National Museum of Korean Contemporary History, cf. Yi/Hong (2012) and Kim (2013) for two critical observations of the process.

⁸⁶ Cf. Kim CI (2016).

The first act that we must carry out in order to open up the history of a new era is [...] to thoroughly repent and settle wrong history. It is impossible to create a new, healthy history without assessing and settling the mistakes of the past.

Before the ACF's establishment, alleged praise of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee in the *Chosun ilbo* had already caught the attention of Urimodu users.⁸⁷

From primary sources,⁸⁸ it can be deducted that the Anti-Chosun movement mainly focused on three issues: (1) *Chosun ilbo* as a pro-Japanese, i.e. collaborationist newspaper before liberation; (2) the close connection between *Chosun ilbo* and Park Chung-hee during the 1960s and 1970s; and (3)) the history of *Chosun ilbo* in connection to the Gwangju Massacre and the Chun Doo-hwan regime. Taken together, Kim terms this the “three submissive histories of *Chosun ilbo*”, demanding a repenting, an apology and ultimately an overcoming from the newspaper. This is, as argued above, similar to Kang's problem consciousness from the early 1990s as outlined above.

Anti-Chosun and the Collaborator Discourse

Regarding the collaborator issue, Kim Tong-min highlights that, against the newspaper's own history as a proud, ethnic-Korean newspaper [*minjokji*], *Chosun ilbo* instead was opportunistic during the colonial period, especially during the war years after 1937. Furthermore, the collaborator issue is intertwined with the post-liberation elite, i.e. the fact that in the shadow of the emerging Cold War, attempts to purge and convict former collaborators were interrupted by the Rhee government in the name of anti-communism, and many former collaborators retained their posts, forming the much of the ROK elite after the 1960s. This history is referred to by Kim as a “concealment of the past”,⁸⁹ and reflects criticism that was already made by Kang Chun-man four years earlier.⁹⁰ To Anti-Chosun activists, **Pang Il-yŏng** and **Pang U-yŏng**, the president and chairman of *Chosun ilbo*, were precisely such collaborators.

Furthermore, such activities were, in the eyes of Kim, treacherous to the Korean nation:

[After liberation,] those who were pro-Japanese during the period of the Japanese Empire almost unequivocally prolonged their political life by taking a pro-US stance. *Chosun ilbo* walked precisely the same way. They had no interest in the future of either the state [= *kukka*] nor the nation [= *minjok*] [...].

⁸⁷ Kim YJ (2000: 26–27).

⁸⁸ Kim TM (1999: 65–90, 2000, 2001: 23–48).

⁸⁹ Kim TM (1999: 82–83).

⁹⁰ Kang (1995: 32–33).

As a newspaper speaking for the nation, in other words a national newspaper [= *minjokji*], seen through the context of world history, [*Chosun ilbo*] had to take on the role of correctly reading international affairs after the end of WWII, provide a course for national history, and determine the strength of the people [= *minjung*]. At that time, the historical task [of Koreans] can be expressed by the creation of a unified, independent, sovereign state. What did the *Chosun ilbo* do?

Just like other pro-Japanese collaborators who spent the liberation period in hiding, president Pang U-yŏng groped for resurgence by adopting a pro-US, anti-communist ideological stance. To say nothing of repenting for his pro-Japanese activities, he once again started walking an anti-national [= *pan-minjok*] way.⁹¹

However, Kang Chun-man — who is sometimes referred to as a “moderate” as opposed to “progressives” — is cautious against such judgements. Instead of mainly criticizing *Chosun ilbo*’s history, Kang rather draws attention to the role of the newspaper in creating and influencing historical memory.⁹² Taking the memory of Syngman Rhee as an example, Kang laments a tendency to judge Rhee as either black or white, to either glorify or brandmark his image. To Kang, such simplified memory raises caution, emphasizing the need to focus on newspapers and their role in the creation and revision of historical memory.

Kang evaluates a nostalgia for Park Chung-hee, as well as a glorification of Syngman Rhee, as a “PR success” of the establishment trying to keep their influence over South Korean society. An over-focusing on the successful economic development in historical memory, Kang argues, facilitates that political corruption and other negative aspects originating in the Park Chung-hee era remain outside of the historical consciousness of most South Koreans. This, Kang emphasizes, is also a responsibility of academics, who fail to gain influence over the broader public.⁹³

Anti-Chosun and the Memory of Yusin

Second, concerning *Chosun*’s past during the 1970s and 1980s, problem awareness following the ACF’s establishment is strikingly similar to the points outlined in Kang’s 1992 essay introduced above. For example, Kim Tong-min highlights the salutatory editorials published in the newspaper on 18 October 1972, following the proclamation of the Yusin constitution, in which *Chosun ilbo* welcomes the reform as “just the right measure at just the right time [...] for improving the democratic system.”⁹⁴

⁹¹ Kim TM (1999: 81–82).

⁹² Kang (1999: 82–117).

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ *Chosun ilbo* (18 October 1972), quoted after Kim TM (1999: 85).

What differs from Kang's problem awareness of 1992 was that, at this time, the thirty years of military dictatorship are connected to the pro-Japanese collaborator discourse, with hopes by Kim and others of the ACF to make *Chosun* repent for its past in this context:

A tragedy of our history is without doubt that, not properly having settled the remnants of pro-Japanese activities, pro-Japanese collaborators played the leading role of history without an excuse, without sanctions, and without any other measures. They continue to prosper without a sense of guilt.⁹⁵

Anti-Chosun, Gwangju, and Chun Doo-hwan

The third issue that directed the attention of Anti-Chosun activists was the Gwangju Massacre and *Chosun ilbo*'s role in it. While the 1950s–70s remained, for most Koreans in late 1990s and early 2000s, a rather distant past, the events of May 1980 and its aftermath were central to not just intellectuals and other former student activists, but at the core of a post-authoritarian consciousness.⁹⁶ For the progressive camp, scholars speak of Gwangju as a “formative moment.”⁹⁷ Therefore, unsurprisingly, Gwangju received a significant amount of attention from Anti-Chosun activists.

As revealed above, Kang Chun-man had already stressed in the mid-1990s that *Chosun ilbo* has achieved a significant growth in the 1980s and connected this issue to the newspaper's stance during the Gwangju Massacre. Similarly, Kim Tong-min emphasized the same aspects, further emphasizing how *Chosun ilbo* wrote idolizing articles on Chun Doo-hwan in the months following Gwangju.⁹⁸ On 23 August 1980, in an article titled “Chun Doo-hwan the human” (*ingan Chŏn Du-hwan*), the newspaper painted a picture of a man who “put public before private.” A week later, on 28 August, *Chosun ilbo* hailed Chun's election to president as the “beginning of a new era.”

The *Chosun* articles concerning Gwangju and the rise of Chun to power, to Kim Tong-min, constitute “not even a [journalistic] article. They are highly agitating essays full of distortions”, which were continuing throughout the 1980s.⁹⁹ Kim concludes this in the context of the on-going process of historical truth and reconciliation, writing that “the tragedy of Korean contemporary history is the fact that we were never able to interrupt and settle a wrong course of history.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Kim TM (2000: 33).

⁹⁶ Cf. e.g. Shin and Kang (2003) on the legacy of Gwangju in post-authoritarian South Korea.

⁹⁷ E.g. Suh (2010).

⁹⁸ Kim TM (1999: 85–88, 2000c: 27–33).

⁹⁹ Kim TM (2000: 29).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 31.

As was already clear within the ACF's establishment manifesto, the above writers place Anti-Chosun solidly within an epistemological framework of "settling" (*chǒngsan*) the past. Furthermore, by using terms such as "era of division" (*pundan sidae*) and "era of unification" (*t'ongil sidae*), terms coined and used by historian Kang Man-gil, Kim Tong-min further demonstrates the entanglement of Anti-Chosun within a progressive discourse.

Conclusive remarks

In 2010, *Chosun ilbo* had remained the no. 1 newspaper on the South Korean market, selling 1,8 million copies a day compared to 1,31 million (*Chungang ilbo*) and 1,25 million (*Tonga ilbo*).¹⁰¹ For comparison, the progressive *Hankyoreh* sold 283,000 copies, *Kyŏnghyang sinmun* 267,000. Although absolute numbers have been going down since then, these proportions remain largely unchanged to the present day. This demonstrates that, speaking in absolute numbers,¹⁰² the Anti-Chosun can hardly be evaluated as a success. The big three remain powerful, while progressive newspapers struggle to find a larger audience.

However, the Anti-Chosun movement must be evaluated as a success in terms of raising awareness for historical issue among the progressive camp, as well as to the role of big media in shaping historical memory and public opinion in post-authoritarian South Korea. Overall, Anti-Chosun can be divided into four main branches (table 1), each of them focusing on a different issue.

Period	Involved Actors	Classification	Major issue(s)
1992–	Kang Chun-man / <i>Inmul kwa sasang</i>	Intellectual	Media reform
1999–	Urimodu / Anti-Chosun Federation	Online, intellectual	Media reform, historical memory
2000–	Mulch'ong / <i>Okch'ŏn sinmun</i>	Regional	Historical memory (<i>ch'inilp'a</i>)
2002–	Joase (Nosamu Foundation)	Politicalization	Political reporting, <i>ch'inilp'a</i>

Table 1: The four main streams of the Anti-Chosun Movement. Compiled by the author.

In the context of historical memory, Anti-Chosun was connected to two trends of historiography and historical memory in the 1990s. The first was the reflection of new findings on the Korean War into South Korean Cultural memory in relation to South Korea's anti-

¹⁰¹ 2010 is the first year concrete data regarding the distribution of newspapers became available.

¹⁰² How much these numbers tell over the influence of a newspaper in the age of digital news consumption, in particular after the spread of smartphones, remains a topic for future research.

communist tabooization of the war, exemplified by Choi Chang-jip Incident, namely the outrage caused in late November 1998 in regard to Choi's misquoted and simplified statement in *Wŏlgan Chosun* that Kim Il-sung's decision to attack the South was "historic" and the Northern people the "greatest victims" of the war.

The second was Anti-Chosun's placement within a larger process of settling past affairs, and historical truth and reconciliation. Most notably, progressives came to perceive *Chosun ilbo* not just as a newspaper closely connected to past military dictatorships, but as a "pro-Japanese", establishment mouthpiece that ultimately was anti-ethnic and anti-unification in its opposition to Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy and any further détente with North Korea. With the politicization of Anti-Chosun in the shadow of Roh Moo-hyun's rise to the presidency, the collaborator discourse became central to the cause, far eclipsing the political and institutional goals of the movement such as media reform.

Abbreviations

ACF	Anti-Chosun Federation	조선일보반대시민연대
CCDM	Citizens Council for Democratic Media	민주언론시민연합
GNP	Grand National Party	한나라당 (1997.11–2012.2)
Joase	A Beautiful World Without Chosun Ilbo	조선일보없는 아름다운 세상
KBS	Korea Broadcasting Station	
MDP	Millennium Democratic Party	새천년민주당 (2000.1–2005.5)
ROK	Republic of Korea	

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- Weekly magazines: *Hankyoreh 21*, *Sisa Chŏnŏl*
- Monthly magazines: *Inmul kwa sasang*, *Mal*, *Sin tonga*, *Wŏlgan chosŏn*, *Tangdae Pip'yŏng*, *Sahoe pip'yŏng*, *Chungdŭng Uri Kyoyuk*

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**A Marginal Religion and COVID-19 in South Korea:
Shincheonji, Public Discourse, and the Shaping of Religion**

한국의 주변종교와 코로나 19: 신천지, 대중담론과 종교의 형성

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Abstract: In the spring of 2020, South Korea became the second most infected country in the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid spread of the virus was attributed to a Christian religious group known as Shincheonji. The association of this already controversial religion with the spread of the virus quickly led to public condemnation of the group. The public response to the group's association with the virus was, in part, built on an existing foundation of distrust and suspicion. In this paper, I examine the details of Shincheonji's association with the coronavirus and the public reaction to it. I show the political work done by classificatory language pertaining to religion, specifically as it influences perceptions of the legitimacy of marginal religions and how the public should treat them. I also examine how public discourses on what religion should or should not do shape the definitions and boundaries of religion and associated categories.

초록: 2020 년 봄, 한국은 코로나 19 팬데믹 사태에 있어 세계에서 두 번째로 많은 감염자를 갖은 국가가 되었다. 바이러스의 급속한 확산은 신천지로 알려진 기독교 종교 단체의 탓으로 여겨졌다. 이미 논란이 많았던 이 종교와 바이러스 확산의 연관성은 신천지를 향한 대중의 비난을 일으켰다. 이 연관성에 대한 공공의 반응은 일부 기존 불신과 의혹을 바탕으로 생겨났다. 이 논문은 신천지와 코로나 19 의 세부적인 연관성 그리고 이 연관성에 대한 공공의 반응을 탐수해볼 것이다. 필자는 종교와 관련된 분류적 언어에 의해 행해진 정치적 작업을 제시할 것이다. 특히, 그 언어가 주변종교들의 정당성에 대한 인식과 대중이 그들을 다루는 방식을 어떻게 영향을 미치는지 살펴볼 것이다. 또한, 필자는 종교가 어떠해야 하고 어떠하면 안 되는지에 대한 대중 담론이 종교의 개념과 종교와 관련된 개념의 정의와 범위를 어떻게 형성시키는지 논해보겠다.

Keywords: Korea, marginal religion, Shincheonji, COVID-19, religious freedom

키워드: 한국, 주변종교, 신천지, 코로나 19, 종교의 자유

In late February 2020, South Korea experienced a sudden rise in the infection rate of COVID-19. The infection rate doubled overnight on February 21, and within two weeks it increased 16-fold, from 433 cases to more than 7,000. The majority of these cases were in or near the city of Daegu, where a woman designated “Patient 31”, a member of the Shincheonji Church of Jesus, was identified as a so-called “super spreader,”¹ and the largest infection cluster was consequently within the Daegu Shincheonji congregation.² But Shincheonji was already controversial *before* the COVID-19 pandemic and this had a significant influence on the public response to that religion’s association with the virus. Preexisting negative attitudes toward Shincheonji, and the categorical language used to describe it, shaped the public discourse on this group, its link to COVID, and approaches taken toward it.

Formally known as the Shincheonji Church of Jesus, Temple of the Tabernacle of the Testimony (*Shincheonji Yesugyo Jeunggeo Jangmak Seongjeon*, 新天地예수교 證據帳幕聖殿), Shincheonji is a South Korean Christian religious movement established in 1984 by Lee Man-hee (李萬熙, b. 1931).³ It was influenced by two other Christian religious movements Lee had been involved with earlier. It is just one of many so-called “new religions” in South Korea today

¹ I use the term “super-spreader” only to indicate its popular usage in media discourse on Patient 31 and Shincheonji. According to Emma Cave, the term “super-spreader” can refer to “almost any infected individual who is not physically isolated from others” and can also “potentially be used to describe events, policies or settings.” Cave notes the term can be problematic in that “it can lead to undeserved apportionment of moral blame to alleged superspreaders.” Emma Cave, “COVID-19 Super-spreaders: Definitional Quandaries and Implications,” *Asian Bioethics Review* 12, no. 2 (June 2020): 235.

² Kelly Kasulis, “‘Patient 31’ and South Korea’s Sudden Spike in Coronavirus Cases,” *Al Jazeera*, 3 March 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/31-south-korea-sudden-spike-coronavirus-cases-200303065953841.html>; David D. Lee, “Coronavirus: In South Korea, Mounting Anger, Rumours over Shincheonji Church as Cases Rise,” *South China Morning Post*, 27 February 2020, <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3052550/south-korea-mounting-anger-rumours-over-shincheonji>; Yonhap News Agency, “S. Korea’s Virus Cases Surge to 433 on Church Services, Cluster Outbreak at Hospital,” *Yonhap News*, 22 February 2020, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200222001157320?section=national/national>.

³ In this article I utilize the Revised Romanization system for rendering Korean words in the Latin alphabet. For more on Shincheonji and its history, see David W. Kim and Won-il Bang, “Guwonpa, WMSCOG, and Shincheonji: Three Dynamic Grassroots Groups in Contemporary Korean Christian NRM History,” *Religions* 10, no. 3 (March 2019): 1-18; and Massimo Introvigne, “Shincheonji: An Introduction,” *The Journal of CESNUR* 4, no. 3 (May–June 2020): 3–20.

with roots in Christianity. Because, like most new religious movements, it breaks in some way with the established traditions in its theology and liturgy, it is frequently regarded as “heresy” by the mainstream Protestant churches in South Korea. But what has given Shincheonji an especially controversial reputation has been its competition with mainstream Protestant churches for membership, and its approach to proselytization which is seen as a direct threat to those churches. While the nature and extent of their methods have been exaggerated somewhat, it is true that Shincheonji has targeted their conversion efforts at members of other Christian churches, sometimes even sending their own members into other churches to make these contacts. These practices have made other Christians in Korea wary of Shincheonji and its motives, and fueled widespread attitudes of suspicion and distrust toward the religion.⁴

The resulting social stigma, along with organized efforts to pressure Shincheonji members into converting back to Protestantism, leads many members to be secretive about their ties to the religion.⁵ These factors fueled some particularly charged speculation about Shincheonji’s behavior and motives in relation to COVID. People became fearful that infected Shincheonji members would conceal their status and expose others to the virus. Some went as far as to allege Shincheonji was intentionally trying to spread the virus to other churches.⁶

The media coverage and general public response to the association of this COVID infection cluster with Shincheonji was colored by these preexisting negative views. Some of the terms used to describe the religion in Korean were *idan jonggyo* (異端宗教, “heretical religion”),

⁴ CHO Hyun, “Understanding the Shincheonji Cult,” *Hankyoreh*, 4 March 2020, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/931127.html; Kim and Bang, “Guwonpa, WMSCOG, and Shincheonji,” 7, 12, 16; Introvigne, “Shincheonji: An Introduction,” 14–15; Rosita Šorytė, “‘Heavenly Culture, World Peace, Restoration of Light’: Shincheonji as a Global Social Actor and Its Enemies,” *The Journal of CESNUR* 4, no. 3 (May–June 2020), 25.

⁵ Fautré, “Coercive Change of Religion in South Korea,” 35–55; Introvigne, “Shincheonji: An Introduction,” 14–15, 17.

⁶ Kasulis, “‘Patient 31,’”; Lee, “Coronavirus,”; Raphael Rashid, “Being Called a Cult Is One Thing, Being Blamed for an Epidemic Is Quite Another,” *The New York Times*, 9 March 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/opinion/coronavirus-south-korea-church.html>.

and *saibi jonggyo* (似而非宗教, “pseudo-” or “false religion”).⁷ In popular usage, both terms have a similar effect to the word “cult” in English. *Christian Today*, a South Korean interdenominational Christian newspaper, used the term *idan saibi jipdan* (異端似而非集團, heretical pseudo group), omitting the word “religion” entirely from their description of Shincheonji.⁸ The group was also frequently described with such adjectives as “secretive,” “fringe,” and “shadowy.”⁹ The tendency to use such descriptors in media coverage was still evident in early 2021.¹⁰ The usage of such terminology to describe a marginal religion further popularizes the impression that the group is not a “legitimate” religion, that it is problematic, and in some way contravenes the rules of a modern secular society.

Such views and rhetoric influenced some of the government’s approach to Shincheonji. South Korea’s public health and safety agencies implemented measures to contain the virus through contact tracing and testing. Rather than focus specifically on contacts of Patient 31 and the Daegu congregation, though, they opted to test *all* Shincheonji members nationwide. The tracking down of all adherents to a given religion by a government is a bit unsettling in and of itself, but this approach created a number of other problems affecting virus containment efforts.

⁷ BAE Jong-seok, “Jonggyo tanap eul ‘Korona 19’ ro dungap shikiji mara” [Don’t turn to religious oppression because of “Corona 19”], *Ilgan gyeongin*, 12 April 2020, <http://www.gmtoday.co.kr/26945>; BYEON In-cheol, “Incheon-si, ‘idan’ Shincheonji siseol pyeswae gyeoljeong... ‘teukdan eui daechaek pilyo,’” *NoCut News*, 21 February 2020, <https://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/5293745>; KIM Sin-eui, “Susanghan geori Shincheonji deung idan/saibi neun jinjjja reul hyungnaenaen gajja,” *Christian Today*, 3 March 2020, <https://www.christiantoday.co.kr/news/329381>; LEE Hee-yong, “Shincheonji neun wae idan euro jimok badanna...saibi nonjaeng eui yeoksa” [Why Shincheonji is declared a heresy...history of the pseudo-religion controversy], *Yonhap News*, 4 March 2020, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200303179700371>; “Shincheonji neun Gidokgyo ga anida” [Shincheonji is not Christianity – 2], *Sorabeol sinmun*, 5 March 2020, http://www.srbsm.co.kr/default/index_view_page.php?part_idx=290&idx=35451.

⁸ LEE Dae-wung, “Sarang ui Gyohoe, Korona19 daebi ‘Shincheonji churip geumji’ seutikeo buchak” [SaRang church puts up ‘Shincheonji no entry’ stickers in preparation for Corona-19], *Christian Today*, 24 February 2020, <https://www.christiantoday.co.kr/news/329068>.

⁹ CHOE Sang-hun, “Shadowy Church Is at Center of Coronavirus Outbreak in South Korea,” *The New York Times*, 21 February 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/world/asia/south-korea-coronavirus-shincheonji.html>.

¹⁰ CHOE Sang-Hun, “South Korean Church Leader Acquitted of Blocking Antivirus Efforts,” *The New York Times*, 13 January 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/asia/korea-church-covid-trial-prison.html>.

It turned out that outside the Daegu congregation, Shincheonji members were infected at a rate comparable to the rest of the population and the health ministry said there was in fact no correlation between COVID infection and Shincheonji affiliation beyond the previously known cluster. Kim Gang-lip (金剛立, b. 1965), head of the Ministry of Health's Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters, confirmed that Shincheonji members outside of the Daegu congregation were infected at a rate no higher than the rest of the population.¹¹ Additionally, individuals outside of Shincheonji found it more difficult to receive testing while the government was focused on the religion. At least one symptomatic woman was initially denied testing and later died from the virus.¹² And some non-members falsely claimed affiliation to Shincheonji in order to receive free and immediate testing.¹³

A second issue was the member list controversy. In order to trace and test all members, public health authorities ordered Shincheonji to produce lists containing the names and addresses of their members. Some early lists omitted members in three categories: children, overseas members (many of whom are not Korean citizens), and so-called students, prospective members who have not yet committed to joining the religion. This meant that the number of names on initial lists did not match Shincheonji's publicly claimed number of global adherents, which understandably aroused suspicion, though later lists furnished by Shincheonji were more comprehensive. This discrepancy was interpreted differently by various parties. Public health authorities, who hoped to encourage Shincheonji's cooperation, concluded the discrepancies

¹¹ KIM Jan-di, "Jeonguk Shincheonji sindo 99% josa wallyo...Daegu Gyeongbuk oe yujeungsangja 4 cheon 66 myeong" [Nationwide survey of Shincheonji followers 99% complete...4,066 symptomatic individuals in Daegu and Gyeongbuk], *Yonhap News*, 3 March 2020, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200303101800017>.

¹² OH Seung-mok, "'Charari Shincheonji rago hal geot' 14 beonjjae samangja gajok eui nunmul" ['Should have said she was Shincheonji,' tears of the family of 14th fatality], *KBS News*, 1 March 2020, <http://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=4391403>.

¹³ KANG Jong-gu, "Korona 19 geomsabi 16 manweon akkaryeogo... 'nado Shincheonjii' geojit gobaek" [False confessions of 'I am in Shincheonji too' to save 160,000 won Corona-19 testing fee], *Yonhap News*, 2 March 2020, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200302062600065>.

were the result of miscommunications and errors. But the South Korean Justice Ministry and several elected politicians, who sought to take a harder line against the religion and the pandemic, expressed the opinion that Shincheonji was deliberately concealing information and impeding containment of the virus.¹⁴ Both perspectives are examples of observers and power-holders ascribing motives to a marginal religion based on their own views and to justify their preferred courses of action.

Following from the list controversy was the issue of raids. Though public health officials warned that coercive measures could be counterproductive, some politicians and law enforcement officials pressed ahead. Governor Lee Jae-myung (李在明, b. 1964) of Gyeonggi Province, where Shincheonji's headquarters is located, accompanied police on a raid of that facility, which he proudly described as "reminiscent of 007" and necessary to obtain all member information.¹⁵ South Korea's Justice Minister Choo Mi-ae (秋美愛, b. 1958) said an "all-out war" may be necessary and publicly supported raids. She acknowledged there was no legal precedent for such raids, but cited a public opinion poll as justification, a clear example of how negative popular discourse emboldened harsh government action.¹⁶ On July 31, 2020, South Korean authorities arrested Shincheonji Chairman Lee Man-hee on charges of conspiring to withhold

¹⁴ LEE Min-jeong, "Chu Mi-ae 'Sincheonji gangje susa' ...jungdaebon 'bangyeok doum andoenda" [Choo Mi-ae: 'forced investigation of Shincheonji' ...central countermeasures headquarters: 'investigation will not help quarantine'], *JoongAng Ilbo*, 2 March 2020, <https://news.joins.com/article/23719806>; Massimo Introvigne, Willy Fautré, Rosita Šorytė, Alessandro Amicarelli, and Marco Respinti, "Shincheonji and the COVID-19 Epidemic: Sorting Fact from Fiction," *The Journal of CESNUR* 4, no. 3 (May–June 2020), 78–83.

¹⁵ LEE Beom-gu, "I Jae-myeong geochim eomneun 'Sincheonji gangje josa' e eotgallin siseon" [Mixed attention on Lee Jae-myung's unhindered 'forced investigation of Shincheonji'], *Hankook Ilbo*, 27 February 2020, <https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/202002271400345919>.

¹⁶ Elizabeth Shim, "South Korea Authorizes Raid of Shincheonji Amid COVID-19 Outbreak," *UPI*, 4 March 2020, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2020/03/04/South-Korea-authorizes-raid-of-Shincheonji-amid-COVID-19-outbreak/5871583330375/; "Sincheonji apsu susaek yeobu, chanseong 86.2% vs bandae 6.6%," [Regarding Shincheonji search and seizure, 86.2% agree vs 6.6% opposed] *Realmeter*, 2 March 2020, <http://www.realmeter.net/%EC%8B%A0%EC%B2%9C%EC%A7%80-%EC%95%95%EC%88%98%EC%88%98%EC%83%89-%EC%97%AC%EB%B6%80-%EC%B0%AC%EC%84%B1-86-2-vs-%EB%B0%98%EB%8C%80-6-6/>.

information and impeding the government's disease-control efforts. On January 13, 2021, a district court in the South Korean city of Suwon acquitted Lee on these charges. The judge ruled that the discrepancies in member and property lists did not constitute an obstruction of epidemiological investigations.¹⁷ This judgement was consistent with the conclusions reached last year by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Despite this ruling, these charges facilitated popular support for the arrest and indictment of Lee, who was convicted on charges unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic.

While there may not have been strict legal precedent for those raids, there is historical precedent in Korea for such negative attitudes toward marginal religions. As in other countries, marginalization of religions historically has often affected so-called "new religions," those that emerged, or branched off from others, in recent decades. One of the first religions in Korea to be called a "new religion" (*sinjonggyo*, 新宗教) was Donghak (東學, "Eastern Learning"), founded in 1860. Tonghak was perceived as a challenge to Korea's social and political order, leading to the arrest and execution of its first two leaders, Cho Je-u (崔濟愚, 1824–1864) in 1864 and Choe Si-hyeong (崔時亨, 1827–1898) in 1898.¹⁸ During their 35 years of colonial rule in Korea from 1910–1945, Japanese authorities introduced formal legal categories to officially distinguish not only religion from non-religion, but also to label those groups they deemed problematic under a third heading for "pseudo- or "quasi-religions" (*ruiji shūkyō*, 類似宗教). This category included Donghak's successor Cheondogyo (天道教), as well as Korean shamanism and various

¹⁷ KANG Yeong-hun, "Sincheonji I Man-hui 'bangyeok banghae' mujoe... 'myeongdan jegong geobu bangyeok banghae anya,'" *Yonhap News*, 13 January 2021, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210113108351061>; Yonhap News Agency, "Court Acquits Shincheonji Leader of Obstructing Gov't Response to COVID-19," *Yonhap News*, 13 January 2021, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210113007451315>; CHOE Sang-Hun, "South Korean Church Leader Acquitted," *The New York Times*, 13 January 2021.

¹⁸ Don Baker, *Korean Spirituality* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 79; George Kallander, "Eastern Bandits or Revolutionary Soldiers? The 1894 Tonghak Uprising in Korean History and Memory," *History Compass* 8, no. 10 (2010), 1128–9, 1138n1; George L. Kallander, *Salvation through Dissent: Tonghak Heterodoxy and Early Modern Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), 116–23.

other movements and traditions viewed as “heretical,” “superstitious,” or “political.”¹⁹ While the legal category formally disappeared in 1945, it lives in on informally in public discourse through such terms as *saibi jonggyo*.

Two recent incidents during the administration of South Korea’s previous president, Park Geun-hye (朴槿惠, b. 1952), speak to contemporary attitudes toward marginal religions and politics. A church commonly known as Guwonpa (救援派, “Salvation Sect”) was heavily scrutinized in 2014 after the ferry MV *Sewol*, whose operating company was chaired by Guwonpa’s founder Yoo Byung-eun (俞炳彦, 1941–2014), sank in an accident that caused the deaths of more than 200 high school students. The police, suspecting the religion was somehow tied to the company’s mismanagement, conducted a search of Guwonpa facilities.²⁰ In late 2016 and early 2017, President Park was charged with and impeached for corruption along with her associate, Choi Soon-sil (崔順實, b. 1956). Choi, the leader of a religion called Yeongsegyo (靈世教/永世教), was labelled by many as a “shaman adviser” allegedly wielding illegal religious influence over the president. Choo Mi-ae, the current justice minister, who was then the leader of the opposition party, described the Park administration as “not even a dictatorship” but “a scary theocracy.”²¹ Following these recent episodes, the association of “bad religion” with Park’s

¹⁹ Kyung Moon Hwang, *Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894–1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 157–60; JANG Suk Man, *Hanguk geundae jonggyoran mueosinga?* [What is modern Korean religion?] (Seoul: Doseochulpan mosineunsaramdeul, 2017), 264; Jason Ānanda Josephson, *The Invention of Religion in Japan* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 262; Laurel Kendall, *Shamans, Nostalgias, and the IMF: South Korean Popular Religion in Motion* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), 8.

²⁰ KANG Hyun-kyung, “‘Salvation Sect’ Suspected of Backing Yoo’s Business,” *The Korea Times*, 25 April 2014, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/04/113_156136.html; PAEK Sang-hyun with Yeara AHN-PARK, “It is Not True that the Sewol’s Captain is Unrelated to the Salvation Sect,” *The Kukmin Daily*, 3 May 2014, <http://www.kukmindaily.co.kr/article/view.asp?page=&gCode=7111&arcid=0008292344>; Ju-min Park, “South Korean Sect Submits to Search for Founder Linked to Doomed Ferry,” *Reuters*, 21 May 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-ferry/south-korean-sect-submits-to-search-for-founder-linked-to-doomed-ferry-idUSBREA4K03M20140521>.

²¹ SER Myo-ja, “Pseudo-Christian Shamanistic Cult Alleged to have Influence over President Park,” *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 28 October 2016, <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3025416>.

administration and her party proved to still be popular, as a media debate ensued in March over Shincheonji leader Lee Man-hee's watch, possibly a gift from the impeached former president, and what it suggested about her ties to Lee and Shincheonji.²²

Despite some of the claims made about Shincheonji's behavior and practices, the first COVID infection cluster could have potentially happened almost anywhere in South Korea. Crowded facilities and large gatherings, especially at churches, are not uncommon in the country and few countermeasures were in effect in South Korea by late February, with nearly all of the country's highly-praised methods only being implemented after the cluster infection associated with Patient 31. But, the reality is that it *did* happen in a Shincheonji congregation, and that had, I believe had a serious impact on how the country responded. Because the cluster was associated with a religion that was already controversial and viewed with suspicion, that religion was met largely with further distrust. Many were skeptical the group had any intention of cooperating, and the liberal usage of state authority was largely tolerated.

The incident also set precedents for how to deal with the virus which went beyond marginal religion, to other marginalized groups and to mainstream religion. When a COVID cluster emerged in connection with several nightclubs in Seoul's Itaewon district in May, authorities started procedures similar to those applied to the Shincheonji cluster, closing facilities and tracing and testing individuals. This led to fears in the LGBT community that would they

²² KIM Se-jeong, "Shincheonji Founder's Appearance Draws Attention," *The Korea Times*, 3 March 2020, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/03/119_285498.html; PARK Hae-ri and PYEON Gwang-hyeon, "I Man-hui ga chan 'Park Geun-hye sigye' nollan...Park jeon daetongnyeong cheuk 'geumjang eun gajja'" [Controversy over 'Park Geun-hye watch' worn by Lee Man-hee...former president Park's side: 'gold watch is fake'], *JoongAng Ilbo*, 3 March 2020, <https://news.joins.com/article/23720289>; Yonhap News Agency, "I Man-hui chonghoejang sonmok sigye e ssollin nun," [Eyes focused on Chairman Lee Man-hee's wristwatch], *Yonhap News*, 3 March 2020, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/MYH20200303013600038>.

would be publicly identified and discriminated against, as had happened with some members of Shincheonji.²³

After the Shincheonji-linked infection wave, religious gatherings were heavily scrutinized and hit with some of the strictest regulations in the country. While few people argued against religious freedom per se, new, if temporary, limits were placed on how and where people could practice religion, and it was made clear where religious freedom ranks in relation to public health concerns. And when the Sarang Jeil Church (사랑第一教會), one that is politically controversial but still part of the mainstream Protestant establishment, was linked to an infection cluster in mid-August, some media quickly labelled it a “second Shincheonji.”²⁴ The already controversial group is likely now to be forever associated with COVID. The pandemic is not over, nor are the problems it has caused for Shincheonji and indeed for all religions in South Korea. The long-term effects on religion and religious freedom remain to be seen.

²³ Steven Borowiec, “How South Korea’s Nightclub Outbreak Is Shining an Unwelcome Spotlight on the LGBTQ Community,” *Time*, 14 May 2020, <https://time.com/5836699/south-korea-coronavirus-lgbtq-itaewon/>.

²⁴ CHOE Sang-Hun, “South Korea Warns of Another Covid-19 Outbreak Tied to a Church,” *The New York Times*, 16 August 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/16/world/asia/coronavirus-south-korea-church-sarang-jeil.html>; GWEON Ji-yun, “Wigi kiun Sarang Jeil Gyohoe...’je-2 Sincheonji’ uryeo naoneun iyu” [Sarang Jeil Church that cultivated a crisis...emerging reasons for concern about ‘second Shincheonji’], *SBS News*, 16 August 2020, https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1005933696; IM Jae-hui, “Jeon Gwang-hun Sarang Jeil Gyohoe jipdan gamyeom je-2 ui Sincheonji satae doena... ‘geuttae boda naeyong an jota’” [Has Jeon Gwang-hun’s Sarang Jeil Church group infection become the second Shincheonji situation?...the conditions are worse than that time], *Newsis*, 17 August 2020, https://newsis.com/view/?id=NISX20200816_0001131519; News1, “Seoul seo je-2 ui Sincheonji satae? Sarang Jeil Gyohoe hwakjinja ‘pokjeung’” [A second Shincheonji situation in Seoul? Sharp increase in Sarang Jeil Church cases], *dongA*, 16 August 2020, <https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20200816/102511222/1>.

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**From Scandals to the Figure of the Future:
the Discourse of Counterculture in the late 1960s in South Korea¹**

This paper examines the presence of hippies in the South Korean press in the late 1960s. Hippies, which emerged in the mid-1960s in the US and became a worldwide phenomenon in the late 1960s, were a group of young people who pursued and practiced an alternative culture and lifestyle in rejection of their contemporary society and overall system in the period. Hippie culture was a topic that the Korean press, such as daily newspapers and yellow magazines, frequently covered since 1967. Often associated with drugs, nudity, and free sex, hippie culture has been considered abnormal and even detrimental to desirable life and society in Korea. In a larger context of the radical Sixties, however, hippies, along with student activism, black rights movement, feminist movement, and the New Left movement, are an essential part of a set of radical thoughts, movements, and culture, which pursued a “total rejection” of the pre-existing systems, ways of living, and ideologies. In 1969, social researcher and journalist Theodore Roszak has provided a term that embraces the diverse, unprecedented thoughts, movements, and cultures of the 1960s and captures their sociopolitical radicality: a counterculture. It means, according to him, “a culture so radically disaffiliated from the mainstream assumptions of our society that it scarcely looks to many as a culture at all, but takes on the alarming appearance of a barbaric intrusion.” (Roszak 1995, 42)

¹ This paper shows a rough structure of my argumentation on the discourse and practice of hippie culture in the late 1960s in South Korea, based on a preliminary research. I would like to appreciate the readers’ consideration.

Not only hippies, but also the counterculture in the late 1960s in South Korea has been understudied except a few kinds of research in cultural studies, literature history, and art history. This scholarly negligence is, on the one hand, due to the seeming lack of solid countercultural movement during the period. As cultural study scholar I Yŏngmi and literature scholar I Yonghŭi have pointed out, the news coverage on hippies that appeared from 1967 to 1970 was, thus, focusing on hippies from abroad. (I Yŏngmi 2016; I Yonghŭi 2016) On the other hand, a cultural movement called “youth culture” in the 1970s in Korea was something comparable to the radical culture of the Sixties, as it manifestly included the rebellious nature of folk music, Go-go dance, and marijuana.² Therefore, scholars have paid attention to the period of the 1970s, rather than the 1960s. (I Minyŏng 2019; Chŏng T'aesu 2019; Ham Ch'unho and Cho T'aesŏn 2016)

However, some recent articles on arts and cultural figures whose work touched on or related to hippie culture since the very late 1960s provide a glimpse on the discourse of hippies, if any, in South Korea before the time of youth culture. (Song Ŭnyŏng 2018) Among the scholars, literature scholar Song Ŭnyŏng has excavated the hippie culture in Korea by revealing the psychedelic experience from the drug implied in *The Room of the Other* (*T'ainŭi pang*), a novel published in 1971 by Ch'oe Inho. (2018) As she points out, several writers in 1971 refuted to consider some Korean youths with long hair or miniskirt, and enjoying Go-go dance as representatives of hippie culture or student movement in the country. This presence of practices of hippie culture paradoxically proves the very existence of hippie culture in Korea, Song argues. (2018, 151) Then, was there really something considerable as hippie culture in Korea in the late 1960s?

² The youth culture, as a significant event shocking the Korean society and government, is marked by the debate on youth culture (*ch'ŏngnyŏn munhwa*) that took place in Korea in 1974 and the incident of marijuana (*taemach'o*) in 1975.

To answer this question, this paper focuses on news coverages in daily newspapers, monthly magazines, and weekly yellow magazines in South Korea between 1966 and 1970. While newspapers were still the most important and influential source for news and information for the country that went through reconstruction of the realm of press media, monthly magazines that rapidly grew in terms of quantity and quality in the mid-1960s and provided more in-depth, scholarly information and knowledge, and even generated discourses. Yellow magazines were equally pivotal, particularly the issue of hippies, as they were acknowledgedly the main source of sensuous contents, such as photos of naked women, bizarre and eccentric figures, and hippies.³ In the first part, I identify the ways in which the press media published hippies and related news between 1966 and 1970. The press, although showed diverse perspective and methods according to the kind, treated hippies and their culture as the news for entertainment and more particularly as a social malady generated from material prosperity of the “advanced countries” and “Western lifestyle,” while a few times presenting a theoretical analysis of its origin and sociopolitical significance. In the second part, I enlarge the scope towards the discussion on material prosperity, or more concretely, technological advancements of the postwar time, as illustrated and pointed out by Marshall McLuhan and Herbert Marcuse, the two theorists pivotal in the development of the radical Sixties. As I will reveal, the Korean press also shared, sometimes implicitly, the understanding of hippies proposed by these theorists. In 1969, there emerged a discourse of *ch'ōmdan*, meaning “cutting-edge,” as I propose to call in the third part, a discourse that reconfigured the Korean understanding of technological advancements and subsequent

³ The press media that I analyze in this paper is categorized into three: major daily newspapers, such as *Chosŏn'ilbo*, *Tongailbo*, *Chungangilbo*, and *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*; monthly current affair magazines, for example, *Sedae* (*The Generation*) and *Shindonga*; and weekly yellow magazines, such as *Sŏndei Sŏul* (*Sunday Seoul*) and *Chugan Kyŏnghyang*.

intellectual and cultural transformations, also largely based on analysis of McLuhan and Marcuse. Hippie culture and other similar counterculture were mentioned included in this discourse. In the last part, I argue that a Korean case of counterculture existed in 1969 and 1970, mostly in arts and cultural realm, which a thorough reading of the press coverage and discoursization of them in the press, particularly yellow magazines, would manifest.

The Hippie Tribe, *Hip'ijok*, from Advanced Countries

The heyday of hippies in the US is said to be between 1967 and 1969, marked by the Human Be-in festival held in San Francisco in 1967 and the Woodstock festival in 1969. Keeping up with the extraordinary, worldwide phenomenon, the Korean press began delivering news about hippies and their deeds in the summer of 1967. It was daily newspapers that published about hippies the most frequently than monthly and weekly magazines. *Chosŏn-ilbo*, *Tongailbo*, and *Kyŏnghyangshinmun* all published from 1967 important events by hippies all around the world, including the mock funeral of the death of hip that took place in San Francisco, hippies' unconventional wedding ceremonies in Paris and Denmark, and a naked hippie candidate for the Mayor of New York City. (*Chosŏn-ilbo* 1967a; *Tongailbo* 1967a; *Kyŏnghyangshinmun* 1967a) The overall tone of the daily newspapers' coverage of hippies was apathetic, criticizing, and mocking. The press described hippies even something like an odd species or a group of animals under a thorough scientific examination and as a social illness to be cured: hippie communities were called a hippie village (*hip'ich'on*), the hippies were a hippie tribe (*hip'ijok*), and the hippies' lifestyle was called "ecology," (*saengt'ae*) and also "pathology," (*pyŏngn*). Throughout the late 1960s, the daily newspapers had generally kept this perspective on hippies that regards them merely as entertaining and shocking news: what they sensationally

presented were a hippie fortune-teller suggesting to sell all the stocks, a nude ceremony of hippies, hippies swimming in mud, and hippies electing a pig for their presidents. In 1970, the news of a notorious serial killer, Charles Manson, who manipulated a group of hippies supportive of his crime, made the hippies look more detrimental to the morality and safety of the society.

A few newspaper articles, however, showed an illustration of hippies in a serious manner by discussing their sociopolitical background and importance. A series “The Hippies, the Assessment of Their Customs and Pathology,” published in July 1968 in *Kyŏnghyang shinmun*, starts with surprise by the bizarre lifestyle, culture, and deeds of hippies in the world, mainly the US, but also presents a sociological analysis of the advent of the group. (1968) According to the series, hippies are successive to the beat generation, or beatniks, who opposed the Vietnam war, pursued an alternative lifestyle against the high capitalism, and enjoyed then disparaged jazz music in the early 1960s. Citing a professor in sociology named Maiōsū and a theologian in the University of Chicago named Mat'in, the article points out the economic development and material prosperity as the cause of the advent of the extraordinary group: hippies and their rejection of the entire social system are a symptom of the corruption and deindividualization of human civilization in the unprecedented prosperity of the society. The advent of the hippies was accordingly a natural reaction to get back the true individual self. This overt presentation of positive assessment on hippies was yet an exceptional case among many newspaper articles on hippies. While they seemed aware of hippies' sociopolitical significance within the American, or Western, society and civilization, the daily newspapers mostly highlighted hippies' overindulgence in excessive freedom, hedonist lifestyle, and sexual pleasure. The shocking abnormality underlined in these articles served to lead to a conclusion that South Korea, a

country which was pursuing similar economic growth and material prosperity, should ward off such a malady.

The hippies appeared in monthly current-affair and quality magazines as well, albeit much fewer than they did in daily newspapers. Current affair magazines, which number and readership rapidly increased in the mid-1960s in Korea, primarily aimed to provide a space for the exchange of opinions, theories, and thoughts on important sociopolitical affairs inside and outside the country. Thus, they carried the news on hippies from a more scholarly and critical perspective. The first article wholly dedicated to hippies in monthly magazines was “The Hippies Disappearing like Migratory Birds,” written by Chŏng Wŏnyŏl, a foreign news reporter from *Chosŏn Ilbo*, published in the January issue of *Sedae*. (1968) Talking about the fading of hippies in the US with a neutral, explanatory tone, he argues that the hippies, along with its precedent, the beats, and successor, the freebies, are the “rebellious kids” pointing to the dehumanizing American society.⁴ Magazines also published articles from foreign media, which often carried a vivid description directly imported from the abroad. “Theory on the Hippies,” or “Die Hippies” by Peter Opitz published in the June issue of *Zeitschrift Für Politik* in 1968, translated into Korean in the November 1968 issue of *Shindonga*, for example, deliberately presents the development of hippie movement as well as an assessment of its sociopolitical signification in detail. (1968) While acknowledging the importance of the hippies as an alarm to the American society, Opitz points out the hippies’ lack of will to transform the system itself, not merely refuse it, for the better world they sought for.

One might assume that weekly yellow magazines, which have been acknowledged most

⁴ At the mock funeral of the death of hip by hippies in San Francisco, hippies proposed Freesbie, a group of their successors.

for their sensuous contents, were the major venue for the news on hippies. The yellow magazines, however, did not focus on hippies, but covered them in relation to and as a part of a larger trend of nudity. This is manifested well in *Sunday Seoul*, the most widely read in the nation, was *Sunday Seoul*. While put in print in September by *Sŏulshinmun*, a government-run newspaper company, and thus, going through under the government's pre-approval of the contents, *Sunday Seoul* carried sensuous images and contents most among the yellow magazines. *Sunday Seoul* primarily concentrated on the world-widely popular phenomenon of the naked, which included villages of "nudist" people, artworks with naked, mostly female, bodies, and strip girls. (*Sunday Seoul* 1968a; 1968b) In this, hippies were mentioned here and there, sometimes as identical to nudists in Denmark or the US, and sometimes as advocates for the liberation of sex, which issue lied at the ground of the popularity of nude. At the same time, *Chugan Kyŏnggyang*, which was issued by *Kyŏnggyangshinmun*, a daily newspaper company run by the Roman catholic church of Seoul, published fewer articles on hippies and nudity. During the year 1968, it only covered a village of nudists in Europe and a hippie community in the US in the December 22 issue. (1968a) *Chugan Kyŏnggyang*, as a relatively conservative magazine, touched on the issue of nudity but from an artistic perspective, which enabled a morally proper approach to the nude under the name of art. In "130 years of Nude Photography: Its Trace and Aesthetics," for example, renowned photographer Im Ŭngsik provides a summary of the long history of nude photography in Euro-North America with lots of color copies of the artworks presenting naked women. In 1969, continuing to pay attention to the issue of nudity, *Sunday Seoul* published a series "Trip to the Kingdom of Free Sex," which intensively delivered a reportage to the sexually degenerated phenomena of free and collective sex from not only in Euro-North America, but even in Thailand, Brazil, Singapore, and Taiwan. (1969a) In this year,

Chugan Kyŏnggyang maintained a relatively conservative stance and printed a reportage of a professional female nude model, nude theatre popular in Euro-North America, in addition to several articles focusing on hippies in Denmark and South East Asia. (1969a; 1969b; 1969c; 1969e)

Icons of the Sixties: McLuhan and Marcuse

Behind the Korean press coverage of hippies lied a larger interest in apprehending their contemporary society and the world, especially the Euro-North American, or “advanced,” society, which was showing a drastically developed and subsequently transformed way of living. In this interest are two figures whose theories all start from the technological advancements of the postwar time, but took opposite directions: Marshall McLuhan and Herbert Marcuse. It should be noted that technological advancements and their total effect on human civilization were not an unfamiliar issue in the discourse of hippies and counterculture. Analyzing the large phenomenon of counterculture in 1969, Roszak pointed out technocracy, the predominance of technology in every aspect of society, civilization, and life, as the societal background and the object of resistance of hippies as well as a set of countercultural movements.⁵ It is unknown that the Korean press was aware of Roszak’s analysis. Yet the Korean press coverage on hippies and a series of related radical movements show a similar understanding. As if proving this, the Korean press pointed out McLuhan and Marcuse as the most influential theorists in the decade of the 1960s.

Marshall McLuhan, the renowned media theorist in the late 1960s who provided a new

⁵ Although he primarily relies on Marcuse’s argument on the technocracy and brought only partially McLuhan’s theory, hippie movement and other kinds of radical movements became interconnected in his analysis.

understanding of the relationship between media and human civilization, particularly in his seminal book *Understanding Media*, provided an assessment of the contemporary Western civilization, best represented by the famous phrase “the media is the message.” (1964) He argues that the form of medium affects not only the process of sending and receiving information, but also the message that the medium is delivering; the media is not only an instrument for humans to interact with the world, but more an environment that “massages” humans. Due to the epistemic changes from new kinds of media, human civilization turns into something similar to a tribal civilization: humans put more value on tactile experiences, direct network, and involvement, and thus, the world becomes “a global village.” It was this new kind of human civilization that scholars and the public in North America acclaimed McLuhan’s theory to be a prophet of hippies and other similar lifestyles, which shared lots of affinities with the tribal civilization in McLuhan’s theory. In this theorization, the essential root of the advent of alternate lifestyle is the unprecedentedly rapid technological development and transformation of the environment by it, although it seems to have been forgotten in today’s discourse on hippies of the Sixties.

McLuhan and his theory appeared in daily newspapers and current-affair magazines in Korea mainly in 1968 and 1969.⁶ Many articles in daily newspapers and magazines mentioned McLuhan’s theory or showed a McLuhanian understanding regarding the issue of hippies. In the series “Underground Arts,” published in July and August 1968 in *Tongailbo*, for instance, Chang Yunhwan, a journalist who was especially specialized in theatre critic, explains the various kinds of underground arts from the West and Japan as influenced by hippie culture and writes that the

⁶ In addition, his book *Understanding Media: The Extension of Man* was translated into Korean and published in early 1968.

advent of hippies is a warning sign of the Western lifestyle and civilization, borrowing words of McLuhan and Arnold Toynbee. (1968) In an article “McLuhan’s Theory and Its Understanding” written by Pak Musŭng, the head of the Tokyo branch of *Chungangilbo* in the December 1967 issue of *Sedae*, the author mentioned hippies while systematically introducing McLuhan’s theories on media, television, journalism, mass production, and sex. (1967) “Why does today’s young generation like the Beatles, have long hair, and shout out free sex?” the author answers to this question, borrowing McLuhan’s theory, that the era of electronic communication generates a new world where every individual is related to each other, as in a tribal society, and hippies are the sign of such a change. (Pak 1967, 189-190)

As such, the Korean daily newspapers and monthly magazines implied this McLuhanian understanding that highlights in explaining the emergence of the bizarre groups the importance of prosperous material condition, which was often described as “Western lifestyle,” not only to the advent of hippies but also to rebellious groups of young people or too avant-garde art practices. Although these groups were not called or identified with hippies, they certainly shared the unconventionality, or the resistance to the conventions, with hippie culture. One of the earliest examples is a collection of black and white photographs, titled “Rebelling Japanese Youth,” in the February 1966 issue of *Sedae*, which shows a group of young Japanese people overindulged in jazz music, the Beatles, hallucinating sleeping pills, all-night parties with electric guitar plays, dancing, drinking, smoking, and getting naked. (1966) The notes beside the photographs writes that this hedonist trend among postwar Japanese young generation was generated from “Western lifestyle that swept the Japanese life and shake the traditions and customs of Japan.” This perspective kept appearing in monthly magazines, for instance, in “The Youth of Japan” by Pak Hyŏnt’ae in the March 1968 issue of *Sedae*, which argues that the

Japanese young generation's relentless pursuit of individual happiness (*siawase*) and style (*gakkoi*) is possible as the material abundance had resolved the basic necessities of life, or *Ŭishikchu*. (1968)

As for the case of Marcuse, the Korean press focused on his theory in relation to the worldwide upsurge of student activism at the time. Herbert Marcuse, a German philosopher then teaching at the University of California, San Diego. In 1968, daily newspapers in Korea began to pay attention to Marcuse's theory, which was already famous as a theoretical leader of the student activism in the US with his influential 1964 book *One-Dimensional Man*. "The Theory of Marcuse," an article published on June 27, 1968, in *Chosŏnbo*, by its reporter in Paris Song Kŏnho, delivers the worldwide fame of the philosopher and provides a summary of his theory. (1968) Today's society, the technological society, became a totalitarian one as the developed technology controls every aspect of civilization, including labor, culture, lifestyle, and even individual desires. To break this totalitarianism, as Marcuse argues, the role of the student class is essential as they are the only social class that is not absorbed into the totalitarian system. The reporter writes that Marcuse's view on the extraordinary role of the student class must be most welcomed by student activism of the Sixties. The furious student activism in France, the US, and England in 1968, which Marcuse's theory was often discussed as interlinked to, were also frequent topics in the Korean newspapers.

In 1969, Marcuse's theory became discussed in association not only to the student activism in Euro-North America, but also to student protest in Korea, arguably fueled by the nation-wide protest of intellectuals and college students against the constitutional amendment of the presidency in the year. The Korean press had delivered the news on student protest before 1969, as the surge of student activism that called for a groundbreaking change in education and

institutional system was a worldwide phenomenon. While primarily focusing on the news from abroad, in 1969, the Korean press incorporated student protest in Korea as a part of the worldly student protest, under the name of “student power” (*sŭt'yudŏnt'ŭ p'awŏ* or *sŭt'yudent'ŭ p'awŏ*). Monthly magazines published articles and series constituted of roundtables, reportages, and foreign essays translated into Korean, which compare the history of student protests in Korea, from the March 1st movement in 1919 against the Japanese occupation to the April 19th Revolution in 1960 against the false presidential election, to the long history of student protests of the world. This global history of student protests, as they formulated, starts with the student protests in the nineteenth century France to India’s protest in the early twentieth century and that in the University of California, Berkeley, in 1964 and 1965 and of course the May 68 Revolt in France. Several intellectuals co-published *Student Power*, a scholarly anthology on student activism of the world and Korea, including Marcuse’s theory.

A Discourse of *Ch'ŏmdan* in 1969

Around 1969, looking ahead of the new decade of the 1970s, daily newspapers began to systematically look over the technological advancements and subsequent changes and related phenomena in life and society during the 1960s, including hippies, which were previously presented in a somewhat fragmented manner in the press. Series of articles published in *Chosŏnilbo*, *Tongailbo*, and *Kyŏnghyangshinmun* assessed the level of the material and intellectual development of their contemporary society and civilization, in fact, those of the US, and anticipate advancements and transformations that would emerge in the 1970s. This series in several newspapers were entitled “*ch'ŏmdan*,” literally meaning “the very edge” in Korean. What they introduced widely ranged from new technologies, such as holography, escalators, and space

aeronautics to avant-garde arts and culture as well as radical political ideas arising from student activism and countercultures.⁷ As for South Korea with a history of colonialism and decolonization and a convoluted rapport with the US during the Cold War era, it was not uncommon to see the active influx of American culture and thoughts via the press, but this discourse of *ch'ömdan*, I would call, was peculiar in that it consciously framed, or used, these imports as a vision, or at least, an inspiration for a better future in the new decade. In other words, this discourse was in essence a reconfiguration of the understanding of the material and intellectual advancements in the US. As this discourse illustrated, the expeditious technological development and the consequently changed condition of human civilization generated radical thoughts and alternative lifestyles, which the young American generation actively jumped into with full confidence in initiating total transformations of their lives and society.

It was in this broader discourse that a set of arts and culture that looked bizarre and incomprehensible to the eyes of the Korean public, for example, hippie culture, happenings and the theatre of absurd, were considered as an essential part of the advanced society and civilization, not as a bizarre and undesirable thing. In the discourse of *ch'ömdan* based on the technological advancements as a prerequisite and condition for innovations, these arts and cultural works were derived from, reflecting, or touching on the issue of technological development, regardless of genre, medium, or style of the works. In “Avant-garde Art: Inspecting the Cutting-Edge of the World,” by Chang Yunhwan, many cutting-edge avant-garde arts works, such as nouvelle vague literature, concrete poetry, total theatre, participatory theatre, happenings,

⁷ Among many, for example, from December 11th, 1968, to March 12th, 1969, *Kyöngnyangshinmun* (*Kyunghyang Newspaper*) published a series, “The Cutting-edge: Contemporary’s Challenge toward the Future” (*Ch'ömdan miraerül hyanghan hyöndaeüi tojön*). *Tongailbo* (*Dongah newspaper*) in February and March 1969 published a similar series of “Avant-garde Art: Inspecting the Cutting-Edge of the World” (*Chönwiyesul: segye ch'ömdanüi chömgöm*).

artworks using light and sound, and contemporary music without sound, were born as “artists threw away of the preconception when the highly developed scientific civilization shocked the inner world of artists and provided a new possibility of media to them who were discouraged by the limits of medium.” (Chang, 1969) In addition, the discourse explicitly marked McLuhan and Marcuse as the main thinkers who predicted, influenced, and led the advancements of the Sixties. In its series “The Cutting-edge: Contemporary’s Challenge toward the Future,” for instance, *Kyŏnghyangshinmun* provides extensive research on the cutting-edge, from scientific devices, new discoveries, and innovative technologies to arts and cultural works and philosophy, in which theories of McLuhan and Marcuse are marked as beloved by hippies as well as student activists.

In late 1969, the notion of *ch'ŏmdan* obtained a larger sense as something fashionable, which implies an injection of scientific innovation, as the discourse was expanded to popular cultures, such as music and fashion design. Daily newspapers called innovative fashion styles, for example, the nude fashion, or “nude look” (*nudŭ ruk'ŭ*) as phrased in Korean, *ch'ŏmdan*. This Korean word, of course, is a common term for “state-of-the-art,” thus, it might not be peculiar to call the most up-to-date fashion trend *ch'ŏmdan*. However, when the press called a set of fashion design and cultural trends *ch'ŏmdan* in 1969 and 1970, the word implied a specific kind of fineness imbued with scientific innovation and also elements of hippie culture that gives a sense of primitivism, which seemingly contradicts the scientific nuance. In October 1969, for instance, *Chugan Kyŏnghyang* published a series of “Cutting-edge fashion,” or *ch'ŏmdan p'aesyŏn*, in which a set of fashion trends in Euro-North America, such as miniskirts and see-through style, were introduced with color photographs. As seen in these images, elements of hippie culture, for example, the primitive motifs and styles in clothing, were incorporated with elements of technological advancements, such as aeronautics represented by spaceships, the Moon, and the

like, into the discourse of *ch'ōmdan*. Similarly, the “*ch'ōmdan* beauties” in the November 19 issue of *Chugan Kyōnghyang*, also shows a representation of female beauty with a sci-fi-like appearance. As such, this kind of representation of hippies and the larger discourse of *ch'ōmdan* sheds a light on another understanding of the Korean press’s perspective on the hippie culture of the time. (1969)

The inclusion of a previously undesirable culture as a fashionable, and even desirable, trend is also found in the case of miniskirts, which was in fashion in South Korea since 1967. “Miniskirt,” or women wearing a miniskirt was at first a topic representing hedonism in Western society. Immediately, it became a famous fashion trend among young Korean women, most represented by the image of famous female singer Yun Pohŭi exposing her slim, bare legs with a mini dress on, the widely accepted first female celebrity who wore miniskirt in South Korea. The Korean press generally considered the fashion trend of miniskirt as a sign of the decadence of their contemporary young generation, and simultaneously, regarded it as an outcome of the prosperous life, such as that of the US and Japan, and thus, a sign of subjectivity of women in the society. In a short essay “Miniskirt” in the March 1967 issue of *Sedae*, the author Chōng Aera casually writes that the popularity of miniskirt, which symbolizes a high level of consumerist life and culture, in South Korea reflects hope for such a developed material culture. (1967) *Sedae*, in January 1968 issue, published an article from the December 1st issue of *Time* magazine, which illustrates the young women wearing miniskirts that “they do not need to put on what they dislike and can do whatever they want as long as they want to.” In 1969 and 1970, the trend of miniskirts became discussed as one of *ch'ōmdan* fashion styles by the Korean press, particularly the yellow magazines. Wearing miniskirts, along with other styles such as bikinis and see-through style, became a manifestation of an innovative way of living in the advanced society.

Korean Counter-arts and Cultures

The discourse of *ch'ōmdan* in 1969 only focused on the materials from abroad and mentioned several names of the artists as the Korean counterparts of cutting-edge, avant-garde art and cultural practice of the US. In 1970, it began to actively construct the solid Korean case of *ch'ōmdan*. In the discourse in 1968 and 1969, some authors in daily newspapers briefly mentioned some names of Korean young artists and cultural producers as examples of Korean counterparts of *ch'ōmdan*. It was yellow magazines that presented a group of practitioners, including those mentioned in newspapers, in many art and cultural genres, including painting, music, theatre, literature, and even popular culture—Go-go dance—as the artists of *ch'ōmdan* and subsequently proposed a new configuration of the avant-garde arts and culture of the country. The Korean *ch'ōmdan* artists as formulated by the yellow magazines were characterized as “youthful” and “insurrectional,” resonating to the “insurrectional youth” of the US and Japan, which was associated with McLuhan’s theory. These artists were also characterized as “anti-establishment” attitude for their resistance to and refusal of conventional genre specificities, which also echoes the “total rejection” of the counterculture generation as pointed out by Marcuse, and Roszak. As the magazines write, painter Kim Kurim proposed the use of new mediums, such as light, mail, and grass and earth, for painting. Theatre director Pang T'aesu refused to use lines and words, the essential constituents of theatre play, but only carried bodily movements as a medium for theatre. In addition, Son Ilkwang, one of the rare male fashion designers in the country emphasized the anti-establishment attitude in the newly adopted realm of fashion design. Chōng Ch'ansŭng and Chōng Kangja were painters who presented naked bodies and everyday objects in happenings rather than a painting. As such, these artists, who

already received attention from the press, particularly from the yellow magazines, primarily as sensuous and entertaining news in 1969, became “*ch'ōmdan* leaders of 1970” at the beginning of the decade. As the yellow magazines delivered, these “insurrectional” leaders were entrepreneurs who would break the archaic and stagnant life, society, and all the systems of the time.

These arts and cultural figures were discussed not only in relation to the *ch'ōmdan*, which is primarily associated with the technological advancements of the 1960s. A few writers locate this avant-garde trend in arts and culture as derived from April 19 Revolution in 1960 in Korea as well as a set of psychological and theoretical frameworks imported from the US. Kim Pyŏngik, a journalist and literature critic, for example, provided such a broadened and developed understanding of Korean avant-garde arts and culture. (Kim 1970a; 1970b) In his writings, Kim sheds light on the sociopolitical significance of arts and cultural practice as a harbinger of the new era, which would be led by the politically conscious and active Revolution generation, represented by the college-educated class.⁸ He writes, “Our country which lacked a true consciousness as a citizen and self-respect, at last, experienced the transformation into modern consciousness and realized a possibility of subjectivity of culture through the April 19th [revolution].” (1970b) The awareness of the political power of the student protest and self-identification as the April Revolution generation, as a matter of fact, appeared among some avant-garde arts and cultural figures, although not overtly presented in the press coverage of their works and interviews.

What these publications manifest is that hippie culture was popular, or at least a “hip”

⁸ Kim himself was one of the notable Revolution generation literature critics during the 1970s. See Kim Seryŏng, “Kimbyŏngigŭi ch'ogi pip'yŏng yŏn'gu” [Research on Kim Pyŏngik's Early Criticism], *Hyŏndaemunhak Iron Hak'oe* 45 (2011): 29-58. The discourse of Korean cutting-edge mentioned in this essay appeared before Kim articulated his own theory of the Revolution generation's role and responsibility in literature and the nation, in which he called for writers' direct participation into society.

trend, among young Korean people in 1969 and 1970. Indeed, as many articles from the Korean press media show, lots of young people, particularly college students, enjoyed and even produced new cultural trends influenced by several products from and associated with hippie culture. The pivotal role of college students in this trend was available from the quantitative growth of universities in the country, and moreover, from the developed self-awareness of the students as active subjects who is capable to bring about changes in education, society, and life, an attitude imbued from the experience of April 19th Revolution, as Kim Pyöngik argues, despite some controversies. Therefore, some university students created happenings and absurd theatres in their groups in universities. A larger population of young people enjoyed Go-go dancing, which fit jazz music, psychedelic music, and the Beatles, all of which were considered music favored by hippies. The word “psychedelic,” which originally connotes a specific hallucinatory experience from drug use, became in fashion in music, for example, as in “psychedelic rock,” “psychedelic soul,” and “psychedelic pop.” In addition, as for this psychedelic music, it was a trend to create a total experience of sound and light by projecting colorful lights on the musicians and bands playing, which resembles McLuhan’s description of a total, tactile experience of art.

This kind of hippie culture in South Korea, however, lived a very short life. On August 28th, 1970, the government enforced a total crackdown on “happening people and hippies.” Furthermore, on the 26th of September, they implemented a law to punish violations of public morals, ranging from mixed-gender camping and drinking by married women to “degenerate arts under the name of avant-garde art, including naked paintings, long hair, rugged clothing, naked shows, silent street plays, porno films, happy smoke [marijuana], and Go-go dancing.” (*Kyönggyangshinmun* 1970) Since this implementation, the Korean press, including the yellow magazines, ceased to publish images of naked bodies and articles that featured hippie culture and

avant-garde arts and culture. Indeed, it was the death of the hip in South Korea.

Conclusion

In this paper, I identified the presence of hippies in the Korean press from 1966 to 1970 and located it within a larger interest of the Korean press in the technological advancements as presented through their introduction and writings on the theories of McLuhan and Marcuse. As I illuminated, the discourse of *ch'ömdan* was a watershed for the Korean press's configuration of the technologically developed future and for the new understanding of hippies and similarly extraordinary practices of arts and culture. The short-lived practices of Korean counterculture, however, were halted by the nationwide oppression by the Park government.

The cases of Korean counterculture presented in this paper became a ground for successive countercultural practices in the country, for example, Ha Kilchong, a film director who represented well the youth of Korea in the 1970s. In addition, the famous debate on “youth culture” in 1974, in fact, began to appear in the Korean press in 1970, for example, in Kim Pyöngik's writings, and to grow in 1971, as in journalist Nam Chaehüi's writings. In this regard, the Korean counterculture in the late 1960s should be considered, and further investigated, as related to the youth culture of the 1970s in Korea.

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**Searching for a Modern *Jianghu*
: Demi-Gods and Semi-Devils and the Transnational *Haohan***

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(As the author requested, this paper is not provided for circulation.)

Another Interpretation of the Ancient History Crisis :The Relationship to Korean New Religions¹

Ancient history scholarship in Korea has been facing a difficult situation - the so-called “Ancient History Crisis” - since 2014. It has been intense and destructive enough to lead to social conflicts and legal disputes, and has left the academic community traumatized. Some pointed out that the situation is very similar to the controversy over ancient history that occurred in the mid-1970s and '80s. Therefore, the previous events were classified as the first Ancient History Crisis and the latter as the second Ancient History Crisis.² To conclude, it is undesirable to distinguish the first and second Ancient Historical Crises as if they were separate issues. It would be better to say that this problem has been a consistent undercurrent active within Korean society since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, and has at times risen to the surface as a result of certain triggers. First of all, even if it would be a little boring, I would like to sketch a timeline of the “Ancient History Crisis” as it developed during the 2010s, for those unfamiliar with the situation facing Korean academia.

The first Ancient History Crisis: mid-1970s and '80s

The origin of the first Ancient History Crisis may be found in a Korean history text book. Originally, Korean history textbooks were produced by civil society and approved by the government. However, when President Park Chung-hee ordered “education with

¹ This article is largely based on a previous paper, “The Crisis of Korean Historical Scholarship in light of the Korean Ancient History Controversy,” which was presented at an AAS (Association for Asian Studies) workshop under the theme of “New Threats to Academic Freedom” on 14 May 2021. However, my earlier paper, presented at AAS’s workshop, also deals with structural problems in Korean academia and this paper describes the aspects of “New Religion” in more depth.

² In-sung Cho, “Kodaesa p'adonggwa kojosŏn yŏksajido” *Han'guksayŏn'gu*.172 (2016): 27; Jeong-bin Lee, “Kodaesa p'adonggwa shingminjuŭi, han'gukkodaesahagŭi sŏnggwawa kwaje.” *Studies on History Education*.37 (2020): 214

nationalism” in 1972, the first state-issued national history textbook was published in 1974.³ The National Institute of Korean History, a public institute under the Ministry of Education, was the publisher of government-issued national history textbooks. Perceiving problems with the contents of this national history textbook due to what he believed to be a colonialist view of Korean history, Dr. An Ho-sang formed the National History Retrieve Council in 1975 and proposed the correction of its errors to the Minister of Education in 1978. Dr. An Ho-sang (1902-1999) was born at the end of the Chosŏn Dynasty and studied in Shanghai and Germany during Japanese colonial rule, and as a means of furthering the independence movement, he was interested in the use of the Korean alphabet, known as Hangul. After national liberation in 1945, he focused on creating and disseminating the One Nation concept (Ilminjuŭi or Iminism) of Rhee Syngman’s regime during his time as the first Minister of Education, from 1948 to 1950.⁴

His criticism focused on the textbook’s view of Gojoseon’s territory as being located within a basin of the Taedong River in Pyongyang and Dangun as a myth, not a historical character. The case also led to court proceedings and parliamentary hearings. Notably, a parliamentary hearing in November 1981 called eight mainstream scholars to answer questions about the issues relating to the portrayal of ancient Korean history which Dr. An et al. had raised. This event received widespread public attention, leaving the academic community traumatized by the heavy exposure of the scholars to personal attacks and accusations of being “colonialist historians.”⁵

In the face of such social pressure, the National Institute of Korean History formed a “National History Education Committee” consisting of 30 history and archaeology

³ Yŏksagyoyukyŏn'guso, *Uri yŏksagyoyugŭi yŏksa* (Humanist, 2015): 181-204

⁴ Jung-in Kang and Sang-bok Ha, “Anhosangŭi minjokchuŭie taehan pip'anjŏk sŏngch'al,” *Human Beings, Environment and Their Future* Vol. 10. (Spring 2013): 119-49.

⁵ Jong-young Yoon, *Kuksagyogwasŏ p'adong* (Hyeon 1999): 11-96

professors and teachers in 1986 to discuss standards for creating national history textbooks. In June 1987, the standards for government-issued textbooks were finalized. However, two of the committee members resigned in the middle of the process, and the media's and public's personal attacks on historians who participated in the committee were grave. In addition to this, the National History Correction Congress was founded by figures within the political opposition, notably Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who both became president in later periods, electing former president Yun Posun as their chairperson (in office from 1960~1962). They called for the clear affirmation of the existence of Dangun as the first ancestor of the Korean people, and of the location of the Han Commanderies as being in China, which should therefore be excluded from Korean history.

Let me touch on the historical concept of Han Commanderies here.⁶ In fact, this is the most controversial issue related to Korea's early history. The Han Commanderies were four new administrative divisions of that period - Lelang, Lintun, Zhenfan, and Xuantu - that the Han Empire established after destroying the ancient state of Gojoseon (Old Chosŏn or Ancient Chosŏn) in 108 BC. According to ancient records, the Lelang Commandery was established in the land of Gojoseon, which is generally believed by Koreans to be the first country in Korean history, but is also the key to tracking the historical center and territorial boundaries of Gojoseon, a notoriously difficult research task due to a shortage of surviving documentary records. However, the Japanese Empire, which colonized the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945, treated Gojoseon as a myth and denied its existence, understanding the establishment of the Lelang Commandery as marking the beginning of Korean history.⁷ It

⁶ Hyung-Il Pai of the University of California, Santa Barbara, as the only scholar in English-speaking academia working on this topic, published a full-fledged research paper on Gojoseon and Lelang, but was criticized by Korean domestic scholarship for not reflecting the latest research results in her work. See Hyung Il Pai. *Constructing "Korean" Origins* (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Asia Center 2000); In-wook Kang, "Rōshiawa migugūi kojosōnsa inshik." *Kojosōnsa yŏn'gu 100nyŏn*, 2 ed. (Seoul: Hakyŏnmunhwasa 2009): 261-99

⁷ Pai, 23-96

also excavated the remains and relics of Lelang in modern Pyongyang, North Korea, and emphasized popular education about the history of Lelang in such a way that promoted the notion of ancient China's dominance of the Korean Peninsula at this time. However, current state-of-the-art research and archaeological excavations have shown that three of Han's four commanderies were largely nominal in power and influence,⁸ and that the make-up of the local ruling class did not change following their installation.⁹

The early history of Korea was a popular theme in the '80s, especially accounts of Gojoseon and Dangun. The publication of the manuscript *Hwandan Gogi*, in 1979, which academia judged to be fabricated, was one relevant factor. The presentation of ancient history in this book is completely different from the historical records that have been handed down to the present, and depicts Gojoseon as an empire controlling vast territories. At that time, a novel titled *Dan* based on *Hwandan Gogi* became a bestseller. Popular interest in these themes escalated ahead of the '86 Asian Games and the '88 Seoul Olympics. Through this series of events, the legend of the ancient kingdoms, as well as the Dangun myth, Dangun's founding of Gojoseon, and an understanding of the northeastern part of China (Manchuria) as a historical stage of Korean history came to be included in the subsequent national history textbook.¹⁰

The Second Ancient History Crisis : 2014-2017

On March 19, 2014, the National Movement for the Decolonization of History (NMDH) held its inauguration ceremony in the conference room of the National Assembly. Distinguished people from all walks of life, including former director of National Intelligence

⁸ Byington, Mark E. ed. *The Han Commanderies in Early Korean History*. Early Korean Project Occasional Series. Vol. 6. (Korea Institute, Harvard University 2013): 12

⁹ Ibid., 101-136

¹⁰ Young Historians. *Han'gung kodaesawa saibiyöksahak* (Seoul: Yöksabip'yöngsa 2017): 63-67

Service (NIS) Lee Jong-chan, pastor of the Galilee Church in Guro, Seoul, In Myung-jin, and former president of the Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology, Huh Sung-gwan, were co-chairmen. The event was co-hosted by eight organizations, six of which honored independence activists who lived during the Japanese colonial period and two of which were historical research institutes, although not considered mainstream by Korean history scholarship: the Kookhak Research Institute¹¹ and the Hangaram History and Culture Institute. Among them, Dr. Lee Deok-il, director of Hangaram History and Cultural Institute, earned his doctorate based on research into the anti-Japanese independence movement during the Japanese colonial period and was a writer of popular history books and a well known public figure.

According to the “Statement to the Korean Government” and the “Statement to the Korean People” distributed at the launch ceremony, it was necessary to rewrite history by creating a new public-private joint consultative body, as the Northeast Asian History Foundation (NAHF), a research institute affiliated with the Ministry of Education, was still following the view of Japanese colonialism.

They raised the issue that the content of the Early Korea Project (EKP), which has been promoted by the NAHF since 2007 by funding its research activities at Harvard University's Korea Institute, is unpatriotic. The EKP, designed to introduce the latest domestic research on early Korean history and archaeology into English-language scholarship, was publishing the Early Korea Project Series to this end, of which the sixth publication, *The Han Commanderies in Early Korean History*, sparked anger among NMDH members.

Although the book mentions that there were different views regarding the location

¹¹ The official English name given on its website is “the Institute of Koreanology.” However, it was translated here as the “Kookhak Research Institute”, in order to stress the term "Kukhak", meaning “National Studies”, that appears in the original Korean name: Kuk'akyōn'guso. The reason why the concept Kukhak is important will be explained later in this paper.

of the center of the state of Gojoseon, the NMDH misunderstood this book as claiming that its center had been located in modern Pyongyang, and made the accusation that its conclusions were identical to the colonialist historical narrative of the Japanese Empire.

Political interest in this union was also so high that eight incumbent lawmakers and two former lawmakers attended the ceremony, while two current lawmakers sent congratulatory messages. The NMDH ended the opening ceremony with a strong condemnation, claiming that the EKP should be suspended immediately as it is anti-patriotic even though it is run on taxpayers' money. A month later, on April 22, they requested an audit of the project from the Board of the Korean Board of Audit and Inspection.

Even though the NAHF and Harvard project director Dr. Mark E. Byington has defended their innocence, public opinion of the EKP has deteriorated significantly due to media reports. In the end, the NAHF did not extend the contract for the project as the National Assembly demanded a full cut to the EKP's budget in June 2014. Meanwhile, in September, a public audit was initiated at the request of the NMDH, to investigate whether there was any wastage of their partial contribution to the EKP's research funding budget. Until then, no Korean researcher had actively attempted to justify the research activities of the NAHF or the EKP.

Now that the NAHF's project to support the EKP has been suspended, the problem is no longer a simple one. NMDH, which succeeded in halting one "traitorous" project, has now begun to criticize another of the NAHF's initiatives: the Northeast Asian Historical Atlas Project. The project is aimed at producing historical maps covering the territory of Korea, China and Japan in both paper and digital formats.¹² Since 2008, the NAHF has been working with academia, at first with Yonsei University, and later with

¹² Seok-hyeon Lee. "Tongbugayöksajido p'yŏnch'ansaŏp," *Proceedings of the Annual Conference of The Association of Korean Cultural and Historical Geographers*. (Seoul: 2012): 1-5

Sogang University. However, NMDH members have condemned the maps for the way they depict the Four Commanderies of Han as being located in Pyongyang, and for omitting South Korea's currently easternmost island of Dokdo. On their account, they claim that the map holds anti-nationalist perspectives servile to China and Japan. The NAHF evaluated this project again, and eventually, in December 2015, notified Sogang University of the termination of their agreement, suspending a project with an overall cost of 4.7 billion won (approximately 5 million dollars) over the course of its duration. The suspension of the project was devastating as it involved a large number of incumbent professors directly or indirectly over an eight-year period. Moreover, it has further deepened the crisis being faced by existing Korean history scholarship, as researchers connected to NMDH have subsequently been appointed to conduct national research projects offered by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) and the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS) and entitled to receive grants from the Lotte Foundation.

Mainstream researchers in the field of ancient Korean history finally initiated a collective confrontation with NMDH's movement. First of all, the Society for Korean Ancient History, South Korea's most influential academic society in the field of early Korean history, held a public lecture series on 12 subjects for citizens in the first and second half of 2016. The speakers were drawn from senior history faculty at major universities that had rarely been seen on the public stage before. In addition, the progressive history journal *Yöksabip'yŏng* (*Critical Review of History*, 2016 Spring Edition) launched a full-fledged academic backlash against non-mainstream historians such as Lee Deok-il, with papers written by young scholars on the subject of Korean ancient history and the criticism of pseudo-history.¹³ This was called a "reaction by the mainstream historical community that has been criticized as

¹³ The presented papers were published in a book titled *Korean Ancient History and Criticism of Pseudo History* under the name "Young Historians" in 2017. Right after this book's release, researchers in the NMDH camp published a book criticizing Young Historians' arguments; see Kim Myeong-ok et al. *Maegugŭi yŏksahakcha, kŭdŭlmanŭi sesang* (Seoul: Man'gwŏndang, 2017)

colonialist” by the media.¹⁴

Meanwhile, a lawsuit was filed against Dr. Lee Deok-il, who was in charge of the academic section of NMDH. In his book published in 2014, Dr. Lee Deok-il criticized Korean ancient history scholarship in institutional academia, explicitly citing the names of many former and current researchers, including members of the NAHF. One of them, Kim Hyun-koo, a professor emeritus of history at Korea University, sued Lee Deok-il for defamation.

Due to the active response from mainstream scholars, the media, which had previously been busy representing only NMDH’s position, changed their attitudes, and columns and articles supporting mainstream scholars’ claims followed. In addition, NMDH temporarily shrank when the first court ruling on the defamation charges filed by Professor Kim Hyun-koo on February 5, 2016 sentenced Dr. Lee Deok-il to six months in prison and a two year suspended sentence. To overcome that, on 26 June 2016, a coalition of 122 NGOs attempted to launch a new organization called the Correct History Council for the Future (CHCF). The group’s launch ceremony was held in the National Assembly conference room, just like the opening ceremony of the NMDH in 2014. However, there was nothing new in their message, which consisted of repeating criticisms that mainstream academia was following the historical perspective of Japanese colonialists. Reflecting the altered circumstances, only two lawmakers attended the event.

The public controversy over early Korean history, which began at the beginning of 2014, initially appeared to have subsided three years after Lee Deok-il was acquitted during his second defamation trial in 2016, and once again after the final ruling in May 2017.

How the “non-mainstream” has grown to threaten the “mainstream.”

¹⁴Ki-seok Han, “[Manp’ashikchŏk] Han’gung kodaesa nollan.” *Sŏulgyŏngje*, 10 Mar 2016. <https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/1KTPJEL5LV>

Because these two crises are apparently so similar, several explanations have been suggested as to the common causes of each controversy. The first factor to be considered was collusion between politicians and independent scholars.¹⁵ As mentioned earlier, the initial Ancient History Crisis was triggered by the publishing of the first state-issued history textbook under President Park Chung-hee in 1974. It was argued that the controversies surrounding Dangun *etc.* had grown like “poisonous mushrooms” as the far-right pseudohistory was parasitic upon the Park Chung-hee regime, which used it to promote nationalism in order to maintain its illegitimate power. While the Ministry of Education eventually ceased creating and publishing its own textbooks following a new education policy introduced in 2007, limiting government oversight to post-publication authorization, President Park Geun-hye’s government announced a return to previous guidelines on state-issued textbooks in November 2015, sparking massive opposition from all walks of life. Some pointed out that the popular imaginary of a glorious ancient history was prevalent among officials and lawmakers within the Park Geun-hye regime.

However, historical scholars within academia did not provide sufficient explanation as to how independent scholars grew to threaten mainstream scholarship and why they became so prevalent in all walks of life in South Korea. Their reflections were limited to simplistic observations such as “The academic community has not been active in communicating with the public.”¹⁶

However, the first and second rounds cannot be seen as separate events, as calls

¹⁵ Ho-jung Song. “Ch’oegün han’guksanggosa nonjaengüi ponjilgwa kü taeüng” *Yöksawa hyönshil*.100. (Seoul: Korean History Society 2016): 34; Young Historians. *Han’gung kodaesawa saibiyöksahak (Korean Ancient History and Criticism of Pseudo History)* (Seoul: Yöksabip’yöngsa 2017): 121; Young Historians. 2018: 308-43; Yo-keun Jeong. “Ch’öngsandoeöya hal chökp’ye, kuksujuüi yusa yöksahak” *Yöksawa hyönshil*.105 (2017): 3-20

¹⁶ Tae-don Noh et al. (*Uri shidaeüi*) *Han’gung kodaesa : the 30th anniversary lectures of the Korean Society of Antiquities for Korean citizens*. (Seoul: Churyusöng 2017)

for a revision of the contents of the textbook continued,¹⁷ complaints about the NAHF's depiction of ancient history continued. Dr. Lee had been condemning the NAHF's website, which was reflecting the mainstream opinion of Korean historical scholarship, since the publication of his book *Korean History, The Truth They Have Hidden* was published in 2009. He argued that the foundation was acting treacherously even though it was established with taxpayers' money in order to prevent neighboring countries' historical distortions. Later, in 2012, two more incidents occurred for which Dr. Lee blamed the NAHF: the controversy surrounding the history source book supplementary material of Gyeonggi province,¹⁸ and the "CRS report" affair.¹⁹ Lee Deok-il criticized the foundation each time and the media directly repeated his claims in their reporting. Thus, on this occasion, those who were angry about the report formed an alliance with the NMDH in 2014. Therefore, this problem is not over. It just sank under the surface again for a while. If we do not explore the underlying cause of this repetitive problem, the Ancient History Crisis will recur in the future.

Until now, an exploration of its underlying causes has largely been undertaken outside the academic study of Korean history. From a political-ideological perspective, it has been argued that the trend of nationalism generalizing mainstream historical scholarship led to the rise of an excessive form of nationalism within society, which in turn contributed to the spread of a chauvinistic historiography.²⁰ Also, from the non-academic perspective of a third

¹⁷ Ho-jung Song, 2016, 27

¹⁸ The history source book incident was triggered when the NAHF submitted its professional opinion on the new history source book to the local administration of Gyeonggi Province. For example, it advised them to correct the account of Dangun (Tan'gun), who was believed to be the founder of Gojoseon, as a "myth, not a historical fact."

¹⁹ "CRS report" incident began later 2012 when the Korean media reported that the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) was preparing a report regarding China's potential claim of historical rights to North Korean territory in case this state collapses in future. Because it was a sensitive issue concerning historical territorial claims, the South Korean government allowed the NAHF to provide advice on the matter. However, maps included in the NAHF's response were unexpectedly revealed by a lawmaker in the assembly, causing new problems, since they depicted the Lelang Commandery as being located in present-day Pyongyang.

²⁰ Jae-ho Jeon, "2000nyöndae han'gugüi t'rküktanjökt' minjokchuüie kwanhan pip'anjöng yön'gu: t'rkusjuüi

party observer, it has been argued that the controversy over ancient history stems from the confrontation between scholars who view Gojoseon as a large empire and scholars who view it as a small political entity preceding the state.²¹ Furthermore, I would add that it may be insightful to evaluate the issue as a reflection of the level of democracy present within Korean society.

However, I cannot help pointing out that the interpretations given so far have overlooked something. This is the religious aspect of the issue. Korea's New Religions, or New Religious Movements, are called "pseudo-religions," "native religions," "folk religions," or "civil religions" in modern times, and have new world views and understandings of human problems that are distinct from those of established, institutionalized religions.²² Beginning with the Donghak Revolution of 1894,²³ they include Cheondogyo, Daejonggyo, Jeungsangyo, and Won Buddhism, and share a common identity as "Korea's unique spiritual traditions and rich sources of religious thought."²⁴

However, in 1915, under Japanese colonial rule, only Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Japanese Shintoism were recognized religions, and the rest of Korea's autochthonous religions were labeled "pseudo-religions".²⁵ Eventually, in 1936, Japan issued a dissolution decree for all pseudo-religions, which led to the dissolution of many New

yöksahakt'ui chollip kibanül chungshimüro," *Chöngch'isasangyön'gu* 25, no. 1 (May 2019): 67-94.

²¹ Sang-tae Kim, *Kojosön nonjaenggwa han'guk minjujuüi* (Seoul: Global Contents 2017)

²² Kyeong-won Lee and Kyeong-eon Baik, "Chüngsan'gye shinjonggyoundongüi yöksawa sasangjöng pyöñch'öne taehan chomyöng" *Han'gung shinjonggyo chihyönggwa munhwa* (Jipmoondang 2015): 327

²³ For English works on Donghak Revolution, see Yong Choon Kim, "Studies of Donghak and the Donghak Revolution in English-speaking Countries," *Tonghak'akpo* 13: 38-52

²⁴ Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourims(Korean Government), 2018, *2018nyön han'gugüi chonggyo hyönhwang*, by Byeong-cheol Go et al.: 75

²⁵ Gwang-soo Park et al., *Han'gung shinjonggyo chihyönggwa munhwa*. Han'gukchonggyoyön'guch'ongsö. (Research Center of Religions, Wonkwang Univ. 2015): 13-15

Religions, forcing them underground and dividing them.²⁶ After liberation, native religions resumed their activities and new denominations emerged, but they were dampened by government regulations in the 1970s and 1980s. On November 16, 1985, 33 native religions participated in the establishment of the Association of Korean Native Religions, and in 1991, it became a corporation. Since 2003, it has operated the “Koreaness Awakening Movement Union” and has been carrying out traditional culture education projects. As of 2018, there are 12 religions, including Cheondogyo, Daejonggyo (withdrawal in 2019), Won Buddhism, Gangjeongyudo, Sungyo, Taegeukdo, Jeungsan Beopjonggyo, Daesun Jinrihoe, Cheongwoo Ilsinhoe, Suncheondo, and Jeungsando.²⁷

The earliest to be founded was Cheondogyo in 1905, which was renamed Donghak in the late 19th century. Meanwhile, Dangungyo was founded in 1909 with the aim of reviving Dangun belief. In 1910, Dangungyo, later renamed “Daejonggyo,” moved to Northeast China to avoid surveillance and oppression by Japan. In the 1920s, the number of believers flourished to 200,000 and led the independence movement in Manchuria.²⁸ Dr. An Ho-sang, who was a leading figure in the first crisis, served as the leader of Daejonggyo from 1992 to 1997.

In addition, the Taegeukdo, Jeungsan Beopjonggyo, Daesun Jinrihoe, Jeungsando, Suncheondo, and Cheongwoo Ilsinhoe are the New Religions that follow the ideas of Jeungsan (Chŭngsan, 1871-1909). Jeungsan carried out miracles and announced prophecies, resulting in numerous followers, but died suddenly at the age of 39. Since then, numerous sects established by his family or disciples have been repeatedly emerging and disappearing.

²⁶ Ibid., 63-69

²⁷ Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourims: 76

²⁸ Geol-sun Park, *Kuk'agundong(The Korean Studies Movement against Japanese Imperialism)*, The Committee to Compile the History of the Korean Independence Movement ed., (Cheon-an: Institute of Korean Independence Movement Studies 2009): 168-170

Most Korean New Religions are understood to have been influenced by Western Christianity, but Jeungsan-affiliated sects are categorized as the least Christian in terms of its temple style, use of divine names, and form of worship, familiar to the public through bestsellers like *This is the Great Transformation*.²⁹

“Dangun” worshippers who threaten academia.

The major players active in the first Crisis in of the mid '70s and '80s were usually people who did not have a degree or had not majored in history, if they had. For example, Dr. An Ho-sang was a Ph.D. in philosophy. However, throughout the second Crisis, the “non-mainstream” has grown large enough to threaten the “mainstream.” This is because they have earned more Ph.D.s in history or archeology, and have even been awarded research projects from government-funded research institutes.

The Department of Korean Studies at the University of Brain Education (UBE) should be noted here. According to its homepage, this department takes a distinctive approach from ordinary Korean Studies in so far as texts such as *Ch'ŏnbugyŏng* and *Hwandan Gogi*, which are not trusted as reliable sources by mainstream academia, are considered to be important historical materials. It also has a Ph.D. program, and a subsidiary organization called the “Kook-hak Institute”, in which professors of this department serve as operating members. It even publishes an academic journal called “*Sundo Culture*”. Sundo literally means “the practice for achieving eternal life,” so the scope of this journal includes topics such as Gojoseon and Dangun. In other words, this department has become a cradle for the training of graduates who have completely different views on Gojoseon from mainstream scholarship.

It was Professor Bok Gi-dae who moved to Inha University from UBE's

²⁹ Don Baker, “Renewing Heaven and Earth: Spiritual Discipline in Chungsan'gyo” *Religions of Korea in Practice*, Robert E. Buswell Jr., Ed. (Princeton University Press 2007): 487-89

Department of Korean Studies, and he won a three-year research project focused on the location of ancient Pyongyang from AKS. However, it was later revealed that Lee In-cheol, then head of the project group of AKS, was a Ph.D. graduate of UBE. In addition to this, Park Sung-soo(1931-2016), a senior historian and chairman of "Daehan Sarang [Korea Love]," - a civic group promoting *Hwandan Gogi* - is mentioned as the honorary president of UBE and chairman of the World Society of Hwandan History and Culture.³⁰ It has become more difficult for the general public to discern historical reality now that alumni from this department are working in the academy, in government and in civil society organizations.

There is one other important figure to pay attention to. This is Ilchi Lee, the president of UBE. He is also the founder of the world-renowned organization Dahn Yoga, otherwise known as "Body&Brain" or "Dan World" in Korea as well as the Global Cyber University, the Korean Institute of Brain Science, the International Brain Education Association, and the Benjamin School for Character Education, among other organizations. He introduces himself as a world-renowned meditator, brain educator and peace activist in his homepage³¹. The common belief unifying these apparently diverse institutions is surprisingly related to the worship of Dangun. The reason for his focus on the brain derives from the phrase "[God is] already embedded in the brain" in the *Samil Shingo*, a Dangun-related religious scripture.³²

Mt. Moak in Korea, where Ilchi Lee of Dahn Yoga found enlightenment, was also the place in which Jeungsan practiced asceticism and became enlightened, and whose religious message went on to have a significant influence on the New Religions related to Dangun. It is also sacred place for the sects related to Jeungsan, which are characterized by

³⁰ <http://www.hwandan.org/>

³¹ <http://www.ilchi.net/AboutIlchi/Profile.aspx>

³² Ho-ik Hur, *Han'gugūi idan kidokkyo* (Seoul: Tongyŏn 2016): 575

the importance given to Dangun.³³ In Lee's book *Brain Respiration* (1998), he argued that Dahn Yoga is a modernized and systematized the Korea ancient tradition of "Dahn Hak," which means a discipline for training body and mind derived from Dangun. It is said that if you train in Dan Yoga, you become one with the universe and reach this goal.³⁴ Since its establishment in 1985, Dahn Yoga has been criticized by both domestic and foreign media and experts as a cult and a pseudo-scientific organization, despite his continuing claims that it is not a religious group.³⁵

He is in fact the godfather of the glorious Gojoseon movement active outside mainstream academia since the 1980s. On September 26, 1987, the "Sacred Progenitor Dangun Admiration Ceremony" was held at the Sejong Center for the Performing Arts, to which more than 700 people attended. This event was spearheaded by Ilchi Lee, accompanied by advisors including former President Yoon Posun, Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-hwan, then-presidential candidates Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil, as well as LG Chairman Koo Ja-kyung and Hyundai Chairman Chung Ju-yung. In the declaration of the event, the organizers defined Dangun as the founder of the Korean nation, a great saint of humankind, and vowed to promote Dangun's teachings to the whole world, to achieve democratization, to reunify the two Koreas, and to spread peace according to Dangun's ideology.

³³ Gwang-soo Park et al., *Han'gung shinjonggyo chihyönggwa munhwa* (Research Center of Religions, Wonkwang Univ. 2015): 327-380

³⁴ Ilchi Lee, *Brain Respiration* (Seoul: Han Munwha 1998): 21-22

³⁵ See Catherine Elton, "The Scary Yoga Obsession." *Glamour*, 7 Dec 2009. Accessed 12 May, 2021. <https://www.glamour.com/story/the-scary-yoga-obsession> ; Kyra Phillips and David Fitzpatrick. "Lawsuit Calls Yoga Chain a Cult." *CNN* 7, Jan 2010. <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/01/05/yoga.lawsuit.lee/index.html> ; Pam Zekman. "Lawsuit Claims Dahn Yoga Is a Cult and a Con." *CBS News*, June 17 2009. <https://culteducation.com/group/899-dahn-yoga/5829-lawsuit-claims-dahn-yoga-is-a-cult-and-a-con.html> ; "Dan Yoga Scandal." *Kūgōshi algoshipta*. Park, Gi-hong Dir., Seoul, 6 Mar 2010. Television.; Sang-jin Han, "Taehae bu tanwöltü." *Shindonga*, Jan 2010. Print.; Woo-jae Kim, "Hyōraek'yōngbyōl sōnggyōk, hwandan'gogi, noet'ureinōt'thangmuniran irūmūro haenghaejinūn t'rkōdaehan sagi (Blood type personality, *Hwandan'gogi*, brain trainer...A 'huge fraud' conducted in the name of scholarship)." *Newstof* 2019, sec. Column. http://www.newstof.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1421&replyAll=&reply_sc_order_by=I ; For a comprehensive overview of Dan Yoga's religious aspects, see Ho-ik Hur(2016): 544-83

Lee also formed an organization called the “Korean Cultural Movement Union” in 1998, a campaign to build Dangun statues in public places and elementary, middle and high schools throughout the country. However, the movement was brought to a halt in 2000 when it became a social issue facing opposition from the Christian community and their charges of idolatry. In 2002, a new educational institution called the Kookhakwon was established to promote education about Korean national identity through historical and traditional cultural experiences. However, this was originally known as the "Korea Cultural Center," created by Lee, which had hosted a ritual for Dangun every October since 1988. The Kookhakwon currently has 16 branches across the country, with 10 subsidiary organizations including the “The Kookhak Research Institute,” which was one of the co-hosts of NMDH’s launch ceremony. The Kookhakwon also owns an online newspaper, K Spirit, founded in 2006 and issued a statement criticizing the NAHF's CRS report in 2012. Even now, education programs are provided to all ages, to businesses, and to government officials including spiritual pursuits related to the search for eternal life through Dahn Yoga, such as frequent public events including Qigong, cultural festivals, meditation accompanied by musical concerts and Dangun festivals.

The term “Kookhak” (lit. national studies) often appears here, and bears resemblance to the Kokugaku (lit. national studies) movement of Japan’s Meiji Era that provoked the "Kume Affair". The Kume Affair refers to Kume Kunitake’s (1839~1931) dishonorable expulsion from the Imperial University (now Tokyo University) after being criticized by researchers and followers of Shintoism. The reason was an article he presented in 1891, arguing that Shinto was just another form of worshiping the sky found universally throughout the world. In the aftermath of this affair, the journals the article included were even banned from publication. The fact that Japan’s Kokugaku movement was very close to Shinto, Japan’s indigenous religion, has implications for understanding the Korean ancient

history controversies.

In the end, the controversy over Gojoseon cannot be resolved academically. This is because those who have religious beliefs about Dangun reject the forms of reasoned debate employed within academia. Academics have so far ignored their claims, but they can no longer remain inactive now that their power has grown so much. This is a reflection of their novel ability to run academic societies with educational institutions and research institutes, publish academic journals, and run doctoral degrees programs.

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The Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising:

Collective Memories of the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising among Korean-Japanese from the

Jeju 4 · 3 Island

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1. Introduction - about the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising
2. Achievement of the truth commission activity of the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising and the memory of Korean Japanese in Jeju after the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising
3. Efforts and achievements of Korean-Japanese residents to promote the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising
4. The Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising remembered by Korean Japanese in Jeju - centered on interviews.

1. Introduction

1) What is Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising

Jeju 4 · 3 was based on the police's shooting on March 1, 1947(The 28th Anniversary of Independence Movement Day), and was based on resistance to oppression by the police, the Northwest Youth Association (a group that played a leading role in right-wing groups, such as helping police search for leftists¹). Since the armed uprising of the Jeju chapter of the South Korea Labor Party(Namro Party' Jeju Party) Forces on April 3, 1948, under the slogan of the independent election and the opposition of the single government, numerous residents were killed in the armed conflict and suppression of the punitive force on Jeju Island².

¹ The Northwest Youth Association (abbreviated Seocheong) was a cause of the Namro Party's resolution of the uprising, especially due to the members of the Northwest Youth Association, which went into the March 1st Uprising in 1947, which was a great opportunity for left-wing oppression. In addition, as the full-fledged devastation operation progressed, members of the Northwest Youth Association joined the police and defense guards at the request of the police and the National Defense Security Agency to engage in the punitive operation.- Jeju April 3rd Uprising Investigation Committee(2003). Jeju4 · 3 Incident Investigation Report. Jeju 4 · 3 Peace Foundation, etc.

² Jeju April 3rd Uprising Investigation and Honor Recovery Committee for Victims(2014). Jeju4 · 3 Incident Investigation Report(Japanese version). Jeju4 · 3 Peace Foundation. 373.

The period of the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising is set from March 1, 1947 to September 21, 1954 in the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Act³, which was enacted to restore the honor of the victims and to find out the truth.

According to the report received by the 4 · 3 Committee based on the 4 · 3 Special Act, the number of victims alone reached 14028, (including the dead, missing, and the disabled), and is remembered as the second most fatal human damaged event in Korean modern history after the Korean War. Among them, the number of victims under the age of 10 reached 814 and the number of victims between the ages of 11 and 20 is 3,026⁴.

Table 1.

현재 희생자 및 유족 심의.결정 현황(21.1 월)

중앙위 심의결정 현황(단위:명) 《희생자 및 유족수 : 총 94,985 명》

구분		희생자					유족	비고
		계	사망자	행방불명	후유장애	수형자		
인	소계	14,533	10,422	3,631	196	284	80,452	5 차(02.11.20) ~ 26 차(20.6.30)

³ The Jeju 4 · 3 Special Act' Honor shall be the first purpose of the investigation of the truth of the case, and the second purpose is to restore the honor of victims and bereaved families by investigating the truth. Therefore, the Special Act prioritizes truth-finding.- Jeju April 3rd Uprising Investigation and Honor Recovery Committee for Victims(2014). Jeju4 · 3 Incident Investigation Report(Japanese version). Jeju4 · 3 Peace Foundation. 46.

⁴ From June 8, 2001 to January 4, 2001, reports of 13,213 victims were received at home and abroad. However, as a result of receiving additional reports twice by extending the reporting period of victims and bereaved families by 90 days, the final number of domestic and foreign reporters by May 30, 2001 was 14,028. Among them, double-reported items or reports will be reinvestigated because they contain deficiencies.

불 인	소계	101	14	5	79	2	731	8 차(03.10.15) ~ 25 차(20.6.30)
정	재심의	△1			△1		△1	26 차(20.6.29)
취 소	소계	26	16	10			12	16 차(11.1.26) ~ 21 차(17.7.25)

The Jeju 4 · 3 uprising, which resulted in numerous victims, was in South Korea's single-handed election.

During World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided by the U.S. and Soviet Union, and in December 1945, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to form a five-year trusteeship between the U.S. and the U.S. The U.S. broke the U.S.-Soviet agreement of trusteeship and filed a motion with the U.N. not long after the establishment of the post-war treatment of Joseon, raising the issue of a new state under U.N. surveillance.

Following Japan's defeat in World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided and occupied by the United States and the Soviet Union. In December 1945, at the Moscow Trilateral Conference of Foreign Ministers was convened by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to deal with post-World War II issues, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to form a five-year trusteeship of Joseon. However, the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Cold War) and the left and right (right wing forces such as the People's Party of Korea and the Communist Party of Korea

and the Democratic Party of Korea) broke down amid intensifying confrontation. The U.S. broke the agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on trusteeship and filed a motion with the U.N. shortly after the establishment of Joseon's pre- and post-processing issue, filing a new state under U.N. surveillance. When the Soviet Union refused to participate, it reached a single-handed election of South Korea⁵.

Between 1945 and 1946, the land of Korean Peninsula's People's Committee was collapsed due to the U.S. government's suppression, while Jeju Island was under the control of the People's Committee. Even in 1947, Jeju Island's left-wing forces were less oppressed than on land, so their capabilities could be preserved. In addition, the left wing of Jeju Island was able to gain the support of Jeju residents due to efforts to solve the challenges in the local community through a unified public organization⁶.

Then, on March 1, 1947, a young child was kicked by the hooves of a mounted police marching to the square during the March 1, 1947. The angry crowd who saw it began to chase the police, and a police officer mistakenly considered it as an attack so he fired a gun. This is called the "March 1st Anniversary Shooting Incident."

⁵ 濟州島 4·3 事件を考える会・東京、2010、『濟州都島 4·3 事件 記憶と眞実－資料集 濟州島 4·3 事件 60 年を越えて』、新幹社、6

⁶ 양정심(2018). 제주 4·3 항쟁-저항과 아픔의 역사. 도서출판선인. 250-254.
Yang Jeong-sim(2018). Jeju April 3rd Uprising - History of Resistance and Pain. Seonin publishment. 250-254.

Six people were killed by bullets shot into the crowd by military police. This was the starting point of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising. As a result of this incident, Jeju Island, which had not seen much disturbance before, began to seethe, causing a general strike of 3.10 in Jeju Island, and the protests began to intensify. This gave the U.S. military government a deep impression of Jeju Island as a "red island," and the U.S. military government began to increase the police and right-wing youth groups such as Seocheong on Jeju Island and suppress Jeju residents with ruthless violence. As a result, the Namro Party and Jeju Party considered measures to organize the self-defense struggle of Jeju residents. Concerned about the uncertainty of the party's existence if the South's sole government is established, the Namro Party and Jeju Party started an armed uprising on April 3 of the same year to stop it. The struggle resulted in the blocking of the May 10 elections in the Jeju area, becoming the only region that blocked the single election.

However, since the establishment of the government on August 15, 1948, it has been weakened by the devastating operation of the military and the hardline punitive forces from late October to January 1949. The devastating operation led to the massacre of Jeju residents and the sacrifice of many civilians. The solidarity between the guerrillas and ordinary citizens of the Jeju Party also began to collapse.⁷ Since then, the Rhee Syngman

⁷ 양정심(2018). 제주 4·3 항쟁-저항과 아픔의 역사. 도서출판선인. 12.

regime's crackdown on Jeju residents led to the massacre of prospective detainees after the outbreak of the Joseon War.

In other words, the uprising was carried out against the division of the Korean Peninsula into the two Koreas due to the South's single election, but within it was the independent armed uprising of the Jeju Party, which was concerned about the existence of the party.

Blocking left-wing forces on Jeju Island, the police, right-wing organizations, including the Seocheong, and the Rhee Syng-man regime's tyranny toward Jeju Island can be cited⁸.

The Jeju 4 · 3 uprising was the starting point of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising, in which the 3.1 Memorial Tournament firing incident was confronted by the Jeju residents' uprising. It was an independent protest by Jeju residents against the massacre and tyranny of Jeju residents by right-wing groups, including the police and SeoCheong, and Jeju residents were also the main agents of the protest. Unlike other regions, Jeju Island is hard to explain in other words, given that resistance continued for a long time even though it could not escape to the outside or receive external support if it blocked the coastline⁹.

Yang Jeong-sim(2018). Jeju April 3rd Uprising - History of Resistance and Pain. Seonin publishmen.12.

⁸ 양정심(2018). 제주 4·3 항쟁-저항과 아픔의 역사. 도서출판선인. 11.

Yang Jeong-sim(2018). Jeju April 3rd Uprising - History of Resistance and Pain. Seonin publishmen.11.

⁹ 濟州島 4·3 事件を考える会・東京、2010、『濟州都島 4·3 事件 記憶と真実－資料集 濟州島 4·3 事件 60 年を越えて』新幹社、17

2) Development of the 4.3 Fact-finding Movement in Jeju

Public discussions on Jeju 4.3 fact-finding began after the April 19 Revolution in 1960. However, it was suspended due to the 5.16 coup in the following year, and discussions on 4 ▪ 3 were taboo for the next 20 years under the military regime due to anti-communist law, national security law and the collective punishment.

Then in 1978, Hyun Ki-young published a novel about the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising called "Uncle Soon-i," which was an opportunity to recognize Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising again. This work deals with the horrors and trauma of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising by accusing police officers from Seocheon and exposing crimes against humanity committed on Jeju Island. As a result, the author suffered from being dragged to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and tortured, but the novel had a significant meaning in that it promoted the truth of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising public through literature.

The re-discussion of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising emerged as an important issue within the student movement and social movement since the 1987 civil uprising, and has been actively developed in the wake of the democratization movement in the late 1980s.

In 1989, 11 civil society organizations in Jeju organized the "April commemoration Joint Preparation Committee" to hold the 41st anniversary memorial service at the Jeju Civic Center. It was the first public memorial service ever held.

Shortly after the event, the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising Research Institute was launched on May 10 of the same year, and research activities for Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising 's fact-finding and honor recovery movement began. In addition, the Jeju Newspaper began to publish a series of testimonies in " Jeju 4 · 3 uprising " in 1989. From that time by 1998, a total of five books were published, including the Jemin Ilbo's founding plan, "4 · 3 Says," leaving Jeju 4 · 3 uprising -related testimony as a systematic record.

In the 1990s, Jeju residents demanded a full-fledged investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising and a full-fledged restoration of honor, which led to the gradual handling of Jeju 4 · 3 uprising by political circles, local councils, and local governments.

In 1993, the Jeju Provincial Council established Jeju 4 · 3 uprising Special Committee, launched an investigation into the damage status of each town, and began to receive reports of damage from the 4 · 3 Jeju uprising on February 7, 1994. As a result, in May 1995, the Jeju Provincial Council published the first report on the 4 · 3 damage investigation and published a list of 14,125 victims¹⁰.

Following the accumulation of such damage investigations, the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising Truth and Reconciliation Problem gradually focused on the massacre of civilians. As the U.S.

¹⁰ Jeju April 3rd Uprising Investigation and Honor Recovery Committee for Victims(2014). Jeju4 · 3 Incident Investigation Report(Japanese version). Jeju4 · 3 Peace Foundation. 43.

participation in the massacre became public, the reality of the massacre and the damage began to be gradually illuminated in the international solidarity.

In April 1997, the 50th Anniversary Project Promotion Pan-National Committee was formed. Citizens' movements, international symposiums, various forms of art festivals and memorial systems to solve the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising problems were held and gradually spread across the country.

3) 4 · 3 Enactment and revision of the Special Act

After the Kim Dae-jung government began, in March 1998, National Congress for New Politics formed a special committee to investigate the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising on Jeju Island. The following year, in March 1999, Jeju Island formed a provincial solidarity to investigate the truth and restore honor, and in October of that year, 24 bereaved families and civil society organizations organized a coalition to enact the special law.

The Jeju 4 · 3 uprising investigation and Jeju Island in the parliamentary plenary session on December 16, 1999 victims to salvage its reputation by a special law (4 · 3 Special Law) was passed in January 2000, the following year, Kim Dae-jung on Thursday signed the 4 · 3 Special Act of the president. It was the fruit of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising about 10 years after the fact-finding campaign began. On December 16, 1999, the National

Assembly passed a Special Act on the Investigation of the Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising and the Restoration of the Honor of Victims (4 · 3 Special Act). In January 2000, the following year, President Kim Dae-jung signed on the 4.3 Special Act. It was the fruit of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising about 10 years after the fact-finding campaign began.

Under the 4 · 3 Special Act, the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising Fact-finding Committee and the Victims' Honor Recovery Committee (4 · 3 Committee) was launched. In 2003, the Jeju 4 · 3 fact-finding report was prepared and finalized, victims and bereaved families were reported and determined, Jeju 4 · 3 Peace Park was created and Jeju 4 · 3 Peace Memorial Hall was established, medical support for the bereaved families and living support for the disabled¹¹.

However, the 4 · 3 Special Act did not include details. There were problems such as limiting the scope of victims and bereaved families, lack of fact-finding authority, lack of practical support for bereaved families, omission of regulations on excavation of remains and designation of national anniversaries, and omission of re-deliberation regulations.

¹¹ 박찬식(2014). 제주 4·3 바로알기. 제주 4·3 평화재단. 54-57.

Park chan-sik(2014). Knowing Jeju 4 · 3 uprising properly. Jeju4 · 3 Peace Foundation. 54-57.

The special law was passed as these issues were largely omitted and focused on the ruling and opposition parties' agreements¹².

As a result, discussions on the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising Truth Movement became more active, and the revision was promulgated in January 2007 and revised again in August 2013. As a result, the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising was designated as a memorial day, opening the door for the designation of a legal anniversary, and providing a legal basis for the state to subsidize living subsidies to victims and bereaved families.

2. Achievement of the truth commission activity of the Jeju 4 · 3 and the memory of Korean Japanese in Jeju after the Jeju 4 · 3

4 · 3 Special Act on Jeju, Korea in 2000 was enacted in 2003 'Jeju 4 · 3 uprising investigation reports, Jeju, Korea' on October 31, is confirmed and the same year, Roh Moo-hyun government's formally apologized for mistakes of the past state public power. Park Geun-hye of designating '4 · 3. above to the victims, Jeju-do, be held in memory.' as a holiday for the 2014 (in Korean history textbook of 2015, the description of Jeju 4 ·

¹² 양조훈(2017). 제주 4·3 70 년-어둠에서 빛으로-제 1 부 제 2 장. 제주 4·3 평화재단. 510-512.

Yang Jo-hoon(2017). Jeju 4.3 70 years- Darkness to Light - Chapter 1, clause 2. Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation. 510-512.

3 uprising was downsized than the existing history textbooks and technology and it also intended to reduce Jeju 4▪3 uprising by proposing a bill to abolish the Jeju 4•3 committee.)

The big truth of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising has been revealed in large part, with the results of newly defining Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising as a national historical event that took place at the time of the unification government campaign. However, Korean society is still lukewarm about the memories of Japanese Jeju residents after the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising.

Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising was a massacre about 70 years ago, but there has been strict oppression of officials by the joint system ever since. Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising is a traumatic memory that is vividly remembered until recently when its honor has been restored, and it means a lot to the flow of modern Korean history. This is not limited to Korean society, but also to the Korean-Japanese community from Jeju Island, which moved to Japan to avoid the devastation of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising.

Korean Japanese in Jeju came to Japan and represented the will of the people as a protest against the 5.10 single elections before and after liberation, which resulted in the establishment of a divided regime at that time. Much effort has been made to publicize the devastation of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, and many Korean Japanese in Jeju have also been persecuted and oppressed in Japan. It is still not well known about the memories of

Japanese Jeju residents after Jeju 4 · 3, including the fact that they sent funds earned from leather farms to Jeju Island to lay the foundation for the development of the Jeju region. Therefore, I think a visual view is needed on how Jeju 4 · 3 uprising memories affect the lives of experienced people in the future. We would like to examine what the Korean Japanese Jeju residents are saying from Jeju 4 · 3 uprising in Japanese society, what efforts they are making, and how far they will expand the scope of space to regenerate collective historical memories such as Jeju 4 · 3 uprising, and problems when such memories are regenerated.

3. Efforts and achievements of Korean-Japanese residents to promote Jeju 4 · 3 uprising

1) Beginning of the Jeju 4 · 3 Truth Movement in Tokyo and Writer Kim Seok-beom

The start of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising Truth and Reconciliation Movement in Tokyo was triggered by the "40th Anniversary of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising " held in April 1988. (April 3, 1988 at 2 p.m., Suidobashi(水道橋), Tokyo, Korea YMCA. At the center was Kim Seok-beom, a Korean Japanese writer, who wrote 3,000 letters in the Asahi Shimbun on March 29, 1988. With this opening, the rally attracted about 500 people, including

Japanese owners and a large number of Japanese, which contributed greatly to the success of the rally¹³.

Kim Seok-beom introduced the truth of Jeju 4 · 3 uprising to Japanese society by writing novels such as "看守朴書房 (간수박서방) " (1957.8), "烏の死 (까마귀의 죽음) " (1957.12), and "火山島 (화산도) " (1976-1997). In addition, Jeju 4 · 3 uprising began to gain attention in Japanese society with the publication of "The History of the April 3 Armed Struggle of the Jeju People" (1963) by Kim Bong-hyun and Kim Min-joo.

According to the mainichi shinbun, a Japanese newspaper, Kim Seok-beom visited Daemado in 1951, when he heard from a woman about the experience of sexual torture. It is said that he was overwhelmed by reality and started writing "烏の死 (까마귀의 죽음) " (1957) based on Jeju 4 · 3 uprising. With this work, Kim Seok-beom was awarded the Osaragi Jiro Award (大佛次郎賞) in 1984 and the Mainichi Prize in 1998, marking Jeju 4 · 3 uprising in Japanese society.

On the other hand, Kim Seok-beom was selected as the winner of the first Jeju 4 · 3 Peace Prize held in Korea in 2015, but was criticized by conservative lawmakers and

¹³ 조동현. 제주도 4 · 3 사건 70 주년기념 국제심포지엄-국제사회와 제주 4 · 3-일본에서 보는 시각. 제주 4.3 사건 70 주년 희생자 위령제 실행위원회(오사카). 32-33.
Cho Dong-hyun. Jeju 4.3 International Symposium on the 70th Anniversary of the Jeju 4.3 Incident. Jeju 4.3 Incident 70th Anniversary Victims' Memorial Committee (Osaka). 32-33.

others for making remarks criticizing Rhee Syng-man. In October 2015, "Hwasan Island" was published in Korea and tried to attend a publication ceremony, but was refused entry.

This can be seen as a representative example of the ideological conflict that is still extremely prevalent in Korean society.

2) The Jeju 4 · 3 uprising Thinking Group and the 50th Anniversary of Jeju 4 · 3 uprising

The Jeju 4 · 3 uprising Truth and Reconciliation Movement will be stalled for nearly a decade after the 40th anniversary of the memorial service. Regarding this factor, Chairman Cho Dong-hyun¹⁴ says it is because he failed to overcome the frame as a Jeju resident, including some intellectuals from Jeju Island.

Also, the left-leaning Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Chochongnyeon) formed by North Korean organizations at the time, it is said that the lack of a mindset to confront the two major organizations of the "Korean People's Group of Japan (Mindan)" of the right-wing faction, which was formed for the purpose of conducting national movements in a unified manner¹⁵.

¹⁴ Meeting thinking about the 4.3 incident on Jeju Island/Tokyo Branch Chairman(濟州島 4·3 事件を考える会・東京一会長).

¹⁵ 조동현(2018). 제주도 4 · 3 사건 70 주년기념 국제심포지엄-국제사회와 제주 4 · 3-일본에서 보는 시각. 제주 4 · 3 사건 70 주년 희생자 위령제 실행위원회(오사카). 32-33.
Cho Dong-hyun and Jeju 4.3 International Symposium on the 70th Anniversary of the Jeju 4.3 Incident. Jeju 4.3 Incident 70th Anniversary Victims' Memorial Committee (Osaka). 32-33.

Ahead of the 50th anniversary of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, Japan was advocated by those who did not support the activities of Chochongnyeon and Mindan, and the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising fact-finding movement was not carried out due to the heightened movement of third countries.

In the meantime, some intellectuals who were engaged in the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Movement gathered to organize the 50th Anniversary Project Execution Committee of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, focusing on the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, which aims to popularize in Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising.

Table 2.

Member of the Implementation Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising

《Joint representatives》	Kim Seok-beom, Lee Chul, Hyun Kwang-soo, Kim Min-ju, Kim Il, Ahn Soo-young, Han Dae-sook, Lee Soo-oh, Yang Seok-il, Moon Kyung-soo
《Secretariat》	ho Dong-hyun, Ko Yi-sam, Ko Hee-tak, Han Sung-hyun, Kim Joong-myung, and Kim Min-ju (not attending)

The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising 50th Anniversary Project Executive Committee created an opportunity to leap forward as a civic movement where anyone can participate in the

fragmentary the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising Movement, whic the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Uprising is limited to the owners of Japan. Furthermore, the meaning of J is significant in that it has been striving to popularize the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising in Japanese society by adding various cultural arts such as folk songs and memorial concerts in sports with strong academic characteristics.

An event conducted by the Implementation Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising

- October 1997, 10, A heated discussion between writer Kim Seok-beom and Yang Seok-il
- Bruce Cummings' guest speech in March 1998 "The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising and the U.S. Military Government"
- ShinKyansha's (新幹社) "Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising" (Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Coverage Team 4.3) says Translated)
- Apr 4th 50th Anniversary memorial concert-Ochanomiz(御茶ノ水) Casals Hall-500 people)

In addition, performances were held at Osaka Philotti Hall based on the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 50th anniversary project. The performance was held as a pan-popular event, with about 1,100 people participating.

In order to participate in the 50th anniversary of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising Movement, Osaka's executive committee was in charge of the civil union and Tokyo's executive committee, showing their willingness to support the Chochongnyeon and Mindan.

This is an example of how the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising went beyond the confrontation between the left and the right and together on the path of reconciliation and healing that it wants to pursue.

4. Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising remembered by Korean Japanese in Jeju - centered on interviews.

The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, remembered by Koreans from Jeju Island, was interviewed by Koreans in Japan about the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising memory of Jeju Island on what kind of historical experience it is, how it is remembered in the Korean community in Japan, and what can be said.

The purpose of the interview is to focus on how the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising is remembered in Korean-Japanese society and how memories are regenerated and organize what I realized.

Subjects are as follows:

- Meeting thinking about the 4 ▪ 3 incident on Jeju Island/Tokyo Branch Chairman(濟州島 4・3 事件を考える会・東京一会長)

- Secretary-General of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising - Tokyo, CEO of publisher Shinkansha Ko i-sam), (Jeju Research Institute and Jeju MBC) participated in the 6th part of " 4. 3rd Japanese Jeju-Unstoppable Memory" jointly with Jeju Special Self - Governing Province on the last 4 ▪ 3 70th anniversary(濟州島 4・3 事件を考える会・東京一事務局、新幹社取締役)

- Secretariat of the NPO's "Culture Center Arirang" - Jeong Kang-heon(文化センターアリラン)

- Jeju4 ▪ 3 Peace Foundation - Cho Mi-yeon

Table 3.

4-1. The following is a representation of the questions and answers.

Q 1	<p>【Question】</p> <p>How did you get to know Jeju 4 ▪ 3?</p>
Q 2	<p>【Question】</p> <p>Typical examples of state violence in Korea include " Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising ", "Yeosun uprising", and "May 18 Gwangju Democratic Movement". Why does Jeju 4 ▪ 3 have no official name, unlike the 5 ▪ 18 Gwangju Democratic Movement? Why?</p>
Q 3	<p>【Question】</p> <p>There is no official name, but it has recently been called "Jeju 4 ▪ 3" (especially since 1998.) It was previously called " Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising ". How do you feel about why it has recently been called Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising and its background?</p> <p>It is still called Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising in Japan. The same applies in the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Thinking Group. Why is it called " Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising " in Japan, unlike in Korea.</p>
Q 4	<p>【Question】</p> <p>Why is Jeju 4 ▪ 3 not displayed in many places, unlike the May 18 Democratization Movement?</p>
Q5	<p>【Question】</p> <p>What do you think Jeju residents are looking for in the Korean-Japanese community in Jeju 4.3?</p>
Q6	<p>【Question】</p> <p>What do you think the bereaved families of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 (from Jeju in the Korean-Japanese community) are demanding in Jeju 4 ▪ 3?</p>

Q7	<p>【Question】</p> <p>With the revision of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Special Act, a number of issues remain, including conflicts between bereaved families and confrontations between the left and right. In particular, the conflict between the bereaved family and the government over the issue of compensation payment is seen as great. Therefore, in revising the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Special Act, it is important to adjust the payment of compensation in what format, and what do you think about it (the prospect of revising the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Special Act).</p>
Q 8	<p>【Question】</p> <p>There are problems such as the creation of the 4 ▪ 3 Peace Park in the process of adjusting compensation, and some medical support, but no compensation per person is paid. How is the bereaved family of Jeju 4 ▪ 3 from Jeju Island compensated in terms of ethnic Koreans living in Japan?</p>
Q8	<p>【Question】</p> <p>The bereaved families' association existing in Jeju Island is divided into two tendencies, especially the far-right bereaved families' association's resistance over the revision of the Jeju Special Act. It is not official in Japan, but there is such a meeting. Are opinions divided like the bereaved families' association in Jeju Island?</p>
Q9	<p>【Question】</p> <p>April 3, 2020, 4 ▪ 3, Jeju, 72nd anniversary event, held at Jeju Peace Park Moon Jae-in, the president talked about 4 ▪ 3 that he would try to resolve completely. "complete resolution" is being used when discussing the Japanese military sexual slavery issues between Korea and Japan. I think there is a difference in interpretation between Korea and Japan over a "complete solution," what do you think?</p> <p>Also, what does the complete resolution of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 mean here?</p>

4-2. Survey Results and Considerations

Question 1) As for "How I got to know The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising " all three Jejuian resident in Japan answered that they gradually learned about it in a place related to the Korean association after entering university. Up to high school students said that it is not an environment where they can talk about The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising at home. One of the factors is that the textbook could not cover The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising because it was not taught as an independent case at the Joseon school at that time.

Next, question 2) isn't The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, a representative example of Korean state violence, a formal name unlike other examples? As for the question, he replied that the problem is in Korea. He replied that it was because the opposition parties existed because the people who caused the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Uprising were opposed to the single government. This needs to be considered in terms of domestic ideology.

As I said earlier, Kim Seok-beom, who can be seen as the beginning of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising fact-finding campaign in Tokyo, Japan, was selected as the winner of the 1st J the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising Peace Prize held in Korea in 2015, and earned credit for Jeju 4.3. However, he was criticized by conservative lawmakers for his remarks criticizing Rhee Syng-man, and was refused entry to the Volcano Island Publishing Conference in Korea in October of the same year. This is considered an example of an ideological conflict that still remains serious in our society.

Next, questions 4) and 5), "In the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Uprising, what do you think Jeju-born people are looking for and what the bereaved families of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising are asking for?" should be prepared to proudly talk about what happened in Jeju. In the Korean-Japanese community, there was discrimination on the people from jeju such as called redness for a while.

Regardless of whether or not they directly participated in the armed uprising, The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, if they were the family members of the participants, they were called Reds. As a factor, the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Uprising was a closed area where the perpetrator could not be distinguished because the victim and the perpetrator were mixed in the same village, and if there was a relationship, it was accused of being "red." Since it is still recognized in Korean-Japanese society, I think many people should know and share the truth of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Uprising to escape from such perception.

To this end, Koreans in Japan are making various efforts in Japanese society, one of which is the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Uprising memorial service.

Q8) "In the process of compensation adjustment, there are problems such as the creation of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising Peace Park and some medical support, but compensation per person is not paid." Asked how the bereaved families of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising from Jeju are being compensated in terms of ethnic Koreans living in Japan, Chairman Cho Dong-

hyun replied that he understood that there were no bereaved families who applied in Tokyo and that there were only a few people in Osaka.

It is understood that compensation is not properly paid to the bereaved family of the Jejuian resident in Japan.

Currently, there are about 14,533 victims of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, 2021. As the amendment to the Special Act on the Truth Finding and Restoration of Victims of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, which was newly established to relieve victims of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, 2021. Additional methods and criteria for compensation are established.

The revised bill deals with details to restore honor and heal wounds, including additional fact-finding, the establishment of special retrial rules for victims of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising and the development of special support measures. Although compensation specifying state responsibilities is not clearly stated, it has resulted in such things as specifying the payment of alimony. This is a national compensation. This means that state compensation and reward issues and related alimony payments are stipulated.

As such, additional compensation payments are being made based on the revision on the victims and bereaved families of Jeju Island in Korea, and honor recovery is gradually taking place. However, compensation and alimony are not being paid smoothly to the victims and bereaved families of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising, who came to Japan to avoid the

devastation of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising. We cannot see it in Tokyo and also in Osaka we barely see it.

The Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising Special Act, enacted in 2000, contains the provisions of Article 10 of the Act on the Establishment of a Reporting Center for Victims and bereaved families to receive reports of damage at overseas missions in Korea.

Overseas travel here mainly means Japan, suggesting a deep connection between the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising and the Jejuian resident in Japan.

However, the total number of victims of the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising in Japan is 75, including 74 reported between 2000 and 2003, when the Japanese Association of Relatives was formed, and one additional reported in 2013.

as a factor

- ① Relatives in Jeju Island have already reported it, so there is no more.
- ② Korean residents in Japan of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan have not been able to report it because they have not obtained permission from their superiors.
- ③ In case of living in a third country, arrangement of family register and difficult application procedures.

For this reason, those who apply for compensation are insufficient and therefore payments are being delayed.

The issue of victims excluded from third countries (foreign missions) within the boundary of the Jeju 4.3 Special Act needs to be considered, and the process of applying for victims in third countries should also be reached with social consensus.

In addition, in question 4, to the question "Why do you think the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising is not displayed in many places, unlike the May 18 Democratic Movement?" Cho Mi-yeon replied that a national consensus should be reached.

The May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement has many records of memories, clearly identifying perpetrators and victims.

On the other hand, the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 Uprising has a lack of data, and the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising has a lot of conflicts because there are both perpetrators and victims in the same village, making it difficult to generalize. In collective memory, interpretation is done well when characterization is clearly established, but due to the above factors, it is still difficult to display the Jeju 4 ▪ 3 uprising in various places or describe it in textbooks.

Based on what I realized in the interview above, I would like to compare the memories of the Jeju 4 · 3 uprising, which is remembered by the next interviewer, by listening to testimony and organizing them by region.

‘동포사회’와 교육

- 재일코리안계 학교를 경험한 3인의 구술사에 근거하여 -

조 세 진*¹

(ver 2021.04)

Ⅱ 目 次 Ⅱ

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1. 들어가며

1.1 문제제기

본 논문은 조선학교와 코리아국제중고등학교를 순차적으로 경험한

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재일코리안 3인의 구술사를 통하여 재일코리안계 학교 교육에 있어서 커뮤니티의 의미와 과제를 고찰하는 것을 목적으로 한다.

먼저 본고에서 칭하는 '재일코리안계 학교'는 재일코리안들이 후대의 교육을 목적으로 설립한 학교를 의미한다. 재일코리안들은 해방 이후 일본의 공교육 기관과는 별도로 일본 각지에 조선인들의 교육을 위한 학교를 운영해 왔다. 이후 재정적 필요 및 역사적 배경 속에서 조선민주주의인민공화국(이하 '북한'로 약칭) 또는 대한민국 정부의 지원을 받으며 조선학교, 한국계학교가 운영되고 있으며 2000년대에는 새로운 방향성을 추구하는 신생 학교가 설립되었다. 학교의 운영 주체와 학교가 기반한 커뮤니티 등에 따라 교육의 방향성에는 정도의 차이가 존재하지만 재일코리안 학생들의 교육을 주요한 목적으로 설립되었다는 점에서 이들은 공통된 기반을 갖는다. 이들 학교는 일반적으로 '민족학교'로 칭하여져 왔으나(정진성 2017) '민족'이라는 용어가 갖는 다양한 함의를 고려하여 본고는 '재일코리안계 학교'라는 명칭을 사용하고자 한다.

국경을 넘는 사람들의 이동이 현저해지고 있는 현재, 국민국가의 틀을 전제로 하는 교육 제도가 담아내지 못하는 수요가 가시화되고 있다. 이러한 현황에서 한국 사회, 그리고 주변 동아시아 사회의 에스닉 마이너리티 커뮤니티가 화교 학교, 재일코리안계 학교 등을 운영하며 일궈온 교육 실천의 경험은 다문화사회에 걸맞는 교육을 설계하는데 있어서 중요한 참고가 될 것이다.

한국과 일본은 에스닉 마이너리티의 독자적 학교의 역사를 볼 때 경

험의 유사성이 관찰된다. 몇 세대에 이전에 정착한 에스닉 마이너리티가 정주 사회에 진입하는 것을 가로막는 제도적, 문화적 장벽이 존재하고 있으며, 이는 에스닉 마이너리티 커뮤니티가 커뮤니티 내부의 결속에 집중하는 한편, '조국'으로 상징하는 정주 사회 외부의 국민국가와의 관계를 중시해온 역사적 경험의 토대를 만들어왔다(Ryang 1997, 王恩美 2008, 정은주 2013). 이는 에스닉 마이너리티의 독자적 학교의 경험에도 반영되었다.

그러나 정주 사회의 배타성에 대응하는 방식으로 형성된 형성된 에스닉 마이너리티 커뮤니티의 내부 지향적 인식, 그리고 정주 사회가 아닌 '조국'에 대한 과도한 초점화는 정주 사회에서 태어나고 성장해온 젊은 세대들의 사고와의 괴리를 만들어 내고 있다. 본고는 이러한 상황을 재일코리안계 학교를 사례를 통해 살펴보고자 한다.

필자는 재일코리안 교육의 전개에 관심을 갖고 2017년부터 코리아국제중고등학교(Korea International School, 이하 KIS로 약칭)에서 참여관찰 및 인터뷰 조사를 실시해 왔다. KIS는 2008년 오사카부 이바라키시에 설립된 중고등 6년 과정의 학교로, 국민국가적 이념의 제약을 넘어서는 재일코리안 교육을 지향하였던 재일코리안 오피니언 리더들에 의해 '월경인'이라는 가치를 내걸고 설립된 학교이다. 다양한 배경을 가진 학생들 중에서는 조선학교 초등 혹은 중등과정을 졸업하고 KIS에 진학한 학생들이 있었는데 이들과의 인터뷰에서는 조선학교와 코리아국제학원이라는 두 재일코리안계 학교의 경험에 기반한 인식을 볼 수 있었다. 필자는 이들의 구술을 통해 현재 재일코리안계 학교가 직면하고 있는

현실의 단면을 고찰할 수 있다고 생각하기에 이들의 구술을 고찰 대상으로 삼고자 한다.

1.2 조사 내용

본고는 재일코리아계 학교인 조선학교와 KIS에서 재학한 경험이 있는 3인의 인터뷰 조사를 구술사 분석의 방법을 이용하여 고찰하고자 한다. 이들은 학교 변동의 경험을 통해 재일코리안 학교를 상대화해 볼 수 있는 기회를 가졌다는 점에서 재일코리안 젊은 세대를 대상으로 하는 논의에 있어서 중요한 관점을 제공해 준다고 생각된다.

필자는 KIS에서 2017년부터 인터뷰 조사 및 참여관찰을 진행하였고 2018년부터는 주 일 회 수업을 담당하며 학생들과 교류해왔다. 필자가 인터뷰를 진행한 KIS 재학생 및 졸업생 중 조선학교 출신자는 9명이었으며 초중 교육을 포함하여 9년 이상 조선학교 교육을 경험한 이는 6명이었다². 본고는 복수의 인터뷰를 실시한 3명의 구술사를 분석 대상으로 하였다.

<표1> 조사협력자 기본 정보 및 인터뷰 정보³

이름	나이	재일코리안 세대	인터뷰 일정·장소
유리	19세	재일코리안 4세	① 2019/10/10 (KIS)

² 참고로 필자는 비교분석을 위하여 본고가 고찰하는 조사협력자와 비슷한 연령대로 조선학교 초중고 교육을 마친 3인의 인터뷰를 실시한 바 있다.

³ 연령은 본고를 작성하는 2021년 1월을 기준으로 하였다.

			② 2019/11/21 (KIS) ③ 2020/01/23 (외부) ④ 2021/01/15 (화상통화)
모모	21세	재일코리안 3세	① 2017/10/19 (KIS) ② 2017/10/26 (KIS) ③ 2019/11/05 (외부)
희주	22세	재일코리안 4세	① 2019/09/26 (외부) ② 2019/11/18 (외부) ③ 2020/11/30 (외부)

인터뷰는 비구조화 인터뷰 방식을 택하였으며 인터뷰 내용은 녹음 후 기록하였다. 인터뷰에서는 조사협력자의 선택에 따라 일본어, 한국어가 모두 사용되었는데 본고가 인용하는 구술 중 별도의 표기가 없는 경우 일본어 구술을 필자가 번역한 것이다⁴. 개인 정보의 표기는 조사협력자와 협의하에 결정하였으며 유리의 경우 가명을 사용하였다. 인용과 서술 내용은 작성 후 조사협력자와의 확인 과정을 거쳤다.

2. 조선학교와 코리아국제중고등학교 개관

2.1 조선학교

⁴ 한국어/조선어의 명칭에 대한 표기는 '한국어'를 기본으로 하나 조사협력자가 '조선어'로 지칭하는 경우 그대로 사용한다.

현재 일본 전역에 소재하고 있는 조선학교는 유치부 40교, 초등부 51교, 중등부 31교, 고등부 10교 및 조선대학교 1교이다. 조선학교는 일본에 거주해온 조선인들에 의해 해방 이후 건립되기 시작한 학교를 역사적 뿌리로 갖고 있으며 오영호가 지적하듯이 해방 후 재일코리안들의 탈식민화에 있어 매우 중요한 기능을 담당해 왔다(吳永鎬 2019). 그러나 근래에는 일본의 정규학교로서의 인정받지 못하면서 오는 재정적 불이익, 조일관계 악화에 따른 조선학교 이미지의 악화, 재일코리안 사회 안에서의 분단, 국제결혼 등 재일코리안 사회 내부의 변화, 저출산, 학교 통폐합에 따른 통학의 어려움 등으로 인한 학생 수 감소와 학교 수의 감소로 어려움을 겪고 있다(이토 2018:94-98).

조선학교의 운영 체계는 일본 각지의 조선학교의 교원은 조선대학교에서 교원 교육을 받은 이들에 의해 충원되는 시스템을 갖추고 있으며 교과내용은 통일적인 커리큘럼을 통해 관리되고 있다. 조선학교는 1957년부터 조선민주주의인민공화국(이하 북한으로 지칭)의 재정적 원조를 받으며 관련성을 갖기 시작한다. 소니아량은 조선학교의 교과서 분석 등을 통하여 북한의 '해외공민'으로서의 정체성 형성의 구조를 논하였다(Ryang 1997). 1990년대 초반에는 재일코리안의 상황에 맞춘 교육을 실현하기 위해 교과 개편이 이루어진다. 다만 북한에 대한 감정적 유대 관계의 형성은 조선학교 교육에서 유지되고 있는 특징으로 보이는데, 2010년대에 조선학교에 대한 조사를 실시한 야마모토는 고등부 3학년의 북한 수학여행의 참여관찰을 통해 북한을 '조국'으로서 느끼는 학생들의 감상을 기술하였다(山本 2014:86-89). 2000년대 초반 조선학교에서 참여관찰을 실시한 송기찬은 조선학교가 '본질주의에 입각한 '강경한 민족주의'로 인해 '집단

주의의 억압적 요소가 존재함을 지적한다. 다만 학생들은 학생들은 조선인/일본인이라는 두 정체성을 소유함으로 인해 '이중언어에 의한 다중적 자아의 운용'을 통해 문제를 해결한다고 분석한다(송기찬 2018:256).

조선학교를 중심으로 형성되어 있는 커뮤니티의 존재는 조선학교를 이해하기 위한 핵심적인 개념이다(이문웅 2004, 曹慶鎬 2012, 中島 2013), 山本 2014, 金汝卿 2020). 조선학교는 대부분 조선학교를 졸업한 학부모들이 자녀들을 입학시키며 학부모들의 학교 운영에 대한 참여가 높으며 가족들 상호 간의 인지도가 높다. 이러한 긴밀한 관계는 구성원들이 커뮤니티의 존재를 인지하는데 있어 중요한 기능을 한다. 야마모토는 '커뮤니티 내부에서 공유되고 있는 역사와 이야기, 개개인의 생활사'가 존재하는 긴밀한 관계의 특징을 기술하며 학생들이 '유소년기부터 재일조선인들의 농밀한 인간관계 안에서 자라면서 그 장점을 실감'하면서 커뮤니티에 대한 애정을 형성하고 있는 단면을 기술하였다(山本 2014:83-84). 이러한 커뮤니티 감각은 일본 각지의 조선학교의 학생들이 여러 대회 및 행사 등을 통해 친분을 쌓는 과정을 통해 재학 중인 학교의 범위를 넘어 넓은 범위의 커뮤니티에 인식과 연대감으로 이어진다.

위에서 살펴본 대로 조선학교는 강한 구심력을 특징으로 하는 커뮤니티를 지지기반으로 운영되고 있다. 선행연구는 이에 대해 차별에 대한 우려 없이 조선인으로서의 정체성을 획득할 수 있는 학습 공간의 제공한다는 측면에 중점을 두었다. 이러한 특징은 조선학교의 핵심적인 존재 의의로서 과소평가될 수 없을 것이다. 그러나 학교 교육에 있어서 커뮤니티

가 강력한 구심력을 형성하고 있는 점, 학교 교육에서 보여지는 '강경한 민족주의'적 인식 등이 학습자인 젊은 세대들에게 어떻게 수용되고 있는지에 대해서는 충분한 논의가 부재한 실정이다. 이러한 논의 지형은 재일코리안계 학교가 놓여있는 현실적 변화를 이해하기 위한 실마리를 제공해주지 못하는 문제로 이어지고 있다.

2.2 코리아국제학원

KIS는 앞서 논한 대로 국민국가적 이념의 제약을 넘어서는 재일코리안계 학교 교육의 대안을 제시하고자 했던 이들에 의해 '월경인' 육성을 목표로 2008년 설립되었다(脇坂 2015). KIS에 관해서는 교육 학생들의 아이덴티티, 교육 특성 등에 관한 논문이 존재하지만(金素馨 2017, 金南 2016, 金南 2018, 趙世珍 2018, 比嘉 2011). 한국에는 간략한 소개에 그치고 있기에 본고에서 다소의 지면을 할애해 소개하도록 한다.

KIS는 중학교와 고등학교 과정에 해당하는 6년의 교육 과정을 갖추고 있다⁵. 교육과정의 가장 큰 특징은 영어, 코리아어, 일본어의 3개 국어 습득에 비중을 두는 교육으로 언어 수업이 전 수업의 절반 가량을 점하고 있다⁶. 재일코리안사, 다문화공생, 다문화사회연구 등의 수업에서는 재일코리안의 역사, 일본사회 내의 마이너리티에 대해 학습하는 기회를 갖는

⁵ 법적 분류에 따르면 KIS는 '각종학교'에 해당한다. 이는 일본의 일반 중고등학교가 '1조교'인 것과는 다른 카테고리이며 이로 인해 많은 교육적 혜택에서 제외된다.

⁶ 국민국가의 제약을 뛰어넘고자 하는 건학이념에 따라 '국어', '국사' 등의 명칭 대신 '코리아어', '코리아사' 등의 명칭을 과목명에 사용하고 있다.

다. 고등부에서는 신청 학생에 한하여 IB코스를 운영하고 있다⁷.

교원의 구성은 재일코리안, 한국 출신자, 일본인, 미국인 등 다양하며 현재의 교장과 교감은 과거에 재일코리안계 학교에서 근무한 경력이 있는 재일코리안이다. 한국 출신자도 대부분 일본어 사용이 능숙하며 수업 언어는 학생들의 구성에 따라 선택되고 있다.

학생의 구성은 2017년 조사 시 114명 재학생 중 약 70%가 재일코리안으로 가장 높은 비율을 차지하였으나 2021년 현재는 재학생 70여명 중 약 50%를 점하고 있다. 재일코리안 외에는 한국 유학생, 뉴커머 거주자, 일본인, 중국인 등이었다. 학생 모집을 위하여 한국 유학생들 유치를 적극적으로 실시하여 한국인 유학생 수가 증가하는 추세이다. 다양한 배경의 학생들이 모여있는 학교 환경은 학생들에게 서로 다른 문화에 기반한 생각, 생활 습관을 접하는 기회가 되는데 때로는 문화적 차이가 대립을 증폭시키는 원인이 되기도 한다.

해외 경험은 KIS 커리큘럼의 중요한 축이다. 해외연수 프로그램으로 중등부 2학년에 한국 연수, 고등부 1학년에 캐나다 연수를 실시한다. 캐나다 연수는 아시아 밖의 관점에서 자신들을 볼 수 있게 하는 계기가 된다. 재일코리안의 학생들은 자신들을 '코리안'이라고 설명하지만 캐나다의 호스트패밀리는 몇 대에 걸쳐 일본에 살고 있는 그들이 국적상 '코리안'이라는 것에 의아해하고 이것은 학생들에게 긴 설명을 요하는 대화로 연결되었다는 에피소드를 필자는 복수의 인터뷰를 통해 들을 수 있었다. 이러한 경험을 통해 학생들은 에스니시티의 증거로서 한국 국적을 이해하고

⁷ IB(International Baccalaureate)는 국제학위를 취득할 수 있는 커리큘럼으로 국제학위기구가 커리큘럼을 주관한다.

있는 자신의 사고를 상대화하는 경험을 갖는다. 그 밖에 지원자의 경우
고등부 1년간 피지에서 유학하는 프로그램을 운영하고 있다.

학교의 공식적인 행사 외에도 학교에서는 학생들의 해외 교류 프로그램
참가를 적극적으로 장려한다. 일례로 교사의 주도로 한국, 일본, 중국,
러시아의 조선반도에 뿌리를 갖는 어린이들이 교류하는 여름캠프인 '어린이
희망학교'에는 매해 10명 전후의 KIS 재학생과 졸업생이 스테프로 참가
하고 있다. 이곳에서 재일코리안 학생들은 자신들과 비슷한 역사를 갖는
중국, 러시아의 코리안디아스포라의 어린이들을 보면서 자신이 갖는 디아
스포라의 역사성을 넓은 맥락에서 재인식하게 하는 기회를 갖는다. 2017
년에 본 캠프에 참가한 KIS 졸업생은 어린이희망학교에서의 경험을 다음
과 같이 표현했다.

자이니치라는 커뮤니티에서 자랐고 (고등학교 때에) KIS에 와서 (시야가)
조금 넓어지기는 했는데, 여러 나라에 한국(조선반도-인용자)에 뿌리를 가
진 사람들이 있다는 건 조선학교 때에는 배우지 않았던 거라서 (어린이희
망학교에서) KIS 때보다 더 다양한 사람들이 있다는 발견이 제 안에서는
굉장히 컸어요. 괜히 동료의식이 느껴졌어요. 나와 같은 사람들이 모였구나
라는 생각이 들더라고요.

본 졸업생은 유치부부터 중학교까지의 과정을 조선학교에서, 고등학교
과정을 KIS에서 마치고 일본사립대학에 진학한 경우인데 코리안디아스포
라인 타국적 사람들과의 만남을 통해 '동료의식', '같은 사람들'으로 표현한
연대감을 느꼈으며 이들의 존재를 통해 '자이니치라는 커뮤니티'에서 가

질 수 없었던 시야를 획득하게 되었음을 표현하였다.

본고의 내용과 관련하여 재일코리안 교원의 인터뷰를 간략히 소개한다. 현재 교장직을 담당하고 있는 김정태는 1967년생의 재일코리안 4세대이다. 조선학교의 유치부 과정부터 조선대학교까지 조선학교의 교육을 받았으며 대학교 졸업 후 14년간 간사이 지역 조선학교 교사로 근무하였다. 2004년 치마저고리, 초상화와 관련하여 학교의 방침에 의문을 느껴 퇴직하고 이후 교육 사업을 진행하였다. 이 때 한국 시민단체와의 연계 활동이 계기가 되어 '어린이희망학교'를 합동운영하고 있다. 한국인들과의 교류 속에서는 자신 안에 있는 '일본'의 존재를 재발견하면서 과거의 민족 교육을 통한 민족 아이덴티티가 재일코리안으로서의 자신의 아이덴티티 일부를 '억누르면서' 유지해온 것에 대해 문제의식을 느꼈다고 한다. 과거의 민족 교육이 '자신을 부정하거나 자신의 일부를 싫어하게 하면서 아이덴티티를 확립했다면 미래의 교육은 그것과는 다른 방향을 지향해야 한다는 생각으로 KIS에 참여하게 되었다⁸.

KIS는 10년을 조금 넘긴 짧은 역사 동안 학교 운영 방침의 잦은 변동 및 이사진과 교사의 교체 등 어려움에 계속적으로 직면하고 있다. 경제적 안정성의 결여는 이러한 문제의 가장 큰 원인으로 보이는데, 법적으로 각종학교에 속하기 때문에 일본정부의 지원을 받지 못하며 또한 한국계 학교로 아닌 관계로 재정적 지원이 부재한 상황은 경제적 어려움을 가중시키고 있다. 이러한 상황으로 인하여 현재 학교의 상황은 매우 유동적이다.

⁸ 인터뷰는 ① 2017년 4월 4일, ② 2017년 5월 18일 KIS 학내에서 실시하였다.

2021년부터는 학생모집난을 타개하기 위하여 K-Pop코스의 운영을 시작하였다.

3. 3인의 경험과 커뮤니티의 의미

본 장에서는 3인의 구술을 조선학교와 코리아국제학원에서의 경험과 인식을 학교 변동 과정을 중심으로 살펴보고, 이를 재일코리안 커뮤니티에 대한 인식에 대한 측면에서 고찰한다⁹.

개개인의 기술에 앞서 3인의 공통점을 간략히 기술한다. 조선학교는 학부모가 조선학교 경험자인 경우가 일반적이는데, 3인의 경우에도 재일코리안 부/모는 조선학교 출신자이다. 부/모는 조선적을 보유하고 있었으나 자녀들과 함께 조선적에서 한국 국적을 변경하였다.

이들이 구술하는 경험은 구술 시기와 시간적으로 근접해 있으며 따라서 본고에서 다루는 이들의 생각은 정립 중의 변화 가능한 인식임을 의미한다. 이는 구술을 완결된 사고로서 이해하기보다는 학습 주체로서 교육 현장에서 느낀 사고를 경험에서 비교적 가까운 시점에서 재현함을 통해 젊은 세대 3인의 인식을 당사자의 입장에서 바라보기 위한 실마리로 이해할 수 있을 것이다.

3.1 유리의 경우

⁹ 구술의 인용문에 있어서 0 표기 안에 기입한 내용은 인용문의 이해를 돕기 위해 필자가 가필한 것이다.

우리는 재일코리안 4세대이다. 유치원 과정부터 중학교까지 간사이 지역의 조선학교에서 수학한 후 고등학교 과정에서 KIS에 진학하였으며 졸업 후에는 일본 사립대학교에서 수학하고 있다.

우리의 가족은 조선학교와 연이 깊다. 부모님은 조선학교 출신이고 외가의 조부모님은 조선학교에서 장기간 교편을 잡았으며 특히 외조부의 경우 30년 이상 교원생활을 하였다. 우리의 사촌들 대부분도 조선학교에서 중학교 과정을 마쳤다.

3.1.1 조선학교의 경험과 커뮤니티에 대한 인식

우리는 인터뷰에서 조선학교에서의 긍정적인 경험과 학교에 대한 깊은 애정을 표현하였다. 무용부 활동에서 장시간 함께 연습을 함께 한 친구들과의 우정, 교사들과의 친밀한 관계 등이 구술의 큰 부분을 점하고 있었는데, 이를 통해서는 학교에 대한 긍정적인 인식의 기반에 학교에서 형성한 인간 관계가 중요하게 자리잡고 있는 것을 볼 수 있었다. 이러한 관계에 대한 인식은 학교의 범위를 넘어 조선학교 커뮤니티로 확장된다.

교실에는 '모두는 하나를 위해, 하나는 모두를 위해'라는 게 쓰여 있어서 항상 그걸 생각하면서 행동해요. 씨클 활동을 할 때도 응원해주는 동포들이 있으니까 그 사람들을 기쁘게 해주고 싶다는 생각을 하면서 항상 연습했어요. 그런 걸 통해서 자신을 소중히 여기는 법을 배웠다고 할까요.

우리는 '모두를 위해'라는 학교의 슬로건에 대해 언급하는데 슬로건에서 언급되는 '모두'를 '응원해주는 동포들'로 이해하고 있음을 알 수 있다. 또

한 강도 높은 무용부 연습에 적극적으로 임할 수 있었던 이유로 '응원해주는 동포'들에게 좋은 공연을 보여주고 싶다는 생각을 구술하였는데 이를 통해서도 조선학교와 학교에서 확장된 커뮤니티가 유기적으로 연결되어 있는 구체적인 실체로서 인지되고 있는 것을 알 수 있다.

커뮤니티 구성원들에 대한 인지를 통해 '자신을 소중히 생각하는 법'을 배울 수 있었다는 구술에서는 조선학교 커뮤니티가 우리에게 자기공정의 근거가 되고 있음을 보여준다. 이러한 인식은 다음 구술에서도 확인할 수 있다.

(조선학교 교육은) '우리'를 정말 소중하게 생각하거든요. '우리 민족', '우리말', '우리 역사, 귀찮을 정도로 애착을 갖도록 가르쳐 주시니까 그런 게 중요하다는 걸 인식하게 되요. '우리'를 지켜온 사람들, 특히 조선학교가 어려움에 처해있는 상황에서 학교를 지켜온 사람들을 보고 배우고 저 자신도 일본 정부에 항의하는 과정에서 학교가 더 소중하게 느껴졌어요. 무슨 일이든 단결하고 학교 안에서의 단결은 물론이고 지역의 동포들과도 함께 협력해서 단결하는 걸 보면서 내가 행복한 존재라는 게 느껴졌어요.

위의 구술에서는 우리가 조선학교와 관련된 활동을 통해서 재일코리안들로 구성된 커뮤니티에 대한 구체적 상을 형성했다는 것을 알 수 있다. 조선학교 고교 무상화 제외 문제에 대해 조선학교 학생들과 동포 사회 사람들이 협력하는 항의 행동을 통해서 우리는 커뮤니티의 일원으로서의 자신을 재확인하고 이러한 과정은 스스로를 '행복한 존재'로 인식하게 하

는 역할을 한다. 에스닉 마이너리티인 개인이 자신과 같은 배경을 가진 커뮤니티의 존재를 인식하는 것이 에스닉 정체성을 긍정적으로 경험하는데 있어서 중요한 기반이 되고 있음을 볼 수 있다.

그렇다면 우리에게 있어 조선학교 커뮤니티는 어떠한 특징을 가진 것으로 비춰지고 있을까. 이문웅은 총련계의 재일코리안 사회가 일본인 사회 안에서 하나의 민족 집단으로 남기 위한 방법으로 '문화적인 경계'를 강조하는 경향이 있음을 지적한 바 있는데(2004:183) 이러한 '경계'는 우리가 재일코리안 사회에 대한 상을 형성하는 데 있어 중요한 특징이 되고 있다.

조선학교에서는 100% 조선어로 이야기해야 하는데 그 이유를 선생님은 '당연한 것이니까'라고 말씀하셨습니다. 우리들은 본래대로라면 조선어만 말할 수 있는데 (식민지 역사 때문에) 일본어로 말하도록 강요되었기 때문에 (현재) 일본어를 말하는 것뿐이니까 (조선어를 사용하는) 이 공간에서 만큼은 본래의 상태로 돌아올 수 있는 거라고요.

우리는 조선어를 사용하는 것을 '일본어로 말하도록 강요당한' 피식민 경험 이전으로 돌아가는 것이며 조선학교의 공간은 '본래의 상태로 돌아갈 수 있는 것을 가능하게 하는 곳으로 표현하였다. 여기에서는 재일코리안 4세대인 우리가 식민화를 경험한 1세대의 역사 인식의 언어로부터 강하게 영향을 받고 있는 것을 볼 수 있다. 다만 이러한 인식이 일본 사회를 바라보는 우리의 인식 전반을 규정하고 있지는 않은데 예를 들어 '지

금 행복하게 살고 있기 때문에 내가 살고 있는 곳이 좋다', '모국은 일본, 조국은 조선, 고향은 한국'이라는 표현에서는 정주하고 있는 일본 사회에 대한 긍정과 애정을 볼 수 있다.

이러한 표현의 격차에서는 조선학교에서 학습한 언어가 우리가 실생활에서 경험하고 있는 현재에 대한 인식을 표현하는데 있어서 적절한 사고의 틀을 제공해주고 있다고 생각해 볼 수 있을 것이다.

3.1.2. KIS 진학과 커뮤니티 인식의 재고

우리는 부모님의 의향으로 KIS로 진학을 선택하였다. 사촌들이 대부분 중학교 과정 이후에 조선학교가 아닌 타 학교를 선택하는 과정을 보면서 내린 결정이었다. 우리는 KIS에, 동생들은 일본학교에 진학하였다.

우리는 조선학교 교원이셨던 외할머니, 외할아버지에게 조선학교에 진학하지 않는다는 이야기를 전할 때 떨리고 걱정되었던 일화를 구술하였는데, 걱정과는 달리 '열심히 공부하고 예절과 자기의 존재에 대해서 (조선학교에서) 배웠으니 이제는 그것을 세상에 어울리게 배워갔으면 좋겠다'라고 격려해 주셨던 것을 회고하였다. 우리의 외조부모가 장기간 조선학교 교원으로 근무했다는 사실은 가족이 조선학교에 대해 긍정적인 입장이었을 것을 추측할 수 있게 한다. 이러한 가족 내에서의 학교 선택이 었다는 점을 생각할 때 학교에 대한 지지와는 별개로, 조선학교 교육의 틀에서 충족되지 않는 교육적 수요가 존재함을 알 수 있다.

학생들이 모두 재일코리안으로 구성원의 동질성이 강했던 조선학교와는 달리, 새로 진학한 KIS는 구성원의 다양성이 두드러지는 환경이었다.

KIS에서 우리가 재학한 학급은 22명으로 그 중 재일코리안이 12명, 한국인 뉴커머/유학생 4명, 일본인 2명, 중국인 3명, 미국인(부모는 재일코리안) 1명으로 구성되었다. 우리는 KIS에 진학했을 때 학교 문화의 차이로 인해 쉽지 않은 적응 기간을 거쳤다고 한다. 조선학교에서 학생들 간의 조화 및 교사와 학생 간의 예의범절을 중시하는 문화에 익숙했던 우리는 KIS의 문화가 대립이 심하고 관계가 차가우며 교사와 학생의 관계는 예의가 지켜지지 않는다고 느꼈다. 다양한 문화적 배경을 가진 학생들이 한 공간에 모인 환경은 상호 간의 오해나 마찰을 일으킬 수 있는 요소가 증가함을 의미하는데 이러한 환경은 동질적 배경을 가진 조선학교에서는 경험하지 못했던 것이었다.

우리는 학생회 활동 등 학교 활동에 적극적으로 참여해가는 과정을 통해 학교 분위기에 점차 익숙해지는데 이 과정에서 조선학교 경험이 어떻게 상대화되어 가는지 살펴보자.

그곳(조선학교)에 있을 때는 즐겁고 우리 편만 있었으니까 반대로 바깥으로 나가는 게 무서웠어요. 저는 그곳에서 정말 중요한 걸 배웠다고 생각하고 물론 지금도 감사하게 생각하는데 막상 (조선학교를) 나와 보니까 또 다른 세계가 있구나 하는 경험하고 내가 생각했던 당연한 것들이 당연한 것이 아니게 되었던 경험을 했어요. (필자: 어떤 게 당연한 게 아니게 됐나요?) 제가 있던 조선학교는 조선에만 루트가 있는 사람들이고 전부 조선어로 배우고 저 같은 사람들이 많이 있잖아요. 그런데 여기(KIS)라던가 바깥에 나가면 다들 다른 생각을 하고 있으니까 (...)

위의 구술에서는 조선학교 이외의 공간에 대해 '다른 세계'라는 표현을

사용하는데 이러한 표현에서는 '경계' 인식이 작용하고 있는 것을 볼 수 있다. 구술에서는 '바깥으로 나가는 게 무서웠다', '바깥에 나가면 (사람들의 태도가) 차갑다. (조선학교) 안은 가장 안심할 수 있는 장소' 등 조선학교와 그 외의 사회에 대한 이분법적 인식을 볼 수 있는데 이러한 인식은 조선학교를 떠나는 것에 대한 심리적 부담감과 연결되었던 것을 알 수 있다.

안심할 수 있는 공간으로서의 조선학교라는 인식과 병렬적으로 형성되어 있는 조선학교의 '바깥'에 대한 대조적인 인식은 일본 사회 안의 에스닉 마이너리티의 공동체적 관계를 중요시하는 재일코리안 커뮤니티가 갖는 딜레마를 보여준다. 재일코리안 커뮤니티는 차별과 공격의 대상이 되기 쉬운 재일코리안들이 안심하고 자신을 표현할 수 있는 관계의 장을 제공한다. 그러나 커뮤니티에 대한 긍정과 필요성에 대한 인식이 외부 사회에 대한 고정적이고 부정적인 이미지와 맞닿아 있을 때에는 구성원이 커뮤니티 외부와의 관계맺음에 대해 주저하게 하는 원인이 될 수 있음을 보여준다.

KIS 진학 이후 우리는 친구들과의 대화 등 일상어가 조선어에서 일본어로 바뀌게 되는데 이 경험을 통해 조선어 사용과 민족 아이덴티티의 연관 관계에 대해 재고하게 된다.

(조선학교에서는) 조선어만 사용하면서 생활했지만 그것만이 민족을 소중하게 여기는 것은 아니다(라고 생각하게 되었어요). 우리는 지금 여기서 일본어를 사용해서 이야기를 나누고 있지만, 소중하게 여기려면 충분히 그렇게 할 수 있다고 생각해요. 조선학교에 있을 때에는 이렇게 이국에서 생활할 때 조

선어로 말하는 게 조선 민족을 소중하게 여기는 유일한 방법이라고 생각이라고 생각했는데, (조선학교를 나와서) 다른 방법도 있다고 느꼈어요.

우리는 '조선어로 말하는 게 조선 민족을 소중하게 여기는 유일한 방법'이라고 생각했던 과거의 인식을 반추하고 에스닉 아이덴티티에 대한 보다 유연한 표현 방법에 대해 생각하게 된 것을 볼 수 있다. 우리는 KIS 재학 시기 재일코리안, 중국 조선족, 한국인이 참가하는 청소년 국제 컨퍼런스 등 해외 활동에 참여했는데 이러한 경험 또한 에스닉 아이덴티티에 대한 재고에 영향을 주었을 것이라고 생각해 볼 수 있다.

이상으로 살펴본 우리의 경험에서는 조선학교를 중심으로 형성된 커뮤니티가 우리의 긍정적인 에스닉 정체성 형성에 기여하는 한편, 구심력이 강한 커뮤니티가 커뮤니티 외부의 관계를 상상하는데 있어 제약으로 기능하는 측면을 볼 수 있었다. 이러한 경험에서는 에스닉 마이너리티로서 안전하게 성장할 수 있는 환경과 동시에 다양성의 경험이 담보되는 학교 환경의 조성이 필요하다는 것을 알 수 있다.

3.2 모모의 경우

모모는 어머니가 재일코리안, 아버지가 일본인으로 재일코리안3세이자 더블이며 한국국적자이다¹⁰. 모모가 유치원인 시기 부모님이 이혼하였으

¹⁰ 일본에서는 부모 양쪽의 국적이 다른 경우 하프, 더블 등으로 표현한다. 시기상으로는 하프(half)가 먼저 사용되기 시작하였고 더블은 하프가 가진 '절반이라는 의미가 부정적 함의를 갖는다는 문제의식에서 시작된 사용법이다. 다만 현재 일본사회에서 '하프'라는 용어는 중립적이

며 그 이후 조선학교 유치부로 진학하여 조선학교 초등과정, 중등과정, 고등과정 중반까지 수학하였다. 고등부 2학년 시기 간사이 지역으로의 이사를 계기로 조선학교에서 KIS로 전학하였으며 졸업 후 간사이 지역 사립 대학교에서 수학하고 있다.

모모의 구술에서는 재일코리안 어머니의 가족이 조선학교에 대한 각별한 애정을 가지고 있는 것을 엿볼 수 있었다. 이러한 가족의 분위기의 형성에 있어서 외조모의 경험은 중요한 토대가 되고 있는 것으로 보이는데, 외조모는 조선학교 탄압을 경험한 당사자로 모모는 어린 시절 외조모와 함께 조선학교를 바라보면서 외조모가 “할매가 세운 학교니까 할매가 죽을 때까지는 꼭 남겨둬야 한다”라고 말했던 일화를 구술하였다. 이러한 경험에서는 재일코리안 윗세대가 조선학교의 역사와 직접적인 방식으로 연결되어 있으며 그러한 경험이 가족 간 기억의 전승을 통해 현재의 젊은 세대로 이어지고 있는 것을 보여준다.

고등학교 2학년 시기 이사 이후 진학할 학교로는 조선학교의 선택지가 있었으며 외조모는 조선학교에 진학하기를 원했다고 한다. 하지만 모모는 외국어 교육으로 특화된 이미지를 가지고 있었던 KIS를 택하는데 당시 졸업 후 진로를 고민하기 시작하던 시기로 영어에 대한 관심을 KIS에서의 수업을 통해 발전시킬 수 있을 것이라고 기대했기 때문이었다. 모모가 고등부 2학년의 전반까지 재학하던 조선학교의 고등부는 같은 반의 대다수가 조선대학교 진학을 목표로 하는 곳이었다. 조선학교 고등부 중 조선

거나 긍정적인 의미로도 사용되고 있다. 본고에서 필자는 ‘더블’을 사용하지만 인터뷰에서 구술된 표현은 본래의 표현대로 사용한다.

대학교 진학률은 지역적 특성에 따라 차이가 있는데 모모가 재학했던 학교의 분위기는 조선대학교 진학을 목표로 하지 않았던 모모가 자신의 미래를 설계하기 위한 충분한 자극이 되지 않았던 것으로 생각된다.

전학 시기는 부모님의 이혼 이후 오랜 시간 교류가 없었던 아버지와의 재회가 있었던 때이기도 했다. 일본인인 아버지와의 만남은 더블로서의 자신의 아이덴티티를 적극적으로 자리매김하고자 하는 계기가 된다.

3.2.1. 학교 변동의 경험과 조선학교 경험의 상대화

모모와 첫 인터뷰를 가졌던 것은 모모가 고등학교 3학년으로 KIS로 전학 온 지는 1년 정도가 지난 때였다. 모모의 반은 15명으로 그 중 제일코리안이 9명, 한국인 뉴커머/유학생 1명, 일본인 5명으로 구성되어 있었다. 인터뷰에서는 일부 학생들이 표현하는 조선학교에 대한 편견에 대해 반발심을 구술하였는데, 한편으로는 새로운 환경 속에서 조선학교 교육을 통해 형성해 온 인식을 상대화시키는 사고 과정도 볼 수 있었다. 모모는 첫 인터뷰 때 최근의 심경을 '말로 표현할 수 없을 만큼 복잡한 기분'이라고 하였다. 그러한 심경에 대해 보다 구체적으로 설명해 주기를 부탁한 필자에게 모모는 두 번째 인터뷰에서 다음과 같이 구술하였다.

지금까지는 어느 쪽인지 극단적이었어요. (...) 다문화사회연구(KIS 사회과 수업)를 배우고 정말 하나의 시점만으로는 안 된다는 걸 느끼면서 좀 더 객관적인 관점을 가져보고 싶어졌어요. 내 자신만의 관점이면 나 자신에게만 통용되는 거니까요. 이왕 아버지가 일본인이고 어머니가 한국인인데 일방적인 관점만 갖고 있으면 아깝잖아요. 양쪽을 무기로 가질 수 있으면 좋겠다는 생각을 했어요. 한국의 시점은 이렇고 일본은 시점은 이렇고. 그리고 나의 시점

은 이렇고 세 가지의 생각을 가져보고 싶어요.

위의 구술에서는 모모가 자신이 기존에 가지고 있던 관점이 편향적이었을 수 있다고 생각하게 된 점과 과거의 생각에 대한 반추를 통해 '객관적 관점' 혹은 '나의 시점'을 모색해 보고자 하는 의지가 표현되어 있다.

이러한 모색에는 새로운 환경, 새로운 지식 등이 영향을 주고 있음을 알 수 있다. 조선학교에 대해 긍정적이지 않은 인식을 가진 구성원도 일부 존재하는 새로운 환경에서 자신이 조선학교 교육을 통해 형성해온 관점에 대해 자문하게 된 것이 '객관적 관점'을 모색하고자 하는 하나의 자극이 된 것을 알 수 있다. 또한 재일코리안을 보다 보편적 관점에서 바라볼 수 있게 하는 다양한 에스닉 집단에 대한 학습 또한 자극원이 된 것을 볼 수 있다. 위의 구술에서 언급된 '다문화사회연구' 수업은 필자도 참여 관찰을 위해 참가했던 토론회 수업으로 일본 사회에 존재하는 다양한 에스닉 마이너리티 집단에 대한 이해를 높이는 것을 목적으로 한 것이었다.

이러한 과정 속에서 모모는 조선학교도 새로운 관점으로 바라보게 된다. 모모는 조선학교 친구들이 북한 수학여행을 다녀온 후 '민족심'이 고양됨과 동시에 일본 사회에 대한 배타적 감정이 강화된 것을 느끼며 친구들의 생각을 거리를 두고 바라보고 있음을 구술하였다.

고3이니까 내년부터는 모두 각자의 미래를 향해서 나아갈 텐데, 그것(조선학교에서 배운 시점)만으로는 (사회에서) 통하지 않는다는 것도 여기에 와서 잘 알게 되어서, (친구들도) 좀 더 다른 눈으로 바라보면 어떨까 하는 의문이 생겼다고 해야 하나요. (...) 민족심을 가지고 있기 때문에 (학생들에게) 알려줄

수 있는 것도 있지만 자신들이 조선학교 선생님이 되면 그 시점만으로 가르치면 학생들에게도 영향이 있을 테니까, 민족심을 가르치면서도 그 외의 시점도 있다는 걸 가르쳐주면 좋겠다는 (생각이 들었어요).

모모는 조선학교에서 습득한 자신이 생각이 조선학교 외의 관계에서 '통하지 않는다'는 경험을 통해 조선학교의 교육이 '민족심' 혹은 민족적 아이덴티티의 관점을 가르치는 것과 동시에 그 외의 다양한 관점에서 문제를 볼 수 있는 능력을 길러주어야 할 필요성에 대해 생각하게 되었음을 구술하였다.

3.2.2. 새로운 관점의 모색과 이름

새로운 관점을 모색하려는 시도에 대한 구술에 있어서 한 가지 흥미로운 점은 모모가 자신의 뿌리가 재일코리안과 일본인의 양쪽에 있다는 사실을 새로운 관점을 모색하기 위한 매개물로서 의미화하고자 하였다는 점이다. 앞의 인용에서 '이왕 아버지가 일본인이고 어머니가 한국인'이라는 자신의 배경을 '양쪽을 무기로 가질 수 있으면 좋겠다'는 생각으로 연결시켜 표현한 것에서는 이러한 사고의 특징을 볼 수 있다.

이러한 모색은 '모모'라는 이름에 관한 인터뷰 당시의 생각에서도 볼 수 있었다. 필자가 참여관찰을 하던 시기는 대학 원서를 한창 작성하던 때였는데 모모는 원서에 쓸 이름을 '모모'로 할 것인지 '모모코'로 할 것인지에 대해 고민하고 있었다. 모모는 이름에 대한 고민을 '객관적 관점'을 지향해보고 싶다는 생각을 투영하여 설명하였다.

조선사람으로 살아와서 '허모모'이지만 어떤 의미에서는 저는 하프니까요. 일본과 한국의 하프니까 하프의 입장에서 한 번 (세상을) 보고 싶다는 생각도 있어서 '허모모코'로 해볼까 생각하고 있어요. 통명으로 일본 사람으로서의 이름도 갖고 있는데 그 쪽은 모모코 그리고 한국인으로서의 '허'는 (성으로) 있으니까 이름은 '모모코'로 해서 하프로서의 자신을 표현해보고 싶다는 생각이 있어요.

'하프의 입장에서 한 번 보고 싶다', '하프로서의 자신을 표현해보고 싶다'는 표현에서는 '하프'라는 포지션을 통해 조선사람 혹은 일본사람으로서 관점이라는 고정된 사고를 지양하려는 의지를 읽을 수 있다. 모모가 '조선사람'이라는 정체성과 함께 받아들였던 관점에 대해 반추하고 그 토대 위에서 '나의 시점'이 무엇인가를 정립하고자 하려는 시도가 당시의 이름에 대한 생각에도 반영되고 있는 것이다.

모모는 조선학교 유치부 이후 계속 '桃子'라는 한자에 '모모'라는 발음을 사용하고 있었는데 이러한 이름의 특이성은 모모가 더블로서 조선학교를 다녔다는 개인의 역사와 관련이 있다. '桃子'는 일본인 부친이 지어준 이름으로 원래의 발음은 '모모코'였으나 조선학교 진학 이후에는 조선인다운 이름이 권장되었기 때문에 '코'의 발음을 뺀 이름을 사용하게 되었다.

이름에 관련된 이러한 경험에서는 재일코리안 3세인 젊은 세대가 갖는

보다 다양해진 가족 배경과 조선학교가 상정하는 '조선인' 정체성 사이에 어긋남이 발생하고 있는 모습을 볼 수 있다. 재일코리안과 일본인의 더블의 구술사를 연구한 박추향은 조선학교의 민족 정체성의 강조가 더블의 개인에게 억압적인 경험일 수 있음을 논했다(朴秋香 2007). 모모의 경우 조선학교에서 정체성의 혼란이나 억압을 경험을 했던 것은 아니지만 조선학교에서의 교육이 '일본에 사는 조선인으로서의 교육이어서 하프로서의 실감은 없었'다는 점, 조선학교를 떠난 이후에 더블로서의 아이덴티티에 대해 모색하는 시간을 갖게 되었다는 점에서 조선학교가 재일코리안으로서 상정하는 특정한 배경을 갖지 않은 학생들에게 보다 자유롭게 아이덴티티에 대해 생각할 계기를 제공해주고 있지 못하다는 점을 생각해 수 있다.

이상으로 모모의 경험과 인식을 살펴보았다. 모모의 구술에서는 조선학교와 그곳에서 형성된 관계에 대한 깊은 애정을 볼 수 있었다. 한편 고등학교 중반부에 장래에 대한 고민과 모색 속에서 선택한 KIS의 환경속에서는 더블이라는 정체성과 함께 일본사회를 보다 적극적으로 사고하고자 하는 모색을 볼 수 있었다.

3.3 회주의 경우

회주는 재일코리안 4세이다¹¹. 부모님은 조선학교에서 수학하였고 부모님 모두 총련 관련 업무에 종사한 경험이 있다. 교토시에 위치한 조선학

¹¹ 인터뷰는 한국어로 진행되었으며 본고에서 인용된 구술 중 문법적 오류는 가독성을 위해 필자가 수정하였다.

교 유치부와 초등부에서 수학하고, 초등부 6학년 시기 미에현으로 전학한 후 조선학교 초등부와 중등부를 졸업하였다. 참고로 회주는 2009년 조선학교습격사건 때에 초등부 고학년의 학생으로서 학교에서 사건을 목격한 당사자이다¹².

조선학교 고등부로는 진학의 뜻을 갖지 않았고 일본 고등학교에 진학하고자 하였으나 수험에 실패하면서 그 시기 알게 된 KIS에 진학하였다. 회주는 KIS에서 학생회장을 담당하는 등의 활발한 대내 활동을 하였다. 졸업 이후 일본 기업에서 근무하고 있다.

필자가 회주를 알게 된 것은 회주가 KIS를 졸업한 이후 2017년도에 참여한 여름 캠프 '어린이희망학교'를 통해서였다. 캠프 스태프로 함께 참여하면서 제일코리안계 학교 경험에 대한 생각을 들을 수 있었고 이를 바탕으로 이후 간헐적으로 인터뷰를 진행하였다.

회주는 필자가 인터뷰를 진행한 제일코리안 젊은 세대 중 한국어 사용이 가장 한국어 원어민의 구사에 근접해 있었는데 이러한 특징에서는 KIS에서 한국인 유학생들과의 교류가 활발했던 것을 엿볼 수 있었다.

3.3.1. 조선학교 경험에 대한 인식

회주는 고등학교 졸업 이후 본격적으로 사회 생활을 시작한 이후 4년 정도의 시간이 지난 시점에서 진행한 인터뷰에서, 현재 시점에서 돌이켜 볼 때 조선학교 커뮤니티가 자신의 성격 형성에 중요한 영향을 미쳤으며

¹² 조선학교습격사건은 2009년 12월 4일 교토조선제일초급학교 앞에서 재특회 멤버 11명이 헤이트스피치를 벌인 사건을 말한다. 본 사건에 대해서는 中村一成의 『ルポ 朝鮮学校襲撃事件』(岩波書店 2014)에 구체적으로 기술되어 있다.

재일코리안으로서의 정체성을 형성하는데 중요한 기능을 했음을 느낀다고 구술했다. 희주는 특히 조선학교의 커뮤니티의 밀접한 관계에 대해 긍정적으로 구술했는데 친구들과 함께 성장해 가며 '가족같은' 관계를 만들 수 있었던 점, 학부모들이 자녀가 아닌 학생들에게도 관심을 가져주어 그러한 관심 속에서 성장해갈 수 있었던 점 등을 들었다.

희주는 자신이 재일코리안인 것을 '득템'한 것이라고 생각한다고 구술하며 자신의 에스니시티에 대한 긍정을 표현했다. 이러한 인식에서는 현재의 일본인들과의 교류가 주가 되는 사회 생활에서, 희주의 재일코리안으로서의 경험이 일본인 사회 속에서만 자라온 일본인들에게 특별한 경험과 시점으로서 이해받는 경험이 축적된 점도 작용하고 있었다. 일본인과의 교류 속에서 민족 차별의 경험이 존재하지 않았던 것은 것은 아니나 그것을 상쇄시키는 긍정적인 경험들이 있었음을 알 수 있다.

역사에 대한 지식도 그렇고 어떤 시대 배경이 있고 그걸 알면 알수록 얼마나 귀한 존재인지. (보통은) 생각도 못하잖아요. 시대배경을 생각하면 할수록 특별함을 느끼고 (...) 재일교포라는 마이너리티이기 때문에 이런 특별함을 느낄 수 있고 그 특별함 덕분에 긍정적으로 나라는 존재를 아껴주고 가족들도 주변 사람들도 아껴주고 그런 삶을 살고 싶다는 생각으로도 이어지는 거 같아요.

또한 재일코리안으로서의 정체성을 심어준 조선학교에 대한 긍정을 표현하였다.

나라는 존재의미를 잘 생각할 수 있는 (공간이에요). 말도 그렇고 문화도 그렇

고 어떤 생각으로 살아가야 하는지에 대한 토대, 민족성 이런 것을 키워주는 학교인 건 사실인 거 같아요 (...) 부모님이 조선학교에 보내주셔서 자기가 가진 루트에 대해서 어릴 때부터 생각을 하는 환경이었고 이렇게 지금 말도 하고 있고, 계속 일본 학교만 다녔으면 나에 대해 생각할 타이밍도 없었을 거 같고요, 일본 사람도 재일교포도 여러 사람들을 만나볼 기회가 있어서 여러 시점에서 나에 대해서 생각할 기회가 되었던 거 같아요.

그러나 고등부 진학을 고려하는 시점에서 조선학교 진학의 의도는 없었는데 통학거리의 장거리화, 기숙사 생활 등에 따르는 비용 증가 등의 단점 외에 조선학교에서 맺는 한정된 관계와 그러한 환경이 만들어낼 제한된 관점이 조선학교를 매력적으로 느끼지 않게 하는 이유로 작용하였다.

여기에서만 계속 있으면 내가 고등학교 졸업하고 나서 보는 세상이 너무 다른 세상일 거 같고 왜냐면 조선학교만 아니까. 똑같이 (상급학교로) 올라가니까 똑같은 거잖아요. (...) 조선학교에만 딱 이렇게 집중하는 친구들에 비하면 그나마 아직은 일본 친구들이랑 같이 하는 커뮤니티를 갖긴 했었어요. 그렇지만 시야가 좁아지는게 싫었고.

희주는 조선학교에서 형성된 관계를 '가족'에 비유할 만큼 친밀함을 느끼지만 그러한 관계가 형성하게 될 동질적 환경이 '조선학교만 아'는 상황을 만들 수 있고 그러할 경우 '졸업하고 나서 보는 세상이 너무 다른 세상일 거 같'다고 생각했다. 필자는 희주와의 교류에서 희주가 호기심이 많고 적극적이며 새로운 관계를 맺는 것을 즐기는 개방적인 성격임을 느

낄 수 있었는데 이러한 성격은 회주가 익숙한 공간을 떠나서 새로운 관계를 만들고 새로운 관점을 접하고자 하는 지향과 연결되고 있다고 생각된다.

조선학교에 대한 회주의 인식에서는 조선학교를 중심으로 형성된 구심력이 강한 커뮤니티에 대한 양가적인 감정을 볼 수 있다. 구심력이 강하기 때문에 밀도 있는 관계를 맺고 그러한 관계 속에서 성장할 수 있었던 것에 감사함을 느끼지만 어느 연령에 도달했을 때는 그러한 환경을 새로운 가능성을 제한하는 것으로 인식하게 된 것이다.

3.3.2. 조선학교가 아닌 사회에 대한 호기심과 그 의미

조선학교에 진학하지 않는 방향을 택한 회주는 먼저 일본학교 진학을 생각했다고 한다.

일본학교에서 어떤 교육을 하는지도 궁금했어요. 헤이트 스피치나 (재일코리안에 대해) 안 좋게 말하는 사람도 많잖아요, 아직도 그 사람들이 어떤 교육을 받아서 그런 말을 하는지 궁금했어요. 재일교포도 일본사람도, 사람이니까 그 사람의 성격이라는 게 가장 중요한건데. 이런 거 있죠, 중국인이니까 그렇다, 그런 거 있잖아요. 근데 중국인이랑 일본인이랑 한국인이랑 그 사람만 갖는 그 사람의 성격이 있고 그 사람만의 개성이 있는데.(...)

회주는 일본학교에 가보고 싶었던 이유로 일본학교 교육에 대한 호기심을 들었다. 재일코리안에 대해 편견을 가진 일본인들이 '어떤 교육을 받아서 그런 말을 하는지', '일본 학교에서 우리를 어떻게 이야기하는지', 즉

일본인들이 가진 편견이 어떤 방식으로 교육현장에서 재생산되는지에 대한 호기심이 일본학교를 지망하게 된 이유가 되었다.

여기에서는 회주가 편견이나 차별적 인식을 가진 일부의 일본인들을 바라봄에 있어서 그 사람들을 비판함에 앞서 그 사람들이 가진 차별적 인식이 형성된 경로에 주목하려는 태도를 볼 수 있다. 이는 '일본인' 혹은 '중국인' 등 국적을 통하여 사람들을 카테고리화하고 그에 근거하여 개개인을 바라보는 고정관념에 대한 비판과도 연결된다.

국가와 개인의 연계를 절대적으로 보지 않는 이러한 관점은 3.2절에서 모모가 '하프의 입장'을 통해 '객관적 시점'을 추구하고자 하는 시점과도 겹쳐진다. 일본 사회에서 살아가는 재일코리아인이라는 삶의 기반을 영위하는 과정에서 국적/민족이라는 틀 안에서 만들어진 관점은 스스로가 세상을 보는 관점을 좁힐 수도 있다고 생각하는 것이며 이러한 문제를 극복할 수 있는 방법을 모색하고 있는 것이다.

일본의 학교가 에스닉 마이너리티에 대한 차별을 재생산하는 교육을 수행하고 있을 수도 있다는 인식과 그럼에도 불구하고 그것을 직접 관찰하고 탐구해 보고 싶었다는 생각에서는 회주가 일본 사회를 이해하고 싶어하는 자세를 볼 수 있게 한다. 이러한 생각에는 회주가 자신이 살아갈 사회를 일본 사회로 상정하는 것은 것과 관련이 있다.

일본에서 태어난 한국인인데 앞으로도 계속 사는 건 일본이고 그렇게 됐을 때 나라는 사람이 어떻게 살아야 되지? 어떤 걸 중요하게 생각하고 살아야 되지? 그런 의문을 가지고 있었어요.

희주는 자신이 '일본에서 태어난 한국인'이며 '앞으로도 계속 사는 건 일본'이라는 점에서 자신이 커온 재일코리안의 커뮤니티를 넘어 일본인들과의 관계를 만들어가고 싶어했다는 것을 알 수 있다.

3.3.3. 커뮤니티를 지켜가는 것과 변화를 받아들이는 것

희주는 조선학교가 '할머니 할아버지들이 지켜 오신 전통이 많으니까 우리라는 모습을 유지해야겠다는 굳은 생각을 가지는 게 의미가 있다'는 걸 이해하지만 다른 한편으로는 전통을 고수하는 것이 새로움을 받아들이지 않는 것으로 연결되는 것에 문제의식을 갖고 있었다.

제가 학교에 다니던 그 당시에는 케이팝 노래를 들으면 안된다, 제이팝 노래를 들으면 안된다 이런 식으로 요즘 시대에 맞지 않는데 (전통을) 지켜야 한다고 말씀하시는 그런 선생님들도 계셨어요. (조선학교) 예술경연대회 같은 데서 무용이나 노래로 표현을 하는데 (내용이) 정말 변함 없이 조선학교가 가진 이미지를 항상 지켜오고 있잖아요. 더 재미있는 아이디어나 변화가 있어도 괜찮은데 항상 그렇게 똑같은 걸 하고 지켜오고 있으니까. 그게 안 좋다고는 볼 수 없지만 저는 졸업하고 변하고 있으니까 그런 걸 볼 때 약간 어색한 느낌이 있어요.

필자는 다른 졸업생과의 인터뷰에서 조선학교에서 대중 가요를 듣지 못하도록 제제 받은 것을 조선학교에 대한 의문의 시발점으로 든 구술을 접한 경험이 있다. 이러한 규제의 여부는 교원의 세대에 따라서 차이가 있는 것으로 보이는데 세대가 높은 교원의 이러한 제제에 대해서는 경험

자들의 불만과 의문을 들을 수 있었다.

앞서 3.1절에서는 조선학교 공간을 조선인들이 피식민 경험 이전의 '본래의 상태'로 돌아올 수 있는 공간으로서 의미를 두는 교원의 발언이 유리의 구슬에서 인용되어 있다. 이러한 비유는 상징적인 것이지만 회주가 언급하는 전통을 고수하려는 문화적 특성 역시 외부 사회로부터 본래의 상태를 지켜야 한다는 관념과 맞닿아 있다고 생각된다. 탈식민 연구에서는 식민지 이후의 사회에서 탈식민을 추구하는 것이 전통으로 회귀하는 문제를 지적하고 있는데 조선학교 문화의 특징은 이러한 맥락에서도 살펴볼 수 있을 것이다.

회주는 긍정적 에스닉 마이너리티로서의 정체성을 조선반도와 일본의 양 쪽에 대한 이해를 가질 수 있는 점으로 드는데 조선학교 교육도 이러한 측면을 살리기를 바란다고 구술한다.

나는 재일교포로 살아와서 장점이 많다고 생각해요. (...) 시대가 많이 변해가면서 국제학교도 많아지고 한일 관계에 있어서도 교두보의 역할을 할 수 있다고 생각해요. 조선학교 학생들은 한국어도 할 수 있고 일본에서 사니까 일본도 잘 알고 장점을 두 개 가지게 된 거죠. 그걸 잘 이용을 해야 시대에 맞는 스타일을 찾아갈 수 있는 게 아닐까.

회주에게 있어서 다양한 배경을 가진 학생들과 일상적으로 접할 수 있는 KIS는 회주가 가진 호기심을 충족시키기에 좋은 장소였다. KIS는 학생들의 문화가 다양하기 때문에 상호 간의 오해와 마찰이 발생하는 일이 종종 있는데 회주는 그러한 문화적 차이에 의한 갈등을 주위에서 접할 때에도 그 차이를 만드는 개개인의 개성에 대한 호기심이 컸다고 구술한

다. 학생회장 등을 담당하며 주도적으로 학교에 참여했던 경험 역시 회주가 KIS를 긍정적으로 인식하게 하는 데 중요한 역할을 한 것으로 보인다. 이상으로 회주의 경험을 살펴보았다. 유리와 모모가 조선학교에서의 관계를 긍정적으로 묘사했듯이 회주도 조선학교에서의 인간 관계가 큰 의미를 갖는 것을 볼 수 있다. 그러나 이러한 환경은 회주가 새로운 관점을 흡수하고 발견하고자 할 때 제약으로 느껴졌고 그러한 문제의식이 다른 학교에 대한 시도로 연결된 것을 확인할 수 있다.

4. 고찰

3장에서는 유리, 모모, 회주의 구술을 학교 변동의 경험을 살펴보고 조선학교 커뮤니티에 대한 인식을 중심으로 분석을 시도하였다. 본 장에서는 3장의 분석을 정리하고 이를 통해 살펴볼 수 있는 현재의 젊은 세대의 정체성의 일면을 논한다. 마지막으로 재일코리안계 학교의 방향성에 시사하는 점에 대해 생각해 보고자 한다.

3인은 조선학교에서의 경험에 대한 긍정과 교우 관계에 대한 애정, 혁신적인 교육을 실천한 교원들에 대한 감사함이 표현되어 있었다. 또한 3인의 구술에서는 재일코리안으로서의 정체성에 대한 긍정과 그러한 정체성을 가질 수 있었던 토대로서 조선학교를 인식하고 있는 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 조선학교가 긍정적이고 안정된 에스닉 정체성을 기를 수 있는 공간으로서 기능하는 점은 앞서 논했던 조선학교를 대상으로 한 연구에서 공통적으로 논의되는 바이다. 그러나 3인의 인식에서는 조선학교계 커뮤니티에 대한 문제의식도 발견할 수 있었다. 이 중 공통점으로 도출할

수 있는 것으로 변화에 대한 바람이었다.

이들은 본인의 선택 혹은 부모의 제안으로 조선학교 고등부 초기/중기에 조선학교를 떠나는 결정을 하고 타 재일코리안계 학교인 KIS에서 수학하게 된다. 이러한 경험에서 이들은 조선학교의 경험을 상대화하여 고찰하는 기회를 갖게 되는데, 이를 통해 공통적으로 조선학교와 변화의 문제에 주목하고 있음을 볼 수 있다. 회주가 조선학교에서 피로하는 문화 공연에 대한 인식에서 '더 재미있는 아이디어나 변화가 있어도 괜찮은데 항상 그렇게 똑같은 걸 하고 지켜오고 있으니까 (...) 저는 졸업하고 변하고 있으니까 그런 걸 볼 때 약간 어색한 느낌이 있'다고 구술하는 부분은 변화가 정체되는 측면에 대한 문제의식을 단적으로 드러낸다고 볼 수 있다.

재일코리안에 대한 차별이 현존하는 일본 사회에서 재일코리안의 커뮤니티는 긍정적 정체성을 성장시킬 수 있는 중요한 토대가 된다. 하지만 그러한 커뮤니티가 젊은 세대의 변화에 맞게 어떻게 변화해 가야 하는가에 대한 논의는 충분히 이루어지고 있지 않다.

조사협력자 3인의 조부모, 부모는 넓은 의미에서 '총련계 재일조선인 사회'의 구성원이라는 카테고리로서 파악하는 것이 가능할 것이다. 조부모가 조선학교 교원이었던 유리의 경우, 조모가 조선학교 탄압의 경험을 손녀에게 들려주면서 조선학교를 손녀의 대에서도 학교가 지켜지기를 바란다는 희망을 전해주었다는 경험도 있었다. 긴 시간을 관통하여 가족을 통해 전해지는 이러한 경험과 기억에서는 조선학교 커뮤니티를 지탱하고 있는 힘이 이데올로기 등의 추상적인 이념이 아닌 구체적인 기억과 감정

임을 알 수 있게 해준다. 이러한 가까운 가족이 가지고 있는 조선학교에 대한 애정은 조사협력자 3인에게도 깊은 영향을 주었을 것을 추측해 볼 수 있다. 그러나 2000년 전후 출생한 3인의 현재까지의 라이프코스는 '총련사회'의 구성원이라는 인식틀로서만 이들의 삶을 이해하는 것에 한계에 도달하고 있음을 알 수 있게 한다. 본고가 제시한 3인의 구술과 정체성의 표현이 총련계 재일코리안 젊은 세대를 대표한다고는 할 수 없다. 그러나 지금까지의 연구가 대표적인 사례를 들고자 때 어떤 전형성이라는 특성에 집중하면서 변화하고 있는 현황에 대해서는 주의를 기울이지 못한 측면에 대해서는 본고가 새로운 논점을 제기할 수 있을 것이라고 생각한다.

마지막으로 재일코리안계 학교의 방향성이라는 측면에서 본고의 분석을 검토하도록 한다. 3인의 구술을 통해서는 교육의 수요자가 재일코리안계 학교를 선택함에 있어서 민족 교육이라는 측면과 일본 사회에서 살아가기 위한 준비라는 또 다른 측면을 그 비중의 적절성과 함께 고려하면서 조선학교 교육을 바라보고 있다는 것을 알 수 있다. 젊은 세대의 다양화하는 정체성을 포괄할 수 있는 에스닉 마이너리티 교육이란 어떤 것인지에 대해서는 현재 세계적으로 논의되고 있는 에스닉 마이너리티 교육 연구 성과와의 대화를 통해 논의를 진전시켜나가야 할 필요가 있을 것이다.

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The role of Vietnamese communities in the process of formation and development of modern South Korea

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Abstract

Many factors have contributed to the process of formation and development of the Republic of Korea both internally and externally. In spite of not being the largest foreign community in South Korea, Vietnamese generations in the southern Korean Peninsula have experienced a relatively long integration process and made significant contributions to the national building process of the country in the past as well as national modernization since the second half of the twentieth century. One of the most typical examples of this development process is the valuable contributions of the Yi family, especially Lý Long Tường, in the resistance wars against the foreign invaders of the Korean people in the 12th and 13th centuries as well as the development process of this country during the medieval period. Although many Vietnamese came to study and lived in the People's Democratic Republic of Korea after the liberation of North Vietnam in 1954, it was until after the success of the Han River's Miracle in the 1960s-1980s, the influxes of Vietnamese immigrants into South Korea increased dramatically. The largest of these is labors exported to work in South Korea, Vietnamese students in the South Korean education system, and later Vietnamese brides to marry Korean husbands. Although the number of Vietnamese immigrants in the Republic of Korea has grown rapidly and contributed greatly to the take-off process of the land of kimchi, the overheating development of this trend is also facing several unexpected problems. Therefore, the article not only aims to explore the integration process of Vietnamese communities into the economic, cultural and social life of South Korea, but also find out some solutions to overcome and limit the negative effects of these phenomena that have seemed to increase strongly in this area recently.

Keywords: Vietnamese communities, modern South Korea, period of Han river, take-off process, land of kimchi.

1. Introduction

Vietnam and South Korea are the two countries that share many cultural and historic similarities. In the medieval age, the feudal dynasties of both countries were often seen as satellite states of the dynasties in China. The traditional cultures of the two countries therefore also have many similarities because they were deeply influenced by Chinese Confucian culture. In the early modern time, both nations experienced the status of colonization and dependence, so it is easy for them to sympathize and share destiny with each other. In the later modern age, both peoples were taken into the spirals of power struggle of the Cold War. Both countries were divided in relatively similar historical periods and circumstances. On a broader scale, the people of both countries

also share many racial similarities in comparison to those of many other peoples around the world. It is thanks to the natural similarities, the fluctuation of historical contexts, and many cultural and emotional connections that the people of both countries often easily understand, share, and help each other more favorably. South Korea has today been one of the most important strategic partners of Vietnam (HA.NV 2020) and one of the largest foreign direct investors in Vietnam for years (Phuong Minh 2019). The investment capital of leading national corporations (Ngọc Thảo 2021) and the enthusiastic help of the Government as well as the comprehensive support of the Korean people (VNA 2020) have been extremely important contributions and externally favorable factors for Vietnam to integrate more successfully and more deeply into the region and the world over the past few decades. In contrast, Vietnamese communities have also made certain contributions to the formation and development of modern South Korea in many different forms and levels. Although the role of Vietnamese communities in South Korean society is increasingly enhanced, their inadequacies in the process of integration into this emerging modernized economy have also been revealed more. This fact shows that the contributions of Vietnamese communities to the prosperity of South Korea in the past time are undeniable, but the image of Vietnamese people in the eyes of local people is not always perfect as desired. Therefore, this article not only analyzes a few typical contributions of Vietnamese communities to the development of modern South Korea, but also proposes some solutions to help the Vietnamese integrate better and have more useful contributions to the prosperity of South Korea in the coming time.

2. The process of integration of Vietnamese communities into modern South Korean society

2.1. An outline of the process of formation and development of Vietnamese communities in South Korea

The number of foreigners residing in South Korea was bigger than 1 million for the first time in August 2007 (KBS World 2020). In January 2016, 134,164 Vietnamese resided in South Korea out of a total of 1.88 million foreigners in this country (TTXVN 2016). In June 2016, the number of foreigners in South Korea exceeded 2 million people (KBS World 2020). In 2018, the total population of South Korea was 51.63 million, but 2.36 million foreigners (nearly 5% of the total population) were staying in this country (Hà 2020). At the end of December 2019, a total of 2,524,656 foreigners were living in South Korea (4.9%) (KBS World 2020). Most expats have often settle in certain areas. The most typical of these is Wongok ward of Ansan City, Gyeonggi Province (Hà 2020). Totally, 414,318 foreigners resided in Gyeonggi Province in 2019. This number in Seoul was 281,876 at the same time (KBS World 2020).

In May 2013, around 117,215 Vietnamese were residing in South Korea. Most of them were exported workers, Korean husband-marrying Vietnamese brides, and approximately 5,000 students. In addition, there were around 5,000 Vietnamese of the families of Lý Hoa Sơn and Lý Tinh Thiên who immigrated to Korea between the 12th and 13th centuries (Nguyễn Khánh 2013). In January 2016, 134,164 Vietnamese people lived in South Korea (VOV 2016). The Vietnamese have become the third largest expat

community in South Korea, after China (981,610 people, accounted for 52.2%) and the US (136,008 people and accounted for 7.2%) (TTXVN 2016).

In April 30, 2016, 141,652 Vietnamese people stayed in South Korea. This number accounted for 7.18% of the total number of foreigners in South Korea at the same time, but did not include diplomatic staff and their families and only 129,478 residents over 90 days (excluding B and C visas). More specifically, 27,999 people visited their relatives (F-1) (19.77%) and around 12,000 Vietnamese came to South Korea for travel. 1,383 Vietnamese had permanent resident visa or green card (F-5), 0.98%, 121 male and 1,262 female (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). In April 30, 2016, Vietnamese long-term residents (F-2) accounted for 6.17% of the total number of long-term residing foreigners in South Korea. This figure for permanent residents (F-5) was 1.1% (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). Out of 2.52 million foreigners residing in South Korea in 2019, 224,518 ones were Vietnamese (only after China) (KBS World 2020).

In summary, although Vietnamese communities in South Korea started to form since Lý Long Tường set foot in Goryeo in the 12th century (Trung Nghĩa 2006), they only really developed strongly since Vietnam's implementation of the policy of innovation in 1986. Based on the spiritual foundation that Vietnam would like to make friends with all countries around the world and the increasing human resource needs of two sides, the number of Vietnamese traveling to South Korea increased day by day and Vietnamese communities in the land of kimchi have also become stronger with the prosperity of the host country. Of these, popular workers, Korean-marrying Vietnamese brides, and students have accounted for the most part. The growth of Vietnamese communities in South Korea not only reflects the flourishing period in diplomatic relations between the two countries, but also contributes significantly to the development of modern South Korea in many aspects.

2.2. Some contributions of Vietnamese communities to South Korean modernization

The contributions of Vietnamese communities in South Korea to the formation and development of this country are relatively comprehensive, but this section only focuses on analyzing some contributions of Vietnamese communities in the Southern part of the Korea peninsula in five main aspects.

Contributions of Vietnamese people in the process of defending the Korean homeland (the protection of national security, peace in the region, and stability in the world): Despite not being the largest foreign community in South Korea, Vietnamese generations in the Republic of Korea have had a relatively long integration process and have made significant contributions to the process of nation building in the past as well as national modernization of this country since the second half of the twentieth century. One of the most typical examples for this development process is the valuable contributions of the descendants of the Lý families of Vietnam in the Korean people's resistance wars against foreign invasion in the 12th and 12th centuries as well as the development of this country in the medieval age (PV 2018). In the modern times, many Vietnamese-originated Korean generations have also joined the country's army and made valuable contributions to the construction and defense of the Korean homeland. For example, Bae

Joon-hyoung, 22 years of age and whose mother is Vietnamese in North Gyeongsang Province, was selected to attend a 12-week basic training course starting on July 7, 2012 to become South Korea's first multicultural soldiers. After this training, they will be promoted to the rank of sergeant. The first multicultural commanding officers of the South Korean army appeared as the country's military service law was revised in 2009 (Bích Lan 2012). It is these Vietnamese people who have contributed to protecting national security, social order and safety, regional peace, the world stability, and enhancing Korea's stature in the international arena.

Contributions of the Vietnamese people to the special relationship between the two countries and the diversity of South Korean culture: Although many Vietnamese came to study and live in the People's Democratic Republic of Korea after the Northern Vietnam had been liberated in 1954, it was not until the end of the Han River's Miracle (1960-1970) (Zila Team 2020) that the waves of Vietnamese immigration to South Korea went up dramatically. The growing presence of Vietnamese communities have not only contributed to bringing South Korea into the threshold of a multicultural society when the proportion of foreigners accounted for nearly 5% of the country's population (KBS World 2020), but has also promoted the South Korean investment capital flows and aid resources into Vietnam more strongly. Vietnamese communities in South Korea have made great efforts to organize traditional festivals to introduce the image of Vietnam to the people of the land of kimchi. Vietnamese culture has not only become more popular, but has also been increasingly respected in South Korea. Vietnamese language has also become commoner to citizens of the Republic of Korea. Since 2013, Vietnamese language has been one of the official foreign ones for university entrance exams in South Korea. Those who are good at Vietnamese language often have more opportunities to be recruited into enterprises with ties to Vietnam (Nguyễn Khánh 2013). Contributing to the overall success of the strategic partnership between the two countries are many different factors, including hundreds of diplomats, experts, students, settlers, and employees of both countries (Mạnh Hùng 2021). These have been concrete evidences for the very well and effectively developing strategic cooperation relationship between Vietnam and South Korea in recent years (Ban Tuyên giáo Tỉnh ủy Hưng Yên 2020) and are expected to continuously grow more sustainably in the future, in which the Vietnamese communities in the Republic of Korea will play an increasingly important role.

Contributions of Vietnamese exported workers to the development and prosperity of South Korea: It was until April 30, 2016 that the largest group out of 141,652 Vietnamese residents in South Korea were exported workers (E-9), 40,620 people (28.68%), 36,954 men and 3820 women (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). Vietnamese people accounted for 15.08% of the total number of foreign unskilled workers in the Southern part of the Korean peninsula (E-9). This figure for professional workers (E-7) was 5.39%, while that of research workers (E-3) was 5.67% and that of professors (E-1) was only 1.48% (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). Vietnam has often topped the list of countries that export general labors to South Korea under the Foreign Work Permit Program (EPS). From August 2004 to June 30, 2008, Vietnam exported a total number of 31,511 workers to South Korea and 2,894 people were re-employed after the end of their first labor

contracts. In the first six months of 2008, Vietnam exported 6,089 workers to the Republic of Korea and 1,774 workers' labor contracts were lengthened for the first time (TTXVN 2008). Vietnamese workers in South Korea have been actively contributing to this country's economic development and Vietnam's economic integration. These have been positive and effective bridges for the trusted friendship between the two countries and have contributed to introducing Vietnamese culture to international friends (Center of Overseas Labor 2016). On the contrary, in order to create conditions for foreign workers in general and Vietnamese labors in particular to work better in the difficult circumstances of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Government of the Republic of Korea announced that it would carry out the program of *Seasonal work for foreign residents in the country* on February 15, 2021 (TTXVN 2021).

The role of Vietnamese students in the process of internationalization and enhancement of the South Korean education system: Out of a total number of 1.88 million foreign residents in South Korea in January 2016, 195,134 were international students (12.1%) (TTXVN 2016). Of these, 57,539 students were Vietnamese ones, just behind China (71,719 people) (KBS World 2020). The number of Vietnamese students at South Korean universities has increased sharply over the past few years and it is the fastest growing group in the Northeast Asian countries (Anh Ngọc B 2018). Around 10,000 out of 141,652 Vietnamese who were staying in South Korea in April 30, 2016 were students. Of these, 5,560 students studied Korean language and 4,088 studied other majors from college to higher levels (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). In April 30, 2016, Korean language-studying Vietnamese students (D-4) accounted for 17.26% of the total number of international students in South Korea. This figure of Vietnamese students in other majors (D-2) was 5.59% (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). In 2017, nearly 15,000 Vietnamese students went to South Korea for study. This number was three times higher than that of 2015. In April 2018, more than 27,000 students (19%) out of the total number of more than 142,000 foreign students enrolled in undergraduate and graduate programs in South Korea were Vietnamese (Anh Ngọc B 2018). The number of Vietnamese students in South Korea is predicted to surpass that of Chinese ones in the coming years (Anh Ngọc B 2018). The majority of Vietnamese students are not only exemplary examples of the spirit of hard work, but also the pride of many training institutions. The instructor Lê Nguyễn Minh Phương of Joongbu University (South Korea) is one of such people and became one of 18 foreigners honored as honorary citizens of Seoul on November 13, 2019 (Mạnh Hùng & Anh Nguyên 2020).

Contributions of South Korean husband-marrying Vietnamese brides to this country's growth: In December 2018, 132,391 foreign women (10% of the total number of foreign residents in South Korea) were South Korean-marrying immigrants (Hải Anh 2019). Of 141,652 Vietnamese who were staying in South Korea in April 30, 2016, 38,069 were married to Korean citizens (F-6) (26.88%), 37,092 women and 977 men (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). Vietnamese people accounted for 31.53% of the total number of foreigners married to South Korean nationals (F-6) (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). Vietnam has currently the largest number of South Korean-marrying brides (around 40,000 people) (H.N A 2019). Vietnamese women accounted for 73% of the total number

of foreign brides in South Korea (Anh Ngọc A 2018) in the period of 2014-2016 (Hoàng Vũ 2019). The sharing of many commonalities of East Asian cultural traditions and human characteristics have led many South Korean men come to Vietnam to get married (H.N A 2019). Among these, many people are very proud of their role of South Korean husband-marrying Vietnamese brides (Nguyễn Khánh 2013). Many Vietnamese brides have not only fully fulfilled their duties of a wife and daughter-in-law in South Korean families, but have also quickly and successfully integrated into the modern life of the host country and even partly affirmed their positions in South Korean social life (Thu Hằng 2019). Vietnamese brides' successes in South Korea have gradually changed the natives' way of thinking and points of view on this country's immigrants. Many people feel proud of the silent contributions of Vietnamese brides to the common prosperity of the land of kimchi (Nguyễn Khánh 2013).

In short, although the contributions of Vietnamese communities in South Korea to this country's development over the past few decades have covered many different aspects, it is most noticeable in five basic areas. In addition to the important contributions to the formation and development of the nation and state of the South Korean people since the 12th century have been intermediary bridges and special catalysts for the comprehensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and South Korea for many years. However, the most specific and diligent contributions of Vietnamese communities in South Korea belong to general labors. Meanwhile, the number of Vietnamese students in the Southern part of the Korean peninsula is second only to that of China, but their influences on the development of bilateral cultural and educational ties between the two countries is second to none as peacefully cultural ambassadors of the two peoples. Nevertheless, the success of the community of South Korean husband-marrying Vietnamese brides is really a typical example of integration efforts and faithful commitment of immigrants to the future and destiny of the host country. It is thanks to those positive contributions that even though the Vietnamese are not the largest immigrant community in the Republic of Korea, they are highly appreciated by the native people for their ability to adapt to the new cultural environment and have many significant contributions to the development of the host country (Nguyễn Khánh 2013).

2.3. Problems and solutions

Although the number of Vietnamese immigrants to South Korea has increased over the past few years and many of them have made significant contributions to the process of turning into a dragon in the land of kimchi, they are also facing a lot of questions. The most typical of these are the following:

The first is illegal entrance and immigration. Legally, foreigners who want to enter South Korea must have a valid passport and a visa issued by this country's Minister of Justice (ICO Group 2017). However, 39,281 foreigners resided illegally in South Korea in 2019 (KBS World 2020). On February 24, 2016, Busan city police arrested three agents who specialized in bringing around 100 Vietnamese people to illegally enter the Republic of Korea (Mỹ Loan 2016). Within the first 6 months of 2018, more than 1,500 Vietnamese workers who resided illegally in South Korea were forced to return home. Nearly 520 of them were arrested and deported back to the country (Anh Ngọc B 2019).

While the authorities need to promptly prevent and strictly handle illegal immigration cases, individual migrants should not bet their own future and destiny on illegal immigration and residence in any country.

The second is domestic violence and discrimination against Vietnamese brides in the Southern half of the Korea peninsula. Around 18,000 Vietnamese people get married with foreigners each year. Of these, approximately 72% are women (Hoàng Vũ 2019), but not all of them are lucky enough to change their marriage lives as promised (Hoàng Vũ 2019). Therefore, if anyone cannot adapt to the current life of any foreign country, it is advised to resolutely and decisively make divorce to protect themselves and their children (H.N B 2019). In the long run, the Vietnamese women who want to find happiness in distant lands need to know more carefully about the persons with whom they would like to get married and become a bride in foreign countries (H.N B 2019). At the same time, uncultured behavior patterns and domestic violence need to be eliminated from the daily life of modern South Korean society (H.N B 2019).

The third is the violation of labor contracts (the disappearance of Vietnamese exported labors after the end of labor contracts or the exhaustion of South Korean employers with foreign employees). This phenomenon occurs from both sides. Vietnamese exported workers do not fully implement their labor contracts, while many South Korean business owners also try to circumvent the state law to maximize their possible profits. The story is often easy to see from part-time students (Anh Ngọc A 2019). The second is Vietnamese exported labors who are in shortage of the conditions to meet the working standards of the host state (Anh Ngọc C 2019). Meanwhile, the death of a Cambodian female worker on December 20, 2020 in the town of Pocheon exposed the exploitation of foreign labor for many years in the South Korean farms (Phúc Duy 2021). The above-mentioned situation shows that the violation of labor contracts has taken place for both Vietnamese workers and South Korean employers. The violation of labor contracts in any form will affect the legal rights of the parties involved and should be handled severely (Anh Ngọc C 2019).

The fourth is the unprofessional labor attitude, low labor productivity, and mainly unskilled labors in the economic areas that need a lot of manual human resources. Among 141,652 Vietnamese residents in South Korea in April 30, 2016, unskilled workers (E-9) accounted for 28.68% (40,620 people) (Hàn Quốc ngày nay 2016). Vietnam has often been known as the largest exporter of popular laborers to the Republic of Korea under the Foreign Work Permit Program (EPS) (TTXVN 2008). This fact shows that although Vietnamese workers were one of the biggest laboring groups in South Korea, most of them are simple workers and their legitimate interests have not always been fully protected by the host country's law. Therefore, the establishment of organizations and associations to protect the legitimate interests of expatriate laborers is very necessary. Meanwhile, the law enforcement system or law enforcement agencies of South Korea also need to work more effectively in order to minimize uncivilized labor relations in a multicultural and modern society.

The fifth is the violation of local laws and commercial fraud. Although Vietnam has made great improvements on the road to becoming a civilized country, traces of a

pre-industrialized society cannot be completely removed from her citizens. Many of these pre-civilized elements even persist longer and follow Vietnamese people to foreign countries that Vietnamese communities in South Korea are not exceptions. This phenomena have occurred in South Korea for many times, but it is most visible during the period of implementation of isolation measures to prevent the Covid-19 pandemic from communities (Huyền Lê 2019). Many different subjective and objective reasons might contribute to leading to this problem, but a more reasonable policy and an opener financial support program for expatriates with difficult circumstances is not only more useful for the strangers who want to spend their lives with the land of kimchi for the whole life, but it also actually helps this country leave better images and deeper impressions on international friends.

3. Conclusion

Vietnamese communities in South Korea are not the largest groups of foreigners in the land of kimchi, but they were formed a long time ago (the 12th and 13th centuries) and have developed very rapidly in recent decades. It is the similarity of culture and historical background that has not only brought the two countries closer to each other, but Vietnamese communities in South Korea have also had many opportunities to develop faster in the past few years. During the period of nearly a millennium of coexistence, Vietnamese communities in the Southern part of the Korean peninsula have not only accompanied the ups and downs of this nation's history, but had also long-term and comprehensive contributions in almost all fields to the state-building and nation-forming journey of the modern South Korean people. Although the contributions of Vietnamese communities in South Korea are evident in many different fronts, the boldest imprints and most visible achievements are often recorded in five key areas. Many Vietnamese sacrificed themselves for the independence and freedom of the Korean peninsula since the day they first set foot on the land of their new hometown (the lineage of Lý Long Tường) and many achieved glorious victories in the process of state-building and national defense of the land of kimchi. However, the most notable have been the achievements of Vietnamese communities in South Korea in the process of cultivating and developing the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries over the past few years. At the same time, Vietnamese students in the Republic of Korea have not only demonstrated their academic ability, but have also become cultural ambassadors of the two countries' education. Nevertheless, Korean-marrying Vietnamese brides' successes are really an illustrating example for the integration process of immigrants and concrete contributions to solving many pressing social problems of an emerging industrialized country. However, many issues need to be discussed further. The most prominent of these are the phenomena of illegal migration and settlement, domestic violence and discrimination against Vietnamese brides, violation of labor contracts by both parties, unprofessional labor attitude and unfair risk, and violation of the host country' law and commercial fraud. This fact shows that each Vietnamese in South Korea needs more efforts to integrate successfully and make many useful contributions to the development of the host country, but the native people must also have a clearer and more accurate

view on the role of immigrant communities in general and Vietnamese communities in South Korea in particular in the process of formation and development of their country.

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**Alternative Voices of the Korean Community in the United States:
*Korean Independence and the Voice of America***

Not every Korean cheered on July 24, 1948, when Dr. Syngman Rhee became the first president of the Republic of Korea. Continuous downpour accompanied the inauguration ceremony while Rhee administered the oath of office to himself “like Napoleon,” for the Republic had yet to fill the chief justice position (Clark 1948).¹ Just days earlier on July 20, he had overwhelmingly won by 180 to 16 votes in a secret ballot presidential election by the Korean National Assembly according to the provisions of the Constitution, which was adopted by the National Assembly on July 12 (Johnston 1948). The *New York Times* article announcing Rhee’s victory called him “a protagonist of Korean independence” for more than 35 years and highlighted his devotion “to seeking Korean self-determination” throughout his life (Johnston 1948). However, the article made no mention of Rhee’s specific activities for Korean independence or that they largely took place in the United States where the Korean community predominantly centered in Hawaii and California highly criticized and denounced many of his actions.

On August 15, 1948, also the third anniversary of Korea’s liberation from more than three decades of Japanese colonization, Rhee made official the loose border along the 38th parallel that demarcated the arbitrarily decided U.S.-Soviet occupation zones by establishing the government of the Republic of Korea. Kim Il-sung followed suit on September 8 with the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the formal division of the Korean peninsula impacted not only the Korean people living on the northern and southern sides of the parallel, but also Koreans living in the United States. Generally considered conservative Christians, these individuals divided into factions based on their support or opposition of Rhee even before the end

¹ In addition to this article, several Korean language newspapers also mention the rain during the inauguration ceremony, although with a more positive interpretation.

of Japanese imperialism, and the rifts among the factions intensified and split the U.S. Korean society into three groups (Jung 2014, 28-9). The first group consisted of the supporters of Rhee who welcomed the formation of the South Korean government and his political success. Next, the second group formed the opposition faction to Rhee but was still in affiliation of the Korean National Association (KNA), which was the official representative organization for all overseas Koreans and supported the Korean Provisional Government (KPG). While they opposed the division of the peninsula, they were not against a Korean government with U.S. patronage and kept neutral and silent on the matter despite having the largest organizational size, except for a few individuals who expressed their centrist position. Lastly, the minority faction comprised of radical students who “argued that as political situations in Asia were rapidly changing, so must Korean independence strategies and approaches” (Cha 2010, 131).

Two representative publications espoused ideologies of Korean nationalism that diverged from Rhee’s and started in 1943. The earlier of the two was *Korean Independence*, which was led by radical, left-leaning students and first went to print on October 6, 1943. In contrast, the Korean Affairs Institute (KAI), which was headed by a more centrist group, published the first issue of the *Voice of Korea* on November 22, 1943. Since 1943, both *Korean Independence* and the *Voice of Korea* supported Korean nationalism by bringing awareness to diverse ideas and political philosophies. However, as the two groups fought against Rhee and his brand of Korean independence, they faced different but likewise tragic ends: The U.S. government launched a full-scale surveillance and investigation into the activities of *Korean Independence*’s core leadership, which led many to be imprisoned and ultimately deported under the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950. Due to financial deficit, the *Voice of Korea* stopped publishing in April 1962 and the KAI had to be dissolved. This paper investigates the origins and activities of these two groups to

examine the years predating the Korean War and see how the interpretation of their activities by government officials allowed for the persecution of certain individuals of the Korean community in the United States. Through this analysis, this paper shows that the United States has repeatedly failed to understand the wants and desires of the Korean people, and at the same time, argues that the respective demise of *Korean Independence* and the *Voice of Korea* ultimately resulted from more than just government interpretations of their activities, but from the gradual loss of support and backing from their own community members.

Literature on early Cold War era persecutions in the United States are plentiful, but they focus less on Asians in general and even less on Koreans specifically. Of Asian cases, the persecution of the Chinese community received the majority of scholarly attention due to the rise of communist China from its alignment with the Soviet Union.² In contrast, scholars have given relatively little attention to the persecutions of the Korean community, reflecting the sentiment of the Korean War as a “forgotten war,” even though this war directly resulted from Cold War geopolitical tensions and served as a proxy war between the United States and Soviet Union in addition to a civil war between the North and South.³ Perhaps for this reason, historians of the Cold War persecutions of Koreans in America mainly use the deportation proceedings as a case study for civil rights or citizenship and naturalization rights from the U.S. perspective or national identity and belongingness from the Korean perspective. As such, the current literature focuses on a chronological boundary that only looks at the periods around the Korean War, when the actual

² Some examples of such research include Cindy I.-Fen Cheng, *Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race During the Cold War* (NYU Press, 2014); Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton University Press, 2004); Charlotte Brooks, *Between Mao and McCarthy: Chinese American Politics in the Cold War Years* (University of Chicago Press, 2015); Madeline Y. Hsu, *The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority* (Princeton University Press, 2015); Ellen D. Wu, *The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority* (Princeton University Press, 2014).

³ Notable examples are Cindy I.-Fen Cheng, *Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race During the Cold War* (NYU Press, 2014), and Jane H. Hong, *Reorienting America: Race, Geopolitics, and the Repeal of Asian Exclusion, 1940-1952*, Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 2013.

origin of independence activities stems as far back as the time of Japanese colonialism and fails to consider the details of specific activities and how the interpretation of these activities by government officials allowed for the persecution of particular individuals. Cheng (2014) details the cases of David Hyun and Diamond Kimm, whose political actions for Korean nationalism became “subversive activities” by foreigners that posed to threaten the Anglo-American way of life. To accomplish her task, Cheng examines how the Los Angeles Committee for Protection of Foreign Born (LACPFB) fought against the federal government’s discriminatory treatment of Hyun and Kimm’s communism and foreignness and endeavored to safeguard civil rights for all those on American soil, without distinction between aliens and citizens.⁴

While Cheng provides a broad background into how the political activities by Hyun and Kimm could be transformed into subversive activities from the perspective of the U.S. government, there are little specific details of their actual undertakings. In addition, Cheng’s use of the term “Korean American” is questionable because the reason that Hyun and Kimm could be persecuted under the McCarran Act was for their alien status. Hyun was born in colonized Korea and entered the United States through a Chinese passport when the Japanese empire controlled overseas migration of Koreans for their concern that they would negatively affect the image of Japanese citizens abroad; he was the son of Reverend Soon Hyun who was a prominent figure in the Korean independence movement in Hawaii. Kimm entered on a student visa to complete graduate work in the United States but became involved with the Korean independence movement and overstayed his visa, which gave justification for his deportation case. They were Koreans in America rather than Korean Americans.

⁴ According to Jeffrey M. Garcilazo, LACPFB emerged as the leader in “oppos[ing] politically driven deportations of all immigrant groups, but especially on behalf of Mexican Americans” (Garcilazo 2001, 274). Committee records show that the organization elected David Hyun as its first chairman on October 8, 1950.

Moreover, most of the primary sources that Cheng uses are related to the defense of Hyun and Kimm by the LACPFB such as respondent briefs, court transcripts, and LACPFB records. Although Cheng's research reveals a fair amount of information related to Hyun and Kimm's political activities, the drawback of using "official" materials is their questionable ability to accurately portray the actions and voices of subaltern people. In this case, the briefs and transcripts are tinged with the perspective of advocates—the materials in support of Hyun and Kimm will take a positive light of their activities while those against will have a negative view. Cheng does not cross-reference the details of Hyun and Kimm's political activities with their own works, so we are left wondering exactly how "subversive" and communism-oriented their political actions were—which were generally centered around a publication titled *Korean Independence*—that made it possible for their interpretation as such by the U.S. government.

The next section provides a context for the Korean nationalist movement in the United States and examines how the factions representing the conservative right, the neutral center, and the radical left originated in the Korean community.

Factions of the Korean Community in the United States

On March 1, 1919, local resistance for Korean independence culminated into an outburst of nationwide peaceful demonstrations known as the March First Movement. The news of the Movement reached overseas Koreans and caused similar spike in political activity in diasporic communities, particularly among the Koreans on the Hawaiian Islands and continental United States. The Movement ushered in a new phase of the Korean independence movement in which nationalist activities occurred outside the Korean peninsula, leading to the formation of the KPG in Shanghai in April 1919 and various organizations in the United States. While Korean people back home acted upon their colonization by seeking independence from Imperial Japan, Rhee and

two of his affiliates “brazenly handed a petition to President Wilson to make Korea a mandatory subject of the League of Nations” (Lyu 1977, 54). Rhee sought to obtain League of Nations subject status for Korea, which would entrust the tutelage of Korea “to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility” to be “able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world,” as stated in Article 22 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Despite Rhee’s claim that this route would free Korea from the shackles of Japanese colonization, his action shocked and shamed the Korean community since subject status simply cast off one form of subordination for another.⁵

Rhee’s elitism and power-hungry tendencies was a major cause of the divide in the Korean community between his supporters and critics. According to an account of a Korean nationalist who participated in the independence movement in the United States, “To understand Korean politics in the Republic of Korea, one must necessarily know the background of Korean politics in Hawaii and the continental United States, for Rhee’s same dirty politics have been transplanted to the homeland of divided Korea under his rule” (Lyu 1977, 98).⁶ The nationalist fervor started by the March First Movement declined drastically starting in the mid-1920s as Koreans became disillusioned by factional strife over power between Rhee and the KNA, which was the main body of the Korean independence movement for Koreans in the United States (Yang 1990, 175). The movement regained ground with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 when Koreans saw the opportunity to assist with the Chinese war effort and see the defeat of Japanese imperialism, but it led to more questions on the direction under which the independence movement should take and which party it should follow—the right-wing Korean Independence Party under the KPG or

⁵ As a colony of a state that was on the winning side of World War II, the League of Nations mandate was not applicable to Korea.

⁶ According to *Amerasia Journal*, “Kingsley K. Lyu (1904-1976) was an early [immigrant] Korean nationalist and a member of the Korean Government Delegation to the United Nations Conference held in San Francisco in 1945.”

the left-wing and more powerful Korean National Revolutionary Party (KNRP). Of those who comprised the membership of the KNA, the older and established Korean immigrants made up the majority and supported the KPG, while the young students in Southern California sought to find a non-conservative approach to Korean independence and eventually aligned with the KNRP in 1942. On a Friday in December 1937, the students officially convened for the first time and continued to meet every Friday thereafter as the Friday Forum. These students would eventually establish *Korean Independence* in 1943.

In contrast to the radical leftists of the independence movement, the separation of the more neutral faction did not occur until the 1940s. With the possibility of U.S. entry into World War II, which was recognized as the best hope for Korean liberation from Japanese colonization, leaders of various Korean nationalist societies—young and old—convened in Honolulu in April 1941. After a week of meetings, they succeeded in bringing together political and personal differences to create the United Korean Committee of North America (UKC), which marked the first concerted effort to unify Korean nationalist organizations in the United States since 1919 (R. Kim 2011, 137): Among the member organizations included the KNA, and Korean Independence Party, KNRP, and Korean Student Federation of North America (Choi 2007, 220-1). From the start, Rhee clashed with the UKC, finding it “enormously difficult to support a vision of the nation that did not place him at the center of power” for he “envisioned the [UKC] as an organization created not only to support the KPG but to also support his own political agenda” (Choi 2007, 223-4). The relationship between the UKC and Rhee continued to sour throughout 1942 and ultimately culminated in Rhee’s departure from the Committee in the fall of 1943 due to the buildup from Rhee’s refusal to work within the established operational channels of the Committee, his continued reliance on non-Korean advisees, and the Committee’s denial to indulge Rhee’s financial and personal demands.

When the KNRP and the Korean Student Federation of North Korea left the UKC for their disapproval of the Committee's acceptance of the Cairo Declaration—"in which [Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek] declared that Korea would be free and independent 'in due course' following the defeat of Japan" rather than "unconditional freedom and independence" with the conclusion of World War II—the three way split among the Korean nationalists in the United States was complete (Choi 2007, 236-7).

The Southern California Student Group and *Korean Independence*

Starting in December 1937, the Korean students in Southern California—led by Byun Jun-ho, Kim Kang (Diamond Kimm), and Lee Kyeong-seon—held weekly Friday Forums to discuss their concerns and ideas on the rapidly changing situation in Asia. While there are no records of discussions from the forum, we can sense the Marxist and socialist identity of the meetings from an article written on March 23, 1938, by Kim Kang in the KNA's the *New Korea*:

[The new Korea] we envision is not the state of the Yi Dynasty but a new state that guarantees the liberty and equality of the people and between nations. It is not a country that serves one man's interest but a country guaranteeing equal voting rights, public education for all under twenty-three years of age, protection of livelihood for all between the ages of twenty-three and fifty-three, and security in retirement for all over fifty-three" (Yang 1990, 179).

When the KNA rejected the recommendations by the students for reforms and reorganization, the student group evolved from a discussion forum into a series of politically active organizations: The League to Aid China, the Society to Aid Korean Voluntary Corps in China, and finally, the KNRP (Cha 2010, 132).

In contrast to Rhee and other right-wing nationalists who envisioned the postwar Korean state following the U.S. model, the leaders of the KNRP saw a two-fold task of national liberation and social revolution. The student leaders established the bilingual *Korean Independence* to conduct mass education on left ideologies and politics and the necessity of more fundamental

social reforms, publishing its first issue on October 6, 1943. Its membership consisted of both Marxist hardliners and social democrat moderates, but “[t]he political viewpoint of the newspaper had been toned down, partly to counteract criticisms of more moderate forces in the independence movement and partly to draw broader support for [the efforts of the KNRP]” (Yang 1990, 187). Each week the newspaper published 2,000 copies of an issue with eight total pages, including a two-page section in English, and shipped about 1,000 to paid subscribers in not only the United States but also Canada, Mexico, Cuba, China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (Yang 1990, 187).

Between October 1943 and December 1945, *Korean Independence* continued to espouse a moderate perspective and reserved judgment on U.S. occupation policies, but on January 2, 1946, the newspaper shifted course to start criticizing U.S. policy in Korea with articles in the Korean section such as “Exposure of U.S. policy to plant seeds of civil war in Korea: U.S. goal is to establish a reactionary Korean government” and others that praised the Moscow Agreement, which would establish a five-year trusteeship for Korea (*Korean Independence*, Jan. 2, 1946). While this reaction from the students may seem strange considering their response to how the UKC handled the “in due course” of the Cairo Declaration, they felt that a trusteeship was the better alternative to the status quo since it paved the way for the independence of a *single* Korea.

With each week, the radical and anti-U.S. voice of the newspaper grew stronger as the United States continued to misunderstand the desires of the Korean people. Unlike the Soviet Union occupied north, which took a more laissez faire approach to occupation and allowed the Korean people under the leadership of Kim Il-sung to settle colonial legacies to remove pro-Japanese collaborators from positions of power and conduct land reform, the United States made no attempt to resolve the ills of the past. One of the first acts by the U.S. Occupation in Korea was

to announce that the colonial bureaucracy implemented by the Japanese would continue operations with all its previous personnel—both Japanese and Korean—and including the Japanese Governor-General. Furthermore, the United States Military Government continued to receive advice from and consult with Japanese officials in Korea while also forming ties with a particular political party (Korean Democratic Party) with pro-Japanese connections without considering the full available information. As evident from the previous, the U.S. Occupation made errors in decisions during its time in Korea due to “American responses to political conflict in unfamiliar settings” (Cumings 1981, 145), an aspect of the U.S. imperial project that is prevalent throughout history.

On January 16, 1946, the English section of *Korean Independence* called the American Military Government in Korea “fascistic” and “quisling,” while including a “plea to all Korean patriots” from Pak Hon-young, one of the main leaders of the Korean communist movement during the colonial era and the representative of the Korean Communist Party’s Central Committee (*Korean Independence*, Jan. 16, 1946). *Korean Independence* did not hesitate to report any news that it viewed as threatening to Korean nationalism and independence, whether that criticized the United States, U.S. occupation officials such as General MacArthur and Lieutenant General Hodge, or Korean politicians like Rhee or Kim Koo. In fact, according to the newspaper, it was clear that the “Korean majority support Moscow decisions” with “fascist groups delay[ing] Korea[n] independence” (*Korean Independence*, Jan. 30, 1946).

On March 13, 1946, *Korean Independence*’s condemnation of the United States reached new heights when it brought attention to U.S. imperial ambitions “seeking monopoly of Korean markets and resources” (*Korean Independence*, Mar. 13, 1946) and followed it up with the Korean article, “The exposed mask of American imperialism” (*Korean Independence*, May 8, 1946). In an August 1946 issue, the newspaper denounced the U.S. Occupation for “protecting the interest

of a rotten few, such as pro-Japanese traitors, reactionary landowners and bourgeoisie at the sacrifice of the people,” while “[t]he Soviet Union is quite the opposite” (Yang 1990, 197). Byun Jun-ho went further to compare communism and capitalism in a November 1946 issue, writing that “a communist state was a truly a democratic state because it was concerned with the happiness of farmers and workers. On the other hand, capitalist society was based on capitalist control of the government, not for the people but for the capitalist” (Yang 1990, 192). The new radical direction caused the newspaper to suffer a sharp decline in sponsors, donors, and subscribers, and nearly every issue from January 1947 carried an appeal for financial assistance; ultimately, the number of pages was reduced to half, from eight to four (Yang 1990, 192).

Since January 1947, *Korean Independence* faced one bad news after another. In July 1947, the *Los Angeles Examiner* described the Korean Independence News Company as one of several “anti-American” Korean organizations that “were all set up and operated to force recall of American occupation forces in Korea, to back Russian policy in Korea against that of the United States” (Yang 1990, 193). Moreover, the Korean Independent News Company had an entry in the document prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities on December 18, 1948; it was “[c]ited as a Communist front ‘for the purpose of protesting American policy in Korea and creating pressure for the recall of American occupation forces from that country’” (United States 1948). Members of *Korean Independence* and the KNRP were investigated by the House Committee for Un-American Activities or called in for violations of immigration laws. However, the U.S. media and people failed to realize that *Korean Independence* did not support the Soviet Union and condemned the United States for reasons of political ideology. The newspaper supported the country with the policy that has the most benefit to the Korean people.

Nonetheless, it was no coincidence that the timing of U.S. government investigation into the members of *Korean Independence* occurred at this time. The publication had lost much of its readership and subscription base with its radical turn, and with little to no support from its local community, U.S. government could conduct its investigation without any hindrance. According to the public source information related to Diamond Kimm (Kim Kang), the earliest record of FBI surveillance starts in 1944,⁷ during which time the *Korean Independence* took a moderate, social democratic position to obtain broad readership in the Korean community so there was little reason for his surveillance. In fact, it was more like that Diamond Kimm had been under watch for overstaying his student visa, for which he had been facing harassment from INS as early as 1941 and was eventually “designated for voluntary departure within ninety days following the issuance of an exit permit” that never was issued, even though he reapplied several times between 1945 and 1947 (Yang 1990, 195). For this reason, we can see that the investigation into Diamond Kimm’s activities as a Communist occurred due to his immigration status, and the fact that his hearing was not held until 1950 allowed the U.S. government authorities to collect information about his “subversive activities” and use them against him at his future deportation trial.

Although Diamond Kimm was highly active in the Korean nationalist movement, he only had connections to other people who were also left-wing radicals and not of the Korean community at large. Therefore, although progressive organizations such as the LACPFB protested on his behalf, Diamond Kimm was not supported by any organizations of the Korean community. According to Cha, “the fear of backlash from the Cold War anti-Communist sentiment, McCarthyism and the conservative Korean community...kept anyone who knew anything about the activities from talking, let alone writing about them” (Cha 2010, 121). As such, it is not difficult

⁷ Diamond Kimm. Federal Bureau of Investigation File, Diamond Kimm deportation case, Korean American Digital Archive, University of Southern California.

to imagine that the Korean community in the United States, which was still predominantly comprised of first-generation immigrants with no U.S. citizenship, would be fearful of a similar incident happening to them. Through the experiences of Diamond Kimm and *Korean Independence*, the importance of community cohesion becomes evident.

Korean Affairs Institute and the *Voice of Korea*

On August 30, 1943, perhaps intuitively sensing Rhee's betrayal of the UKC, Charles Ho Kim (executive chairman of the Committee), Youngjeung Kim (public relations director), Leo C. Song, and Earl Yim founded the KAI for the following purposes:

1. To propagate a universal spirit of goodwill, predicated upon the philosophy that the modern world can not [*sic*] survive "half free and half serf" and that the narrowing compactness of the globe, resulting from scientific progress, renders mutual cooperation, tolerance and respect among the nations indispensable to human security and lasting peace.
2. To particularly espouse the freedom and national integrity of Korea, which lies in the shortest route to Tokyo and possesses invaluable potential contributions toward the United Nations victory.
3. To render all possible aid to the United States war effort and the promotion of Korean freedom.
4. To maintain a research bureau for the compilation, collocation and dissemination of education information concerning Korea as an aid to the proper presentation of her case to the people of the United States.
5. To cooperate with the United Nations in utilization of Korean resources toward the defeat of Japan, solution of Korean post war problems, advocacy of international freedom, economy and democracy, in crystallization of the Atlantic Charter and elimination of the existing barriers between nations, through mutual human understanding and interchange of knowledge.
6. To engage in relief work should circumstances dictate the wisdom thereof in the judgment of the Board of Governors.
7. To perform the foregoing acts and things, and such others may prove necessary, expedient, or desirable for the accomplishment of the purposes enumerated, whether or no [*sic*] particularly specified herein, in the State of California, any other state, the District of Columbia, any territory, colony, or possession of the United States of America, and in any other country, nation, state, or locality, the Board of Governors may see fit to operate from time to time (Articles of Incorporation 1943).

However, only two months passed when the Institute's leadership decided to amend the following sections of its purpose on October 30, 1943 (revisions are marked in italics):

1. To propagate *through the compilation, collocation, and dissemination of education information*, a universal spirit of goodwill...
2. [removed]
3. *To cooperate with and assist the United States in the war effort by compiling and making available information deemed of value for such purposes.*
4. *To prepare and publish for educational purposes, text books and pamphlets regarding Korea and its people.* [no additional amendments thereafter] (Certificate Amending Articles of Incorporation 1943)⁸

With the above changes, we can see that the focus of the Institute shifts to producing educational materials with the aim of instructing all people about Korea. Considering the date that these amendments took place, it is possible that this was an effort by the Institute to differentiate itself and the *Voice of Korea* from *Korean Independence* and other similar organizations and publications, especially since its positioning as a publisher of educational materials portrays a neutral status in comparison to a newspaper. Then, was the leadership of the KAI neutral, and why did the Institute and the *Voice of Korea* try to maintain an image of neutrality?

Although forgotten from the public memory of the Korean diaspora in the United States, Charles Ho Kim and Yongjeung Kim had connections with the left. Charles Ho Kim was one of the founding members of the Korean Labor Socialist Progressive Party in 1919, which was created for the recognition of the KPG “from socialists who were fast gaining in stature and popularity from their successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia was a boost the Korean independence fighters needed to jump-start their campaign for their country’s independence,” as well as a supporter of the students’ Friday Forum (Cha 2010, 124). In addition, Charles Ho Kim and Yongjeung Kim both looked to Yeo Un-hyeong, a prominent left-wing leader of Korean independence movement, as their political mentor and spent time in exile in China with Yeo Un-hyeong before they came to the United States (Cha 2010, 8).⁹ However, pragmatic considerations necessitated Charles Ho Kim

⁸ The items referred here from the Articles of Incorporation and Certificate Amending Articles of Incorporation are not numbered on the original documents but are numbered here for easier reference.

⁹ There are a few examples of Yongjeung Kim’s correspondence with Yeo Un-hyeong in Box 4, Arranged correspondence: M-Z, Yong-jeung Kim papers.

and Yongjeung Kim's appearance of neutrality. In a society in which the majority population comprised of political conservatives, their neutrality was important to maintain their successful agricultural businesses,¹⁰ and eventually, it became essential due to the surveillance by the U.S. government for what it considered to be subversive activities. At the same time, if they took "a centrist position, [they] would have the flexibility to jockey to the left or right as well as preserve [their] bourgeoisie livelihood" (Cha 2010, 9).

On November 22, 1943, the KAI, a non-profit organization "devoted to freedom," published its inaugural biweekly issue of the *Voice of Korea*. The single page featured an article titled "Korea and the War" that discussed the importance of victory in the war and introduced Korea and the Institute to its readers, concluding with "Understand Makes Friends!" (KAI, Nov. 22, 1943). The reverse side of the single page included two maps, the one on top showing "the shortest route to Japan" while the bottom map marked major cities and the railroad tracks on the peninsula connecting with China's. Considering that most Americans even today cannot accurately find the Korean peninsula, let alone North Korea (Quealy 2017),¹¹ the map served as another resource to inform Americans about Korea.

Between November 1943 and April 1945, the *Voice of Korea* printed educational information on Korea, but on May 12, 1945, for a Special United Nations Conference Issue, the *Voice of Korea* reprinted a letter to the editor written by Yongjeung Kim on April 25 and published by the *New York Times* on May 2 regarding the possibility that the Cairo Declaration would not be followed, stating that "it would be best for the interest of Korea and her neighbors to leave her alone to resolve her own problems" (KAI, May 12, 1945). The subsequent issue reproduced the

¹⁰ Charles Ho Kim was one-third of the Kim Brothers, Inc. that had exclusive rights to the fruit and trees of the Le Grand nectarine. Youngjeung Kim formed a partnership with Leo C. Song as the K&S Jobbers and worked with Kim Brothers, Inc.

¹¹ Out of 1,746 guesses by adults, only 36 percent located North Korea correctly.

letter Yongjeung Kim wrote to the U.S. secretary of state on May 8 to inquire about “a secret agreement at Yalta in which Russia was given a free hand in Korea in the post-war settlement contrary to the Cairo Declaration,” as well as the response on May 17 from the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and on May 19 from the United Kingdom delegation, which confirmed the commitments of the Cairo Declaration (KAI, May 29, 1945).

Imperial Japan surrendered on August 15, and Koreans all over celebrated their liberation from Japanese colonization. However, their newly found happiness would not last, as the United States and Soviet Union divided the peninsula along the 38th parallel and each occupied a part. In response, the *Voice of Korea* prescribed policy measures, calling for the United States to “maintain her greatness” by establishing a short and unified command of the occupation since it would be a “waste [of] money and manpower to occupy Korea for a prolonged period of time [when] [t]hey should concentrate their efforts in watching the sly enemy, Japan” (KAI, Sept. 24, 1945). The Institute continued to publish issues recommending a temporary occupation and unification of the peninsulas throughout 1946, but despite his frustration at the situation, Yongjeung Kim showed the United States in positive light when the opportunity presented itself. For instance, the October 18, 1945, issue included a photograph titled “Here Come the Americans!” with the following caption: “Koreans cheer the U.S. Seventh Infantry Division troops marching through Seoul, Korea, for formal occupation of the country, marking the end of forty years enslavement of the Koreans by the Japanese” (KAI, Oct. 18, 1945). Moreover, another issue reprinted an article by an U.S. journalist writing about the White House visit of a representative from the southern part of the peninsula “to express the gratitude of the people of Korea for their liberation” (Hurst, Jun. 6, 1946). At the same time, while the *Voice of Korea* did not shy away from criticizing the occupation, it put the blame equally on the Soviet Union and the United States when it did so: “Korea is the

victim of the Soviet-American conflict, which divides the country and prevents Koreans from forming a government of their own choice. Russia and the United States should settle their differences elsewhere instead of sacrificing Korea” (Y. Kim, May 22, 1946).

With the formation of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948, the objectives of the Institute regularly changed to accommodate the situation at hand, which is evident through the records of the Institute’s Annual Meetings. On August 18, 1948, the Sixth Annual Meeting saw the resignations of Leo C. Song and Earl Yim and elections of Charles Ho Kim as Chairman of the Board of Governors and Treasurer, Harry S. Kim as Vice Chairman, Warren Y. Kim as Secretary, and Yongjeung Kim as Executive President, and resolved that:

The Institute shall continue to propagate a universal spirit of goodwill through mutual human understanding and interchange of knowledge; to promote Korean freedom; to research and disseminate factual and educational information concerning Korea as an aid to the proper solution of her case by the United States and the United Nations (Sixth Annual Meeting 1948).

Furthermore, at the Seventh Annual Meeting on August 16, 1949, it was declared that the *Voice of Korea* would be published monthly beginning November 1949 (Seventh Annual Meeting 1949). The involvement of Charles Ho Kim, Harry S. Kim, and Warren Y. Kim in the KAI is significant for they were all active in the Korean independence movement as members of the KNA and later also played various roles in the UKC, but most importantly of all, they were united in their opposition of Rhee. As such, it was logical that they would want to be involved make a stand against Rhee’s control of the Republic of Korea, since they knew firsthand how unfit he was to govern the country.

The buildup of border skirmishes and the desire to unify the peninsula under one regime led to outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, and each time, the KAI reacted to adjust its objectives accordingly as follows (emphasis added):

Eighth Annual Meeting – July 25, 1950:

The meeting reaffirmed its objectives that: The Institute shall continue to propagate a universal spirit of good will through mutual human understanding and interchange of knowledge; *to promote Korean freedom*; to compile and disseminate factual and educational information concerning Korea and its people for the purpose of aiding the United States and the United Nations to bring about a proper solution of Korea's case.

Ninth Annual Meeting – August 10, 1951:

The meeting reaffirmed the Institute's objectives that: to propagate a universal spirit of good will, *to promote Korean freedom to help the United States and the United Nations to bring about a proper solution of the Korean problem*, through compiling, disseminating and interpreting facts about Korea and thoughts and aspirations of its people.

Tenth Annual Meeting – August 14, 1952:

The meeting reaffirmed the Institute's objectives that: to propagate a universal spirit of good will, to foster friendly understanding between the Korean and American peoples, *to promote Korean freedom and democratic developement [sic] and to assist the United States and the United Nations to bring about a proper solution of the Korean problem*, through compiling, disseminating, analyzing and interpreting facts about Korea and thoughts and aspirations of its people.

Eleventh Annual Meeting – August 12, 1953:

The meeting reaffirmed the Institute's objectives that: to promote Korean freedom and friendly Korean-American relations, to propagate a universal spirit of good will and to assist the United States and the United Nations to bring about a proper solution of the Korean problem, by compiling, disseminating, interpreting and analyzing the facts about Korea and the aspirations and desires of its people.

Concurrent to the above revisions to the Institute's objectives, the KAI maintained its position for the necessity of Korea as a neutral state with neither connection to the United States nor the Soviet Union but became very vocal against the Republic of Korea government under Rhee. During the Korean War, the *Voice of Korea* published writing that spoke of "America's Job in Korea" (KAI, Feb. 28, 1953) to rehabilitate Korea that was also an "Inescapable Responsibility" (KAI, Mar. 31, 1953) while Rhee, who "has never been an asset to the United States and the United Nations in Korea and will continue to be a liability," "tr[ied] to force his terms on the United States" by stirring up "anti-American feeling" with the Korean people (KAI, Jun. 30, 1953). Aside from working on the publication, Yongjeung Kim also wrote correspondence to foreign governments, U.S. government official in the White House and the state department, members of the U.S. Congress, and even to Rhee directly to accomplish the purposes of the Institute.

Even after the Korean War, the activities of the Institute continued as usual until September 13, 1961, when the Board of Governors authorized Yongjeung Kim to temporarily suspend the publication of the *Voice of Korea* at any time he deems it necessary due to the financial difficulties of the Institute (Nineteenth Annual Meeting 1961). Since then, every annual meeting brought negative news regarding the future of the KAI. At the Twentieth Annual Meeting on August 31, 1962, the Board of Governors approved the temporary suspension of the *Voice of Korea* and the closure of the Washington office of the Institute, as well as the resignation of Charles Ho Kim and reelected Yongjeung Kim, president; Harry S. Kim, vice-president and treasurer; Warren Y. Kim, secretary. However, it also acknowledged the accumulated debt of \$21,000.00, and promised to study the ways and means of its liquidation (Twentieth Annual Meeting 1962). At the final Annual Meeting on August 24, 1963, the Institute

Yongjeung Kim reported that for the lack of finances the publication of THE VOICE OF KOREA remains suspended and all other activities have been curtailed. He agrees to take the responsibility of settling the indebtedness of the Institute. Leaving the selection and appointment of a new Board of Governors to Yongjeung Kim, Harry S. Kim, and Warren Y. Kim resigned from the Board for their personal reasons (Twenty-First Annual Meeting 1963).

After a 19-year run, the *Voice of Korea* ran its last print with the March/April 1962 (v. 19, no. 271) issue. While the KAI was highly active from inception until around the mid-1950s, based on the number of correspondences that Yongjeung Kim sent during that time, it slowly saw demise for several reasons. First, the Korean War that lasted for three years affected barely any change in the border between the two Koreas as the armistice line was again drawn on the 38th parallel, albeit with some slight changes. The War accomplished nothing for Korean independence and reunification at a cost of too many lives. Besides, the majority of the conservative Korean community in the United States, particularly those who supported Rhee, knew that community activity to demand reunification so soon would be futile or was satisfied at Rhee's continued reign

over the south. Second, the Red Scare that occurred in the United States in 1950s led to overall decreased political activity and interest by those residing the United States for fear of persecution. At the same time, it should be mentioned that because of their moderate political ideology as well as their affluence, Yongjeung Kim, Charles Ho Kim, and other involved with the KAI were never under the threat of persecution like the members of *Korean Independence* were. Even so, Yongjeung Kim created security for himself by reprinting the correspondence that he sent in the *Voice of Korea* and being highly visible in the public eye by not only writing letters to dignitaries in the United States or overseas alike but also writing letters to the editors of major U.S. newspapers, such as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*.

Through the examination of two publications, as well as the background of their creation, this paper showed not only the repeated failures of the United States to understand the wants and desires of the Korean people but also that the respective demise of *Korean Independence* and the *Voice of Korea* ultimately resulted from more than just government interpretations of their activities, but from the gradual loss of support and backing from their own community members. The peak of radical ideologies published by *Korean Independence* occurred in 1946, but it was only when the Korean community turned its back on the newspaper in 1947 that its members started to face persecution, which led to the imprisonments and deportations under the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950. Likewise, the *Voice of Korea* published by the KAI dissolved to the financial deficit when members of the Korean community no longer sponsored it, either due to disinterest for the fact that the Korean War had a reactionary result or fear of McCarthyism and Red Scare due to the Cold War. Despite the short publication periods of *Korean Independence* and the *Voice of Korea*, there remains much to be learned from their content and membership.

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African Presidents in Pyongyang: The Impact of North Korean Invitation Diplomacy During the Cold War



Figure 1: The April Spring Festival in 1982, in Pyongyang. Featured in the photo are Ahmed Sékou Touré, Kim Il Sung, and Kenneth Kaunda.

In June 1987 the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) met in North Korea to discuss the issue of South-South cooperation. This Extraordinary Ministerial Conference of the NAM ran for four days and became known as the Pyongyang Conference. It was perhaps one of North Korea's most outstanding diplomatic victories during the Cold War, as it confirmed the DPRK's self-image of a leading voice in the struggle to create a new world. The outcome of the summit, the Pyongyang Declaration and Plan of Action on South-South Co-operation, was a 22-page blueprint for a new international economic order.¹ And the fact that South Korea was not invited spoke for itself.

¹ UNDL, A/42/411, Letter dated 87/07/06 from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

In his opening speech, Kim Il Sung, the Great Leader who ruled North Korea between 1948 and 1994, gracefully expressed his “deep gratitude” to the Zimbabwean government (Kim 1995). And indeed, Africa’s importance for the conference was hard to miss. The decision to organize the gathering in Pyongyang was made in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1986 during the 8th Non-Aligned Summit.² North Korea reportedly paid \$500,000 to support the summit preparations.³ The President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, was also the chairman of the NAM and a personal friend of Kim.

Mugabe addressed the conference in Pyongyang and lamented the world’s ineffective efforts to oppose South Africa, warning that the situation in southern Africa was deteriorating. Another speech was provided by Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, the Secretary-General of SWAPO, who appealed to the Ministers of the NAM to “do everything in their power to increase political, diplomatic and material assistance to the national liberation movements”. The United Nations Council for Namibia, represented by the Zambian Peter Zuze, also lobbied for their cause. The African delegations collaborated across state boundaries to rally support for the liberation struggle. The final version of the Pyongyang Declaration strongly condemned the apartheid regime in South Africa and repeatedly affirmed its support for SWAPO and the ANC.⁴

This paper tells the story of the unlikely alliance of African liberation fighters and a North Korean monarch, who joined forces to bend the course of history in their favour. Already in 1978 Park Sang-Seek observed that North Korea utilized an “invitation diplomacy” in its attempts to woo African countries (Park 1978). But until now scholarship has not appraised how this actually worked in practice. Throughout the Cold War a stream of African politicians, intellectuals, freedom fighters, journalists, and students flocked to Pyongyang in search of

² ZANU-PF, *Zimbabwe News*, Vol 20, No. 9, September 1989.

³ NAUK, FCO 21/3602, North and South Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, Harare, August-September 1986.

⁴ UNAM Archives, PA4/1/2/73/22, Report of the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the extraordinary ministerial conference of the movement of non-aligned countries on South-South co-operation, held at Pyongyang from 9 to 13 June 1987, A/AC.131/260, 5 October 1987.

political support, secondary education, and military training. North Korea is sometimes described as a ‘hermit kingdom’ and may look like a closed country but Pyongyang, especially in those years, was open for business.

Based on source material from African liberation archives, Western diplomatic repositories and North Korean publications, this paper offers the first comprehensive assessment of North Korea’s invitation diplomacy in the context of (southern) Africa. Who was invited, and why? How did these visits look like and what were their lasting effects, if there were any? I will first examine the attractiveness and significance of Pyongyang as a meeting space, before discussing a host of bilateral visits by African actors. I will briefly describe the rare ‘world tour’ of Kim Il Sung and explain why it is so difficult to write this history from below. The conclusion will deal with the question what both sides of this novel Afro-Asian partnership gained by engaging with each other in this way.

Welcome to Pyongyang

Invitations to Pyongyang were a powerful tool in the goodwill campaign that North Korea utilized to impress African countries. The capital was the pride of the DPRK, a socialist paradise on earth, and a city like no other. The key to this illustrious status was the devastating impact of the Korean War (1950-1953), during which American bombs almost completely destroyed Pyongyang. The urban planners in the post-war reconstruction of North Korea had basically a *tabula rasa* to create a city appropriate for a people destined for socialist greatness. The traumatic experience of the war allowed the DPRK to create a kind of socialist realism that was distinctly different from visual styles developed in the Soviet Union or China (Kirkwood 2013, 551). In the first decades after the division of the Korean peninsula North Korea clearly outperformed its southern rival. Its impressive economic growth and strong anti-imperialist credentials made it a popular ally among newly-liberated countries around the world, while

South Korea's economy lagged behind, its reputation tainted by the US-supported dictatorship of Syngman Rhee.

When the Korean War confirmed the stalemate of the Korean division of 1948, both countries along the 38th parallel competed for African support. The diplomatic metropolises of Pyongyang and Seoul sought to establish alliances with newly independent African countries, particularly with the purpose to garner votes in the General Assembly of the United Nations, where the Korean question was the oldest Cold War issue on the agenda. North Korea wanted the US troops out of South Korea and used the United Nations to mobilize the opinion of the world in their favour. South Korea, on the other hand, wanted to isolate its northern neighbour as much as possible. Park, in his 1978 study called "Africa and Two Koreas: A Study of African Non-Alignment" noticed the divergent strategies both Koreas were using. North Korea developed an "invitation diplomacy" with a focus on cultural diplomacy, whereas South Korea emphasized a "visitation diplomacy" with a focus on trade diplomacy (Park 1978). This distinction is widely accepted in the scant literature that exists of Afro-DPRK ties. But what does invitation diplomacy mean, beyond observing that it existed? Park's quantitative approach focuses mainly on African votes in the United Nations General Assembly about the Korean Question, yet does not assess the actual visits within the context of African liberation struggles. This article aims to do the latter.

The city of Pyongyang served as a stage for multilateral summits similar to the Pyongyang Conference of 1987. This was not the only summit held under the auspices of the Non-Aligned Movement. The DPRK also hosted more specialized events such as the 2nd Meeting of the Non-Aligned Sports Ministers in Pyongyang, in 1986, and the Non-Aligned Movement Film Festival, in 1987.⁵ The latter event was opened by the Zimbabwean Nathan

⁵ NAUK, FCO 21/3602, North and South Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, Harare, August-September 1986.

Shamuyarira, then the Minister of Information and later the Minister of Foreign Affairs for ZANU-PF, who spoke discussed the role of film in the anti-imperialist struggle.⁶

African delegations were usually active participants during conferences like these, especially when it concerned themes that were relevant for the liberation struggle and the development of independent states. Other examples can be found in gatherings such as the “Task of World Journalists against Imperialist and Friendship and Piece”, a five-day conference in Pyongyang in 1983, visited by nearly 3000 delegates. SWAPO, the most prominent Namibian liberation movement, was also present.⁷ The size of these conventions must not be underestimated. In 1989 Pyongyang hosted the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students, a seven-day event including 15.000 delegates from 180 countries. A Swedish Colonel who was invited entrusted to a British diplomat that it “was every bit as impressive in terms of numbers, organization and facilities as the Seoul Olympics last year.” Robert Mugabe was one of the honoured guests who gave an address.⁸

North Korea traditionally also invited foreign delegations to attend national celebrations such as the Day of the Sun (15 April), the birthday of Kim Il Sung which often features military parades, or the recurring Arirang Mass Games (in August or September). Nowadays foreign spectators mostly consist of Western tourists with a defect moral compass and too much money to spend. Another special kind of meetings were the seminars that North Korea organized to promote their idiosyncratic brand of socialism, named Juche (Myers 2015). During the Cold War the DPRK invested heavily in this form of cultural diplomacy, most notably through the establishment of local Juche Study Centres in Africa. African intellectuals were occasionally invited to attend Juche seminars in North Korea.

⁶ UNAM Archives, PA3/6/89, Newsletter [Non-Aligned countries]. - Harare: The COMINAC II Secretariat, 1987-1990.

⁷ UNAM Archives, PA1/14/1/1, Namibia Today, Lusaka, Zambia (official organ of SWAPO).

⁸ NAUK, FCO 21/4436, World Youth Festival, Pyongyang, North Korea, July 1989.

Frontline States in Southern Africa



Figure 2: The Frontline States Summit of 1985. From left to right: Sam Nujoma, Samora Machel, Kenneth Kaunda, and Robert Mugabe. Source: National Archives of Namibia.

Due to their size and promotional power the multilateral events like NAM conferences and Juche seminars were the most visible performances of North Korea in the diplomatic arena. Less conspicuous but perhaps most influential were bilateral visits from individual African country or liberation movement to North Korea. The DPRK offered an alternative path towards state building and the initial success of the socialist country inspired many African students, soldiers, and politicians, particularly in southern Africa. North Korea devoted considerable time and resources in supporting national liberation movements, organizations that were effectively non-state actors but which the DPRK nonetheless regarded as states in waiting.⁹

⁹ Within the context of each national liberation struggle in southern Africa, several liberation movements competed for international recognition as the true representative of their people. The status of the authentic 'national liberation movement' was important because it secured political, material and financial support. North Korea mainly choose to back liberation movements that were recognized by the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, and in rare cases switched allegiance when the opportunity arose. In the context of Angola, for example, the DPRK first supported the FNLA, but later switched to the MPLA when it recognized that the MPLA had a winning hand in the Angolan Civil War. See NAUK, FCO 45/1680, Relations between Angola and communist countries.

A traditional Cold War lens which focuses mainly on Great Power diplomacy tends to overlook this vital domain of informal diplomacy, but this is where the DPRK was most effective. Despite the non-state status of many African delegations the relationship with their Korean hosts was not of an unequal nature. The establishment of diplomatic ties was often quickly followed by promises of economic aid, military support or cultural cooperation. While this pattern is recognisable throughout the entire African continent, southern Africa is a particularly special region because it was the last to become decolonized.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the decolonization of southern Africa was severely delayed and complicated by the white-minority rule over South Africa. In response, several neighbouring states organised opposition through the establishment of the Frontline States, a loose coalition of countries that resisted the apartheid regime. The Frontline States worked closely together with national liberation movements in the region, by providing them with material and political support, and space to launch military attacks or build exile camps (Khadiagala 2007). The intersection between the DPRK and African liberation movements occurred in this complicated setting.

In order to provide a more intimate view of the visits of African leaders to Pyongyang, we can take a look at the photograph above of the Frontline States summit in 1985. In the photo we see four people who were or would become part of the first generation of southern African presidents, who all visited Pyongyang and maintained personal ties to the Kim regime. To illustrate this, the sections below present short historical vignettes of their visits to North Korea and what this meant for the development of bilateral ties between their country and the DPRK. These visits usually followed to same routine: foreign delegations joined a photo op with their Korean hosts at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, they undertook a visit to the Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery and perhaps also to other architectural highlights such as the Juche Tower,

next were tours through schools and tractor factories, and finally a joyous banquet - with speeches, gifts, and other ceremonial fuss – was the traditional highlight of the journey.



Figure 3: Sam Nujoma receives a tour in Pyongyang, in the 1980s. Source: National Archives of Namibia.

Sam Nujoma was the undisputed leader of SWAPO, Namibia's main liberation movement (officially recognized by the United Nations as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian peoples'). He became the first president of Namibia and visited North Korea repeatedly before he ascended to the highest office of his country in 1990. Photographs from 1983, 1986 and 1989 show Nujoma and his team being received as statesmen in waiting by Kim. The Namibians attended military displays, they made the traditional visit to the Kumsusan Palace, and Nujoma was awarded the Korean Order of Freedom and Independence. During a banquet in 1986, Kim thanked Nujoma for being "an intimate friend of our people", continuing that his visit "will be important in consolidating the friendship and solidarity between our Party and SWAPO." Nujoma, in turn, thanked his host for "the practical material assistance, political

and diplomatic support” of the Koreans during the liberation struggle. Kim assured him that “Our Party and people will firmly stand by you in the future too” (Van der Hoog 2019, 47–49).

Kim kept his word. Shortly after independence, in 1991, the Namibian government asked North Korea to train the Presidential Guard. The British Foreign Office lamented the “embarrassment” that this decision would cause them, but explained that it was no surprise that the “Neanderthal ex-PLAN element” in the government desired the help of the North Koreans: “they place a high value on old friendships, and have little if any understanding of the world beyond SWAPO.”¹⁰ There are strong indications that North Korea had trained the guerrillas of the People’s Liberation Army (PLAN) in exile camps in Angola (Godwin 2016).

Mansudae Overseas Projects used their Windhoek office as a base for their operations in southern Africa. In Namibia MOP constructed four projects: the National Heroes’ Acre of Namibia (a copy of the Heroes’ Acre in Harare and the Pyongyang Cemetery), the State House where the president resides, the Independence Memorial Museum in Windhoek and the Okahandja Military Museum. MOP faced international scrutiny in recent years when the United Nations disclosed that the company was acting as a front for a North Korean arms company that supplied machinery to the Namibian Defence Force. MOP also allegedly made use of forced North Korean labourers for their construction work and used a local bank to withdraw \$280,000 in cash, which they then carried to the DPRK. The company office is now closed and Namibia is no longer issuing visas for North Korean nationals (Van der Hoog 2019, 56).

¹⁰ NAUK, FCO 21/2527, Relations between North Korea and other countries.



Figure 4: Samora Machel and Kim Il Sung meet in Pyongyang.

The first president of Mozambique, Samora Machel, visited Pyongyang in 1975, right after Mozambican independence. Machel, accompanied by a FRELIMO delegation, endorsed Kim's position on a unified Korea during a banquet in the capital (Machel 57). He also travelled to Pyongyang in 1978, 1982 and 1984. Alberto Chipande, the first Minister of Defence, visited Pyongyang in 1988. The two countries signed an agreement for economic and technical cooperation and the DPRK provided medical aid at the end of the liberation war.¹¹ But military cooperation was the important facet of this relationship. In the 1980s the British Foreign Office noted "many ministerial visits" from the Mozambican government to North Korea, including the president's special adviser and a number of army officers for "special military training".¹² One of the central streets in Maputo, Mozambique's capital city, is named after Kim Il Sung. Machel died in 1986, but the United Nations revealed in 2017 that these military ties were still ongoing. North Korea was training elite Mozambican forces in Maputo and provided weapons

¹¹ See for more information, <http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/moz-dprk.php> (last accessed 23 April 2021).

¹² NAUK, FCO 21/2527, Relations between North Korea and other countries.

and repair services for tanks. Mansudae Overseas Projects erected a statue of Machel in Maputo, in 2011.



Figure 5: A Zambian delegation in Pyongyang, 1987. In the centre we see Kenneth Kaunda, Kim Il Sung, and Betty Kaunda.

The first president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, visited Pyongyang at least four times in the 1980s (twice in 1980, in April 1982, and in 1987). Other high-ranking Zambian officials, such as the Secretary-General of UNIP Mainza Chona, the Minister for National Guidance Justin Chima, and the Army Chief of Staff General Malimba Masheke, also led delegations to North Korea during these years.¹³

An North Korean newsreel shows Kaunda leading a 25-30 people strong delegation to Pyongyang, in 1982. It is Kim's 70th birthday and the newsreel shows a festive atmosphere. Kaunda presents a bronze plaque (supported by two elephant horns) with the map of Zambia as

¹³ NAUK, FCO 45/536, Communist activities in Zambia; NAUK, FCO 106/850, Political relations between Zambia and communist countries; NAUK, FCO 21/2527, Relations between North Korea and other countries.

a gift to Kim and then proceeds to sing during a banquet, vocally supported by his large entourage. The song in question was ‘Tiyende Pamodzi’, Kaunda’s trademark song that he liked to sing during the liberation struggle. Kim watches while being seated and in the background tens of Koreans are sitting behind their dining tables. Much to the contentment of the Koreans, Kaunda and his team suddenly shout “One Zambia, One Nation!” and then “One Korea, One Nation!”¹⁴ Kaunda was accompanied by his wife, and Mrs Kaunda was so impressed with the hospitality of the Koreans that she decided to stay on for an extra week, and was flown back to Lusaka by special plane.¹⁵

The British Foreign Office observed the warm ties between the two countries, noting that “Kaunda appears to be an admirer of the North Korean system.” While Zambia became disillusioned with the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, the Zambians were “genuinely impressed” with North Korea. “To the Zambians humanism and discipline may after all be compatible on the North Korean model.” Zambia and North Korea signed a cultural agreement, exchanging radio and television materials. In the early 1980s 10 North Korean military instructors resided in Kabwe, Zambia to select local soldiers for paramilitary training. The North Koreans also made a feasibility study for rice production near Mumbwa, but it is uncertain whether any agricultural assistance was provided.¹⁶ The North Korean embassy in Lusaka also serviced Botswana and thus performed a regional role (Manatsha 2018).

¹⁴ The video can be watched on YouTube: <https://youtu.be/Tda0e-M76a8>. “One Zambia, One Nation” was the nationalist mantra of the UNIP government of Kaunda, and a common slogan in Zambia. “One Korea, One Nation”, on the other hands, was a much more controversial slogan at the height of the Cold War, when Korea remained divided.

¹⁵ NAUK, FCO 106/850, Political relations between Zambia and communist countries.

¹⁶ NAUK, FCO 106/850, Political relations between Zambia and communist countries.



Figure 6: Robert Mugabe and Kim Il Sung meet in Pyongyang, 1993. Source: AP.

The first premier and later president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, visited Pyongyang for the first time in May 1978, two years before the independence of his country.¹⁷ Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was defined by two competing liberation movements, Mugabe's ZANU and Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU, and North Korea backed Mugabe.¹⁸ The DPRK had supported ZANU officials from their exiled bases in Tanzania and Mozambique, providing weapons and military training in Pyongyang. Shortly after independence, Mugabe again travelled to Pyongyang in October 1980 to attend the 35th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party, and used this opportunity to request Kim's aid in forging a new army brigade. North Korea subsequently trained and armed Zimbabwe's Fifth Brigade, used by Mugabe to massacre his opposition in Matabeleland in a genocidal campaign in the early 1980s (Choi and Jeong 2017). In January 1987, Mugabe travelled to Pyongyang for the fourth time, proclaiming that:

¹⁷ Zimbabwe's first president, Canaan Banana, visited Pyongyang in May 1982 (Choi & Jeong 2017, 345). Banana fulfilled a largely ceremonial position, while the true executive power was consolidated within Mugabe's premiership. In 1987 Mugabe took over the formal presidency.

¹⁸ Unlike the Soviet Union, who decided to back ZAPU.

“The people of Zimbabwe will always remember the invaluable assistance they received from their Korean friends during the struggle for national independence. We shall continue to be grateful ... for assistance rendered to enable us to increase our capacity to defend our unity, territorial integrity, and national survival (Young 2018, 144).”

During the first years of his rule Mugabe also frequently appeared in Pyongyang to address multilateral gatherings such as the Non-Aligned Movement conference or the World Youth Festival. The relationship between Mugabe and Kim was cordial, and to express his gratitude the Zimbabwean leader gifted two rhinos to Kim, named Zimbo and Zimba (Van der Hoog 2018, 76). Mansudae Overseas Projects was also awarded lucrative construction contracts. It built the National Heroes’ Acre of Zimbabwe near Harare, a cemetery for national heroes that was inspired by the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery in Pyongyang, and a large statue of Nkomo in Bulawayo (Van der Hoog 2019).¹⁹



Figure 7: Seretse Khama and Ruth Khama visit Pyongyang.

¹⁹ There is, of course, a bitter irony in the fact that a North Korean construction company designed a monument for Nkomo while North Korean army instructors trained the brigade that massacred Nkomo’s political base.

The four leaders mentioned above (Nujoma, Machel, Kaunda and Mugabe) could all be characterized as socialist politicians and leaders of anti-democratic states²⁰, thus ‘explaining’ that they naturally gravitated towards the North Korean regime in a search for inspiration. But this would be a mistake. In order to illustrate this, we can take a look at the man who is missing from the Frontline States Summit photo of 1985: Seretse Khama, the first president of Botswana. Botswana was one of the original three Frontline States but was reluctant to use their territory as a launch base for military excursions from friendly liberation movements. It was a strong United States ally and has been named as “mainland Africa’s most notable outlier” in terms of its moderate democratic governance and economic growth (Rotberg 2012, 66). Yet it was not an exception when it came to the DPRK.

Seretse Khama undertook a four-day visit to North Korea in August 1976, much to the dismay of the United States (Kirby 2020, 12–16). Khama was accompanied by a large entourage, which included his wife, Lady Ruth Khama, top government officials, and two future presidents: Festus Mogae (president between 1998-2008), and his son, Ian Khama (president between 2008-2018).²¹ They were picked up by a private Korean jet from Beijing and upon arrival the streets of Pyongyang were lined with portraits of Kim and Khama, and national flags of both countries. The Botswana were impressed by the mass performance of school children in the national stadium of Pyongyang, especially because they were taught a Setswana song (‘Dintlanyane tsa Botswana’, or ‘The Beauty of Botswana’). Khama in turn addressed a mass rally, where he publicly praised the North Korean Juche ideology, saying it was compatible with the Botswana national principle of *ipelegeng/boipelego* (self-reliance or self-help). Photos of the visit show Khama’s carefree dancing alongside a Korean music group during a visit to a cooperative farm (Manatsha 2018).

²⁰ Mozambique and Zambia were transformed into official one-party states quickly after independence, while Namibia and Zimbabwe have been ruled by a single party since independence.

²¹ Including Daniel Kwelagobe (Minister for Public Broadcasting and Information) and Simon Hirschfield (Botswana Police Commissioner) (Manatsha 2018, 143).

Despite the friendly atmosphere, Khama's visit was a bit of a culture shock for both parties. The North Koreans were regarded by some Batswana as "stiff and humourless" and their forced adoration for Kim, which became apparent during tours through offices, schools and factories, surprised them. Khama's entourage, on the other hand, shocked the Koreans because of their "free and easy relations" amongst each other, especially when a Korean interpreter walked in on a game of billiards in the small basement room of the Batswana guest house, and was "horrified when Khama was allowed to lose the game to his juniors" (Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou 1995, 334). This would be impossible in North Korea.

In the 1970s Botswana sided with the North Koreans in the United Nations (Kirby 2020, 15). In the 1980s North Korea trained Batswana police officers in the art of unarmed combat and gifted military weapons to the young nation (Manatsha 2018). In 2005 the North Korean art studio Mansudae Overseas Projects (MOP) constructed the Three Dikgosi Monument, consisting of three bronze statues of important chiefs, including Khama's grandfather, Khama III. The monument was inaugurated by Festus Mogae, who had also visited Pyongyang. But in 2014 Botswana suddenly severed its ties to North Korea, prompted by global pressure against the Korean nuclear arms programme and human rights violations (Manatsha 2018).

Kim in Africa

Kim Il Sung, on the other hand, almost never reciprocated the state visits of African leaders. Kim saw himself as the vanguard of anti-imperialist forces around the world, the creator of the illustrious Juche thought (also known as Kimilsungism), and the architect of the new Korea. But even though Kim physically and spiritually embodied the promise of North Korean

development that attracted visitors from all over Africa, he hardly travelled to the continent, except once.²²

In 1975 Kim Il Sung undertook a ‘world tour’ that covered a few countries in Europe and Africa. Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia were honoured with a visit, as well as Algeria and Mauritania.²³ Both African countries were one-party states with charismatic authoritarian and socialist leaders, not unlike North Korea. A propaganda video that was aired on North Korean television shows how Kim was welcomed in Algeria by Chairman Houari Boumédiène and “600,000 citizens”. Kim was received by a military guard at the airport and driven through Algiers with an extensive motorcade, a parade of honour observed by indeed thousands of people along the streets. The University of Algiers awarded him an honorary doctorate and the city of Algiers surprised him with honorary citizenship, while a stadium full of people cheered him on.

Kim’s ensuing visit to Mauritania, also in March 1975, was no less of a spectacle. Banners in French, Arabic and Korean welcomed “Comrade Kim Il Sung, the Great Leader.” While driving through the streets of Nouakchott in an open car, the propaganda video shows thousands of people cheering and dancing. President Moktar Ould Daddah is seen to bestow the “Supreme National Declaration of the Grand State Order of Merit” to Kim Il Sung, for his “tremendous services to the building of an independent state” in Mauritania. His visit was “the greatest event in the history of Mauritania,” roared the voice-over.

The propaganda video shows the importance of North Korea’s ties to Africa for both its domestic consumption and its global image. North Koreans at home were, through images like these, reminded of their state’s glorious position on the world stage. The warm embraces

²² The British Foreign Office reported rumors that in 1983 Kim might organize a tour to Eastern and Southern Africa, covering loyal allies such as Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Yet this did not materialize, for unknown reasons. NAUK, FCO 21/2319, Relations between North Korea and countries other than the UK.

²³ Parts of this video can be watched on YouTube, both in English and Korean: see <https://youtu.be/MgX8Je-BRrE> and <https://youtu.be/Tda0e-M76a8> (last accessed 16 March 2021).

between Kim and African leaders also contributed to North Korea's "export track" of propaganda, in which the state cultivated its position as a non-aligned power house (Myers 2015). Coincidentally the video also symbolizes the fickle nature of Afro-DPRK relationships. Balázs Szalontai remarked that as soon as a year after Kim's glamorous visit, in 1976, the DPRK removed the Mauritania part from the newsreel because of bilateral tensions. North Korea had recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), causing an angered Mauritania to expel all North Korean technical experts and half of its diplomatic staff (Noland 2011).

Kim's reluctance to travel to Africa does not mean that Koreans never travelled to Africa. On the contrary, in the past decades a wide variety of DPRK citizens visited African countries, to conduct business on behalf of their state. Military instructors training the Fifth Brigade in Zimbabwe (Choi and Jeong 2017), cultural instructors for Mass Games in Angola (Young 2019) or artists and builders constructing monuments in Ethiopia (Che 2015), North Koreans could be found all over the continent. Such visits were often short-term, conducted by lower-status officials, and had a functional nature. In archival sources these officials remain anonymous, and unfortunately not much is known about their personal experiences and thoughts.

A History From Below

Despite all the evidence that exists of Afro-DPRK interactions on a diplomatic level, the question remains how we can write this history from below. Unfortunately very few first-hand accounts exist from Africans that have visited North Korea during the Cold War years. Yet, we have a few examples of people that travelled all the way to Pyongyang for ideological training, a general scholarship, or exile.

In addition to the pragmatic motive of investing in sound political relationships with newly emerging countries, North Korea also sought to export its socialist philosophy of Juche

to the rest of the world. Dozens of African countries hosted Juche Study Centres and Korea Friendship Associations, and the intelligentsia of young African countries were invited to attend ideological seminars in Pyongyang. Evidence that party leaders, journalists, and professors were usually amongst the invitees can be found in *Study of the Juche Idea*, a journal (still running) that consists of submitted articles on how to implement Juche thought. Every single issue that was published during the Cold War included African contributions. Often these articles dealt with the combination of Juche and another theme (art, independence, agriculture, economic development) but recurring feature was the experience of an African visitor to Pyongyang.

Sossa Kounoutcho, the General Director of the National Research Institute of Science in Togo, visited North Korea in September 1977 to attend an International Seminar of the Juche Idea. In an article titled “The Great Honour Accorded me in Pyongyang” Kounoutcho described his travels – the highlight was a meeting with Kim. “Thanks to the great rays of Juche”, said the Togolese academic, “the last life line of imperialism is being cut off and final liberation is in sight even in Africa, which was once called a ‘continent of darkness’.” E.S. Mushi, an Inspector of Schools for the Ministry of Education in Tanzania, declared in 1989 that “I find it reasonable that after paying two academic visits to socialist Korea, I should write down my impressions about this land of learning ... Many peace-loving people of every continent look upon Korea as the beacon of hope and a model of socialism.” Mushi visited several educational institutions, from nursery schools to universities, and was “deeply impressed” by what he saw. O.T. Mupawaenda, a librarian at the University of Zimbabwe, contributed to the journal in the same year. In 1986 he had stayed for a month in Pyongyang, together with a Zimbabwean lecturer in law and a Ministry of Justice Officer. Similar to Mushi, Mupawaenda had a special interest in the North Korean school system and was duly impressed.²⁴

²⁴ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, *Study of the Juche Idea*: 1979-1990.

Study of the Juche Idea contains more laudatory descriptions in the same spirit as above. But setting apart the lavish praise the authors reserve for their Korean hosts, we learn very little of their actual experiences. I was not able to corroborate their encounters with other sources, except in one case: Mupawaenda also submitted an article to a Western academic journal, under the title “A Zimbabwean Librarian Visits North Korea.” In this writing he does not deviate from the admiration that is recorded in the Juche journal: his visit was “far more rewarding, gratifying and interesting than previous visits to other countries, socialist, capitalist or non-aligned” (Mupawaenda 1987).

The focus on short-term high-level visits of African political elites can obscure the evidence of the much larger group of ‘normal’ African visitors to North Korea, particularly students. One case is the Guinean Aliou Niane, who studied at the Wonsan Agricultural College between 1982-1987. Niane’s stint in North Korea was a result of Sékou Touré’s visit to Pyongyang in 1982, when the Guinean president attended Kim Il Sung’s 70th birthday celebrations (see figure 1). Touré and Kim agreed to send 10 Guinean students from agricultural universities to North Korea for additional training. Niane was among them and saw students from Madagascar, Mali, Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Zambia and Togo living and studying in the DPRK. His experiences are detailed in a number of interviews and he is apparently working on a French memoirs about his time in Wonsan.²⁵

Niane, in one interview, mentioned that he met “the sons of living or dead African presidents”, whose name he could not disclose because of security reasons. The fact that the children of African politicians resided in North Korea is substantiated by the story of Monique Macías, who coincidentally also published the only memoirs that detail the experiences of an African visitor in Pyongyang. Born in 1970, she was the daughter of Francisco Macías Nguema,

²⁵ See for a full interviews <https://freekorea.us/2009/05/memories-of-an-african-student-forced-to-study-in-north-korea-during-the-1980s/> (last accessed 27 April 2021).

the first president of Equatorial Guinea and a totalitarian leader. Her father's regime was overthrown by a military coup in 1979, and Macías Nguema was subsequently executed. Shortly before his death he sent his three children, among them Monica, to North Korea for safety. Monica lived for fifteen years in Pyongyang under the protection of the Kim family. Here she made friends, learned Korean and graduated from the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School. In 2013 she wrote a book - in Korean - about her life in exile, titled "I am Monique, From Pyongyang" (Macías 2013).

Alternative Histories of Decolonization

North Korea is commonly known the 'hermit kingdom', but the unexplored history of visits by Africans to the DPRK refutes this misconception. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a wide array of African politicians, intellectuals, freedom fighters, journalists, and students travelled to Pyongyang. Some were in search of political support, others sought military training or a general education, there were those with an interest in socialist ideology, and many of them were invited for multilateral conferences, for example by the Non-Aligned Movement. While these visits occurred against the backdrop of an ideological battle between two superpowers, the main driver behind these events was the process of decolonisation.

The history of friendship between African liberation movements and North Korea presents alternative histories of decolonisation - not driven by an ideological Cold War or the interests of powerful colonial empires, but smaller entities that cultivated ties across geographical and cultural boundaries. It is important to recognize the complexity of this era of change by including more diverse actors and acknowledging their own agency. North Korea operated independently from the Soviet Union or China, skilfully navigating between the Sino-Soviet split of 1956, and was mainly driven by its competition with South Korea. But by inviting

and impressing African elites, North Korea effectively exported its ideology and strengthened their position as a unique voice in the non-aligned world.

Yet the agency that is attributed to North Korea should be equally attributed to the African actors that contributed to the understudied DPRK-African relationship. The singing of Kaunda and dancing of Khama during their visits to Kim Il Sung showed that they felt at ease in the DPRK, and they used this convivial atmosphere to their advantage. The trips were utilized to garner material support for their liberation movements, scholarships for African students, and military or police training by Korean instructors. It is difficult to assess the impact of North Korean ideology on contemporary southern African governments, but the North Korean monuments that cast shadows over the African landscapes are testament to the legacy of North Korea's invitation diplomacy, and the relationship that followed.

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**A pawn in the Great Game: Joseon's rapprochement with the Russian Empire amidst
the British seizure of Komun islands, 1884-1886**

In the mid-late nineteenth century, the Northeast Asian region, which throughout its history generally maintained a self-sufficient system of cross-country relations and exchanges, focused on the Sinocentric diplomatic order, began to experience significant political and geopolitical changes. With the influence of Western powers and capitals reaching this part of the globe, the old China-centered system was significantly weakened, paving the way for “modern,” open-type foreign exchanges. For various reasons, the so-called opening of Northeast Asia for diplomacy and trade happened not simultaneously but gradually, with China and the Japanese archipelago being included in global geopolitics earlier than other countries in this region.

Squeezed between China in the north-east and the modernized Meiji Japan in the south-west, the small kingdom known as Joseon (Korea), was forced to join global diplomatic relations only in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Due to its geographic location and internal

political situation that for many years prevented foreigners, in general, and westerners, in particular, from landing a foot on its territory, Joseon was the last country in the Northeast Asia to be open for international trade and included in diplomatic exchanges with Western partners.¹

Joseon concluded its first modern-type treaty only in 1876,² and after that found itself unable to maintain its traditional policy of isolation. However, the active phase of Joseon's foreign policy began only in the early 1880s. Therefore, by the mid-1880s, Joseon was still new in tasting the deep waters of geopolitical exchanges. Nonetheless, guided by a proactive diplomatic approach launched by its King,³ by the spring of 1885 Joseon had concluded treaties with all major powers present in Northeast Asia⁴, including Great Britain and the Russian Empire, and fully stepped into regional geopolitics. That is when the issue around Komun islands unfolded.

Part One: So close, and yet so far

Russo-Joseon (semi-)official exchanges began in 1860 after the Russian Empire had obtained large territories in northeastern Manchuria (Primorsky region).⁵ These territories bordered the northern provinces of Joseon by land, thus laying the foundations for an intensification of exchanges between the two countries.

The poorly controlled borderline between the Hamgyong Province of Joseon and the southern territories of the Russian Primorsky region allowed a relatively easy crossing. Since the early 1860s, these circumstances underlay a steady migration of Joseon's citizens (mostly peasants), pursuing unoccupied land further to the north, to the Russian territories.⁶ Therefore, in March of 1880, a commissary to the Russian Ussuri region approached Hamgyong Province's authorities suggesting the mutual strengthening of supervision of human traffic over the Russo-Joseon borderline, but failed to achieve a result on this matter.⁷⁸

Despite the discouraging outcome of their first attempt at approaching Joseon, the dynamic

development of overland trade,⁹ however, assured the Russian party of the necessity to formalize relations between the two countries. Therefore, in early June of 1882, the Russian resident representative in China submitted a note to the Chinese government requesting its assistance in negotiating a treaty with Joseon.¹⁰ Referring to the recently concluded treaty between the United States and Joseon,¹¹ he asked for this new treaty to be of the same nature and content, but with one addition: the Russian party wanted to include a clause that would govern the overland trade between the two countries.¹² On this matter the Russian party's attempt failed again: in mid-July, the Chinese government delivered Joseon's reply, which stated that, since the borderline between the two countries is narrow and small, there is no need for a special clause about the overland trade in the treaty.¹³

Although rejected again, the Russian government did not give up on the idea and, after consulting in late 1883 with the adviser to the Joseon government Paul Georg von Möllendorff,¹⁴ it appointed the Russian consul in Tientsin Carl Waeber¹⁵ to carry out the treaty negotiations with Joseon officials. Relying on the favorable conditions of Kojong's active line in diplomacy and the example of Joseon's already concluded and ratified treaties with the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, on June 20, 1884 Waeber arrived in Joseon. The negotiations went smoothly, and on June 27, the Russo-Joseon treaty was signed in Seoul.

Amidst the news of the escalation of the Sino-French conflict over Vietnam,¹⁶ which "*caus[ed] much excitement*"¹⁷ among Joseon's civilians and officials, the recently concluded (not yet ratified), treaty with Russia was soon used as grounding for rapprochement between the two countries. This time, however, it was the Joseon party who stepped up the initiative.

In August-September 1884, Paul Georg von Möllendorff had reached the Russian Empire's officials in China, offering them a discussion about the international status of Joseon. Attempting to take advantage of the geopolitical struggles of that moment, he introduced two possible options for the Russian party's consideration: a *neutralization*¹⁸¹⁹ of Joseon, ensured

by protective measures of China, Japan and Russia; or an exclusive protection of the Korean peninsula by Great Britain.²⁰ Against the background of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, as well as the fact that the treaty between Joseon and the Russian Empire, entered into against China's will,²¹ was not yet ratified, both fore-mentioned options appeared highly provocative. It was only natural that the Russian officials could not comply with either of them. Therefore, although the Joseon representative's offer was duly reported to Saint Petersburg, no reaction from the Russian government on it followed.²²

In December of the same year, while visiting Tokyo under Kojong's order to handle the diplomatic consequences²³ of the resent Kapsin coup,²⁴ Paul Georg von Möllendorff reached the Russian officials again. This time he offered Russia the opportunity to establish its military protectorate over Joseon. For this purpose, von Möllendorff asked the Russian government to send its military instructors and military ships with two hundred sailors on board to Joseon. While not completely rejecting this offer, the government in Saint Petersburg, however, stated that the presence of its naval forces on the Korean peninsula is undesirable.²⁵ Therefore, once again, the Joseon party's attempt to engage with Russia faced the latter's ambiguous attitude and a refusal to undertake responsibilities on the Korean peninsula.

Ironically, in the summer of 1885, the Russian party rushed to take up Paul Georg von Möllendorff's December of 1884 offer, when, driven by the British navy's activities on Komun islands, it initiated an open attempt to approach Joseon.

Part two: Setting the premise

Since the 1870s, Great Britain expressed its interest in three islands on the Southwest of the Korean peninsula, called the Komun islands by the locals, but became commonly known under its western name – Port Hamilton. In July 1875, amidst “*arising difficulties*” between Joseon and Japan (unfolding due to the Japanese government continuous attempts to “open” Joseon for trade and modern-type diplomacy and the Joseon government's firm resistance to

that “opening”), and rumors that the latter reached an agreement with Russia to attack Joseon, the British representative in Tokyo introduced the idea of seizure of Joseon’s Komun islands. He rationalized that the possession of these islands would ensure the British presence in the region.²⁶ This plan was, however, rejected at that time, as Her Majesty’s government concluded that it did not wish to “*set other nations the example of occupying places to which Great Britain has no title.*”²⁷

However, by the spring of 1885, amidst escalating Anglo-Russian hostilities in the Middle East, also known as the “Great Game,”²⁸ the British approach towards the inviolability of borders in Northeast Asia was revised.

After the Afghan army, that was siding with Great Britain, clashed with Russians in early March 1885,²⁹ and the government in London started its preparations for the war,³⁰ the Komun islands issue was brought out again and treated in a markedly different light. Evidently, Great Britain, the major maritime power with a relatively small land army,³¹ sought a way to counterbalance its potential overland campaign in the Middle East. Therefore, a paradigm of strengthening its presence in the Northwest Pacific waterways was enforced. In mid-March of 1885, the British fleet deployed in Nagasaki was ordered to be ready for potential actions against Russia.³² On April 15, a new order dictating the occupation of Joseon’s Komun islands was issued. The territory was taken the day after, on April 16, with no resistance from locals.³³

These actions were post-factum rationalized by British politicians by a set of geopolitical and economic reasons, which, ironically, were very similar to arguments that were used against the plan of occupation of the islands back in 1875. The Admiralty Foreign Intelligence Committee explained the decision in the light of the British trade interests in the region, such as: the need to protect Hong Kong, which Great Britain had leased from China in 1841, the need to ensure the safety of British trade in the region, and a complicated ground that the seizure of these islands will be useful for British potential future actions in Northern China, Japan, on

the Korean peninsula and even in eastern Siberia.³⁴ Meanwhile, the First Lord of the Admiralty highlighted a geopolitical factor of British hostilities with Russia over Afghanistan, the escalation of which determined the need to blockade Russia in the Pacific and to direct naval offensive against Vladivostok.³⁵

Based on the previous points, it can be concluded that, despite the existence of decade-old schemes about Komun islands, the British seizure of the islands in April of 1885 was not a long-planned and well-prepared act. The British diplomatic pool's post-factum attempts to get its actions approved by the main powers in the region provide another proof of this assumption.

On April 17, the British representative in Beijing was officially instructed "*not [to] mention ... [the seizure of Komun islands]*".³⁶ The same instructions were transferred to the British ambassador in Tokyo.³⁷ Her Majesty's government spared no efforts to make sure that no rumors of its activities at the islands would spread before its new status was negotiated and, ultimately, approved by both China and Japan. Accordantly, the Chinese minister in London was informed of the seizure of the islands on April 16,³⁸ and a confidential telegraphic message of the same nature was delivered to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs on April 20.³⁹ The British government explained to both countries that this invasive action was performed "*in a view of the probable occupation of these islands by another power.*"⁴⁰⁴¹ Surely, the "*another power*" was Russia.

Having long-standing territorial disputes with Russia⁴² and aiming to secure its prevailing status in the region, the Chinese party promptly responded, stating that "*it was better that England should take ... [these islands] rather than the Russians.*"⁴³ This favorable response encouraged the British officials to take a further step and to attempt to conclude a written understanding with the Qing about Joseon's Komun islands.⁴⁴

However, the Japanese party's reaction was rather restrained. Technically not opposing the British navy's actions, the government in Tokyo declared that under "*the fear that Russia might*

otherwise misconstrue it into an implied approval of English proceedings”, it “*cannot view without concern occupation of place so adjacent.*”⁴⁵ Thus, while voicing no disapproval, the Japanese government, however, distanced itself from the issue. Apparently, the British party also came to realize that the Russian Empire's close interest in the Komun islands case was unavoidable. Therefore, it rushed to initiate negotiations with the Joseon government directly, aiming at preventing the Russians from getting involved.

On April 24, the British representative in Seoul William Carles⁴⁶ officially informed the Joseon government of Royal Navy's activities at Komun islands. Although, he specifically stressed that the occupation was temporary,⁴⁷⁴⁸ it was only natural the Joseon party did not comply. Therefore, realizing that Joseon's open protests would unavoidably invoke Russia's attention, the British diplomat spared no efforts to convince the country's authorities of the good nature of Her Majesty's government's intentions. To succeed with this task, the Russian party's actions in the Anglo-Russian hostilities in Afghanistan were to be described in a certain negative way. On May 7, 1885, while briefing Joseon's Foreign Minister Kim Yunsik,⁴⁹ Carles revealed that “*Russia had encroached on Afghanistan, with the Ruler of which country England was in intimate relations, and that England had resented the invasion of the territory of her friendly neighbor*” and “*then came forward to Afghanistan's protection.*”⁵⁰ The British diplomat, then, assured the Joseon official that the British fleet had to take Komun islands to prevent Russia from seizing it.⁵¹⁵²

Meanwhile, the Russian party, perhaps unintentionally was contributing to the British party's narrative. First, in early May, the word spread that the Russian Minister in Beijing has informed his Chinese counterpart that if China consents to the British occupation of the islands, then the Russian government will feel the need to occupy some other island or portion of the Korean peninsula.⁵³ Then, the Russian vessel *Vladivostok* reached Komun islands.⁵⁴ Treated as a “*design to hoist*”⁵⁵ a Russian flag over the islands, *Vladivostok*'s arrival added value to

the British party's accusations against Russia.

Carles, however, went even further and, on May 14, have informed Kim Yunsik of the ongoing speculation that the Joseon government offered Russia the ceding of a “*group of islands*” in exchange for its military protection. Two days later, the same rumor was duly delivered to the Chinese minister in Seoul.⁵⁶ No specific islands were ever named, but, given the timing and circumstances that surrounded the appearance of this speculation, it can be assumed that the part of Joseon land in question were Komun islands.⁵⁷

As the result, by late May of 1885, when the peak of Anglo-Russian tensions in the Middle East has passed,⁵⁸ the British party found itself securing a moral right to continue with the occupation of these islands, quite literally re-allocating the Great Game from the Middle East to the Northeast Asian region. Amidst that, a rapprochement between Joseon and the Russian Empire unfolded.

Part 3: Between the hammer and the hard place

On May 18, after obtaining an eyewitness report of the occupation of Joseon's islands, the Russian representative in Beijing repeated his government's protest on the British actions to the Chinese government. On the same day Alexey Shpeyer,⁵⁹ secretary of the Russian legation in Tokyo, was authorized for his second trip to Joseon.⁶⁰ Visiting Joseon in a semi-official capacity, Shpeyer was ordered to monitor the negotiations on the Komun islands case and oppose the British possession of these islands. He was to stay in Joseon until the arrival of Carl Waeber, who was appointed as the Russian minister to serve in Seoul. Shpeyer's agenda also included negotiations with the Joseon government about the employment of Russian military instructors – an idea, introduced by von Möllendorff in early 1885. However, to avoid a clash with China or Japan over Joseon, Shpeyer was specifically instructed to proceed with the discussions about this issue only if Joseon stated its desire to employ Russian instructors first.⁶¹ Therefore, no official credentials enabling Shpeyer to carry out such talks were issued for him

by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Here it is deemed necessary to point out that the Russian government's decision on Shpeyer's mission was taken before von Möllendorff, sent by Kojong to Japan to submit the Joseon government's official protest on the British navy's actions at Komun islands directly to Commander-in-Chief of the British China Station, had called on the Russian consul in Nagasaki for consultations.⁶² Therefore, it would be safe to assume that the Russian party acted with no regard for the Joseon party's ongoing agenda, and that its intention to make an open diplomatic gesture towards Joseon was triggered by the then-current geopolitical situation that was unfolding in the region due to the Anglo-Russian tensions in the Middle East. Evidently, the Russian party was under an impression that the offer that von Möllendorff voiced back in February 1885, before the British invasive actions on the Korean peninsula, remained unchanged and intended to use them in its rivalry with Great Britain.

In these complicated premises, on June 9, 1885, Shpeyer reached Seoul.⁶³ Believing that *"the King and general government of Korea were fully aware of the arrangements entered into by Mr. Von Möllendorff"* the Russian delegate straight away attempted to deal directly with the Joseon government. That, however, turned out to be problematic, therefore, *"for some ten days"* Shpeyer *"dealt with Mr. Von Möllendorff solely."*⁶⁴

Despite that, Kojong was, apparently, duly informed of the Russian delegate's agenda in Joseon. Therefore, the King acted accordingly. On June 14, he summoned the United States minister, George Clayton Foulk,⁶⁵ for yet another discussion about American military instructors, long-awaited in Joseon.⁶⁶ During this meeting Foulk also noted Kojong's *"increased anxiety... to have the American assistants,"* that was *"without doubt due to the attitude of Russia and England in their present strained relations."*⁶⁷ It is evident that understanding the geopolitical meaning of the Anglo-Russian tensions, which were *"threatening to the autonomy of Korea",*⁶⁸ Kojong was hesitant to approach either of these two

countries, and instead resolved to addressing the United States as the third party.

Amidst that, frustrated by a delay and in violation of his instructions, on June 18, Shpeyer took an initiative and directly addressed the Joseon government, claiming “*that they must once stop American officers [from] coming [to Joseon]... and employ Russians instead.*”⁶⁹ It is evident that the Russian delegate became aware of Kojong’s further request to the American party and attempted to prevent the Joseon government from succeeding with it. However, rather than spoiling the Joseon-American negotiations, Shpeyer’s open declamation instead alarmed the British Consul in Seoul. Understanding Shpeyer’s statement as the Russian party’s attempt to enforce its influence over Joseon and by it to not only to squeeze the British out from Komun islands but also to strengthen its presence in the region, the British party proceeded with prompt countermeasures.

On June 19, the new British representative Willian Aston⁷⁰ informed Kim Yunsik that the occupation of Komun islands, in fact, had not been occasioned by the Russo-British tensions in the Middle East and that von Möllendorff’s intrigues with the Russian legation in Tokyo in early 1885 were the real reason for Royal Navy’s invasive actions.⁷¹ Evidently, this British strategy was proven to be effective. The next day Shpeyer finally met with Kim personally just to learn that the Joseon government was completely unaware of its’ foreign advisor’s repeated appeals for the Russian military assistance.⁷² Discouraged by such a turn of events, the Russian delegate made yet another attempt to convince the Joseon government to accept Russian military instructors, openly delivering a detailed report of von Möllendorff’s diplomatic ventures of 1884 and 1885.⁷³ These drastic actions, however, produced a small effect on Kim Yunsik, who simply replied that no Russian instructors cannot be invited because the employment of the American instructors was the King’s personal request, while von Möllendorff’s negotiations with the Russian party were carried out at a private level.

But the Russian diplomat refused to take “no” for an answer. To counter the Joseon party’s

ultimatum, Shpeyer resolved to bluffing. He stated that if the Joseon government insisted on engaging American drill instructors, then “*no [Russian] minister will certainly come and hereafter a serious rupture will necessarily ensure.*”⁷⁴

This threat, evidently, reached its goal. Three unidentified Joseon state officials, who referred to themselves as Kojong confidants, soon called on Shpeyer. They revealed that the King was willing to employ Russian military instructors, but he wished to keep this agreement in secret until the instructors arrived in Joseon. Therefore, the following plan of actions to soothe the Russian delegate’s interactions with the Joseon government was drafted: on the following days, Kojong should grant Shpeyer a formal audience during which the issue of Russian military instructors would not be discussed; then the King would formally inform the United States of an issue with Russian military instructors and ask the government in Washington to cancel a dispatch of their drill instructors; finally, before Shpeyer left Joseon,⁷⁵ a letter from Kojong would be delivered to him. In this letter, the King would express his desire to accept Russian military instructors, undertake to enter into a necessarily written agreement with the Russian Empire upon the instructors’ arrival and to reject employment of military instructors from other countries.⁷⁶

Honoring his part of the deal, on June 21, Kojong summoned Foulk for a discussion about “*the demands made by Russians*”. During this meeting, the American official informed the King that “*one of the Corean Ministers had said that Americans were not wanted.*”⁷⁷ This statement not only indicated that the government in Washington was aware of the Kojong-Shpeyer secret agreement but also quite unambiguously implied that Joseon’s further rapprochement with Russia may harm the country’s relations with the United States. This turn of events, however, did not make the King give up on the idea to rapport with Russians. The next day, he finally met with Shpeyer. As was agreed upon, Kojong denied any knowledge of previously carried out negotiations the employment of Russian military advisors. He

recommended the Russian delegate to address this matter to the Foreign Minister of Joseon.⁷⁸

It is noticeable that Kojong made this suggestion while being aware of Kim Yunsik's firm opposition to the employment of the Russian instructors. On the evening of the same day yet another "confidant" from the King made a call on Shpeyer. He explained that Kojong wanted the Russian delegate to continue to press Joseon's Foreign Minister on this matter, but added that, if this approach failed, then the King would issue a written promise to employ the Russian military instructors, regardless of Kim's opposition.⁷⁹ This motivated the Russian delegate for further actions.

Suspecting that Kim Yunsik's resistance had taken its source from the Chinese party's opposition and intending to overrule it, on June 23, Shpeyer called on the Qing resident in Seoul. Surprisingly, the Chinese diplomat explained that while the Joseon government indeed informed him about the negotiations, he did not advise the Foreign Ministry in this regard. Moreover, the Chinese official clarified that, in his opinion, it is not a matter of concern for China to which government Joseon will turn for instructors.⁸⁰⁸¹

As the assumption of the Chinese party's meddling efforts was proven wrong and having no other leads to explain the Joseon Foreign minister's resistance, on June 24, Shpeyer once again met with Kim Yunsik and rather boldly attempted to persuade him to comply with the plan. Kim was, however, adamant. He once again brought up the existence of a previous written agreement with the United States, but as it did not discourage the Russian delegate, ultimately pointed out that, as Shpeyer approached the Joseon government with no credentials, the whole discussion was of a private nature,⁸² therefore, pointless. That was a card Shpeyer could not trump. He retreated, hoping, perhaps, for another opportunity to renegotiate to appear soon.

This is when the British party made its' final blow, completely frustrating Shpeyer's efforts and, de-facto, annulling his agreement with the King. On June 26, obviously aiming at forcing Kojong to denounce the rapprochement with Russia, the British minister in Seoul informed the

Joseon government of his government's intention to release Komun islands when assured that von Möllendorff's consultations with Russian officials were not authorized by the King.⁸³ Taking up this promise, the Joseon government complied, issuing on July 1 an official statement that disowned von Möllendorff's agreements with Russian officials.⁸⁴

After this announcement, it became clear to Shpeyer that Kojong's written compliance was the last opportunity for his mission to succeed. After all, even failing on the official level, the Russian delegate still had Kojong's semi-official promise. Indeed, up until his last moments in Seoul, Shpeyer remained assured that the issue with the Russian instructors will be resolved following his agreement with the King: on July 12, a messenger from the Palace informed him that "*the letter in question would be delivered ... that night.*"⁸⁵ The Russian party waited until morning, but no deliveries from the King came.⁸⁶⁸⁷ With this, Shpeyer left the country on July 13, failing to achieve goals set for him by his government and once again violating the instruction issued for him by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Part 4: Half a loaf is better than no bread

By autumn of 1885 and amidst China tightening its grasp over Joseon⁸⁸ it became clear that in the summer Kojong had backed the wrong horse: despite him stepping down from the rapprochement with Russia, the winter of 1885 and spring of 1886 came and passed, but the British navy had shown no signs of intention to leave Komun islands. Or so it seemed. The historical irony of the situation was that just as Kojong had realized that, with the Chinese party's unspoken approval of the continuation of the British occupation of part of Joseon's land, he had no other options left but to approach the Russians again, the Chinese and the British parties engaged in discussion on the way for the Her Majesty's navy to finally release the islands.

In mid-March 1886, "*harassed... by Russia*", which, despite its weakened by the failure of Shpeyer's mission position on the Korean peninsula,⁸⁹ continued to make threats to "*take 10*

times more of Joseon's territory”⁹⁰ if the British navy did not retreat from Joseon, the Chinese party concluded that it “*could not get into troubles with Russia about a matter that concerned only English interests*”.⁹¹ In late March, the British party also realized that, amidst high maintenance costs and relatively low strategic value, further occupation of this Joseon’s territory was no longer desirable.⁹² Thus, assuming that on a geopolitical scale the British and the Chinese interests were pursuing the same objective, and that “*it would be against the interest both of China and England if [Komun islands] ...to be occupied by another European Power*”, the government in London produced a new strategy of joint guarantees of Joseon’s integrity. According to it, the Chinese party was to obtain Russia’s “*written engagement not to take ... [Komun islands]*” before the British navy’s withdrawal from it.⁹³ However, contrary to what was expected of him, Lǐ Hóngzhāng,⁹⁴ the Chinese state official in charge of Joseon affairs, demanded a prior obligation from the British party to evacuate the islands. Only then he would undertake the task of “*getting [the required] ... engagement from Russia*”.⁹⁵⁹⁶

Evidently, Kojong knew nothing about changes in the Chinese and British parties’ agendas. Therefore, since the early summer of 1886, he was closely watching Carl Weaber’s, the Russian minister in Seoul, activities, so as not to miss the right time for another attempt at rapprochement.

The opportunity soon appeared as the Russian party once again voiced a desire for an agreement of overland trade to be concluded between the two countries. This initiative was treated by Kojong as a sign of the government in Saint Petersburg’s incessant interest in the Korean peninsula. The British and German parties, however, were, on the contrary, alarmed by it. Both countries assumed that Russia would demand the same tariffs as those that were defined by Joseon’s overland trade regulations with China (1882).⁹⁷ Therefore, they feared that, if concluded, such Russo-Joseon agreement would negatively affect their trade in the region. For this reason, attempting to frustrate Weaber’s venture, the British and German representatives

in Seoul stated that in the case of the conclusion of such an agreement, their governments would insist on an adjustment of tariffs and duties defined in their applicable treaties.⁹⁸ Naturally, the Chinese party also viewed the Russian government's initiative with worry and dissatisfaction. In early July, Lǐ Hóngzhāng even issued an open memorial to "*the King of Corea*", in which he accused Russia of having an unfriendly agenda "*to encroach on Corea on the slightest quarrel*" and suggested that "*it is better for Corea to have no land trade at all*" than to trade with its northern neighbor.⁹⁹

Lǐ's concerns of a possible Russo-Joseon rapprochement were increasing with a report in a local Joseon newspaper that in mid-July 1886 delivered news of a Russian vessel spotted near Wonsan (known internationally as Port Lazareff) at the East coast of the peninsula. As alarming as this was, the situation got even worse when the new British minister to Joseon, Edward Baber,¹⁰⁰ by a mistake of mistranslation, was informed not of one Russian ship, but of "*the presence of a fleet of four Russian vessels at Port Lazareff*". Apparently, before bringing "*his knowledge of the presence of such [a] fleet to the attention of Mr. Waeber*", Baber telegraphed this urgent news "*to Peking, and communicated it to the Chinese representative in Söul*".¹⁰¹ As the agitation was steepening, rumors of Russo-Joseon secret rapprochement began to spread. At the end of July 1886, the British minister at Beijing reported to London that the King "*have quite recently asked for protection of Russia, and the Russian Agent to have said that request must be in writing*". Highlighting the Chinese party's concerns in the matter, the diplomat added that Lǐ Hóngzhāng "*has telegraphed to Corea to prevent written request at all costs*".¹⁰²

Against this background, Kojong's actual attempt to attain the protection of the Russian Empire was set in motion.

On August 5, Joseon's high state official called on the Russian minister in Seoul, Carl Waeber. During this meeting that lasted for four hours, the Joseon official passionately explained to Waeber that "*the King is extremely burdened by the influence that the Chinese*

representative has on the country”, that he “*is convinced that China would not be able to defend [Joseon] ... if any serious trouble arises*” and that the British seizure of Komun islands was a vivid proof of such Chinese disability, just to convince the Russian diplomat to accept the letter that will be soon delivered to him, in which the King will ask for Russian government’s “*assistance for strengthening Joseon’s independence.*”¹⁰³ No arguments that such action would only worsen the Chinese party’s dissatisfaction with the Joseon government and harm Sino-Russian relations as well,¹⁰⁴ voiced by Waeber to persuade Kojong from submitting the letter, had taken effect. Therefore, on August 9, a written request, bearing stamps of the King and the Minister of the internal affairs was delivered to the Russian legation. In the letter, Kojong largely repeated the above-mentioned arguments and requested the Russian party’s assistance of Joseon’s liberation from the Chinese vassalage, additionally asking the government in Saint Petersburg to “*send warships to temporarily ensure [his] ... security*” “*if tensions with the other Country arise.*”¹⁰⁵

Amidst the sensitive situation present in the country, it was only natural that soon the Chinese minister in Seoul, Yuán Shikǎi,¹⁰⁶ would be informed of Kojong's actions.

And so it went. Around August 12, Yuán, allegedly,¹⁰⁷ came into possession of a copy of the King’s letter. After this, the Chinese party’s prompt retaliation followed. Revealing that “*he had accurate knowledge of an agreement in writing, bearing the King’s seal, the effect of which was to turn Korea bodily over to Russian protection*”, Yuán informed Joseon’s high officials that “*China would at all hazards put an end to such a movement*”, he even threatened that 75,000 Chinese soldiers would be sent to Joseon under his summon¹⁰⁸ to punish the King for his independent actions.

Taking Yuán’s threat seriously, once again, Kojong had to step back from his agreement with the Russians. Even more, attempting to appease the Chinese Minister and escape the retaliation promised by him, the King produced and delivered an explanatory note to Yuán, in

which he claimed that it was not his idea to approach Russia and that the letter and his stamp on it were forged.¹⁰⁹

It is hard to estimate how convincing Kojong's assurances appeared to the Qing. However, it stands as a historical fact that against the uncertainty of the Chinese minister's threats,¹¹⁰ and the uncertainty of the Joseon party's explanations, it was the Russian party's response to the situation that released the steam from a speedily developing crisis: implying that the letter, which Yuán allegedly had, was forged, the Russian minister in Seoul was adamant in his denial that any correspondence from the Palace requesting Russian protection had ever reached him.¹¹¹

Evidently, not willing to harm fragile Sino-Russian relations, and intending to resolve the Komun islands case, the Chinese party choose not to challenge Waeber's words. Instead, Lǐ rushed to instruct the Chinese representative in Saint Petersburg that if the letter from Kojong was ever received through Waeber, then the Russian government was to be asked to resolutely treat it as not composed or authorized by the King of Joseon.¹¹² The Russian foreign ministry complied,¹¹³ and with this, the diplomatic crisis on the Korean peninsula was avoided.

Part 5: The bitter end

The above-written evidently show that in 1885-1886 Joseon has been treated as expendable, a pawn of a bigger game unfolding between the Russian Empire and Great Britain. The British seizure of Komun islands was an example of how geopolitical struggle between the two Western countries can affect balance of power inside Northeast Asia. Royal Navy's invasive action at Joseon's land promptly transformed into a major international crisis that was involving not only title countries but also the Russian Empire, China, and, to some extent, Japan, placing them in rivaling camps.

As neither of the competing parties considered Joseon's standing and interests, it is

possible to conclude post-factum that Kojong had no chances to solve the crisis looming around his country while not approaching Russia or Great Britain. He, however, still tried. In the summer of 1885, when Shpeyer reached Seoul intending to transform not yet formalized relations between the two countries into a strategic partnership, the King of Joseon immediately realized that his official statement of any nature about the Russian party's demands would automatically be treated as an expression of support to either Russia or Great Britain. If he would choose to officially support the agreement with Russia, this would invoke not only China's disapproval, but, most importantly, provide the British party with a pretext and a justification for its seizure of Joseon's territory. If he, however, would completely ignore the Russians, this would spoil the relations between the two countries even before the ratification of a Russo-Joseon's treaty.¹¹⁴ Thus, Kojong took a middle path of withdrawing from the official negotiations with Shpeyer but continuing the semi-official discussions. It was, however, the British party's promise to release Komun islands that eventually put a cross on the King's semi-official interactions with the Russian delegation and, ultimately, put on hold the Russo-Joseon rapprochement.

By the summer of 1886, Kojong had learned his lesson, realizing that Anglo-Russian rivalry, reached Northeast Asia, left him with no chance to solve the Komun islands problem himself. Since the British party already tricked him once, the King of Joseon chose to side with Russia, rushing to reconcile with it at the first opportunity. However, lacking knowledge about the Sino-British talks over the Komun islands issue, instead of protecting his country, Kojong put it in a vulnerable position. It cannot be an overstatement to conclude that the events of August of 1886 negatively affected the ongoing discussion over Joseon's territorial integrity and thereby slowed down the withdrawal of the British navy from Komun islands.

As was mentioned above, since the spring of 1886, the British officials pressed the Chinese party about obtaining guarantees of non-occupation of this territory by a third power. However,

if before the incident Lǐ Hóngzhāng, aiming not to irritate the Russian party, handled the matter cautiously, since mid-August of 1886 his approach changed. When, at the end of August, the Russo-Chinese consultations over Joseon, which were gradually unfolding since the spring, entered the stage of discussion of a written agreement,¹¹⁵ the Chinese party, feeling insecure amidst the rumors of the secret Russo-Joseon rapprochement, began to insist on a clause that would ensure the Russian party's admittance of China's suzerain rights over the Korean peninsula.¹¹⁶ As it would endanger its interests in the region (namely, the ongoing negotiations about the overland treaty with Joseon), such a clause was deemed unacceptable for the Russian party.¹¹⁷ This clash of opinions has, naturally, unleashed time-consuming negotiations. Only in mid-November of 1886, both parties, ultimately unable to reach consensus on the matter, concluded a verbal, gentleman's agreement, whereby both Russia and China guaranteed Joseon's status quo, i.e. its integrity.¹¹⁸ Luckily, constantly updated on the Sino-Russian negotiations, the British party too saw merits of the absence of a written Russo-Chinese agreement: if ever gone to war with Russia, it could easily re-occupy Komun islands.¹¹⁹ With this, the Chinese party's verbal assurance "*that no part of the territory of Corea including Port Hamilton will be occupied by a foreign power*" was deemed sufficient, and "*on the faith of this guarantee [and] to comply with the wishes of the Chinese government*",¹²⁰ in mid-November of 1886, the British party began its preparation to evacuate from the Joseon territory.

Post-scriptum

- Komun islands became free of the British navy in late February of 1887.
- The British navy's withdrawal under "*the Government of China guarantees [of] the security of the islands from seizure by any other power*"¹²¹ was largely seen as a result of the Qing's diplomatic effort.
- The events of 1886 did not elevate the Russian party's standing at the Korean peninsula

but brought Kojong and Waeber together. For many years, until Waeber's ultimate departure from Joseon in 1897, he and the King maintained close trustworthy relations.

- Great game – the Russo-British global rivalry – officially have never ended, although the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, divided both countries' interests in the Middle East.

¹ Despite numerous attempts facilitated by several western powers active in the region (including several attempts of the United States party), until 1876 (the Joseon-Japan “Kanghwa” treaty) the country remained non-involved in global geopolitical processes.

² Treaty that Japan forced on Joseon in 1876 was copying treaties that the United States and Great Britain have forced on Japan in the mid-1850s. This treaty paid the path for the development of Asian imperialism, led by Japan.

³ *Kojong Shillok* (고종실록), 19kwŏn, *kojong 19nyŏn 8wŏl 5il muo 5pŏntchaegisa, sŏulgwa chibange seun ch'ŏkyangbirŭl modu ppobabŏrirago myŏnghada* (19권, 고종 19년 8월 5일 무오 5번째기사, 서울과 지방에 세운 척양비를 모두 뽑아버리라고 명하다), http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_11908005_005.

⁴ A treaty with the United States was concluded in May of 1882. It was followed by treaties with Great Britain (November of 1883), Germany (November of 1883) and Italy (June of 1884).

⁵ By the Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Convention of Beijing (1860) with China.

⁶ By the end of 1869, around 7000 Joseon peasants were residing in the South Ussuri territory of Russia. From *Boris Park* (Борис Пак). *Rossiya i Koreya* (Россия и Корея). Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniya RAN, 2004, p.86.

⁷ Boris Park states that reacting to the Russian authority's suggestion, the ruler of Joseon had forbidden any direct contact with Russian officials. For detail, see *Boris Park* (Борис Пак). *Rossiya i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p. 93.

⁸ Kojong's refusal to communicate with the Russian party was, apparently, influenced by the Sino-Russian crisis over the Ile river region (1871-1881) and the existing concept, promoted by the Chinese and British parties and supported by the Japanese party, of the invasive nature of the Russian policies in Northeast Asia.

In May of 1880, Great Britain began to suspect that the Russian Empire is in preparations for a treaty with Joseon. A report of Japan's agent in Seoul, obtained by the British official in Tokyo, served as an occasion for it. It revealed that in March 1880, a Russian Agent arrived on a ship of war to Seoul and delivered a correspondence to the government of Joseon, the object of which, as Inoue believed, was “to conclude a Treaty of Commerce with Korea.” Amidst the Anglo-Russian tensions in the Middle East region, this report brought Great Britain's attention towards Joseon. Speculations, spread in the summer of 1880, about the Russian party's intention to invade Joseon in case of the Sino-Russian military conflict, added to the British party's concerns. Therefore, by November of the same year, the British government decided on the necessity of a treaty with Joseon, giving this country's “political importance for all nations trading in the far East.” For detail, see *Mr. Kennedy to the Marquis Salisbury, May 25, 1880, #90. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, Seoul, Korea: Sin Mun Dang Pub. Co., 1982, p. 57; *Mr. Kennedy to Earl Gravelle, June 29, 1880, # 113. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 61; *Mr. Kennedy to Earl Gravelle, November 21, 1880, #179. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 77.

⁹ With no restrictions properly applied, by the 1880s active human traffic over the Russo-Joseon borderline was supplemented by a flourishing, but unregulated, trade. The annual turnover of overland trade between Joseon and Russia in 1881 was 450,000 rubles. By 1884 it grew twice. See *Tatiana Simbirtseva* (Татьяна Симбирцева). *Rossiysko-koreyskiye kontakty v Pekine v kontse XVII – seredine XIX vv. (po dnevnikam koreyskikh poslov)* (Российско-корейские контакты в Пекине в конце XVII – середине XIX вв. (по дневникам корейских послов)). *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Проблемы Дальнего Востока) № 6, 1998), *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* pp. 91-93; *Boris Park* (Борис Пак). *Rossiya i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p. 91.

¹⁰ Grosvenor to Earl Granville, December 14, 1882, #155, *Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 139.

¹¹ The treaty was signed on May 22, 1882.

¹² *Boris Park* (Борис Пак). *Rossiya i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p. 117.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 118.

¹⁴ Paul Georg von Möllendorff (1847-1901) was a German linguist and diplomat. He is mostly known as the first foreign advisor of Kojong, serving in Joseon in this capacity from 1882 to 1885.

¹⁵ Carl Waeber (Карл Иванович Вебер, 1841 – 1910) was a Russian Empire diplomat, Kojong's close acquaintance. From 1885 to 1897, he served as the Russian representative in Joseon. In this capacity, Waeber largely contributed to strengthening the Russian Empire's influence on the Korean peninsula.

¹⁶ The Sino-French conflict over Vietnam – rivalry over the prevalence at Vietnam, was unfolding between France and China since the late 1870s. By 1884, after several military clashes, the conflict developed into a full-scale war (the so-called Sino-French War), which ended with the Chinese party's loss in the spring of 1885.

¹⁷ Horace N. Allen. *Korea the Fact and Fancy*. Seoul: Hanbinmun'go (한빛문고), 1983, p.167.

¹⁸ By «neutralization» von Möllendorff meant international guarantees of Joseon's integrity with Belgium case taken as example.

¹⁹ For more detailed outlook of the strategy of Joseon's neutralization see, for example: Sang Pil Jin. *Korean neutralization attempts (1882-1907): retracing the struggle for survival and imperial intrigues*. Ph.D. dissertation, SOAS, University of London, 2016.

²⁰ Boris Park (Борис Пак). *Rossiia i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p. 144.

²¹ Since the early 1880s the Chinese government advised Joseon against the engaging with Russia. As it was explained above, this hostile attitude was influenced by the on-gonging Sino-Russian territorial tensions and the Qing's government's intention to secure its prevailing rights at the Korean peninsula.

²² Yur-Bok Lee. *West goes East: Paul Georg von Möllendorff and great power imperialism in late Yi Korea*. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1988, p. 95.

²³ *Kojong Shillok* (고종실록), 21kwŏn, *kojong 21nyŏn 10wŏl 27il musul 2pŏntchaegisa, sŏsangurŭl chŏn'gwŏn taeshine, mwillendorŭp'ŭrŭl pudaeshine immyŏnghayŏ ilbone p'agyŏnhada* (21권, 고종 21년 10월 27일 무술 2번째기사, 서상우를 전권 대신에, 뮐렌도르프를 부대신에 임명하여 일본에 파견하다), http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12110027_002.

²⁴ Kapsin Coup was a revolutionary attempt of liberal political forces of Joseon – the so-called Progressive Party – to come to the power through a civil and military uprising. Started on December 4, 1884, Kapsin Coup lasted only 4 days and was suppressed by the Chinese military forces.

²⁵ The government in Saint Petersburg rationalized its reply by neutrality, which is intended to maintain in case of Sino-Japanese military conflict over the Korean peninsula. For detail, see Boris Park (Борис Пак). *Rossiia i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p. 146.

²⁶ Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet on the Importance of Port Hamilton, February 5, 1885, *Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 488.

²⁷ *The Secretary to Tenterden, August 3, 1875*. From Stephen A. Royle. *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885-1887*. London: Routledge, 2017, p. 49.

²⁸ The Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, the so-called Great Game, was one of major global geopolitical struggles on the nineteenth century. Unfolding since the early 1870s, this rivalry was set in the premise of the Russian party's ambitions to strengthen its presence in the Middle East and the British party's efforts push-out the Russians from the region, as their presence endangered the British hold on India.

²⁹ Since 1882, pushed out of Afghanistan by the Afghan-British forces, the Russian army was campaigning to reclaim the region. Unavoidably, these activities were laying the foundation for another escalation of the political and diplomatic confrontation between Great Britain and the Russian Empire. These tensions peaked in March 1885 when the Russians provoked a strike of the Afghan army and used this opportunity for counterattacking and advancing into the south of Afghanistan's territory. For detail, see Gerald Morgan, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810-1895*. London: Routledge, 1981, p. 195.

³⁰ Gerald Morgan, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810-1895*, p.195.

³¹ In the 1880s, the British army counted only about 48 thousand soldiers, while the Russian troops consisted of more than 900,000 regular soldiers and nearly 250,000 irregulars (mostly Cossacks). Numbers are taken from open sources (Wikipedia).

³² *Plunkett to Granville March 21, 1885*. From Stephen A. Royle. *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885-1887*, p.58.

³³ Stephen A. Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885-1887*, p.58.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ *Earl Granville to O'Connor, April 17, 1885, #79a*. *Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 491.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ *Earl Granville to the Marquis Tseng, April 16, 1885, #7*. *Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 490.

³⁹ *Plunkett to Earl Granville, April 23, 1885, #11*. *Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 491.

⁴⁰ *Earl Granville to the Marquis Tseng April 16, 1885, #7. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, pp. 490-491.

⁴¹ It is possible to guess that by “another power” the British officials meant Russia.

⁴² The late nineteenth century was marked by several Russo-Chinese territorial disputes. Aside from the Russian party obtaining territories in northeastern Manchuria, in the 1880s, the Sino-Russian crisis over the Ile river region (1871-1881) was one of the most actual issues. Additionally, an issue of the borderline between the two countries, which the Chinese party was aiming to solve since 1874, was actively negotiated only in the spring-summer of 1886.

⁴³ *O’Conor to Earl Granville, April 21, 1885, #53. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 508.

⁴⁴ On April 28, a draft of this agreement, prepared by the British Foreign Ministry, was delivered to the Chinese envoy in London. For detail, see *Earl Granville to the Marquis Tseng, April 28, 1885. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 493.

⁴⁵ *Mr. Plunkett to Earl Gravile, April 23, 1885, #11. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 491.

⁴⁶ William Richard Carles (1848 – 1929) was a “provisionally” British Vice-Consul for Joseon in 1884-1885.

⁴⁷ *O’Conor to Carles, April 24, 1885*. From Stephen A. Royle, *Anglo-Korean relations and the port Hamilton affair, 1885-1887*, p.59.

⁴⁸ This narrative was already used on the Chinese and Japanese and since then became a part of general rhetoric that British diplomacy utilized while dealing with consequences of its actions regarding Komun islands. The temporary nature of its seizure was, however, not completely true. Some powerful British politicians were advocating for a permanent hold of Port Hamilton. Eventually, their suggestions were overpowered by the opinion that the permanent hold on the islands would unavoidably invoke Russia’s protests and, therefore, contribute to the tensions between the two countries. Thus, the scheme of setting a permanent British navy base at Joseon’s Komun islands was soon put aside. For detail, see *Memorandum by Lord Northbrook, May 20, 1885. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, pp.498-499.

⁴⁹ Kim Yunsik (김윤식 / 金允植, 1835 – 1922) was an influential politician and diplomat of Joseon. In 1884, he served as the Foreign Minister of Joseon and signed a treaty with the Russian Empire. Despite that, Kim Yunsik was known as a pro-Chinese politician.

⁵⁰ *Vice-Consul Carles to Mr. O’Conor, May 7, 1885. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 511.

⁵¹ *Carles to O’Conor, May 19, 1885*. From Stephen A. Royle. *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885-1887*, p.60.

⁵² It is important to note that despite the existence of several rumors about Russian interest in leasing Joseon’s territories to use it as an unfreezing port for its Pacific Fleet, the majority of these rumors were pointing out to Wonsan, while Komun islands was out of consideration. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the British rhetoric of accusing the Russian party of having plans regarding Komun islands was aiming at providing a pretext for the British navy’s hold on the islands and preventing Joseon from an open protest against it. For detail, see *Ian Nish. Collected Writings of Ian Nish: Part 2: Japanese Political History - Japan and East Asia (Collected Writings of Modern Western Scholars on Japan) (Pt. 2)*. London: Routledge. 2003, pp. 120-122.

⁵³ *Earl Granville to Mr. O’Conor, May 6, 1885, #93A. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 494.

⁵⁴ *Vice-Admiral Sir W. Dowell to the Secretary to the Admiralty, May 14, 1885, Inclosure 1 in #68. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 519.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Acting Consul-General Carles to Mr. Plunkett, May 18, 1885, Inclosure 1 in #79. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 531.

⁵⁷ It is difficult to trace the origins of this speculation. However, a mere fact that Carles reported it to his colleague in Tokyo as something that reached him “from Japan” lays the foundation for an assumption that this rumor was produced by Great Britain, or even by Carles himself. See *Acting Consul-General Carles to Mr. Plunkett, May 18, 1885, Inclosure 1 in #79. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 531.

⁵⁸ Stephen A. Royle. *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885-1887*, p. 129.

⁵⁹ Alexey Shpeyer (also known as Alexis de Speyer, Алексей Николаевич Шпейер; 1854–1916) was a Russian diplomat. In 1885, he served as secretary of the Russian Empire’s legation in Tokyo. In 1897, he was appointed as Russian consul general to the Korean Empire.

⁶⁰ Shpeyer has visited Joseon briefly in January of 1885. He even met with Kojong, but as his appearance in Seoul was unofficial, no applied consultations, negotiations or such with the Joseon government has taken place at that time. For detail see, for example *Boris Park (Борис Пак). Rossiya i Koreya (Россия и Корея)*, pp.146-149.

⁶¹ *Boris Park (Борис Пак). Rossiya i Koreya (Россия и Корея)*, p. 153.

⁶² Evidently, von Möllendorf have reached Nagasaki on May 18, 1885. For detail, see *Kojong Shillok (고종실록)*,

22kwŏn, kojong 22nyŏn 4wŏl 6il kapsul 7pŏntchaegisa, ōmseŏng tŭngi yŏngguk sugun chedogege p'yŏnjirŭl ponaeda (22권, 고종 22년 4월 6일 갑술 7번째기사, 엄세영 등이 영국 수군 제독에게 편지를 보내다), http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12204006_007

⁶³ Bella Park (Бэлла Пак). *Rossiyskaya Diplomatiya i Koreya (1876-1898)* (Российская Дипломатия и Корея (1876-1898)). Ph.D. dissertation. Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniya Rossiyskoy Akademii Nauk (Институт Востоковедения Российской Академии Наук), 2006, p. 208.

⁶⁴ Foulk to Secretary of State, July 5, 1885, #192. *Korean-American relations. Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial period, 1883-1886*. Ed. by George M. McCune and John A. Harrison. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1963, p. 81.

⁶⁵ George Clayton Foulk (1856 – 1893) was a United States Navy officer. From 1883 he served as Naval Attaché to Joseon, from 1886 to 1886, and from 1886 to 1887 he served as the United States minister in Joseon. Foulk maintained close relations with several influential politicians, was enjoying Kojong's confidence.

⁶⁶ An agreement that the United States government will provide Joseon with various specialists and instructors was achieved during the Joseon observation delegation to the United States in autumn of 1883. Since that time Kojong, personally concerned in the matter, was continuously pressing the US officials to make good on this promise. However, the arrival of the American specialists was constantly delayed under various pretexts.

⁶⁷ Foulk to Secretary of State, June 18, 1885, #184. *Korean-American relations. Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial period, 1883-1886*, p.58.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Horace N. Allen. *Allenŭi ilgi* (알렌의 日記). Translated by Kim Wŏnmo (김원모). Seoul: Tan'guktaehakkyoch'ulp'anbu (檀國大學校出版部), 1994, p.472 (June 19, 1885).

⁷⁰ William George Aston (1841 – 1911) was a British diplomat. He first served in Japan, but in 1884 was transferred to Joseon as the British representative. He was transferred back to Japan in 1885.

⁷¹ Aston to O'Connor, July 10, 1885. From George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, vol.1*. Florida: University press of Florida Tallahassee, 1982, p. 52.

⁷² George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, vol.1*, p.38.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp.39-40.

⁷⁵ Clearly, Kojong was unaware of the Russian Foreign Ministry's instructions that dictated Shpeyer to stay in Joseon until Waeber's arrival.

⁷⁶ Boris Park (Борис Пак). *Rossiya i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p. 155.

⁷⁷ Horace N. Allen. *Allenŭi ilgi* (알렌의 日記), p.474 (June 21, 1885).

⁷⁸ George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, vol.1*, p.41.

⁷⁹ Boris Park (Борис Пак). *Rossiya i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p.155.

⁸⁰ Shpeyer to Davydov, June 15 (27), 1885. From George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, vol.1*, p.41.

⁸¹ It seems reasonable to treat the Chinese minister's reply as truthful. An order from Lǐ Hóngzhāng, dictating resident Chen to frustrate the treaty between Russia and Joseon and remove von Möllendorff from his post as the counselor of the King, came on July 2. The latter lays the foundation for the assumption that China, at least officially, was not involved in the ongoing Shpeyer-Kim negotiations. For detail, see George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, vol.1*, p.45.

⁸² George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, vol.1*, p.43.

⁸³ Foulk to Secretary of State, June 26, 1885, #187. *Korean-American relations. Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial period, 1883 - 1886*, p.79.

⁸⁴ George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, vol.1*, p.p.45.

⁸⁵ Shpeyer to Davydov, June 24 (July 6), 1885. From George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, vol.1*, p.47.

⁸⁶ Haeoesaryoch'ongsŏ 12kwŏn rŏshiagungnip'aegunsŏngmunsŏ I (1854~1894) (해외사료총서 12권 러시아국립해군성문서 I (1854~1894)). 8. RGAVMF, f.26, op.1, d.6, ll.3ob.~5ob □03060835 (8. PГABMФ, ф.26, on.1, д.6, лл.3об.~5об. □03060835), http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?sort=levelId&dir=ASC&start=1&limit=20&page=1&pre_page=1&setId=2&prevPage=0&prevLimit=&itemId=fs&types=&synonym=off&chinessChar=on&brokerPagingInfo=&levelId=fs_012_0080&position=-1.

⁸⁷ It is easy to guess that at the very last moment Kojong was persuaded from honoring his part of the deal with Russians.

⁸⁸ As the result of publication of Kojong's secret attempt to approach Russia, the Qing implemented punitive

measures to its vassal state. Paul Georg von Möllendorff was ousted, the Chinese resident in Seoul replaced, and in the early October of 1885, Kojong's father and ex-regent – the Taewŏn'gun – known for his anti-foreign policies, returned to Seoul.

⁸⁹ The Russian Empire minister, who finally reached Seoul in early October of 1885, was specifically instructed to proceed with extreme caution and not to irritate the Chinese and other foreign representatives, and for that not to discuss matters of Russian protectorate with Joseon's officials, even if the Joseon party initiated such discussions. This "wait-and-see" disposition of the Russian government lasted until the summer of 1886. For detail, see *Bella Park* (Белла Пак). *Rossiyskiy Diplomat K.I.Veber i yego Koreya* (Российский Дипломат К.И.Вебер и его Корея). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Instituta Vostokovedeniya RAN (Издательство Института Востоковедения РАН, 2013), p.51.

⁹⁰ *Plunkett to Earl Granville, June 23, 1885, #173. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, pp. 582-583.

⁹¹ *The Earl Rosebery to Mr. O'Connor, April 1, 1886, #79. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p. 667.

⁹² *O'Connor to Earl Rosebery, Match 27, #109, 1886. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, pp. 672-673.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Lǐ Hóngzhāng (李鴻章, 1823 – 1901) was an influential politician and diplomat of Qing China. Since the mid-1870s, he oversaw China's policies regarding Joseon. Under Li's supervision, Joseon signed its treaty with the United States in 1882.

⁹⁵ *O'Connor to Earl Rosebery, Match 27, #109, 1886. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, pp. 672-673.

⁹⁶ This refusal to submit to the British party's demands and surprisingly almost tender attitude that the Chinese state official expressed towards the Russian Empire could be explained by the upcoming negotiations over the borderline between the two countries, an issue that China was aiming to solve since 1874. Unfolded in May of 1886, the Russo-Chinese negotiations continued until October of the same year. For detail, see *Oleg Timofeev* (Олег Тимофеев). *Rossiysko-kitayskiye otnosheniya v Priamur'ye (ser. XIX-nach. XX vv.)* (Российско-китайские отношения в Приамурье (сер. XIX-нач. XX вв.)), http://www.igpi.ru/center/lib/hist_tradit/east/china/timofeev_1.html.

⁹⁷ These new regulations basically ensured the Chinese trade hegemony on the Korean peninsula. For detail, see *Jung Mee Park. Interpreting the Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations of 1882 between Joseon and the Qing: How logics of appropriateness shaped Sino-Korean relations. International Area Studies Review* (2020, Vol. 23(1)).

⁹⁸ *Boris Park* (Борис Пак). *Rossiya i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p. 174.

⁹⁹ *Denby to Secretary of State, July 5, 1886. Korean-American relations. Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial period, 1883 – 1886*, pp.145-147.

¹⁰⁰ Edward Colborne Baber (1843 – 1890) was an English diplomat, who from 1885 to 1886, acted as consul-general in Joseon.

¹⁰¹ *Foulk to Secretary of State, September 8, 1886, #3. Korean-American relations. Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial period, 1883 – 1886*, pp. 149-150.

Roots of Baber's anxiety can be found in the Joseon government's decree of early July 1886 of granting the United States schooner with right of pearl-fishing near Komun islands. For detail, see *Vice-Admiral Hamilton to the Secretary of the Admiralty, July 19, 1886, Inclosure in #47. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p.688.

¹⁰² *Sir J. Walsham to the Earl of Rosebery, July 31, 1886, #53. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p.689.

¹⁰³ *Waeber to Girs, August 6, 1886. Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Fond №150 «Yaponskiy stol», 493, 1, K1, 1885-1887, Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perepiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, Delo №36, list 109* (Архив Внешней Политики Российской Империи, Фонд №150 «Японский стол», 493, 1, K1, 1885-1887, Донесения поверенного в делах и генерального консула в Сеула и разная переписка о положении дел в Корее, об отношениях оной к Китаю и о сношениях Кореей России и других держав, Дело №36, лист 109).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ *Waeber to Girs, August 6, 1886, Prilozheniye* (Приложение). *Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Fond №150 «Yaponskiy stol», 493, 1, K1, 1885-1887, Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perepiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, Delo №36, list 117* (Архив Внешней Политики Российской Империи, Фонд №150 «Японский стол», 493, 1, K1, 1885-1887, Донесения поверенного в делах и генерального консула в Сеула и разная переписка о положении дел в Корее, об отношениях оной к Китаю и о сношениях Кореей России и других держав, Дело №36, лист 117).

и других держав, Дело №36, лист 117).

¹⁰⁶ Yuán Shikāi (袁世凱, 1859 – 1916) was the Qing's military official and diplomat. Yuán first arrived at Joseon in 1882 as a military commander, in 1885 he was appointed as the Imperial Resident in Seoul and hold this post until 1895.

¹⁰⁷ Up until this day it is not quite proved in the Chinese official was indeed having a copy of the King of Joseon's written request to the Russian Empire. On August 15, asked to show this letter by the foreign advisor to the King, Yuán refused to do so. For detail, see *Foulk to Secretary of State, September 8, 1886, #3. Korean-American relations. Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial period, 1883 – 1886*, p. 150.

¹⁰⁸ *Foulk to Secretary of State, September 8, 1886, #3. Korean-American relations. Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial period, 1883 – 1886*, p. 151.

¹⁰⁹ Boris Park (Борис Пак). *Rossiya i Koreya* (Россия и Корея), p. 165.

¹¹⁰ New Foreign advisor to the King, Owen Nickerson Denny, was at that time convinced that Yuán had no letter in his possession and that the rumors of the secret Russo-Joseon rapprochement were untrue. For detail, see *Foulk to Secretary of State, September 8, 1886, #3, Korean-American relations. Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial period, 1883 – 1886*, p. 150; Denny to Detring, August 12, 1886, #16, *An American Adviser in Late Yi Korea: The Letters of Owen Nickerson Denny*, edited, with an introduction, by Robert R. Swartout, Jr. (the University of Alabama press, 1984), p. 39.

¹¹¹ Kim Jonghong (Ким Чжон Хон). *Russko-Koreyskiye diplomaticheskiye otnosheniya v 1884 - 1904 gg* (Русско-Корейские дипломатические отношения в 1884 - 1904 гг.). *Ph.D. dissertation*. Moscow: Moskovskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet imeni M.V. Lomonosova (Московский Государственный Университет имени М.В. Ломоносова), 2000, pp. 141-145.

¹¹² *Lǐwénzhōng gōng quánjí* (李文忠公全集), *Diàn gǎo 7:324-b, guāngxù 12 nián 7 yuè 19 rì* (電稿7:324-b, 光緒 12年 7月19日). From *Im Kyesun* (任桂淳). *Chorŏ maryakkwa kŭ huŭi chorŏ miryakkwa kŭ huhuŭi chorŏgwan'gye* (1884-1894) (朝露密約과 그 후의 朝露關係 (1884-1894)). In *Chorŏgwan'gye 100nyŏnsa* (朝露關係 100年史). Seoul: Han'guksayŏn'guhyŏbŭihoe (한국사연구협의회), 1984, p.105.

¹¹³ Young Ick Lew. *Yüan Shih-k'ai's Residency and the Korean Enlightenment Movement (1885-94)*. Journal of Korean Studies, Volume 5. Washington: Center for Korea Studies, University of Washington, 1984, p. 83.

¹¹⁴ The treaty was ratified in October of 1885.

¹¹⁵ For detail account and analysis of Lǐ-Ladyzhevsky negotiations over Joseon see, for example *Hyunsoo Kim. "The relationship between the British fleet's withdrawal from Port Hamilton (Kŏmundo) and British foreign policy: the Li-Ladyzensky joint agreement of 1886*. European Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 13. pp. 43-75.

¹¹⁶ George Alexander Lensen. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899, volume 1*, p. 63.

¹¹⁷ Boris Park (Борис Пак). *Rossiyskaya diplomatiya i Koreya* (Российская дипломатия и Корея). Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniya RAN (Институт востоковедения РАН), p. 166; *Mr. Brenan to sir J. Walshaw, November 3, 1886, Inclosure in #299. Anglo-American diplomatic materials relating to Korea, 1866-1886*, p.747.

¹¹⁸ *Korph, Memorandum osobogo sobraniya* (Меморандум особого собрания), *January 26, 1887. Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Fond №143 «Kitayskiy stol», 491, 5, 1887, Vsepoddaneyshiye doklady, 168, List 10 – 10 oborot, 17 oborot – 18* (Архив Внешней Политики Российской Империи, Фонд №143 «Китайский стол», 491, 5, 1887, Всеподданейшие доклады, 168, Лист 10 – 10 оборот, 17 оборот – 18).

¹¹⁹ Stephen A. Royle. *Anglo-Korean relations and the port Hamilton affair, 1885-1887*, p. 133.

¹²⁰ *Iddesleigh to Walshaw, November 19, 1886. From Stephen A. Royle. Anglo-Korean relations and the port Hamilton affair, 1885-1887*, p. 133.

The Fault in Our Stars? Korea's Strategy for Survival and Germany's Rise, 1876–1910

Dylan Motin

Observers often attribute the disappearance of Korea in 1910 to the failure of Korean elites to modernize and open the country. Yet, this explanation overlooks the international structure and the power shifts ongoing during the early twentieth century. Accordingly, this study uses international relations theory to shed a new light on the Japanese annexation of Korea. First, it shows that the international strategy of Joseon and the Korean Empire corresponds to buck-passing, a cost-effective strategy for weak states. Second, it argues that the rise of German power during the 1900s forced the great powers to focus their attention on Europe. In doing so, they left Korea with no one to catch its buck and vulnerable to a Japanese takeover. Therefore, this article is of import for both Korean historiography and the understanding of the strategies of small states.

Key Words: annexation of Korea, balance of power, buck-passing, Joseon, Korean Empire

I. Introduction

The 1876–1910 period of Korean history is often seen as a straight line leading inexorably toward Japanese annexation (for example Hao 2018). For Hulbert (1969, 121–2), Korea took the road to perdition in 1880 due the debilitating conflict between reformists and conservatives. McKenzie asserts that “no unbiased observer can deny that Korea owes the loss of her independence mainly to the corruption and weakness of her old administration” (McKenzie 1969, v) and, close to Hulbert, that “the Emperor [...] had, in the hour that he consented to crush the reformers, pronounced the doom of his country” (McKenzie 1969, 88). Lew (1979, 106) laments that, if it was not for nefarious Chinese influences, “the vibrant nationalism and enthusiasm for reform exhibited by the Korean leaders of the enlightenment movement indicate that Korea could have succeeded in achieving sufficient modern wealth and power to preserve its national

* I would like to thank Kuyoun Chung and Alexandre Haym for their thorough comments. All remaining errors are mine.

independence, if not rival modern Japan in economic and military terms.” Indeed, Korea is often compared to Japan, which successfully became a great power through reforms. For example, Mun (2013) attributes the ultimate failure of Joseon’s elites to their inability to emulate Japan. Ironically, the Japanese came up with a similar rationale while attempting to convince the Korean Emperor to sign the protectorate treaty: since Korea failed at modernizing, it was an easy target for predatory great powers, and thus required Japan’s mentoring to survive (Kim 2005).

Yet, this comparison is misplaced because the two states’ initial conditions were unlike. In other words, even if Korea had taken a different pathway, the end result would likely have been similar. Many scholars seem to confound modernization with power but these are quite different concepts. As we shall see, Korea did not confront directly international threats but instead encouraged other powers to defend its sovereignty on its behalf.

Although this study does not dispense from studying Joseon’s internal situation, it shows that international political factors are sufficient to explain the annexation of Korea. First, it refines our understanding of Korea’s late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries foreign policy. Second, this article replaces the colonization of Korea in its global setting and explores the impact of the rise of Germany on the Korean question. Third, it sheds a new light on the trajectories of small states embroiled in great power competition.

II. Theory

A. The Korean Question

Korea’s modernization efforts between 1876 and 1905 mostly failed. But why did not the Korean government tried harder to modernize? Why did Korea have the luxury to forestall reforms? Joseon was a country with old and stable institutions and a relatively homogenous population, united by a strong nationalism. There was no predetermination in the failure to modernize. Korea should actually have had even more incentives than Japan to modernize, because, unlike Korea, Japan is an archipelago protected by large bodies of water.

Japan wanted to expand for accumulating territories and resources (see Liberman 1996, chap. 6). Korea was a potential source of manpower and economic growth. Seizing Korea would enlarge Japan's consumption and financial markets. In addition, Japan lacked the natural resources to fuel its economy while Korea could provide agricultural products, gold, silver, iron, lead, tungsten, and coal. Tokyo was also interested in timber and fishery resources (Lee 1984, 317–29; Roy 2011, 24). German military adviser Jacob Meckel's oft-cited description of Korea being “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan” (Duus 1998, 49) reflects its military importance for Japan. The Korean Peninsula is a strategic piece of real estate for both defensive and offensive considerations. Although the threat Korea poses to Japanese security is likely overrated — the Americans in 1945 planned to land directly on Japan even without controlling Korea, for example — it remains that Korean territory can help a would-be aggressor to project power toward Japan.

While Japan had the latent capabilities to become a great power, Korea did not.¹ It counted in 1900 around 12 million people while Japan had around 45 million (McEvedy and Jones 1978, 177, 181). Japan was more than three times more populous; even if Korea had had an equal per capita wealth, it would still have been three times poorer than Japan. It had few hopes to ever match Japan's military power. Therefore, reforms or not, Korea was unlikely to create a favorable balance of power while it was an attractive target for the Japanese. Accordingly, Korea's

situation was a most precarious one. Surrounded by three major expansionist powers, all of which had identified Korea as strategically important, it is difficult to see how it could have easily navigated its way safely toward modernization without inviting the intervention of its neighbors. Nor is it easy to conceive how a poor, overwhelmingly agricultural nation of perhaps 15 million could have resisted its much larger and more powerful neighbors. Few nations escaped colonization in this era, including other long-standing states such as Vietnam and Burma. Among the small number of exceptions were states such as Thailand, Afghanistan, and Persia, which did so partly as buffer states between empires, but Japan's victories over China and Russia ruled out this possibility. (Seth 2010, 36)

Indeed, Persia and Thailand avoided colonization by playing one great power against the other. Several authors sensed that Korea attempted a similar strategy. Writing about 1898, Hulbert (1969, 159) noticed that Korea “had come to look with some anxiety upon the growing influence

¹ For a discussion of power in international politics, see Motin (2021).

of Russia here, and with the same oscillatory motion as of yore made a strong move in the opposite direction when the opportunity came. The Korean government has been nearly as astute as Turkey in playing off her ‘friends’ against each other.” Mun (2013, 8) judges, with reprobation, that Korean leaders “deluded themselves in trying to ‘use’ China, Japan, and Russia, which were pressuring Joseon’s with their crushing military power.” Historian Tyler Dennett concluded that “the Emperor of Korea, in his last effort to play one Power against another, had been entangled in his own crooked ways and there was no help for him” (quoted in Kim 2006, 254). Such strategy is known by international relations theorists as ‘buck-passing’.

B. Strategies for Survival

There are four main strategies for survival that states often employ (see table 1):

Two aggressive strategies are conquest (military expansion to gain regional hegemony) and bandwagoning for profit (aligning with a strong, aggressive state to gain some of its spoils). One defensive strategy is balancing: building military power, finding allies, and confronting aggressive states. A second defensive strategy is buck-passing. Buck-passers recognize the need to balance against a threat, but they do as little of the required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of others. Buck-passing is often preferable to balancing; balancing, after all, is costly and may undermine one’s own long-term security through depletion of manpower and wealth. Buck-passing transfers as much of these costs as possible to other states. (Lind 2004, 103–4)

Table 1. Small power strategies

Strategy	Emergence	Balance	Buck-pass	Bandwagon
Costs	-	high	low	low
Security	high	high	medium	low
Examples	Meiji Japan, Red China, Putin Russia	Cold War W. Europe	19 th c. Thailand and Belgium	WWI Bulgaria, WWII Hungary, 1950s China

For a small state, the best way to survive is to maintain the balance of power so that no great power is able to easily conquer it. Balancing means allying with the weaker side against the strongest military threat (external balancing) and/or increase one’s defense effort (internal

balancing; Waltz 1979, 118). Internal balancing is often done at great economic cost and is possible only as long as money and manpower are available. External balancing is cheaper but risky. Allies will come to help only if they please so. In addition, one may end up trapped in an ally's wars — this is the so-called abandonment-entrapment dilemma (Snyder 1984). Furthermore, balancing is hard to work out when there is no clear threat.

Another strategy is emergence (Lind's conquest). A secondary state can try to develop its economy and better its military in order to become a great power. Japan during the late-nineteenth century did just that. But becoming a great power requires to possess strong building blocks. Among these is a large population. When a small state like Korea cannot grow 'vertically', it can try to grow 'horizontally'; conquer new lands or people. This is how eighteenth-century Prussia became a great power and, more recently, what Saddam Hussein attempted with Iraq. However, Korea, surrounded by far stronger neighbors, did not have that option.

Bandwagon is allying with the strongest power to reap some benefit, such as territorial compensation, economic support, or help against other rivals. Yet, it is dangerous to rely upon the continued benevolence of a stronger and potentially predatory state. Bandwagoning is a last-resort strategy (see Labs 1992; Walt 1987).

Buck-passing occurs when a state remains on the sidelines of power competition and instead gets another state to balance against a potential aggressor. The buck-passer understands the danger but does not want to bear the brunt of the confrontation. To facilitate buck-passing and deflect the attention of the aggressor, the buck-passer usually tries to maintain cordial relations with the aggressor.

Buck-passing not only avoids costs of balancing but also weakens the other powers, which have to contain or eventually fight the threat by their own means. It is also an efficient strategy when several potential threats exist and one does not have the strength to balance against all of them. The buck-passer expects "that other states, even singly, will be able to stalemate the aggressor without assistance and [...] that the process of fighting will be debilitating even for a victorious aggressor. Such an aggressor will pose a reduced threat to buck-passing onlookers who remain at their full, pre-war strength" (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 145). One can avoid conflict, keep its resources, and live to fight another day. However, it comes with risks: if the buck-catcher fails, the buck-passer is left alone to face an aggrandized aggressor. In addition, one needs a great

power to balance against another great power; if the buck-catcher's intentions change, a small state may be preyed upon.² Some have introduced alternative strategies like "hiding" (Schroeder 1994, 117); yet, in practice, hiding and buck-passing are almost undistinguishable. It is also different from hedging (Jackson 2014, 333–40), which is maintaining good working relations with both sides, and neutrality — no friendship with either side.³ Buck-passing is the result of a collective action problem. When one's contribution is too small to affect the provision of a public good — here balancing — it makes sense to free-ride on the balancing efforts of others:

The smaller member by definition gets a smaller fraction of the benefit of any amount of the collective good he provides than a larger member, and therefore has less incentive to provide additional amounts of the collective good. Once a smaller member has the amount of the collective good he gets free from the largest member, he has more than he would have purchased for himself, and has no incentive to obtain any of the collective good at his own expense. In small groups with common interests there is accordingly *a surprising tendency for the "exploitation" of the great by the small*. (Olson 1971, 35, emphasis in original)

Although Korea would have been better off with more power, a small state's efforts affect little the overall balance of power. For a small power in a multipolar setting, balancing provides little security at great costs while relying on great powers for protection provides security for cheap. In a balanced multipolar world, alliances are flexible and can change overnight. If a partner becomes threatening, it is easy to seek help from another power. Who is the main threat is not always obvious and can change quickly. Thus, playing one against the other while maintaining freedom of action is an attracting strategy. This is less possible in unbalanced systems and bipolarity, where flexibility is nonexistent and even small states have to pick the less threatening side. Therefore, for nineteenth-century Korea, buck-passing was the best — or least bad — strategy. It eventually failed due to the rise of Germany in the early-twentieth century.

III. International Situation

² Christensen and Snyder (1990, 141) and Mearsheimer (2014, 157–62).

³ For a classical discussion of alignment strategies, see Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) and Snyder (1984).

A great power being a state that has “sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world” and thus “some reasonable prospect of turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ultimately wins the war” (Mearsheimer 2014, 5). Thus, the structure of the international system is the number of great powers that compose it and the distribution of their military capabilities. The great powers for the relevant period were Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy (after 1861), Japan (after 1895), and the United States (after 1898; see Levy 1983, 29–42; Mearsheimer 2014, 6).

Table 2. *Structure of the international system, 1860–1991*

Period	1860–1902	1903–18	1919–38	1939–45	1946–91
Distribution	multipolar	multipolar	multipolar	multipolar	bipolar
Potential hegemon, Europe	-	Germany	-	Germany	Soviet Union
Potential hegemon, Asia	-	-	-	Japan	Soviet Union

Source: Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, updated ed. New York: W. W. Norton, chap. 8.

The conclusion of the Second Opium War in 1860 is an appropriate yardstick to mark the end of the East Asian system and the beginning of the global system. Meiji reforms in Japan, induced by the fear of European powers’ encroachments, started in 1868; interconnection between East Asian and global international systems must then have occurred at a prior date. The Crimean War (1853–6) saw Britain and France sending forces to Northeast Asia for confronting Russia (Eckel 1944; Stephan 1969; Suzuki 2019, 1101). French colonization of Vietnam started in 1858. The end of the Second Opium War in 1860 can thus be used as a benchmark for the fusion of the East Asian and global systems, whose structure was balanced multipolarity (see table 2).

But not all great powers had territories or implantations in the vicinity of Korea. Those active in East Asia were Britain, France, Russia, Germany after 1884, Japan after 1895, and the United States after 1898.⁴ Japan before 1895 and China were major states in Asia but not great powers.

⁴ The policies of these great powers are discussed in part V.

The international system changed in a significant way during the early twentieth century. Mearsheimer (2014, 304) views Germany as a potential hegemon from 1903 until 1918. A potential hegemon is a great power which has a large lead in military capabilities and is strong enough to confront the two next most powerful states in tandem and possibly even beat them (Mearsheimer 2014, 44–5). Before 1903, “Germany was not yet a potential hegemon, and the French and Russian armies together seemed capable of containing the Germany army [...] But that all changed in the first five years of the twentieth century, when Germany became a potential hegemon (1903) and Russia was dealt a devastating defeat by Japan (1904–5)” (Mearsheimer 2014, 331).

Japan trailed far behind the other great powers in terms of economic might during the relevant period; it was even less wealthy than Italy (Mearsheimer 2014, 221). The Japanese military was also relatively weak: in the aftermath of the 1904–5 war, Tokyo almost went bankrupt and the Japanese army even lacked ammunitions during several battles (Vié 2011, 30). The great powers should have been capable to push back Japan, as it was not a very impressive power. Although the Japanese army was trailing the main powers in numbers, the Japanese navy was markedly smaller while it had to project power across a sea in order to get to Korea (tables 3 and 4). Therefore, Tokyo was unlikely to resist a full-fledged great power onslaught to retake the Korean Peninsula; by 1905, Japan had only two army divisions available on the peninsula (around 30,000 troops; Jung 2010, 125).

Table 3. *Army personnel of the powers and Korea, 1890–1909 (in thousand)*

	1890–4	1895–9	1900–4	1905–9
Austria	340	358	375	410
France	564	623	673	678
Germany	507	495	495	601
Italy	268	282	295	323
Japan	150	240	577	625
Korea	-	-	17.56*	N/A
Russia	896	948	1,000	1,225
U.K.	208	253	276	257
U.S.	27	132	85	75

* Data for 1902. The 1900–5 period was the peak of the Korean army; it had less troops still in earlier periods.⁵
 Sources: Jo, Jaegon. 1996. “Daehan jeguggi gunsa jeongchaeggwa gunsa giguui unyeong” [Military policy and military organization at the time of the Korean Empire]. *Quarterly Review of Korean History* 19: 128, fn. 70; and Rasler, Karen A., and William R. Thompson. 1994. *The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490–1990*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 197.

Table 4. *Capital ships of the main powers (battleships and cruisers)*

Year	Japan	Britain	France	Germany	Russia	United States
1900	4/4	39/11	25/10	14/1	22/8	7/2
1901	6/7	41/12	25/9	15/1	22/8	9/2
1902	7/7	47/14	25/11	16/2	23/8	10/2
1903	7/7	49/19	25/12	18/2	23/9	11/2
1904	5/7	55/29	26/19	17/4	26/9	12/2
1905	5/9	58/29	26/20	19/4	14/4	13/6
1906	7/10	63/33	26/21	21/6	13/4	17/6
1907	8/12	62/35	27/21	22/6	10/4	22/9
1908	9/13	62/36	31/21	25/8	10/4	26/10
1909	11/14	62/37	29/23	26/8	10/4	26/11
1910	10/16	62/36	26/23	26/9	10/4	30/11

* Read: battleships / cruisers

Source: Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. 1997. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 147.

IV. Korean Strategy

A. 1860–76: *Old Ways Die Hard*

Joseon had been for centuries a vassal and tributary state of China and the 1860–76 period saw Joseon continuing to align on Beijing.⁶ This was not a balancing strategy against a threat, because Seoul made few attempts at reform and self-reinforcement. Although it should have been clear with the Second Opium War that China was unable to compete with the great powers and

⁵ For a discussion of the late Joseon and Korean Imperial army, see Shim (2005). Before the Russo-Japanese War, the Korean navy was confined to a single corvette in sorry condition.

⁶ For good discussions of tributary relations, see Cha (2011) and Perdue (2015).

protect Korea, Korean leaders failed to perceive it and still believed that China was the leading power in the world.

After the murder of French missionaries by the Koreans in 1866, France sent a small fleet to punish Korea and force Seoul to establish commercial relations with Paris. Yet, this fleet was too small to do much harm and soon left. The Joseon government believed that its strategy of relying on China and refusing to interact with the great powers was working. An American mission was similarly pushed back in 1871, giving the Koreans a false sense of security and reinforcing their ‘zombie bandwagoning’ with China. However, the Japanese pressured militarily Korea in 1876 to open up; Korea had to find a new strategy (Battistini 1952, 48–9; Seth 2010, 10–3). Relying on China was unworkable because Beijing was too weak to defend Korea against the great powers or even Japan. Joseon soon started to reach for several powers.

Korea had faulty information about the distribution of power and lacked knowledge concerning the activities and capabilities of European powers in Asia. Although the Koreans sensed a relative weakening of China, they believed it was still the hegemonic power of the region and that defying Chinese domination was too risky. For example, the Koreans ignored for a long time the true extent of the concessions that China made to European powers in the aftermath of the Second Opium War (Hara 1998). This misperception is ill-explained by structural realism. Other theories like neoclassical realism (see Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016) would likely do a better job at explaining this era. After this period of zombie bandwagoning, however, Korean leaders resorted to buck-passing.

B. 1876–84: First Bucks Passed

The Koreans first attempted to limit Chinese influence by inviting the Japanese in.⁷ The *First National Bank* of Japan was allowed to operate in Korea in 1878 (Roy 2011, 10). However, after 1880, Joseon saw in Russia the main threat to its independence and hoped to gain the support of other powers — mainly China, Japan, and the United States — in order to contain it (Seth 2010, 14). Seoul signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the United States in 1882. The Koreans then asked for U.S. support in both civilian and military matters and were granted a few

⁷ I list instances of political decisions from the Korean government to involve a power in peninsular affairs.

military instructors (Battistini 1952, 56–7). Joseon also required Japanese military advisors to train the Korean cadets to modern warfare (Seth 2010, 15). Tokyo obtained in 1883 a concession to lay an undersea telegraphic cable between Busan and Nagasaki.

A German national, Paul Georg von Möllendorff, arrived in Korea in late 1882 and was appointed deputy foreign minister. He clearly favored buck-passing too. Möllendorff understood that China was on the decline, and that to balance the rising clout of Japan, Korea would need to rely on a third actor. He imagined Russia in this role and envisioned something akin to the situation of Belgium, where several powers would balance each other and thus guarantee Korean independence (Jin 2019, 282–3). During the early 1880s, French presence in Korea was rising too. Kim Ok-gyun and Seo Jae-pil, two Korean officials visiting Japan, approached France in early 1884 with the hope of gaining French support to train and modernize the Korean army (Sims 1995, 130–1).

C. 1884–96: Chinese and Japanese Domination

The abortive Gapsin Coup of December 1884 led to the intervention of Chinese troops in Seoul. China used the occasion to reestablish its dominant position: between 1885 and 1894, China's envoy to Korea, the Imperial Resident Yuan Shikai, exercised a direct control over Korean affairs. Korea became a quasi-protectorate of China. The Chinese were relatively successful at blocking Korean attempts at finding foreign support and worked with conservative forces to block important reforms (Seth 2010, 19–22).

This period is therefore the first failure of the buck-passing strategy. Yet, even under foreign domination, the Joseon government kept trying to pass his buck. The Korean emperor hoped to end Chinese domination by appealing to Russia. Möllendorff secretly met with the Russian envoy to Tokyo in early 1885 and requested Russian protection (Cho and Lee 2018, 65). That same year, the occupation of the Geomundo islands by a British force displeased Joseon. In May 1885, the Koreans asked Russia to pressure Britain and even proposed to give some islands to Russia in exchange for help (Suzuki 2019, 1111). Korea's opening toward Russia also aimed at escaping

Chinese domination. However, the Chinese heard of these contacts and ended them (Kim 2015b, 6–7).⁸

The Japanese grew wary of Chinese influence over Korea and war was soon brewing. When Japanese forces landed and occupied Korea in 1894, the Korean army did not react. In fact, the Joseon government saw this as an opportunity to get rid of Chinese domination and implored both sides — and not only Japan — to withdraw their troops (McKenzie 1969, 41). The war ended in a swift Japanese victory and destroyed China's domination over Korea at once, but Joseon had merely traded one threat for another: Japan was now garrisoning Korea and soon dominated Joseon politics.

Joseon resorted to buck-passing once again and wanted Russia to catch the buck. Korea's quiet buck-passing was bearing its fruits. The Japanese felt that their influence in Seoul was waning while Russia's clout was on the rise. The Japanese legation in Korea adopted a dramatic course of action and assassinated Joseon Queen Min (Orbach 2017, 110). A number of European powers were already disturbed by Japan's influence over Manchuria and this murder shocked the public opinion. Soon, Russia threatened Japan of a naval offensive by readying its fleet; the Japanese navy was ill-prepared to face a Russian onslaught (Vié 2011, 12). France was a treaty ally of Russia and stepped in too. Germany also joined, hoping to carve colonies for itself in China and drive a wedge in the Russo-French alliance by supporting Moscow. A small contingent of Russian troops landed in Korea and the Korean Emperor escaped his palace to take residence in the Russian legation (Ahn 2019, 63–5; Battistini 1952, 63–6; Jung 2010, 114–5; Orbach 2017, 112). The Japanese realized they were outgunned by the three powers and relinquished their control over Manchuria and Korea.

D. 1896–1905: The Buck Stops Here

The 1894–5 Sino-Japanese War reshuffled Korea's international environment. Chinese power was definitively broken. Now allied with Russia, France was no more a potential threat while Britain was leaning closer to Japan by the day. Hence, only Japan and Russia remained as existential threats. Japan showed in 1895 that it had become a full-fledged great power.

⁸ Britain actually encouraged China to annex Korea so it would not fall into Russian hands (Kim 2015b, 10). For discussions on this decade of Chinese domination, see Lew (1979) and Seth (2010, 19–25).

Gojong, after establishing the Korean Empire in 1897, tried to grow its military capabilities. He started military reforms and established a more centralized command system (Jung 2010, 118). Meanwhile, Russia was actively increasing its influence over Manchuria and militarily occupied it in 1900, as a result of its intervention in the Boxer Revolt. Petersburg soon had nearly 200,000 soldiers in the region (Vié 2011, 20–1; Westwood 1986, 14). The Russians extended the Trans-Siberian railway into Manchuria, thus facilitating the movement of troops towards Korea. Russia's clout grew to the extent that Russians even became palace guards for the Emperor (Seth 2010, 29).

Russia's occupation of Manchuria became a threat as looming as Japan's rise; it was not clear for Korean leaders which was the most dangerous. When Russian envoy to Korea Alexey Shpeyer became more assertive, Korea reverted back to buck-passing and started to rebuke the Russians and give economic concessions to other foreigners and notably the Japanese (Hulbert 1969, 156–7). Russian military instructors left the country in 1898. Japan acquired the concession for the Incheon-Seoul railway, which allowed for the quick movement of troops landing in Incheon towards the capital. In September of that year, the Koreans granted to the Japanese the militarily important Seoul-Busan railway concession. Yet, after 1900, the Russians redoubled their efforts to dominate Korea and chase the Japanese out. They asked for a coaling station in Masan, southern Korea, near by the Japanese territory; although the Koreans refused, the Japanese grew wary (Roy 2011, 3–4; Vié 2011, 14).

In early 1902, Gojong used the anniversary of his 40 years on the throne as a pretext to invite the great powers and have them guarantee Korea's independence. Germany was especially adamant in backing Korea, as it assured Gojong that it would support Seoul against a possible Japanese aggression (Jung 2010, 119–20). In 1902, Korea secured the help of a Japanese bank to create a stable money. In July 1903, a small Russian force entered Korean territory and started building a fort at Yongampo. Under Japanese pressure, they soon withdrew but this alarmed both the Japanese and the Koreans (Seth 2010, 32).

The origins of the weaponry and military supply used by the Korean army support the buck-passing hypothesis. Between 1898 and 1903, 12 instances of military-related importations are recorded: five from Japan, three from France, two from Germany, one from Russia, and one from the United Kingdom. The only and last import from Russia occurred in March 1900 (Jo 1996, 112).

In July 1896, the concession for building the strategic Northwestern railway was awarded to France. Gojong had hopes that France would act as a protector of Korea. France indeed provided civilian and military support but the French saw that war between Japan and Russia was on the horizon and worried that Russian military power would be squandered in Asia instead of balancing the German threat in Europe. France not only disengaged from Korean affairs, but advised in 1902 Russia to pursue limited goals in Korea and let Japan have a dominating influence there. Paris also gave up on building said railway (Roy 2011, 4; Suh 2003, 138–9).

Gojong too understood that, with Russia occupying Manchuria, war between Japan and Russia was brewing and that Korea would likely be swiftly conquered by Japan. In order to guarantee its independence, he hoped to rely on the United States and especially Germany — as Britain and France would be unlikely to help (Jung 2010, 122–3). The assistance promises he had received from Germany probably prompted a sense of security in Seoul and explain why Korea immediately declared its neutrality when the war eventually started in February 1904.⁹ As Prime Minister Yi Yong-ik explained,

Let Russia and Japan fight. Korea will take no share in their fighting. Our Emperor has issued a declaration of neutrality, and by that we will abide. If our neutrality is broken, the Powers will act without being asked, and will protect us. (McKenzie 1969, 109)

He likely hoped to get through as in 1895, when the Triple Intervention of France, Germany, and Russia rolled back Japan. Indeed, a relative balance of power allowed the Koreans to play one against the other and avoid to fall into one side's grip. But this time, there would be no salvation from abroad.

E. When Day Breaks: Last-ditch Attempts

Right after the end of the war, the Koreans realized that the Japanese were here to stay. Korean officials visited foreign embassies and requested help for maintaining the country's sovereignty, to no avail (Jung 2010, 126). The Emperor obtained a positive response from the Russian tsar, but it never concretized into actions (Kim 2006, 238).

⁹ When the war broke out, Gojong transferred his personal properties to the *Deutsch-Asiatische Bank*, as he trusted Germany the most (Jung 2010, 123).

During the early morning hours of 18 November 1905, the treaty transforming Korea into a Japanese protectorate was signed. At dawn, Korea was an independent state no more (see Kim 2005). However, on November 20, Germany received a telegram from Gojong stating that the treaty had been signed under duress and requesting German help. Although this led to nothing, the Emperor did try again in 1906, but the German officials in charge did not even bother to deliver his message to Wilhelm II (Jung 2010, 132–5). He also sent letters to eight other powers but was ignored. Throughout late 1905 and early 1906, the Koreans lobbied Britain and the United States for protection but failed to persuade them (Kim 2006, 235, 247).

When Professor Homer Hulbert, serving as an envoy of the Emperor, reached Washington in 1907, the American senators he met were rather perplexed: “What do you expect us to do?” they asked him, “Do you really believe that America ought to go to war with Japan over Korea?” (McKenzie 1969, 131). The Emperors then sent three representatives to the Second Hague Peace Conference for requesting assistance, but they were denied entry (Seth 2010, 34; see also Wilz 1985). Gojong finally gave up and, pressured by the Japanese, abdicated the throne to his son that same year.

Table 5. *Overview of Korea’s buck-passing strategy*

Period	1876–9	1880–2	1883–4	1896–8	1898–1904
Main threat	China	Russia	Japan	Japan	Russia
Main buck-catchers	Japan	China, Japan	China	Russia	Japan
Secondary buck-catchers	-	-	France	France	Germany

After 1876, the Koreans had to face an environment full of dangers, with China, Japan, and Russia lurking around. They played these three powers one against the other, but China took a lead and Finlandized Joseon in 1884. Japan’s intervention in 1894 successfully freed Korea from the Chinese, but the Japanese now occupied Korea. Thanks to the Triple Intervention, however, Korea took back its freedom in 1896 and soon reverted to its default strategy, buck-passing. Russia was the most immediate military threat but also the only power able and willing to balance rising Japanese power. Japan was a major threat too, but the only state capable of blocking Russian ambitions. The Koreans thus successively enticed the less threatening of the two into balancing

against the other. They understood it was risky so they also tried to get assistance from France and Germany. The Japanese eventually prevailed and seized Korea.

Korea thus tended to buck-pass between its more powerful neighbors. But why did this fail in the end? Researchers have overlooked the interconnection of Asian and European power politics and the ripple effect of Germany's rise. I argue in the next part that the rise of Germany neutralized all the available buck-catchers, therefore rendering buck-passing impossible.

V. Great Powers' Reactions

Why a strategy that worked relatively well suddenly failed in 1904–5? Why did the great powers intervene on Joseon's behalf in 1895–6 but not after 1904? The great powers had six years (1904–10) to potentially reverse Japanese domination over Korea. This was enough time to put together any kind of individual or collective action. It looks indeed peculiar that European and American powers, usually adamant on maintaining the balance of power, accepted that easily Japanese protectorate over Korea. It stretches the imagination that the great powers failed to comprehend that Japan's annexation of Korea would seriously alter the Asian balance of power in Japan's favor. Dennett (1922, 18) noticed that "the general policy of the European powers before 1900 [...] was to repress the growing strength of Japan" to safeguard the regional balance of power. After all, London, Paris, and Washington were less shy to oppose German colonial ambitions during the Moroccan affair and grant France domination over Morocco in 1906. Not only Russia, but also Britain and France had had in the nineteenth century ambitions regarding Korea. Moreover, the United States was treaty-bound to guarantee Korean sovereignty.

The great powers failed to restore Korea's sovereignty not because they would not, but because they could not. For Japan, Korea was an immediate interest, while for European great powers, it was a distant concern compared to the German threat. The Russo-Japanese War tilted the balance of power still more, since the weakening of Russia forced Britain and France to cooperate more closely with each other, with Russia, and also with Japan. Germany, which by this time had become a potential hegemon, was absorbing almost all of American, British, French, and Russian attention.

A. Britain

At the dawn of the twentieth century, Britain's main concern was to maintain the balance of power in the East by preventing both Russian domination and a Russo-Japanese entente (Edward 1957, 20, 25–6; Kim 2015a, 191–2). Britain signed an alliance treaty with Japan in 1902. However, the rationale behind British actions soon exchanged its anti-Russian coloration for an anti-German one.

Anglo-French relations improved markedly in late 1902–early 1903. That laid the basis for the April 1904 *Entente cordiale* (Edward 1957, 22–3; Kim 2014, 57). Indeed, British leaders came to perceive Germany as their main threat after 1904 (Chapman 2004, 53–5). The rise of Germany forced Britain to engage deeply into continental power politics. The British were eager to form a grand alliance of France, Japan, and Russia in order to contain Germany. In August 1905, Britain renewed its alliance treaty with Japan, thus acknowledging Tokyo's dominion over Korea (Kim 2015c, 9–11, 18). In any case by that time Britain was already redirecting its naval forces away from Asia and toward Europe; it would have few means left to confront Japan even if it had wanted to (Vié 2011, 33). Indeed, Britain's strategy was to rely on Japan to protect India and its Asian flank while focusing on Europe and Germany's rise (Jung 2010, 142–3). As Walt put it,

Germany had a large land army, an expanding Navy, revisionist ambitions, and was far closer to the British isles. [...] Germany threatened to overturn the balance of power on the continent and establish itself as a European hegemon, precisely the outcome Britain had long sought to prevent. (Walt 2018, 21–2)

B. France

As mentioned above, France was for a time sympathetic toward the cause of Korea. However, this changed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

France and Russia allied in 1892, both acknowledging Germany as the most threatening power. France also bettered its relations with Britain in April 1904 to balance against Germany. During the Russo-Japanese War, French leaders understood that they had few military means

available to help Russia in Asia, since their Far East forces were meager. In addition, they would not endanger their relations with Britain for a secondary issue such as Korea. France's support to its Russian ally was mostly moral. France even played both sides, selling weapons to Japan while informing Russia of Japanese troop movements. The Moroccan Crisis of 1905, which started in the midst of the war, reinforced French fears of a conflagration with Germany. As soon as the Russo-Japanese War ended, the French asked the Russians to immediately send their army back to Europe for redressing the balance of power with Berlin. They were fearing a German attack while Russia was busy in Asia.¹⁰ France even pressed Britain to provide more support in order to compensate for the reduction of Russian forces in Europe and the weakening of the Russian army after its string of defeats against Japan. France played a key role in forcing Russia to refocus on Central Europe and give up its ambitions in the East (Korobov 2006; Parsons 1969, 40–1).

Paris also wanted to improve its relations with Japan. A first motive was to secure Russia's Asian flank in case of a war in Europe by gaining Tokyo's friendship. Another was to protect French colonies in Asia by befriending Japan. The Franco-Japanese Treaty of 1907 recognized Japan's dominion over Korea and established strong cooperation between the two powers (Kim 2015c, 19–20).

C. Germany

Germany was probably the great power the most supportive of Korean independence, since neither a Japanese Korea nor a Russian Korea were any good to the Germans.

At first, Berlin hoped that the Korean question would bring a war between the Russo-French alliance and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, thus opening the way for German hegemony over Europe (Jung 2010, 118). German Chancellor von Bülow saw in the coming of the Russo-Japanese War an opportunity to diminish international pressure on Germany. The Germans attempted a rapprochement with Russia — with the hope of breaking the French-Russian alliance, to no avail (Steinberg 1970).

¹⁰ French worries were founded, as the Germans did indeed seriously think about attacking France in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War (Kowner 2007, 6–7).

After that failure, Germany's endgame became to ally with the United States against Japan in order to drive a wedge between Washington and London and force the British to focus their attention away from Europe.¹¹ Indeed, relations between Germany and Japan soured after 1902, because German interests in China conflicted with Japan's and the Japanese grew closer and closer to Britain (Chapman 2004, 51–3). But this hope was ill-founded too. If the Germans correctly understood that the Americans were wary of Japan, they failed to realize that the Americans were more wary of Germany still (Mehnert 1996; Szimpl 1998, 19–20).

In 1907 and 1908, Germany attempted to balance Japan's new found superiority by allying with China. This endeavor too petered out (Kim 2015c, 21–2; Szimpl 1998, 1–13). Berlin could hardly act on its own because it was constrained by hostile powers all around the corner. It could have done little short of starting a world war — which it actually did a few years later.

D. Russia

By the end of 1906, the Russians resolved to better their relations with Britain in order to balance against Germany and Austria. As Britain was an ally of Japan, this meant mending fences with Tokyo. France, Russia's most important ally, also pressured Petersburg to pivot toward Europe and away from Asia. Russian military planners acknowledged that a war with Austria and Germany was the most pressing threat and came to see a war of revenge against Japan as unrealistic for at least a decade (Korobov 2006, 7–8).

Japan, up to 1906, was not rushing for annexing Korea, as it was wary of Russia's reaction. However, Russo-Japanese relations soon started to improve under British and French auspices. Russia had initially invited Korean diplomats to participate to the 1907 Hague Conference in order to plaid the cause of Korea's freedom against Japanese encroachments. But as relations bettered, this invitation became an embarrassment for the Russians, who joined the other powers in denying to the Korean delegation access to the conference. Finally, Petersburg and Tokyo reached an official diplomatic rapprochement in July 1907 (Kim 2015c, 16–9). This and the Anglo-Russian

¹¹ On wedge strategies, see Crawford (2011).

Convention of August 1907 definitively put Britain and Russia on the same side, postponing *sine die* a Russian intervention on Seoul's behalf.

E. United States

At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, wariness about Germany's growing naval power was on the rise in the United States. After the U.S. victory over Spain in 1898, Germany and its navy became the biggest strategic worry for American planners (Braisted 1957, 235–7; Vagts 1939; 1940). In December 1903, the Navy ruled that the fleet was too small to be divided between Atlantic and Pacific and that all American battleships should be stationed in the Atlantic to face the German threat.

At first, during the Russo-Japanese War, the United States hoped to maintain the balance of power between Japan and Russia (Kim 2015c, 8). But in July 1905, two months before the end of the conflict, the United States reached an agreement with Japan about their respective interests in Asia and in the Pacific, and agreed to Japanese control over Korea. Accordingly, the Americans discarded all Korean appeals to the treaty of 1882 offering U.S. good offices towards Korea. Japan-U.S. tensions increased after the Oriental Public School affair of October 1906. However, although the Americans had a large naval advantage over Japan, they decided against basing their fleet in the Pacific due to the German danger. Therefore, after the fleet toured the Pacific in late 1907–early 1908 for a show of force, it was brought back to the Atlantic (Braisted 1957, 236–41; Szippel 1998, 19–20; Wilz 1985).

The Americans were eager to settle down with Japan in order to focus on Germany; President Roosevelt's "uneasiness regarding Germany in the Atlantic coupled with the American military weakness in the Pacific were sufficient to induce the President to welcome the Root-Takahira exchange of November 30, 1908, in which the United States and Japan publicly affirmed their intention to respect each other's territorial possessions," including Japanese domination over Korea (Braisted 1957, 242). By November 1909, Germany had become the second naval power of the world. The United States did not maintain a significant battle fleet in the Pacific until after the end of World War I (Braisted 1957, 243). Washington judged that it could not risk a showdown

with Japan and chose to improve its relations with Tokyo, sweeping the Korean question under the carpet (Mehnert 1996, 1460–1).

F. Summary: No Bang for the Buck

In 1895, France, Germany, and Russia intervened to roll back Japan's conquests. Yet, in the lapse of ten years, the strategic situation had dramatically changed. Germany had gone from average great power to *primus inter pares*. Britain allied with Japan and relied on Tokyo to safeguard its Asian possessions, so it could concentrate on Germany. France, instead of supporting Russia, pushed the Russians to give up their Korean ambitions, accept Japan's preeminence, and refocus on the German threat. Paris also hoped to arouse British sympathy by not opposing Japan and to gain Tokyo's support against Berlin. Russia, weakened by the Russo-Japanese war, had little choice other than to follow France and accommodate Britain for balancing against Germany. This entailed befriending Japan and therefore leaving Korea to its fate. The United States, although worried by Japanese expansion, could not risk a conflict with Japan while its naval might was needed against Germany. Paradoxically, Germany was the most willing but the least able to help Korea. Berlin seriously wanted to restore the *status quo ante bellum* but could do little, contained as it was by a hostile network of alliances.¹² During the 1904–1907 period, known to historians as the 'Diplomatic Revolution' (see Kim 2010; 2015c, 2; see also White 1995), the global balance of power changed to the extent that Korea's strategy of buck-passing came to a dead end. This Diplomatic Revolution — the newborn amity of Britain, France, and Russia among themselves and with Japan — was the direct consequence of Germany's emergence as a potential hegemon in Europe.

VI. Conclusion: All Things Must Buck-pass

¹² The great powers likely knew of the sympathy existing between Germany and the Korean Empire. This may have been the nail in Korea's coffin, as London, Paris, and Washington would have had little remorse to let Japan terminate a friend of Germany.

Korea did not balance against threats because it had a cheaper meal available on its foreign policy menu. Since it had great powers it could rely on, it eschewed balancing efforts altogether. Therefore, whenever possible, Joseon and then the Korean Empire opted for a buck-passing strategy. This failed after 1904 due to a factor beyond Korea's control: the rise of Germany. Britain, France, Russia, and the United States were far more wary of German power than of Japanese expansion and therefore left Korea to its own devices.

This study contributes to the 'fault-in-ourselves' and 'fault-in-our-stars' debate in international relations theory. Fault-in-ourselves theories — mainly liberalism — would argue that Korea's failure to resist Japanese colonization is mostly a self-inflicted blow, since Korean elites and institutions failed to kick-start modernization due to particular interests. Yet, fault-in-our-stars theories — mainly offensive realism — show that Korean foreign policy was optimized for the international environment it was facing.¹³ Korea chose the best strategy in a multipolar system of evenly matched great powers. Even during the last decade of Korean independence, Japan and Russia were equal in might and both had obvious colonial designs. Buck-passing failed due to the rise of Germany, an evolution on which the Koreans had no grip. Although the great powers would have preferred Korea to survive, Germany unwittingly condemned it.

This study does not erase domestic-level explanations but adds to them. Korea would have been better off with modernization, as more wealth is always better than less. But even a modernized Korea would have had to face Japanese power, to which Korea was a core interest while it was only a secondary problem for other great powers. It is unlikely that Japan would have given up on such ambitions, and without great power help it is doubtful that Korea could have decisively beaten Japan. Buck-passing strategy worked — until it did not. In all likelihood balancing would not have boded far better. Therefore, it is necessary to reassess late Joseon's foreign policy with this framework in mind. Korea played a very weak hand rather skillfully, but was left helpless when the rules of the game changed in the early 1900s.

During the nineteenth century, Korea had plenty of threats but enough great powers to play one against the other. In 1945, with Japanese power broken, the Soviet Union became a potential hegemon in Asia. South Korea had to face the combined threat from the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea and had few choices other than to balance against the Soviets and their following.

¹³ For liberalism, see Russett and O'Neal (2001); for offensive realism, see Mearsheimer (2014).

Buck-passing was not a viable option. It allied with the United States, the only counterweight available, and made far-ranging reforms to build up its economy and modernize its military.

Since Korea could not confront Japan on its own devices, it passed the buck to other powers. Yet, after 1903 no one was left to catch that buck. Korea's failure is not due to domestic ineptness but to dramatic changes in the balance of power. This can serve as a cautionary tale for those defending buck-passing or 'hedging' as a workable foreign policy for today's South Korea. Seoul is wary of the rise of China, now a potential hegemon in Asia, but would like to maintain its fruitful economic intercourse with Beijing. Many hope that U.S. power will deter a Chinese bid for regional hegemony while Chinese winds keep blowing in Korean economic sails. Such a strategy could have worked in a balanced multipolar environment, but with a potential hegemon next door it could be a recipe for disaster.

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Colonial Joseon as Viewed by British Indian Cyclists: The Travel Accounts of Adi B Hakim ,Bapasola ,Bhumgara and Ramnath Biswas

식민지 인도 자전거 여행가들이 인식한 식민지 조선:아비 하킴, 잘 바파솔라와 루스툼 붐가라과 람나스 비스와서의 경문록 중심으로

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I- 머리 말

한국과 인도의 역사적 관계는 불교가 한국에 유입 되었던 고대로 거슬러 올라간다. 불교를 포함한 양 국가의 문화적 관계는 가야의 시조 김수로(金首露)왕과 인도의 공주 허황옥(許黃玉)의 혼인을 포함한 여러 설화가 전한다. 『삼국유사(三國遺事)』에는 아유타(阿踰陀)국의 공주가 한반도에 도착하여 김수로왕과 결혼했다고 전하며, 이후에도 여러 승려들이 불교를 공부하고 순례할 목적으로 인도를 방문하며 양국의 문화교류는 지속되었다. 신라의 스님 혜초(慧超)는 인도의 역사와 문화를 이해하는 데 유용한 자료인 『왕오천축국전(往五天竺國傳)』를 저술하였다. 스님 치공은(불교 이름은 Sunyadisya) 고려 시대에 불교를 전파하기 위해 한국을 방문하였다.

이러한 한-인도 양국 간 협력 관계는 19 세기에도 지속되었다. 인도와 한국은 반식민지 운동을 전개하며 서로 관심을 가지고 교류하였다. 한국은 독립을 위한 인도의 대투쟁을 높게 평가했으며, 1919 년 3 월 1 일 삼·일 운동 이후 정치 지도자들과 지식인들을 높이 평가했다. 1929 년 인도의 시성 타고르는 한국을 "동방의 등불"로 묘사하며 시를 지어 보내주었다. 타고르는 이 외에도 여러 시에서 한국의 정체성과 한국 민족주의를 높게 평가하였다. 인도독립운동의 위대한 지도자인 마하트마 간디, 네루도 한국 민족주의 운동에 대하여 언급하였다.

한국과 인도의 역사적 관계는 불교가 한국에 유입되었던 고대로 거슬러 올라간다. 한국과 인도 두 나라는 식민지 체재 아래서 아픔을 겪었고, 고된 길을 통해 독립을 쟁취하였다. 이 두 국가는 서로 비슷한 고통을 경험하였으며, 사상을 공유하고 도덕적인 지원을 나누며 같이 손을 잡았다. 그러나 역사적 근거가 부족으로 많은 학자들은 두 나라의 국민들이 서로에 대한 관심이 별로 없었다고 생각되어왔다. 하지만 식민지 시절의 인도에서 식민지 시절의 조선으로 순방한 이들이 만난 세상과 사람들의 이야기를 담은 네 개의 여행기가 있다. 세 개의 조선 여행기를 포함한 현대 인도 자료를 최근에 검토한 결과 인도-한국 두 나라의 관계에 역사적 분석의 새로운 지평이 있다는 것이 나타났다.

본고의 연구가 주목하는 것은 일제강점기 시기에 조선을 방문한 인도인 자전거 여행가들이 관찰하고 이해한 사실들 정립하는 것이다. 1926 년에 인도인이 자전거로 조선을 방문했다. 또한 1932 년에도 인도인이 자전거로 조선을 찾아왔다. 이러한 자료들은 제 3 국가의 인도인이 일제가 한국에 미친 현실을 목격한 객관적인 기록이라는 점에서 중요한 자료이다. 또한 한국을 방

문한 인도 여행가들이 남긴 여행기를 통해 식민지 조선의 사회정치적 상황에 대해 살펴보고 식민지 조선에서 보이는 문화와 정치적 사건들을 찾아보고자 한다.

본고는 뱅골어와 영어로 쓰인 1 차 자료와 영어와 한국어로 쓰인 2 차자료를 바탕으로 한다. 이 연구에 쓰인 뱅골어 1 차 자료는 작년에 연구가 직접 발굴한 새로운 여행기 이다.

II-세계일주 사이클 여행자와 함께한 은둔자의 나라 한국 (隱遁者 一韓國)- 하킴

인도 작가인 아비 하킴, 잘 바파솔라와 루스툼 붐가라는 여행기인 『사이클 여행자와 함께하는 세계일주』에서 한국을 ‘은둔자의 왕국’으로 묘사하였다. 세 명의 인도인 유대인들은 자전거를 타고 세계 일주를 하였다. 그들은 1923 년 8 월 15 일에 뭄바이에서 출발하였고, 1928 년 3 월 18 일에 그들의 고향을 돌아왔다 (Babani, Viegas, 2021:21&54). 4 년 5 개월의 시간 동안 그들은 한반도를 포함한 44,000 마일을 달렸다. 1931 년에 3 명 작가인으로 뭄바이에서 영어로 『사이클 여행자와 함께하는 세계일주』 (With Cyclists around the World) 세계 유람기를 발간되었다. 인도의 초대 수상인 자와하랄 네루는 이 책에 서문을 달았다. “나는 이 책 속의 젊은이들이 참으로 부럽다”(Hakim, 1931:Vii). 이 세 명의 자전거 여행자들은 1926 년 2 월에 첫 시작으로 부산에 도착하였으며 아래와 같이 한국을 묘사하였다. “문명이 발전된 한국은 영국의 두 배 정도 되는 한반도에 자리 잡고 있으며, 이곳 사람들은 외국 문물로부터 스스로 단절하고 살고 있다.” “한국은 중국과 일본으로 지리적으로 가까움에도 불구하고 의복에서나 생활양식에서 서로 닮지 않았다. 한국 사람은 독특했다. 서양화 되어가는 일본의 정치적 영향에 의한 정신 개선은 의심스러웠다. 일제 식민지 동안의 한국인들 화(火)와 한(恨)은 결코 좋은 이유에서 비롯되지 않는 것 같다(Hakim et al, 1931:271). 그들의 이야기 첫 부분에서 작가는 한국에서 잘 닦인 도로를 예상하지 않았지만 놀랍게도 그들은 질 높은 도로를 발견하였다. “한국의 삶은 수도를 중심으로 발달되어있어 광역시를 벗어난 문명은 미개하다. 그래서 우리들이 한반도에서의 첫 출발이 잘 포장된 길로 되어 있어 무척이나 놀랍다.”(Hakim et al, 1931:271)

여행길에서 그들은 우연히 한국이란 나라가 외국인들에게 상당히 매력적이란 것을 발견하였다. “우리는 한국인들이 이렇게 일본인을 제외하고 외국인들에게 호감이 있는지 몰랐다. 일본인들의 존재는 의심할 여지없이 전혀 즐겁지 않다, 그러나 이러한 예외를 제외하고 한국인들의 한결같은 외국인에 대한 배려는 다양한 방법으로 드러난다 (Hakim et al, 1931:274).”

작가는 한국인들이 무척이나 밝고 다정한 민족이라고 생각하고 있다. 그들은 반가움을 이렇게 표현한다. “한국인들의 자발적인 호의에 감사합니다. 모든 한국 사람들은 언제나 우리들이 문들 두들기면 쉴 곳을 마련해 주고, 어떠한 요청에도 인색함 없이 도움이나 음식을 나누어 주었습니다. 심지어 아주 성가신 이른 아침에조차도 (Hakim et al, 1931:277). 한국인들은 타인을 배려하며 외국인들의 언어적 어려움도 이해합니다. 그래서 그들은 손님들의 얼굴 표정이나 몸동

작을 통해 그들이 무엇을 원하는지 알려고 항상 애씁니다”(Hakim et al,1931:274).

1926년 2월 11일자 조선일보에 “자전거로 세계여행 청년 인도인”이란 제목의 글과 함께 인도인을 소개되었다. “부처의 나라에서 청년 왔다,간디의 나라에서 청년이 왔다,타고르의 나라에서 청년이 왔다(조선일보, 1926년 2월 11일)”라고 기사를 올렸다.이틀 뒤에 1926년 2월 13일 동아일보에서 사진과함께 인도에서 잔전거타고 청년들왔다” 라고 서술 되었다(동아일보, 1926년 2월 13일). 그리고 1926년 2월 20일에 조선일보에서 사진과함께 환영 소식을 2페이지 정도 크게 보도 되었다(조선일보 1926년 2월 20일).

인도인 하킴 자전거 팀 큰 환영과 대접 받았다. 1926년 2월에 한국 땅에 들어와서 4월에 한국 땅을 떠났을 때 까지 거의 매일 이팀의 이동, 강연, 환영모임, 송별 모임등 조선일보 기사로 실려있었다. 양국 식민지 국가로서 서로 큰 관심과 희망 보여줬다.

III-자전거로 돌아본 한국 유람기(Korea expedition on a Two-wheeler) : 람나스 비스와스

람나스 비스와스는 세계 자전거 여행자이자 작가 및 군인이다. 그는 세계 여러 곳곳을 유람하였고 이후 벵골에서 이러한 자신의 경험담으로 30권 이상의 여행기를 집필하였다. 람나스는 1894년 지금의 방글라데시아인 이스트-벵골 바니아찬가 실랏(Baniachanga, Sylhet)에서 태어났다. 그는 1918년 영국군에 입대, 중동지역으로 파병되었다(Mamun,2012:52).. 1924년 영국 군대 전역 후 페르시아에서 외교부 행정원이 되었고, 말레이시아 영국해군재판소에서 통역을 수행하였다. 그는 혁명단체와 연루되었다는 혐의로 외교부 행정직을 박탈당했다. 그리고 나서 1931년 7월 7일에 싱가포르에서 첫 번째 세계 자전거 유람이 시작되었다. 싱가포르에서 출발하여 중국, 몽골, 한국, 미얀마, 인도, 아프가니스탄, 터기를 지나 유럽에 도착하였다. 그러나 그는 건강상의 이유로 인도에서 영국으로 돌아왔다. 1934년 람나스는 두 번째 자전거 기행으로 유럽을 돌아보았다. 1938년 그는 세 번째 자전거 여행으로 아프리카와 아메리카 대륙을 달렸다(Mamun,2012:55).제 2 차 세계 대전은 마침내 비스외스의 세 번째 여행을 끝냈다. 결국은 캘커타에 정착하기 위해 1940년에 돌아와 그의 전 세계 경험에 대해 30권 이상의 책을 썼다 (Basu, 2007:487). 7만 마일(약 11만 3천 킬로미터) 이상을 자전거로 달렸다. 그는 인도의 라빈드라 타고르로부터 축하 메시지를 받았다.

람나스는 1932년에 한국의 자전거 여행을 하였고, 1942년에 『자전거로 돌아본 한국 유람기』(Korea Expedition On A Two-wheeler)를 발간하였다. 람나스 비스와스의 식민지 조선 여행기 위한 첫 기록은 1932년 5월 5일자 동아일보에 “자전거로 세계여행”이란 제목의 글과 함께 인도인 람나스를 소개된 자료다. 람나스의 사진과 함께 “람나스 비스와스씨는 인도 군대를 전역하였고 한국의 문화와 사람들에 많은 관심이 있다”고 신문에 기재되었다(동아일보 1932년 5월 5일). 1932년 7월 12일자 동아 일보 신문에는 “오늘은 람나스씨가 싱가포르를 떠나 한

국에 온지 1년이 되는 날이다. 작년 7월 7일이 그가 싱가포르를 떠난 날이다. 그는 조선이란 나라가 지난 수 십 년 동안 비슷한 시기를 보낸 것 같아 보인다고 하였다. 인도의 젊은이들이 처한 상황과 한국의 젊은이들의 상황과 놀라울 정도로 같아 보이는 것 같다고 하였다. 인도와 한국 양국의 일반인들의 삶은 정말 애처로운 상황이다(동아일보, 1932년 7월 12일)”. 1932년 7월 23일 부산일보에는 일본어로 “반도는 악사[樂士]! 조선인은 행복하다 (부산일보, 1932년 7월 23일)” 라고 기재되었다. 1932년 7월 25일 동아일보에는 “약 한달 뒤에 서울 출발하여 7월 21일 부산에 도착한 람나스씨는 7월 28일에 출국하여 일본으로 갈 예정이다(동아일보, 1932년 7월 25일)” 라고 기사를 올렸다. 이어서 기사 안에는 “람나스는 ‘본 세계 여행의 목적들은 직접 나라를 보는 것뿐만 아니라 그 나라 사람들의 삶의 방식과 문화를 이해하고, 다양한 경험을 해보는 것이다. 또한 말레이시아 페낭, 방콕, 베트남의 사이공, 인도네시아에도 갔다가 중국 북부 쪽으로 갈려고 한다”라고 서술 되었다 (The Straits Time, June 02 1931, p.12).

람나스 비스와스가 한국에 체류한 시간과 이 기간 조선의 상황에 대한 문제이다. 1932년 5월 5일자 『동아일보』는 “자전거로 세계여행”이란 제목의 기사를 통해 비스와스를 처음 소개했다. 이 내용으로 볼 때, 5월 5일 이전에 이미 만주로부터 육로로 서울에 도착한 것으로 보인다. 평양이 매우 아름다웠다는 그의 평가가 이를 방증한다. 그리고 같은 해 7월 21일 부산에 도착했고, 일주일 체류 후 28일 일본으로 출국했다. 이렇게 볼 때, 한반도에 서의 체류기간은 길게 잡아도 6개월을 넘지 못했다. 그런데, 그가 한반도에 왔던 1932년은 한국독립운동사에서 매우 특별한 한 해였다.

1932년 1월 8일 한민애국단원인 이봉창(1900~1932)의 도쿄 의거부터 시작해, 4월 29일 윤봉길(1908~1932)이 중국 상하이 훙커우 공원서 의거를 일으켰다. 이 두 분의 젊은 의사는 모두 1932년 제국주의 일본에 의해 처형되었다. 5월 1일은 조선어학회의 기관지 『한글』이 속간되었고, 대한민국 임시정부가 중국 상하이에서 항저우로 이전했던 시기였다. 1919년 3.1운동 이후 한반도에서 항일독립의 의지가 최고조에 이르렀던 때가 바로 1932년이였다. 반면, 일본 제국주의의 통제와 탄압으로 더욱 심해졌다. 민족말살통치의 일환으로 ‘창씨개명’을 강요하고, 경제적 약탈을 노골적으로 감행했다. 일본 관동군이 1931년 만주사변을 일으키고, 다음해인 1932년 3월 1일 ‘만주국’이라는 괴뢰국을 세웠다. 바로 람나스 비스와스가 만주로부터 한반도로 들어왔던 그때의 1932년이다.

람나스는 자신의 여행기에 잃어버린 자신의 가이드북 이야기로 시작하였다. “강과 계곡, 언덕과 산으로 둘러싸인 나라 한국을 방문하였으나, 나는 이 나라의 이러한 정보를 많이 얻을 수 없었다. 촉박한 시간에 한국의 인구가 얼마나 되는지도 알 수도 없었고 심지어 여행 가이드북도 잃어버렸다. 한국의 지역 정보 등을 얻기 위해 나는 지도관련 서적을 구입했어야 했다”(Biswas, 1942:1). 작가는 만주를 통하여 한국에 들어왔다. 출입국 사무실에서 그는 세관 직원과 마주쳤다. 세관 직원은 그의 담배를 던지며 말하였다. “내가 던진 담배는 일본산이다. 당신

은 만주족 사람들이 수입담배를 좋아한다는 것을 특히 값싼 유럽산 담배를 매우 좋아한다는 것을 알 것이다. 우리는 그런 그들에게 값싼 담배들을 보내주고 있다. 하지만 그럼에도 불구하고 나는 당신이 한국에서 이 값싼 담배로 기침하는 것을 원하지 않는다. 일본의 속국이 되어버린 한국에 이 지지분한 것으로 병을 옮기는 것을 누구에도 원하지 않는다. 왜냐하면 한국이 병들면 일본 또한 병들기 때문이다”(Biswas,1942:1). 작가의 다음 표현은 더욱 놀랍다. “지배자가 이러한 자세로 식민지를 통치하는 곳에서 사람들은 분명 행복하고 부유하게 살 것이다. 그리고 나는 알게 되었다. 일본은 한국으로부터 승리를 쟁취한 것뿐만 아니라 이제는 전체를 집어 삼키려고 하고 있다. 만약 먹은 것이 독이라면 자신 또한 해롭게 될 것이다”(Biswas,1942:2).

람나스는 잘 정돈 된 길과 잔디와 나무를 보고 놀라움을 감추지 못했다. 그는 자신이 길 길 잃었을 때 경찰들이 마을을 찾아 주었다. 작가는 그들에게 말하였다. “나는 인도에서 여기 한국에 나의 힘을 자랑하러 온 것이 아니라, 사람이 사람을 지독히 고문하는 곳에서 여전히 행복이 있는지 보러 온 것이다”(Biswas,1942:2).

람나스는 한국인과 일본인 경찰들 사이에 임금의 차이가 있음을 보았다. 그가 일본인 경찰에게 질문하였다. “월급이 얼마나 되나요?” 일본 경찰이 말하였다. “일본인은 45 원을 받고, 한국인은 40 원을 받습니다.” 그는 “왜 이렇게 차이가 나는 겁니까?”하고 질문하자. 일본인 경찰은 자신의 가슴을 쿵쿵 치며 말하였다. “나는 고향이 일본 ‘나가사키’입니다. 거기서 저희가 집을 임대하면 임대료를 내야 하지 않나요? 만약 당신이 보고 있는 저 한국인들이 일본에 가서 일을 한다면 당연히 임대료를 내야겠지요. 그러나 만약 그들이 집을 임대하지 않았다면 우리 또한 임대료를 받지 않겠죠 ”(Biswas,1942:3).

동아일보에서 작가의 사진과 함께 인터뷰를 기사에 실었다. 작가는 각 지방의 신문기자들을 보고 놀랐다. 그는 ‘동아 일보’ 신문과 인도의 ‘아난드 바자르 (Aanad bazar)’와 비교하였다. 그가 말하기를 “이 ‘동아일보’는 한국 사람들이 계속 상생할 수 있게 해주는 것 같다. 만약 이 신문이 없었으면 그들은 당장에 일본에 의해 뭉개져 버렸을 것이다”(Biswas,1942:8).

람나스는 일본의 ‘일본식 성명 강요’ 또는 ‘창씨개명’ 정책을 기술하였다. 그는 한국인 대장장이와 토론하였다. “만약 우리가 일본의 통치자식 이름과 그들의 언어를 받아 들인다면 한국이란 나라의 존재는 사라져 버리게 될 것이다. 그리고 노예로 전락해 버리게 될 것이다. 자신의 고유한 존엄성을 잃은 사람은 그들이 삶 또한 무가치해져 버릴 것이다”(Biswas,1942:10). 람나스는 이러한 상황을 말하였다. “일제 식민지 통치아래 일본식 성명 강요는 사람들에게 잘 수용이 되지 않았다”(Biswas,1942:11).

작가는 인도에 관한 많은 소문들을 들었다. 소문은 인도 여성과 인도인의 짧은 삶에 한 내용이었다. 한국인이 말하기를 “우리는 인도에 대하여 많은 이야기를 들어 왔었고, 또 많은 글을 읽어 왔다. 그러나 여전히 우리는 웃고 있지요. 만약 우리가 이것을 말한다면 우리는 모든 것을 잃고 신이라는 이름 아래서 선교하려 가야 할 것이다. 이런 것에 우리는 별로 관심이 없다. 단지

당신의 이야기로 즐거울 뿐이다. 우리는 거의 죽어 갔지만, 당신의 등장으로 우리는 다시 살아났다”(Biswas,1942:12). 람나스는 선교자들에 대해 감사함을 표하였다. “나는 선교사 분들께 진심으로 감사 드립니다. 당신들은 우리에게 영어를 가르쳐 주었고, 우리는 이것으로 서로서로 대화할 수 있고 변하게 되었다”(Biswas,1942:13).

람나스는 학교에서 강연하였다. 그는 서울에 있는 학교에서 초대되어 인도 여성에 대하여 강연하게 되었다. 학교측은 중국 광둥지방의 중국 통역원을 데려왔다. 그리하여 람나스는 그들에게 미국에서 돌아온 한국인들이 많음에도 불구하고 왜 중국 통역원을 데려왔는지 물어 보았다. 답변은 확실한 어조로 전달되었다. “한국 남성들은 여전히 여성으로부터 절대적인 위치에 서고 싶어한다. 그들은 여성들이 남성들에게 무조건 복종하고 영원히 따르기를 원한다. 남성들은 여성들 앞에서 진실을 밝혀지기를 수 없이 많이 거부해 왔다. 그래서 나의 답변이 말한 것과 같이 정확히 통역이 되고 전해지는 차원에서 중국인 통역원을 지명하게 되었다”(Biswas,1942:32).

람나스는 강력한 의료정책과 함께 두 가지 다른 사건들을 서술하였다. 한 사건은 수박장수 사건이다. 약 200 명의 행상들이 잡혀서 경찰서로 연행되었다. 경찰관이 말하였다. “한국 정부는 여러분들의 의료 건강에 대하여 관여하기로 하였다. 만약 당신들이 영양결핍이거나 건강이 쇠약해 진다면, 한국 정부도 영향을 받게 될 것이다. 당신들은 살인과 같은 죄를 지었다. 이에 강력한 처벌을 내리고자 한다. 한국 정부는 살인을 원하지 않지만 누구든 이러한 일을 한 경우 우리들이 사형을 집행할 것이다”(Biswas,1942:21). 의사는 수박 장수 사진을 보여주었다. 의사는 ‘파리들이 수박 위에 앉아 있었고 이로 인해 수박은 질병에 감염될 것이다’라고 하였다. 의사는 소리치며 말하였다. “많은 사람들이 죽는 이유가 무엇이나? 수박장수 때문 아니냐? 이 사람이 살인자가 아니고 무엇이나? 교수형에 처해야 하지 않겠냐? 여기 있는 행상 모두다 이러한 죄를 지었으니 너희들 모두다 살인자들이지 않느냐? 너희 전부 교수형에 처해야 하지 않겠느냐? 할 말 있으면 말해 보아라”(Biswas,1942:21). 두 번째 사건은 그가 어린 한국인 소년과 나눈 파리와 모기의 경고에 대한 이야기이다. 한국 소년이 말하였다. “우리는 일본인들이 하는 것에 대해 반대로 하고 싶어합니다.” 람나스가 대답하였다. “이건 잘못된 일이야. 만약 한국사람들이 처벌 받는다면 결국 복수를 할 수 있는 사람들이 아무도 없게 될 것이다. 그리하여 ‘언젠가 우리는 독립한다.’라고 말하는 사람이 없게 되는 것이지. 미국 영화를 본적 있니? 미국인들은 여전히 말하지 ‘언젠가 우리는 지배한다.’라고. 만약 정말로 독립을 말하고 싶으면 너는 당장 일본의 좋은 점들을 받아들여야 할 것이야 ”(Biswas,1942:28).

작가는 한국을 인도 그리고 다른 나라들과 종종 비교하였다. “평양은 마치 한국의 실롱이나 다즐링, 심라와 같다. 이뿐만 아니라 평양의 아름다움은 필리핀의 바기오 혹은 독일의 드레스덴, 인도의 스리나가르, 마야의 프레이저 언덕과 같다”(Biswas,1942:16). 나아가 그는 “나는 프랑스의 인도네시아, 독일의 자바와 수마트라, 포르투갈의 다만, 디우, 고아 그리고 영국의 인도, 지금은 일본의 한국을 보았다.”라고 서술하였다. 보면 볼 수록, 느끼면 느낄수록 나는 일본의 한

국이 아니라 일본과 한국 두 나라를 모두 느낄 수가 있었다”(Biswas,1942:22).

람나스는 자신보다 먼저 한국에 방문한 인도인 자전거 여행자들을 알게 되었다. 그러나 그는 그들이 인도인임을 거부하였다. 사실 그들은 인도에서 온 이란사람들이었다. “그 사람들을 인도인이라 말하는 것은 나에게 모욕감 등을 느끼게 한다.” 그는 말하였다. “여보시게 친구들, 당신들이 각각 한국인과 일본인들인 것처럼 나 또한 인도인 이라네. 나의 피부 색깔이 증거이지. 비록 우리가 영국 정부로부터 식민지 통치를 받고 있어도, 나는 자신감 있게 인도의 힌두인 (Hindustani Hindu)이라고 말할 수 있어. 나는 이란인도, 파키스탄인도, 몽골인도 아니야. 나는 유일한 인도의 힌두인이야. 나를 싫어하고 독립하기 싫어한다면 나를 너희 나라에서 쫓아내어도 좋아. 하지만 여전히 나는 인도인 (Hindustani)가 아니라고 말 못하지 ”(Biswas,1942:30). 이런 면 에서 람나스 비스와스 의 강한 민족주의 감정은 밝혀진다.

비스와스는 자신보다 먼저 한국에 방문한 다른 인도 지식인들 성자 순다 싱 그리고 법학자, 교육가, 사회 개혁가인 하리 싱 가우르를 소개하였다. 성자 순다 싱 시크교도 이었고 기독교를 극렬히 반대한 분이였다. 순다싱은 인도의 넓은 땅 뿐만 아니라 세계 여행하며 복음을 전했습니다. 1918 년 복음을 전하기위하여 중국과 일본 방문하였다. 성자 순다 싱 쓴 책들이 1929 년 조선기독교대학(Chosen Christian College) 도서관의 기록된 책들이 현재 연세대학교 도서관에서 이연구가 직접 발굴 하였다. 그 당시에 성자 순다 싱 영향을 식민지 조선에도 볼수 있다. 비스와스와 불교인 일본 경찰 대화에 따라서 “미국인들의 이런 작품 보세요. 그들은 Sunder Singh(순다 싱)이라는 인도 사람의 이름을 사용하고 있다. 예수의 이름이 일하지 않아서 부처님 나라 사람을 세웠다. 부처가 온 나라, 그 나라에 순다 싱이라는 사람이 예수님의 첫 번째 제자였다”(Biswas,1942:07). 조선인들이 순다 싱 어떻게 생긴지, 어디서 태어난지 등 궁금하긴했다. 1932 년에 하리 싱 가우르 일본 정부 초청으로 자기 딸과 함께 일본 방문하며 식민지 조선, 만주에도 방문하였다. 비스와스는 여행할 때 조선인들 통해서 가우르와 딸 미리 방문의 대해 알게되었고 가우르는 귀국해서 일본이나 조선 유람기 왜 서술하지 않았으니 궁금하였다. (Biswas 1942:20)

람나스 비스와스 1932 년 9 월 5 일 부산에서 출발하여 일본 고배에 도착하였다. 일본의 자전거 견문록 1945 년에 『 Ju-Jitsu Japan 』 를 발간하였다.비스와스의 일본 유람기에서 조선땅에 라시아인 문제 볼 수 있다. 일본 유람기에 “조선인들을 약탈하는 것이 러시아인의 습관이 되었기 때문에 여러 조선인이 일본으로 가야했다”(Biswas,1945:122) 라고 언급되어있다. 비스와스는 서울에서 일본으로 전달해야할 받았던 편지를 일본에 가서 호텔 직원 도움으로 힘들게 주소를 찾아 편지를 전달한 내용도 기록하였다(Biswas,1945:138). 일본에서 만났던 일반들이랑 재미있는 대화한적있다. 일본에서 “많이 사람들이 비스와스 한테 인도가 언제 영국의 통치에서 자유로울 것인지 물었다. 그는 질문으로 대답하며 “일본인 한국인을 언제 해방시킬건지 물었다”.비스와스의 질문에 대답 할 수있는 사람은 거의 없었고, 대부분의 사람들은 한국인이 자유롭

고 일본인의 통제하에 있지 않다고 대답했다 (1945:141).

1931 년 영어로 쓰인 『사이클 여행자와 함께하는 세계일주』 그리고 1942 년 과 1945 년
벵골어로 쓰인 『자전거로 돌아본 한국 유람기』와 『Ju-Jitsu Japan』 1 차 사료를 통해 식민
지 조선을 방문했던 한 인도인의 경험과 시각을 다루고 있다. 비교적 짧은 체류기간이었지만, 인
도 자전거 여행기들은 일제의 정책의 착취, 식민지 발전, 조선 민족독립운동 에 대하여 명확히
보여주고 있다.

IV. 맺음 말

한국과 인도는 식민지의 참혹한 현실을 경험했다. 위의 『사이클 여행자와 함께하는 세계일주』
와, 『자전거로 돌아본 한국 유람기』와 『Ju-Jitsu Japan』 인도인 자전거 여행기들의 한국
유람기들이 한국의 다양한 식민지 양상을 보여주고 있다. 제 3 의 시각에서 일본의 식민지였던
조선인들의 모습과 당시의 풍경을 생생하게 묘사하고 있다는 점은 일제강점기 관련 연구의 새로
운 지평을 열어주었다. 비교적 짧은 체류기간이었지만, 람나스 비스와스는 일제의 민족말살정책
이 시행되었던 1930 년대 창씨개명과 조선 민족독립운동의 일면을 여실히 보여주고 있다. 영국
의 식민지였던 인도의 모습을 당시 조선에 투영한 그의 시각과 경험은 한국인들에게 매우 귀중
한 역사의 기억으로 남을 것으로 볼 수 있다. 인도여행기들은 일본 정책의 착취와 식민지 발전에
대하여 명확히 보여주고 있다. 식민지 기간은 일본 제국주의의 이득을 위한 식민역사 왜곡에 식
민지주의자에 의해 심각하게 시도되었음을 입증하고 있다. 이러한 시도들은 좀처럼 이야기 속에
는 나타나지 않았다. 그러나 몇몇 여행기들은 나라의 현 상황에 대한 이해에 많은 영향을 받았다.
이러한 이유로 인도 여행기들은 한국의 식민지 이해에 아주 호소력 있게 다가온다.인도인 여행
자들은 한국인들에 대하여 연민을 느끼며 한국의 민족주의 움직임에 대한 자세한 장면을 숨김없
이 기술하였다. 인도인 작가들은 인도와 영국의 관계를 한국과 일본의 관계를 비교하였다. 이러
한 비교는 그들의 본국에서의 민족주의적 정서가 방문한 나라와 같음을 명백히 보여주고 있다.

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The Public Maids on the Bus:

Gendered Service of the Bus Attendants during the 1960s-70s¹

Minji Jo (Seoul National University)

Introduction

When an American sociologist Hochschild extracted a new concept “emotional labor” from the daily work in service industry in the 1980s, the main cases supporting her argument were from flight attendants at Delta Airlines.² In their service labor, it was obviously a part of their work to control their emotions to be kind to customers, which was often affected by existing gender roles in their society.

When the service industry established its own standards and norms in Korean society during the 1960s-70s, there were bus attendants before flight attendants. At that time, most Koreans needed assistance for the process of riding the bus, just like we still do on flights. The female bus attendants, often called cha-jang (車掌) or An-nae-yang (案内嬢), were the typical examples indicating what the so-called “service” consisted of, which eventually showed gendered characteristics of the early stages of the Korean service industry.

In Seoul during the 1960s-70s, Koreans could learn how to use buses as mass transportation.

¹ Topics of this presentation were discussed in author’s another article in Korean.

² Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012, p.7

A few buses were already introduced in limited areas during the colonial period, however, most of the time streetcars had been the main option for ordinary Koreans. After a surge in its population since the late 1950s,³ Seoul eventually doubled its administrative districts in 1963. Now streetcars could not cover the expanded territory with their limited lines and a slow speed of less than 20 km/h.⁴ Since most offices and schools were located downtown, the traffic congestion in Seoul became a more serious problem.⁵

Kim hyeon-ok, an ambitious new mayor of Seoul since 1966, tried to reorganize the entire transportation system in this growing city based on automobiles. In terms of public transportation, he finally decided to supplant streetcars with buses. Streetcars, once running in the old capital city of the Chosun dynasty, now became obstacles on the driving road or even a source of accidents. Instead, a few city-operated buses and new express buses linking the downtown and outskirts were introduced.⁶ Until the subway line number 1 was launched in August 1974, buses were definitely the number one vehicle in Seoul.

We need to point out that while buses became the core of public transportation, as a part of public service, their management fell under private companies.⁷ Even though a handful of city-operated buses were introduced, right after the dismissal of streetcars in 1968, they just

³ Seoul Open Data Plaza, <http://data.seoul.go.kr> (accessed April 29, 2021)

⁴ Choi In-young, The limitations and demolition of tram transportation in Seoul during the 1960s, *Seoul and History*, No.93, 2016, p.231

⁵ Song Eun-young, *The Birth of Seoul*, Seoul: Pooreun Yeok-sa, 2018, pp.188-189

⁶ Choi In-young, Expansion of Seoul in the 1960s and the Emergence of Municipal Bus, *Seoul and History*, No.101, 2019, p.323

⁷ Department of Transportation, *White Paper on Transportation*, Department of Transportation, 1970, pp.243-244

remained supplements.⁸ Since most Koreans were still not familiar with getting on buses and paying the fare, a new convention was necessary for businessmen to make profits through this process. However, it caused unexpected costs and conflicts when a new convention was settled.

Bus attendants, the female service workers in the field, eventually had to accept that burden with their vulnerable position. This extinct occupation shows us how society had used workers' femininity to cover contingencies in the field. This study focuses on this convention-making process, based on analysis of articles from newspapers and magazines at that time, and publications by female workers in that field. These documents show that the female service workers had to take in all of the cost and risk during this transition period.

I. Femininity as a buffer

In August 1961, 3 months after their military coup, the Park Chung-hee group decided to change all the bus attendants in Seoul to females, saying that women could give better "service".⁹ It was a time when the word "kindness" got special attention, as they asserted that their coup was only for kindly serving people's needs.¹⁰ According to them, existing male attendants were not kind enough to the passengers. So far, using buses had definitely not been a very pleasant experience. In 1955, a reporter complained about the chaos on the bus in a cynical article titled "Bus attendants (車掌) or Bus funeral (車葬)?" It argued that the situation

⁸ Department of Transportation, *White Paper on Transportation*, Department of Transportation, 1971, p.104

⁹ Changing Bus attendants to Females by the End of July, *Dong A Ilbo*, June 21, 1961

¹⁰ The Main Points of the Chairman Park's Statement, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, July 6, 1961

on streetcars was slightly better because their management belonged to a public enterprise.¹¹

In the case of buses, several private companies ran their own lines. Since it was their first priority to maximize profits from this new vehicle, the owners tried to carry as many passengers as possible in as short a time as possible. There were several rules for a valid contract, and everybody was supposed to play their role to make this whole process work. The process was not entirely new to Koreans who had used streetcars before, however, its speed was still pretty new. After all, everybody needed more practice to perform their proper roles swiftly on overcrowded buses.

Some people, however, were even offended when young bus attendants merely asked them to pay the fare.¹² Even though buses started to get common around the urban areas, for most Koreans at that time, it was still not familiar to use the public transportation on a daily basis. It was too awkward to receive directions from young girls about how to fulfill their contractual obligation in time. Moreover, even bus owners were new-comers in this new business world at that time, without understanding the characteristics of this field as a part of social infrastructure. Sometimes they manipulated capacities or timetables to sell one more ticket, ignoring the minimum rationality of public transportation.¹³ This unsettled system widely fueled passengers' anger, which they eventually discharged towards the vulnerable human targets on the bus.

Using attendants' femininity to ease the displeasure was not a completely unique idea that

¹¹ Bus attendants (車掌) or Bus funeral (車葬)?, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 16, 1955

¹² A Shameless Free-rider, *Dong-A Ilbo*, December 17, 1962

¹³ Yoon Mi-hwa, *Where the White Clouds go—A Bus Attendant's Sad Memoir*, DaehyunMunhwasa, 1983, p.147

Park's group invented for the first time. The concept of female bus attendant itself was not an entirely new thing, which temporarily emerged as "bus girls" during the colonial period. In the case of streetcars, even before the armistice of the Korean War, in May 1953, the so-called "nightingale" female attendants were placed at the middle door of each car. Their sweet voice was supposed to be a refresher in hell-like streetcars, as well as their cute navy uniform with a crispy white collar and green armband.¹⁴ The author of the above "Bus funeral" article also suggested that buses adopt female attendants just like streetcars, instead of male ones who were treating passengers like pigs or dogs.¹⁵

In 1959, the Rhee Syng-man administration mentioned their plan to change bus attendants to uniformed girls for "better service".¹⁶ In June 1961, the so-called "virgin" bus attendants emerged in Busan first.¹⁷ A month later, the Seoul city authorities finally decided to recruit 100 female attendants to allocate each bus company, following the direction from the Department of Transportation. 16 to 20-year-old girls were eligible, and the city-operated employment agency was accepting their applications. The results would be announced in the afternoon on that day, and the accepted applicants were going to take 10 day-long etiquette lessons and start their new job on August 1.¹⁸

After this news broke, Seoul citizens were thrilled about enjoyable bus riding with cute girls. Some of them argued that the virtue of bus attendants was offering pleasure to the passengers

¹⁴ In Fresh Uniforms, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 28, 1953

¹⁵ Bus Attendants (車掌) or Bus Funeral (車葬)?, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 16, 1955

¹⁶ Making All Bus Attendants Females, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, February 24, 1959

¹⁷ Welcome, Goodbye, Female Attendants on Bus, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 11, 1961

¹⁸ City-operated Employment Agency, Recruiting Bus Attendants, *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 5, 1961

with a kind attitude and a sweet smile, which was exactly what women were for.¹⁹ Apparently, unemployed women were also excited about this new job opportunity. Once the recruitment was open, it was so competitive that only one out of six applicants were hired. An examiner said that he would hire good looking girls with minimum literacy who knew how to look attractive.²⁰

About two weeks later, however, it became too obvious that these rookies could hardly meet those expectations. According to the opinion sections of the newspapers, if female attendants could not be nightingales they should at least have a feminine voice, but nobody could detect femininity in their voice.²¹ Yelling and instructing on the hectic buses, the attendants never had enough time or energy to speak in a sweet voice. On top of it, male passengers could not understand how any young girl would dare command them to hurry. In their mind, “Hurry” should only be an instruction from parents or bosses, not something that young girls could say to older men.²²

Above all, some passengers could never understand why those attendants were obsessed with the fare even before getting on board. Since they insulted those snobbish girls about having no trust in human nature, attendants had to memorize each and every facial feature and clothing of those who did not pay the fare first.²³ Even when free-riders happened to get caught, they shamelessly yelled at those girls for daring to put them in trouble over a few coins. It hurt

¹⁹ Excursus (餘滴), *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 21, 1961

²⁰ 1 out of 6, Exam for Bus attendants, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, July 3, 1961

²¹ Excursus (餘滴), *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 19, 1961; Bus and Control of Attendants, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 22, 1961

²² Nonsense (황설수설), *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 30, 1963

²³ Yoon Mi-hwa, *Ibid*, pp.158-159

some people's ego when those attendants asked to show their ID card to get students' or military discount. Once their feelings were hurt, passengers often did not hesitate to commit violence against female attendants.²⁴

A month after this change, however, the result of an opinion poll operated by Seoul city office shows that 61% (1,659) of the respondents sampled from Seoul citizens still preferred female attendants.²⁵ Two years later, in 1963, the recruiting and training system for female attendants was mostly settled. The Myoungsang (delightfulness) Transportation Academy at Eulji-ro 6ga was in charge of this process. Since anyone who graduated from elementary school could apply for this course, two thirds of the applicants were teenagers.²⁶

By 1966, bus attendants had officially become a female occupation in the public perception. For example, when the bus owners tried to reverse this change to hire male attendants again, almost nobody agreed with them.²⁷ Many people agreed that there was an obvious distinction within the job market, based on gendered standards. Some jobs were clearly for ladies, whereas others went to gentlemen.²⁸ Eventually, the Seoul city authorities had to decide to keep the existing system, saying that more than 90% of the Seoul citizens apparently wanted female attendants in their survey.²⁹

Despite minor dissatisfactions, the main reason why they still preferred females was because

²⁴ Yoon Chung-ja, *Standing Alone On My Way: My Days as A Bus Attendant*, Jinmyoungmunhwasa, 1967, p.36

²⁵ The Urgent Remedy for the Unemployed, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 29, 1961

²⁶ A Diagnosis for Female Attendants' Service, *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 7, 1963

²⁷ Do We Have To Change Them To Males?, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, February 10, 1966

²⁸ Excursus (餘滴), *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, February 14, 1966

²⁹ Keeping Female Attendants, *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 23, 1966

they thought that being kind was clearly a women's job. Even after this decision to maintain the status quo, people still talked about the decent virtues that working women on the bus should keep in mind. They deplored those female attendants who raised their voice "unwomanly", which defeated the purpose of hiring women—ladies were not supposed to yell in public.³⁰ Besides, just in case of quarrels, female attendants could be relatively negligible threats.³¹

Under the circumstances causing inevitable conflicts, vulnerable female workers on the forefront were exposed to various kinds of violence on the bus. After all, the so-called "kind service" in this sense referred to the condition that the attendants could not resist passenger's unfair treatment or violence toward them. In etiquette classes during the training course, the female bus attendants learned how to restrain their anger to look polite even when passengers crossed the line.³² Accordingly, gendered service from the female bus attendants became the easiest buffers for various conflicts, along with the unsettled convention.

2. Femininity, somewhere between non-profit and commercial

A characteristic of the gendered service work was that the customers were buying the workers' femininity as a product in the market. Whenever the Seoul city authorities and the bus owners raised the fare, they promised to offer better service worth paying for. The most frequent repertoire was hiring more female attendants. In April 1962, when they decided to raise the bus

³⁰ Please Smile, Female Attendants, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 1, 1966

³¹ Excursus (餘滴), *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, July 2, 1964

³² A Diagnosis for Female Attendants' Service, *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 7, 1963

fare, the first thing they emphasized was completing the change from male to female attendants. Female attendants, with their cute uniform and ladylike smiles, were considered improved service, justifying the higher price.³³

The problem is that even though everyone claimed that they should receive “services” from female attendants, there was no consensus on the basis for whether it was a consumer's right to pay money or a public right as a citizen. Some consumers insisted on the better service worth paying for, thereby making bus owners keep appealing to women's services whenever they raised the fare.³⁴ Others, however, pointed out that buses were supposed to be a part of public service, which should ensure the right of individual citizens. For the common good, bus owners were supposed to voluntarily consider public concerns, leaving their profits aside, to repay citizens' determination to pay the raised fare.³⁵

Interestingly, this kind of argument contrasts the so-called “service” as something public and non-profit, with individual businessmen's commercialized interests. Some people even brought up the human rights of passengers, which was supposed to meet the global standards of developed countries.³⁶ Now the female bus attendants became a symbol of inhuman modernity, which embodied snobbish mammonism. According to those complaints, they were supposed to be a part of public servants.³⁷ Sometimes even the government used the female bus attendants' labor in public work, such as street campaigns or traffic control. In the summer of

³³ The Bus Fare Increased, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, April 1, 1962

³⁴ Nonsense (황설수설), *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 14, 1964

³⁵ Nonsense (황설수설), *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 4, 1962

³⁶ Fundamental Measures, Necessary for Avoiding Car Accidents, *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 20, 1963

³⁷ Nonsense (황설수설), *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 20, 1963

1975, a group of female bus attendants had to participate in a choir performance to amuse citizens.³⁸

After all, the term to refer to service of female attendants was muddled with mixed meanings, such as the service industry in general, sometimes public utilities, even voluntary work. On this account, this ambiguous concept of “service” was also used in association with democratic desire in Korean society. The coup group asserted that they succeeded with democratic ideals from the April 19 Revolution, which encouraged Koreans to terminate the long-term dictatorship in 1960.³⁹ Unlike their dictatorial predecessors, they contended that they would satisfy citizens with “kind service”, which meant a genuine kind of democracy, in their logic.⁴⁰ Now, workers’ gender sometimes had to incarnate abstract virtues in such political rhetoric.

Since there was no clear boundary for those female attendants’ role, their commercial or public functions often overlapped. For example, the Seoul city authorities officially encouraged adding the female attendants’ commercial value. In June 1965, Mapo police office performed a coronation for “Miss Transportation” selected from the female bus attendants in Seoul, which was held in accompany with an award ceremony for the best driver. To some newspaper reporters, the head of the Mapo police office playfully suggested that if any bachelor wanted to date Miss Transportation, he would be glad to be a matchmaker. One of those reporters appreciated his skillful public relations technique in a newspaper article.⁴¹

Even with this confusion, Korean society was gradually becoming familiar with service in

³⁸ Having a Good Time with Bongcheon Female Bus Attendants’ Chorus, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, July 1, 1975

³⁹ Military Revolution Is an Extension of April 19, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 27, 1961

⁴⁰ Have Dedication Towards Citizens, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, December 13, 1961

⁴¹ A Neon Sign, *Chosun Ilbo*, June 2, 1965

the commercial sense. Another indicator showing this commercialization of workers' femininity was a hierarchy, depending on the price. Intra-city bus attendants, for example, were consentaneously considered as a low caste. Besides the patriarchal perspective of scorning general working women in public, their sexuality was even more underpriced, because people could access their service with less money. Consequently, sexual harassment against them, both in physical and verbal ways, became a chronic issue.⁴² While various studies had pointed out their poor working conditions and health problems, this kind of information was often twisted to become a source of insults. According to the female attendants, the rumors about their infertility from the vibrations in the car, ruined the very last piece of self-esteem that they barely kept for themselves.⁴³

Since the historic Seoul-Busan expressway was open in 1970, bus attendants on Inter-city express buses occupied a slightly higher status in Korean society,⁴⁴ because of the different amount of money that people had to pay for accessing them in person. While most express bus owners generally required more than a high-school diploma for their employees, job fraud targeting city bus attendants was rampant, in which swindlers deceived them for turnover opportunities for express buses.⁴⁵ A year later, a lecturer working at the official academy for various bus attendants complained that newspaper reporters were only interested in the newly emerged express bus attendants, whereas the struggles of regular bus attendants remained

⁴² Do You Really Need to Beat Up the Bus Attendant? We Need More Love, *Dong-A Ilbo*, January 28, 1974

⁴³ Standing Jobs Hurting Female Health, *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 1, 1980

⁴⁴ How to be an Express Bus Attendant, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 14, 1972

⁴⁵ Job Fraud Targeting Bus Attendants, Deceiving for a Job Opportunity, *Chosun Ilbo*, August 10, 1977

unknown.⁴⁶

As passengers paid more money to make a seat reservation, attendants' role on express buses was completely different from their counterparts on city buses. Even though they also sold tickets occasionally on the bus, the transportation contracts were mainly made at the ticket office, which caused a huge difference compared to the chaotic situation on city buses. In addition, since it was relatively easier for bus owners to figure out the number of passengers, their physical control over female attendants' bodies was alleviated. While city bus attendants were suffering from inhuman body searches, express buses widely adopted a milder supervisory system to randomly check occupied seats.⁴⁷

Through this process, the passengers had to learn how to purchase gendered service, which still felt unfamiliar and even stressful to them. Some people still had troubles with readjusting themselves into the hierarchy of the service industry cold-heartedly following price. That was why they sometimes discharged their negative feelings towards the female workers in the field. However, they eventually started to accept the mechanism of purchasing commercialized service in a hierarchy, which meant their budget would determine the intensity of service from female workers. After all, they needed to pay more money to get enough "feminine" service that they had expected from the female attendants.

3. Female Workers, Somewhere between Capitalistic Exploitation and Paternalistic Protection

⁴⁶ A Unique Job, Speech Coach at Transportation Academy, Dong-A Ilbo, August 16, 1971

⁴⁷ Baek Young-hyun, A Memoir of an Embezzlement Supervisor on the Bus, *Shin Dong-A*, May 1980, p.372

Another aspect of the gendered service work was emergence of the female workers. Just like average employers in any other field of Korean society at that time, the bus owners tried to exploit female bus attendants to maximize profit. It was common for those employers to shift unexpected costs and risks of this custom-making process to the vulnerable female workers.⁴⁸ Coercive and violent methods were widely adopted, casting a similar impression based on previous studies⁴⁹ analyzing female factory workers during this era.

Abusing female bus attendants had been a deep seated problem since the beginning of the feminizing policy in August 1961.⁵⁰ Just like factory owners, bus owners also pushed unfair contracts, taking advantage of unstable positions of female workers. Minor differences depending on each bus aside, however, bus attendants generally took stimulant pills to stay awake, covering more than 18 hours a day.⁵¹ During the working hours, they barely had essential breaks for meals or even toilets. Restroom stalls had loudspeakers to rush them. Once they violated unfair regulations, employers would put their names on the blacklist to keep them from other job opportunities.⁵²

The highlight of those forceful controls was the notorious body search on female attendants, which was also fairly prevalent within any other economic sectors using female labor during this era.⁵³ Due to the particular nature of the daily work on buses, bus attendants were carrying

⁴⁸ Yoon Mi-hwa, *Ibid*, p.156

⁴⁹ Hagen Koo, *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation*, Cornell University Press, 2001

⁵⁰ The First Press Conference of the New Minister of Department of Transportation, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 24, 1961

⁵¹ Yoon Mi-hwa, *Ibid*, pp.149-154

⁵² Inhuman Working Conditions of the Bus Attendants, *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 25, 1974

⁵³ No Human Rights in Industrial Complex, *Dong-A Ilbo*, October 18, 1978

cash in their pockets. So it was not surprising that they were sometimes predisposed to crimes like embezzlement, especially considering their low wages. All kinds of possible measures were used to find the last coin of their daily earnings. Many owners hired special female supervisors to put their hands into workers' private parts,⁵⁴ whereas others ordered workers to jump over a 1-meter-high rope. Because these sensational reports drew wide attention, a researchers' association even held a symposium on this issue, about embezzlement on the bus.⁵⁵

Besides those poor working conditions based on unfair relationships with their employers, as the so-called "service" workers, bus attendants had to deal with another factor: customers. This is what distinguishes the situation of service workers from those of other workers in the manufacturing sectors. The female bus attendants had to take on all the responsibility for unexpected dangers in the field, caused by inexperienced passengers. Among those problems, car accidents were an inextricably linked tragedy for the bus attendants. Since Koreans just started to use automobiles widely for the first time, car accidents increased dramatically during the 1960s.⁵⁶ In the case of buses, the infamous "departure with open door" case had put many female bus attendants in prison, accused of professional negligence causing deaths.⁵⁷

In addition to tragic accidents, other trivial conflicts from this unsettled convention were getting on their nerves every day. Repulsion against new customs caused constant friction in their workplace, on these overcrowded buses. Without any safety net, female attendants were

⁵⁴ We are also women, *Chosun Ilbo*, September 23, 1965

⁵⁵ Female Attendants' Extra Income, Problems and Measures from the Symposium about Embezzlement, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, April 29, 1970

⁵⁶ The 1960s (2) Struggles for the New Order, Hard-Working 10 Years, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, December 15, 1969

⁵⁷ A Murder by an Unkind Bus, *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 6, 1962

just exposed to violence from passengers who did not understand why they had to follow young girls' directions.⁵⁸ Moreover, since they were carrying cash, female attendants on the bus or in their dormitories soon became the easiest targets for criminals.⁵⁹ Under any circumstances, bus attendants had to put daily revenue on their top priority, sometimes even higher than their own lives.

Even under this inhumane schedule, some female attendants sacrificed their sleep to organize strikes and form their own union, to persistently fight against mistreatment and exploitation. The most common pattern was escaping together from their dormitory, right after midnight when all the buses ended their daily schedule, and collectively refusing to work the next day.⁶⁰ Once they went out on strike, a whole bus line just stopped running, and people had to wait at bus stops for hours and hours. Considering its effect, sometimes police forces arrested leaders of the strike on charges of obstruction of business.⁶¹

Even though their heroic strikes were not always successful, on the contrary, it was relatively easier for those female attendants to get some sympathy as young girls. Once in a while, the government and the city authorities investigated the bus owners for violating the Labor Standards Law. In 1964, the prosecutors booked 200 bus owners in Seoul for using under-aged girls nine extra hours over the legal working time limit.⁶² Two years later, they implemented this process again.⁶³ Whenever the results of those investigations were released to the public,

⁵⁸ An Intolerable False Report, *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 3, 1962

⁵⁹ The Suspension of the Bus Service because of thieves, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 11, 1966

⁶⁰ Collective Escape of Female Attendants, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, October 25, 1966

⁶¹ Dismissal of 9 Attendants after Requiring Delayed Wages, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 14, 1967

⁶² Mistreating Female Attendants—17 hours a day, *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 1, 1964

⁶³ Punishment for Forceful Body Search, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, December 9, 1966

people loudly blamed the cold-hearted employers for that harsh exploitation.⁶⁴ Since young girls' poor working conditions were displayed in public all day, it was not completely light-hearted for passengers to take out all stress on them.

With the whole society watching, after all, the female bus attendants became one of the typical symbols of the needy girls outside of "normal" families at that time. Civilian organizations like the YWCA annually invited those female bus attendants to their Christmas parties as charity work.⁶⁵ Sometimes newspapers passionately found an unlucky bus girl to deliver her sad life story, such as an 18-year-old girl who lost her mother when she was a baby during the Korean War, scanning all the passengers on the bus to find mommy. According to those kinds of articles, if those 15 or 16 year-old workers were born into a better family, then their hands would be touching piano keys, instead of dirty banknotes. At the end of those articles, authors generally suggested a more generous attitude towards those poor little girls.⁶⁶

Considering that they were mostly young girls, familiar with living in a group, and exposed to public eyes, the female bus attendants were definitely a useful resource for the public relations policy. The first lady graciously shared her own home-baked bread with those poor female attendants, and offered free classes for those who did not have a chance to educate themselves. Even after she died, those attendants could still get some attention from the government.⁶⁷ Since the labor issue got recognized during the early 1970s, the president sometimes took gestures to invite a few representative workers to the Blue House, such as

⁶⁴ Editorial, *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 4, 1964

⁶⁵ 100 Attendants Invited to the Christmas Party at YWCA, *Dong-A Ilbo*, December 20, 1963

⁶⁶ Magnifying Lens, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, December 25, 1962

⁶⁷ Everybody in Tears, *Maeil Business News*, August 19, 1974

miners, sweepers, and bus attendants.⁶⁸

Until the end of the regime, female bus attendants were a political resource for the Blue House to show off their paternalism towards workers. The businesses which offered better facilities for bus attendants occasionally received an award from the President.⁶⁹ Charitable bus owners and obedient girl attendants were the perfect model to display the harmonization of capital and labor the government had argued for during the 1970s. When President Park personally gave bus attendants winter outfits in December of the late 1970s, the newspapers immediately reported his mercy.⁷⁰

The government often condemned individual employers and passengers regarding female workers' suffering, mentioning patriarchal protections for them. President Park officially mentioned this issue in his speech for the New Year's press conference in 1978, urging the bus owners to consider those female attendants as their family members.⁷¹ To employers and passengers, he was vocal in requesting them to imagine how they would feel if their own daughters or younger sisters were treated in this way.

Despite his mercy, however, it was their policy to create a whole system that required the female workers to take all cost and risk. Right after the May 16 coup, when the coup leadership emphasized the value of being kind towards citizens, they shifted the task to visualize this virtue to female workers on the forefront. Even when some bus owners complained about

⁶⁸ "I Told Them to Treat You Better...", *Dong-A Ilbo*, March 12, 1974

⁶⁹ The Presidential Award to Cheil Bus, *Maeil Business News*, March 7, 1975

⁷⁰ President Park Giving Winter Clothes to Female Bus Attendants, *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 4, 1978

⁷¹ The presidential speech for the New Year's press conference in 1978, <http://pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp> (accessed April 29, 2021)

operational subtleties of managing female workers, the government was undeniably the most active player in this picture who led the game of “good service”. As a result, starting in large cities, about 10% of the attendants were replaced with women each year, and in 1965 the number already reached about 70%.⁷²

Afterwards, the government kept allowing the private bus owners to operate their business based on the cheap labor of the female workers. Even with their patriarchal rhetoric or philanthropic charity work, their priority was never workers’ rights, including these female attendants. On top of it, these young female workers in public had to be symbols embodying the generosity of the government.

Conclusion

Since the mid-1970s, bus owners already had complained about the female attendant shortage in the field. Even though the poor working conditions of the female factory workers were well-known in Korean society, their situation was generally considered better, at least compared to the female workers in public transportation. In 1982, based on the technical improvements and widely practiced customs, the new self-service buses were finally adopted. Now the bus owners could gradually reduce female attendants to lower their cost. In 1989, the legal obligation for the bus owners to place attendants on each bus was eventually terminated.

⁷² Lee Byung-tae, *A Study on Female Workers in Cars*, Korean Automobile & Transport Workers’ Union, 1975, p.43

In the interim, the usage of this ambiguous word “service” was puzzling with existing Korean words such as kindness, voluntariness, or even politeness, eventually positioning female service workers inside of a customary hierarchy in the Korean way. Bus attendants were educated and supervised that they should not sit on the bus, even if there was a seat, because it was rude for such servants like them. After all, the so-called “kind service” in the field fundamentally represented the condition that inferior workers could not stand up to superior customers. That was why the government deliberately displayed female workers on the forefront, who passengers could easily dominate at any time.

During the 1960s-70s, the female bus attendants were definitely considered a main model of working women in public in Korean society. From the reason why they were widely instituted in the first place, to the expectation of their employers, passengers, and government, and all the context behind the scenes, shows us characteristics of the early stages of the Korean service industry. All the players in this whole picture tried to use the service workers’ femininity as a kind of buffer to absorb tensions or conflicts caused from unsettled customs during this transition era.

While the foreign concept of service was still something unfamiliar to many Koreans, what the female bus attendants were supposed to do and what they actually did gradually filled out the vacant meaning of this new concept. After all, its meaning began to contain accepting the consumers’ unfair treatment or violence toward them. Considering recent debates about service workers’ rights, it is clear that the formation of this concept during the 1960s-70s still affects the fundamental characteristics of the service industry in Korean society today.

The Making of an Intellectual: The Effects of US Education, Experiences as Civil
Official and Educator on Yun Ch'i-ho's Journey Towards Collaboration

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Introduction

Yun Ch'i-ho, a Korean intellectual who lived through the most turbulent epochs of modern Korea, is perhaps one of the most colorful personalities of the period. He was an embodiment of the intellectual response to Japanese colonialism in Korea, who encountered a diverse array of intellectual discourse and worked at times as a civil official, an international student, the principal of a vocational school and a religious man. He traveled to and spent formative years in Japan, China, and the United States and familiarized himself with the ideas associated with modernity, such as Social Darwinism, and tactics like self-strengthening movements to resist colonialism. The personal experiences abroad, his religious beliefs and the career as an educator all contributed to his intellectual trajectory from a conservative intellectual, to a reserved nationalist and gradual reformist to an active collaborator of Japanese imperialism. Therefore, this paper argues that the making of Yun Ch'i-ho as an intellectual can shed more light on how he ended up as a disillusioned cynic in 1945.

Important phases in the life of Yun Ch'i-ho demarcate the stages of his transformation from a traditional intellectual to a gradual reformist and finally to a disillusioned collaborator. As an international student in United States, Yun appreciated the achievements of 'civilization and enlightenment' but was disappointed by the arrogance and hypocrisy that exuded from Americans. He identified the source of contempt and discrimination for marginalized black Americans in their socioeconomic

status and drew a parallel with the conditions of Koreans. To rectify this problem, Yun vowed to adopt the method of leaders like Booker T. Washington that focused on vocational training. His career as a bureaucrat and public intellectual in the Independence Club ended in bitter taste as the throne retrenched the modernist reforms proposed by Yun and his colleagues with the support of the conservative opponents. Yun began to consider both the monarchy and its elite bureaucrats as impediments to expanding political participation among other reforms necessary to modernize Korea. As an educator and administrator in Anglo-Korean School, Yun incorporated training in agricultural skills and loom in the curriculum that emphasized practical education. However, his friendship with like-minded Korean nationalists implicated him in the 105 Incident in 1911, an alleged assassination plot of the governor-general, for which he was incarcerated. After publicly recanting his dedication to nationalism, Yun criticized the naïve participants of the March First Movement in 1919 and began to relapse into comfort under the Cultural Rule of Saitō Makoto in the 1920s. After another renouncement of his faith in the aftermath of the crackdown of the Industrial Club in 1937, another conservative nationalist organization, Yun began to publicly support the Japanese policy of *naisen ittai* and endorsed military conscription.

We've discussed the arc of Yun's changes in his stance towards nationalism and Japanese colonialism. I will explore each of the crucial phases of his life— as a student in United States, a civil official and bureaucrat, an educator and finally a collaborator, and examine how his experiences and external factors shaped him into these in the rest of the paper.

Early Life and Introduction to Christianity

Yun Ch'i-ho came from a *yangban* family and received a traditional, Confucian education. Even though his immediate relatives and father Yun Wung-ryŭl did not occupy the higher echelons of government offices, Yun Ch'i-ho's initial upbringing situated him in a conservative environment that could not anticipate the complex and eclectic intellectual legacy he would bequeath afterwards. His first major encounter with modernized society was part of the Gentlemen's Tour arranged by Kojong to Japan in 1880. As one of the first Korean students studying in Tokyo, Yun was impressed with the achievements of Westernized Japan. He came to believe in the expedience of realizing Confucian ideals of statecraft through modernization, hoping to reform the increasingly deficient administrative polity of Chosŏn court in both efficiency and efficacy. Yun associated with Inoue Kaoru and Fukuzawa Yukichi and accepted their advice to work as translator for Lucius H. Foote, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary – an ambassador to Korea dispatched following the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between United States and Korea in 1882. His goal was to contribute to his nation from what he had learned in Japan and also to acquaint himself with America through his new post. Yun found his opportunity to serve Chosŏn directly as a government official of the *tongli amun* while serving as translator to Foote.

Yun Ch'i-ho believed the fate of a successful overhaul of Chosŏn administration depended on the royal judgment of the monarch, who was the exclusive source of

legitimation and justification necessary to rationalize the political reforms and implement technological innovation from the West. At this stage of Yun's career, the fledgling bureaucrat sought to realize the rule of virtue, or *deokch'i*, through the revamped political institutions overseen by the Confucian monarch, rather than through a popular assembly and system of representation.

However, a group of radical reformists staged the Kapsin Coup in 1884 against the advice of Yun who considered this an act of treason against Kojong. The failed attempt to force a radical reform through a physical takeover of political leadership discredited the proponents of Western-style programs of reform, both radical and gradual, and led to a conservative retrenchment. Expectedly, Yun was accused of participating in the coup and departed for Shanghai in self-exile fearing official retribution through the system of guilt by association.

In Shanghai, Yun enrolled in the Anglo-Chinese College, a school established by Young J. Allen, a missionary from the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church in United States. Yun learned the basic tenets of Christianity from W. B. Bonnel, another missionary who served as the young Korean's personal mentor. Upon reflecting his life, Yun realized that he had to clean his soul for life after death, and wrote an essay, 'Confessions of the Heart,' that repented his pursuit of sensual desires and vowed to abide by the virtues of self-discipline and diligence that are regulated through an omniscient God.

Similarly, Yun believed that advanced scientific knowledge and technology, and the assiduous work ethic of Americans to overcome and master natural resources

achieved US economic prowess. This entire venture was supported by the Protestant Christian virtues. For Yun, every nation needed to emulate the program of industrialization and modernization. Conversely, the Confucian system was a weak and inferior set of ideological antithesis that dragged down his native Chosŏn to a state of poverty and depravity, susceptible to colonial rule. In this dichotomy, Western civilization represented the strong and morally good, and non-Western civilizations were weak and morally evil.

The American Experience

Yun hoped to further his education in Christianity and Western academic discourse and realized his goals by reaching out for assistance from the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church that operated the Anglo-Chinese College in Shanghai. Through the personal introduction and recommendation of a number of missionaries he learned from, Yun traveled to study theology at Vanderbilt for three years and then took courses in humanities at Emory for two more years. His encounter with the institutionalized Christian dogma in United States did not compel him to appreciate the inner tenets of this religious system. Yun never was engrossed in transcendent issues of faith. Instead, he focused on their social ramifications and practical applications. Although Yun initially believed Christianity would be a personal religion detached from

social reality unlike Confucianism which pervaded Chosŏn life, he ultimately realized that he was mistaken. Yun's life outside the classroom allowed him to enhance his perspective on how Christianity functioned in society and political life, formulating the American perspective on various underprivileged races and non-Americans and also on physical manifestations of the proselytizing missions to Asia.

To be certain, Yun Ch'i-ho was astonished by the material grandeur of American civilization when he arrived in San Francisco on October 26th, 1888. Paved roads, majestic houses, (Yun Ch'i-ho, Diary Entry, October 26th, 1888) and the material wealth that spoke to the rapid economic growth of postwar United States impressed him immensely. Like many other contemporary Asian intellectuals who visited Europe and the United States, Yun attributed this economic prowess to the realization of natural resources' potential through natural sciences and application of latest technology for the purpose of industrialization. Western civilization was able to prosper through this methodology and the work ethic and could provide sustenance for people even on the lowest echelons of society compared to Asia. Yun internalized the idea of the modernization theory that placed Western model of civilization as a teleological goal for all aspiring nations. Conversely, Confucian cosmology was at the opposite end, representing an obstacle to reform and the basis for its inherent inferiority. Yun was deeply disappointed that he was a member of such a nation and even more distraught when he was called brethren of the Chinese by his classmates. While Yun was already feeling inferior as a Korean in America, he bristled anew at being associated with the Chinese. In one passage of his diary (Yun, Diary Entry, May 4, 1890):

Vanhook this morning among a crowd said to me "They will have no messing club in the Hall during this summer. how will you do then" You will have to go then to your town bretheren". The town bretheren are the Chinese laundry men. I kept silent. But emotions of shame-for my ignoble nationality, Corea-and of indignation-at this undisguised insult-made me perfectly wretched all the morning.

In another entry (Yun, Diary Entry, February 2, 1891), Yun attributes his personal gloom and melancholy to his feeling of national disgrace:

What is it that makes me to shun company like a plague? What is it that keeps me often in melancholy and solitary meditations? What is it that often makes me feel thoroughly disconsolate? What is it that makes me exceedingly sensitive to the slightest sign of slight or contempt? It is this: the consciousness of my national disgrace and shame.

Yun also encountered the hypocrisy of Christianity in the form of its racial discrimination across American society, on Native Americans, and Asian migrant laborers. Attending sermons and services at local Churches, Yun Ch'i-ho discovered the Orientalist perspective of Christian reverends and missionaries. China and Korea especially were portrayed as potential sites of missions not only for their religious beliefs but for their material and spiritual poverty (Yun, Diary Entry, October 25, 1891):

Rev. Beach spoke on China in the p.m. meeting. He detailed the (1) Poverty, (2) Population, (3) Diseases, (4) Ignorance, (5) Immorality of China. He delights in the darker side of everything.

"Idolatry is devil worship, and the superstitious fears of the Chinese, fostered and fed for ages by its observance, have emasculated them to the last degree. They are in perpetual 'bondage unto fear.' I had no dream of the depths to which

they had descended, or the paralysis which has fallen upon them. China, as compared with Christian countries, is a thousand years behind in the race of national progress:

Such harsh descriptions of China only reinforced his indignation at racial discrimination in United States. Concurrently, however, he rationalized the phenomenon by positing that the inferior races were at the mercy of the strong because of their inherent backwardness, and Divine Providence allowed this in human history. The Social Darwinist ideology of the “survival of the fittest” applied to human societies where each civilization was placed on a linear scale of progress, and the inferior races were destined be guided and Christianized by the superior ones. Specifically, Josiah Strong’s *Our Country* became a primer of these ideas among Christian missionaries that in turn influenced students of theology like Yun.

Yun also believed that the West offered a chance to civilize and modernize to non-Western nations through imperialism, and how the latter seized these opportunities depended on their distinct and inherent qualities. To Yun, the Japanese possessed the virtues of intellect, ambition, politeness, adherence to order and rule of law, courage and patriotism that made them successful modernizers. The Meiji emperor as an enlightened monarch led a top-down system of reform through education and guidance which diffused these virtues to the people. To Yun, Confucianism contained similar ideas but lacked the crucial component of motivation to translate them into reality. Believing that institutionalized education was the most effective method to impart those virtues to Koreans, Yun decided to establish a school in Korea. This school would

provide the students with the training necessary to make them productive workers in the modern industry, and thereby partake in the process of nation-building.

Career as Civil Official and Educator

Yun was devoting himself to the Independence Club during this period in order to push for political reforms from within the Korean bureaucracy. Formed in 1896 along with other intellectual elites, the Independence Club sought to “de-center” China as the axiom of Korean cultural and social cosmology in the wake of its defeat to Japan that demonstrated its dramatic decline (Suh 2017, 74). As an endeavor to break away from the Chinese ideological hegemony, epitomized by Confucianism, the Club sponsored various public discussions on matters of nationalism and reforms that would prepare Korea to fight imperialism. According to Shim Hyun-Nyo, Yun took the initiative in publishing *the Independent* as the official printed organ of the Independence Club (Shim 1990, 31). He convinced Sŏ Chae-p’il, or Philip Jaisohn, another colonial intellectual educated in the U.S. and the founding member of the Independence Club, of the importance of publishing an official newspaper. Yun hoped that *the Independent* and its presentation in the vernacular Han’gŭl would contribute to the dissemination of the national script in tandem with the efforts of linguists like Chu Si-kyung and stimulate intellectual discourse in Korea. Specifically, as editor of *the Independent* Yun strove to

instill a sense of patriotism among his readers and suggest policies for reconstructing the Korean state alongside an efficient army and a perfect educational system (Yun, Diary Entry, August 24, 1894).

By 1898, Yun began to redirect the outcome of these intellectual debates to the higher level of political sphere through the Club's production of memorials to the throne. These were influenced by the formation of the public opinion, the awareness of civil rights and the desire for national independence and autonomy that most participants shared from the discourse. Yun boldly advanced the notion that the incompetent administration of the Chosŏn government did more harm for the country than external threats (Shim 1990, 35). Unfortunately, the series of reforms enacted on the advice of the Club began to clash with the Confucian system where the king governed with a close group of officials who had passed the national examination, along with the *yangban* literati, that left little room for outsiders to participate in the decision-making process. The conservative politicians hamstrung the prowess of the Independence Club by accusing its members of planning to establish a republic, with Pak Chŏng-yang, the head of the cabinet, as president, and Yun Ch'i-ho as vice president. On December 1898, Kojong ordered the Club dissolved and its key members arrested for treason against the Chosŏn dynasty. The premature demise of reforms for popular political participation and efficient bureaucracy dashed Yun's hopes of an endogenous, Korean-centered revitalization of Chosŏn. He loathed the selfish behavior he saw in the officialdom that disregarded the fate of the country in exchange for personal gains. Still, the conservative

opposition did not radicalize Yun to push for more sweeping reforms; he continued to espouse a gradual approach to reforming Korea.

Yun narrowly escaped punishment thanks to his father's position as minister and Kojong's personal favor. The king did not oust him from public office but relegated him to the position of *kamniship* (commercial supervisor) in cities like Wonsan, Deokwon (February 1899) and Samhwa (March 1900). Yun became the *kamni* of Deokwon again in July 1901 (Songdo School Centennial Compilation Committee 2006, 39). Now that his efforts to reform the government from within had come to naught, Yun looked to education as the primary mean of national reconstruction.

In 1906, frustrated by the lack of attention and progress on the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church's mission to Songdo, Yun decided to move to the city and lead the effort himself. In spite of the scant presence of missionaries of the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church, at Songdo, Yun marched forward with his vision of establishing a school for industrial training. He received the help of Reverend Collyer, the first missionary assigned to the city, who provided a night school run by other missionaries to use as the foundation for a new institution. Yun renamed it to Anglo-Korean School and began to prepare a new curriculum. His focus was on vocational training, the practical way of preparing Korean laborers for the necessities of urban industrialization. Yun's educational philosophy and the challenges he faced as the principal of the Anglo-Korean School is most evident in his article that was published in the *Korean Mission Field*, a missionary magazine published in the United States in 1907.

In this article, Yun lamented the shortage of teachers who could teach Korean in the wake of other schools opening across the country in response to the public fervor in education. Further, Yun admitted that his school held a rigid criteria for hiring, with which applicants were judged for their moral character as well as for their academic qualifications (Yun Ch'i-Ho, *The Anglo-Korean School*, Song Do, 143). Similarly, textbooks were difficult to procure since nobody wrote them and no one bought them. However, Yun was encouraged by the enthusiasm of the students' parents who wanted the best education for their children even though they sometimes struggled to pay tuition. The students themselves were highly motivated to learn, and responded with zeal to the opportunity of vocational training. Yun was especially pleased that schoolboys were willing to take lessons in knitting based on its utility and overcome its aversion based on its ascription by gender and class (Yun, *The Anglo-Korean School*, Song Do, 143). The Songdo boys were not afraid to commit to manual labor hitherto derided as unworthy of Confucian scholars. Yun anticipated in this report of 1907 that his students would raise their own vegetables in the field with domestically produced fertilizers, taking another step towards autarky and self-sustenance. He concluded the article by reiterating his belief in the primacy of industrial training over other theoretical education like in literature. His maxim was that "Shakespeare can wait, but the land, under our present regime, may be seized, by the military necessity that knows no law and laws that have no necessity (Yun, *The Anglo-Korean School*, Song Do, 144)."

Finally, Yun drove home three major concerns. First, the school needs to impart practical knowledge that they students can use after leaving the school with least amount

of money and time. Second, the apparatus and materials for this work needs to be acquired in Korea and its vicinity. Third, the industry needs to create revenue quickly and in a reasonable amount. For these criteria Yun suggested agriculture, especially raising fruits, vegetables and dairy work, as well as carpentry, printing, and tanning as possible industrial projects (Yun, *The Anglo-Korean School*, Song Do, 144).

The Colonial Period

Meanwhile, the geopolitical developments around Korea and Yun's association with missionaries began to further erode his confidence in America as a partner and tutor for Korean modernization. First, Yun continued to clash with the missionaries of the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church, over the direction of his school curriculum. The denomination emphasized the importance of spreading the religious truth of the Gospel, rather than the practical skills related to capitalist industry. Yun was also annoyed by the insensitive, wholesale replication of educational programs from missionary schools in China for Korean audiences. He realized that missionary indifference to the particularities of the Korean nation stemmed from the powerful prejudice of racial discrimination.

The crucial turning point of Yun's personal career as educator and his thoughts on nationalist reforms was in 1911, when the Japanese colonial state arrested him and

104 other Korean leaders, who were mostly Protestant Christians, on the charges of conspiring the assassination of the Governor-General Terauchi Masatake. The 105 Incident, as the controversy came to be known, accused Yun as the mastermind behind the preparation of this heinous crime, which was substantiated by forced testimony from torturing the arrested Korean Christians (Suh 2017, 83).

The American missionaries were shocked at this round of arrests and considered it a systematic persecution of Christianity and reported the outrage to the American public through newspaper articles. The direct associates of Yun in the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church pressured the Japanese government to release him by petitioning the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and then President Taft and Secretary of State Philander Knox (Suh 2017, 83). The final decision amongst the American missionaries in the U.S., however, was not to directly intervene, and instead to “give [the Japanese] a chance” to prove themselves benevolent teachers of civilization towards “a subject race,” according to Arthur Judson Brown, the general secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Missions who presided over the meeting of Protestant leaders in response to this conspiracy (Brown 1909, 24,27).

The colonial regime probably tortured and extracted Yun’s confirmation that he would not participate in politics, and finally released him in 1915. Yun, shocked and enfeebled from his incarceration, wrote in the *Maeil Sinbo* that he would dedicate himself to promoting the “harmony and happiness” of the Korean and Japanese peoples (Suh 2017, 84). While other Korean nationalists believed this confession was not made in earnest, they contended that Yun had lost whatever will he had in the movement when

he publicly denounced the participants of the 1919 March First movement and discouraged petitioning directly to Wilson for support (Suh 2017, 84). Left to his own devices, after falsely being accused of plotting against the Governor-General, Yun never again found courage to participate in the nationalist cause, and especially renounced his trust in American missionaries as political allies.

By the time of the March First Independence Movement of 1919, therefore, Yun was doubtful whether Korean independence was possible or even desirable. He believed it was not ready to benefit from the consequences, and rather should strive to strengthen itself under the colonial system with some autonomy within it. Accordingly, he sympathized with the fervor of the participants of the March First Movement, but considered the political activists working for a premature Korean independence a greater threat to the nation than the Japanese. Instead, Yun argued that Koreans had to refrain from questioning colonial authority and instead attempt to win the favor of the Japanese within the framework of the empire. Simultaneously, they had to improve their intellectual and economic circumstances in order to alleviate racial discrimination. Again, Yun believed that the idea of self-determination of Woodrow Wilson did not apply to Korea, which is why it should not expect any help in fighting for political autonomy. So he considered any attempt to seek foreign aid untenable and antithetical to expanding the political and cultural space of Korea within the Japanese empire. Rather, he espoused that ‘gradual political autonomy’ that would help the Koreans achieve social equity with the Japanese before political autonomy.

Among other intellectuals leaning towards gradual development within the system of colonialism, Yun associated with a group of conservative reformists called the cultural nationalists. Despite his incarceration, Yun still believed that improving the living conditions of the Korean people would contribute to their eventual demand for political rights. In his diary entry of August 11, 1919, Yun stated that “As B. Washington insisted that the Negro must attain economic equality before he can claim social equality so the Koreans must reach economic equality before we may claim political equality (Yun, Diary Entry, August 11, 1919).” And on the diary entry of September 1st of the same year, he continued to elaborate upon the idea (Yun, Diary Entry, September 1, 1919):

Y.M.C.A. as usual. Discrimination, racial, national caste, sectarian, individual—or what not, is rooted deep in human nature. As long as there are differences in the grades of civilization—as long as there are inferior and superior grades of some sort, so long there will be discriminations. No law, no lecture, no sermonizing will make the whiteman give up his discrimination against a colored-man until the latter shall have proved to be his equal or superior. No law or sermonizing will make the Japanese do away with his discrimination against the Korean until the Korean shall have proved to be his equal in all things. First seek to improve your condition intellectual, and economical, then all these things—equal treatment and equal opportunities—will be added unto you.

However, the Japanese colonial regime reported the news of the racial violence in United States to emphasize its ‘benign’ policies towards Koreans. In the summer of 1919, the government-sponsored press lashed out against the hypocrisy of American missionaries for excoriating the systematic discrimination of Koreans without addressing the issue of race riots (the so-called Red Summer) in their home country. As

Suh mentioned in his research, the article on Maeil Sinbo titled “*Karyonhan hŭgin ŭi unmyong*” (The Unfortunate Fate of African Americans) on September 11th, 1919, stipulated that compared to the blacks killed through lynching and police suppression in the US, the Koreans under Japanese rule fared much better (Suh 2017, 92). This comparison specifically angered Yun, who had personally experienced racial tension in the American South between white and black Americans.

Collaboration

Governor-General Saitō Makoto’s introduction of accommodationist policies of the Cultural Rule in 1920 softened Yun’s criticism of colonial rule. The Cultural Rule allowed politically moderate Korean colonial elites to participate in economic, cultural, and political spheres. In 1922, Yun accepted the offer of principalship of the Songdo Higher Common School, formerly the Anglo-Korean School that had changed its name and curriculum to adhere to the colonial regulations. He limited his term to three years and accepted the job on the condition of having full control of the school funds (Yun, Diary Entry, October 6, 1922).

Yun did not forgive the United States for acquiescing the Japanese annexation of Korea following the Russo-Japanese War, arguing that the West had set a bad precedent for Japan to imitate in exploiting its colonies (Suh 2017, 94). In the diary

entry for September 25, 1931, Yun posits that since the United States under Theodore Roosevelt accepted the Japanese arguments for annexing Korea, there was no justifiable objection to raise against its conquest of Manchuria. The regional government of Manchuria is as corrupt and incompetent as the Korean government on the eve of annexation, and both were of significant importance to Japan. Should Manchuria and Korea fall under Russian influence, they would deny Japanese interests and would pose as potential threats to its sovereignty. Yun reduced the entire matter to a simple proposition: whether Japan possesses enough power to endure the strain of a military occupation of Manchuria (Yun, Diary Entry, September 25, 1931). On the basis of Social Darwinist justification for imperialism, the United States and other Western powers could not protest the Japanese acquisition of Manchuria, since they had expanded by the same procedure.

Now identifying more with the Japanese empire, Yun celebrated the opportunity for Koreans to rise up in the social ladder through military service after the formation of Manchukuo in 1931 and following war with China in 1937. Particularly, the colonial regime enacted a systematic oppression of nationalist intellectuals in the wake of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Police authorities arrested members of the Industrial Club (*hŭngŏpkurakpu*), a nationalist organization formed in 1924 by independence activists of Christian backgrounds such as Sin Hŭngu and Syngman Rhee. The *Suyangdonguhoe*, another similar organization with An Chang-ho and Yi Gwang-su as members, was also the target of this cleanup activity. Yun Ch'i-ho personally vouched for the innocence of the apprehended intellectuals, including An who was a

close friend, at the Government-General. This demonstrates that Yun still maintained a respected relationship with his nationalist colleagues, even though he was not involved in political activism.

In 1940, Yun adopted a Japanese name at the behest of his family and friends on the pretext of protecting his students from colonial oppression. A year later, he declared the attack on Pearl Harbor not a foolish challenge against the most powerful civilization in the world, but rather “the greatest war in the history of mankind” that would demonstrate the power of the colored races in the face of Anglo-Saxon arrogance (Yun, Diary Entry, December 9, 1941). He urged Koreans to partake in this endeavor that would secure the safety of Asia amidst Western imperialism and white supremacy. Accordingly, when the Japanese military expanded conscription to include Korean subjects in 1943, Yun rejoiced and delivered a radio speech titled “What Can Equal Joy Today at the Formal Beginning of the Enforcement of Conscription?” that reiterated his faith in the importance of Korean participation in military affairs. He summarily participated wholeheartedly in the campaign to entice Korean men to serve in the imperial army, through a series of lectures, editorials, and articles.

Yun’s final vindication of his actions and perspective on Korean liberation appeared in his writing titled “An Old-man’s Ruminations.” In this writing, dated October 15th and 20th of 1945, Yun proclaims that only England and United States have managed to successfully adopt democracy, and Korea is not yet prepared to run a democratic system. He is harsher on communism as a potential alternative, calling it alongside the Japanese militarism “the devil and deep.” Instead, Yun calls for a

Paternalist system where a strongman would keep at bay the “forms and slogans of democracy” and the “atrocities and absurdities of communism” in the “uneducated and undisciplined masses of Korea. (Yun Ch’i-ho 1945)” He also argues that Koreans as subjects of Japan had no alternative but to cooperate with the colonial government to survive, and their acts of “collaboration” should be forgiven through general amnesty. Conversely, Yun harshly criticizes the “swagger” of the so-called “patriots” that talked as if they liberated Korea, rather than the crediting the victory of the allies that had defeated Japan. His endorsement of a vision of unified Korea, without “personal ambitions” and “factional intrigues,” working together for the common good of the beleaguered nation, is reminiscent of the totalitarian agenda of the Japanese imperialism and also its critique of Korea as a divided historical subject. Leaving behind his final assessment of the situation in Korea, Yun died on December 9th, 1945, before he could personally come under the criticism for his acts of “betrayal” of Korea.

Conclusion

Yun’s own making as a historical figure shaped his thoughts on the nation, modernity, and colonialism. He was an emotional introvert who did not publicly articulate his frustration and anger for the injustices of Americans and Japanese outside of his diary. Yun also could not reconcile the discrepancy between his elite background

and his endorsement of practical training, which remained the exclusive duty of the Korean masses. His political recantation is a testament to effectiveness of Japanese agenda to coopt Korean intellectuals and bureaucrats. Yun agreed with the Japanese criticism of factionalism in Korea as the main obstacle to modernization, as he personally experienced it as a civil official. His experiences of racial discrimination in United States also brought him in line with the Pan-Asian ideology of the Japanese empire. As much as Yun hoped to muster his erudition and experiences to reform Korea, the more he found himself interrupted by the physical coercion of the Government General and the ideological allure of a united Asia against disparaging West. Ultimately, Yun Ch'i-ho failed to shape his times and rather was a man shaped by his times.

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‘Don’t Be So Free-Willed.’ The Road to Gender Equality from the End of the Qing Dynasty
to Contemporary People’s Republic of China

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Introduction:

In the later years of the Tang dynasty (655-690 A.D.) and the short-lived years of the Southern Zhou dynasty (690-705), Wu Zetian became the empress of China, an unprecedented event in a heavily male-dominate society. Social status of women, particularly in ancient China, was almost nonexistent. Women were not allowed to participate in politics and were not allowed to interfere in the lives of men— yet, a woman managed to reach the top position of power. Empress Wu reigned over the country with an iron fist and is famously known as the first, and subsequently the last, female leader of the Middle Kingdom. While women have little influence in contemporary People’s Republic of China (PRC), none can deny the fact that women have made monumental movements towards gaining equal rights, opportunities, and treatment that their fellow men receive. China prides itself on having a rich five-thousand-year history, with dynasties and governments that have risen and fallen like the sun. While historians have questioned the authenticity of the Xia dynasty as there are no records of the dynasty existing and written records of the ancient dynasty did not appear until later in history, it is not a legend that China has, at the very least, three-thousand-years of history (Woo 2008, 4).

Although Empress Wu made history by becoming the first female leader of an overwhelmingly patriarchal society, little changes were made regarding gender equality in ancient China. The Tang Dynasty led to some vital changes in women roles, but women were first and foremost child bearers and wives. The Tang legal code showed progression as it promoted male and female as “equals,” and discouraged men from taking second wives. Equality, although promoted in the law, remained unseen in the Tang Dynasty. Men criticized women, rarely discussed female jobs or lives, and portrayed women as inferior to their male counterparts (Pissin, 2012).

The mistreatment and inequality that women have suffered from throughout Chinese history can be traced back to the origins of filial piety, an idea put forward by Confucius that promotes women listening to men, citizens listening to their rulers, the ancient Chinese philosopher. Filial piety promotes the idea of submission from those who are seen as ‘less’ powerful to those who are more powerful—this includes children submitting to their parents, citizens submitting to their rulers, and women submitting to men. Confucianism first became the official state philosophy during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 A.D.) and became a common taught subject in education, where it has remained an integral part of Chinese society ever since (Cartwright, 2012). Confucianism faced elimination when Mao Zedong first established the PRC and led the Cultural Revolution, as Zedong believed that Confucius threatened the socialist movement and modernization of China. The PRC has taken a new stance on Confucius with current president of the PRC and leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping. In the past, Xi Jinping used Confucianist rhetoric in his speeches and promoted his ideologies in the country (Schuman, 2014). Throughout Chinese history, there’s been a complicated relationship with feminism and gender equality. Historians and feminist scholars argue that the Tang Dynasty was one of the greatest dynasties for Chinese women, while later dynasties like the Song and Qing oppressed women. The movement for gender equality in China has not been completely successful, nor has it been a complete failure; many accomplishments for women have been made, while regressions are constantly occurring. Strides and important progress have been made in the past one-hundred years—since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911—towards gender equality, but women of the Middle Kingdom still face conservative values, Confucianist ideologies, and a patriarchal society that negatively impacts women’s ability to succeed.

Historiography

He-Yin Zhen, a Chinese scholar, wrote a feminist journal called *Natural Justice* in 1907-1908. In her essay “On the Revenge of Women: Instruments of Man’s Rule over Women,” she wrote a critique of Confucianism as a state ideology, calling it “ancient teaching” that the men are seen as superior beings and always comes first (Augustine, 2019, 7). Confucianist ideals are often blamed for China’s social hierarchy and gender equality issues that have been around since China’s ancient dynasties, but Paul Ropp states that these blames are often overly simplistic and does not examine the “complexity and ambiguity” of Chinese culture (Ropp, 1994, 347-348). Marie Florine Bruneau has acknowledged that Chinese women were victims of power relations and social hierarchy but admitted that western and Chinese historians should work together to develop a greater understanding of women’s history and feminism in Imperial China (Augustine, 2019).

He-Yin Zhen isn’t the only Chinese scholar who spoke out against inequality and mistreatment of women in Imperial China. Liang Qichao published a single collection of essays known as “On Institutional Reform,” after China’s defeat by the Japanese during the First Sino-Japanese War (1895-1896). Qichao’s article “On Women’s Education” called for women and children to be allowed to receive an education, stating:

“The listener would respond that with so many other important reforms having yet to be implemented, the discussion of women’s education is a distraction from the most pressing and fundamental problems. However, when I seek out the root causes of national weakness, I find that they inevitably lie in women’s lack of education” (Liu, Karl, & Ko, 2013, p.190).

Although some historians, writers, and feminists discussed the importance of allowing females to play more of a vital role economically, socially, and politically, the ideas put forward by scholars like He-Yin Zhen did not receive much national attention. Even with

feminism becoming more of a discussion in 20th century China, the rise of social and women's history in China remain relatively new for Chinese historians. In the past four decades, social history in China has been on the rise with a renowned focus on “subjects that have been previously neglected—which include but are not limited to women, ethnic minorities, and working-class people” (Wang, 2006, 315). In 1983, Li Xiaojiang published an academic article titled *Renlei jinbu yu funu jiefan* (English: Progress of mankind and women's liberation), marking the beginning of women's studies in China—a branch of history that Chinese historians have further worked towards developing over the years (Wang, 2006). Social historians and traditional historians in China clashed in the past due to the rise of feminism and women's history in the country, which still holds conservative values and gender roles.

Feminism in Chinese history is a complicated topic that western and Chinese historians continuously explore to understand China's social advancements. There is a concern of western superiority that could come from western historians attempting to push their values and ideas onto China—at the same time, there are voices that are attempting to speak up about social injustice to improve their nation only with to receive pushback from the CCP, with free speech becoming increasingly more limited under Xi Jinping's presidency. This research is intended to provide contributions to the understanding of China's social hierarchy and gender inequality that have occurred in the previous 100 years, examining the advancements and regressions of Chinese women's rights from the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, through the Republic of China (ROC) under Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-shek, and throughout the seventy-one years of the history of the PRC.

Women in the Qing Dynasty

The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.) had a complicated structure when it came to women's roles and rights in China. Women began having more rights than they ever did at

any previous point of Chinese history. Women turned to writing poetry as a method of sharing their moral advice with the Qing men. Liu Yin (1806-1832), a poet from Jiangsu who died in 1832 after devoted care of her mother-in-law, married Miao Zhengjia—a man chosen by Yin’s grandfather, but detested by other family members. As a result, Yin wrote a verse in one of her poems that spoke out against being wealthy and explained that she planned on marrying Zhengjia even without her family’s approval (Yang, 2016). Despite her going against her family’s wishes and marrying Zhengjia, Liu Yin became well-known for her filial piety after taking care of her mother-in-law and giving a great deal of respect to her grandfather.

Yin was one of the many women in the Qing Dynasty who turned to literature to voice their opinions, either through poetry or satirical writing. Li Ju-Chen wrote “In the Country of Women,” describing a man named Lin Zhiyang who found himself in a land of women and forced to become a male concubine for the female ruler. In the satirical passage, Zhiyang begs to be released after having his feet binded and being forced to dress up for the female leader, a clear protest of foot binding and concubines that many emperors and royal men had throughout Chinese dynasties. Although women of the Qing Dynasty followed the social and expected gender norms of the time, many spoke out about their uneasiness while filling these roles. By relying on writing, women established themselves as important members of the family and of society and broke the expectations that women had to enjoy their roles in life and remain quiet.

Foot binding, the practice of forcibly breaking women’s feet and deforming them to look like hooves, had first spread across China during the Song Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) and continued through the Qing Dynasty, although the origins of foot binding in China remains unknown, as it did not become a controversial topic until the 20th century. An old Chinese saying states: “If you love your son, you don’t go easy on his studies; if you love your

daughter, you don't go easy on her footbinding" (Ping, 2000, p.33). Descriptions of what made women beautiful focused on their small feet, deformed through foot binding. Even though foot binding peaked during the Qing Dynasty, the Manchu emperors forbade and gave orders to stop the practice. Emperor Kangxi ordered families to get punished in 1664 if they were found to be bounding their daughter's feet but withdrew this order after families began falsely accusing opposing families of continuing the practice. Foot binding became a symbol of beauty and social status. Men believed that by foot binding women, women could distract foreign invaders. Women also had their feet binded to keep them in chambers or remaining chastised (Ping, 2000). The practice of foot binding severely limited the rights of women and became a symbol of the patriarchal treatment of women in imperial China. Women were deformed for the pleasures of men, displayed as trophies to be won, and established a stereotype that women needed their feet bound to be seen as beautiful.

Women who were born in higher socioeconomic families had the ability to study scholarly subjects, particularly in families that enjoyed book collecting. Chen Ershi studied history from an early age and wrote a number of literary works to discuss what women's duties are when they come from a gentry family (Yang, 2016). Chen also performed motherly and wifely duties that were expected of women in all families and judged those who did not perform the same duties harshly. Furthermore, women did not share the same property or marriage rights that their male counterparts possessed. When a man passed away in the family, the oldest son usually became head of the household—if no older son existed with the first wife, the power would go to a different wife's or concubine's oldest son. If no son existed, the family could choose the head of the household. Women, on the other hand, did not have a say in who became man of the household. A woman living in the Qing Dynasty could only keep part of the man's property as long as she did not remarry. A childless widow could only choose a head of the house upon the man's family approval (Jiahong, 2020). Only

a husband could initiate a divorce and only a woman's parents or the husband and his family could approve a marriage process.

The Qing Dynasty would collapse in 1911 after the Xinhai Revolution, and the establishment of the ROC took place in 1912. During the Qing Dynasty, women made some gains toward equality, and even established revolutionary changes around China. In 1897, the first modern school for girls was established in Shanghai. By 1907, 12 girls' schools existed within Shanghai, and 20 existed within Peking (now Beijing) (Beahan, 1975). Women's journals that provided education and awareness became increasingly more popular. Women were more outspoken and voiced their opinions using unique methods. Yet, limited female rights remained—women were still treated as objects and were not given the same legal rights that men of the Qing Dynasty had. Dr. Sun Yat-sen led the Xinhai Revolution and laid foundation for his Three Principles that would lead to Chinese prosperity—nationalism, democracy, and social livelihood. Dr. Sun Yat-sen spoke of his new government, where the people would have popular sovereignty and the government would lead the country—not unlike those of the United States and the United Kingdom—as if it were a rebirth of China. “Such a government will be the most complete and finest in the world, and a state of such a government will indeed be of the people, by the people, for the people” (de Bary & Lufrano, 2000, p. 324). Political, social, and economic reform were part of Dr Sun Yat-sen's goals as president of the new and modern China, and the future—particularly for women who had suffered throughout Chinese dynastical rule—seemed hopeful.

Women's Rights in the Republic of China

Sun Yat-sen became president of modern China, and on February 14th awarded Yuan Shikai, a Chinese army leader near the end of the Qing Dynasty, the honor of being the first president in ROC history. The ROC Constitution stated that: “The people of the Republic of China are uniformly equal, without distinction to race, class, or religion” (Carter, 2021). Tang

Qunying, an active feminist who helped overthrow the Qing Dynasty, and 12 other women stormed the Chinese Parliament, jeering loudly when the question of women's suffrage arose. The new president of the ROC moved the meetings to Beijing, and a law passed that only allowed men to vote. The new political party of China, the Kuomintang (KMT), overwhelmingly disapproved of equal voting rights. Despite Dr. Sun Yat-sen's democratic principles, the ROC had placed new limitations on women's rights in the newly established government.

Little is known about how Dr. Sun Yat-sen felt about gender roles and women's rights in China. Sun Yat-sen believed that through education women could improve themselves, and he was born in the 19th century Qing Dynasty. Yat-sen witnessed the pain of foot binding and immediately placed a ban on the practice in March 1912. Sun Yat-sen supported women participation in the Chinese government, but often met backlash by his more traditional peers. However, Sun Yat-sen also recognized that by allowing women equal rights would lose more support than it would gain, potentially affecting support for the KMT and hurting national solidarity which Sun Yat-sen decreed necessary for a prosperous nation (Ning-Yu, 1988). Although voting rights were not established for women, the Republic of China stated that women's education is as important as men's education. According to the Women's International League in 1928, the Ministry of Education said:

“The firmness of the foundation upon which the Republic of China has been founded depends on education. We must, hereafter, make our best effort to develop and encourage women's education as well as that for men. We must emphasize and provide for the social as well as school education” (Pie, 1928).

The ROC had a mixture of theoretical ideas and intellectualism from both the western and eastern worlds, that ranged from Confucianism to anarchism. He Zhen argued that women should not blame men for not being able to afford to eat or receive the equal treatment that men get, but to blame the rich and the capitalist system. He Zhen promoted communism as a system that would provide more equality and freedom for women (de Bary & Lufrano, 2000). Despite a renowned focus on women education, intellectualism, and democratic principles, the ROC government and ruling KMT party would begin to lead attacks on women, particularly women who were seen as radicals.

By the late-1920s, the KMT and conservative Chinese culturalists were attacking revolutionary leaders that were actively attempting to reform China's social hierarchy and gender inequality. According to Cai Chang, women who were arrested would be "stripped naked, nailed on crosses, and their [women] noses and breasts cut off before they were killed" (Diamond, 1975, p. 7). By 1934, Chiang Kai-shek had control of the KMT and underwent social reforms with his New Life Movement that returned to a patriarchal society and Neo-Confucianist thought that existed in imperial and ancient China. Kai-shek and the KMT both took severe actions to limit the feminist and anti-Confucianist rhetoric that had begun during the May 4th Movement after the controversy with the Treaty of Versailles and lasted throughout the 1920s (Diamond, 1975).

The movement for women's rights essentially ended by the end of the 1930s. A civil war between the KMT and CCP had been brewing for years, and a "Whiter Terror" that killed any CCP sympathizers or those who went against Confucianist and KMT ideas and policies became a normality. Chiang Kai-shek ruled KMT areas with an iron fist, denying any ideas that may harm the social structure of China—his wife, Soong Mei-ling, denied that women could ever be equal to men and believed that only men went to college or technical training schools, whereas women were expected to remain in the house and be a mother.

With the KMT's rhetoric and behavior, as well as the sudden shift away from Dr. Sun Yatsen's original Republican China visions, gender equality was once again unachievable.

Yet, once again, women during the reign of the KMT had a complex relationship with their quest for equality. More women were receiving an education and were actively participating in the government or movements to revolutionize and modernize China. Women were so intellectual during the Republican-led era that male intellectuals began worrying about the relationship between women and the central government, as well as their own identities (Edwards, 2000). Even with foot binding being technically banned as early as 1912, it was rarely enforced, and officials often overlooked the ban. Women still suffered from foot binding throughout the Republican era. Zhang Yun Ying is among one of the last living Chinese citizens with bound feet, being born in 1927 and having her feet bound at age 7. Most living Chinese citizens with their feet bound grew up in rural areas during the Republican era, where the practice of foot binding continued (Mills, 2015). Conservative values and Confucianist ideologies held back women from receiving the equality they fought years to get, from the time the ROC was established to the time of its collapse. On October 1st, 1949, Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China after the communist army won a civil war that had been raging between the CCP and KMT for 22 years.

Women's Rights in the People's Republic of China

Chairman Mao once proclaimed "women hold up half the sky" as he advocated for equality amongst men and women. Mao would state that "Whatever men comrades can accomplish, women comrades can too" (Phillips, 2017). Women enjoyed numerous advantages under the early days of Mao's leadership. Mao Zedong and his communist party members promoted peasant women to revolt against society, promoted a liberal vision of women's rights, and enlisted millions of women into the Chinese civil war.

Mao took immediate steps to give women more freedom in the home and the workplace, establishing the Marriage Law of 1950 which challenged the traditional social hierarchy. Women were promised property, the abolishment of concubinage, arranged and child marriages were outlawed, and a reformation of divorce laws occurred. Article 1 of the Marriage Law states:

“The New Democratic marriage system, which is based on free choice of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on protection of the lawful interests of women and children, shall be put into effect” (Chen, Cheng, Letz, & Spence, 2014, p. 376).

Mao announced that International Women’s Day would be an annual holiday for China in December 1949 and replaced the term “nuren” (female person) with “funu” (women). Jiping Zuo, a Chinese historian, argued that Mao made these progressive changes not to provide women with social autonomy that they had been seeking since the days of the Qing Dynasty and the early Republican-era, but instead to protect themselves from western nations who were at the time clashing with communist ideologies in the Soviet Union (Wielink, 2019). Even with Mao’s new rhetoric matching what women had been working for, little actual changes were made. Men still made more money and received more desirable jobs, men still received better education, and men still had more access to resources than women did.

In 1966, Mao and the CCP began the Cultural Revolution, building a Cult of Personality around Mao and eliminating anything perceived as a threat to the CCP’s existence that would last until 1976. Youth, particularly females who heard Mao’s rhetoric supporting the idea of men and women being equal, participated in the movement without question. Young girls would get married to men but had to consider their family class and

socioeconomic background. If either a girl or a boy came from a background that the CCP frowned upon, their political future faced jeopardy. Women during the Cultural Revolution faced negative stereotypes and perceptions of who they were (Yang & Yan, 2017). The Cultural Revolution still treated women as inferiors to men, but women working and participating in higher education institutions were at an all-time high. Although both the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward are sometimes remembered by western historians as being two catastrophic failures that led to a worsened image of Mao Zedong, it provided women more opportunities that they had never previously had in the past (Li, 2000).

After Mao Zedong's death, Deng Xiaoping began rising to power and eventually took control of the CCP by 1978. Xiaoping introduced economic and opening up reforms as he worked towards moving away from Mao's closed-door and isolationist policies. By introducing new economic reforms, Deng Xiaoping provided women with more options and better potential lives—however, in doing so, he limited gender equality. Guo (1997) argues that whereas Mao developed a strictly socialist society that promoted production and reproduction where all humans are equal, the implementation of economic reforms to transform the PRC into a capitalist state—one that is often referred to by the CCP as “socialist with Chinese characteristics”—are hindering gender equality in China. Deng Xiaoping's regime also introduced the controversial one-child policy, which allows each family to only have one child (with the exception of more rural areas where 2 children are allowed) to combat overpopulation. This policy, while it may have been well-intended, severely harmed women's rights in China. Girls often suffered higher infanticide rates because traditional Chinese culture sees the man—not the woman—as taking care of the family when they are older. As families were only allowed one child, girls were often seen as inferior children and often treated as such. The one-child policy has had a rippling effect across contemporary China, with a significantly high gender imbalance (Shasha, 2020).

Furthermore, it has become illegal in the PRC to allow families to know the sex of their child before the birth unless it is for medical purposes.

Although women never achieved complete equality like they hoped for, they were treated as co-revolutionaries who were important to the modernization of China. Regardless of Mao's intentions or ulterior motives behind his rhetoric, women finally saw themselves making tremendous strides towards full gender equality in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1980s women had seen almost all of their efforts and progression disappear with Deng's reforms. Traditional gender roles returned with the shift from socialism to capitalism in China, where men often had the ability to make the wealth that Deng's regime promoted, while women struggled to receive high-paying jobs that kept their livelihood. As a result, women became housewives and child bearers again. Furthermore, under the capitalist system, women have faced more social issues than they have under Mao Zedong, with more violence happening against women (Lemond, 2002).

Although there were previous leaders of China before, few—if any with the exception of Mao Zedong—have had such a Cult of Personality surrounding him like current president Xi Jinping does. Taking office in 2012, Xi eliminated term limits (which were put in by Deng Xiaoping to avoid another leader like Mao Zedong consolidating power) in 2018. Ever since the rise of Xi Jinping, free speech within the country—particularly speech that can affect social order—have been severely limited. These limitations have also affected the feminist movement in China. In 2015, women protested sexual harassment for the upcoming International Women's Day by putting stickers on public transportation. Police detained five women for their roles in the silent awareness movement. These five women became known as the "Feminist Five" (Wang, 2017). Feminist women face abuse on social media and are removed from social media rather than the people attacking them (Wee, 2021). Crackdowns on perceived dissent against the Chinese government became increasingly more common

after the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, where Deng's regime ordered force to be used on peaceful protestors. Today, the CCP faces backlash against possible human rights violations in Xinjiang, aggression in the South China Sea, and the lack of transparency with the COVID-19 coronavirus. Xi Jinping's regime will only continue cracking down on protests that may affect the social order or lead to political unrest in China.

Although women continue making progress towards equality, in terms of working in bureaucratic offices or becoming CCP members, receiving high-quality education, or receiving better-paying jobs that allow women to live independently, many conservative Chinese families still expect their daughters to get married at a young age and bear children. Chinese families and society pressure women immensely to get married and give birth before they're 30 years old, even though many are moving away from the traditional ideologies of marriage and having a child and would rather focus on their own lives. Women who are not married by 25 years old—and especially 30 years old—are referred to as “Sheng nu” (leftover woman). Women, however, are actively working towards combatting these derogatory terms that portray women as only being successful if they are married with children (SK-II, 2016). Even with gender equality movements to combat the conservative ideologies and the social hierarchy that still exists in China, the government and traditionalists continue to pushback—limiting the effectiveness of the movement and the potential that the women can bring to China's growth. The CCP has been in power for 71 years with no end in sight.

Conclusion

There is a Chinese proverb that says *bu pa man, jiu pa zhan* (It's better to make slow progress than no progress at all). The feminist movement and numerous efforts at gender equality throughout Chinese history are convoluted at best and unfathomable at worst. Despite the Tang Dynasty with Wu Zetian as empress coming 1,000 years prior to the Qing

Dynasty, many historians continue to argue that the Tang was a golden age for women. One could argue that women had higher gender equality (but not necessarily better living opportunities) during Mao Zedong's reign than Deng Xiaoping or Xi Jinping's reign. Important developments that cannot be overlooked or underestimated have been made in Chinese society, particularly in the last 100 years. Women have become more outspoken, moving away from the passive-aggressive poetry and satirical writings of the Qing Dynasty to online discussions, protests, and full-fledged feminist movements. Women have received better education and work opportunities. Yet, women still face backlash and pushback from the CCP and traditional Confucianist society. Women are still expected to get married young, to have children, and to possess filial piety towards her family and her husband's family.

Women in contemporary PRC are consistently working towards developing a more equitable society that provides women the same opportunities that men receive, while combatting traditional norms and values that have limited women for thousands of years. Feminists are actively protesting for greater gender equality, but the CCP remains committed to shutting down these movements—a move that may have negative consequences for gender equality in China in the near-future.

Women play more of a vital role today in China's economic and political developments than they ever have in Chinese history. Although severely lopsided, as of 2019 women accounted for 25% of the CCP—nearly a 10% improvement in 10 years (Statista 2020). Women are receiving a better education and employment than they ever have in previous generations—yet gender inequality and stereotypical traditional roles still exist in many Chinese households. Although improvements have been made under the CCP since its establishment in 1949, and women's rights have steadily been rising since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, China's current fight in shutting down what the government perceives

to be “radical” movements means that the PRC has a long way to go before achieving gender equality that provides women the same opportunities that men have.

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들어가며 : 가족을 사회적인 것(the social)으로 바라보기

2018년 한국의 GDP 대비 사회복지지출(SOCX)은 11.1%로 OECD국가 중에 멕시코와 칠레에 이어 하위권에 머물렀다. 서유럽 국가들-프랑스(31.2%), 벨기에(28.9%), 핀란드(28.7%)-의 절반에도 미치지 못하는 것은 물론이고, 시장형 복지국가인 미국(18.7%), 영국(20.6%)보다 낮으며 인근국가인 일본(21.9%)에 비해서도 절반정도에 불과하다.¹⁾ 세계 11위라는 한국경제의 양적 지표(무역규모, GDP)에 비해 복지지출이 매우 낮다는 사실을 알 수 있다. 한국의 낮은 수준의 사회안전망은 지속적인 사회문제로 제기되고 있다. 대부분의 연구는 이 문제의 기원을 1990년대 후반에 가속화된 신자유주의에서 찾는다. 초기 산업사회의 위험관리체계는 남성산업노동자, 높은 출산율, 안정적 가족, 성별분업에 기반을 두었으나 현재에는 이러한 체계가 작동하지 않는다고 주장한다.²⁾

한편 유럽에서는 통치성을 강조하는 후기 푸코리언들을 중심으로 신자유주의 전후의 질적 변화가 연구되었다. 제2차 세계대전 이후 복지국가들은 노동시장과 가족에 기반을 둔 사회안전망을 구축했다가 최근 경제적 위기가 닥치자 개인의 책임으로 이전시키고 있다. 푸코와 동줄로는 통치성(governmentality)이 사회성(the social)을 통해 작동한다고 주장했고, 이들의 관점에서 유럽의 전후 사회보장제도는 국가에 의해 구성된 '사회적 연대'라고도 볼 수 있다. 그런 의미에서 신자유주의는 사회보장과 기초한 통치성과 전혀 다른 통치성을 구성하고 있다.³⁾

후기 푸코리언들의 주장은 유럽의 자유주의적 통치성을 설명하는데 유효하지만 한국과 같은 탈식민-후발 산업국가의 신자유주의 이전의 통치성과 사회적 연대를 설명하는데 한계를 갖는다. 왜냐하면 통치성이 작동한 '통로'로써 사회보장제도가 한국에 없었기 때문이다. 이를 교조적으로 받아들이면 한국에서 자유주의적 통치성이 없었다고 말할 수 있다. 하지만 한국은 냉전기에 자본주의 블록의 일원으로 깊숙이 진입한 국가이며, 이 과정에서 미국을 경유한 자유주의가 수입된 국가이기도 하다. 이를 고려한다면 탈식민국가이자 냉전의 전선국가(front-state)로서 서구사회와 다른 방식의 자유주의적 통치성이 작동했다고 추측할 수 있다.⁴⁾ 즉 자유주의적 통치성이 작동하는

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1) Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) in OECD, <http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm>
2) 김영란, '한국의 사회적 위험 변화와 가족위험', "가족과 문화" 26-2, 2014.
3) 자크 동줄로는 자유주의적 통치성의 핵심을 국가의 단순한 통제확장이 아닌, 시민들이 스스로 국가가 설정한 목표에 동의하고 그 목표를 이루게 하는 과정으로 보았다. 이를 위해 성장, 진보, 연대라는 정치적 언어가 필요했으며, 사회의 다양한 영역(노동조합, 언론, 전문관료, 정당, 보고서 등)이 수단화되었다고 판단했다. 이 중에서도 출생률, 세금 등의 통치기술을 고안하고 전문화하는 과정은 자유주의적 통치성이 작동하는데 중요한 역할을 했다. Jacques Donzelot 1993 : 88-108.
4) 허은은 1950년대 미 공보원(USIS)의 활동을 통해 미국이 냉전기에 한국을 자유진영에 포섭하고 냉전 민족주의를 형성하는데 개입한 과정을 분석하였다. 그에 따르면 한국은 1945년 이후 탈식민 국가로서 새로운 국제체제의 일원으로 구성되어야 하는 존재였으며, 동시에 냉전의 최전선 국가로서 일본과는 또 다른 동아시아 국가로 기능해야 했다. 허은, '냉전시대 미국의 민족국가 형성 개입과 헤게모니 구축의 최전선', "한국사연구" 155, 2011; '냉전시대 남북 분단국가의 문화정체성 모색과 '냉전 민족주의', "한국사학보" 2011 참조.

데에 사회보장제도가 아닌 다른 형태의 사회성을 경유했다고 볼 수 있다.

한국에서 사회복지제도-전국민 의료보험, 국민연금, 최저임금제도-는 1980년대 후반 군사정권이 물러나고 제도적 민주화가 진행되면서 제도화되었다. 1960~80년대 군사정권기에 국가는 소수의 중산층, 상층 노동계급을 대상으로 하는 선별적 복지정책을 시행했다.⁵⁾ 그렇다면 이 시기에 한국인의 사회안전망은 누가 책임졌을까? 자본주의 사회에서 국가는 개인의 삶을 모두 책임지지 않지만 재생산 문제는 지속될 수밖에 없다. 한국인의 사회안전 문제-주거, 실업, 출산, 보육, 교육, 의료, 노후-는 전적으로 가족에게 일임되었다.

이 연구는 가족을 사적인 영역으로 한정하지 않고, 한국현대사에서 국가의 통치성이 발현된 영역(sphere)으로 바라본다. 한국은 서구의 대규모 원조 아래 1961년부터 가족계획정책을 적극적으로 도입하고 추진했다. 그 결과 1960년대 초 한국의 출산율은 6.3명이었으나 1983년 2.06명으로 낮아지며 유례없는 가족계획 성공국가로 자리매김했다. 최근의 연구는 가족계획을 분석하며 기존의 개인적인 영역이었던 출산이 인구통계의 영역으로 진입했고, 국가가 가족을 통해 사회를 통치했다고 설명한다.⁶⁾ 본 연구는 이러한 관점을 수용하면서도 더 나아가 가족 내에서도 국가가 적극적으로 개입하지 않았던 영역, 즉 생계와 이주의 문제를 분석해야 한다고 주장한다. 대부분의 가족연구는 현재까지 자료의 한계로 인해 중산층 가족담론, 가족계획 연구에 한정되었다. 본 연구는 현실에서 빈곤가족의 선택과 행위를 규명하기 위해 인터뷰 자료를 적극적으로 활용할 예정이다.

농촌출신 빈곤가족의 이주문제를 분석하는 이유는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 역사적인 배경이다. 1960~70년대 한국사회는 산업구조와 인구 측면에서 엄청난 변화를 겪었다. 1953년 한국전쟁이 끝나고 농촌사회의 피폐함은 지속되었다. 여기에 1960년대 군사정부에서 급속한 산업화를 추진하자 농촌에서 수많은 청년들이 서울로 몰려들었다. 이 시기의 농촌청년들의 이주과정과 가족관계의 변화는 한국의 근대화 과정에서 발생한 사회현상으로 접근되어야 한다. 둘째, 가족 인터뷰를 활용한 연구는 이주민 뿐 아니라 그들의 가족까지 포함하여 연속과 단절의 양 측면을 보여준다. 기존의 빈곤 이주민 연구는 주로 농촌출신 도시거주민을 대상으로 이뤄졌다.⁷⁾ 기존 연구의 접근은 이주민이 갖는 고향 정체성과 가족의 위계 내에서 이주하지 못했던 가족(남은 자)의 문제를 은폐한다. 이주민에 대한 연구는 떠난 자, 떠나지 못한 자, 떠났다가 귀향한 자의 관계성을 모두 포함해야 한다. 셋째, 가족을 통해 사회를 통치한다는 발상은 국가의 직접적 개입(가족계획)만 의미하지 않는다. 빈곤가족의 삶은 정부가 적극적으로 유포하는 국가주의적 담론(조국근대화, 반공주의, 성장)을 반영하면서 동시에 국가가 책임져주지 않는 집단의 생존전략이기도 하다. 따라서 국가주의적 담론은 빈곤가족의 삶에 그대로 반영되지 않는다. 국가가 직접적인 물질·경제적 지원을 제공하지 않고, 빈곤가족을 사실상 내버려 두면서 이들의 삶은 국가로부터 독립적인 연대성을 발휘한다. 모순적으로 보이는 이러한 현상은 곧 한국현대사의 중요한 성격을 설명해줄 수 있다.

5) 양명지, '박정희 정권의 지배전략으로서의 계급정치', "사회발전연구"9, 2003.

6) 조주은, "가족과 통치-인구는 어떻게 정치의 문제가 되었나", 창비, 2018.

7) 미국인 인류학자인 Vincent S.R. Brandt 박사는 농촌마을과 빈민촌을 연구하며 다음과 같은 말을 남겼다. "Today in Seoul, city dirt has a kind of prestige compared to country mud, which is demeaning." 그는 농촌/도시 이미지의 대조가 전국적으로 발생한다는 사실을 밝혔다. (Brandt, 1969) 한편 사회학자 조은은 25년간 빈민가족을 추적하며 그들의 빈곤이 재생산되는 과정을 연구했다. (조은, '사당동더하기25', 또하나의문화, 2012) 이들의 연구는 기념비적이지만 ①빈곤가족의 원가족(proto-family)에 직접적으로 접근하지 못했고, ②빈곤가족의 계급상승 과정을 설명하지 못했다는 한계를 갖는다.

1. 인구이동의 확대와 통계행정업무의 전문화

쿠데타로 집권한 박정희 정부는 1962년 법률 제1067호로 주민등록법을 제정했다. 이로써 한국은 1942년 조선총독부에서 제정했던 조선기류령을 대체할 법적 제도를 갖췄다. 새로운 법은 기존 법처럼 주민을 등록하여 인구 이동과 증감을 파악하고 행정사무를 도왔다. 하지만 기존 법과 달리 내국인의 등록만을 허용하고, 실거주지와 등록지를 일원화하여 이중등록을 불허했다. 또한 30일 이상 특정 지역에 거주한다면 반드시 주민등록을 하도록 명문화했다.⁸⁾ 이와 같은 변화는 영토 내에 거주하는 한국 국적 보유자의 인구동태를 보다 명확하게 행정체계에 귀속시키는 것을 의미했다.

주민등록제도는 박정희 정부의 선제적인 인구정책만으로 볼 수 없다. 1950년대부터 농촌경제의 빈곤이 심각한 수준에 달했고, 이농(離農)은 도시 빈민과 잠재적 실업자의 증가를 의미했다. 1962년 1월 고려대 농과대학 학생회는 필드워크를 마치고 보고서를 제출했는데, 이에 따르면 “정부 영농자금의 혜택을 받는 농가는 50%도 안 되고, 농촌 젊은 세대들이 도시로 진출하려는 경향을 경계해야 한다”고 밝혔다.⁹⁾ 농촌문제의 지속과 도시 문제의 확장은 정부 정책의 무능만으로 보기 어렵다. 제3세계 주변부 국가의 급격한 자본주의화 과정에서 공통되게 발생하는 현상이었고, 1971년 K.Hart는 제3세계 도시지역의 “비공식 경제활동” 개념을 제안했고, ILO는 이를 채택하여 개발도상국 도시경제에 관한 연구·정책을 수립했다.¹⁰⁾

1960년대에 한국 농촌에서는 매년 10~20만 명의 인구가 도시로 이주하였다. 특히 1967~68년 대가뭄은 농촌 영세민의 대규모 이농으로 이어졌다. 1967년에는 농업 지역이었던 전라도·경상도 출신 이주민이 20% 늘어나 밤마다 서울역 주변에서 200여명이 노숙을 하고, 이들이 주로 종사했던 지게꾼도 500여명이나 늘어났다. 가뭄피해가 심했던 1968년에는 38만여 명이 농촌을 떠난 것으로 추정되었다. 1년 동안 농촌인구의 2.3%가 고향을 등지고 떠난 것이다.¹¹⁾

<Table 1> Population Change and Movement in Seoul, 1960-90

Unit: persons, %

	Population (A)	Household	Net Movement	Population moved in (B)	Population moved out	ratio of people moving in (B/A)
1960	2,444,874	447,089	-	-	-	-
1965	3,470,880	649,290	-	-	-	-
1970	5,536,169	1,097,432	293,828	1,742,813	1,448,985	31.5
1975	6,889,470	1,410,748	459,569	3,396,662	2,937,093	49.3
1980	8,366,756	1,847,877	164,904	2,767,816	2,602,912	33.1
1985	9,645,932	2,340,156	30,364	2,784,387	2,754,023	28.9
1990	10,627,790	2,823,228	-90,992	2,726,492	2,817,484	25.7

<Table 1>을 보면 알 수 있듯이, 서울시 인구는 30년 동안 244만 명에서 1000만 명으로 4배 이상 증가했다. 반면 같은 시기 한국 총인구는 3000만 명에서 5200만 명으로 1.7배 증가했다. 놀라운 것은 1970~80년대에 매년 서울인구의 31~49%가 New comer로 채워졌다는 사실이다. 즉,

8) 주민등록법, 법률 제1067호, 1962년 5월 10일 제정, 6월 20일 시행. 국가법령정보센터.

9) ‘농촌살림 얼마나 나아졌나’, “동아일보”, 1962.1.12.

10) 윤여덕, 김종채, “이농민의 도시적응과 사회통합에 관한 연구”, 한국농촌경제연구원, 1984.

11) ‘이농 상경자 격증 풍찬노숙’, “동아일보”, 1967.10.12.

서울이주가 점차 감소한 1990년 이전까지 서울은 지속적으로 농촌으로부터 새롭게 사람들이 유입되는 도시였다. 반면 농촌인구는 1960년 1600만 명에서 1980년 1256만 명으로 감소했고, 총인구 대비 64%에서 33%로 떨어졌다.

1960~70년대 사람들이 서울로 몰려든 원인은 농촌에서 찾을 수 있다. 농촌의 1인당 소득수준은 도시에 비하여 1965년 87.7%였으나 본격적인 공업화가 진행되면서 1970년 53.4%까지 떨어졌다. 1970년대 정부정책으로 도농격차가 축소되어 다시 92.9%까지 증가했지만, 여전히 농촌사회는 도시에 비하여 낙후되고 가난한 곳이었다. 1971년의 한 연구에 따르면, 도시 이주민의 72.1%가 경제적 동기에서 이주를 결정하였다. (Hwang 1982)

농촌 청년들은 경제적 이유만으로 서울로 떠나지 않았다. 도시이주를 원하는 청소년의 41%는 “사회적 안목을 확대하고 더 많은 사람들을 만나기 위해서”, 22.3%는 “현대문화의 혜택을 누리기 위해서” 도시이주를 원했다. 즉 이농(離農)은 객관적 조건과 함께 의식변화가 수반되어야 했다. 이들은 서울에서 도시 빈민층으로 전락했지만 그럼에도 농촌을 낙후되고 희망이 없는 곳으로 여겼기 때문에 도시 이주를 희망했다. 이러한 선택은 당시에 심각한 사회문제로 대두되었다. 농촌사회의 붕괴되면서 도시문제가 폭발적으로 증가했기 때문이다. (Lee 1975; Hwang 1982)

그렇다면 정부는 급격한 인구이동을 어떻게 바라보고 대응했을까? 1968, 1970년 두 차례에 걸쳐 주민등록법이 개정되었다. 개정된 법은 전 국민 주민등록번호, 주민등록증 교부를 행정적으로 강제했고, 경찰의 시민에 대한 주민등록증 검사가 법안에 삽입되었다. 이러한 변화는 인구증가를 관리한다는 일반적인 국가의 역할이라는 측면 외에도 정치적인 목적이 수반되었다. 1968년은 1·21 사건, 푸에블로호 사건이 발생해 남북갈등이 고조되는 시기였다. 정부는 1969년 주민등록법 개정 제안 서류에서 “주민등록증을 제시하도록 함으로써 간첩이나 불순분자를 용이하게 식별·색출하여 반공태세를 강화”한다고 밝혔다.¹²⁾ 정부는 주민동태와 인구이동 파악을 기존의 일반적인 사회문제에서 국가안보의 수준으로 확장시켰다. 다른 한편, 이러한 조치는 한국전쟁 이후 지속적으로 강조되었던 “반공 담론”이 행정계통을 통해 시민의 일상에 스며드는 것을 의미하기도 했다. 반공 자유주의의 신체화라고도 할 수 있다. 안정적 거주지가 명시된 주민등록증의 소유 여부가 국민과 비국민을 나눴기 때문이다.

주민등록법 개정은 인구이동통계 작성의 전문화로 이어졌다. 기존의 인구센서스는 1949년, 1955년, 1960년, 1965년, 1970년 대체로 5년 주기로 진행되었다. 정부는 1970년부터 매월 단위의 인구통계 작성과 관리·분석을 명령했다. 각 지역의 동·읍·면장은 인구이동 정보를 매월 2개 양식의 서류로 상급 구·시·군에 보고를 해야 했고, 각 단체장은 이를 다시 경제기획원장에게 보고했다. 이 당시 사용된 인구이동보고서 양식을 보면 인구의 자연 증감(출산·사망)보다 전입·전출이 앞에 배치되어 있고, 성별·지역별 인구이동 사유까지 조사하였다. 경제기획원은 각 지역으로부터 받은 자료를 모아 매년 <인구이동통계연보> 보고서를 출판했다. 이 보고서 표지에는 “주민등록에 의한 집계”를 부제로 달아 주민등록제도에 포함되지 않는 인구가 있다는 사실을 확인시켰다. 또한 보고서의 권두언에는 주민등록 통계의 확대·전문화·행정효율을 강조하는 글이 매년 실렸다.¹³⁾

이처럼 1960~70년대는 급격한 인구이동과 인구이동통계의 발전이 함께 나타났다. 어떤 것이 먼저였는지는 중요하지 않다. 한 가지 분명한 것은 인구이동 자체가 정부에게는 일종의 사회불안으로 인식되었고, 인구이동통계는 정부의 말단 행정력 침투와 맞물려 강화되었다는 점이다. 무엇보다 담당부서가 경제정책을 담당하는 기관이었다는 점은 인구이동통계가 경제성장의 기술로써 활용되었다는 점을 시사한다. 개인이 곧 국가 통치의 대상으로 배치되었다는 사실을 의미한다.

12) 국회의안정보시스템, 의안번호 070509, 주민등록법개정법률안(안).

13) “인구이동통계연보”, 경제기획원 조사통계국, 1970~1980.

2. 인터뷰 자료를 활용한 6남매의 이주과정과 가족관계 변화 분석

(1) 6남매 가족의 기초 정보와 이주 경험

인터뷰를 진행한 6남매의 고향인 늑전리는 충청남도의 산골 마을로 전형적인 가난한 농촌의 모습을 띠고 있었다. 늑전리에는 6남매가 성장하는 동안 100가구 정도가 거주하고 있었고, 대부분 같은 성씨가 거주하는 집성촌이었다. 주요 산업은 농업이었고, 주변에 산이 많기 때문에 농업으로 충당하지 못하는 비용은 나무를 베어 파는 식으로 감당했다. 이 마을은 산으로 둘러싸여 있어 한국전쟁 때에도 피해를 받지 않았고, 서울에서 피난민들이 내려와 임시 거주했던 적이 있다. 이 마을은 빈부격차가 존재했지만 크지 않았다. 산 속에 위치하여 대중교통이 없고, 가장 가까운 관청&시장과 10km 이상 떨어졌고, 농경지 규모도 매우 작았다. 집성촌 특징상 농사와 마을행사를 친족 공동의 노동력으로 치렀다. 식민지기에 만들어진 철도(장항선)가 마을 부근을 지나 1960~70년대 일반적인 상경 방법이었던 무임승차에 좋은 조건을 갖췄다.

6남매의 가족은 마을 내에서 중간규모 농사를 짓는 집이었다. 아버지는 성실한 농부로 문맹이었고, 어머니는 더 큰 마을에서 시집온 사람으로 한문과 한글을 사용할 수 있었다. 어머니의 영향으로 6남매 중 여성은 상대적으로 농사일을 덜 할 수 있었다. 물론 이는 여성의 일을 “노동”으로 인식하지 못하는 6남매의 인식이 기억을 왜곡시킨 것일 수 있으며, 이 부분은 뒤에서 따로 설명한다. 이들의 부모는 7남매를 낳았지만 1명이 어렸을 때에 사망하여 6남매로 표기한다. 6남매 중 첫째는 1933년생이고 막내는 1956년생으로 한 세대에 해당하는 23년의 나이차를 갖는다. 하지만 가족계획이 실행되기 전 한국의 출산율이 6.3명이었다는 점을 고려한다면 이들은 평균적이었다고 할 수 있다. 오히려 더 많은 자녀를 낳았던 농촌사회를 고려한다면 약간 적은 자녀구성이기도 하다.

농촌 청소년의 도시 선망은 6남매 가운데 60~70년대에 이주한 이들에게서도 똑같이 나타났다. M3은 형제들이 고향을 떠나 농경지를 많이 확보했지만 서울이주를 강력하게 희망하였다. 그에게 서울은 현금을 벌 수 있고, 희망적인 공간으로 기억되었다. F2는 이주의 원인을 묻는 질문에 “중학교 졸업하면 당연히 서울 가야 한다고 생각했어”라고 답했다. 이 같은 증언은 농가소득의 증가가 이촌향도를 막지 못했다는 사실을 보여준다.

<Table 2> 6남매의 이주관련 주요 사건

	생년	이주과정 및 주요 경험	최종 직업	첫 이주 시기	결혼	최종 정착지 결정
M1 (male)	1933	-1956~59년 군복무 -1960~63년 서울, 의정부, 동두천 등에서 거주 -간장공장, 미군아파트 건설현장 등에서 일함 -1964년 귀향	목수	1960	1952	1964
M2 (male)	1937	-1955~60년 계절형 이주(홍제동) -1960~63년 군복무 -1964년 서울로 완전이주(이태원) -1970년대 중반 18개월 동안 사우디아라비아 파견근무 -국회의사당, 군인아파트 등 공사장 미장으로 일함	미장이	1955	1963	1964
M3 (male)	1941	-1957~69년 계절형 이주(홍제동·이태원) -1969년 서울로 완전이주(이태원) -국회의사당, 군인아파트 등 공사장 미장으로 일함	미장이	1957	1969	1969

M4 (male)	1944	-1960년 대전에서 하숙학원을 다님 -1965~1968년 군복무 -1969년 서울로 완전이주, 항공대 수위로 취직(이태원) -결혼하면서 분가(화전)	대학 교직원	1960	1972	1972
F1	1950	-1969년 10일간 서울에서 생활(이태원) -고향에서 부모 봉양하다 결혼하여 고향 인근에 정착	농부	1969	1974	1974
F1	1956	-중학교 졸업 후 서울 및 도시로 이주(이태원, 안양) -치과 보조원, 가발공장, 방직공장 노동자로 일함 -1978년 귀향 후 부모 봉양하다 결혼하여 서울에 정착	판매업	1972	1980	1980

<Table 2>는 6남매의 생애사에서 주요 사건과 이주 관련 내용을 정리한 것이다. 인터뷰는 2015년 여름에 진행했으며, 6남매의 아버지 제삿날에 방문하여 연구 취지를 밝히고 인터뷰 허락을 받았다. 6남매 외에도 이들과 이주과정을 비교할 수 있는 사촌, 4남의 처를 인터뷰했다. 본 인터뷰 자료는 국사편찬위원회에 소장된 <1940~70년대 ‘가족’의 구성과 개인 생애사의 상관관계> 자료군에서 열람할 수 있다. 이하 글에서 사용되는 내용은 해당 인터뷰 자료에 기반을 두므로 따로 각주를 넣지 않는다. 또한 개인 프라이버시 보호를 위해 생년 순서와 성별만 파악할 수 있도록 M1, M2, M3, M4, F1, F2로 표시한다. 6남매의 이주는 1955년에 시작하여 1980년에 마무리되었다. 이들의 인터뷰는 1960~70년대 농촌 청년의 이주과정과 가족관계의 변화를 보여주는데 적합하다. 또한 국가통계의 대상이 되었지만 통계에서 드러나지 않았던 사실들을 보여줄 것이다.

(2) 무작정상경, 계절이주의 성공요인 : 친족·가족 자원의 활용

1960~70년대 신문과 잡지에는 연일 “무작정 상경”이란 단어가 등장했다. 무작정 상경은 10~20대 청년들이 농촌 사회를 낙후되고 희망 없는 곳이라 여기면서 연고(connection) 없이 서울로 올라오는 현상을 의미했다. 언론에서 “무작정 상경”은 부정적인 의미로 자주 사용되었다. 개인에게는 탈빈곤을 향한 여정이었지만 정부나 지식인의 입장에서 무작정 상경은 농촌사회를 붕괴시키고 도시문제를 증가시키는 사회문제로 인식되었다.¹⁴⁾ 청년들은 주로 서울에 일거리가 많은 봄과 여름에 올라와서 서울역 부근에서 지게꾼을 하거나 물건을 파는 행상을 했고, 겨울이면 고향으로 내려가는 경우가 많았다. 경찰은 1960년대 후반부터 무작정 상경이 급증하자 ①설득 귀향 조치시키거나 ②무의탁인 자는 시립보호소에 수용하고 ③연고가 있는 자들은 연고자를 찾아주고 ④신원이 확실한 청소년에게는 이발사 양성소·식모·공장의 취업을 알선했다.¹⁵⁾ 경찰의 조치는 서울 연고지 유무가 계절형 이주에 큰 영향을 미쳤음을 보여준다.

6남매도 계절형 단기이주를 오래 했기 때문에 서울의 연고지 유무는 초창기 이주과정의 성패에서 중요했다. 이들이 이주 초기에 활용할 수 있었던 자원은 친족 네트워크였다. 한국전쟁이 끝나고 서울에서 전후복구가 시작되면서 고향 마을에서 일부 사람들이 서울 홍제동으로 이주하여 거주하고 있었다. 이 지역은 서울에서 개발되지 않았던 산이었고 널빤지 등을 줍거나 흙벽돌을 만들어

14) 박정미는 신문기사와 잡지를 분석하여 ‘무작정 상경’에 대한 낙인이 성별에 따라 다르게 작동했다고 밝혔다. 남성의 무작정 상경은 ‘성공 스토리’의 레토릭으로 활용되었으나 여성의 무작정 상경은 ‘성적 타락’의 위협으로 그려졌다. 박정미, ‘‘무작정상경’-서울 이주자에 관한 담론과 젠더’, “사회와 역사” 113, 2017. 송은영은 문학 작품을 분석하여 이주민이 서울시민으로 변모되는 과정을 문화, 욕망, 계층갈등의 키워드로 설명했다. 이 연구는 현재까지 서울시민이 어떻게 구성되었는지 설명하는 기념비적인 연구 성과이다. 송은영, “서울 탄생기”, 푸른역사, 2018.

15) 「이농상경 선도책 마련」, 『동아일보』 1967년 10월 13일자.

판자촌을 이루었다. 6남매에서 초기에 이주를 시도했던 M1, M2, M3은 모두 홍제동에서 잠깐 거주했던 경험을 가졌다. 여기에서 ‘임시 거주’는 몇 가지 의미를 갖는다. 첫째로 단속에서 피할 수 있는 기회를 제공받았다는 점이다. 빈곤가족 구성원은 서울로 올라갈 차비조차 없는 경우가 많았다. 따라서 이들은 무임승차를 하곤 했는데 서울에 연고가 있다면 당장 귀향조치를 당하지 않았다. 서울에 남게 되면 어떤 일이든지 하면서 체류기간을 늘려나갈 수 있었다. 반대로 일을 구하지 못한다면 다시 고향으로 내려가 다음 해를 기약했다. 둘째로 이들은 홍제동에서 불안정하지만 당장 현금을 벌 수 있는 일용직 일자리를 알아볼 수 있었다. 홍제동 주민들은 꽃을 재배하여 서울역과 명동 등에서 판매하고 있었는데 여기에서 일을 하거나 친척의 소개로 날품팔이, 공사장 막일 등을 할 수 있었다. M2, M3, M4는 모두 농촌에서 현금을 볼 수 없었다고 증언했다. 당시 농촌사회는 여전히 현물 거래가 주를 이뤘으나 점차 현금 수요가 증가하는 상황이었다. 농촌 현금수요가 증가하는 3,4월에 무작정 상경자가 증가하는 건 우연이 아니었다.¹⁶⁾ 안정적인 잠자리와 직업이 없었지만 서울에서 일을 하면 일당을 받을 수 있었기 때문이다. 이는 빈곤청년들이 안정적이지 않은 농촌과 도시 중에 도시를 선택하는 큰 이유였다. 셋째로, 아주 기초적인 식사와 잠자리가 제공되었다는 점이다. 서울 판자촌에는 항상 사람이 많았다. 좁은 공간에 많은 사람이 몰려 사는 탓이 가장 컸지만 고향과 서울에 사는 친족들이 무수하게 방문했기 때문이다.¹⁷⁾ 빈민촌을 연구한 모든 연구에서 공통되게 지적하고 있는 점이기도 하다. 돈 없이 서울에 올라온 M1, M2, M3, M4에게 홍제동 친척집은 그들이 굶어 죽지 않게 해주는 중요한 공간이었다. 친족자원 활용은 이주의 계기와도 관련이 있었다. 빈곤계층 청년들은 이미 서울을 경험하고 고향을 방문한 친구·친척들로부터 서울 이야기를 듣고, 서울에 대한 선망을 키워갔다.

M3 : 친척 형님이 기차 타러 가더라고. 나도 무조건 기차역으로 따라 간 거야. 갈 데가 없으니까 그 사람 집에 가서 자고 먹고 했지. 임시로 있었는데 좋았어. 내가 서울에 돈이 있어, 집이 있어?

M2 : 늑전리 사람들은 먹고 살게 없어서 서울에서 살았어. 나는 19살 때부터 서울에 왔는데 집을 따로 얻지는 않고, 홍제동에 가면 전부 친척들이니까. 거기에서 먹고 자고 했어.

M1, M2, M3도 고향을 방문했던 친척에게 서울 이야기를 듣고, 그들을 따라 서울로 무작정 상경을 감행했다. 친척을 따라 상경하는 것은 곧 그들을 데려간 사람들이 며칠이라도 잠자리와 먹을 것을 제공해줘야 한다는 것을 의미했다. 이 때문에 서울 빈민촌에는 동향 사람들로 구성된 집들이 많을 수밖에 없었다.

이주 초창기에 홍제동 집이 중요한 역할을 했다면 M2의 완전한 서울 정착과 이태원 집의 마련은 6남매의 이주를 안정화하는데 결정적이었다. M2는 19세(1955년)부터 결혼을 했던 27세(1963년)까지 계절형 이주를 했다. 한때 서울역에서 노숙까지 했던 그는 28세(1964년)에 부인, 아들과 함께 완전히 서울로 이주했다. 그는 오랫동안 서울을 경험하며 여러 일을 하고 있었고, 홍제동 친척의 도움으로 공사현장에서 미장으로 일할 수 있었다. 1960~70년대에 건설 일용직은 학력·현금 자본이 없던 농촌 출신 남성들을 대거 흡수했던 직종이다. 건설업의 특징상 동향 출신 구-이주자가 신-이주자를 작업반에 넣어 일감을 주거나 일을 가르치는 방식으로 진행되었다. 고향의 네트워크가 서울 경제활동에서 작동할 수 있는 업종이었던 것이다.¹⁸⁾

1964년 서울 이태원에 마련된 “가족의 집”은 더 많은 가족들의 연쇄적인 계절형 이주를 예고하

16) ‘미담(米擔)의 효율적인 운용’, “매일경제”, 1967.9.6.

17) Brandt, 1969.

18) 윤여덕, 김종채, 앞의 보고서, 40-42쪽.

는 것이었다. 먼저 서울에 혼자 거주하던 M1은 M2의 집에서 식사를 하곤 했고, 17세(1957년)부터 29세(1969년)까지 12년 동안 계절이주를 하던 M3도 결혼 후 바로 이태원에 정착할 수 있었다. 또한 그의 형을 따라 공사장에서 일하며 가족을 부양할 돈을 벌게 되었다. “가족의 집”은 6남매는 물론이고 그들의 조카들, 사촌들까지 모두 서울을 경험하기 위해 단기간이라도 방문하는 장소가 되었다. 농촌 빈곤가족의 서울진출을 위한 전진기지로 활용되기 시작한 것이다.

“가족의 집”은 계절 이주를 위한 실용적 목적 외에도 6남매와 그 가족들의 인식을 조금씩 바꿔 놓고 있었다. 첫째, 전통적 가족 개념에서 “장남”이 갖는 의미를 변화시켰다. 전통적인 사회에서 “장남”은 두 명일 수가 없다. “장남”은 부모 봉양 뿐 아니라 가족 전체의 지도자로서 가족 네트워크를 이끄는 사람이어야 했다. 하지만 M1의 서울이주 실패와 M2의 서울정착은 같은 시기에 일어났다. M1은 부인과 자녀들을 고향에 남긴 채 오랫동안 서울생활을 하면서 돈을 벌지도 못했다. 이 때문에 6남매의 어머니는 서울에 올라와 M1을 설득해 고향으로 내려갔고, M1은 다시 서울생활을 하지 못했다. M1의 삶에서 서울이주의 실패는 인생의 실패를 의미했다. 그는 인터뷰 내내 자신의 삶을 후회에 가득 찬 모습으로 그렸고, 동생들에게 미안함을 표현했다. 반면 가족까지 데리고 상경한 M2는 서울에 완전 정착한 후에 많은 동생과 친척들을 돌봤다. 이 시기부터 M2는 “서울의 장남”이라 불렸다. 장남 지위가 M1에서 M2로 이동했다기보다 서울과 고향, 양쪽의 장남으로 역할이 분화되었다고 보아야 한다. 역설적으로 M1은 장남이기 때문에 귀향했지만 그것 때문에 장남의 지위를 부분적으로 잃고 말았다.

둘째, “가족의 집”은 이주민의 반농반도시(半農半都)의 정체성을 유지시키고 있었다. 당시 정부와 지식인들은 도시 빈민의 농촌 네트워크를 부정적으로 인식하고 있었다. 이들의 관점에서 이주민은 도시민의 정체성을 갖추지 못한 사람들이었다. 정부는 이농을 도시문제의 연장선으로 인식했고, 산업화와 도시화 후유증의 원인을 개인의 적응력 부족으로 보았다.¹⁹⁾ 더 나아가 정부와 지식인은 모순되게도 도시민과 고향에 남은 가족의 경제적·사회적·문화적 교류를 긍정적으로 보면서도 도시에서 형성된 동향출신 인적 네트워크 조직을 부정적으로 보았다. 도시민이 되어야 할 이주민들이 농민 정체성으로 남아있다는 이분법적 근대화론적인 입장이었다.(Hwang 1982) 하지만 한 향우회 연구가 보여주듯 이주민의 동향 네트워크는 낮은 도시에서 그들이 적응하기 위한 주요한 방식이었다.(Park 2001: 2) “가족의 집”에서 형성된 반농반도시(半農半都)의 정체성은 농민에서 도시민으로 연착륙하는 과정을 의미했다.

초기 계절형 이주단계에서 가족·친족 네트워크의 활용을 활용하지 못한 사례는 이들의 사촌을 통해 확인할 수 있다. 이들의 사촌A는 태어나기도 전에 아버지가 사망하면서 6남매의 친족 자원을 전혀 활용하지 못했다. 그의 어머니가 재혼했지만 새아버지마저 사망하면서 6남매의 사촌인 A는 10대 시절 서울에 올라와 잠만 재워주고 임금을 받지 못하는 중국요리집 종업원이나 폐품 팔이 등을 해야 했다. 게다가 그의 누나들은 여성이라는 이유로 어머니가 재혼할 때에 데려가지도 못해서 절에 맡겨진 채 삶을 겨우 유지할 수 있었다. 한 연구에 따르면 농촌가족의 이농을 어렵게 하는 개인적 요인으로 자금부족(43.1%), 무기술(34.8%), 도시공간의 요인으로 소외감(40.5%), 주거문제(36.8%)가 있었다. 이와 같은 경제활동의 자신감 결여와 고향과 대비되는 도시 생활의 공포는 자연스럽게 활용가능한 마을공동체와 친족자원의 중요성을 높여 주었다.(Min; Jung 1990: 89-90) 실제로 사촌A는 자신의 어려웠던 10대 시절과 비교하며 당시 저임금 여성노동자(F2의 사례)마저 “특혜 받았던 사람들”이라 기억하였다. 이처럼 친족자원의 활용은 초창기 이주과정에서 이주의 지속성을 결정할 수 있는 중요한 자원이었다. 특히 빈곤청년의 대부분이 무학력·저학력이라는 점에서 친족 자원을 제외하고는 가용한 자원이 전혀 없었다고 보아야 한다.

19) 조윤희, 「근대화의 소외지대-빈자에게 낙원은 없는가」, 『다리』1971년 10월 호

(3) 완전정착의 결정적 요인과 성차 : 결혼과 분가

그렇다면 가족자원을 활용했던 청년들은 서울의 완전정착에 성공했을까? 한쪽에 이주에 성공한 청년들이 있었다면, 다른 한쪽에는 고향에 남았거나 이주 후에 귀향한 사람들이 있었다. 이들은 현재 직업과 거주지를 기준으로 보았을 때에 전혀 다른 그룹에 속하지만 가족 단위 내에서 동일한 공동체 구성원으로 존재한다. 6남매 가운데에서도 이주에 성공한 그룹(M2, M3, M4, F2), 이주에 실패한 그룹(M1, M2)의 차이가 있다. 이들은 1960년대 초반까지 한 집에 살면서 가난한 경험을 공유했지만 이주와 결혼, 분가 과정에서 다른 특징을 보였다.

M2, M3, M4는 결혼 이전부터 단신 계절형 이주를 오랫동안 경험했다는 특징을 갖는다. 미혼 남성은 상대적으로 자유롭게 이주를 했고, 가족부양을 위한 돈벌이나 송금으로부터 자유로웠다. 무엇보다 이들의 풍부한 경험은 결혼 직후에 완전히 서울에 정착하는데 큰 도움이 되었다. 이들이 결혼을 하고 완전히 서울로 이주하는 과정에서 이들을 말린 가족들도 있었다. 특히 M3은 아버지를 도와 농사일을 가장 많이 하던 아들이었다. 그는 자신의 이주를 말리는 친척에게 “나 여기에 있으면 콩보리밥 먹고 서울 가면 쌀밥 먹어요. 아버지는 보리밥 드시고 나만 쌀밥 먹는 건 안되었지만 나는 그렇게 살아야겠어요”라고 말하며 부인과 함께 서울로 올라왔다. 고향에 남았을 때에 서로에게 경제적 지원이나 비전을 제공할 수 없는 빈곤가족에게 이와 같은 ‘각자도생’의 방식은 비극이면서 이주의 가능성을 열어주는 계기로 작동했다. 결혼은 곧 새로운 가족의 구성을 의미했고, 남성 중심 호주제가 강력했던 농촌사회에서 결혼한 남성의 탄생은 또 다른 권력의 생성을 의미했다. M2도 고향을 완전히 떠나며 안타까웠다는 말을 했지만 부인과 자식을 먹여 살리려면 어쩔 수 없었다고 회고했다. M2, M3은 결혼 후 서울에 정착하며 “생선 껌짜스로 만든 집”에서 살고, 공사에서 추락 사고를 겪었지만 다음 날 다시 일을 나가는 등 고강도 육체노동에 종사해야 했다. M2는 1970년대 중반에 사우디아라비아 파견근무를 나가 더 많은 돈을 벌었고, 주택을 구매했다. 그들은 이것을 모두 “가족”을 위한 삶으로 기억하고 있었다. 여기에서 가족이란 원가족(proto-family)이 아닌 본인의 결혼과 동시에 새롭게 형성된 새로운 핵가족을 의미한다. 서울 정착은 곧 원가족으로부터 분리이자 새로운 경제 단위의 형성을 의미했다. 새로 구성된 핵가족 중심의 생존전략은 빈곤 가족 구성원의 일반적인 전략이기도 했다.

M1의 경우 전술한 바와 같이 고향에 부인과 자녀 3명을 남겨두고 서울, 의정부, 동두천 등을 돌며 고정적인 직업을 찾지 못했다. M1은 어렸을 때부터 한문을 공부했기 때문에 동생들에 비해 힘든 일을 잘하는 성격이 아니었다. 게다가 결혼과 군복무로 인해 1960년부터 계절 이주를 시도했고, 이는 1950년대부터 계절 이주를 했던 동생들보다 경험이 부족했다. 여기에 “장남”의 지위와 어머니의 설득은 그의 서울생활을 포기하게 만들었다. 그는 고향으로 돌아와 잠깐 살다가 집으로부터 12km가량 떨어진 동네로 이사하여 외가 식구의 도움으로 목수 일을 하며 살았다.

반면 최종정착지의 결정과정은 가족 내 젠더 격차를 보여준다.

F1 : 오빠들이 못하게 해서 나는 객지 생활을 못했어. 그래도 여동생은 조금 아래니까, 시대가 바뀌었으니까 객지 생활을 했지. 나는 못했어. 나는 그냥 집에서 있었어. 그러다가 결혼하고 지금까지 산 거야.

F1은 6남매 중 유일하게 정규교육을 받지 못했고, 오빠들의 반대로 서울생활도 하지 못했다. 그녀는 학교를 가지 못한 것 때문에 아버지에게 대한 미움, 서울 이주를 하지 못하게 했던 오빠들에

대한 서러움, 자신의 삶이 잘못되었다는 후회로 가득 찬 인터뷰를 들려주었다. 그녀는 20세 되던 1969년에 이태원에 있는 M2의 집에서 10일간 머문 적이 있었다. 하지만 집안일로 다시 고향에 내려가게 되었고, 그 때에 여동생(F2)의 중학교 입학금 문제로 아버지와 M4가 크게 싸웠다. 이때 M4는 F1에게 왜 돈 벌어서 여동생(F2) 교육비를 대지 않냐면서 크게 혼냈고, F1은 너무 서러워서 자살을 시도했다. 이후 F1은 오빠들이 떠난 고향에 남아 부모를 봉양하다가 인근 마을의 남성을 만나 결혼했다. 남편을 따라 현재까지 고향 근처 마을에서 거주하고 있다. 여기에서 중요한 건 M2, M3, M4는 가족의 반대에도 불구하고 자신의 의지대로 서울이주를 시도했다는 점이다. 하지만 F1은 오빠들이 반대하여 이주를 할 수 없었고, 최종 정착지도 남편의 거주지에 귀속되었다. 이런 사례는 농촌 청년들의 이주 과정에서도 가족 내 성별 위계가 작동했다는 사실을 보여준다.

F2는 여성임에도 6남매 가운데 유일하게 중학교까지 졸업했다. M1-M4는 모두 초등학교만 졸업하거나 중퇴했다. 그렇다면 가장 학력이 높았던 F2는 자신의 의지대로 최종정착지를 결정했을까? F1보다 나이가 어렸고 학력자원을 가졌던 F2는 분명 F1보다 이주과정에서 선택지가 많았다. 그녀는 학교를 졸업할 때까지 방학이면 가끔씩 오빠(M2)의 집을 방문하며 서울생활을 즐겼다. 중학교를 졸업하자 1972년 “가족의 집”으로 이주했다. 그녀는 오빠(M4)의 도움으로 직업소개소를 방문했고, 서울에서 치과보조원, 가발공장 노동자로 일했다. 20살이 되던 1975년에는 고향 친구 소개로 안양 동일방직에 입사하여 3년간 공장 노동자로 일했다. 그녀의 자취방은 다시 “가족의 집” 역할을 수행하여 조카(M1의 딸)의 도시 이주를 도왔다. 이처럼 F2는 6남매 가운데 가장 빠른 시간 내에 “공식경제” 내에 진입할 수 있었다. 그녀는 다른 남매에 비해 학력자원을 가졌고, 또한 여성노동 시장이 확대되었던 1970년대 산업구조와 맞물렸다. 그럼에도 그녀의 최종 정착지는 F1과 마찬가지로 남편에게 귀속되었다. 언니(F1)가 결혼하자 서울에 있던 오빠들은 홀로 있는 부모님을 걱정했고, 미혼이었던 그녀를 고향으로 내려 보냈다.²⁰⁾ 결국 돌봄 노동은 미혼 여성의 몫이었다. 그녀는 1980년 서울에서 일하는 인근 마을출신 남성과 결혼하며 서울로 이주하였다. 이처럼 최종 정착지를 결정하는 과정에서 ‘결혼’은 남성과 여성 모두에게 중요한 계기였다. 하지만 결혼 후 남성은 거주지 선택의 결정권자로, 여성은 이에 종속된 존재로 위치 지어졌다.²¹⁾

(4) 변형되면서 지속되는 것들 : 여성의 노동과 교육, 가족의례

앞서 설명했던 6남매의 이주과정이 그들의 젠더 인식과 가족관계를 어떻게 변화시키거나 유지시켰는지 살펴본다. 이들의 인터뷰 과정에서 공통되게 나타난 증언이 있었다. 이들은 늑전리 여성들이 “노동”을 하지 않았다고 말했다. 하지만 실제로 늑전리 여성들은 모시 섬유와 청올치(참 노끈)를 만들어 장터에서 판매했고, 장터에서 물건을 떼다가 마을에서 판매하기도 했다. 이러한 행위들은 농촌에서 현금수입을 얻기 위한 노동이었다. 농업의 특성상 일반적인 작물은 수확기에만 일부 현금으로 바뀌었기 때문이다. 이뿐 아니라 F1, F2는 아버지의 농사일도 도왔다. 여기에서 중요한 점은 6남매가 모두 여성 노동을 “노동”으로 기억하지 않는다는 사실이다. 이는 전통적으로 농업은

20) 인터뷰이(F2)는 이 결정을 다른 남매들과 달리 자신의 결정이라 회고했다. F2가 왜 고향에 내려왔는지는 명확하지 않다. 부모봉양에 대한 가족의 압력과 자신의 결정 모두 뒤섞여 있을 가능성이 높다. 무엇보다 F1과 F2는 6살 차이나는 자매 사이지만 무학력·고향에 남은 F1은 자신의 과거를 부정적으로 기억했고, 반면 F2는 서울이주·결혼생활을 매우 긍정적으로 기억했다. 이러한 삶의 내러티브 차이가 같은 사건에 대한 다른 기억으로 남았을 수도 있다.

21) 인구이동통계연보는 매년 인구이동의 동기를 조사했는데 1970년대에 매년 가장 높은 비중은 “가족이주”였다. 2위는 “직업”이었다. 또한 이주민의 성비는 매년 남성이 여성보다 높았다. 이를 종합해보았을 때에 노동이주 가운데 남성의 비중이 높았으며, “가족이주”는 주로 기혼 남성의 부인과 자녀였을 것으로 추정할 수 있다. 이 비율에 대한 구체적 수치는 추가적인 분석이 필요하다.

남성의 일이라는 성별 분업 인식을 반영한다. 또한 농촌에서는 남성이 현금을 벌만한 일이 없다는 현실을 반영하기도 한다. 현금을 벌수 있는 일은 모두 여성의 일-또는 여성의 일로 인식되는 일-이었기 때문이다.²²⁾ 이런 상황에서 돌봄 노동을 여성의 일로 인식한 것은 당연한 일이었다. 그럼에도 현실은 1970년대 중산층 핵가족 담론의 돌봄 노동과 차이를 보여주었다. F1, F2는 돌봄 노동을 위해 개인의 이주나 직업을 포기해야 했다. 이러한 과정은 여성이 성별 분업을 수용했으며 성차가 가족 내에서 작동했다는 점을 보여준다. M2는 F2가 부모를 봉양하면 결혼할 때에 결혼자금을 지원한다고 약속했다. 이런 방식은 남성형제 부인들이 담당했어야 할 돌봄 노동을 여성형제에게 전가하고, 그 대가로 결혼과정에서 경제적으로 보상하는 것을 의미했다. 빈곤가족 내부에서 한정된 자원을 성차에 따라 배치하고 활용하는 방식인 것이다.

6남매의 인터뷰에서 가장 극적인 장면은 1969년 막내인 F2의 중학교 진학 문제이다. 서울의 빈민촌 연구에 따르면 불안정 직업군의 이주민은 원가족에 대한 부양의무를 다하기보다 분가 가족의 생존전략으로서 자녀교육에 더 많은 투자를 했다. 자신이 갖지 못한 학력자원을 획득해야 비공식 경제 부문을 빠르게 탈출하고 안정적인 직장을 얻을 수 있기 때문이다. 이런 이주민의 인식 변화가 6남매 남성들에게 발견되었다. 1969년은 남성형제들이 대부분이 서울에 정착하거나 경험이 쌓였던 시기이다. 늑전리에서 여성의 진학은 “기집애들 가르쳐봤자 결혼하고 시집살이 때문에 힘들면 친정집에 편지나 한다”는 성차별적 인식 속에 존재했다. 이들의 아버지도 F2를 중학교에 보내지 않으려 했었다. 하지만 남성들은 아버지를 설득하거나 크게 다뤄 F2를 중학교에 보냈다. M4는 아버지 밥상을 얹으면서까지 싸웠고, M3은 자기 결혼비용의 일부를 F2 중학교 입학금으로 지불했고, F1은 현금을 모아 3년간 등록금을 대주었다. 이처럼 이주과정을 경험한 남성들의 여성 교육에 대한 인식 변화는 기존의 가족구조 내에서 혁명적인 변화라 할 수 있다. 물론 이것은 가족 내 젠더위계의 해체를 의미하지 않았고, 빈곤탈출이라는 목표 아래에서 구성되었다. 하지만 가족 구성원의 도시생활 경험 없이는 만들어지기 어려운 변화였다.



그림 2 1970년 이병원(6남매의 父)의 회갑잔치 사진

마지막으로 이 가족은 이주와 분가의 경험 속에서도 원가족의 의미를 재확인하고자 했다. 집성촌에서 성장한 6남매에게 가족의례-명절, 제사, 결혼 등-는 익숙한 행위지만 그 내용은 변화하고 있었다. 전통적 가족형태-같은 마을에 사는 혈연관계-가 사라지면서 원가족은 새로운 핵가족처럼 더 이상 경제적 생존 공동체가 아니었다. 그럼에도 서울로 이주한 가족은 고향에 남은 가족에게 미안함을 느꼈다. 남은 가족이 부모 봉양과 같은 책임을 떠맡았기 때문이다. M2가 F2에게 결혼 자금을 대준 것도 비슷한 맥락이다. 한편 고향에 남은 가족도 서울

22) 농촌의 현금부족은 해방 이후 지속적으로 제기된 문제였다. 정부 주도의 농촌소득증대 사업은 1970년에야 본격화되는데 정부가 곡물가격과 생산방식을 강력하게 통제하면서 가능해졌다. 1970년대에 일시적으로 농가소득이 증가하지만 농업 구조조정, 기술력 있는 농민 육성에는 실패하여 농업의 지위는 점차 낮아졌다. (Lee 2013) 한편 1970년대 일시적인 농가소득의 증대는 역설적으로 1960~70년대 농촌 청소년의 도시 이동 덕분일 수 있다. 농촌의 유희 노동력이 감소했기 때문이다. 6남매 중 남성들은 농촌소득증대사업이 본격화되기 전인 1960년대에 모두 고향을 떠났다.

가족에게 미안함을 느꼈다. 서울가족이 가난 때문에 어쩔 수 없이 고향을 떠난 사람들이며, 자신들이 이들에게 해준 것이 없다고 느꼈기 때문이다. 또한 서울 가족들은 자신의 자녀들이 서울에 정착하는 데에 큰 도움을 주었다. 가족의례는 이러한 복잡한 감정, 이해관계, 경험으로 채워졌다. 1969년 정부는 <가정의례준칙>을 제정해 전통적 가정의례를 모두 간소화시키려 했다. 정부와 지식인들은 준칙의 행정적 효과가 없다면서 이는 한국인의 과시욕 때문이라고 보았다.²³⁾ 박정희 대통령은 1972년 전국적인 새마을운동을 지시하는 회의에서 농촌에서 연간소득을 모두 가족의례에 쓴다며 “전근대적이고 비생산적인 풍조를 몰아내야 한다”고 비난했다.²⁴⁾

하지만 의례 형식이 지속된 것은 역설적으로 이주와 가족관계 변화라는 근대적 과정의 부산물이었다. M4는 박정희 대통령의 지지자이자 인터뷰 과정에서 “시골의 봉건적 사고가 문제”라는 말을 자주했다. 그럼에도 그는 1970년 아버지 회갑잔치를 “무의미하지만 당연히 해야 했던 것”이라고 기억을 했다. 다른 남매들도 모두 회갑잔치를 자식으로서 당연히 해야 할 도리로 기억했다. 한편 재혼했던 사촌A의 엄마는 아들과 함께 회갑잔치에 참석했다. 이는 농촌가족의 보수성을 고려하면 쉽지 않은 결정이었다. 이날을 계기로 사촌A는 본인의 원가족(natal family)을 인식하게 됐고, 6남매는 본인들이 돌보지 못한 사촌A에 대한 부채의식을 가지게 되었다. 이후 성인이 된 6남매가 사촌A의 남매를 찾아 원가족으로 재결합시키는 데에 중요한 기억으로 자리매김했다. 이처럼 가족의례는 과거의 형태를 띠면서도 헤어진 가족들이 모두 만나 유대의식을 재확인하는 자리로 기능했다. 만약 이들이 빈곤가족이 아니었다면, 개인의 능력으로 이주를 감행했다면 원가족의 존재를 재확인하는 가족의례의 중요성이 낮았을 것이다. 이 시기에 가족의례는 자신이 이주를 감행하며 다른 가족의 자원을 활용했던 것, 누군가의 희생을 필요로 했다는 것을 기억하고 위로하는 의례로 기능했다. 서로에게 경제적 지원을 할 수 없는 빈곤가족의 유일한 문화적 실천이었다.²⁵⁾

나가며 : 은유로서 국가, 생존전략으로서 가족

1960년대 한국사회에는 조국근대화 담론이 배회하고 있었다. 1961년 집권한 박정희 정부는 탈빈곤의 수사를 내세우고 외자에 기반 한 급격한 공업화를 추진하고 있었다. 적대국가로서 북한은 한국 정부에게 위협이자 곧 극복해야 할 대상으로 여겨졌다. 냉전이라는 말이 어울리지 않게 열전을 치렀던 한국에서 공산진영과 자유진영의 대립은 위협이자 곧 기회를 의미했다. 경제성장을 향한 열망, 반공주의, 국가중심주의의 강화- 이 세 가지는 냉전이라는 세계질서 하에서 군사정부가 선택하고 강화시킨 테제였다. 정부는 이러한 목표를 쟁취하기 위해 국가주도의 경제정책을 수립하면서도 개인에게 근면과 절약을 강조했다. 이는 1970년대 “잘살기 운동”이라는 새마을운동으로 이어져 전국에 보급되었다. 이 시기에 국민은 국가를 위해 존재해야 했고, 한국의 강력한 정부 이미지가 구축되었다.

6남매의 인터뷰에서 국가에 대한 직접적인 충성은 한명을 제외하고 나타나지 않았다. 그들의 삶이 정부의 탈빈곤 담론과 같은 경향성을 보인 것은 분명하다. 하지만 빈곤가족에게 가난은 실제적

23) 『경향신문』, 1970년 3월 6일, 「가정의례준칙 선포 1주년」.

24) 『대한뉴스』 제870호 거국적인 새마을 운동을, 1972년 3월 11일.

25) Carlos E. Sluzki는 이주자의 가족갈등을 분석하면서 “Families cling to the old country's norms and refuse to engage with the new environment.”라고 말했다. 이러한 과거의 형태는 새로운 환경 속에서 위기를 맞는다고 주장했다. (Sluzki 1979: 4) 그의 설명에 따르면 6남매의 가족의례는 새로운 환경을 거부하는 행위로도 보인다. 그러나 가족의례의 이중적 의미-과거 형식의 지속과 새로운 내용의 충전-은 보다 깊은 분석이 앞으로 시도되어야 한다.

위협이기도 했다. 이들의 이주 경험과 새로운 가족형성은 가난의 위협으로 벗어나기 위한 생존전략이었다. 서로에게 경제적 지원을 할 수 없는 상황에서 원가족 이데올로기는 그들의 이주를 추동하는 요인이자 억누르는 이중적 역할을 수행했다. 이들은 서울의 가족자원을 이주의 첫 단계로 활용했지만 서울정착 이후 경제적 지원까지 이어지지 못했다. 대신 이들은 새로 형성된 핵가족의 도시생존을 최우선의 과제로 삼았다. 또한 고향에서 전통적인 가족의례 형식을 유지하면서도 분리된 가족의 멤버십을 재확인하는 내용으로 채워갔다. 이러한 과정에서 국가는 국회의사당 건설 경험, 가족계획처럼 일상의 부분이자 개별의 일화로 기억되었다. 이들에게 힘들었던 과거의 경험은 가족을 위한 헌신으로 기억되었다.

1960~70년대 한국정부는 끊임없이 통치기술을 관료적·전문적으로 확장시켰다. 인구이동은 통계의 대상이 되었고, 개인은 인구로서 통치의 대상이 되었다. 가족은 인구조절 정책이 관철되는 대상이 되었다. 하지만 정부는 경제정책을 수립하고 이를 위해 인구를 배치하는 노력만큼 사회정책과 분배정책을 실행하지 않았다. 경제성장에 수반되는 노동문제와 재생산의 문제는 개인과 가족에게 전가되었다. 가난한 가족은 국가를 위해 동원되는 순간에만 ‘국민’으로 정체성을 가졌고, 일상의 생존과정에서는 국가로부터 버림받은 ‘난민’에 불과했다. 이들은 사회적 연대성보다 가족중심의 생존전략과 연대성을 구축했다. 가난한 가족의 생존전략에서 원가족의 질서와 위계는 활용 가능한 자원과 규칙을 상징했고, 이들은 이주와 새가족 형성을 경험하며 기존의 규칙을 변형시켰다. 결론적으로 한국사회의 가족중심주의는 서구와 다른 동양의 전통적 특징을 보여주지 않는다. 오히려 냉전의 주변부이자 군사적 최전선 지역에서 발견되는 자유주의적 통치성의 일면이자 한국 근대화 방식의 일부분으로 이해해야 한다.

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Regulating Women's Sexuality with Legislative Measures: Unmarried Mothers in South Korea since the 1950s

Youlim Kim

1. Introduction

Since the liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945, it has gone through significant changes in its approach to Family Law. Although Koreans have endeavoured to erase the trace of Japanese colonisation, substantial parts of legislative systems framed by the Japanese government, particularly when it comes to patriarchal subjects, were maintained. In fact, some of the policies they introduced were believed to be traditional and “useful” when it came to “building a prosperous” nation after being liberated.

As McClintock (1993) described, nationalism is gendered, and conveys a very strong message of family tropes to the society. For instance, nations are often depicted as a unit that has an image of a patriarchal family and women with a very limited role in it (McClintock 1993, 64). Each element of the unit had its own unique role like each family, and apparently men were empowered within this process whereas women were encouraged to stay demure and ‘become ideal wives (Kim 2017, 72)’. Nationalism overwhelmed the Korean peninsula in the 20th century and this has once again situated women in a precarious and passive position.

In terms of the legislative measures for unmarried mothers, there are several studies that analyse legal systems and status for unmarried mothers in South Korea (Korea, hereafter). Yi (2013), Cho (2011), Kim and Kim (2018) and Song (2019) drew upon research exploring

legal measures that had an impact on unmarried mothers, such as affiliation of a child, decision of parental authority, adoption laws, and Single-Parent Family Support Act (*hanbumogajokchiwŏnbŏp*). They are the common laws brought up by scholars to explain the legal status of unmarried mothers. Apart from these laws, the right to abortion was also tackled (Song 2019, Yang 2005). These legal provisions could be grouped into three main laws, which are the family law, the adoption law, and the abortion ban. By reviewing the historical and political milieu of each measure, the relationship between legislative measures and unmarried mothers is explored.

2. Family Law

Family law, long sustained by the family head system (*hoju chedo*) and prohibition of marriage between parties with the same surname and the same ancestral seat (*tongsŏng tongbon kŭmhon*) took a crucial role in consolidating the patriarchal ideology in the society. It refers to relatives and inheritance articles in the Civil Code. Family head system was exercised as a clan register where patrilineage was the main condition of the system (Lee 2008, 145). Children assumed their father's surname (civil code article 781) and male descendants had priority among lineal descendants with respect to succession to the family headship and inheritance (civil act article 984). A male who is a lineal descendant (a father, a son and a grandson) was to be in the first priority in the succession of the family headship, whereas female lineal descendants took the next precedence and then lastly the wife of the original family head.

Genealogy of family law could be outlined back to the period of Japanese occupation.

According to 1910 and 1912's Customs Survey Report¹ (*Kwansŭpchosabogosŏ*), in the late *Chosŏn* period, women had many restrictions and limitations on their roles within the family. For instance, unmarried women were not entitled to become a family head (*hoju*), women could not lead ancestral rites nor the family line, wives were responsible to fully obey their husbands, and their legal capacity was extremely limited (Chŏng 1992, 89-90, 340, 382). The modern definition of family head system, an important pillar of the family law until 2005, was also considered to be introduced by the colonial government (Park 1976, Hong and Yang 2008, Jung 2013). Japanese government had also grafted statutory marriage and paternal lineage on *Chosŏn*'s civil code from their civil code, and this meant children who were born from concubinage or non-statutory marriage will now become illegitimate children (*sasaenga*) (Hong 2013). Therefore, the affiliation of the child by their biological father became hereafter at stake and if there was one, the relationship between the unmarried mother and her child was no longer family by the law.

The imperialists had tried to institutionalise the family head system by combining it with Confucian ideas, ancestral rites and filial duty. Japanese officers identified the heir of ancestral rites as the head of family; by equalising them, they could render people to perceive the family head as is in their own custom (Hong and Yang 2008, 180). Therefore, since the colonial government established the family head system as the main frame of the family law, it has lasted in Korean society with the name of tradition. Furthermore, by standardising paternal lineage as the desirable family tree, children who failed to acquire 'father's bloodline' were marginalised by law and society (Hong 2013, 50).

¹ The Customs Survey Report was a significant reference to the interpretation of *Chosŏn*'s customs and the Japanese governmental officials legalised the custom into Family Law.

On the 22nd of February 1958, the government Republic of Korea enacted the civil code, which included provisions on relatives and inheritance. They abolished the article Incapacity of wives but maintained the family head system. In 1958's civil code, parental authority was contemplated as the father's right, and giving them the parental authority before the mother of a child born out of wedlock (Civil Code article 909, enacted in 22.2. 1958). Fathers could refuse their parental authorities, or usurp the mother's parental authority by entering the child in the father's register.

Furthermore, Article 789 (Legal branch family) was amended in 29. 12. 1962, which confirmed couples who get married establish a branch family; this was to encourage couple-focused nuclear family. With the Five-Year Economic Development Plan from 1962, the legal amendment played a significant role in changing the landscape of family structure (Ahn 2014: 97). On the one hand, the government wanted to maintain the traditional value of family, but on the other, they wanted modernisation of the family system. The ultimate aim was to support the government and the economic development.

The government in the 1970s held a nationwide Family Planning campaign due to the rapid increase of birth rate after the Korean War. Family Planning was exhorted and the government started to consider raising women's social status as an implement to reduce the birth rate, spurred on by the growing voice of women's communities (C. Kim 2009, 4, Ahn 2014, 100). As a solution to raise women's social status, and ultimately, to lower the birth rate, the Civil Code was amended in 1977. With the 1977's amendment, parental authority could be jointly exercised by both parents. However, when the parents did not meet the agreement or when they got divorced, the father of the child took the authority.

In 1990, there was another amendment, which undermined patrilineal legislations and giving mothers equal parental authority. Mothers who are reinstated in their original family or remarried after getting divorce or bereavement could now maintain their parental authority². Nonetheless, unmarried mothers were prone to getting excluded from this discussion. Hence, albeit an illegitimate child has kept his or her unmarried mother's surname in their whole life, the biological father could affiliate the child without any agreement from the child nor the mother, resulting in the change of the child's surname and ancestral seat was to be changed.

Eventually in 2005, the family head system was abolished after polemical debates. This enabled children from unmarried mothers to continue to use their previous surname even after their fathers' affiliation³. However, the frame of "normal family" was still limited to heterosexual couples with children who take on their father's surname; having their mother's surname was considered to be the second choice⁴. Unlike a father's children, who do not need to change their surname and ancestral seat depending on their father's marital status, mother's children were constantly required to change them when their mother got married, divorced, remarried, etc. In Korean society, where there is a rule of taking up the father's surname, living as a child of the mother could trigger social stigma (Yang 2011, 402).

² Before the enactment of 1990, it was stated that [*A mother who is reinstated in their original family or remarried after getting divorce or the husband dies, cannot maintain the parental authority of the child from the previous marriage.*] Civil Code article 909, paragraph 5, enacted in 1958.

³ When the child is affiliated by their father, their surname will be automatically changed to their father's, unless there is a pre-notice to the court before the affiliation proceeding started.

⁴ Article 781 (amended in 31.03.2005)

(1) A child shall succeed his or her father's surname and origin of surname: Provided, That when the parents agree to have the child assume his or her mother's surname and origin of surname at the time of filing a report on their marriage, he or she shall succeed the mother's surname and origin of surname.

(3) A child whose father is not known shall assume the mother's surname and origin of surname.

With the amendment of the Article 781 in 2005, a child can now take over his or her mother's surname when there is an agreement between the parents. However, this agreement could only be made at the time of registering their marriage, which seems to be untimely to decide. In addition, there needs an additional document to confirm the agreement between the couple.

3. Adoption Law

From 1953 to the 1960s, former president Rhee Syngman's policy towards unmarried mothers' children was to send them away to their father's countries. This came about after the growth in the number of military prostitutes and mixed-race children since the U.S. military occupation in 1945 (A. Kim 2009, 36). To remedy this, Child Placement Service (*han'gugadongyangohoe*) was established in 1954, and Rhee enacted a decree sending those children to the father's country of origin in the following year.

According to the former president Rhee Syngman's One People Principle (*ilminjuui*), Republic of Korea should be one nation with one people and ethnic group (Kim 1995, 339). Not only was the principle an ideology to consolidate Rhee's regime, but was it also meant to infuse anticommunist ideas and nationalism. Therefore, mixed-race children did not belong to the state of Korea. In this context, the government wanted to move the children away out of sight and eventually get rid of them (Pate 2010, 154).

Women who gave birth to mixed-race children in the 50s and 60s were accused of defiling the "pure" genealogy of Korean paternal line, and were deemed as whores (A. Kim 2009, 42). Although the military camp town prostitutes were tacitly used to bridge relations between Korea and the US, they were still stigmatised at the same time (Moon 1997). To many Koreans, the children born from these women reminded them of the relationship between the powerful US and submissive Korea, another humiliation they were already familiar with (Kim 2015, 192). Therefore, it was advised that they be sent for adoption overseas, and it was carried out in a simple and rapid manner with the support of the government.

Proxy adoption allowed more Korean orphans to travel to find their adoptive parents. After all, it was a fast track for American families to achieve “humanitarian and Christian” values as well as Cold War patriotism, and for the Korean government, it was used to remove the national disgrace as quickly as they could (Choy 2015, 56, Oh 2012, 35). As a result, 4,190 children were adopted into the U.S from 1955 to 1961 (Oh 2012, 41). By designating foreign agencies to undertake adoption matters, the government could not only save social expenditure but also gain economic profit from international adoption (Jeong 2016, 54).

Within the process of proxy adoption, the agencies collected the orphans and completed the adoption process on behalf of the adoptive parents (Pate 2010, 152). The Korean government allowed proxy adoption by the law in 1961⁵ and they gave adoption agencies exclusive authority to arrange foreign adoptions in 1966⁶. Overseas adoption before the 1960s was mainly focused on mixed race children, yet the number of children from unmarried mothers who were not military prostitutes quickly increased starting in the 1970s. Their mothers faced the same pressure for relinquishing their children for international adoption, although with a different rationale (Lee and Lee 2019, 136).

There were also discrimination and criticism against the women who violated the gender norm before the period, but the right to be a mother were rarely been questioned (Kwon 2014, 50-1). However, with the introduction of international adoption starting in the late 50s and the establishment of social work in the 70s, unmarried mothers began to be viewed as unqualified mothers. The major factor for this can be the introduction of western social work studies

⁵ Act on Special Cases Concerning Adopting Orphans (*koaibyangt'ŭngnyepŏp*) article 6, enacted in 30.9.1961.

⁶ Act on Special Cases Concerning Adopting Orphans article 5, revised in 23.2.1966.

conducted in the Baby Scoop Era. According to Kwon (2014, 67), unmarried mothers began to be described as “deficit mothers” by psychological and social work theory in the 70s, while adoption agencies were introducing the Baby Scoop Era’s adoption model and studies.

The adoption policy faced new dynamics with changes in the political regime. There were competing frames of political and ideological legitimacy between North and South Korea behind the scenes. North Korea had slandered South Korea for sending children abroad for adoption and employed it in their propaganda (Won 1989, 31). The government of South Korea therefore saw adoption as an important subject when it comes to competition between the two Koreas. Thus, the Act on Special Cases Concerning Adopting Orphans (*koaibyangt'ŭngnyepŏp*), which provided exclusive rights to foreign agencies was abolished in 1976, and was replaced by the Act on Special Cases Concerning Adoption (*ibyangt'ŭngnyepŏp*). Some international adoptions were abruptly suspended in 1971 and 1975, and the government started to promote domestic adoption together with international adoption.

Nonetheless, these attempts to curtail the number of international adoptions came to naught in the 1980s with the beginning of Chun’s military regime. The new government promoted population control policy more actively than the previous one and this led to the government’s invigoration of emigration; international adoption was acknowledged as another kind of moving overseas (Won 1989, 46-7). Thus, the doors to overseas adoption were fully opened by the government (Sohn 2020: 164). Around this period (1981-1988), the number of adoptees increased more than ever before.

With the highest number of overseas adoption and adopted children from unmarried mothers

in the 80s, more concerns began to rise about Korea's portrayal in foreign media. The Korean government was afraid if Korea was tagged as "babies for export" or "adoption market", and tarnish the country's reputation ahead of the Olympics in 1988 (Tongailbo 1988). Therefore, the policy direction was once again changed later in the 80s. Mother and Fatherless Child Welfare Act (*mojabokchibŏp*) was first passed in 1989 to support fatherless families, and unmarried mothers were also expected to benefit from it. Moreover, there was a whole amendment regarding The Act on Special Cases Concerning Adoption Promotion and Procedures (*ibyangch'okchint'ŭngnyepŏp*) in 1995, as a measure to protect children's rights and activating domestic adoption.

The 21st century began with projections of steep population decline and the government came up with the Framework Act on Low Birth Rate in an Aging Society in 2005 and specific plans for it the next year. This also allowed a new turning point on adoption and single parent policies. Supporting unmarried mothers finally received widespread support, instead of pressuring them to send the children for adoption. Act on Special Cases Concerning Adoption (*ibyangt'ŭngnyepŏp*) in 2011 was amended with the purpose of inducing the birth mother to decide to raise her own baby and guaranteeing her one week of legal delay before adoption. The amended adoption law rendered the *modus operandi* of adoption more complicated and time-consuming as well.

4. Abortion Ban

Abortion was not punished traditionally in the Chosŏn era; there were only legislations on punishing those who abort infants by battering (墮胎), considered as wounding offences (Jeon and Seo 2003, 132). Meanwhile, there were no regulations offered if a woman

terminated her pregnancy on her own, for instance by taking a medication⁷ (Baek 2007: 200). However, the rules of abortion changed under the occupation of Japan. The Japanese government applied their criminal law to the *Chosŏn* Criminal Code (*Chosŏn hyŏngsaryŏng*) in 1912 and even those who go through abortion would now also be punished. Banning the abortion prompted social discourses on abortion itself, as well as women's presupposed lifestyles (Lee 2013, 144). Even after the liberation, the government of Korea soon enacted an abortion ban, so it was made illegal by Criminal Code article 269 and 270 from 1953 to 2019.

Although abortion was officially banned in Korea from the year 1953, it has been mostly overlooked as the government realised population control as their most urgent task starting the 60s. The military regime led by Park Chung-hee strongly advocated the adoption of Family Planning in order to escape from the personal- and national level of poverty. Reducing the birth rate was a national campaign which was described to have a strong connection to national economic growth (DiMoia 2008, 365). Eventually in 1961 the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea (PPFK) was organised and the federation came to be the center of planning, administrating, training and promoting the national family plan.

Regardless of this effort, about two million babies were born from 1970 to 1971 following an increase in the number of women in their childbearing years. The international belief that population growth triggers many social problems was also predominant in some East and Southeast Asian nations (Lingam 1994, 85), and Korea was no exception. Korean policy makers wanted to mend the agenda of high birth rate by regulating women's sexuality. They

⁷ A few cases regarding pregnant women taking abortive drugs are mentioned in historical records such as *yŏnsan'gunilgi* vol 21. and *kojongsillok* vol 33. Article 14. There are no statements about punishing women who tried abortion, but they indicate that abortive drugs were consumed in Chosŏn era.

did it by distributing intrauterine devices, performing loop insertions, manufacturing birth control pills and eventually introducing menstrual regulation (MR) (DiMoia 2008, Ji 2019).

The Abortion ban in the 70s was now a dead letter, and the enactment of Mother and Child Health Act (*mojabogŏnpŏp*) in 1973 became the legislation to approve the government's promotion of induced abortion (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2016, 86). According to the Mother and Child Health Act, abortion was allowed within limited parameters such as eugenics in the case of mental disabilities or physical diseases, rape and other similar conditions.

Meanwhile, it can be pointed out that the government's campaign to lower the birth rate brought about another side effect of female feticide. Although Civil Code was amended in 1977 as a way to diminish the notion of preference for sons, the perception did not change for a long time. Notwithstanding the amendment, the family head still had to be male under the social values of the time and therefore, people wanted sons to carry on their family lines (Jeon and Seo 2003, 140). In the past, couples could have as many children as they wanted, until they finally had a son, but this was discouraged in the 70s. With the government's anti-natalist policies, having at least one son in the family became a lot harder, since they were expected to have fewer children by the society. This induced the increased number of sex-selective abortions from the 70s.

Family Planning has faced a new challenge in the 21st century with the threat of an aging society. The New Population Policy (*Sinin'gujŏngch'aek*) was already presented in 1996 but the government was mostly focusing on balancing the sex ratio at birth. Nevertheless, when the aging society became an urgent task for the government, they brought up a series of

amendments related to the Basic Plan on Low Birth Rate in an Aging Society (*chŏch'ulssan'goryŏnghwa kibon'gyehoek*) starting 2006, which was on the opposite side of the spectrum from the previous Family Planning policies. The government promised social benefits and financial supports to married couples who have more children and also those who adopt children (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2006).

Along with the Master Plan for the Prevention of Illegal Abortion (*pulbŏp in'gongimsinjungjŏryebang chonghapkyehoek*) in 2010, the Constitutional Court in 2012 decided that the ban was constitutional. The court's decision indicated that "women's rights cannot be more significant than the fetus' rights" (Kim and Lee 2019, 100). In 2017, a constitutional appeal on abortion ban was once again filed, and the constitutional court eventually ruled the abortion ban unconstitutional and ordered the law's revision by the end of 2020.

5. Legislative Measures and Unmarried Mothers

In accordance with the alterations of the political and social milieu, legislative measures which mainly targeted women also changed. Although the government legitimised the changes in the name of 'custom', 'prosperity', 'optimum population', and even sometimes 'women's rights', the policies were actually presupposed by the ideology of nationalism and the idea of treating women's body as the site of control, which regulated women's body with different means. These rules had a great impact on the social status of unmarried mothers.

In the frame of the law, unmarried mothers were discredited upon and marginalised from becoming a mother and establishing a family. The government recognised only monogamous

husband-wife couples as a “normal family” (Kwōn 2019: 156). For example, the amendment in 1962 acknowledged married couples as a legal branch family, and abnormalised unmarried mothers and their children from the family system. (Kwon 2015, 62). The predominant ideology behind this family scene was the reinforcement of parental authority which belongs to patriarchs (Kwōn 2019, 150,156).

There were provisions in Family law that were discriminative to unmarried mothers, like having parental authority and the right of the fathers to affiliate their children. Even after the abolishment of the Family head system, because the rules of patrilineal were still in effect, making the children to follow their mother’s surname after the father’s affiliation was still sometimes complicated. Moreover, many of the amendments were encouraged by the government’s population control policies. There were constant calls for the revision of gender biased laws since the establishment of the Civil Code, but the amendment was only carried out from the late 70s, when there was a suggestion that women’s higher social status might help reducing the birth rate (C. Kim 2009, 4, Ahn 2014, 100).

The policy of encouraging international or domestic adoption constantly changed depending on the political situation by the government. As the decline of birth rate became a big social agenda, the government rushed to implement new policies supporting single parent policies. Thus, there were abrupt policy changes on adoption and unmarried mothers in the recent few decades, in a way to support domestic adoption and unmarried mothers, which were sometimes unrealistic and unhelpful. For instance, the intention of one amendment in 2011 was to support birth mothers in raising their children, but it unintentionally put more babies at risk of being abandoned without being registered. It turned out that unmarried mothers who did not want to raise their new born baby feared being tagged as such after registering their

baby. Moreover, institutes that were made for unmarried mothers lacked suitable programmes and aid (Lee 2017, 110).

Adoption laws in Korea have made some progress since the 1950s, but each legislation has constantly ruled unmarried mothers out from the society's image of family. Initially, the children of unmarried mothers were not accepted by the society, and only used by the government for the national development. Unmarried mothers were disparaged as unsuitable for motherhood in this process; laws or social welfare did little to aid them. Although legislation on unmarried mothers and their children have been amended to support them, these seemed to have been intended to cope with population decline rather than alleviate the suffering of this marginalised group.

The abortion ban in Korea is closely related to population policy and social preference for male babies. New birth control technologies campaigned by the government in the 60s and 70s with the phrase of "national development" allowed more women to embrace the measures to avoid pregnancy (DiMoia 2008, 367). Yet, unmarried women's right to abortion was still often disregarded. Unmarried women were not counted in social benefits or any discussions of birth control. Conforming to the Mother and Child Health Act, the government still kept unmarried women banned from getting an abortion and although there were discussions on legalising unmarried women's abortion in 1986, soon it died on the vine (Shim et al 1990, 40). Hence, unmarried women who got pregnant had to find places to get clandestine abortion and this put them in an insecure position in terms of health and stigma. However, still a large number of unmarried women chose to terminate their pregnancies because "they were unmarried" (Yang 2018, 216).

For many decades, women would not have been really punished for getting abortion because the government did not enforce the ban closely. However, abortion was still legally banned. Therefore, the law itself had a regulatory power in the society and this made women stay silent about their experience of abortion (Yang 2005, 32). Those who went through it felt guilty and were aware of people's eyes on them, even if no one was investigating, nor punishing them. Since women could not share their experiences, they did not know where to complain and whom to blame, and the experience of abortion became their own private problems and stigma.

The government started to strictly enforce its measures forbidding abortion from 2009. The minister of Health and Welfare, Chŏn Chaehŭi asserted that dropping the abortion rate by half would boost the birth rate. Reflecting the government's perspective on controlling population, abortion was singled out as a major cause for the low birth rate and it became more difficult for women to terminate their pregnancies by their own will.

Therefore, starting in the 21st Century, the social discourse on abortion in Korea has changed into women demanding abortion rights. This seems like a very abrupt change in the society, but it was just the response of the atmosphere which regulates women's sexuality and reproductive rights. Each discussion seem to have the opposite ideology, but they are in fact closely related features of one idea (Lingam 1994, 86). Furthermore, the government only focused on the state's development and birth rate regulation. They have missed the point of nurturing, protecting and the becoming of a human being, as Yang (2018, 225) stated. This is also associated with the decisions and decision-making of mothers, which are often neglected in abortion ban discussions.

Lastly, legislation regarding abortion was focused on married couples. The Mother and Child Health act allowed pregnant women to get abortion only if she and her spouse both gave their consent (Article 14), making it harder for unmarried mothers get an abortion. Since many unmarried mothers could not bring partners or guardians, they had to choose to get abortion in more secretive and riskier ways. Others were completely unable to get an abortion and ended up facing a vicious cycle of adoption and typical troubles that unmarried mothers face.

6. Speaking for the Changes

There have been constant appeals for the amendment of these three laws, which could guarantee legal gender equality for women and men. Many women and their supporters had strived to amend the family law since the 1950s⁸. They saw the 70s as a suitable time to campaign for achieving women's rights in the family law, so they organised the Association of Pan-Women's Family Law Reform (*pömyösönggajokpöpkajöngch'okchinhoe*) in 1973. They announced 10 revision outlines, including revising the articles of parental authority (Ch'oe 2019). Sixty-one women's organisations joined the association and campaigned for the revisions until the family law was finally revised in 1977 (Ahn 2014, 98). Women's organisations carried their movement out further by holding symposiums and seminars to discuss the importance of family law revision and lobbying parliament members (Ch'oe 2019, Ahn 2014, 114). These activities continued until the abolishment of the family head system in 2005.

⁸ Yi, Taeyöng, the first female lawyer in Korea organised the Korean Women's Associations United with other women groups, submitted a letter of recommendation to the Code Compilation Committee in 1953, and the establishment of the Women's Legal Aid Centre (*yösöngbömnyulssangdamso*) in 1957, activated the amendment movement (*kajokpöpkajöngundong*).

Individual women also questioned the unequal rights stated in the family law. The case of Chin was one of the examples of women bringing up the problems of the family law and social discrimination against unmarried mothers. Chin gave birth to a child in 1998 without marriage, and the biological father of the child had sent the child for an adoption without consulting Chin. Chin filed a claim for infant extradition trial (*yuaindosimp'anch'ōnggusō*) but the trial was declared void, with the reason that the court has no authority to ask the biological father of the child where the child was adopted to (yōsōngsinmun 2010). She then turned to women's organisations such as Korean Women's Hot Line, who provided her with legal support; they filed an adoption invalidity and infant extradition suit.

Eventually the adoptive parents of Chin's child decided to give up the child and return the baby to Chin, but Chin still testified that she experienced myriad gender discriminative reactions from police officers and investigators (yōsōngsinmun 2005). Furthermore, she was often advised that it will be better off for both the child and herself to just give up the child (yōsōngsinmun 2005). This case not only revealed the gender inequality of the family law, which prioritise father's affiliation over the child's biological mother and marginalise the mother's authority, but also indicated the society's perception of unmarried mothers raising their own child. Nevertheless, women including unmarried mothers and women's organisation members constantly cooperated to push back against the patriarchal and unequal political measures.

Unmarried mothers' self-advocacy groups started to emerge in the 2000s, and they began to raise their voice for their own rights. In 2007, the Korean Unwed Mothers Support Network was established as the first unmarried mothers' self-advocacy group, the first of many more similar organisations that will be founded later. With the awareness of the high number of

adoption rate among unmarried mothers and the prevailing social stigma, they campaigned to alter the stereotype imposed on unmarried mothers. Furthermore, they proposed policies by holding conferences and publishing papers, as well as provided support programmes for the mothers and children (Korean Unwed Mothers Families Association 2019, Korean Unwed Mothers Support Network 2020).

The unmarried mothers' groups came to participate in solidarity with adoptees, and they helped amending the adoption law in 2011 (Heit 2013, 56). Not only this, but they also appointed 11th of May as "Single Mother's Day" in 2011, as a response to the government establishing it as "Adoption Day" (Chŏnhong 2019). This was to bring awareness to the unmarried mother's issue, which cannot be separated from adoption matters in Korea (Heit 2013, 60). In addition, they question through this movement, how the government should treat and respond to various actors existing in the society (Chŏnhong 2019). Eventually, the government designated 10th of May as "Single Parent's Day", as a response to the movement. The alliance of the groups challenged the biased perspectives of the governmental measures and has become a voice that legislators sometimes take into consideration.

Regarding the agenda of the abortion ban, feminist groups have constantly tried to bring up the discourse on abortion ever since it was banned, but the movement only hit its stride from the year 2016. That year, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced partial amendment to the rules of administrative disposition related to medical treatment (ũiryogwan'gye haengjŏngch'ŏbun kyuch'ik ilbugaejŏngnyŏngan). They were aiming to strengthen the administrative measures by stipulating the abortion operation as an "immoral medical practice" (Pak 2017, 322). Women's movements and feminist groups started "black protest" to deprecate it and to speak out against the abortion ban (Na 2017, 301-2). The protest and

movement continued until the constitutional court finally ordered that the law must be revised.

7. Summary and Conclusions

Notwithstanding continuous changes in governmental policies and attitudes on families, the government has been deeply involved in controlling one's body by passing numerous measures since the 1950s. The policies and legislations established by the military regimes resembled the ones from the colonial period in terms of patriarchal and nationalistic ideology (Moon 1998, 34, Seo 2007, 110). The colonial government generalised patriarchal features from *Chōsun* to define and form the gender order in their colony (Yang 2011, 118). Not only did they assume that the order was relevant in the society and legal measures, but also introduced further concepts and measures that were patriarchal and gender biased.

Korean legislative measures regarding unmarried mothers reflect the social image imposed on women at that time. The Family law, adoption laws, and abortion law enforced from the 1950s were the quintessential measures which contained so many discriminative elements against unmarried mothers. They functioned to restrain not only the body and sexuality of Korean women but also the motherhood of unmarried mothers for decades. These measures were justified under the name of national development, but later on to an extent, they introduced different features to support women once society eventually confronted them with a new agenda such as low birth rate.

Although the legislations were coercive and regulatory in nature against women, there were women's groups and movements that constantly tried to fight against the law. Women,

including unmarried mothers did not remain silent, nor stayed as a passive victim. The movements and campaigns became even more active starting from the 2010s and this led to further discussions and revisions on the political measures. Therefore, in addition to the dynamic features of social changes and the nature of legislations, women's voices have also influenced the political measures over unmarried mothers.

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Different Faces, Same “Ville” – Population Transition in South Korea’s Camptowns

James Constant

Songtan is a neighborhood of the city of Pyeongtaek in southern Gyeonggi Province. Since 1952, Songtan has been home to Osan Air Base, the only base in Korea built from scratch for the U.S. Air Force. Camp Humphreys, which sprawls nearby, and Kunsan Air Base in North Jeolla were both originally Japanese air bases. The area around Songtan Station looks like a quiet, typical Korean city, with its low gray villa apartments, chain restaurants and real estate agents, but walk northwest toward the air base, and the pace of life quickens and Korean signage blends into a multilingual milieu. This is the “Ville,” where streets are fronted by businesses offering international wire transfers, Philippine groceries, chicken-fried steak and Texas barbecue. When I visited the Ville in spring 2019, it bustled with American men in groups or walking arm-in-arm with women. Over bowls of pho noodle soup in a popular Vietnamese restaurant, it did not take long for my conversation with a young American airman to turn to the subject of Songtan’s current state. According to him, the camptown was a stain on Korean society. In particular, he was upset that “juicy girls,” the Filipina women who work in the clubs surrounding the base, engaged in prostitution openly without facing pressure from the local authorities. In his view, sex sold off-base was a Korean problem, and all that an upright American could do was throw up his hands and avoid this nightly display of loose Asian morals.

When I left the restaurant, the sun was starting to come down and Songtan’s atmosphere began to change. The club lights lit up, alcohol began flow, and the camptown took on a debauchorous, vaguely menacing air. American military police, not Korean officers, kept a watchful eye on Songtan’s main strip. As I walked back to the station, I saw what the airman mentioned – women calling out from bar windows to crew-cut young Americans who strode by with tax-free beer bottles in hand. For the men, Songtan’s camptown was a place to party and relax, but for the women, this was their workplace.

Scenes like this one have been repeated every Saturday night across South Korea for three-quarters of a century, but today there is one important difference. There are virtually no Korean women working in the Osan camptown sex industry anymore – with the exception, perhaps, of “Songtan Sally,” a near-mythical elderly streetwalker who is the subject of prank social media profiles, novelty clothing and lurid songs produced by Osan airmen.¹

This paper is an attempt to situate the large-scale replacement of South Korean camptown women with people from abroad in both transnational and local historical contexts.² The factors that inform this shift are fundamentally rooted in Asia’s changing economic dynamics. The reasons why Koreans have largely stopped selling sex directly to U.S. soldiers are related to the reasons why Korean farms and factory workers rely on foreign migrant workers and why many rural Korean men turn to brides from other parts of Asia. Camptown work can be understood as a job that has been left to migrant workers as South Korea’s economy has developed. However, there are important caveats needed when applying this narrative to camptown migrant women. Most developed countries have a contingent of migrants, large or small, working in relatively low-wage sectors. But there is nothing necessarily inevitable about populating entertainment districts for foreign soldiers with women from a third country – that is to say, this system is dependent on the assumptions and actions of large and small actors, including the South Korean government, U.S. military, club owners and the women themselves. This paper examines the historical factors that explain why the camptowns around U.S. bases in South Korea are now dominated by the presence of foreign women, largely from the Philippines. While this situation was not inevitable, it is also not unique. This phenomenon of the transnational camptown is also

¹ JF. “Songtan Sally - The OFFICIAL Parody Song.” YouTube. 2011, May 15.

² As a general term, many academics dealing with the subject tend to prefer “camptown woman” to prostitute – many women working in camptowns, including in clubs that sell sexual services, do not themselves engage in prostitution. The lines between prostitute and non-prostitute have always been blurry in the camptowns.

alive and well in Japan, particularly Okinawa, where a majority of U.S. Forces Japan troops have been stationed since the 1950s. This is a Korean story, but one that can only be understood in the context of the U.S. military's presence, conduct and relationship with local actors across the Pacific Rim.

Camptown, Asia

The parties in the camptowns used to be bigger. For most of the 1950 and 1960s, there were roughly 60,000 Americans soldiers stationed in South Korea, twice as many as today.³ GI's "fraternization" (as military brass put it) with Korean women began after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War and the U.S. occupation of the peninsula's southern half. But the United States was only the second Pacific power to rule Seoul in the 20th century – the Japanese military's consumption of Korean women's bodies across its empire came first. For the first two years of the American occupation of South Korea, the system of legal, licensed prostitution introduced by the Japanese was taken advantage of by soldiers.⁴ But outside of these brothels, the lines between prostitute and poor women desperate for food or a place to live were blurred. Seungsook Moon argues that the vast majority of women who sold sex to American soldiers in the immediate postwar period did not participate in legal prostitution or even view themselves as prostitutes, as they included women who had jobs on American military bases or students who went on compensated dates to dances with soldiers.⁵ During the Korean War, the system of

³ Tim Kane, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006.

⁴ Seungsook Moon., "Regulating Desire, Managing the Empire: the US Military Prostitution in South Korea, 1945-1970" in *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present*, ed. Seungsook Moon, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 44-45.

⁵ Ibid.

regulated prostitution was massively expanded at the direction of the South Korean National Assembly to cope with the influx of U.S. and UN soldiers.⁶ During the Park Chung-hee dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s, the government took several measures, such as the creation of “special districts” geared toward prostitution and the Establishment of the Korean American Friendship Society, that were geared toward further codifying and regulating prostitution.⁷ Park’s government also placed an emphasis on using prostitution to generate much-needed foreign currency to aid South Korea’s development.⁸

This system, and the attitudes that underpinned it, were not unique to South Korea. Camptowns exist virtually everywhere the United States military has had a substantial long-term presence in East and Southeast Asia, as documented by Sandra Pollock Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus in their 1992 book *Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia*, a photographic, journalistic and historical journey through camptowns in the Philippines, Japan and Korea. The basic bargain 20th-century camptown bargain goes something like this – the American military believed that sex was necessary troop morale, while Asian governments aimed to protect the majority of their women from soldiers by isolating fraternization to small pockets around U.S. bases. In 1959, one South Korean National Assembly member said:

It's inevitable that there are prostitutes who cater to foreign soldiers. . . . We should distinguish between those prostitutes who cater to domestic customers and those who cater to U.S. soldiers and train those catering to the foreigners on American customs, [entertainment] facilities, or language and etiquette.⁹

⁶ Ibid, 51.

⁷ Ibid, 58.

⁸ Katharine H. S. Moon, *Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 40.

⁹ Cho Hyoung and Chang Pil-hwa, "Perspectives on Prostitution in the Korean Legislature: 1948- 1989," *Women's Studies Review*, vol. 7, (1990), 95.

In Japan, a system of “special comfort women” for the U.S. Occupation Forces was immediately planned by the cabinet of Prime Minister Naruhiko Higashikuni following the country’s surrender in August 1945.¹⁰ Most U.S. military bases in Japan were built on Okinawa, which remained under American rule until 1971. In the late 1980s, Sturdevant and Stoltzfus visited Kin, a camptown outside Camp Hansen in Okinawa, and found that almost all the women working in the bars were from the Philippines, while the business owners were Japanese and had ties to organized crime.¹¹ When Philippine women quietly began arriving in the 1970s to work in bars and clubs, their presence went largely unnoticed until a fire tore through an Okinawa club in November 1983, killing two women.¹²

The Philippine camptown women Sturdevant and Stoltzfus met with in Okinawa were legal, contracted workers ostensibly hired as dancers. According to their testimonies, they did dance, though often topless or nude, but made most of their money through the sale of “juicy drinks” and conversation with GIs. They also made money by going out on “bar fines,” in which a customer pays money to take a woman out from the club for a date (and possibly more). The women were hired by promotion agencies in the Philippines, and despite difficult working conditions (including abusive bosses that may withhold pay), they were at least pleased to be making more money than even educated professionals would in the Philippines.¹³ The authors also visited Korea, and documented the experiences of camptown women in Dongducheon, a large camptown north of Seoul, but made no mention of non-Koreans working there.

¹⁰ Michiko Takeuchi, “‘Pan Pan Girls’ Performing and Resisting Neocolonialism(s) in the Pacific Theater: U.S. Military Prostitution in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952” in *Over There: Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present*, ed. Seungsook Moon, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 78-108.

¹¹ Sandra Pollock Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus, *Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the US Military in Asia*, (New York : The New Press, 1992), 254.

¹² Akemi Johnson, “Daisy’s Story: Filipina Migrants and Other Women in the Shadow of the U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 18, issue 21, no. 2 (2020), 9.

¹³ Sturdevant and Stoltzfus, *Let the Good Times Roll*, 255.

When sociologist Hae Yeon Choo visited a camptown for fieldwork in 2009, she found that, like late-1980s Okinawa, virtually all the women she met working in the bars, apart from managers and owners, were from the Philippines.¹⁴ Lee Jin-kyung, writing of a camptown she visited in the early 2000s, took note of the same phenomenon.¹⁵ While Philippine women have been working in Okinawan and South Korean camptowns for decades now, their historical engagement with the camptown system is not limited to foreign countries. Until the early 1990s, the United States maintained two sprawling bases in the Philippines. Clark Air Force Base and U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay were the two largest overseas U.S. military installations in the world, and were surrounded by camptowns filled with women, mostly from poor rural areas. The camptowns expanded in concert with the bases' growth during the Vietnam War.¹⁶ In the late 1980s, around 9,000 women were estimated to be working as adult entertainers in the camptowns surrounding Clark and Subic Bay.¹⁷ Although American soldiers are no longer stationed in the Philippines, the former camptown areas remain a hub for sex tourism by international tourists and U.S. troops on "rest and relaxation" leave.¹⁸

Labor dynamics in South Korea and the Philippines

Working in camptowns used to be a way for South Korean women who faced limited employment opportunities to make more money than they would have otherwise been able to.

¹⁴ Hae Yeon Choo, *Decentering Citizenship: Gender, Labor, and Migrant Rights in South Korea*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 13.

¹⁵ Jin-kyung Lee, *Service Economies: Militarism, Sex Work, and Migrant Labor in South Korea*, (Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 130.

¹⁶ David Evans, "Prostitution: Legacy of U.S. Troops in the Philippines," *The Chicago Tribune*, May 27, 1990.

¹⁷ Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 86.

¹⁸ Alan Macatuno, "Party Is Over In Gapo," *Inquirer*, Oct. 22, 2014.

But with rising local wages, camptown bar work – demeaning labor that isolates women from mainstream South Korean society – began to lose its appeal. As the low-ranking American soldiers that made up the bulk of camptown customers became comparatively less wealthy in Korea, club owners started having trouble finding workers.¹⁹

Katherine Moon’s study of camptown history conducted in 1992 (before the mass influx of foreign women) included a portentous look into the economic factors that would determine their future. Hostesses grew sick of soldiers who “suck on one or two bottles of beer all day;” they derided the amount GIs offered for sex as “measly” and “ridiculous.”²⁰ In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the South Korean economy grew between 7 and 9 percent a year, with relatively low inflation and unemployment.²¹ It was little wonder that a job that forced women to endure pitiful working conditions and social pariah status lost any limited allure it might have had to poor South Korean women.

Since the late 1980s, rapid wage increases and labor shortages led the government to permit more foreigners, mostly from poorer parts of Asia, to migrate for work in South Korea. The jobs that are most likely to be taken by migrant workers are so-called “3-D jobs” – those that are dirty, difficult and dangerous. These jobs do not pay enough for native workers to endure their stigma and poor working conditions. In South Korea, 3-D jobs are primarily associated with industry, agriculture and construction, which largely employ male migrants.²² The South Korean government took steps to alleviate labor shortages in these sectors by introducing the Industrial Trainee System in 1991. Throughout the 1990s, the South Korean government refined this

¹⁹ Seungsook Moon, “Camptown Prostitution,” 342.

²⁰ Katherine H. S. Moon, *Sex Among Allies*, 32.

²¹ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 340.

²² Wang-Bae Kim, “Migration of Foreign Workers Into South Korea: From Periphery to Semi-Periphery in the Global Labor Market,” *Asian Survey* 44, no. 2 (2004): 317.

system in accordance with the needs of local industries.²³ Considering the nature of camptown hostessing and prostitution, it is no stretch to add them to the 3-D category. Camptown women are heavily stigmatized, may be abused by customers or bosses, and risk catching STDs or getting pregnant with an unwanted child. The nature of their work often requires that they consume dangerous amounts of alcohol on a regular basis. South Koreans have grown increasingly unwilling to put up with these risks, so migrants now shoulder them.

The state's role in dealing with the lack of domestic workers in the camptown entertainment sector and in other areas of the South Korean economy were virtually the same in the early 1990s – a legal immigration solution was devised to both. The Industrial Trainee System was largely aimed at small domestic manufacturing firms' labor shortfalls, and the introduction of a new visa type allowed camptown bars to keep serving American customers despite a dearth of Korean female entertainers. While migrant manpower for industry was treated as necessary for economic success, in the context of the South Korean government's historical relationship to prostitution in camptowns, the hiring of foreign women was similarly inevitable – U.S. soldiers' desire for paid female companionship had to be met.

Peopling Korea's new camptowns

One of, if not the first, report on Philippine foreign women working in South Korean camptowns was a 1998 article in the left-leaning magazine *Mal*. This article was based off a tip from a group of Korean camptown women in Gunsan, North Jeolla who were concerned about being undercut by the Philippine hostesses who were beginning to outnumber them. The

²³ Ibid, 328.

journalist's primary concern appears to lie with South Koreans – the camptown women whose incomes are affected by new competition, and the Koreans who may catch venereal diseases brought in by foreign women.²⁴ The article also describes the women as “imported” into South Korea, and makes scant mention of the difficulties they face, with the exception of irregular STD testing when compared to Korean camptown women. It reflects an ethnic nationalist view of camptown work that echoes the Park Chung-hee government's calls for hostesses to bring in foreign currency to assist in South Korea's development. The article does make brief mention of the means by which Philippine hostesses are brought to South Korea to work in camptowns – the E-6 artist visa.²⁵ According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this visa is for “a person who plans to engage in profitable activities such as music, fine arts, and literature, or professional acting, or professional entertainment activities in accordance with the Public Performance Act.” It is the only South Korean visa category that requires proof of HIV negative status. It is issued for a six-month period and can only be renewed once.²⁶

The E-6 visa was first introduced in 1993, and quickly became the preferred way to bring foreign women into South Korea to work in camptown bars and clubs catering to Korean men. According to a government estimate, in the first ten months of 2002, there were a total of 10,000 women on E-6 visas working in adult entertainment establishments, with a total of 5,700 entering South Korea during that period.²⁷

The Korea Special Tourism Association (KSTA) is an umbrella group representing local business organizations of camptown bar owners that began in the 1960s. The KSTA was given

²⁴ Oh Yeon-ho, “Chu-han Gi-ji-chon-e-seo Yu-ip-doin Pilipin Yeo-seong-deul” [Filipinas Imported into American Military Camptowns], (*Mal*: August 1998):162.

²⁵ Ibid, 170.

²⁶ Korea Visa Portal, “Visa by Categories,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.

²⁷ Chung-hoon Chang, “Seoul to Be More Selective with E-6 Visas,” *Korea JoongAng Daily*, January 6, 2003

permission by the Ministry of Culture and Sports to bring in foreign women as employees on the E-6 visa in 1996.²⁸ In 2001, women made up 81.2 percent of the 8,586 people who entered South Korea on E-6 visas that year.²⁹ While not all the women worked in camptowns, over 90 percent were estimated to work in businesses associated with prostitution.³⁰

While the Mal article only dealt with Philippine hostesses, some Russian women also worked in the camptowns of the 1990s and early 2000s, though recent writers have found that virtually all the foreign women working in camptowns in recent years are from the Philippines. While most Filipinas brought in on E-6 visas worked in camptowns, a majority of Russian women on the visa worked in clubs catering to Korean men.³¹

For the first six years after the introduction of the E-6 visa, entertainers could only be brought to Korea through licensed recruitment agencies. In 1999, the law was changed to allow businesses to bring in entertainers with just a recommendation.³² Subsequently, the number of foreigner-only tourist restaurants – a Korean hospitality category that includes virtually nothing but camptown bars – tripled in number between 1999 and 2002.³³

When asked by a Time magazine reporter in 2002 about whether there was prostitution by foreigners on E-6 visas in camptowns, Choi Byung-goo, a director in the Ministry of Culture

²⁸ Hyun-wung Ko, Chae-won Kim, Ra-mi So, Da-he Chang-im, Tong-sim Kim, and Tong-nyong Kim. “Oegugin yonyein toip silta’aejosa mit chongcha’ekbikyoyongu” [A study on the import of foreign entertainers and policy comparison], (Seoul: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2006), 40.

²⁹ Ibid, 65.

³⁰ Seungsook Moon, “Camptown Prostitution and the Imperial SOFA: Abuse and Violence against Transnational Camptown Women in South Korea,” in *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present*, ed. Seungsook Moon, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 342.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ko, et. al, “Oegugin yonyein toip silta’aejosa mit chongcha’ekbikyoyongu,” 64.

³³ Ibid, 42.

and Sports, abdicated responsibility. "The bars are tourist restaurants for foreigners," he said.

"There is no way we can know how they operate their businesses."³⁴

Sturdevant and Stoltzfus documented a functionally identical system of hiring Philippine camptown women through entertainer visas in Okinawa in the late 1980s. They trace their appearance to the dollar-yen exchange rate turning unfavorable to GIs' purchasing power starting in the late 1970s.³⁵ As the South Korean economy followed Japan in entering the group of high-income countries, the same system of migrant prostitution for the U.S. military was implemented. The authors also note that during the rule of Ferdinand Marcos, the export of labor became a key pillar of the Philippines' economy.

Philippine citizens are, by many estimates, the most globalized workforce on the planet.³⁶ In a 2003 state visit to the United States, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared

Not only am I the head of state responsible for a nation of 80 million people. I'm also the CEO of a global Philippine enterprise of 8 million Filipinos who live and work abroad and generate billions of dollars a year in revenue for our country.³⁷

Philippine workers have become ubiquitous in diverse labor sectors across the globe, and as of 2008, roughly 10 percent of the country's population was working abroad.³⁸ Robyn Magalit Rodriguez argues that since the 1970s, the Philippine state has facilitated emigration through multiple means, including facilitation of overseas labor placement agencies. These labor agencies are the same places where women are first introduced to jobs in South Korean camptowns. Several Philippine government bodies, including the Philippine Technical Education

³⁴ Donald Macintyre, "Base Instincts," *Time*, August 5, 2002.

³⁵ Sturdevant and Stoltzfus, *Let the Good Times Roll*, 252.

³⁶ Robyn Magalit Rodriguez, *Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 141.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, ix.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, xiii.

and Skills Development Authority and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, have agreements with the South Korean government on the issuance of E-6 artist visas, which are used to bring in camptown workers.³⁹

Hae Yeon Choo's sociological fieldwork in the late 2000s covered three different groups of Filipinas in South Korea: factory workers, marriage migrants and camptown hostesses. She found that Filipina women overseas share the experience of navigating a "migrant journey of multiple border-crossings, promoted by the Philippine state, under the exclusive migration regimes where migrant women are valued only for their labor and where their citizenship and belonging are severely curtailed."⁴⁰ She argues that much of Philippine migrants' choices in labor opportunity in South Korea are determined by chance as much as personal preference and aptitude. Unlike Filipinas who go overseas for professional positions, such as nurses, factory workers or camptown hostesses are largely unskilled. They could have just as easily ended up as domestic workers in Hong Kong or Taiwan if their labor brokers in the Philippines had suggested that option.⁴¹

It is clear that the Philippine government and its embassy in Seoul have been aware for decades that women work in camptowns as hostesses and prostitutes. When anthropologist Sealing Cheng interviewed the Philippine embassy in Seoul's labor attaché in 2000, the embassy employee described camptown women in starkly moral terms as "willing victims."⁴² However, as Cheng proves, while women were aware of some aspects of the work they would do in camptowns before they arrived in South Korea, such as the fact that they would pour drinks and

³⁹ Sealing Cheng, *On the Move for Love: Migrant Entertainers and the U.S. Military in South Korea*. (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 37.

⁴⁰ Choo, 22.

⁴¹ Ibid, 23.

⁴² Cheng, 82.

dance, they were not informed of many crucial details, such as whether or not they would be expected to have sex with customers or drink large quantities of alcohol themselves.⁴³

Tacit permission

The response from the American military to trafficking in foreign women in camptowns is neatly summarized in a 2003 quote from Major Gen. James Soligan, former deputy chief of staff for the U.S. Forces Korea.

“From a policy perspective, we have taken a clear stand that these are not circumstances that are condoned, supported, encouraged or would allow our soldiers to participate in... [but I am] unsure what to do beyond keeping soldiers confined to base or barring them from clubs with Russian or Philippine hostesses.”⁴⁴

This is consistent with the U.S. military’s historical stance toward prostitution involving Korean women – public moral condemnation, but also an unwillingness to take action that would have a major effect on the business.⁴⁵ In a telling example from Songtan, in 2013, Osan Air Base added six “juicy bars” to a list of businesses that servicemembers were banned from patronizing over prostitution and human trafficking concerns. Fiery opposition by bar owners, who marched hundreds of Philippine women carrying signs reading “Stop Illegal Investigation of Club” in front of the base in daily protests, led to the entire camptown district being temporarily placed off-limits to airmen after 11 p.m.⁴⁶ Before that curfew, however, airmen were free to patronize any of the dozens of other clubs in Songtan, many of which in all likelihood did provide prostitution services.

⁴³ Ibid, 25.

⁴⁴ Barbara Demick, “Off-Base Behavior in Korea,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 26, 2002.

⁴⁵ Katherine Moon, *Sex Among Allies*, 36.

⁴⁶ Jon Rabirotff, “Businesses Counter-Protest 'Juicy Bars' Demo Outside Osan,” *Stars and Stripes*, June 17, 2013.

The Air Force's 2013 action in Songtan came roughly a decade after the first serious concerns about prostitution and human trafficking in South Korean camptowns were raised by members of the U.S. military and civilians in government. In 2002, two U.S. media reports – a Fox hidden-camera expose and a detailed Time magazine report by Donald Macintyre – exposed the conditions faced by foreign camptown women to a domestic American audience. Most of the soldiers who the Time reporter spoke to believed that the women they were chatting with in camptown clubs were working against their will. One sergeant interviewed at a “juicy bar” across from several hostesses said, “The women are here because they've been tricked... They're told they're going to be bartending or waitressing, but once they get here, things are different.”⁴⁷ In response to these reports, several members of Congress wrote to then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, urging him to take action to prevent American soldiers from soliciting sex from trafficked people overseas. In 2004, the Department of Defense rolled out a new zero-tolerance policy went beyond just addressing trafficking concerns – it allowed any department personnel caught soliciting prostitution to be charged in a military court.⁴⁸ In order to enforce this provision, inspections of entertainment areas near bases would be conducted by U.S. military police, which continues to be the case today.⁴⁹

The effectiveness of these inspections have been questioned. In 2005, the Pentagon opened an investigation into whether U.S. military camptown patrols actually served to provide security cover to fellow servicemembers who were soliciting prostitution.⁵⁰ The results of this investigation have not been made public.

⁴⁷ Macintyre, “Base Instincts.”

⁴⁸ Sallie Yea, *Trafficking Women in Korea: Filipina Migrant Entertainers*, (London: Routledge, 2015), 29.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Jacoby, Mary. “Does U.S. Abet Korean Sex Trade?” *Tampa Bay Times*, December 15, 2019.

Going off-base expressly for sex is, at least on paper, a risky activity for a U.S. servicemember, so camptown bars have adapted. There are no traditional glass-windowed red-light districts – they have been largely replaced by the “juicy bar” model, which is ostensibly based around sharing conversation in exchange for drink purchases. In reality, it is common knowledge among enlisted soldiers and high-ranking officers that juicy bars also sell sex.⁵¹ If a customer wants to have sex with a woman, they must pay a “bar fine” to the owner and leave the premises for a nearby motel, though oral sex is often still provided in designated places inside a bar itself.⁵²

In the Dongducheon camptown near Camp Casey in Gyeonggi, women must sell about \$3,500 worth of drinks every two weeks to meet their quota.⁵³ According to a Korea Times report from 2018, this quota was usually used to enforce competition among bar workers, but reporting from the early 2000s indicate that women had wages withheld or were verbally or physically abused if they did not sell enough drinks.⁵⁴ A club owner described the means by which women were held as primarily based on their isolated status in South Korea:

“Some of the women are locked up. If a fire breaks out, they can’t escape. But the main method of coercing them is psychological. They know no one. They have no money. The only way they can get money is by prostituting themselves.”⁵⁵

Despite prostitution’s illegal status in South Korea and various crackdowns, the fact is that over the course of the 20th century, the United States military and Republic of Korea authorities have cooperated to alternately endorse or ignore the camptown sex trade. This began during the U.S. military’s 1945-48 occupation of South Korea, when the U.S. Office of the Corps Surgeon in

⁵¹ Jon Rabirowff, and Hae-rym Hwang. “Juicy Bars' Said to Be Havens for Prostitution Aimed at U.S. Military,” *Stars and Stripes*, September 9, 2009.

⁵² Ko, “The Curse of E-6-2.”

⁵³ Ko, Dong-hwan. “The Curse of E-6-2.” *Korea Times*, October 17, 2018.

⁵⁴ Demick, “Off-Base Behavior in Korea.”

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Seoul was established on September 11, 1945 for the purpose of conducting venereal disease checks on licensed prostitutes, a legacy of the Japanese colonial period.⁵⁶ This cooperation was formalized during the Park Chung-hee era, as camptown bar organizations and Korean-American Friendship Council chapters were established to mediate between the U.S. military and Korean authorities and establish rules for camptowns. Women were regularly tested for venereal diseases in order to protect soldiers. In the 1970s, this collaboration was expanded substantially through the Camptown Cleanup Campaign, which attempted to reduce friction between Koreans and American soldiers in the context of camptown prostitution through several major initiatives, such as banning racial segregation at Korean-owned clubs targeting servicemembers.⁵⁷

This tacit cooperation between Korean and American authorities on the availability of paid sex for American soldiers has continued into the 21st century. Military officials like Major Gen. Soligan grouse about the impossibility of preventing soldiers from fraternizing with camptown bar girls and various half-hearted measures have been taken, but E-6 visas continue to be issued and soldiers continue to solicit women for sex in camptowns. The agencies that recruit foreign women to camptowns must register with the U.S. Ministry of Commerce and Industry's military purveyance section, and camptown bar employees must receive identity checks by the U.S. Eighth Army, which is stationed in Korea.⁵⁸ Despite this, the U.S. State Department's 2020 "Trafficking in Persons" report for South Korea acknowledges that women engage in illegal prostitution, willingly or not, for U.S. soldiers.

"Traffickers exploit some foreign women on E6-2 entertainment visas... in bars and clubs, including "foreigners only" bars near ports and U.S. military bases. Job brokers, unscrupulous recruitment agencies, and managers of bars and clubs

⁵⁶ Lee, Na Young. "The Construction of Military Prostitution in South Korea during the U.S. Military Rule, 1945-1948." *Feminist Studies* 33, no. 3 (2007): 463.

⁵⁷ Katherine Moon, *Sex Among Allies*, 58.

⁵⁸ Seungsook Moon, "Camptown Prostitution," 345.

recruit foreign women under false promises of jobs as singers or performers but instead coerce victims to work excessive hours selling juice and alcohol, and to engage in commercial sex acts in clubs.”⁵⁹

As for the Korean side, organizations such as the KSTA that are geared toward providing adult entertainment for U.S. soldiers still exist. In 2010, KSTA President Yi Hun-hui traveled to the Philippines to negotiate an agreement to increase the number of hostesses coming on E-6 visas after the Philippine government cut the number of women travelling to work in Korea on the visas over sex trafficking and labor abuse concerns.⁶⁰ Migrant camptown women are subject to the same government-run STD testing scheme that was first introduced during the 1940s and refined into its current system in the 1970s.⁶¹ Their results are recorded on “women’s health check cards,” which are regularly checked by U.S. military police and are required for women’s work contracts.⁶²

Despite this reality, the American military’s approach to juicy bars, however, seems to be narrowly based on banning servicemembers clubs that have clear evidence of prostitution, while permitting them access to all other similar “juicy bars.” In 2010, U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Walter Sharp told the Stars and Stripes military newspaper that, “The bottom line is that juicy bars ... have women that are there to talk to soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines. You can’t presume that things go beyond that, which is what you would have to do if you want to put them [all] off-limits.”⁶³ His statement reflects both an implicit acknowledgement of the continued presence of prostitution and an unwillingness to take substantial action that would

⁵⁹ United States Department of State: Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking In Persons, “2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: South Korea.”

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Cheng, *On the Move for Love*, 61.

⁶² Yea, 75.

⁶³ Jon Rabirot. “Congressman Pushes for DOD Post to Enforce Rules on 'Juicy Bars',” *Stars and Stripes*, April 24, 2014.

align all U.S. servicemembers' behavior with the Department of Defense's anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking policies.

Conclusion

Historian Bruce Cumings described “the continuous subordination of one female generation after another to the sexual servicing of American males” as the one constant element in the Korean-American relationship.⁶⁴ Today, the woman sexually servicing USFK servicemembers are, by and large, from the Philippines, rather than Korea. However, the fundamental structure of general tolerance of illegal prostitution, despite stated displeasure by military authorities. Due to South Korea's economic development, demeaning, dangerous camptown work attracted fewer Korean women. In response, in the early 1990s, camptown bar owners began bringing in foreign women, mostly from the Philippines. They had the cooperation of South Korean government authorities, particularly the Ministry of Culture and Sports and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were involved in developing a legal visa scheme for camptown women. The United States has largely taken an attitude of concerned surprise regarding individual incidents of prostitution in today's camptowns, ignoring the fact that these commercial areas are built on the sale of sex to soldiers. This approach has remained the same as trafficking of Korean women into the sex trade has largely ended and the operation of camptown brothels has become a transnational enterprise.

⁶⁴ Bruce Cumings, “Silent but Deadly: Sexual Subordination in the U.S.-Korean Relationship,” in *Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the US Military in Asia* (New York: New Press, 1994): 169.

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‘I would like to live the rest of my days without being ignored by others’: ‘ideal’ victimhood and South Korea’s ‘comfort women’

Charlotte Mills¹

I. Introduction

Transitional justice (TJ) initiatives are often presented as victim-centred processes that allow for the full exploration of historical events, as well as victim experiences and the acknowledgement of victim rights (Bernath 2016, 51). They claim in particular to empower victims, providing them the opportunity to express their voice and guide the state to ‘new domains’ (Pavlich 2005, 44-9). In practice, TJ initiatives are more complex. It can be argued that the TJ framework places restrictions upon victims, limiting which experiences can be voiced, and having a negative impact upon specific marginalised groups of victims such as women.

The whole concept of the victim ‘evokes the notion of a disabled agent: somebody whose ability to act freely has been destroyed and needs restoration’ (Ramirez-Barat 2014, 435), encouraging the selection – or creation – of a victimhood which fits this broad concept that leaves the victim ‘powerless’ (Ramirez-Barat 2014, 435). The victim, as a result, begins to lose agency over their experience, their individual identity being replaced by a generalised, state

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controlled view of what it means to be a victim, leading to the creation of an ‘ideal’ victim (McEvoy and McConnachie 2012, 531). This ‘ideal’ victim fulfils a generalised criteria centred on innocence, the harm suffered being grotesque, and the harm being committed by an ‘evil’ perpetrator (Schwöbel-Patel 2018). From these concepts, a hierarchy of victimhood is created. The ‘ideal’ victimhood criteria is particularly problematic as it is often based upon the understanding of purity and moral superiority (Bernath 2016, 60). In other words, who is considered as a victim within TJ has thus been narrowed to fit an artificial construct which is not representative of the individual victim; those who do not fit a certain victimhood are non-victims and silenced.

Overall, the construction of an ‘ideal’ victimhood encourages the pursuit of a grand narrative in which responsibility is only apportioned to the few ‘masterminds’ behind the harm, the consequences of which is the generalisation of experiences of the masses (Rush and Simic 2014, 4). This ‘mass victimisation’ is of ultimate benefit to the state and its political aims; the state can avoid re-examination of the wider issues which led to harm, and instead places responsibility at the hands of a few.

Whilst the construction of victimhood influences all victims engaging with TJ processes, women are particularly impacted. Women’s participation in justice forums remains low, with women being underrepresented at all levels (Zetes 2016, 1296). When women are included, they are often shaped to fit a certain mould, one that is based upon traditional, pre-defined gender roles influenced by male actors acting within a male state (Zetes 2016, 1299). The ‘ideal’ victimhood women’s experiences are required to fit often stems from assumptions and expectations of identity based on purity, vulnerability and innocence (Zetes 2016, 481). For women who have experienced sexual violence, their specific ‘ideal’ victimhood is often understood through a gendered lens that has a limited understanding of the specific form of sexual violence women experience (Henry 2013, 97). This construction of sexual violence

victimhood reinforces the view of women as sexual objects, basing their experience on their loss of innocence and honour, and thus removing women's agency and control over her experience (Engle 2005). For women, 'ideal' victimhood is often deeply entrenched and remains embedded in societal norms long after the harm suffered and into present day (Zetes 2016, 1302). The impact being, for the women who are unable to conform (regardless as to whether the harm was historical or contemporary) are left isolated, their harm and victimhood denied.

This paper examines the construction and impact of 'ideal' sexual violence victimhood in a specific context. The voices of South Korea's WW2 so-called 'comfort women' have long been marginalised, and the survivors are still to receive official truth and justice. Yet, unlike other victims of sexual slavery, the so-called 'comfort women', their past lives, and experiences are public and their entire victimhood is just as public. The 'comfort women' issue is much more complex than just the 'fight' for victimhood of WW2 sex slaves. Sexual slavery in South Korea extends beyond WW2, although the focus is almost exclusively centred on the WW2 'comfort women'. This paper discusses the connection between the 'ideal' victimhood of the WW2 'comfort women' and other examples of historical 'comfort women' (Korean War and *kijichon* women). It seeks to argue that the relationship between the 'ideal' and non-'ideal' victim of sexual slavery can provide an explanation as to why historical justice was not, and continues not to be, achieved.

II. Towards an 'ideal' South Korean sex slave

On 14 August 1991, Kim Hak-sun held a press conference in which she declared her anger at the continued lack of official recognition as well as her experiences being forced into

prostitution by the Japanese military.² Criticism and oral history of Korea's occupation by Japan as well as of WW2 generally was nothing new; however, Kim Hak-sun's testimony was different from other voiced experiences. After decades of stigma, it was the first instance in which a former 'comfort woman' was able to publicly voice her experience and be heard. However, despite a number of 'comfort women' coming forward to also share their experiences, these women have been largely excluded from South Korea's pursuit for TJ. At the time of writing, there are just 15 surviving 'comfort women' who will head to their graves with still contested bodies, experiences and victimhood, and who will no longer be able to voice their continued lack of formal recognition.

Whilst discussion of sexual slavery in Korea has been on-going since the public testimony by Kim Hak-sun in 1991, the wider plight of Korean sex slaves and their experiences remains heavily contested within South Korea and beyond. Their bodies have become a new battleground centred around an 'ideal' victimhood. As this paper will discuss, this is due to these 'comfort women' being the apparent 'preferred' victim for researchers and advocates, as well as being more widely accepted by the Korean state and society as victims of sexual slavery, leading to their portrayal as the 'true' victims of sexual slavery. As a result, the surviving sex slaves of WW2 are at the centre of the 'ideal' victimhood of Korean sex slaves, upon which the creation of 'ideal' victimhood – a victimhood which is, and as will be discussed, applied to *all* victims of sexual slavery – is based.

As discussed, the 'ideal' victim typically conforms to three broad characteristics - innocence, grotesque experiences, and an 'ideal' perpetrator – that are formed from a state's socio-cultural norms and expectations for women; that is, how society expects women to

² Due to the experiences of the WW2 'comfort women' being recorded in detail by various researchers, human rights advocates, and international bodies, this paper will not present an overview of their experiences.

behave, act, and live their lives. In a sexual violence context, women's innocence is based on the idea of sexual purity and chastity (Jung 2014, 51-55). The 'ideal' innocent sexual violence victim must be 'pure': through her behaviour and actions, she must be blameless, honourable, weak, and virginal; women, therefore, cannot be seen to 'invite' sexual violence (Jung 2014, 51-55; K Cho 2008). Their behaviour and actions leading up to the event must demonstrate that the woman attempted to resist and preserve her chastity (K Cho 2008, 121-128). The second requirement – grotesqueness - requires the act of sexual violence itself to be gratuitous in terms of the event/experience of sexual violence. It also needs to be grotesque and harrowing in the sense that the crime removed the ability for the woman to perform the duties that society expects her to perform, namely that of being a chaste wife, mother, and/or daughter (K Cho 1993, 71). The final requirement necessitates that the 'ideal' victim needs an 'ideal' perpetrator. This criterion is complex, as an 'ideal' perpetrator needs to demonstrate an 'evilness' that can be supported by society, and what fulfils the requirement of 'evil' is not necessarily based on action, but also ideology (K Cho 2008, 93). The 'good' versus 'evil' narrative that victim and perpetrator need to portray will, therefore, need to be one that is widely recognised and well-established.

As aforementioned, victims who are able to meet recognisable characteristics have their experiences supported by state and society; they are able to seek truth and justice more easily. Any victim who is unable to conform lacks this support and is often left silenced. With the support of human rights advocates, researchers, and international bodies, identifying the specific requirements to be considered an 'ideal' victim can be met. However, this can come at a cost, with the 'ideal' victim's experience being distorted and even the inadvertent silencing of the 'ideal' victim themselves (Kimura 2003, 166-69).

In other words, when victims ““find” their voice, a silencing of their voices happens at the same time’ (Kimura 2003, 208-09). Examining the testimony of surviving WW2 ‘comfort

women' collected by advocates, Kimura argues that certain measures are adopted whereby 'ideal' experiences are selected which further the aims and objectives of the group (2003, 208-09). This impacts the research conducted on surviving sex slaves, as researchers make 'risky assumptions' which do not consider the motives and possible reflections of the groups conducting the interviews with survivors (2003, 171-73). This can have the negative effect of reinforcing certain socio-cultural norms, which, instead of being challenged, become more deeply engrained. Kimura surmises that the WW2 'comfort woman' occupies a specific 'ideal' sexual violence victimhood, one that is focussed on the idea that the women/girls were 'an innocent virgin, dragged by force, without any notice, subjected to mass rape, forced to serve soldiers, failing to escape, and surviving only through extreme pain' (2003, 172-73). As a result of their experiences being able to fit into an 'ideal' sexual violence victim criteria, the WW2 'comfort women' occupy a privileged position of being considered *the* 'ideal' victim of a specific form of sexual violence: sexual slavery. However, as will be discussed, this also has the consequence of other women (both WW2 'comfort women' and other sex slaves) whose experiences did not strictly meet the same criteria, not being able to meet the 'ideal' sex slave standard and thus not being considered as *true* victims.

Using 21 survivor testimonies gathered by The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan ('Korean Council'), which were, in 1995, published in English under the title of *True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women*, the next three subsections will analyse the requirements of 'ideal' victimhood to establish an 'ideal' victim of sexual slavery.

a. The innocent virgin

The criteria of innocence in a sexual violence context can be seen to be based on patriarchal understandings of chastity, as well as socio-cultural norms and expectations pertaining to the behaviour and action of women victims. Women need to be able to demonstrate that they were weak and vulnerable, that they valued their chastity (which they tried to protect at all costs), and that their chastity was forcibly taken from them.

Survivor testimonies support this construction of ‘ideal’ victim innocence. Equating chastity with virginity, most testimonies detailed (albeit some subtly) the loss of virginity and the value of chastity (e.g. Kim Hak-sun 1995, 35; Mun Pil’gi 1995, 83). Whilst the demonstration of physical resistance during the event is often crucial in determining whether a victim tried to protect her virginity/chastity, in the context of sexual slavery victimhood, the establishment of virginal innocence and chastity is ‘proved’ through the overall behaviour and circumstance of the victim prior to their arrival at the ‘comfort stations’. In other words, the actions and behaviour of WW2 victims are judged, and victims must demonstrate another aspect of Kimura’s definition: that they were ‘dragged by force without any notice’. Regarding this behaviour, all testimonies within the collection refer to the differing forms of coercion and methods of kidnap that were practised. As each victim featured were children when they were taken to the ‘comfort stations’, their naivety prior to arrival at the ‘comfort stations’ is often referenced, which reinforces vulnerability and a particular form of innocence which children possess.

b. Grotesque experiences

The experiences of WW2 sex slaves could not be anything but grotesque. The women endured gross human rights abuses whilst in the ‘comfort stations’. Nevertheless, every testimony

graphically details every aspect of the ‘comfort women’s’ lives, from the continuous rape, physical and emotional abuse, to the harsh working and living conditions. Within this criteria, we can also see a moving away from the general understanding of grotesqueness towards one which embodies socio-cultural norms which are specific to women. Here, grotesqueness is also depicted as the loss of the accepted role of women in society – that of wife and mother. Within survivor testimonies, this grotesqueness – the loss of societal role - is depicted through the damage to the women’s bodies as the potential bearers of children (e.g. Kim Tokchun 1995, 45; Hwang Kumju 1995, 74) as well as the survivors’ inability to adequately fulfil the role of dutiful wife to a husband after WW2 (e.g. Yi Yongsuk 1995, 56-7; Oh Omok 1995, 68-9).

c. ‘Ideal’ perpetrator

Finally, an ‘ideal’ perpetrator is also represented within all the testimonies, with the descriptions of colonial life under the Japanese prior to recruitment as well as the grotesque acts and forcible removal of innocence being used to construct the Japanese state and individual Japanese soldiers as the ‘ideal’ perpetrator. However, a number of testimonies also present a second perpetrator: Korea. For instance:

‘The Japanese were bad. But the Koreans were just as bad because they put their own women through such terrible ordeals for personal profit.’ (Yi Yongsuk 1995, 57)

‘I left home thinking I was doing my duty as a faithful child. But that action ruined my life. From now on, I would like to live the rest of my days without being ignored by others.’ (Hwang Kumju 1995, 79)

This expansion of perpetrator to include the state, individuals, and societal attitudes towards the women demonstrates that, for the victims themselves, the perpetrators of their harm is complex: there is no one 'ideal' perpetrator. However, discussion labelling Korea as a perpetrator was confined to a few short sentences at the end of each testimony. The expressions of resentment to Korea were framed as secondary to that of Japan, who regardless maintained the position of 'ideal' perpetrator. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a conflict between the carefully constructed 'ideal' victimhood, in which the 'ideal' perpetrator is a big, bad (recognisable) enemy, and the perpetrator as understood by the victims themselves.

It can be argued that the 'ideal' perpetrator requirement for sexual slavery victimhood has been appropriated by the state's pursuit of a nationalist discourse, which distorts the lived experiences of the victim. In short, in the eyes of Korea and its construction of the 'ideal' victim of sexual slavery, the sole perpetrator is Japan. A reason for this lies in the symbolism of women's bodies in relation to war, which often reveals nationalistic ideologies. For example, a woman's body symbolises the nation, whilst men symbolise the state, and are the protectors (Mostov 2000, 89; Pettman 1996, 188-89). Within war, sexual violence towards women can be interpreted as a direct attack on the nation itself (Meyer 2000, 122). As a result, it can be seen that from the (male) state's point of view, to seek justice for the woman is to also seek justice for the state, reaffirming the idea that the protectors of the nation have ownership over women's bodies, that justice for sexual violence committed against women is an exercise of male power to avenge the harm committed on the nation (Pettman 1996, 187-89).

The bodies of WW2 sex slaves arguably reflect this: to violate a Korean woman's body is to violate Korea itself. Yang determines that men take centre stage regarding victimhood of female WW2 sex slaves: the women themselves 'property of the masculine nation' (1998, 130-31). It is the men who are both victim and perpetrator, the WW2 sex slave issue no longer between 'Korean women and Japanese men, but between Korean men and Japanese men'

(1998, 131). This is due to the perceived emasculation of the state, whereby they were unable to protect the nation: the body of women.

In Korea, the requirement of chastity only applies to women, and the chastity ideology requires women to show fidelity to either her husband, family, or the Korean state (and thus, all Korean men) (Yang 1998, 131). Thus, Korean women's bodies belong to Korean men, and they are for Korean men to protect, preserve, and control. It is therefore important that the perpetrator is foreign – to admit that the forcible removal of WW2 sex slaves' chastity (and innocence) is also a result of Korean men failing to do their duty 'becomes a matter of national concern' (Yang 1998, 132), one which could damage the pride of the Korean nation.

Thus, it is engrained into society's psyche that Japan, a foreign enemy, is the one and only 'ideal' perpetrator. Yang notes that discussion of the sex slaves of WW2 follows the same structure: an 'us' versus 'them', Korea versus Japan narrative. Yang argues that the nationalistic framing of Japan as the sole perpetrator is a deliberate political action by the state, as it allows Korea to evade responsibility for Korea and Koreans during the colonial occupation (1998, 127). As an example, Yang examines the sudden and public revelation of documents that detail the forced recruitment into sexual slavery of Korean schoolgirls during WW2 (1998, 125). The Korean media focussed on the age and innocence (that is, chastity) of the girls – that they had not yet become teenagers – rather than the involvement of Koreans in the recruitment and continued silence of the girls post-WW2. Yang highlights that the documented evidence of this recruitment was available for all to see: the records were still at the school and even featured in a public exhibition of its history (1998, 125). Following the discovery of the records, the education office in Seoul ordered all schools to no longer disclose information related to sexual slavery in WW2, leading Yang to conclude that 'it is not only the Japanese government that does not want Military Comfort Women to produce more issues or to further inspire

memories' (1998, 128). To do so would go against the carefully constructed narrative that Japan is the sole perpetrator of sexual slavery.

As demonstrated above, the testimonies support this state-controlled construction of the 'ideal' perpetrator via the careful and meticulous detailing of the lived experiences of WW2 sex slaves. However, the accounts from survivors given to the Korean Council also consider Korea itself as a perpetrator (in terms of recruitment as well as the continued harm suffered by former WW2 sex slaves until the redress movement in the 1990s). Although, as noted above, Korea as perpetrator is carefully framed and kept to a minimum. The criteria of who the 'ideal' sexual slavery victimhood points to being the 'ideal' perpetrator sits in conflict with who the survivors themselves see as the perpetrator. The construction of the 'ideal' perpetrator, just as the other requirements for 'ideal' sexual slavery victimhood, is entirely state constructed. By not allowing the victims themselves the complete freedom to construct their own victimhood, the silencing of WW2 sex slaves has continued despite their public testimonies. WW2 sex slaves' experiences are no longer theirs; they are the Korean state's.

As a result of the state's appropriation of WW2 sex slaves' experiences to further political aims, it can be argued that Korea sees its construction of an 'ideal' victim of sexual slavery as of vital importance. As will be discussed, it is imperative that the sex slaves of WW2 are to be seen as the only victims of sexual slavery. To allow a deviation of the 'ideal' sex slave victimhood set out above will allow for the questioning and re-evaluation of Korean history as well as the underlying foundations of the Korean state: socio-cultural norms upon which victimhood is constructed. A consequence of this could be the widening of the 'ideal' victim of sexual slavery to include women who are firstly, not survivors of the WW2 'comfort women' system, and secondly, who do not fulfil the strict conditions (and their boundaries) of 'ideal' sexual slavery victimhood.

III. Impact on other sex slaves

Whilst testimonies put forward by well-meaning groups such as the Korean Council have aided in changing opinion on sexual slavery, they have also contributed to the stigmatisation of Korean sex slaves outside of a WW2 context (Min 2003, 939). The stigmatisation and lack of victimhood status for other Korean sex slaves is justified by two reasons: those surrounding nationalistic beliefs related to an ideal perpetrator and the idea that other sex slaves are willing prostitutes and therefore not innocent. This latter belief is centred on the criteria of innocence, for only ‘impure’ women who did not resist or place themselves in a vulnerable situation would fall prey to prostitution, forced or otherwise. It is when we examine the victimhood status of other sex slaves that it is revealed how the ‘ideal’ victimhood of sexual slavery is intrinsically linked with the WW2 survivors. In other words, the sex slaves of WW2 are the ‘ideal’ victims – the only victims – of sexual slavery. This section will analyse other examples of sexual slavery (Korean War and *kijichon* women³) alongside the current ‘ideal’ sexual slavery victim criteria.

a. Innocent virgins

At a glance, the victimhood status of the Korean War sex slaves should not be problematic. These women can demonstrate their innocence. The sex slaves of the Korean War underwent

³ For conciseness, this paper does not detail the experiences of the Korean War victims or *kijichon* women. For detail on these experiences see: Soh, 2008; G Kim 2008; Moon 1997.

similar recruitment tactics to that of their WW2 counterparts (G Kim 2008), with vulnerable women targeted via coercive means and some even kidnapped (G Kim 2008; Cumings 1992, 171-72). However, despite the similarities, for the Korean War sex slaves, the chastity ideology and other patriarchal social attitudes are the reason behind their failing to meet the innocence criteria (G Kim 2008, 12). The women involved were perceived to be ‘necessary’ for the morale of the South Korean and allied military, and the selection of the victims deliberate: they were from a lower social status and thus were already perceived to be ‘dishonoured bodies’ (G Kim 2008, 12), falling short of the acceptable form of vulnerability. This was despite the coercive and sometimes forceful recruitment methods.

In other words, it is perceived that these women were *willing* to prostitute their bodies because they needed to for survival. Because of this, these women were not seen to have being deceived into undergoing their traumatic experiences like the sex slaves of WW2: they ‘volunteered’ their chastity in return for (financial) security, the treatment that came next should also have been expected and thus consent is implied. Kim Gwi-ok notes that, due to the continuation of the belief within Korean society that the victims were fallen women who willingly became military prostitutes, victims were reluctant to come forward and recount their experiences to her (2008, 12).

Further, for some victims, their already ‘dishonoured’ status and lack of virginity contributed to their lack of victimhood. Focussing on virgin experiences as evidence that women are truly deserving of sexual violence victimhood is problematic and it assumes that victims ‘were worse off in a situation of forced sex because of their inexperience of sex’ (Kimura 2003, 176-77). This assumption assigns virginity as sacred, that ‘rape is only a crime when the victim is a virgin’ (Kimura 2003, 176-77). This leaves the victim dehumanised. She is not a girl/woman, but a virgin: a construct based around her physical sexual state. Her experience is tied to the (accepted) forced removal of that physical state, as is her victimhood.

This perception is also seen in a non-war setting among the *kijichon* women. Like the Korean War sex slaves, *kijichon* women are largely not viewed as victims at all, but as patriots whose prostitution was necessary to protect and further the interests of the Korean state (Moon 1997). The existence and purpose of *kijichon* women goes against the chastity ideology and what is expected of women in society. Despite the recruitment tactics being similar to the Korean War and WW2 victims, the coerced/forced removal of innocence is of no concern: the *kijichon* women are true Koreans who place country before their body, offering their body to protect and preserve the Korean state (Moon 1997). In effect, the nationalistic state ownership of the *kijichon* womens' bodies removes any perceived innocence of the victims concerned. To the Korean state, the *kijichon* woman, regardless of her circumstance, cannot be innocent for she has chosen to give up her chastity to the state to further the nation.

There have been instances when *kijichon* women experiences did escape the 'willing prostitute' mould and the innocence criterion is reinterpreted. These instances usually involve the murder of a woman by an American GI, allowing for the victim to be evaluated on similar lines to that of the WW2 sex slaves: that the woman was a victim of horrific rape committed by an imperialist foreign force. An example of this was the murder of Yun Geum-i by an American soldier in 1992. Hyun Sook Kim argues that when she was alive, Yun Geum-i:

'was shoved to the margins of Korean society and viewed derogatorily as a "Yanggongju." The brutal way she was killed led Koreans to remember and reconstruct the image of her as a "good woman" passively victimized by "beastlike" American soldiers. This re-shaping of Yun's image is unusual: typically, Koreans and Korean Americans consider "Yanggongju" as "crazy women", "loose women", and "women plagued by the longing for - America – sickness"' (1998, 190).

Yun Geum-i went from fallen woman and a foreigner's whore, to victim whose innocence was forcibly taken as a result of American oppression, an oppression which 'embodies the collective suffering of Koreans and the Korean female' (H Kim 1998, 190).

In practice, the experiences of *kijichon* women contrast with the idea that these women are all 'willing' prostitutes. As such, many *kijichon* women pose a threat to the carefully constructed state-controlled narrative that the *kijichon* were patriotic and willing prostitutes (Cho 2008, 119-20). Accepting these women as 'ideal' victims of sexual slavery would break the boundaries allocated to them, and act as a reminder that what separates 'us' and 'them' - ordinary Koreans and 'fallen' women; willing prostitute and victims of rape by a foreign military - is blurred. For '[s]he did not rest obediently where "normal" Koreans or government officials ordered her to stay. She would serve as a haunting reminder to those who tried to distinguish themselves from her by making her presence felt as the excluded outsider that threatens the boundary' (G Cho 2008, 120). An examination of the blur would require state and society to look inwards, to question what is understood by innocence, sexual violence, and sexual slavery, to question their role in the construction of victimhood, and to give the women a voice. It is, therefore, much easier to insist on retaining the idea that *kijichon* women are largely 'willing' prostitutes.

It is of no concern to the Korean state or society that the *kijichon* sex slaves were vulnerable women, many of whom were coerced into prostitution like their Korean and WW2 counterparts by the need for financial security. Nor are the working conditions, the violence, and the psychological abuse many women received once in the camp-downs of concern. Katharine Moon highlights that through the close examination of the individual *kijichon* women - their backgrounds, their recruitment, their experiences - the women are no different to that of the WW2 sex slaves (Moon 1997).

b. 'Ideal' perpetrator

The Korean War sex slaves challenge the 'ideal' perpetrator criteria. During the Korean War, the perpetrators included the Korean military themselves. Indeed, sexual slavery during the Korean War was often justified on the same grounds as that of the WW2 sex slaves. That soldiers have 'uncontrollable sexual desires', and military prostitution is therefore necessary to prevent sexual violence against (the more) innocent civilian: chaste Korean women (G Kim 2008, 5). As previously noted, despite recruitment methods that involved coercion and sometimes kidnap, the Korean War sex slaves were perceived to be 'willing' recruits, who were not vulnerable due to their personal circumstances which led them to needing to seek financial security to survive. An 'othering' is created between the societally deemed 'acceptable' Korean woman (who is innocent, chaste, and vulnerable) and the 'willing' Korean War 'prostitute'. Therefore, in comparison to other Korean women, the Korean War sex slaves could never be true victims. The protection of acceptable Korean women and the sacrifice of those who are seen as non-innocent 'fallen' women is seen as a patriotic act, not only to protect those women who are seen as needing protection from uncontrollable sexual male desires, but also to support the morale of Korean soldiers. That the perpetrators were Korean is also important, with the sexual enslavement of Korean women 'better' if 'done by Koreans' than by a foreign enemy such as the Japanese (G Kim 2008, 12). This further emphasises that the state views Korean women's bodies as the property of Korean men, for Korean men to protect and for Korean men to utilise to protect the nation. These beliefs also situate the Korean War sex slaves as different to their WW2 counterparts: as property of the nation.

The *kijichon* women also provide a dilemma for the 'ideal' perpetrator criterion. On the one hand, they are viewed as patriots and those who suffer are victims of US imperialist

aggression – falling into the ‘ideal’ perpetrator scope. On the other hand, the *kijichon* women are perceived as non-victims, they are degenerate women who chose the life of a prostitute: there is no perpetrator for non-victims. Underlying both is who the victims perceive to be the perpetrator. The *kijichon* women themselves often had a clear perception of who the perpetrator was. Katharine Moon, in her work on *kijichon* women, highlights that the survivors ‘often associated the sexual abuse and exploitation of their bodies with the political and military domination of their country by the US. But they also harboured what seemed to me to be an honest sense of disappointment and a clear understanding that their government and people, not only the US military were to blame for their degraded lives.’ (1998, 166)

However, like the Korean War sex slaves, labelling Korea as perpetrator is problematic, for it goes against the state’s carefully constructed narrative of sexual slavery victimhood only being equated to a WW2 context, but also its designation of Korea as a victim. Challenging this discourse would break down barriers which would require the state to admit that ‘Korean women were commodities, whose bodies and human dignity were disposable’ for the political aims of the Korean state (Moon 1998, 167). It is easier and more beneficial to the state for the ‘ideal’ victimhood to be restrictive.

IV. Conclusion: impact on truth and justice

With justice comes truth; justice cannot be given without granting truth. With the victim being central in TJ processes, the use of a victimhood focussed on an ‘ideal’ can have consequences that ultimately restrict the pursuit of truth and justice, silencing the victims. For women, who are already marginalised, this can further entrench their marginalisation.

Sexual slavery victimhood has been restricted to an ideal that grants victim status to those chaste innocent women whose perpetrator is an ideal imperial enemy – a construction of victimhood based around the WW2 sex slaves. The impact of this ‘ideal’ sexual slavery victim has been reflected in victims’ attempts at truth and justice. Generally, WW2 sex slaves have been successful in their domestic court cases, with the Constitutional Court imploring that the government take action in seeking redress for the survivors, as well as recommending that a victim-centred legal forum be established.⁴ Other sexual slavery victims have been unsuccessful; their experiences falling short of the ‘ideal’ victim standard.⁵ However, in a victim-centred process, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea (TRCK), established in 2005 and created to examine human rights abuses committed from 1910 to 1990, sexual slavery was not featured, even for the ‘ideal’ WW2 sex slave.

The international legal community has welcomed this construction of sexual slavery victimhood. The WW2 sex slaves act as a symbol for the international legal community to demonstrate that it takes issues of sexual violence against women seriously.⁶ As a result, Korea’s approach to the issue of sexual slavery has been reinforced. With the support of

⁴ Challenge against the Act of Omission Involving Article 3 of "Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and the Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan" (2011).

⁵ E.g. in 2014, 122 women submitted a claim in Seoul Central District Court seeking the same outcomes that the WW2 sex slaves have continuously sought: an official governmental apology, recognition, restoration of dignity, and financial reparations totalling to 10 million won. In 2017, Seoul District Court supported the *kijichon* victims’ claims for financial reparations, but rejected the notion that the *kijichon* women were anything but willing prostitutes (Hyun 2017).

⁶ E.g. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Committee Against Torture; Human Rights Committee; CEDAW; and The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal have all produced reports and judgments.

international law, Korea does not need to evaluate its own role; instead, it can place the responsibility of sexual slavery and victim redress at the feet of the Japanese. It is because of this that the TRCK did not need to include sexual slavery within its remit; the TRCK looks inward whereas the issue of sexual slavery is not an inward, national issue, but a foreign, Japanese one.

Ultimately, the narrow focus on sexual slavery which has designated the WW2 victims as the ‘true’ ‘ideal’ victim has not only contributed to the silencing of other victims, further marginalising women, but also of WW2 survivors themselves. The lack of full examination of the harms the WW2 victims endured – both during the war and subsequently as a result of stigma – demonstrates the lack of motivation to break away from the prevailing ideologies which constructed the victimhood in the first place.

However, ‘[c]ollective memories are not fixed but floating. They move according to the currents of the continuous negotiations between available historical records and current social and political agendas. But historical responsibility is not floating’ (Kimura 2003, 8). Thus, there may again be an opportunity for Korea to break away from the strict ‘ideal’ victimhood of sexual slavery that it has constructed, and create a truly victim-centred forum that engages with the entire context, as requested by the Constitutional Court. In that regard, the words of Kim Hak-sun have resonance for other victims too:

‘Why haven’t I been able to lead a normal life, free from shame, like other people? When I look at old women, I compare myself to them, thinking that I cannot be like them. I feel I could tear apart, limb by limb, those who took away my innocence and made me what I am. Yet how can I appease my bitterness? Now I don’t want to disturb my memories any further. Once I am dead and gone, I wonder whether the Korean

and Japanese government will pay attention to the miserable life of a woman like me’
(1995, 40).

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Forming a Sisterhood of Korean Nightingales and Korean Nurses Association (KNA) under the Park Chung-hee Regime

Abstract

This paper investigates the neglected sisterhood of Korean nurses under the Park Chung-hee regime. Particularly, the 1970 nurses' strike catapulted Korean nurses to attention due to a large number of participants in the sabotage, approximately six thousand of nurses across the country. On March 3, 1970, the thousands of nurses refused to give injections to patients as a means of resistance to the nurse Young-ja Kim's trial outcome. The nurse Kim was sentenced to one year and seven months imprisonment for professional negligence resulting in death and violation of the medical law indicating that it is illegal for nurses to inject medicine into patients without a doctor. Despite a hierarchical relationship among the nurses, their vulnerable position in the hospital let them sympathize with nurse Kim's situation. Korean Nurses Association (KNA) played a crucial role in succeeding one of the most significant women workers' strikes in the early 1970s. The KNA actively took part in addressing gender income disparities among nurses, physicians, and interns. The key members of the KNA, dedicated women faculty members in nursing programs, initiated anti-discrimination against woman workers in a hospital. This paper undertakes documentation of the trajectory of woman workers and the labor movement, utilizing academic publications, magazines, and books published in the 1960s and 1970s as well as articles of newspapers (*Dong-A Ilbo*, *Joseon Ilbo*, *Maeil Kyungje*, and *Kyunghyang Sinmun*).

Forming a Sisterhood of Korean Nightingales and Korean Nurses Association (KNA) under the Park Chung-hee Regime

Korean Nursing Association (KNA), under the Park Chung-hee regime, kept petitioning, requesting, and demanding the government to derive institutional modifications from improving nurses' rights. By supporting nurses' collective actions such as strike rallies or demonstrations so that the group actions of specific nurses had a much more significant effect on working women in general. In July 1965, the Korean railroad compelled 80 female nurses to resign and start working in railroad hospitals throughout the country. The nurses rejected the decision and to ask for help from the KNA. The association urgently convened a meeting with head nurses in 28 general hospitals in Seoul to consider actions. The KNA criticized the chairman of the national railroad company, who tried to control personnel without proper legitimacy. They also pointed out that it would be a definite possibility to spread out to other national hospitals.¹ The KNA insisted that the hospital chief deprived the nurses of their official public status and tried to oust the married nurses, blinded by the small wage increase of the existing nurses in the rail hospitals. They delivered their decision to the media that their fight would not stop without withdrawal of the measure.²

In late 1966, the Korean National Council of Women (KNCW) enthusiastically sought to help the KNA, one of the KNCW's affiliated groups, when the professional women's group demanded to improve the unfair treatment of nurses and to raise wages as well as to solve the issue of the domestic shortage of nurses. The KNA had written a petition stating that the KNA's demands were not limited to merely advocating for the rights of individual nurses but that the essential professional women's organization was fighting for the rights of workers. In 1966, the KNA submitted a petition to the government to solve the

¹ "A Right of Nurses Working in Railroad Hospital," *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 7, 1965.

² "Troubles with a measure to enforce resignation" *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, July 7, 1965.

working condition of nurses. The KNA pointed out that the primary reason for the shortage of domestic nurses is not only because of the overseas employment of nurses but because of the low wages and the poor working environment of domestic nurses. The petition the KNA submitted to the government includes the following points: Provide overtime pay; Revise nursing levels. Higher than Level 4 is necessary; A significant increase in the payment of danger pay allowance is needed; There is an urgent need to improve the treatment of nurses working in public health centers; Include a school nursing teacher in the civil servant category.³

Korean National Council of Women (KNCW), the umbrella women's group to reflect the opinions of women's organizations in the government and society, supported the KNA's petition to the government. Kim Hwal-ran, or her well-known English name Helen Kim, president of the KNCW, addressed that the petition was of great significance, not simply advocating for the rights of nurses, but that an occupational group of women was striving for their rights.⁴ The influential female educator and activist, Kim Hwal-ran, claimed that the women's organization could have a more substantial impact on society by discussing and working together to improve women's rights.⁵

Since the leading members of the KNA were female faculty members with higher education, it was relatively easy for the association to speak out through the media. Although most members were not well-educated, key executives in the association had been actively protecting and representing the interests of nurses. Particularly in the 1960s, most of the nurses in South Korea were working-class women suffering from low wages like other

³ "Lack of Nurses," *Dong-A Ilbo*, November 17, 1966; The KNA became a member of the KNCW affiliated group in 1963. They had the second-largest women's group with 8000 members after the Korea YWCA. "The Axis of 1963 (1) Activities of Women's Organizations," *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, December 3, 1963.

⁴ Kim Hwal-ran, "The Role of Women in the Next Half Century," the Publication of the International Seminar to celebrate Dr. Kim Hwal-ran's 50th Anniversary of her Continuous service at Ehwa Womans University (1968.5-30), 21. Ehwa Womans University Publisher, 1968, 8-10.

⁵ "Women and Group Activities," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 09, 1960.

factory girls. According to the 1962 statistic about Korean nurses in the *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 77.5% (4474 nurses) out of the total 5813 nurse population were middle school degree holders. High school graduates accounted for 15.2% of 880 nurses. Only 214 nurses (3.7%) and 77 nurses (1.3%) hold a four-year bachelor's degree and a two-year college degree. Looking at the age of nurses, among the total of 5813 nurses, between 21 and 30 years old, 64% (3755 nurses) accounted for the highest proportion. The nurses aged ranged between 31 to 40 years old accounts for 16% (923 nurses). 15% (853 nurses) of the total nurses were underaged—nurses under 20. After 41 years of age, only 5% of all nurses worked as nurses.⁶

In the fall of 1969, an incident that considerably shook the nurse community took place. It was a case in which a nurse working at a public health center in Busan confronted a situation where her patient died of shock from injected streptomycin. Even though the nurse followed the doctor's general prescription, she got arrested for violating the medical law. The KNA led the nationwide sabotage and gave a reminder to nurses nationwide, saying, "Let's refuse to inject into patients among the various treatment practices of nurses until legal guarantees are obtained." The nurses' collective action was able to be taken across the country because the standing board of the KNA agreed to initiate the collaborative effort.⁷ The KNA's decision to take collective action was due to the frustration of trying to solve this problem with the help of influential people of the government. The association leaders visited those in influential positions of the government authorities but did not achieve much success.⁸

The KNA secretary stated, "This sabotage will continue until a clear legal interpretation admits that the nurse's injection is legal under the current law as long as the nurse followed the doctor's prescription and instructions." In the sabotage participated about

⁶ "The Survey of the Korean Nurses Association," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, December 4, 1962.

⁷ "Injection of a nurse to be judged by the law," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 3, 1969.

⁸ "The Case of the Nurses," *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 3, 1969.

1,000 nurses working in major general hospitals in Seoul, including Seoul National University Medical University Hospital, Yonsei University Severance Hospital, and Catholic Medical University St. Mary's Hospital. The nurses who participated in this sabotage strongly demanded the immediate release of Nurse Kim, proclaiming, "We will not give any injections to patients," and refusing a few medical practices. Thus, doctors had to conduct injections operation without nurses' assistance. It caused a lot of congestion in the hospitals.⁹ Lee Seong-ok, a nurse who has 26 years of experience as the head of the KNA's Seoul branch, called the case that "The rights of the nurses were trampled."¹⁰

In the end, the Ministry of Health and Security officialized through an official letter that the nurse's injection behavior under the doctor's prescription was an auxiliary treatment during work. When the limits of the nurse's responsibility became apparent, the nurse Kim, who was in custody, was released on bail. Afterward, the main issue, in this case, was whether or not it was a direct order from the doctor to prescribe the injection of 5 grams of streptomycin twice a week to the nurse Kim. Since these prescriptions were set as the basic prescription for tuberculosis patients in the long term, the nurse Kim gave injections to those patients with the same prescription without asking the doctor's opinion. At the time, the number of doctors and nurses at the Busanjin Public Health Center was insufficient. The number of patients they needed to take care of per day ranged from 200 to 300.¹¹

The strike of hundreds of nurses in Seoul in 1970 gave off a strong impression on Korean citizens. At the end of February of the same year, the Korea Nursing Association, with 6,000 members nationwide, informed the government that the affiliated nurses would refuse to inject patients to obtain nurses' guaranteed legal status on March 3 of the same year. In September 1970, one day before the 1970 national women's conference started, 164 nurses

⁹ "Sabotage of nurses in major hospitals nationwide," *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 2, 1969.

¹⁰ "Doctors stand upon their rights, and We have to take responsibilities," *Joseon Ilbo*, September 4, 1969.

¹¹ "The Case of the Nurses," *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 3, 1969.

working in the Seoul National University hospital carried out a strike, claiming a pay raise and improving the working condition.¹² Without any government promise, thousands of nurses refused to give patients a shot at the hospital. As a result, hospitals across the country were in great turmoil, and there were hilarious scenes of doctors giving injections instead of nurses.¹³ In the fall of 1970, the strike of nurses at the prestigious hospital shocked the public. Before the nurses' strike, male interns of Seoul National University hospital attempted to go on strike, demanding the improvement of labor conditions and salary increase toward the government. The strike ended up with the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs promising to improve the treatment of male intern doctors. The nurses also went on strike, expecting an improvement in their working conditions like the male interns. They informed the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs that nurses would resign if the government did not take adequate steps. They demanded to increase their income one rank higher and raise subsistence allowance from 2,000 won to 15,000 won and to raise monthly subsidy from 700 won to 1,500 won.

Additionally, they requested a holiday allowance and a menstruation leave. They also asked for more nurses. According to the Medical Standards Act, one nurse had to care for 30 outpatients and five inpatients. However, the reality was that one nurse took care of 42 outpatients or 20 inpatients. They claimed they were overworked by too much work and too many patients.¹⁴

The *Dong-A Ilbo* interview with the president of the KNA showed that female nurses were significantly discriminated against in terms of salary increases and benefits compared to male doctors. Professor Hong Shin-young, president of the Korean Nursing Association, indicated that the government drove them to carry out such an extreme means,

¹² "When nurses expressed their intention to refuse to inject patients, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs asks for the withdrawal," *Maeil Kyungje*, February 28, 1970.

¹³ "Nurses Nationwide, Sabotage Together," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 3, 1970.

¹⁴ "Seoul National University Hospital Nurses' Strike for a salary increase" *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 22, 1970.

the strike since Korean nurses worked with the motto of sacrifice. She also pointed out that nurses didn't get the minimum cost of transportation expenses. Since they must take three shifts to work, even though they were supposed to do in the early morning at three shifts, and they did not earn as much as the paycheck for their family. Even though nurses came out at dawn in three shifts, they did not receive minimum transportation expenses. Many nurses struggled to keep the job because their monthly wage was too small to cover the pay for maids who took care of their children and helped house chores. She pointed to the gender wage gap in pay increases. In a newspaper yesterday morning, she said that the government considered raising doctors' salaries to around 80,000 and 100,000 won while assuming only 2,000 won increase regardless of their position.¹⁵

Contrary to the wish of the chairwoman of the nursing association, the government expressed its intention to put down their demands. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs responded offensively to the nurses' strike, in contrast to accepting their requests for a male intern strike. The ministry stated that the government would accuse them of dereliction of duty. Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Hong Jong-Kwan, announced that when the nurses refused to rescind the government's withdrawal of the struggle and left the hospital, the ministry would report the revocation of duty or their actions as collective offenses following the Civil Service Act and report it to the judicial authorities. He pointed out that doctors and nurses deal with human life, unlike workers in manufacturing plants. Therefore, the government would not accept strikes. He also warned that nurses would be punished for complex measures if they do not perform their duties.¹⁶ Despite the government's warning, nurses resigned collectively. After a day, however, the ministry abruptly changed its attitude.

¹⁵ Kwon Geun-sul, "Interview with the President of the Korean Nursing Association, Mrs. Hong Shin-Young, Adequate Treatment to hardworking," *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 26, 1970.

¹⁶ "The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Warning to the decision of the nurse's collective resignation," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 24, 1970.

The government announced that the ministry would consider the wage increase, depending on what types of nursing degree or qualification they obtained, from degrees of a nursing high school and a two-year nursing college to bachelor's degree of a four-year nursing university. The government also announced that there would be an improvement proposal for increased salaries and food benefits.¹⁷

In 1969, over 1,500 Korean nurses departed for overseas employment under the permission of the government labor agency. At that time, about 2,000 nurses were released annually in Korea.¹⁸ Although nurses cooperated with government policies, they did not hide their dissatisfaction when facing unfair situations. Their resistance and disobedient attitude made the government treat the KNA harshly. In June 1969, the Ministry of Labor accused the KNA's chairwoman, Hong Shin-young, of violating the Occupational Security Act by recruiting nurses wanting to work in West Germany without the government's permission. The ministry claimed that the women's group had recruited more than 40 nurses from local areas across the country without obtaining the government's approval, requiring prior authorization from the Labor Administration before the recruitment. The *Maeil Kyungje* reported that the trial court would impose a three-year jail sentence or a fine of 300,000 won or less based on Articles 15 and 30 of the Occupational Security Act if her allegations of violation are confirmed.¹⁹

The KNA is the largest women's vocational organization with female faculty as representatives and many low-income nurses as members and the following largest women's organization after the YWCA. Despite their class differences, they share their professional identity and overcome their difficulties together. The strikes of Korean nurses in 1969 and 1970 are representative examples of the KNA's unified capabilities.

¹⁷ "The Minister of Education Reviews position adjustments due to the collective nurse resignation," *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 25, 1970.

¹⁸ "Dark Side of Working Women (1) Nurses," *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 10, 1969.

¹⁹ "Accusation of the KNA," *Maeil Kyungje*, June 6, 1969.

**Prospects for a Multicultural Korean Society:
Minority Politics with a Focus on Afro-Koreans**

Burcu Mirkelam

Abstract

This paper looks into the potential towards a multicultural South Korean society and possible improvement of minority politics with a focus on Afro-Asians in South Korea. The main research question is to what extent Afro-Asian community can define a multicultural Korea and challenge the nationalist discourse. It is aimed to look into the government policies to be able to understand the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms of the state towards the minorities. Although there has been an inclination to adopt multicultural policies for the integration of minorities in South Korea, its sphere of influence has been limited and did not necessarily change the public opinion towards multiculturalism. There are complex layers to multiculturalism in South Korea when the state-led policies, public opinion and personal biographies of mixed-race Koreans looked into. As multicultural policies took initiative in the late 1990s, this paper will look into the initiation of these policies until today.

Keywords: multiculturalism, South Korea, mixed-race Koreans, Afro-Koreans, minorities, immigration, multicultural policies

Introduction

In modernizing South Korea, control of the population was a key concern of the state. The existence of the mixed-race children has been problematic for the Korean state as the first president Syngman Rhee adopted the national discourse based on ethnic nationalism to legitimize his authoritarian leadership. In national identity formation colonial and postcolonial Korean society has differed from that of many other nation-states due to the very weak presence of a real or imagined ethnic minority (Seol and Seo 2014, 12). Hence Korean national identity formulated without the construction of an “internal minority” such as Muslims in China or the Ainu in Japan which is considered the most unique characteristic of modern Korean history (Seol and Seo 2014, 12).

The mixed-race children were born out of the union of American GI soldiers and Korean women during the Korean War (1950-1953). The children of American servicemen in Asia referred to as “Amerasian”. Amerasian is a legal term accepted in the US and the official definition was formalized by Public Law 97-359, more commonly known as *The Amerasian Act of 1982* and the definition of Amerasian is as follows “‘fathered by a US citizen...in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand’, after December 31, 1950, and before October 22, 1982” (Doolan 2012, 19). The US military camptowns (*gijichon* or *kijichon*) in Dongducheon and Songtan represented the “antithesis of what the ideal Korean nation should be” (Cheng 2010, 50) as it has undermined the ideal of national sovereignty and homogeneous society. Many Korean children up until late 1970s were sent for adoption mostly to the U.S. Although President Park Chung Hee tried to remedy this situation in the mid-1960s, the numbers of the transnational adoptions continued to increase. Currently, South Korea holds the largest Afro-Asian population in East Asia. Amerasians constitute over one million people which is approximately 2% of the Korea’s overall population and within that number Afro-Asians are even less (Reicheneker 2011, 6) but they are very visible in urban areas. Therefore, the main

research question of this paper “to what extent the Afro-Asian community can define a multicultural South Korea and challenge the nationalist discourse” is an important issue to consider.

The intensification of movement and globalization in the 1980s had a significant impact in the public sphere in South Korea. With the increase in the foreign population of South Korea, the government started to actively promote multiculturalism and adopted policies to alleviate the condition of foreign brides, mixed-race individuals and migrant workers from 2000s onwards. Although the political rhetoric shifted towards ‘multiculturalism’, racial discrimination in daily life is still evident in South Korea. Everyday racism is generally based on skin color. Individuals with darker complexion are more likely to be discriminated against. Bonogit Hussain is an Indian professor living in South Korea who was racially discriminated against on a bus explains to *The New York Times*, “To me, it is obvious that racial discrimination is an everyday [everyday racism] phenomenon in Korea, but nobody seems to talk about it in public. Some people judge me to be a poor migrant worker due to my skin color” (Kim 2009). Another well-known case was Jasmine Lee who is from Philippines but a naturalized Korean citizen. She was the first person to be appointed to National Assembly by the Liberty Korea Party¹ to defend the rights of immigrant wives in 2012 but she faced racially charged attacks, which demonstrated that there is still a general insensitivity towards multiculturalism in South Korea (Soh 2015). However, the public opinion seems to change when the personal biographies of certain individuals were considered. Public opinion is affected from the multi-ethnic individuals’ socioeconomic background such as class, nationality, skin color and occupation. The public attitude towards the successful Afro-Koreans such as the NFL player Hines Ward was positive. Through his success in the U.S. and with the help of the Korean media, Ward was able to create positive feelings among public towards the

¹ Until February 2017, it was known as the Saenuri Party (lit. New Frontier Party).

mixed-race individuals living in South Korea. Thus, the social and economic capital of the multi-ethnic individual is determinant in changing public attitude.

This paper will look into state-led policies, public opinion and personal accounts of mixed-race Koreans to be able to understand Korean multiculturalism. The first section will briefly talk about multiculturalism in South Korea. The second section is about the social integration of the (Black) Amerasians, multicultural policies and public opinion. This section will point out that Afro-Koreans unlike Kosians² were not included in multicultural policies. This makes their situation unique, as multicultural policies were not really applied to them but mostly applied to Kosians. This contrast will be seen throughout the section.

1. Multiculturalism in South Korea

In the 1990s, Korean state took an active role in enhancing its policies towards minorities and embraced the idea of building a “multicultural society in the age of globalization” (*segryehwa sidae-ui damunhwa sahoe*) (Seol and Seo 2014, 13-14). It is important to note that the concept of globalization (*segryehwa*) could be thought as “Korean style globalization” in the sense that globalization was a means to “enhance Korea’s national competitiveness and simultaneously seeking to preserve and if possible strengthen Korean heritage and culture” (Shin 2013, 384). This concept of globalization (*segryehwa*) introduced under the Kim Young Sam government (1993-1998) and expanded under Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003). It led to globalization in the fields of economy, culture (Korean Wave or *hallyu*), politics and creation of a new national image or “New Korea” (Ahn 2014, 394).

South Korea officially recognized the discourse of multiculturalism in 2005. The discourse of multiculturalism peaked with the visit of Hines Ward to South Korea in 2006. Ahn calls this media event as “the Hines Ward moment” that it “created and opened the discursive space for racial politics and multicultural issues in Korean society” (2014, 391). His visit

² Mixed-race children of Southeast Asian wives and Korean husbands from late 1990s onwards.

opened up the unspoken issue of mixed-race individuals especially the unrepresented and repressed Black mixed-race people and racism in South Korean public sphere. Although Korean singer Insooni has a similar background who is a first-generation Afro-Korean, as she grew up in South Korea her struggle against racism was not recognized. In addition, Moon Tae-Young and his brother Moon Tae-Jong were Amerasians who grew up in the US and are playing in South Korea's National Basketball team immediately gained Korean citizenship ("Half Korean Basketballers" 2011). The recognition of Hines Ward and Moon brothers as successful Korean Americans coming from the U.S. (an advanced society) also demonstrates the inferiority complex of Koreans and importance of social capital with regards to inclusion and exclusion of multi-ethnic individuals. In other words, the celebrity cases highlight different degrees of social inclusion and exclusion in South Korea.

After the arrival of Ward, a series of anonymous interviews were done with the mixed-race individuals. The interviewees emphasized their suspicion towards multiculturalism, and temporary and limited effect of mixed-race Korean celebrities in mass media. These celebrities (such as Hines Ward and Moon brothers) were means to brand Korea as a multicultural global power and by doing so the legacy of U.S. militarization that is the source of the emergence of mixed-race individuals was erased or "forgotten". Doolan maintains as these celebrities had exotic looks, the mixed-race individuals were perceived as "babies of 'globalization'" rather than "G.I. babies" (2012, 76-77).

Although this paper is focusing on the Afro-Asian community in South Korea, it is important to know about migrant workers and foreign brides who have triggered the discourse of multiculturalism in South Korea. In the late-1980s the rise in income led to enjoyment of mass consumption and Korean people opted to work for the service sector instead of manufacturing sector (Kim 2004). Therefore, to solve the lack of unskilled labor, Korean government accepted the migrant workers in the 1990s. The migrant workers in South Korea

worked in low-paying “3D” jobs (Dirty, Difficult, Dangerous) as better-educated Koreans did not want to engage in less prestigious jobs (Shin 2013, 374). South Korea was not prepared for the increasing numbers of foreign workers. As they were seen temporary, there were no immigration policies for workers until 1990s. The “closed-door” policy became partially open in South Korea with the adoption of various trainee systems throughout mid-1990s and 2000s. There are mixed feelings felt towards foreign workers. Koreans are well aware that now immigrants are an integral part of the economy, but it is tolerable if the migrant workers live in segregation from the Korean society.

Another source of ethnic diversity in South Korea was the foreign brides who are mostly coming from the Southeast Asian countries in the mid-1990s. International marriages between Korean men and Southeast Asian women and their mixed-race children (Kosians or children of a multicultural family) are exposing South Korea to racial and cultural diversity. The phenomenon of international marriages was uncommon in South Korea until the immigration of foreign brides. In the mid-1990s, the international marriages significantly increased due to the “shortage of ‘marriageable women’” in the rural areas (Shin 2013, 374). The shortage of the marriageable women could be explained by the internal migrations from rural areas to the cities. More Korean women choose to live in urban areas instead of settling down in rural areas, doing hard labor and taking care of the elderly parents-in-law. Therefore, foreign brides from developing countries is one of the last available options for the continuation of the traditional rural family and agrarian economy. According to Shin, the number of foreign brides will continue to increase because of the “acute shortage of native Korean women that is due to the preference for sons that prevailed in Korea in the 1970s and 1980s” (2013, 376). This is one of the main reasons why there is a serious imbalance in the male-female ratio. Thus, the significant increase in international marriages is a means to solve several pressing issues such as labor shortage, the imbalance in male-female ratio and low birth rate all at once (Shin

2013, 376). As Kosians' fathers were Korean, they did not have a problem to obtain citizenship. However, Kosians are suffering from racial discrimination and bullied in school because of their non-Korean looks and mixed-race status even though they are accepted as Korean citizens by law (Shin 2013, 379-80).

The discourse of multiculturalism disseminated through three channels namely: mass media, government and academia. The term “multiculturalism” first entered into the newspaper articles in the 1990s (Ahn 2013, 32). However, media became more active in publishing about multiculturalism with official recognition of the concept in 2005. Since 2005, there has been a “multiculturalism explosion” in the newspapers (Ahn 2013, 32). In the Figure 1 (Shin 2013, 380) and Table 1 (Seol 2010, 598), the increase of the word “multiculturalism” could be seen.




Figure 1. Number of articles including the word “multicultural” in major South Korean newspapers (Donga, Naeil, Munhwa, Kyunghyang, Hangyoreh, Seoul, Sekye, Kookmin, and Hankook), 1992-2006
Source: Shin 2013, 380

Table 1. Number of Articles Containing the Word “Multicultural” (*Damunhwa*)

Year	Number of Articles
1990-1999	343
2000	137
2001	105
2002	126
2003	134
2004	143
2005	209
2006	511
2007	1,684
2008	7,301
2009	14,437
October 2010	15,268
Total	40,398

Source: Seol 2010, 598

The government’s role is crucial in changing the public attitude towards multi-ethnics in South Korea and their social inclusion. In South Korea, ministries involved in multicultural policy-making process include Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, the Ministry of Gender Equality and also local governments. After the government officially adopted multiculturalism, multicultural institutes, policies and practices including the Committee for Foreigner Policy chaired by Prime Minister were established (Shin 2013, 381-82). Changes to citizenship laws, implementation of multicultural curriculum in public schools, childcare support for multicultural families, language training for foreign brides were some of the ideas to be transformed into policies. These ministries are active in organizing Korean language programs and cultural exposure programs such as festivals to help the foreigners living in South Korea (Shin 2013, 388). In other words, ministries coordinate for the utmost goal of improving life conditions for the multiethnic individuals. It is also important to note that as many different ministries are involved in multicultural policymaking, these ministries are competing for funds and obtaining the funds by using multiculturalism as a means (Watson 2012, 246). Therefore,

at the institutional level there is a need to have a “control tower” to solve the overlapping issues and projects related to multiculturalism.

Furthermore, Korean academics organized conferences and conducted research on Korean multiculturalism. Scholars from sociology, literature, family studies, and social welfare studies have done research on foreign brides and mixed-race children. Family and social welfare studies used their research on multiculturalism for the family health support centers’ planning which are done by government financial support (Yoon 2009, 70). In 2007, many universities and national research institutions such as the Korean Sociological Association and the Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology held conferences about multiculturalism (Yoon 2009, 68). Also, in the policy-making process scholars, lawyers, religious leaders and civic movement leaders were involved in the legislation of “Plan for Social Integration of Mixed-bloods and Migrants” and “Plan for Social Integration of Marriage Immigrants” (Yoon 2009, 79). Therefore, it was not just government-led multiculturalism, but it was collaboration between government and NGOs.

2. The Social Integration of (Black) Amerasians and (State-led) Multicultural Policies

2.1 The social integration of (Black) Amerasians in South Korea

What makes Amerasians different from immigrant workers and foreign brides is that they are neither a product of labor shortage in neoliberal economic order nor a demographic solution for the aging society. They were the products of the post-WWII politics. In the case of Afro-Koreans or Black Amerasians, their discrimination in society is two-fold: they were both mixed-race children emerged out of the Cold War politics (like White Amerasians) and had distinctive skin color that exposed them to colorism.

The Korean Nationality and Family Laws contributed to racialized understandings of Amerasians as “other” and were not legally accepted to Korean society. Amerasians were

perceived as foreigners and were not entitled to proper legal rights up until 1998 due to patriarchal constructions of citizenship and family. As the emergence of mixed-race children was unexpected, there were no legal arrangements to include them. The Nationality Law of 1948 stated that only Korean men's children were able to get Korean citizenship regardless of the mother's nationality or ethnic background (Choe 2006, 102). Although there have been revisions to Nationality Law in 1962, 1963 and 1973, it did not change the patriarchal aspect of citizenship which is based on *jus sanguinis* until 1998 (Doolan 2012, 44). Hence up until 1998, citizenship right could be only passed down to child through father. As most of fathers of Amerasian children were leaving Korea, legal status of Amerasian children remained ambiguous.

The revision in Family Law in 1991 gave the right to Korean women to have their children in their family registers without the consent of the male head of the family (Doolan 2012, 46). Before this revision legally the head of the household was the male provider. Through 1948 to 1990, single mothers and their children were not abiding the norm of patriarchal family, hence they were not recognized by state. This meant Amerasian children were not able to get any social welfare benefits, education and healthcare.

Moreover, the revision in 1998 regarding on bilateral *jus sanguinis* was applied to individuals who were born after January 1, 1998 (Doolan 2012, 44). Therefore, Amerasians born before 1998 remained as stateless nonpersons with no legal or social standing in Korea (Doolan 2012, 44). Also, it was almost impossible for women with mixed-race children to get married let alone adding their children to the new husband's household registry (Lee 2012, 102). As there were no legal rights and no access to public education, healthcare or employment for Amerasian children in South Korea, Korean women sent their children to the US. If Korean mothers did not have the means to send their children to the U.S., they opted for abandoning

their children. Because many Korean mothers believed that abandoning their mixed-race children was a better choice since the Nationality Law gave abandoned children citizenship.

One of the fields of social discrimination could be seen through the high rate of unemployment among Amerasians. The areas of possible employment are construction and factory work, working at restaurants and military camps. The salaries for these jobs are quite low and they are not sustainable because these jobs happen to be temporary. A survey done in 2002 presents that approximately 56% of Amerasians were unemployed and 33% were employed in manual jobs and no Amerasians are employed in government (Doolan 2012, 21). Due to unemployment, most of the Amerasians are concerned about their financial debts, living expenses and finding employment.

In the field of education, the term *danil minjok*³ was removed from the elementary school Korean textbooks in 2007 to abide with the multicultural discourse. However, Amerasian individuals who were in elementary school before 2007 remember the bad memories attached to the word and exposed to racial discrimination from their friends and teachers. One of these accounts is singer Yoon Mi-rae whose father was an African-American soldier and mother was Korean said that she was discriminated in both the US and Korea that “In the US, I wasn’t Black enough. In Korea, they called me ‘Yankee’” (John 2015 quoted in Kim 2016, 48). Yoon Mi-Rae also elaborates on her upbringing after moving to Korea from Texas in which she faced discrimination as a young child, and she dropped out of school at the age of 15. These mixed-race students mostly feel like foreigners in South Korea. Some of these children’s fathers were absent so they cannot study in military base and denied of American citizenship.

For Amerasians with American citizenship, they were allowed to go to military or international schools. One of Doolan’s interviewees, Michael who grew up in Yongsan Army

³ Unitary nation based on ethnic homogeneity.

base and attended military school for his primary and secondary education, did not experienced that much racial discrimination because it was a “protective bubble”. He states that the problem is when he left the base, in public spaces, he was exposed to racism (Doolan 2012, 82). The children in the military base are living with their Korean mothers and American fathers so there were not many problems with racism in there. Another interviewee of Doolan was Minna says that when she left the base without her mother, people stared at her and whispered about her racial identity. Minna said that she understood the meaning of being an Amerasian in Korea as young as six years old when one of her friend’s mother called her “twiggi” which is a derogatory word for mixed-race children and connoted that the mixed-race children are dangerous and morally corrupt (Doolan 2012, 82). Although both Michael and Minna have never been to the U.S., they are not considered Korean because of their looks. They were alienated in the country they were born in.

Apart from the military base school, another option for the Amerasians’ education was The Amerasian Christian Academy in Korea which was built in 1999 to prevent the racial discrimination and bullying (Doolan 2012, 78). The school founder James Kang-McCann maintains that this is an education hub for the Amerasians who gave up on public schooling (Doolan 2012, 78). But the Korean government did not officially recognize the Amerasian Christian Academy as a legitimate primary and secondary degree granting institution (Doolan 2012, 79). So, the students from this school needs to take the elementary, middle and high school competency exams. Also, if a student is a graduate of Amerasian Christian Academy, since the school is not recognized by the state, it is hard to get admissions to a Korean college.

Furthermore, singer Insooni established a private alternative boarding school for multicultural children (including immigrants) in Korea called Haemill School in Gangwon Province of Korea in 2013. The school is funded by other charities besides Insooni and provides free education for the students who are graduates of elementary school. Also, Yoon Mi-rae is

telling about her experience as a mixed-race individual through her music (Kim 2013). These initiatives are significant in transforming the racial discrimination and inequality towards mixed-race children in South Korea.

2.2 (State-led) Multicultural policies and public opinion

South Korean government developed ways for mixed race persons to be incorporated into Korean society through revising Nationality and Family Laws and also multicultural policies in late-1990s and 2000s. The multicultural policymaking has been mostly triggered by the marriages between Southeast Asian women and Korean men. Even the concept of “multicultural family”, denoting the international marriages from the late 1990s onwards, was adopted before officially recognizing the concept of multiculturalism. Kim states

The word “multicultural family” first appeared in government documents at the suggestion of an NGO. In 2003, “Hifamily,” an activist organization focused on families, submitted a petition to the National Human Rights Commission saying that the use of the word “mixed blood” (*honhyeol* or *honhyŏl*) was a human rights violation, and sought to replace the term with “the second generation of a multicultural family.” Since 2005, migrant women have been at the center of the Korean government’s attention, and hence started using the word “multicultural family.”... [Beginning in January 2006] “Multicultural family” became the official term used by the government and NGOs, a consensus was reached that systematic support for multicultural families should be provided. (2007, 103-4)

South Korea has an aging population due to the significantly low fertility rate and increasing life expectancy. In 2017, South Korea had its lowest-ever fertility rate of 1.05 births per women and to keep its population level stable, the country needs a fertility rate of 2.1 births per woman (Steger 2018). Kim maintains that “if the current population trends continue, the country will make a transition to an ‘aged society’ in 2019, whereby 14 percent of the Korean population will consist of the elderly, Korea will then become a ‘super-aged society’ by 2026, when the elderly will make up 20 percent of the population (2010, 90). In May 2005, Roh Moo Hyun government (2003-2008) announced the “Act on Aging and Low-Birth Rate” which

aimed to “maintain the proper population composition and to improve its quality in view of maintaining the state’s growth” and to “implement appropriate population politics on the basis of reasoned prediction on population change” (Kim 2007 quoted in Lee 2012, 77-8).

With increasing ethnic diversity and immigration, South Korea adopted “Plan for Promoting the Social Integration of Migrant Women, Biracial People and Immigrants” as the subpart of the multicultural policy in April 2006 (Doolan 2012, 59). This policy was a multicultural family support plan that not only included the mixed-race individuals but also the migrant brides and mostly the legal marriage migrants were able to get support through this policy. Although, multicultural family seems like a comprehensive concept, the law specified and limited this term that only migrant brides and their multicultural families are able to get government support. This meant that this support plan targeted the multicultural families emerging out of this type of international marriages and it specifically did not indicate the children of the U.S. servicemen and Korean women. This policy also included a section called “Improving Social Awareness on Mixed-Race people” that through media it is aimed to increase the social awareness with regards to mixed-race individuals and foreign population (Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion 2006 quoted in Ahn 2014, 396). Roh Moo Hyun government stressed “the need to stop teaching ethnic homogeneity and enhance the tenets of multiculturalism” (Han 2007, 9).

In November 2006, Roh government adopted “Foreigners Treatment Act” which became effective in summer 2007 to protect the immigrants and minorities from unjust discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and sexual orientation (Yoon 2009, 77). In 2007, The Korean National Assembly also passed the Basic Act that aimed to promote social integration of immigrants and promoted mutual respect between foreigners and Korean nationals (Chung 2010, 663). The implementation of this act gave way to a Basic Plan for Immigration Policy and the first plan (2008-2012) included a total budget of 612.7 billion

Korean won (approximately 600 million dollars) to be used to achieve four essential goals: “Enhancing national competitiveness with a proactive openness policy; pursuing quality social integration; enforcing immigration laws; protecting human rights of foreigners” (ROK Ministry of Justice 2009, 14). The Basic Plan was a guideline that aimed to have a smooth integration of the foreign brides and immigrants emphasizing aspects such as human rights and creating a safe and supportive environment for foreigners to settle in South Korea.

In 2008, the policies starting from the 2005 were systematically consolidated under “The Multicultural Families Support Act” (*Tamunhwagajok chiwonbop*) to provide welfare benefits to multicultural families such as medical care, schooling, opportunities for cultural and leisure activities and access to social networks (Moon 2010). This is also the only legal foundation that manages the multicultural families (Kim 2011, xxi). Through building Multicultural Family Support Centers, implications of multiculturalism in South Korea expanded. Yang maintained that the second phase of the basic plan for Multicultural Family Support Act (2013-2017) envisions a multicultural society and focuses on the education of children of marriage migrants (2013, 56-7). Korean Culture and Information Service maintains that the government wanted to accomplish four goals with the multicultural policies: helping the foreign wives in settling in smoothly; finding employment as early as possible; provide financial assistance for migrant wives to bring up healthy children in order to increase future global human resources; and to raise awareness of multiculturalism in Korean society (quoted in Shin 2013, 382). In 2020 Multiculturalism Forum, Minister of Gender Equality and Family stated that they will provide the necessary support to multicultural families in the areas of health, education and economy due to the COVID-19 outbreak (“Seoul vows greater role” 2020).

These policies targeted to support a specific group, the multicultural families. This also demonstrates the centrality of multicultural families in South Korea. Family as a unit is very important in the Korean nation-state building because family becomes part of both public and

private and it shapes the meaning of the national subject (Lee 2012, 99). Through accepting the foreign brides, government acknowledged international marriages as a legitimate means of solving the labor shortage while maintaining a “relatively” homogeneous society (Shin 2013, 382-3). This discursive shift in the policymaking to prioritize the multicultural families rather than migrant workers or Amerasians (Ahn 2013, 29) could be explained by the international brides’ contribution to the reproduction of the Korean nation. The foreign workers’ input to the economy seen as temporary and Amerasians were not much considered as a concern for the multicultural policies from its initiation. It has been assessed that “nearly a third of all children born in 2020 will be Kosians...” and “their accumulated total will soar to 3.3 percent of the population” (Lee et al. 2006 quoted in Shin 2013, 377). As the number of multicultural families significantly increasing, the discursive shift in the multicultural policymaking became inevitable.

The discourse of multiculturalism was used as a regulatory tool to manage the increasing racial others namely the migrant workers, female marriage migrants, ethnic Koreans and mixed-race people. It could be observed that Korean government is using the multicultural policies as a means to solve the immediate foreign bride issue hence not all minorities are treated as the same way under the umbrella of multicultural policies. In other words, multicultural policies have been used as a means to solve the demographic problems and it has been pragmatic in nature hence the narrow application of the policies. Seol and Seo maintain that “although persons of mixed race that fall under the category of multicultural families are supported by the Support for Multicultural Families Act, there are no support policies for children of racial hybridity born in South Korea of a United States Forces Korea service member and a Korean national” (2014, 22). Officially, patrilineal heritage is emphasized and mixed-race Koreans without fathers are excluded from these policy revisions (Doolan 2012, 50-1) which means mostly Kosians were able to get the government support such as education,

social welfare and healthcare through multicultural policies, but many of the Amerasians (without Korean father) born before these regulations were not able to get government support.

One policy field needs to be considered is education. Only in the mid-2000s, adoption of a multicultural curriculum and eliminating derogatory words refer to the mixed-race individuals implemented. To decrease the discrimination against mixed-race students, universities were obliged to admit a certain number of “mixed-race” students (Shin 2013, 382). However, due to ongoing racism many students from a multi-ethnic background cannot continue studying. Amerasian children’s experiences in public schools with regards to bullying, physical and verbal abuse has been shown within the questionnaire done by Park Kyung-Tae on 101 children at the Table 2. Kosians also have similar experiences of bullying at school.

Table 2. Amerasian Students’ Experience in School

Experiences	Yes	No	N/A	Total
I have experiences of being ridiculed by friends.	75.2	24.8	.	100.0
I have experiences of being excluded from friends.	55.4	44.6	.	100.0
I have experiences of being beaten by friends.	33.7	66.3	.	100.0
I have experiences of unfair treatment by school teachers.	43.6	53.5	3.0	100.1
I was totally isolated in school.	35.6	61.4	3.0	100.0
I fought a lot against other students in school.	40.6	56.4	3.0	100.0
I had no friend in school who understood me.	25.7	71.3	3.0	100.0
I have experiences of committing offenses for livelihood.	21.8	78.2	.	100.0

Source: Lee 2012, 84

The teachers have not been much helpful in the schools to motivate and support mixed-race children’s education. Some of the teachers in public schools think that the multicultural education is not their priority or something they have to do as part of their jobs. Watson et al.’s research about teachers’ view on multiculturalism demonstrates that the teachers have mixed feelings about the demographic shift in South Korea and feel unprepared and under-resourced as multicultural educators and do not have much experience with multicultural curriculum (2011, 13). Therefore, the multicultural curriculum was implemented superficially. Some of

the teachers believe through their experiences with multiracial students, they can learn diversity and become a multicultural educator (Yeo 2016, 123). A positive and unbiased interaction is the key to get along in one classroom with people from different backgrounds. In addition, to enhance multicultural education teachers with multi-ethnic backgrounds could be employed in public elementary schools. This could change the students' attitudes towards multiculturalism and multi-ethnic people in South Korea.

Another field where mixed-race individuals were excluded was military. Mixed-race Korean men were banned from serving in the military, although military service is mandatory for all Korean male citizens. With the revisions in 2009, only in January 2011 all able-bodied South Korean men regardless of skin color or ethnic background started to be recruited for military service (Kim 2016, 44). This policy again mostly targeted the children of multicultural families, Kosians. Although there has been discrimination against the mixed-race men in the military, the army officials are trying to improve current conditions regarding mixed-race soldiers to help them adapt more easily ("S. Korean Army" 2012). As shown in the Figure 2, Bae Jun-hyeong and Han Ki-yeop are both from multicultural families. Bae's mother is Vietnamese, and Han's mother is Japanese. The officials maintain that this is the "first time" anyone with such a background to join "the ranks of non-commissioned officers" in South Korean military ("S. Korean Army" 2012).



Figure 2. Bae Jun-hyeong (right) and Han Ki-yeop (left) at army training center on June 11, 2012
Source: *Yonhap* News 2012
<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/06/11/8/0301000000AEN20120611001600315F.HT>
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The revision in military laws was done for Kosians as Amerasians were born before the regulations. Even though some of the Afro-Koreans have the Korean citizenship, their presence is excluded in the military due to their racial background and noticeable skin color. This demonstrates that Amerasians are still perceived as illegitimate and foreign.

The multicultural policies are responsible for the Koreanization of immigrants and mixed-race individuals. Therefore, Shin claims when the nature of the policies looked into, Korea is asking for the minority population to culturally assimilate rather than accepting diverse cultures and values (2013, 383). Today, ethnic nationalism prevails and racial discrimination in Korean society ensues. Lee argues that

...there is an interconnection between the legal imagination and the social one, whereby how mixed-race people are talked about and treated within the family, within schools, on the streets, and so forth is a measure of some intention of governance through policy initiatives or a lack thereof... Amerasians become a-categorical and transient strangers hidden and roaming between the lines of juridical text, bouncing off the discursive limits that define national families and de facto assuming the capacity of 'outsider' or 'other' against which legitimate, national belonging is positioned. (2008, 73-4)

Furthermore, the public opinion regarding multiculturalism did not drastically change. Most of the Korean people still believe in ethnic homogeneity as a distinguishing feature of the Korean society. According to Jiyeon Kim's study almost 80 percent of respondents in 2005 and 2010 believed that Korean bloodline was important to being Korean but that was changed in 2013 that only 65.8 percent and 'as many as 30.4 percent thought that sharing the same bloodline is not important to being Korean' (2015, 209). The respondents were mostly agreeing to cultural assimilation (respect and practice Korean traditions) of the migrants and foreigners. To add, as long as the migrant groups constitute a small proportion of the population, they were seen harmless, disadvantaged, and powerless minority group (Yoon et al. 2008, 339-40).

Similarly, the Korean Multicultural Acceptability Index (KMAI), survey conducted by Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) between December 2011 and January 2012, reveals that only 36.2% of Koreans surveyed had positive views on the coexistence of various cultures (Kim et al. 2014, 108). One-third of the respondents were concerned about foreigners taking their jobs away, increasing the crime rate, and increasing government spending. Surprisingly, those with immigrant family members and experiences in multicultural training showed lower levels of acceptance. The KMAI survey respondents negatively responded to affirmative action for foreign immigrants and policies, which cause a big tax burden. In terms of class position, low-income groups such as farmers, fishermen, blue-collar workers, and salesmen showed lower levels of acceptance of multiculturalism, but younger people, single people and better educated groups showed relatively more positive takes on accepting multiculturalism (Kim et al. 2014, 108). Those who have had more overseas travel and frequently encounter foreigners in their neighborhood, workplaces, and schools also showed higher levels of acceptance of multiculturalism.

There are still mixed feelings about multiculturalism and foreigners in South Korea. Seol and Seo have conducted a survey on 665 people on ten university campuses about the social distance felt towards the minority groups in South Korea in 2010. The minority groups included *Joseonjok*,⁴ North Korean refugees, foreign spouses, foreign migrant workers, Chinese people in Korea (*hwagyo*), gays/lesbians and mixed-race people (*honhyeorin*). Their results were as follows in Figure 3:

⁴ Joseonjok are ethnic Koreans who live in China but occasionally visit South Korea for work. They are also discriminated against in South Korea.




Figure 3. Korean students' social distance scores toward 17 groups in Korea

Note: Bogardus's (1925) social distance scale is a measure of people's willingness to participate in social contacts of varying degrees of closeness with members of diverse social groups. The scale asks people the extent to which they would be accepting of each group (a score of 1.00 for a group is taken to indicate no social distance). Seol and Seo used a revised version of the scale: "As close relatives by marriage" (score 1.00), "As my close personal friends" (2.00), "As co-workers in the same company" (3.00), "As neighbors in the same community" (3.00), "As citizens of my country" (5.00), "Only as visitors to my country" (6.00), and "Would exclude from my country" (7.00).

Source: Seol and Seo 2014, 24

Seol and Seo argue that the status of the minority groups has been subjected to change due to changing social, political and economic environments but it's important to see how the hierarchical nationhood works on a binary logic of inclusion and exclusion (2014, 25). The term 'hierarchical nationhood' has been used to demonstrate that how different legal status groups face different degrees of social acceptance. Some of them are more welcomed than the others by the Korean society. In the hierarchical nationhood scores of 2012 (see Table 3), it has been seen that mixed-race groups received a 'favorable' public perception and in terms of legal and policy dimensions (Seol and Seo 2014, 19).

Table 3. Hierarchical Nationhood Scores of Social and Ethnic Minorities in South Korea, 2012

Social and ethnic minorities in South Korea	Grand average	Legal/policy dimensions					Social dimensions
		Sub-average	Rights to stay and work	Voting rights	Welfare (public assistance)	Social services and/or affirmative action	Public perceptions
Korean American	2.4	1.8	3	2	1	1	3
Foreign spouses	2.8	2.5	3	2	2	3	3
North Korean refugees	2.5	3.0	3	3	3	3	2
Joseonjok	1.6	1.3	2	1	1	1	2
Migrant workers	1.3	1.0	1	1	1	1	1.5
Disabled	3.0	3.0	3	3	3	3	3
Mixed race	2.8	2.5	3	3	3	1	3
Gays/lesbians	2.3	2.5	3	3	3	1	2
<i>Hwagyo</i>	2.0	2.0	3	3	1	1	2

Note: Each of the indicators has three basic categories: 1 being the least favorable, 2 being of middling favorability, and 3 the most favorable. In cases where an indicator is eligible for multiple categories, we calculated the average of the points the indicator evaluated.

Source: Seol and Seo 2014, 19

According to these results Seol and Seo present a hierarchical ranking of the ethnic and social minorities respectively:

The disabled > foreign spouses = persons of mixed race > North Korean refugees > Korean Americans > gays/lesbians > Chinese people in Korea (*hwagyo*) > Joseonjok > migrant workers. (2014, 25)

In South Korea there are multi-ethnic identities, but the concept of multiculturalism is not yet fully embraced by the society as there are discrepancies between the public opinion, multicultural policies and personal accounts of multi-ethnics. According to Shin, the challenge for the Korean society is to realize the ethnic heterogeneity and also “promote ethnic and cultural pluralism by taming the racist modes of thought implicit in ethnic nationalism” (2013, 390). The discourse of multiculturalism and state-led policies in South Korea organizes the racial order and the social order is reproduced and managed through racial categories. According to this racial categories and order, the social, economic and political resources are distributed. The curriculum in schools, military, employment and the multicultural family are

some of the institutions that are affected from the state-led policies. But the racial order is practiced at various levels in everyday lives of Koreans and this mediates social reality and order. Therefore, concepts such as gender, class and race become important to understand the inclusion and exclusion in multicultural South Korea.

Conclusion

This paper elaborated on the status of mixed-race individuals with a focus on the social integration of Afro-Asians in South Korea within the multiculturalism. It is suggested that to be able to understand the Afro-Asian identities in South Korea, it is important to look into the state-led multicultural policies, personal accounts of multi-ethnic individuals and public opinion.

South Korea officially adopted the concept of multiculturalism in 2005 and from the mid-2000s onwards the multicultural policies mostly targeted the multicultural families and Kosians neither Amerasians nor migrant workers due to the shift in policymaking to family. Although Hines Ward's visit to South Korea defined the multicultural turn, Ward was used as a means to adopt the multicultural policies for the multicultural families. Ward's visit to South Korea in 2006 was a mass public event and its effect on public opinion and attitude towards multi-ethnics was positive but temporary.

The multicultural policies failed to improve social inclusion of multi-ethnic individuals as multicultural policies were used as a means to solve the demographic issues such as low birth rate and aging population in South Korean society. Also, the policies were assimilationist in its nature that it did not recognize diverse cultures and identities. Multiculturalism stayed in rhetoric and the public attitude towards multi-ethnics and foreigners did not significantly change. Even in the aftermath of the establishment of these policies, mixed-race individuals were teased and discriminated against in schools and have very few job prospects. It is apparent

that not all segments in the Korean society are ready for a multicultural society. Lee Kwang-gyu, Overseas Koreans Foundation chairman maintains, “Korea is so accustomed to a belief in pure-blood nationalism and a homogenous nation that its people don't seem to be prepared to accept or understand a multiethnic and multicultural society” (quoted in Lee 2012, 86). Although racist attitudes towards multi-ethnic individuals decreased in its intensity, ethnic homogeneity is embedded in the national consciousness. It was reported in The Korea Times that more than 70% of South Koreans hope to embrace multiculturalism but a “a perception gap is now beginning to emerge between elite-led narratives on Global Korea and a South Korean public fearful of losing jobs at a time of economic austerity and national insecurity” (Lee 2010). Therefore, there are still mixed feelings towards multiculturalism among South Korean society.

In conclusion, this research is highly relevant considering the current rapid changes that South Korean society is experiencing in the recent years. South Korea has more than 2.5 million foreign residents which constitutes 4.9% of the total population. Multiculturalism discourse in South Korea is dynamic and different degrees of social acceptance exist for particular individuals with regards to their race, nationality, status in South Korea whether they are immigrants or residents, occupation, class and gender. Although there is a retreat in multiculturalism in the Western societies, multiculturalism is a recent and significant phenomenon in South Korea. It is something that is talked about through law, academia, education and media. South Korean society is diverse but not yet tolerant of diversity. Despite the prevalent use of the term multiculturalism in South Korea, there is little public discussion or shared understanding as to what it is. There is no public consensus on how, and even if, either Korea should transform from an ethnic nation to a multicultural one. Policies for handling minorities in South Korea demonstrate an absence of a clear institutional long-term vision for future. Incoherent policies continue to produce human rights violations and social

conflicts towards minority groups in South Korea. Therefore, it is very significant for South Korea to come in terms with ethnic diversity to be able to keep the unity of nation.

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Integration Policy in South Korea: Beyond Multiculturalism

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Abstract. Immigration to South Korea has increased steadily over the past few decades. The diversification of nationalities, cultures, and ethnicities within Korean society has evolved together with an increasingly complex system of immigration management. Within this policy framework emerges multiple pathways for migrant incorporation, which have been addressed through a growing literature on measures of integration and tools of exclusion, at the intersections of gender, ethnicity, and skills. By taking a normative approach to integration, this article examines more closely how the discourse on integration develops over time and explores the meanings assigned to integration as a set of policies. Through a study of immigrant policy between 2008 and 2020, it is observed that social integration takes on multiple meanings over periods of time and across discursively constructed populations within the Korean society.

Keywords: South Korea, social integration, migrant incorporation, policy discourse

Introduction

The continued increase of immigrants in South Korea has been accompanied by the development of immigration politics that at the same time adopt frameworks from traditional immigration countries and operate with a distinctively different approach to settlement. Scholarly research has in particular been paying attention to the adoption of multiculturalism as a framework for social integration in the first policy framework released in 2008 (MOJ, 2008). An approach previously popular in Europe, multiculturalism touts the mutual acceptance of plural cultures, while oftentimes including policy measures specifically targeted at the civic integration of newcomers,

through language learning, education, support for job search, and other services. Within the Korean context, scholars have argued that multiculturalism has been adopted selectively, and does not apply equally to all parts of the society. Studies observe the differentiation of immigrants both in resident policies (Kim, 2008; Seol and Skrentny, 2009; Ahn, 2013; Kim, 2016) and in the public discourse on multiculturalism (Kim, 2015; Hundt et al, 2019; Kim, 2019; Shin, 2019). This article builds upon the findings of this literature, while also suggesting that multiculturalism as a framework for understanding integration policies in South Korea has limitations. Instead, it takes an exploratory approach and asks what integration implies in the Korean context. By adopting the analytical frameworks of Entzinger (2000) and Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016), the study applies a systematic analysis of policy documents released within the past twenty years, starting from the adoption of pertinent legislations in the 2000s. Through close readings in the policy discourse of Korean immigration, the following research questions are addressed: (1) How have the meanings assigned to integration evolved over time; (2) who are to these integration policies; and (3) what are the implications of integration policies for the prospects of societal cohesion?

The article first provides an introduction to immigration history and legislative developments in South Korea from the 1980s to the present. Next, an overview of theorizations of integration is followed by a review of the literature on social integration as a policy and multiculturalism as a discourse within the context of South Korea. After an outline of the analytical framework and the data applied in this study, the findings of this article are presented. The article concludes with a discussion of the findings.

Immigration in South Korea

South Korea has experienced steady growth in the number of immigrants over the past thirty years, from close to 400,000 in 1999 to more than 1 million in 2009 and 2.5 million in 2019 (KIS, 2020). Close to 90% of all foreign residents to Korea come from the Asian region. As of 2019, major ethnic groups include 700,000 Korean Chinese and 400,000 Chinese, followed by 225,000 Vietnamese, 210,000 Thai, and 157,000 Americans. European countries are represented in small numbers, but the region combined makes up the sixth-largest majority in Korea with close to 98,000 residents (MOJ, 2020.08). Entering the second generation of immigrants, the number of children born to multicultural families in Korea peaked at close to 23,000 newborns in 2012 but has since decreased to 18,000 in 2018. Because the national birth rate has been declining at a rapid pace, the relative share of multicultural children in the general population has increased from 2.9% in 2008 to 5.5% in 2018 (Statistics Korea, 2019.11).

Migration to Korea dates back to the 1980s and took off in the 1990s. There were multiple factors prompting the sudden increase, including shortage of manual workers in the domestic industry, the democratization of Korea, the fall of the Eastern Bloc, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. The first influx of migrants was primarily represented by the Korean diaspora, from the former Soviet Union and North-East China (Lee et al., 2019). Starting from this period, the migration pattern to Korea has remained largely gendered, with men entering the country on manual labor visas and women arriving through international marriage or employment in the entertainment industry. Along with neighboring Japan, Korea represents a rapidly industrialized economy in an otherwise developing region. This became an opportunity when the country experienced that high tertiary enrollment and strong urbanization correlated with a national skill mismatch and internal migration. At this backdrop, the number of low-skilled workers and marriage migrants increased rapidly at the turn

of the century (see Hwang, 2017; Lee et al., 2017). However, it quickly became evident that the new waves of immigration were not without problems, as human rights abuse and domestic violence surfaced simultaneously to rising anti-immigration sentiments (W.S. Kim, 2012). In the 2000s, South Korea passed several immigration laws, which form the foundation of policy processes and bureaucratic structures for immigration management. Today, the administration of immigration is carried out by multiple agencies. Key actors at the central level include the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Gender and Equality, Ministry of Employment and Labor, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior and Safety work together with local governments to support the implementation of immigration policies across the country (Lee et al., 2017).

A Normative Approach to Integration

In the study of integration, a distinction is made between descriptive and normative approaches (see Eichenhofer, 2019). While acknowledging the social process that is the focus of descriptive integration studies (e.g. Beresnevičienė, 2003; Spencer and Charsely, 2019), this article is focused on the normative meanings assigned to integration in policy discourse. The section on integration is therefore grounded in scholarship on law and policy.

de Haas et al. (2020) distinguish between four areas of immigration policy, including border controls, legal entry and stay, integration and exit. These are interrelated, yet distinct areas of immigration policies that combined translate into distinct pathways for different groups of migrants. Filindra and Goodman (2019) further distinguish between immigration policy as “laws and rules governing the admission, removal, and status change of noncitizens” and immigrant policy as “laws that regulate the political, economic, and social rights of noncitizens”

(p. 501). Social integration typically falls within the latter category of policy and is defined as “the inclusion of new individual actors in a system, for the creation of mutual relationships among actors and for their attitudes to the social system as a whole” (EFMS, 2006, p. 9). However, social integration can no longer be considered completely independent from immigration policy, as social integration programs commonly are used as a step towards civic integration (see Ahlén & Boräng, 2018). Today, many countries require immigrants to take courses on language, culture, values, and other aspects relating to the national identity of the host country in order to gain entry or change resident status (e.g. Goodman, 2010). While the operation of immigration policies has been widely documented and compared across countries, including South Korea, little research has examined what these integration policies entail and what they imply about the state’s understanding of societal cohesion. Specifically, N.K. Kim (2013) distinguishes between an ethnic nation that emphasizes ethnicity, religion, and culture, and a civic nation focused on values and principles grounded in democracy. According to N.K. Kim (2013) the two paths carry different implications for immigration: “when national identity is reconstructed on the basis of a civic nation, all citizens, including newcomers, can take part in and contribute to the development of the society where a sustainable democracy can be founded” (p. 44).

Multiculturalism in South Korea

In the East Asian region, political and academic approaches to integration policies have been closely interlinked with discourses on multiculturalism. Multiculturalism can be understood as an approach to integration that acknowledges cultural diversity, as opposed to renouncing minority

cultures. Multicultural policies build upon this shared understanding of cultural plurality, although significant differences have been observed across countries: “the rhetoric of ‘multiculturalism’ may now be ubiquitous around the world, but the word is being used to express quite different ideas, rooted in different traditions, both Western and non-Western” (He and Kymlicka, 2005, p. 1). This observation calls for an approach to multiculturalism - and integration more broadly - that examines their ascribed meanings within specific regional and national contexts.

Within the context of South Korea, several studies have examined the motivational underpinnings of a multicultural discourse. N.H.J. Kim (2015) argue that the adoption of a multicultural discourse by various state and non-state actors is motivated by a desire to be recognized by the international community as a developed country: “Korea’s self-perception as a nation in the middle of the global economic and symbolic hierarchy encourages multiculturalism as a way to move toward the core” (p. 727). Pinar argues that nationalism might encourage cosmopolitanism: “national pride and accomplishment can encourage citizens to become internationalists, citizens of the world, in order to demonstrate their patriotism” (p. 25). Similar views emerge also in research that goes beyond the multicultural discourse to examine the political framing of immigration policies more broadly. In a study focused on the rights of migrant workers and social minorities, Park (2017) finds that advocates of migrant rights emphasize compliance with global human rights norms, thereby appealing to domestic aspirations towards “*seggyehwa* (to become global) and becoming an ‘advanced’ nation” (p. 377).

Despite a growing literature on the discourse of immigration and related policies by Korean media, politicians and activists, few studies have examined immigrant frames through the analysis of legislative frameworks and policy documents. One of the few exceptions is

Ghazarian (2018), who applies Banks' multicultural paradigms to the analysis of the Second Basic Plan for Immigration. While the underlying analytical framework enables the identification of policy frames to dissect sources of problems and visions for solutions, the study is limited by its approach to immigrants as a single group. This fallacy is particularly salient in the Korean context, where multiple studies observe the presence of differential treatment between groups of migrants (N.H.J. Kim, 2016; Seol & Skretny, 2009). The following section outlines the analytical framework adopted in this study to address the gap in the literature, through an examination of policy discourse that accounts for the plurality of integration strategies available within a single national framework.

Research Design

In this study, integration is neither understood as an outcome nor as a single dimension, but rather as a continuous process (Beresnevièiūtė, 2003, pp. 97-98) occurring across multiple spheres (Spencer & Charsley, 2016, pp. 4-5). Following Entzinger (2000), the study distinguishes between political-legal, cultural, and socio-economic dimensions of integration policies. This approach facilitates analysis that goes beyond country-level comparisons and a binary view of inclusion and exclusion. Specifically, it is suggested that countries might adopt a differentiated system for migrant incorporation, and furthermore that such differences might not be equally enforced across the three dimensions of integration. What follows is the assumption that these policies combined yield multiple pathways for migrant incorporation.

Building upon this work, Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016) present an analytical framework for examining the normative and administrative processes that justify and enable a differentiated set of integration policies. Specifically, the authors explain that “integration is

formulated as a problem, the problem is given a normative framing, and concrete policy measures are designed and implemented to achieve a desired outcome” (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016: 20). This approach extends the view of policy as a set of solutions to social problems and asks instead what policymakers frame as social problems, before examining the narrative through which policies are prescribed as solutions (Bacchi, 2000, p. 48).

The policy analysis of this study draws primarily upon legislative frameworks and related policy blueprints. There are seven different legislations pertaining to migration in and out of Korea. These include the Nationality Act (1948), the Immigration Control Act (1963), the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (1999), the Act on Foreign Workers' Employment (2003), the Framework Act on the Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea (2007), the Multicultural Families Support Act (2008) and the Refugee Act (2013). In accordance with the legislative enactments of the late 2000s, Korea established the Foreigners' Policy Committee, the Multicultural Family Policy Commission, and the Foreign Workforce Policy Committee (Lee et. al., 2019). While the latter is carried out on an annual basis, the former two also include a five-year policy blueprint. Starting in 2008, Korea has released three revisions of the Basic Plan for Immigration Policy and the Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Policy. Both working committees are led by the sitting Prime Minister, but whereas the policy framework for immigration includes a variety of agencies, the policy organization of multicultural families is primarily tasked with the Ministry of Gender and Equality (Lee et al., 2017).

Integration Policies in South Korea

The policy analysis in this paper is structured in two parts. The first is focused on the framing of immigration, with particular attention to integration. The second part shifts attention to policy measures, including integration programs and migrant service centers. In doing so, this paper accounts for the possibility that policy documents might be more closely reflective of discourse than practice (Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas, 2016).

Policy Frames: Multicultural or Culturally Diverse?

The First Basic Plan for Immigration (MOJ, 2008) aims at ‘high quality social integration’ through mutual integration of natives and immigrants. Approaching the new multicultural Korea as a two-way street, the policy plan first suggests ‘improving public understanding of a multicultural society’ with enhanced awareness through education and promotional efforts targeted at native Koreans on one hand, and improved opportunities for participation and communication by migrants on the other hand. It is recognized in the policy plan that Korea is experiencing a rapid diversification of ethnicities and cultures, to which natives respond in different ways, ranging from rejection to adjustment. It is also pointed out that “some see the multicultural society as a trend whereas others see it as a value that we must pursue” (MOJ, 2008: 8). Although not making an explicit conclusion as to where the government stands, the policy committee notes that the view of a multicultural society as a trend is more closely reflective of the Act on Supporting Multicultural Families. Acknowledging the formation of a multicultural Korea as an inevitable development, the first policy blueprint approaches the integration of migrants as a matter of societal cohesion, requiring mutual efforts at multiple levels. In doing so, it also makes references to other industrialized countries, where social conflict is reduced through strict border control and integration efforts.

The Second Basic Plan for Immigration (MOJ, 2013) departs from a different worldview than its predecessor, citing German Chancellor Merkel's remarks on the failure to create a multicultural society. The policy plan calls for attention to an emerging anti-multiculturalist sentiment in Korea, highlighting public criticism over illegal behavior among migrants and reverse discrimination against native residents. While the first policy committee suggests accepting the emergence of multicultural society as an inevitable development, and to adjust accordingly, the second policy committee abandons the pursuit of multicultural society through the pursuit of mutual integration. Instead, it declares a 'crisis of national identity' where the burden of integration will be borne by migrants. It is argued that "most Koreans still do not recognize or embrace cultural diversity. This is prompting growing concerns over an identity crisis among immigrants and their children who fail to fully grasp Korean social values" (MOJ, 2013: 20). Underscoring this shift, the revised policy blueprint includes few measures aimed at educating the native population, and instead suggests promoting "social integration that respects shared Korean values" (MOJ, 2013: 43), primarily through expansion of the Korea Immigration and Integration Program (KIIP), which is to be more closely linked with applications for citizenship and permanent residency.

Numbers published in the Third Basic Plan for Immigration (MOJ, 2018) show a strong increase in integration program participation in the years following 2013. However, the immigration committee of 2017 also points to continued negative sentiment against migrants "in spite of the government introducing policies for social integration and enhancement of cultural diversity" (MOJ, 2018: 17). In particular, the committee highlights public concerns about violent crimes, loss of jobs, and welfare burden as a result of increasing immigration. In response, it is suggested that immigrant control is strengthened, while the protection of native employment is

enhanced and the welfare burden is reduced through an increasingly selective system.

Immigrants in Korea are expected to achieve more economic independence, less reliance on welfare, and more community participation. At the same time, it is proposed that educational programs for cultural diversity are expanded and provided to Korean students, teachers, and public officers. The third basic plan does not entirely return to the idea of a multicultural society through mutual integration but instead treats cultural diversity as a separate goal along with human rights.

The past decade of integration policies speaks to a contested idea of how Korea identifies with the rise of national, ethnic, and cultural pluralism. Starting from the idea of a ‘multicultural society’ that emphasized societal cohesion through mutual integration, Korean immigration policy has since distinguished between the integration of migrants on the one hand and the enhanced awareness of cultural diversity on the other hand.

Policy Subjects: Migrants at the Core and Periphery

Both cultural diversity and integration are fluid concepts that denote a variety of possible policy tools and target subjects. While the previous section examined policy measures, this section is focused on the boundaries of inclusion. Such boundaries arise when migrants are categorized into groups and groups are differentiated across migration policies. Throughout the past decade of immigration policy, multicultural families have been continuously covered in terms of integration, motivated by concerns about abuse by native spouses, difficulties with cultural integration among foreign-born spouses, and struggles with social integration in multicultural youth. While the first policy plan also included Korean diaspora from developing countries, this group has since been treated primarily as subjects of labor policies. Non-eligible for permanent

residency or citizenship, non-professional workers are generally excluded from integration measures, but covered by human rights policies. The exception is diaspora workers who were explicitly targeted in the first immigration plan and has resurfaced in the most recent blueprint as migrants who should be offered accustomed courses in social integration, along with highly skilled workers and students. In particular, the third policy plan calls for more selectivity and enhanced social integration coupled with less welfare reliance and higher socio-economic participation by immigrants. The new vision specifically calls for “strengthened measures to prevent settlement” of non-professional migrants (MOJ, 2018: 33). The measure also targets skilled workers on points-based residence permits whose skills are replaceable by locals and therefore a threat to native job seekers. At the same time, the government is looking to improve settlement policies for highly skilled workers, including family invitation and other benefits. Referencing the political migration climate in the United Kingdom and the United States, the Korean immigration committee appears concerned about the costs of migration, and hopes to alleviate the burden and increase benefits through selective management of incoming migration.

Policy Measures: Integration Programs

The Ministry of Justice operates three different integration programs (MOJ, 2017.09). It is argued that the success or failure of social integration for immigrants depends on their social adjustment at the early stages (MOJ, 2017.09). *The Initial Orientation Course for Immigrants* aims to assist newcomers in successfully adapting to Korean society, by providing practical information about living in the country, while also teaching basic law and order. Targets of the program include marriage migrants, international students, underage children born outside of Korea, and residents living in areas densely populated with foreigners, but is only compulsory to

overseas Koreans on a work-and-visit visa (H-2), and workers in the hotel and entertainment industry (E-6). The latter two groups are required to take an additional course with information for settlement and human rights protection respectively. Marriage migrants can choose to take a special course in mutual understanding among family members, which is rewarded with visa extension. The total lecture time for any given pathway amounts to three hours.

The Ministry of Justice further argues that the successful settlement of immigrants is conditioned on the ability to live along with native Koreans, which in turn requires knowledge of the Korean language and culture. *The Social Integration Program* offers a set of courses that are divided into five levels, with the first four teaching Korean language and culture, while the latter two focus on understanding the Korean society, including lessons in history, economy, and public services. Close to 500 hours in total, the program is not compulsory for immigrants, but a prerequisite for those who are looking to apply for permanent resident status or naturalization.

Finally, the Ministry of Justice suggests that family happiness can be achieved through increased awareness of international marriage, while a healthy marriage can be accomplished through the guidance of sponsoring spouses. In contrast with the two previous sets of courses, *the International Marriage Guidance Program* is not targeted at immigrants, but Korean nationals who apply to sponsor the residency of their foreign spouse. Specifically, the program is compulsory for Koreans married to migrants from China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, and Thailand. Course participants learn about the marriage culture and institutions of their spouse's country of origin, along with information about common marriage issues experienced by foreign spouses and observed by civic groups, and provision of education on human rights focused on among others the prevention of domestic violence. The course lasts for three hours.

Policy Measures: Immigration Centers

In 2017, the government opened the first Multicultural Immigrant Center in Asan City and expanded to a total of 18 centers across the country by Spring 2020 (MOIS, 2020). The centers integrate services from multiple government agencies to provide a one-stop service for immigrants in Korea. At the same time, the provision of services is differentiated by groups of migrants, thus reinforcing the migrant categories observed across the three aforementioned integration programs. For example, female immigrants are offered advice on childcare, free interpretation services, and education on Korean culture, language, and society. Migrant workers are offered among others assistance with registration of sojourn, change of residence permit, advice on workers' rights, and courses in HSM. Meanwhile, employers of migrant workers are provided help with registrations and applications related to the employment of immigrants. Center services reflect the view of migrant workers as vulnerable to human rights abuse, and prone to overstay, while marriage migrants are in need of family assistance and subjects of social integration.

Discussion

By examining the policy discourse on immigration in South Korea over time, it is observed that the government increasingly has moved towards a two-track approach that abandons the vision of a 'multicultural society' and instead couples 'social integration that respects shared Korean values' with a 'fair society that respects cultural diversity and human rights'. This observation is confirmed through a review of current integration programs, which are primarily targeted at immigrants, and to lesser extent the majority population. It is further observed that integration

policies apply differently to immigrants depending on their mode of incorporation, with marriage immigrants, their children, and increasingly high-skilled workers, as key targets of integration programs. Notably, the enhanced focus on high-skilled workers as subjects of integration has been coupled with further differentiation of service provision in between groups of migrants, with programs increasingly tailored for the variety of immigration pathways. In addition to this growing divide in between sub-populations of immigrants, the findings further point to the persistence of an ethnic, rather than civic, vision of the nation (N.K. Kim, 2013) underpinning Korean integration policy. This calls into question the discursive narrative of ‘cultural diversity’ within the said policy frameworks, and reveals a paradoxical approach to the management of an increasingly diversifying population.

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鳴鶴所民의 봉기를 통해 살펴 본 고려시대 所民의 실태

한국사학과 고려시대 박사과정 안주영

1. 머리말
2. 고려시대 所의 특성과 명학소
3. 명학소민의 봉기
4. 맺음말

1. 머리말

전근대시대의 백성은 국가를 지탱하는 기반이자 필수요소로 그 중요성은 말할 필요가 없다. 그러나 현재 남아 있는 기록은 지배층의 모습을 보여주는 것이 대부분이므로 백성의 구체적인 삶의 양태를 알기는 어렵다. 특히 기록이 많지 않은 고려시대의 경우 사서에 나오는 백성들의 모습은 수탈 등 고통받는 모습과 조정이나 관리에 대항하는 모습 등이 대부분이다.

고려시대의 所는 국가에서 필요로 하는 특정한 물품의 생산을 담당한 곳이었다. 이곳에 거주한 소민은 주기적인 常貢 외에 부정기적인 別貢이 있었는데 특히 별공은 이들에게 큰 부담이 되었다. 이러한 부담에도 불구하고 소민은 일반 군현민에 비해 여러 면에서 차별 대우를 받았다. 즉 소에 거주하는 이들은 군현민과의 차별 대우에 더하여 상공 외의 별공이라는 고통을 받던 존재였다.

이런 대우를 받던 소 중 하나인 명학소에서 명종 6년(1176), 봉기가 일어난다. 명학소민들은 정부에서 파견한 토벌군에 밀리지 않았고, 현으로의 승격이라는 조치를 받아낸다. 얼마 지나지 않아 이들은 다시 재봉기했는데, 결국 정부군에 의해 진압되었다. 명학소민의 봉기는 무신정권

기에 일어난 상당한 규모의 봉기이자 이후의 농민 봉기 등에 영향을 미쳤다는 점에서 역사적 의미가 있는 사건이었다.

본 글에서는 먼저 고려시대의 소가 어떠한 곳이었는지와, 그중 하나인 명학소에 대해서 다룬다. 다음으로는 명학소민의 봉기가 어떠한 배경 속에 일어났으며, 그 전개 과정을 살필 것이다. 그리고 명학소민의 봉기는 어떤 의미가 있는지를 검토함으로 글을 마칠 것이다. 명학소민의 봉기에 대해서는 이미 상세한 연구가 여럿 있지만, 이 글을 통해 이 사건의 의미를 곱씹어 볼 수 있을 것으로 생각한다.

2. 고려시대 所의 특성과 명학소

고려 시대의 소는 국가에서 필요로 하는 특정한 물품을 생산해 납부하는 곳으로, 일반 군현에 비해 낮은 대우를 받았다. 소는 소 자체로 연구되기도 했지만, 흔히 향·부곡 등과 함께 묶여 부곡제라는 틀로 다뤄진 경우가 많았다. 이와 관련하여 초기 연구에서는 부곡민의 신분을 천민으로 간주했다.¹ 이후 부곡민이 조세를 부담하고 군현민과 신분적 차이가 없다는 것을 이유로 부곡민을 천민으로 보는 것에 의문을 제기한 연구²가 나왔고, 이에 동조하는 견해가 거듭되면서³ 현재 부곡민의 신분은 양인으로 보는 것이 주류가 되었다.

한편 소의 수취구조에 대한 논의도 있었다. 北村秀人은 일반 군현의 수취는 호부·계수관을 통해 이뤄지지만 소는 중앙의 특정 기구가 직접 수취하였다고 하였다.⁴ 박종진은 소는 읍사가

¹ 임건상, 1963, 『조선의 부곡제에 관한 연구』, 과학원 출판사; 北村秀人, 1969, 「高麗時代の所制度について」, 『朝鮮學報』 50; 홍희유, 1979, 『조선중세 수공업사 연구』, 과학백과사전출판사.

² 이우성, 1966, 「고려말기 나주목 거평부곡에 대하여」, 『震檀學報』 50.

³ 武田幸男, 1971, 「良賤制の展開」, 『岩波講座 世界歴史』 6; 박종기, 1990, 『고려시대 부곡제연구』, 서울대학교 출판부; 김난옥, 2001, 『고려시대 천사·천역양인 연구』, 신서원; 이정신, 2013, 『고려시대의 특수행정구역 所 연구』, 해안.

⁴ 北村秀人, 1969, 앞의 논문.

확인되지 않고 공해전 설치 대상에도 포함되지 않았으므로, 소의 공물은 군현의 공물에 포함되어 납부되었다고 보았다.⁵ 이정신은 소의 공물이 지방 공물과 함께 중앙에 운송되었다고 보지만, 소의 공물과 군현민의 공물은 구별되었으며 그런 측면에서 소는 독립적인 부세수취단위였다고 보았다. 또한 별공의 경우에는 별도로 중앙에 직납한 것으로 간주하였다.⁶ 이를 정리하면, 소민의 신분은 양인이며, 소의 공물은 지방 공물과 함께 중앙으로 운송되었다고 할 수 있다.

다음으로는 봉기가 일어났던 명학소에 대해 살펴보겠다. 명학소는 『신증동국여지승람』에 의하면 유성현 동쪽 10리에 위치했다고 하며, 숯을 만드는 炭所로 추정된다.⁷ 숯은 『삼국유사』를 통해 신라 때 활용되었음이 확인되며, 고려시대에는 국가뿐만 아니라 민간에서도 중요한 연료로 사용되었고, 권세가들은 이를 측근에게 나눠주거나 뇌물로도 썼다. 수공업이나 광업에 쓰이는 숯은 지속적으로 많은 양이 필요해 국가에서 조직적으로 공급할 필요가 있었고, 더구나 광업 발달로 숯의 사용량이 늘면서 대규모의 숯을 만들어 공급하는 지역이 필요했다. 이러한 것들이 탄소가 만들어진 이유였을 것으로 여겨진다.⁸ 즉 명학소는 어떠한 물품을 생산한 곳이었는지에 대한 명확한 기록은 없지만, 그 위치 등을 보았을 때 탄소로 추정되며, 숯은 국가적으로도 필요성이 높은 물품이었기에 탄소가 두어졌다고 할 수 있다.

3. 명학소민의 봉기

명학소에 대한 기록은 명종 6년에 등장하며, 그 내용은 그들이 일으킨 봉기에 대한 것이었

⁵ 박종진, 2000, 『고려시기 재정운영과 조세제도』, 서울대학교 출판부.

⁶ 이정신, 2013, 앞의 책.

⁷ 이정신, 2013, 앞의 책; 김갑동, 2007, 「고려시대의 대전」, 『人文科學論文集』 42·43합. 이와 달리 명학소를 鐵所로 보는 논자도 있다(김기섭, 2003, 「고려 무신집권기 鐵의 수취와 명학소민의 봉기」, 『한국중세사연구』 15).

⁸ 이정신, 2013, 앞의 책.

다. 이에 앞서 명학소민의 봉기가 일어난 시기에 주목할 필요가 있다. 명종 6년은 문반과 비교하여 차별받던 무신들이 난을 일으켜 정권을 차지한 무신정권기에 해당한다. 이때는 이의방을 제거한 정중부가 정권을 잡고 있었다.⁹ 정중부 이전의 정권에서는 감무 파견을 통해 지방통제를 강화했고, 문무교차제로 무신들도 지방관에 임명될 수 있었다. 이와 동일하게 정중부 정권에서도 명종 5년(1175)과 6년에 감무를 파견해 중앙집권을 강화했다.¹⁰ 그런데 당시 지방관은 제역할을 잘하지 못한 것 같다.

A. 각 도에 찰방사를 파견하였다. 공부낭중 최선을 흥화도에, 형부원외랑 최효저를 운중도에, 합문지후 임유겸을 삭방도에, 감찰어사 최돈례를 연해명주도에, 비서승 윤종양을 서해도에, 천우위장군 오광척을 양주·충주도에, 낭장 이문중을 진주·합주도에, 시어사 송단을 경상주도에, 장군 송군수를 전라주도에, 형부시랑 이문중을 광주·청주도에, 기거주 황보탁을 춘주도에 파견하여 백성의 애로 사항을 살피고, 관리와 왕이 파견한 사신들의 상벌을 고과하는 것은 10년 이전까지를 조사하게 하였다. 무릇 탄핵을 받은 자가 800여 원이었는데 최효저는 정밀하게 조사하지 못하였으므로 파면되었다.¹¹

이 사료는 명종 8년(1178) 1월에 내려진 조치로, 보통 찰방사는 탐학한 지방관을 탄핵해 민심을 수습하고 중앙정부의 지방통제를 강화하기 위해 파견되었다.¹² 이 사료에서 눈에 띄는 점

⁹ 정중부 정권에 대해서는 다음과 같은 논문이 참조된다(안영근, 1989, 「鄭仲夫政權과 宋有仁」, 『건대사학』 7; 박옥걸, 2000, 「武臣亂과 鄭仲夫政權」, 『白山學報』 54; 김창현, 2003, 「정중부 정권의 성립과 운영」, 『한국중세사연구』 15).

¹⁰ 신안식, 1997, 「고려 명종대 무인정권의 대민정책」, 『역사와 현실』 24; 2002, 『고려 무인정권과 지방사회』, 경인문화사. 85-86쪽.

¹¹ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 8年 1月 22日. “分遣察訪使.工部郎中崔誥于興化道, 刑部員外郎崔孝著雲中道, 閤門祗候林惟謙朔方道, 監察御史崔敦禮沿海溟州道, 秘書丞尹宗諤西海道, 千牛衛將軍吳光陟楊忠州道, 郎將李文中晉陝州道, 侍御史宋端慶尙州道, 將軍宋君秀全羅州道, 刑部侍郎李文中廣清州道, 起居注皇甫倬春州道, 問民疾苦, 黜陟官吏及奉使者, 限十年以前, 追論殿最.凡被劾者, 八百餘員, 孝著以考覈不精免.”

¹² 찰방사에 대해서는 김아네스, 1993, 「高麗時代의 察訪使」, 『한국사연구』 82 참조.

은 탄핵 된 자가 800여 명이었다는 점이다. 이때의 찰방사는 도 단위로 파견되었고 그 범위는 고려 전체에 해당되었는데, 백성의 애로사항을 살피고 왕이 파견한 사신들의 상벌을 고과하는 임무를 맡았다. 이들에 의해 탄핵 된 관리들은 이 두 사항을 잘 이행하지 못했기 때문일 것이다.

이 사료는 명학소민의 봉기와 일 년여의 시차가 있지만, 이때도 정중부 집권기였으므로 명학소민의 봉기가 일어난 명종 6년의 모습도 이와 크게 다르지 않을 것이다. 또한 명종 5년(1175)에는 국왕이 州吏의 침탈로 백성들이 고통받아 고향을 떠나는 일이 있음을 이야기하며 이를 막을 방안에 대해 이야기하였다.¹³ 즉 당시 백성들은 관리들의 침탈로 고통받았고, 그들은 백성들이 겪는 문제점을 잘 해결해 주지 못했다. 이러한 점이 명학소민 봉기의 한 요인이었을 것으로 생각된다. 또한 명종 8년 6월에는 領府의 군인들이 방을 붙였는데, 그 내용은 남적이 일어난 이유가 정중부 등의 전횡에 있다는 것이었다.¹⁴ 명학소민의 목소리는 아니지만, 집정 등 집권자의 방만한 정국 운영이 백성들을 자극했음을 유추할 수 있는 대목이다.

다음으로는 명학소민의 봉기 과정을 살펴보겠다.

B. 공주 명학소의 백성 망이·망소이 등이 당여를 불러 모으고 스스로 산행병마사라 칭하며 공주를 공격하여 함락시켰다. 지후 채원부와 낭장 박강수 등을 보내 선유했으나 적이 따르지 않았다. 2월에 장사 3,000명을 불러 모으고 대장군 정황재와 장군 장박인 등에게 명하여 토벌하게 하였다.¹⁵

명학소민인 망이와 망소이¹⁶ 등은 무리를 모아 공주를 공격해 함락시켰다.¹⁷ 고려 조정에서는

¹³ 『高麗史』卷19, 世家19 明宗 5年 4月 15日.

¹⁴ 『高麗史節要』卷12, 明宗 6年 8月.

¹⁵ 『高麗史節要』卷12, 明宗 6年 1月. “公州鳴鶴所民亡伊亡所伊等嘯聚黨與, 自稱山行兵馬使, 攻陷公州. 遣祗候蔡元富郎將朴剛壽等宣諭, 賊不從. 二月. 召募壯士三千, 命大將軍丁黃載將軍張博仁等討之.”

¹⁶ 봉기의 주도자인 망이·망소이의 신분을 밝혀줄 만한 자료는 현재는 없다. 그렇지만 소에도 吏가 있었음을 염두에 두고, 망이를 所吏로 추정할 견해가 있다(김당택, 2004, 「고려 무인정권 초기 민란의 성

처음에는 회유책을 펼쳤으나 명학소민은 이를 받아들이지 않았고, 이에 군사를 파견해 그들을 공격하였다. 봉기를 일으킨 명학소민의 규모는 사료에 보이지 않지만, 파견된 토벌군이 3천 명인 걸 보면, 수천 명에 달했을 것으로 예상된다.¹⁸ 그런데 토벌군은 명학소민 토벌에 애를 먹었던 것 같다. 2달이 지난 명종 6년 3월에 南賊執捉兵馬使가 적과의 전투가 불리해 많은 병사가 죽었으니 승려를 모집해 군대를 편성할 것을 요청했기 때문이다.¹⁹ 남적집착병마사의 이름이 나오진 않지만, 당시 봉기를 일으킨 명학소민을 남적이라 지칭했고, 이때까지는 명학소민 외에 남적이라 지칭할 이들이 없었으므로 이때 남적집착병마사와 싸우고 있는 대상은 명학소민이었다. 이후 조정에서는 다시 유화책을 펼쳤다.

C-1. 망이의 고향인 명학소를 충순현으로 승격시키고, 내원승 양수탁을 현령으로, 내시 김윤실을 현위로 임명하여 그들을 달랬다.²⁰

C-2. 양온령동정 노약순과 주사동정 한수도가 평장사 이공승과 상서우승 함유일, 내시 장작소감 독고효 등의 편지를 거짓으로 만들어 망이에게 보내고 그들을 끌어들여 난을 일으키고자 하였다. 망이가 그 사

격」, 『고려 무인정권과 명학소민의 봉기』, 도서출판 다운샘, 151쪽).

¹⁷ 공주의 함락에 대해서는 다음과 같은 견해가 있다. 공주는 신라에서는 백제의 수도이자 통일신라에서는 9주의 하나였는데 고려시대에는 그 지역 출신으로 중앙에 진출한 인물이 거의 없고 토성세력이 미약했으며, 특별한 이유도 없이 현종 9년(1018)에 목에서 제외되었다. 즉 공주 지역민은 이러한 이유로 정부에 대해 불만을 품었고, 여기에 더해 공주 주변에 있는 많은 천민집단이 이에 가담하여 군사적 요충지였던 공주가 쉽게 함락되었다고 보았다(이정신, 1988, 「高麗時代 公州 鳴鶴所民의 蜂起에 대한 一研究」, 『韓國史研究』 61·62합, 192~195쪽).

¹⁸ 이정신은 봉기에 가담한 인원을 많아야 천 명 정도로 추정했다. 그리고 이 정도의 숫자로는 공주의 주둔군과 3천 명의 정부군을 이길 수 없었을 것이므로, 주변 주민의 적극적인 호응이 있다고 보았다(이정신, 1988, 앞의 논문, 196쪽).

¹⁹ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 6年 3月 10日.

²⁰ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 6年 6月 13日. “陞亡伊鄉鳴鶴所, 爲忠順縣, 以內園丞梁守鐸爲令, 內侍金允實爲尉, 以撫之.”

신을 붙잡아 안무별감 노약충에게 보냈더니 노약충은 형틀을 채워 개경으로 보냈다.²¹

C-3. 망이·망소이가 투항해 오니 국고의 곡식을 하사하고, 감찰어사 김덕강에게 명하여 고향으로 압송하게 하였다.²²

C-1에 보이듯 조정에서는 명학소를 충순현으로 승격시키고 현령과 현위를 파견하는 조치를 취한다. 즉 명학소민의 불만이 그들이 소민이었다는 것에 있다고 파악해 현으로 승격시킴으로써 군현에 포함시키고, 아울러 지방관을 파견하는 조치도 덧붙인 것이다.²³ 이 조치로 명학소민들이 바로 행복하는 것은 아니었지만 나름의 효과는 있었던 것 같다. 사료 C-2에는 노약순과 한수도가 망이 등과 연합해 난을 일으키고자 했으나, 망이가 그들이 보낸 사신을 붙잡아 안무별감에게 보냈음을 말해준다. 망이가 이러한 대응을 한 이유는 명확히 알 수 없지만, 망이의 조치는 정부에 대해 유화적인 태도를 보인 것이었다.²⁴ 아울러 노약순 등이 망이를 끌어들이려 한 것을 볼 때, 그들의 세력은 상당했다고 여겨진다. 이후 사료 C-3에 보이듯 망이·망소이는 정부에 투항했고, 정부에서는 이들을 고향으로 압송하였다. 즉 무력 충돌이 있었지만 정부는 여러 차례 명학소민에 대해 유화책을 펼쳤고, 명학소민도 이를 어느 정도 긍정적으로 받아들여 봉기의 주도자인 망이와 망소이 등이 행복하였다. 이렇게 명학소민의 일차봉기는 마무리되었다.

²¹ 『高麗史節要』卷12, 明宗 6年 9月. “良醞令同正盧若純主事同正韓受圖詐爲平章事李公升尙書右丞咸有一內侍將作少監獨孤孝等書, 投亡伊, 欲引與爲亂, 亡伊執其使, 送于安撫別監盧若沖, 若沖收械押還.”

²² 『高麗史』卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 1月 8日. “亡伊·亡所伊來降, 賜廩粟, 命監察御史金德剛, 押送其鄉.”

²³ 명종 2년(1172)에 공주의 속현인 회덕군과 석성현에 감무가 파견되었다. 망이는 이를 목도했을 확률이 높는데, 이에 고무되어 정부에 지방관 파견을 요구했다고 보기도 한다(김창현, 2004, 앞의 논문, 153쪽).

²⁴ 망이가 노약순 등의 제안을 거절한 것을 통해 이들이 봉기는 정치적인 목적이 아니었다고 파악하기도 하는데(김당택, 2004, 앞의 논문), 신분해방이 그 목적이었다는 해석이 일반적이다(변태섭, 1959, 「萬積亂 發生의 社會的 素地 -武臣亂 後에 있어서의 身分構成의 變質을 基盤으로-」, 『史學研究』 4: 1971, 『高麗政治制度史研究』, 一潮閣, 467-468쪽; 이정신, 1988, 앞의 논문, 199~202쪽).

하지만 다음 달에 이들은 다시 봉기를 일으킨다.

D-1. 망이 등이 다시 반란을 일으켜 가야사를 노략질하였다.²⁵

D-2. 망이 등이 흥경원에 불을 지르고 절에 있던 승려 10여 인을 죽였으며, 주지승을 위협하여 서울로 글을 가져가게 하였다. 대략 말하기를, “이미 우리 고향을 현으로 승격시키고 또 수령을 두어 안무하더니, 돌이켜 다시 군대를 일으켜 토벌하러 와서 우리 어머니와 아내를 옥에 가두었으니 그 뜻은 어디에 있는가? 차라리 칼날 아래에서 죽을지언정 끝내 항복하여 포로가 되지 않을 것이며, 반드시 개경까지 가고야 말겠다.”라고 하였다.²⁶

명학소민은 다시 봉기해 가야사를 노략질하였다.²⁷ 이들의 재봉기는 D-2에 보이듯 명학소민이 항복한 이후 정부에서 군대를 일으켜 토벌했고, 그들의 어머니와 아내를 옥에 가뒀기 때문이었다. 이를 보면 정부의 유화책은 명학소민의 세력이 강해 그들을 무력으로 제압하기 어려웠기에, 우선 이들을 안심시키고 방심을 틔워 공격하려던 것으로 여겨진다. 이에 망이는 결사항전의 뜻을 밝히며 개경까지 진군할 뜻을 밝힌다. 그러나 이들의 재봉기는 얼마 지나지 않아 끝나게 된다.

²⁵ 『高麗史』卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 2月 10日. “亡伊等復叛, 寇伽耶寺.”

²⁶ 『高麗史』卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 3月 11日. “亡伊等焚弘慶院, 殺居僧十餘人, 逼令住持僧, 齎書赴京, 略云, “既升我鄉爲縣, 又置守以安撫, 旋復發兵來討, 收繫我母妻, 其意安在? 寧死於鋒刃下, 終不爲降虜, 必至王京, 然後已.”

²⁷ 명학소민이 가야사를 공격한 이유는 다음과 같다고 여겨진다. 가야사가 위치한 가야산은 물산이 풍부했는데, 이곳을 공격해 사원의 재물을 약탈하려는 목적이 있을 수 있다. 또한 지리상 서해도의 해상로와 쉽게 연결될 수 있어 이를 통해 중앙을 압박할 수 있었고, 진압군의 주둔지가 되었을 가능성이 높았기 때문이다(배상현, 2004, 『鳴鶴所民 蜂起를 통해 본 佛教寺院과 地方社會』, 『고려 무인정권과 명학소민의 봉기』, 도서출판 다운샘, 300~303쪽).

E-1. 남적의 우두머리 망이가 사람을 보내어 항복을 청하였다.²⁸

E-2. 남적처치병마사 정세유 등이 남적 우두머리인 망이·망소이 등을 체포하여 청주옥에 가두고, 사람을 보내어 승전을 보고하였다.²⁹

망이는 불과 3개월 만에 정부에 항복 의사를 밝혔고, 다음 달에 정부군에 의해 체포됨으로써 명학소민의 봉기는 마무리된다. 개경까지 진군하겠다는 포부를 밝힌 것치고는 너무 쉽게 진압된 것으로 여겨진다. 이는 어떠한 변화가 있기 때문일 것인데, 당시의 상황을 살펴봄으로써 어느 정도 해답을 얻을 수 있을 것이다.

일단 명학소민의 일차봉기가 일어나고 몇 달 뒤 정부로부터 남적이라 지칭되고 병마사를 자칭한 손청이란 인물이 보인다.³⁰ 손청은 명종 7년 2월에 우도병마사에 사로잡혀 처형되었는데, 그때는 伽耶山 賊首로 지칭되었다.³¹ 당시에 발생한 봉기들은 망이, 손청 또는 공주 명학소 등 그 주체나 지역이 사료에 명시된 경우도 있으나, 막연히 南賊으로만 지칭되기도 했다. 그중 손청은 망이와 연합한 세력으로 여겨지기도 하는데,³² 망이와 연합하지 않았더라도 주변 지역의 수괴가 체포된 것은 명학소민에게 부담으로 다가왔을 것이다. 그리고 이는 손청만 있던 것이 아니었다. 다음 달에는 좌도병마사에 의해 이광 등 적수 10여 명이 사로잡혔으며³³ 전라도의

²⁸ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 6月 23日. “南賊首亡伊遣人來, 請降.”

²⁹ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 7月 20日. “南賊處置兵馬使鄭世猷等捕賊首亡伊、亡所伊等, 囚清州獄, 遣人告捷.”

³⁰ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 6年 11月 1日.

³¹ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 2月 29日.

³² 이정신, 1988, 앞의 논문; 배상현, 2004, 앞의 논문, 296-297쪽. 반면 이러한 주장은 지나친 추론으로 설득력이 떨어진다고 주장한 논자도 있다(박종기, 2002, 「농민항쟁연구론」, 『지배와 자율의 공간, 고려의 지방사회』, 푸른역사, 71쪽).

³³ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 3月 18日.

미륵산적이 정부에 투항하였다.³⁴ 즉 명학소민은 재봉기해 가야사와 홍경원을 노략질하며 개경에까지 진군하겠다고 정부를 위협했지만, 정부군이 주위의 봉기 세력들을 진압하고 더러는 항복하자 이에 압박을 느껴 항복을 청했다고 여겨진다.

명학소민의 난은 결국 정부군에 의해 진압되었고, 현으로의 승격도 재봉기로 인해 철회되었다.³⁵ 그렇지만 명학소민의 봉기는 다음과 같은 의미가 있다. 첫 번째는 인근 지역의 민중들이 정부에 저항하는 계기가 된 것이다. 명종 7년 2월에는 익산의 미륵산에서 봉기가 일어났고, 동왕 12년에는 충청도의 관성과 부성 및 전주의 기두 죽동 등이 봉기하였다. 천민에 가까운 대우를 받았던 소 지역의 민중들이 봉기해 점차 이러한 행정구역이 해소되는 계기를 마련되었는데, 명학소를 충순현으로 승격시켜 준 것이 그 시작이었다.³⁶ 즉 소민이 주축이 되어 농민항쟁으로서 시발점을 연 것이자, 이후의 농민항쟁에 영향을 끼친 점이 역사적 의미를 갖는 것이다.³⁷

두 번째는 민중이 사회경제적 폐단에 따른 가중된 수탈정책에 맞선 것이다. 명학소민은 허위적이긴 했지만, 정부로부터 현으로의 승격이라는 조치를 얻어냈다. 이처럼 중앙의 양보를 얻어낸다는 점은 이후 저항 세력에게 큰 영향이 이후 저항 세력에게 고무적인 현상이 되었고, 삼국 부흥운동 같은 고려 정부를 부정하고 새로운 국가를 건설하려는 움직임으로까지 확대되었다. 이러한 점에서 명학소민의 봉기는 자신들이 처한 현실에서 벗어나려는 일차적 목적에서 비롯됐지만, 무인집권기 지방사회의 저항을 한 단계 진전시켰는 점에서 그 의의를 찾을 수 있다.³⁸

마지막은 백성들을 진무하기 위한 조치들이 시행된 것이다. 정부에서는 지방관의 탐학여부를 조사해 민심을 파악하려 했는데, 명종 8년에 찰방사를 파견한 것이 그 실례이다. 또한 권세가

³⁴ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 2月 7日.

³⁵ 『高麗史』 卷19, 世家19 明宗 7年 5月 12日.

³⁶ 김갑동, 2007, 앞의 논문, 199쪽.

³⁷ 김호동, 2004, 「명학소민의 봉기와 역사적 의미」, 『고려 무인정권과 명학소민의 봉기』, 도서출판 다운샘, 331쪽.

³⁸ 신안식, 2017, 「새로운 세상을 위한 밀알, 명학소민 망이망소이의 저항」, 『월간 공공정책』 143, 105쪽.

의 토지침탈을 방지하고 공부를 균등하게 배분하는 등 경제적인 배려를 행했다.³⁹ 즉 명학소민의 봉기는 그들이 목적인 바를 이루진 못했지만, 이후 민중 봉기의 도화선이 되었고 지방사회의 저항을 진전시켰으며, 백성들을 위한 조치들이 시행되었다는 점이 그 의의였다고 할 수 있다.

4. 맺음말

지금까지 고려시대의 소와 명학소, 그리고 명학소민의 봉기에 대해 살펴보았다. 고려시대 소는 특산물을 생산해 공납하는 특수집단으로 그곳에 거주하는 소민은 일반 군현민과 비교해 차별적인 대우를 받고 있었다. 명학소는 어떠한 물품을 생산한 곳인지에 대한 명확한 기록은 없지만, 관련 기록과 주위 지역을 참고했을 때 탄소였을 것으로 추정된다.

명학소민의 봉기는 무신정권기인 명종 6년에 발발했다. 이들이 난을 일으킨 이유가 사료에 나타나지는 않지만, 일반 군현민과 비교했을 때의 차별적 대우를 받은 것과 가혹한 수취 등이 그 원인이었을 것으로 여겨진다. 명학소민은 공주를 점령했으며, 고려 정부군은 그들을 토벌하는 데 애를 먹어 명학소를 현으로 승격시키는 유화책을 폈다. 그리하여 명학소민의 봉기는 일단 마무리되었다.

그러나 명학소민은 다시 봉기를 일으켰는데, 이는 정부의 유화책이 이들을 방심시키려는 것이었기 때문이었다. 재봉기한 명학소민들은 개경까지 공격할 것이라는 의지를 내비쳤는데, 주도자인 망이와 망소이가 붙잡히는 등 정부군에게 진압되어 그들의 봉기는 실패로 끝났다. 그렇지만 명학소민의 봉기는 이후 고려에 상당한 영향을 미쳤다. 명학소민의 봉기는 이후의 농민항쟁의 도화선이 되었고, 지방사회의 진전된 저항을 이끌었다. 또한 정부에서 백성들을 위한 조치들을 행하는 요인이 되기도 했다. 명학소민의 봉기는 일반 군현과 비교했을 때 차별받고 가혹한 수취에 시달린 소민들이 정부를 향해 봉기라는 형태로 자신들의 목소리를 낸 것이었다.

³⁹ 이정신, 1988, 앞의 논문, 211~214쪽.

그리고 이는 소민에만 그쳤던 것이 아니라 주위의 군현민도 참여했다는 점도 의미있다고 할 수 있다.

I. 머리말

II. 조선후기 海民 관련 정책과 문제들

III. 均役法 海稅條 관련 문제인식과 개선 방안

IV. 海民의 ‘王民化’를 추구한 법제 변동론

V. 맺음말

I. 머리말

조선후기 전란과 기근 등으로 인해 많은 유민들이 연해 도서 지역으로 이주하였다. 하지만 연해 지역에는 행정기구가 충분히 설치되지 않았기에, 연해지역 주민들인 海民들은 중앙 정부의 파악과 관리에서 벗어난 ‘化外之民’으로 전락하였다. 海民들은 당시 활발히 전개되던 철수와 둔전 개발 과정에서 국방을 비롯한 중앙과 지방의 여러 기관에 의해 사적으로 예측되어 중첩적으로 수탈당하였고, 경우에 따라서는 국가와 사회의 안전을 위협하는 불만세력으로 轉化하기도 하였다.

조선 왕조정부는 17세기 이래로 연해지역 지방 행정기구를 증설하고 어염세 제도를 개선 하는 등의 방법을 통해서 海民 문제를 해결하고자 하였다. 특히, 18세기 중반 균역법 해세조의 도입은 海民에 대한 수탈을 견감하는데 크게 이바지했다. 그럼에도 행정력의 미비와 균역법 해세조 자체의 한계로 인해 海民 문제는 이후 시기에도 연해 지역의 주된 문제로 남게 된다.

이처럼 海民은 조선 후기 사회 변화 과정속에서 胚胎 되었고 이후 오랜 기간 국가 통치의 해결과제로 남게 되었다. 이와 관련해 조선후기 연해 지역의 여러 문제들에 대해서 조선후기 어염 정책 및 島嶼 정책의 측면에서 정리한 연구들이 있다.¹ 이상의 연구들을 통해 조선후기 海民과 관련한 여러 문제의 원인들과 양상에 대해서 많은 부분들이 밝혀질 수 있었다.

그러나 이들 연구들은 주로 중앙정부 혹은 官의 관점에서 시도된 여러 조치들에 대해 주목

¹ 이옥, 2002, 「朝鮮後期 漁鹽政策 研究」, 고려대학교 박사학위 논문; 김경옥, 2004, 『朝鮮後期 島嶼研究』, 혜안; 송양섭, 2005, 「朝鮮後期 羅州諸島の 折受와 設邑論議의 展開」, 『大東文化研究』 50; 송양섭, 2007, 「1896년 智島郡 創設과 西南海 島嶼 支配構造의 再編」, 『韓國史學報』 26.

하였다. 이에 당사자인 海民 혹은 관련자의 문제 인식과 개선방안에 대한 분석은 충분히 이뤄지지 못했다. 이와 관련해 다산 정약용의 관점이 참고 된다. 물론, 그 역시 양반 지식인이기에 海民의 관점을 충분히 대변해준다고 할 수는 없다.

하지만 다산은 오랜 기간 중앙과 지방의 실무관료로 근무하였으며, 해안가인 전라도 강진에서 10여년 이상 유배생활을 보내며 海民들의 여러 문제에 대해 몸소 경험하였다. 또한 그는 유배기간 동안 다양한 방면의 국가 및 사회개혁방안을 연구하였다. 이에 다산 정약용의 해민 인식과 개혁안에 대해 살펴보는 것은 조선후기 사회의 소외자였던 海民의 실상을 파악하고 그에 대한 당시 지식인의 문제의식을 아울러 살펴보는 데 중요한 단서를 제공해주리라 생각된다.

海民과 연해 지역의 문제에 대한 다산 정약용의 인식과 개선안들은 『목민심서』와 『경세유표』 등의 경세서에 주로 서술되어 있다. 특히, 『경세유표』에는 현실의 문제에 대한 원인 분석 및 그에 대한 구체적 대안들이 상세히 정리되어 있다. 따라서 해민 문제와 관련한 다산의 문제 인식과 개선안에 대해 깊이 파악하기 위해서는 『경세유표』의 저술 목적 및 내용에 대한 이해가 선행될 필요가 있다.

『경세유표』의 원제는 『邦禮草本』으로, 유교의 이상향인 『주례』의 질서에 부합하는 방식으로 조선의 국가제도를 개혁할 것을 지향했음이 반영되어 있다. 이에 다산의 경세학 및 『경세유표』에 대한 초기 연구들에서는 『경세유표』가 다산이 經學에 대한 이해를 바탕으로 古制에 부합하는 이상적인 제도 개혁안을 제시한 것으로 평가하였다.²

하지만 최근에는 『경세유표』가 비록 『주례』로 표상되는 고제의 복구를 추구하고는 있으나, 19세기 초 조선사회에 대한 다산의 깊이 있는 이해의 바탕 위에서 당시 현실에서 가능한 형태의 실현가능한 개혁안들을 담고 있다고 본 연구들이 제출되었다.³ 이를테면 다산이 현실의 한계에 대한 명확한 인식 위에서 유교적인 王政을 지향했다는 것이다.

실제로, 『經世遺表』에 수록된 海民 및 연해 지역에 관련된 여러 제도 개혁안들 역시도 다산의 실제 경험 및 현실인식에 바탕해 있다. 다산은 현실에 대한 냉철한 인식에 바탕 하여 기존에 여러모로 소외되던 海民을 ‘王政’과 ‘王化’의 대상인 王民으로 자리매김하기 위한 구체적이고 현실적인 대안들을 제시한 것이다.

이를 이해하기 위해 우선 2장에서는 조선후기 海民의 형성 및 지방 행정 개편의 추구와 균역법 해세조를 포함한 왕조정부의 해민 정책과 한계들에 대해 살펴볼 것이다. 3장에서는 균역법 해세조의 운영상에서 나타난 문제들에 대한 다산의 인식과 그 개편안에 대해 정리하였다. 4장에서는 행정과 법제의 측면에서 海民을 王民化하기 위해 추구했던 다산의 구상들에 대해 분석하였다.

² 김문식, 1995, 「丁若鏞의 經學思想과 經世論」(上)·(下) 『韓國學報』 78·79; 안병직, 2003, 「다산과 體國經野」, 『茶山學』 4;

³ 백광렬, 2012, 「다산 정약용의 국가개혁론에 관한 한 해석 - 王法을 통한 ‘전국 단위 사회’의 관리」, 『태동고전연구』 28; 김용흠, 2017, 「21세기 다시 읽는 『경세유표』」, 『다산과 현대』 10.

II. 조선후기 海民 관련 정책과 문제들

한반도는 삼면이 바다로 둘러싸여 있기에 연해지역이 넓게 분포되어 있었으며, 서·남해를 중심으로 많은 수의 섬들이 자리 잡고 있다. 이러한 점은 어업과 염업의 발전을 추동하는 요인으로 작용했으나, 연해 지역에 면밀한 행정력이 미치지 못하는 한계를 불러왔다. 전통시대의 제한된 교통과 통신으로는 육지에서 멀리 떨어진 島嶼 지역까지 중앙집권적인 지배가 힘들었기 때문이다.

이는 조선도 마찬가지였다. 먼저, 조선전기에는 이른바 ‘空島’정책이 추진되었다. 15세기를 전후한 시기 바다를 통해 침입한 倭寇의 침입과 노략질에 대응해 연해 및 島嶼 지역 군현들의 邑治와 주민들을 내륙으로 옮기는 조치가 시행된 것이다. 이는 연해지역 백성의 생명과 안전을 위한 조치였지만, 연해와 島嶼 지역은 한동안 국가의 통치력이 미치지 못하는 ‘사각지대’가 되었다.⁴

물론, 왕조정부는 職役 부과를 통해 연해지역과 그 백성들을 일정하게 파악하고 관리하려는 시도를 이어나갔다. 水軍, 鹽干, 鮑作干 등의 身役을 부과하여 각기 군역 수행 및 魚鹽의 생산과 납부 등의 國役을 수행하게 하는 식으로 연해 지역 백성들에게 국가의 통치력을 관철시키고자 한 것이다.⁵ 또한 일부 島嶼에 대해서는 목장을 설치하고 監牧官을 파견하여 관리하게 하는 조치가 이뤄지기도 했다.⁶

하지만 여전히 상당수 연해 島嶼 지역에는 지방관이 파견되지 않았고 그에 따라 국가의 행정력이 면밀하게 적용되지 못하였다. 이에 시간이 지남에 따라 적지 않은 백성들이 避役과 경작지 확보 등의 목적으로 행정의 공백지대인 연해 지역으로 이주해 나갔고 중앙정부의 파악에서 벗어난 ‘海民’이 형성되어 나갔다.⁷

이러한 추세는 17세기를 전후하여 더욱 심화되었다. 우선, 임진왜란 이후 전란과 기근등으로 발생한 상당수의 유민들이 내륙에서 연해와 도서지역으로 이주해 나갔다.⁸ 국방과 각급 군문과 아문들은 전란 이후의 재정고갈을 보충하기 위해 어장과 염전 등에 대해 그 경영권 및 수세권 등 제반 권한을 할급받는 ‘折受’를 통해 연해지역에 대한 私的 지배권을 장악해 나갔다. 또한, 각급 기관은 연해 지역의 미개간지를 개간하는 방식으로 둔전 경영을 추구하기도 했다.⁹

⁴ 조선전기 ‘空島’ 정책의 추이에 대해서는 김경옥, 2004, 『朝鮮後期 島嶼研究』, 해안, 47~67쪽 참조.

⁵ 조선전기 水軍, 鹽干, 鮑作干 등의 직역운영에 대해서는 李讚熙, 1984, 「朝鮮前期 鹽干에 대한 研究」, 『素軒南都泳博士華甲紀念 史學論叢』; 김옥근, 1987, 『朝鮮王朝財政史研究』; 방상현, 1991, 『조선초기 수군제도』, 민족문화사.

⁶ 김경옥, 2004, 위의 책, 67~84쪽.

⁷ ‘海民’ 혹은 ‘海夫’ 등의 용어는 연해 지역에 거주하는 백성을 뜻하는 일반명사이지만 이전 시기 기록에서는 확인되지 않는다. 해당 용어들은 17세기 이후에야 연대기 상에서 등장하게 되는데, 중앙과 지방의 여러 기관에 소속되어 입역 혹은 납포 등의 방식으로 身役을 수행하는 陸民과 달리, 국방과 아문 등에 사적으로 예속되어 둔전 경영에 참여하거나 어염 생산물 등을 납부하는 직역을 수행하는 이들을 칭하는 용어로 사용된다.

⁸ 邊柱承, 1997, 『朝鮮後期 流民 研究』, 고려대학교 사학과 박사학위 논문.

⁹ 송양섭, 2006, 『朝鮮後期 屯田 研究』, 경인문화사.

이 과정에서, 연해지역으로 이주해온 海民들은 점차 중앙정부의 파악에서 벗어나 국방과 각급 기관의 屯民 등으로 예측되어 나갔다. 이를테면 海民들은 점차 왕조정부에 의한 집권적 통치인 ‘王政’, ‘王化’에서 소외된 이른바 ‘化外之民’으로 인식되기 시작한 것이다. 그 실상과 관련해서 아래의 사례들을 살펴보자.

(가)

비변사에서 아뢰기를

"집의 김세정(金世鼎), 장령 안규(安圭)의 계사에 의하면 '여러 궁가(官家)와 각 아문에서 농장과 둔전을 설치한 곳이 연해지방에 가장 많습니다.(…)한 고을의 절반을 잘라 '化外之民'을 만들어 각 도의 차인(差人)이 전관(專管)하여 부리고 있습니다. 그래서 역호는 점점 줄어 여타 백성들은 치우친 괴로움을 견딜 수 없고 속오의 장정을 뽑으려 해도 항상 사람이 없으니 백성을 병들게 하고 국정을 해침이 이보다 더할 수 없습니다. 듣자니 사목을 만들어 변통한 바가 있었으나 수령들이 위세에 눌러 감히 손도 쓰지 못하고 있다 합니다. 일의 성격으로 따지자면 이른바 '둔민'이라는 것은 전토를 받아 짓고 세를 바치는 사람에 불과하니 똑같은 왕민(王民)입니다. 그런데 나라에 조세를 바치는 자는 신역(身役)을 고되게 하여 곤욕을 당하고, 각 궁가나 각 아문에 조세를 바치는 자는 신역을 감면하여 넉넉히 돌보아주니 이것이 어찌된 도리입니까?"¹⁰

(나)

검토관(檢討官) 유취기(兪最基)가 말하기를

"근래 호남(湖南) 연안이 거둬 흉년이 들어 도적이 창궐하고 진도(珍島)와 나주(羅州)의 여러 섬에는 주인을 배반한 악소배(惡少輩)들이 많아 혹은 도주(盜鑄)하는 폐단이 있기도 하고 혹은 황당선(荒唐船)과 왕래하며 서로 통하고 있습니다. 또 역적에 연좌된 자들이 여러 섬에 많이 유배되어 있기 때문에 요언(妖言)을 선동(煽動)하니, 진실로 변란(變亂)을 자극시켜 일으킬 걱정이 있습니다."¹¹

(다)

동부승지 이광세(李匡世)가 아뢰기를

"근래 백성들의 역(役)이 무거워 보존되지 못할 근심이 하루가 갈수록 더 심해지고 있는데, 해부(海夫)에 이르러서는 더욱 불쌍합니다.(…)방렴(防簾)의 조세 징수가 더욱 억울하고 고통스럽습니다. 대개 '방렴'이라 한 것은 해부들이 연해의 고기를 잡을 만한 곳에 힘을 합쳐 재물을 모아 가을을 기다려 발을 쳐 고기를 잡아 살아가는 것인데 소속된 곳이 있어 고기로 세를 바치는 것입니다.(…)동래(東萊)로 말하자면 혹 수영(水營) 및 각청에 소속되기도 하고, 혹은 본부의 각청(各廳)이나 접위청(接慰廳) 등에 소속되어 한 곳도 빠진 곳이 없습니다. 마땅히 묘당으로 하여금 도신에게 분부하여 지금부터는 방염세전(防簾稅錢) 한 조항을 영원히 혁파하여 해민(海民)들이 조금이나마 지탱해 보존되는 바탕을 삼아야 합니다."¹²

¹⁰ 『비변사등록』 숙종 11년 1월 19일.

¹¹ 『영조실록』 권 36 영조 9년 11월 4일(신사).

¹² 『비변사등록』 영조 7년 8월 30일.

(가)는 17세기 후반 숙종대의 기록이다. 국방과 각 아문이 농장과 둔전을 경영하는 과정에서 상당수의 연해 지역 백성들을 둔전에 예속된 屯民으로 삼았음이 확인된다. 아울러 이들 屯民은 명목상으로는 다른 백성들과 마찬가지로 국왕의 지배와 교화를 받는 ‘王民’이지만 지방에서 王化을 수행하는 대리자인 수령의 관할에서 벗어난 ‘化外之民’으로 사실상 중앙정부의 파악과 관리에서 이탈하게 되었음을 알 수 있다.

이는 연해지역의 良丁과 그들이 경영하는 토지, 어염 등의 재원이 중앙정부의 파악에서 누락되는 재정적인 문제를 불러오는 한편, 국가 통치 자체의 안정성을 위협하는 것이기도 했다. (나)에서 볼 수 있듯이 국가의 행정력이 충분히 미치지 못하는 도서 지역 海民들의 활동은 당시 지배층들에 의해 국가 운영 전반을 위협하는 문제로 인식되었다. 실제로, 영조대 ‘나주괘서 사건’을 비롯한 다수의 반정부 사건들이 연해 지역을 무대로 이뤄지며 연해 지역에 대한 관리의 주요한 문제로 부상하기도 했다.¹³

그런가 하면 海民들은 중앙집권적 통치에서 소외되어 있었기에, 중앙정부의 보호 밖에서 국방과 아문 등에 의해 다양하게 수탈당하는 존재이기도 했다. (다)는 海民들은 방렴세 등 다양한 명목의 세금을 여러 기관에 납부해야 했음을 보여준다. 특히, 중앙정부의 파악이 미치지 못하는 연해지역에 위치한 어염 생산시설의 소유권과 수세권 등이 折受를 통해 여러 기관에 의해 할거적으로 점유되면서 海民에 대한 중첩적인 수탈은 더욱 심화되었다.¹⁴

이처럼 조선후기 연해지역의 소외와 海民에 대한 수탈 문제는 점차 악순환을 거듭하며 심각한 문제로 비화했다. 따라서 왕조정부는 17세기 이후 이를 해결하기 위한 여러 정책적 조치들을 시도했다. 우선, 중앙정부의 집권적 통치력을 투사하기 위한 방편으로 연해 도서지역에 鎭堡 혹은 군현을 설치하는 設鎭 및 設邑이 추진되었다.

우선, 숙종대에는 전라도 지역의 섬들을 중심으로 수군진을 설치하는 設鎭이 광범위하게 추진되었다. 물론, 이는 지방관이 아닌 鎭堡의 설치였기에 우선적으로는 海防을 위한 목적을 띄고 있었다. 하지만 수군진의 책임자인 첨사나 만호 등으로 하여금 관할 지역에 대한 戶口와 松田이나 封山 등에 대한 관리 및 수세권을 부여하는 등 제한적이거나 연해 도서지역의 행정에 대한 책임을 부여하였다.¹⁵

영조대 이후에는 이에서 한 발 더 나아가 지방관인 군현을 설치하려는 논의가 진행되었다. 영조 5년(1729)이후 정조 7년(1783)에 이르기까지 나주를 비롯한 다수의 섬으로 이뤄진 지역에 대해서 별도로 군현을 설치하려는 시도가 여러 차례 시도되었다. 이를 통해 정조대를 거치면서 島嶼 지역의 자연촌을 중심으로 面里가 설정되는 등 행정기구의 마련과 파악 측면에서 일정한 발전이 이뤄졌다. 하지만 군현 설치의 재원의 부족과 여러 관련 기관에 대한 조정방안의 미비 등 현실적인 한계로 인해 끝내 실현되지 못하였다.¹⁶

¹³ 17세기 이후 연해도서지역의 운영상에서 나타난 변화상에 대해서는 송양섭, 2005, 「朝鮮後期 羅州諸島の 折受와 設邑論議의 展開」, 『大東文化研究』 50 참조.

¹⁴ 조선후기 각급 기관에 의한 어염의 절수의 배경과 양상에 대해서는 이욱, 2002, 「朝鮮後期 漁鹽政策研究」, 고려대학교 박사학위 논문 참조.

¹⁵ 김경옥, 2000, 위의 책, 179~188쪽.

¹⁶ 김경옥, 2000, 위의 책, 220~237쪽; 송양섭, 2005, 위의 논문.

海民에 대한 수탈 문제를 해결하기 위한 시도도 다방면으로 진행되었다. 17세기 전반에는 주로 어염 생산수단에 대한 신규 折受를 제한하는 등의 소극적인 조치가 추구되었다. 하지만 속종대를 거치면서 단순한 折受 제한에서 나아가 戶曹에 의한 魚鹽稅의 官收官給 등을 통해 각 기관에 의해 할거적으로 점유되던 魚鹽 수취를 일원화하여 海民에 대한 중첩적인 수탈을 최소화하고자 하는 보다 적극적인 움직임이 이루어졌다.¹⁷

영조 26년(1750) 均役法의 도입은 海民에 대한 수탈을 줄이는 주요한 전기로 작용했다. 17세기 중반 이후 꾸준히 추진되던 양역변통의 흐름이 ‘減正’을 골자로 하는 均役法의 실시로 갈무리 되는 과정 속에서 기존에 할거적으로 운영되던 어염선세를 개혁한 均役法 海稅條가 마련된 것이다.¹⁸ 물론, 균역법 해세조의 실시는 균역법 실시의 일환으로 이뤄진 것으로 기본적으로는 감필에 대한 급대재원 마련이 그 근본적인 목적이었다.

하지만 이 과정에서 기존의 折受가 혁파되고 어염세의 수취와 관리에 대한 권한이 균역청에 전속되었다. 이전 시기 海民들이 여러 기관에 의해 중첩적으로 수취되던 문제가 일정하게 개선되었다. 또한, 각 지역에 均稅使를 파견하여 어염의 생산 실태를 조사한 것을 바탕으로 稅額이 확정되었기에 납세액의 책정 등에서도 일정한 개선이 이뤄졌다.¹⁹

실제로, 영조가 균역법 해세조의 도입과 관련해 ‘이것이 어찌 경비를 위한 것이겠는가? 海民도 나의 백성이기 때문에 실로 海民을 위하여 폐단을 없애는 뜻이다.’²⁰라고 천명 한 것에서 이러한 의도가 확인된다. 즉, 균역법의 실시로 陸民들의 역가 부담이 줄어들고 군포의 운영이 균역청으로 일원화된 것과 마찬가지로, 균역법 해세조의 도입은 어염세의 수취기관을 균역청으로 일원화하여 이전 시기의 중첩적인 수탈을 지양하려 했다는 것이다.

그럼에도 균역법 해세조의 도입 이후에도 여전히 문제들은 남아있었다. 비록 균세사들의 조사로 세액 규정이 정비되었으나 지역별로 세액의 산출방식이 상이하고 그에 따라 그 부담도 다소 차이가 발생했다. 이후 『均役廳事目』(奎17253)(追事目)과 『萬機要覽』 편찬 단계에서 일부 稅額의 조정이 이뤄졌지만 여전히 전국 단위의 통일된 課稅 기준은 마련되지 못하였다.²¹

또한, 연해와 도서지역에 대한 지방 행정기구의 마련이 충분히 이뤄지지 못했다는 점은 균역법 해세조의 안정적인 운영을 방해하는 중대한 한계였다. 균역법 해세조의 과세와 재정운영의 관할권이 균역청으로 귀속되었으나 실제 수세 행정을 담당해야 할 지방관 및 관련 행정기구가 마련되지 않았기에 균역법 해세조의 규정이 관철되는 데는 여전히 큰 문제가 남아있었던 것이

¹⁷ 『備邊司謄錄』 53책, 肅宗 29년 1월 13일, “...중략... 我國魚鹽, 散屬諸處, 徒爲中間花消之歸, 自今以後, 使戶曹, 句管查出元數後, 參酌從輕重定稅, 令其地方官收捧...중략... 亦可爲也, 分付戶曹, 依此舉行何如, 上曰, 所達誠是依爲之...중략...” ; 『備邊司謄錄』 95책, 英祖 10년 1월 8일, “...중략... 戶曹判書宋寅明所啓, 三南漁鹽船稅竝自本曹句管事前前有成命矣...중략... 今將磨鍊成節目啓下, 而本曹諸道別將差人等不可不一併革罷, 既罷諸道別將則各宮房各衙門別將亦當一體禁斷, 稟定後方可分付矣, 上曰, 先自湖南爲始可也...중략...”.

¹⁸ 鄭演植, 1989, 「均役法 施行 이후의 지방재정의 변화」, 『진단학보』 67, 32~38쪽.

¹⁹ 균역법 해세조의 도입 과정과 내용에 대해서는 이옥, 2002, 위의 논문 참조.

²⁰ 『승정원일기』 1058책 영조 26년 7월 25일(을축), “今者此舉, 豈徒爲經費? 海民 亦吾民, 故實爲 海民除弊之意”.

²¹ 『均役廳事目』(奎17253) ‘海稅第九’ ; 『萬機要覽』 「財用篇」 3 ‘海稅’.

다.

끝으로 어염 생산시설 및 관련 요소의 소유권과 수세권에 대한 제도적 정비가 미비했다는 점도 문제였다. 이에 어염 경영과 관련해 문벌과 같은 배경이 크게 작용하며 海民에 대한 여러 기관의 사사로운 침탈이 지속되었다. 실제로 정조대 전반 경상도 延日 지역 鹽場의 수세 여부에 대한 鹽民과 충훈부 간의 갈등에 있어서 충훈부가 국왕의 전교를 바탕으로 끝내 수세권을 인정받는 등의 결과가 빚어지기도 하였다.²²

지금까지의 내용을 요약한다. 17세기를 전후하여 전란과 기근 등의 변화를 거치면서 내륙에서 다수의 백성들이 연해 지역으로 이주하여 海民 집단이 형성되었다. 하지만 연해 지역에는 충분한 지방 행정기구가 마련되지 않았기에 海民들이 중앙집권적인 王化에서 벗어나 국방과 개별 군문·아문 등에 의해 사적으로 예측되는 등의 문제가 발생하게 되었다. 이를 해결하기 위해 왕조정부는 지방행정기구를 증설하거나, 균역법 해세조를 도입하는 등의 조치를 시도했으나 여전히 많은 한계가 남아있었다.

Ⅲ. 均役法 海稅條 관련 문제인식과 개선 방안

17세기 이후 왕조정부는 지방행정기구의 증설과 어염세 운영의 개선을 통해 海民 문제를 해결하고자 했다. 특히, 균역법 해세조의 도입은 이전 시기 여러 기관에 의해 중첩적으로 어염세를 수탈당하던 海民의 피해를 줄이는데 크게 이바지했다. 하지만 전술한 바 여러 제도적 한계로 인해 균역법 해세조의 운영 과정에서 많은 문제들이 노정되었다. 이 장에서는 다산 정약용의 균역법 해세조의 제도와 운영에 대한 문제인식과 그에 대한 개혁안을 살펴보고자 한다.

19세기 초 해안 지역인 전라도 강진에서 오랜 기간 유배생활을 한 다산 정약용은 균역법 해세조를 비롯한 어염 전반의 문제에 대해 깊이 인식하고 있었다. 실제로 그는『牧民心書』에서 균역법 이후 연해 지역의 재정 운영에 있어서 ‘어염선세’는 ‘三政’에 맞먹는 주요한 역할을 가진다고 서술한 바 있을 정도로 茶山은 漁鹽의 운영과 개혁에 대해 많은 관심을 가지고 있었다.²³

이에 茶山 정약용은『牧民心書』와『經世遺表』에 균역법 해세조의 운영 및 제반 어염 관련 개혁 사항등에 대해 정리하였다.『牧民心書』의 경우 대개 기존 제도의 테두리 안에서 운영상의 모순을 줄이는 ‘因時順俗’적 개선안을 다룬 반면에,²⁴『經世遺表』에는 보다 본격적인 제도 개혁안들이 서술되어있다.

따라서 茶山 丁若鏞의 균역법 해세조 관련 개혁안의 성격과 의의를 이해하기 위해서는 먼저『經世遺表』의 성격에 대한 선이해가 이뤄질 필요가 있다. 기존에는『經世遺表』에 대해 단순히

²² 『日省錄』 正祖 9년 6월 5일; 『日省錄』 正祖 10년 2월 30일; 『日省錄』 正祖 12년 9월 8일; 『日省錄』 正祖 16년 윤 4월 9일.

²³ 『牧民心書』 「戶典六條」 ‘平賦’, “均役以來。魚鹽船稅。皆有定率。法久而弊....중략...凡沿海出宰者。乃於三政之外。別一大政。在於此事。不可不致意也。”

²⁴ 송양섭, 2014, 『『목민심서』에 나타난 다산 정약용의 ‘인시순속(因時順俗)’적 지방재정 운영론』, 『다산과 현대』 7.

과거『周禮』적 질서로의 復古를 추구한 것이라고 보는 입장이 일반적이었다.²⁵ 하지만 최근에는 『經世遺表』에 나타난 茶山의 국가 개혁 방안에 대해서 단순히『周禮』적 이상을 추구한 것이 아니라 당시 조선의 현실에서 가능한 형태의 王政을 추구한 것이라고 보는 연구들이 진행되었다.²⁶

실제로 『經世遺表』에 나타난 茶山의 개혁 방안은 均役法 海稅條와 같은 당시의 현실에 대한 면밀한 비판 위에서 구성된 것이었다. 이를 통해 볼 때 『經世遺表』는 비록 그 원제가 邦禮草本인 만큼 겉으로는 周禮의 질서의 복구를 지향했으나 그 내용을 보면 당시 조선사회가 당면하고 있던 여러 문제들을 극복하고 당시 현실에 부합하는 王政을 구현하고자 했었음을 알 수 있다.

균역법 해세조와 관련해 다산은 ‘王法은 고르게 하는 것을 귀하게 여긴다’라고 하며 각 稅目에 있어서 전국적으로 통일된 課稅 규정을 마련하고자 했다.²⁷ 앞서 살펴보았듯 균역법 해세조의 규정은 각 稅目별로 통일된 원칙이 정해지지 않은 채 지역별로 세액의 부과 기준이 중구난방으로 이뤄져 지역별 세액 부담의 형평성이 떨어지고 課稅의 타당성이 결여되는 문제가 발생했다. 이에 다산은 어세, 염세, 선세 등 균역법 해세조의 각 세목에 대한 전국적으로 통일된 규정을 고안하고자 노력했다.

	1등	2등	3등	4등	5등	6등	7등	8등	9등
大箕	40냥	36냥	32냥	28냥	24냥	20냥	16냥	13냥	10냥
小魚箕	9냥	8냥	7냥	6냥	5냥	4냥	3냥	2냥	1냥
大隧	90냥	80냥	70냥	60냥	50냥	40냥	30냥	20냥	10냥
小隧	9냥	8냥	7냥	6냥	5냥	4냥	3냥	2냥	1냥
么隧箕	9전	6전	3전						
漁場	24냥	21냥	18냥	15냥	12냥	9냥	6냥	4냥	2냥
漁鯨	90냥	80냥	70냥	60냥	50냥	40냥	30냥	20냥	10냥
漁磯	9냥	8냥	7냥	6냥	5냥	4냥	3냥	2냥	1냥
藿田	90냥	80냥	70냥	60냥	50냥	40냥	30냥	20냥	10냥

<표 1> 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」 ‘魚稅表’, (箕=箭, 隧=條, 鯨=基)

²⁵ 김문식, 1995, 「丁若鏞의 經學思想과 經世論」(上)·(下) 『韓國學報』 78·79; 안병직, 2003, 「다산과 體國經野」, 『茶山學』 4.

²⁶ 백광렬, 2012, 「다산 정약용의 국가개혁론에 관한 한 해석 - 王法을 통한 ‘전국 단위 사회’의 관리」, 『태동고전연구』 28; 김용흠, 2017, 「21세기 다시 읽는 『경세유표』」, 『다산과 현대』 10.

²⁷ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “大抵一王之法。實在均齊。所謂成則三壤。成賦中邦也。諸路稅率。或一概以平之。或細剖以差之。歛仄亂雜。一至如此。苟且因循。冀無怨言。豈不嗟哉..”

우선 漁稅와 관련해 茶山은 均役法 海稅條의 세액에 대해 충청도와 전라도의 경우 생산력과 이윤 등이 큰 차등이 없는데 분등이 세밀하게 되어있다고 비판하였다.²⁸ 이어서 그는 경상도의 漁稅에 대해 晉州, 泗川의 文魚 漁場과 昌原의 江魚場의 경우에 생산량의 1/5을 收稅 하는데 漁稅의 定額이 분명치 않아 監官과 色吏등에 의한 탐학과 隣族徵등이 발생하기 쉬울 것이라고 보았다.²⁹ 강원도, 함경도, 평안도의 漁稅 규정에 대해서 茶山은 『均役事目』에 기록되어 있지 않아 다만 舊例를 따랐다'고 하며 그 기준이 모호하다고 비판하였다.³⁰

이 같은 각 지역 漁稅에 대한 평가에 바탕하여 다산은 <표 1>에서 볼 수 있듯 새로운 魚稅表를 제안하였다. 이는 기본적으로 전국적으로 공통되는 세액 규정으로써 여러 道의 세액 중에서 가장 높은 액수를 뽑아 1등으로 삼고 가장 낮은 액수를 뽑아 9등으로 삼은 후 그 사이의 액수를 일정하게 배치 하는 방식으로 작성되었다.³¹ 아울러 茶山은 각 군현마다 漁稅의 稅案을 만들되 각 등급이 생산 수단이 몇 곳 씩 있는지를 기록하고 그 소유주의 주소명과 호주를 기록할 것을 강조했다.³²

	1등	2등	3등	4등	5등	6등	7등	8등	9등
	24냥	21냥	18냥	15냥	12냥	9냥	6냥	4냥	2냥
京畿							80곳	111곳	290곳
海西				60곳	70곳	67곳	72곳	80곳	
湖西						70곳	90곳	80곳	
湖南	40곳	42곳	48곳	51곳	57곳	62곳	70곳	74곳	80곳

²⁸ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “湖右. 漁筴. 青魚石魚. 其利最厚...중략...凡差等之法. 上闊而下促. 誠以利厚. 財鉅者. 其兩等相距之間. 宜闊利薄. 貨小者其兩等相距之間. 錙銖是爭. 不得不短促也...중략...湖南漁筴(…)臣謹按. 當時定稅. 悉遵本邑之舊例. 非察諸地之實情. 不然. 何若是其不公也. 群山, 蟬島. 誠爲漁筴之大都會. 置之首等可也. 其餘諸邑. 別無差等. 又何必歷歷分等乎.”

²⁹ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “臣謹按. 嶺南漁稅. 影弊最甚. 徵里徵族. 勒充元額. 蓋以五一之稅. 不成法制. 猾監剝割. 民不趨業. 故漁者日衰. 稅者日虐. 以百應千. 以十應百. 以至此耳. 若使立法之初. 少加商量. 豈有是哉. 上納未充. 追捕四出. 縣令亦何以索其什一哉.”

³⁰ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “臣謹按. 三道漁稅. 設令不納於本廳. 均役事目. 宜有提論. 都無一言之偶及. 豈制法之體乎. 意皆悉依舊例. 屬之諸營諸邑. 然一王之法. 宜畫一爲法. 無小參差. 使各欽遵. 今以不納本廳之故. 而任其荒亂. 莫之擇理. 示天下不廣. 惜哉.”, 다만 뒤의 표 1, 표 2, 표 3을 통해 보면 함경도, 강원도(藁田稅 규정은 있음)와 달리 평안도의 경우 漁箭稅 규정이 마련되어 있음이 확인된다. 이는 茶山의 오해로 보인다.

³¹ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “右魚稅表一首. 臣所作也. 其例取諸路所定魚稅之額. 以諸路中最高之數. 立之爲第一等. 以最少之數. 限之爲第九等. 於是取其中緡之數平敷. 差次列之. 爲二三四五六七八等. 或中緡之數. 不可平敷者. 上闊而下促以趁其限. 於是. 取諸路稅額. 齒之于諸等. 其或本數參差不合者. 以其所近上附下附. 近於上者. 增之爲上等. 近於下者. 減之爲下等. 居其中者. 采公議上下之. 魚鯨之稅. 最高者百兩. 終似太重. 故以九十兩. 爲一等.”

³² 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “每郡縣作稅案. 必云一等筴幾處. 五等筴幾處. 六等筴幾處. 不必備九等. 乃列地名戶主. 卽小名成冊. 隨與場鯨皆倣此. 隨其所有. 不必備等.”

嶺南						100곳	200곳	300곳
嶺東						70곳	90곳	80곳
關北					80곳	100곳	90곳	
關西					80곳	80곳	90곳	100곳

<표 1> 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, '鹽稅表'

鹽稅 규정과 관련해 茶山은 여러 道의 鹽稅 규정 중 湖南의 사례가 가장 모범적이라고 보았다. ① 鹽釜의 크기, ② 鹽田의 膏瘠, ③ 柴草 마련의 용이성, ④ 市場과의 거리 등을 모두 고려하여 稅額을 규정하여 타당도가 높다고 본 것이다.³³ 이어서 茶山은 湖南의 鹽稅 규정을 기준으로 하여 ① 鹽釜의 크기를 위주로 하여 鹽稅의 분등을 3등급으로 나누고 그 안에서 기타 요소들의 정도에 따라 分等を 매겨 鹽稅의 稅額을 총 9등급으로 나누었다.³⁴

	大船 (용적량/세액)	小船 (용적량/세액)	小艇 (용적량/세액)
1등	쌀 1000석/50냥	쌀 180석/6냥	쌀 6석/1냥 5전
2등	쌀 900석/45냥	쌀 160석/5냥 5전	쌀 5석/1냥 2전
3등	쌀 800석/40냥	쌀 140석/5냥	쌀 2석/9전
4등	쌀 700석/35냥	쌀 120석/4냥 5전	
5등	쌀 600석/30냥	쌀 100석/4냥	
6등	쌀 500석/25냥	쌀 80석/3냥 5전	
7등	쌀 400석/20냥	쌀 60석/3냥	
8등	쌀 300석/15냥	쌀 40석/2냥 5전	
9등	쌀 200석/10냥	쌀 20석/2냥	

<표 3> 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」 '船稅表'

³³ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “臣謹按。七抱者爲大釜。四抱者爲中釜。則六抱爲大二等。五抱爲大三等。餘可推知。三抱有半及三抱者。爲中二三。又以土之厚薄。柴之貴賤。漁市之遠近。差其等級。上下其錢。盆之大小。以爲本領。而餘皆參伍者也。諸路鹽稅之中。唯湖南之法。備觀諸情。最似精密”

³⁴ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “今槩括爲法。則宜以盆爲主。而四觀各分三等。盆之大小分三等。七抱以下。爲上釜。五抱以下爲中釜。三抱至二抱。爲下釜。土之膩瘠。分三等。曰上土中土下土。柴之貴賤。分三等。以賤者爲上。利之厚薄。分三等。以漁場市場之遠近。分之。”

한편 茶山은 船稅와 관련해 기존의 稅額 규정이 거의 대부분 船隻의 길이(把數)를 기준으로 한 것에 대해 ‘물건을 싣는 것은 힘에 달린 것이지 몸통이 달린 것이 아니다.’라고 하며 용적량을 기준으로 分等を 할 것을 강조하며 크기 별로 9등급을 기준으로 새롭게 세액을 산정하였다.³⁵

이처럼 船稅의 세액이 전국적으로 통일되기 위해서는 선박의 규격화가 선행되어야 했다. 이에 茶山은 전국적으로 배의 규격을 통일시킬 것을 제안한다. 조선의 경우 水運의 활용도가 높음에도 불구하고 배의 제작이 일정한 규격이 없이 이뤄져 造船과 항행에 있어서 일정한 품질과 안전 유지가 되지 않는다고 본 것이다.³⁶

이에 따라서 茶山은 우선 冬官(=工曹)의 신하로 하여금 露梁 근처에 船廠을 마련하여 배의 규격을 제정케 할 것을 제안했다.³⁷ 나아가 그는 이 같은 선박의 규격화를 서울 뿐 아니라 전국 단위로 실시 할 것을 강조했다. 長山浦, 喬桐府, 安眠島, 莞島를 비롯해 통제영과 각급 水營 등에 船廠을 만들어 선박 제작을 규격화 하자고 한 것이다.³⁸

본 장의 내용은 다음과 같이 정리해 볼 수 있다. 균역법 해세조의 도입은 海民의 부담을 줄이는데 크게 이바지했으나, 지역에 따라 세액 및 관련 규정이 상이해 형평성이 떨어졌다. 다산 정약용은 이에 대한 문제의식 속에서 어세, 염세, 선세 등 균역법 해세조의 각 세목에 대해 전국적으로 통일된 규정을 마련하였다. 이는 海民의 부세 부담을 합리화하고, 전국적으로 통일된 王政의 실현을 위한 제도적 바탕의 마련에 방향성이 맞추어진 개혁안이었다.

IV. 海民의 ‘王民化’를 추구한 법제 변동론

다산은 균역법 해세조와 관련해 전국단위로 통일된 稅制를 마련하여 海民의 부세 부담을 표준화하고 그를 통해 王政의 토대를 마련하고자 했다. 하지만 이렇게 마련된 稅制가 안정적인

³⁵ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “所用在力。不在於體。有體小而力能任重者。有體大而力不勝任者。又船有疾捷者。有遲鈍者。今但以其長之幾巴幾尺。定其稅率。原未中理。況諸船分等之法。道各不同。或分三等。或分五等。或分六等。或分九等。或分十等。此道之大船。”

³⁶ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “顧國中之船。或大或小。或長或短。或狹而長。或闊而短。或大而淺。或小而深。千態百狀。無一同者。於是造船而浮之水。以試美惡。甲船雖大。而不能任重。乙船雖小。而不能快走。丙船忌風。搖蕩已甚。丁船喫水沈墊。在卽萬一之倖。偶有一船。任重而快走。能風而拒水。則觀者歎嗟。賀其善成。相與名之曰倖船。而匠人又顧之他。則又隨所爲而爲之。爲甲爲乙爲丙爲丁。而昔之所謂倖船者。今不可復見矣。其何如而爲任重。何如而爲快走。何如而爲能風拒水。蓋茫然不知其所以然矣。若是者。何也。其比例之差。本無常法故也。”

³⁷ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “宜命冬官之臣。就露梁之上。建一大屋。名之曰船廠 執一倖船。召梓匠之善者。度其長短。度其闊狹。度其崇庳(…)求其比例。於是記之爲法。如考工記之文曰。舷闊幾尺。參分其舷闊。以其一爲之底(…)參分船崇。去一以爲舵崇。假令也。於是。按其法而爲之船。則天下之船。皆倖船而復有不善者乎。”

³⁸ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “長山浦建一船廠。喬桐府建一船廠。安眠島建一廠。邊山建一廠。莞島建一廠(…)統制營建一廠。諸路水軍節度之營。各建一廠(…)於是召集匠戶。使居廠屋之旁。令凡欲造舟之人。或造或修。咸於是造焉。有敢於私處匿造者。用私鑄錢律。直斷無赦。則不出十年。國中之船。無一而不車同軌矣。”

로 운영되기 위해서는 이를 실제로 시행하는 법제와 행정기구의 변동이 아울러 이뤄질 필요가 있었다.

연해 도서지역의 행정과 관련 법제에 대한 개혁은 장기적으로 海民을 중앙정부에 의해 파악되고 관리되어 ‘王化’를 받는 이른바 王民으로 만들기 위해서도 필요한 것이었다. 이에 본장에서는 균역법 해세조의 운영을 포함한 연해 지역 제반 행정과 법제에 대한 다산의 개혁안을 海民의 王民化라는 측면에서 살펴보고자 한다.

앞서 살펴봤듯이 숙종대 이후 여러 시도에도 불구하고 서남해를 비롯한 연해 도서 지역에는 충분한 지방 행정기구의 마련이 이뤄지지 못했다. 이에 균역법 해세조의 도입에도 불구하고 기존에 문제가 되었던 궁방과 각급 군문 및 아문들에 의한 折受 및 海民에 대한 수탈이 여전히 이뤄지고 있었다.

(라)

생각건대, 먼 지역 사람을 편하게 하는 것은 왕자의 큰 정사이다. 우리나라는 지역이 편소하여 북쪽은 2천여 리에 불과하고 남쪽은 1천 리에 불과하다. (….) 오직 서남쪽 바다 여러 섬이, 그 중 큰 것은 둘레가 100리나 되고 작은 것도 40~50리가 된다. 별이나 바둑알처럼 많은데다 작고 큰 것이 서로 끼여 있어 수효가 대략 1천여 개인데 이것이 나라의 바깥 울타리이다. 그런데 개벽 이래로 조정에서 일찍이 사신을 보내 이 강토를 다스리지 않았다.(…)혹 궁방(宮房)이 절수(折受)해갔고, 혹은 군문(軍門)에 획급(劃給) 되었으며, 혹은 고을 토호(土豪)에게 공(貢)을 실어가고, 혹은 관리와 계(契)를 만들기도 한다. 진·보(鎭堡)가 있는 곳은 수영(水營)에 매였고, 별장(別將)이 있는 곳은 경영(京營)에 매였는데, 간사한 짓이 사방에서 나와 제멋대로 백성에게 토색질을 한다. 이리하여 비록 고을에 가서 호소하고자 해도 풍파가 험해서 가자면 열흘이나 걸리고, 또는 아전들이 막아서 삼문(三門)이 지척이건만 통하기 어렵다.³⁹

(마)

은루된 魚地를 어찌 이루 다 말하겠는가? 2년마다 균역청 낭관을 한 차례씩 보내서 魚地에 암행(暗行)하여야 그 숨겨진 것을 발견할 수가 있다. 사목에 이르기를, “여러 영, 여러 고을, 여러 진(鎭)에, 만약 본청(本廳 : 균역청)에서 정세(定稅)한 이외에 사사로 불법의 거둠이 있으면 장률(貝藏律)로써 논죄(論罪)하고 무역(貿)한다 핑계하면서 싼 값에 억지로 빼앗은 자도 죄가 같은데, 어사(御史)가 염문(廉問 : 조사함)해서 일체 감률(勘律)한다.” 하였다.(…)모름지기 조정에서 12년마다 균역청 낭관(郎官)을 한 차례 보내서 남몰래 鹽戶에 다니면서 그 세액을 고르게 하고, 그 이익을 살펴서 수정하도록 할 것이다. 그런 다음이라야 용도가 줄어들지 않고 백성의 힘도 피게 될 것이다⁴⁰

³⁹ 『經世遺表』 권 2 「秋官刑曹」, “臣竊伏念 綏遠人者, 王者之大政也. 吾東壤地褊小, 北不過二千餘里 (…). 唯西南海諸島, 其大者圍過百里, 小者四五十里, 星羅棋布, 小大相間, 其數無慮千餘區, 此國家之外藩也. 乃自開闢以來, 朝廷未嘗遣一介之使, 疆理此土(…). 或折授於宮房, 或畫給於軍門, 或輸貢於土豪, 或結契於官吏. 其有鎭堡者, 隸於水營, 其有別將者, 隸於京營. 桀黠四出, 椎剝唯意, 雖欲赴訴於郡縣, 風濤險阻, 動至旬日, 閭吏壅蔽, 咫尺難通”.

⁴⁰ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “(…)漁地隱漏, 可勝言哉? 每十二年, 一遣均役郎, 暗行漁地, 斯可以發其隱也. 事目云: “諸營、邑、鎭, 若於本廳定稅之外, 私有橫斂者, 論以贓律. 稱以貿易, 廉價勒取者, 亦如之. 御史廉問, 一切勘律(…)須自朝廷, 每十二年一遣均役郎, 暗行鹽戶, 平其稅額, 察其隱悲, 修之整之, 然後國用不蹙, 而民力得紓矣”.

(라)에서 볼 수 있듯이 균역법 해세조가 운영된지 50여년이 지난 19세기 초의 시점에서도 연해 도서 지역에는 지방관이 파견되지 않았고 그에 따라 여전히 국방과 아문들이 海民들에 의한 사사로운 침탈을 하고 있었다. 이와 관련해 茶山은 우선, (마)와 같이 漁·鹽 생산수단의 누탈 혹은 훼손을 막기 위해 魚地의 경우 2년, 鹽戶의 경우 12년을 주기로 각기 균역 낭관을 각지에 파견하여 실태를 적간케 할 것을 제안한다.⁴¹

(바)

내 생각에는 별도로 한 관청을 세워서 온 나라 섬을 관장하고 그 명칭을 수원사(綏遠司)라 하여 그 판적(版籍)을 맡고 부세를 고르게 하며, 침어(侵漁)를 금단하고 질고(疾苦)를 제거하도록 하는 것이 마땅하다는 것이다. 법을 세우는 초기에는 감찰어사를 분견(分遣)하되 규정을 만들어주고 여러 섬을 순행하면서 강계(疆界)를 바루고 호구를 기록하며 폐막(弊瘼)을 물은 다음, 돌아와 모여서 법제를 편저(編著)하여 여러 섬에 반포하고 그 법에 따르도록 한다. 또 3~4년마다 본사 낭관(本司郎官)을 보내 여러 섬을 암행하면서 간찰한 짓을 살피며, 또 섬 백성에게 원통하고 억울한 일이 있는 것은 바로 본사에 호소하도록 하여, 여러 섬 백성에게 의지할 곳이 있도록 함은 참으로 먼 곳 백성을 편하게 하는 큰 정사이다.⁴²

또한 다산은 궁극적으로는 연해 도서 지역 등 기존에 중앙 행정력이 충분히 미치지 못했던 지역에 대한 사무를 관장하는 기관의 창설을 주장했다. (바)에서 확인할 수 있듯이, 刑曹의 屬司로 島嶼 지역을 비롯한 격오지의 판적과 조세행정을 관할하는 기관인 綏遠司를 조직하여 운영할 것을 이야기 한 것이다.⁴³

이상의 제도 마련은 먼저 여러 營·衙門 등에 의해 사사로이 수취되고 있는 어염을 중앙 재정(王籍)으로 귀속시키는데 이바지하는 것이었다.⁴⁴ 또한, 이는 ‘王化’에서 소외되어 원통하고 억울한 일을 겪던 海民들의 여러 불만을 파악하고 해결할 수 있는 제도적 장치를 마련한다는 점에서 궁극적으로는 海民의 王民化를 위한 조치였다고 이해할 수 있다.

⁴¹ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “...중략...每十二年。一遣均役郎。暗行鹽戶。平其稅額。察其隱悲。修之整之。然後國用不蹙。而民力得紓矣...중략...漁地隱漏。可勝言哉。每十二年。一遣均役郎。暗行漁地。斯可以發其隱也。; 『經世遺表』 권 1 「地官戶曹」, “...중략...平賦司 卽均役廳...중략...”, 『경세유표』에 따르면 茶山の 국가 개혁방안에서 균역청은 平賦司로 개칭되어 이른바 九賦의 수취를 담당하는 기능을 맡게 되었다.

⁴² 『經世遺表』 권 2 「秋官刑曹」, “(…)謂宜別建一司, 以掌環國之海島, 名之曰綏遠司, 典其版籍, 均其賦斂, 禁其侵漁, 除其疾苦。立法之初, 分遣監察御史, 授以規式, 巡行諸島, 正其疆理, 書其戶口, 詢其弊瘼, 歸而會之, 著爲法制, 頒于諸島, 使之欽遵。又每三四年, 遣本司郎官, 暗行諸島, 察其奸猾。又凡島民有冤鬱者, 許令直訴于本司, 使諸島之民, 得有所依怙, 誠綏遠之大政也(…)”.

⁴³ 『經世遺表』 권 2 「秋官刑曹」, 다산은 서남해 뿐 아니라 북부의 폐사군 등에 대해서도 綏遠司의 통제를 받게 지정하였다.

⁴⁴ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “...중략...宜以沿海之地。一隴一篲。咸隸 王籍。平其賦稅。與諸路較若畫一。無有一竇(…)派給諸營諸邑曰。統制營一千兩。左水營八百兩。東萊府七百兩。金海府五百兩。漆原縣三百兩。以其餘錢。納于京司。不亦可乎...중략...”

물론, 이는 여전히 근본적인 해결책인 지방관의 설치를 비롯한 행정기구의 증설에는 미치지 못했다. 하지만 실제 서남해 도서 지역에 지방행정기구가 설치된 것은 교통과 통신 시설의 발전이 일정부분 이뤄진 19세기 후반에야 가능했다는 점⁴⁵을 살펴볼 때, 이러한 다산의 제안은 연해지역에서의 오랜 유배경험을 바탕으로 현실적인 대안을 제시한 것으로 평가할 수 있다.

한편 茶山은 균역법 해세조의 운영과 관련해, 거시적인 제도 개혁 뿐 아니라 실제 운영상에 있어서 문제가 될 수 있는 色吏 등 실무자의 중간 수탈 및 作奸에 대한 대안도 마련하였다. 色吏 및 아전 등의 폐해를 막기 위해 茶山은 우선 漁人등 海民 내부에서 甲首를 뽑아 色吏의 탐학을 견제할 것을 제안했다. 이를 통해서 아래로는 海民들의 피해를 줄이고 위로는 국가의 재정 침탈을 막을 수 있을 것이라고 본 것이다.⁴⁶

이처럼 다산 정약용은 19세기 초 당시의 현실에 대한 뚜렷한 이해의 바탕 위에서 균역법 해세조의 운영 및 지방 행정 운영에 대한 개혁책을 제시하였다. 그런가 하면 그는 海民의 생활에 있어서 가장 큰 문제가 되는 어염에 대한 折受를 근절할 수 있는 법적 방안을 고안하는데도 노력하였다.

전술한바 18세기 후반 이후 均役法 海稅條의 운영이 지속되는 과정에서도 어염 생산수단에 대한 折受와 私占이 다시 발생하고 있었다. 茶山 역시 魚鹽 등에 대한 折受와 私占이 심화되는 양상을 심각한 문제로 인식하였다. 茶山은 심지어 우리나라의 경우 삼면이 바다로 둘러싸여 있지만 그 이익은 모두 私門으로 귀속되고 있다고 표현하기도 했다.⁴⁷ 아울러 茶山은 어염 등에 대한 私占이 이뤄지는 방법에 대해서도 소개했다. 이에 관해서 『牧民心書』 「刑典六條」에 서술된 茶山의 설명을 들어보자.

(사)

霸占이라는 것은 무엇인가? 부잣집에는 모두 낭자(浪子)가 있어 그가 도박하고 술 마시는 것으로 그 아버지가 속을 태우는데, 지체 높은 양반들이 이 자들과 결탁하여 속으로 약속을 하고 빚을 준 것처럼 문서를 만드는데 그 돈이 천만이나 된다. 목민관으로서 체신이 없는 자는 그들의 부탁을 듣고 곧 잡아다가 혹독하게 매를 때리며 엄격한 칼과 올가미로 다루어 기름진 전답의 약속 문서를 강제로 받아다가 지체 높은 집에 준다. 이 풍습이 어디서나 이루어지고 있는데 충청(忠淸)·공홍(公洪)의 두 도가 그중에서도 가장 심하다. 목민관이 비록 외롭고 한미한 사람이라 하더라도 어찌 차마 앉아서 보기만 하고 금하지 않을 것인가?

⁴⁵ 김경옥, 2000, 「朝鮮後期 西南海 島嶼의 社會經濟的 變化와 島嶼政策 研究」, 전남대학교 박사학위 논문, 129쪽, 서남해 도서 지역의 경우 고종 대에 가서야 設邑이 이뤄졌다.; 고동환, 2006, 「조선후기 島嶼政策과 元山島의 변화」, 『湖西史學』 45; 송양섭, 2007, 「1896년 智島郡 創設과 西南海 島嶼 支配 構造의 再編」, 『韓國史學報』 26.

⁴⁶ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “(…)今若使稅率至輕。以爲椿額。乃於漁人之中。差出甲首。或一場一人。或數場一人。使之視船多少。上下其率。法見上。但充原額。毋闕時利。不問今年之利害。則其無票驗者。伊等自相摘發。如京城市人亂塵摘發之法。而瓜皮革履。必無以匿其形跡。夫然後下情活潑。上入牢固。而無衰惡日頹之患矣。今差猾監數十百人。佩牌四出。日以消息之牒。報于縣官。民何以措其手足哉。私受之名。不如票驗。況茫茫碧海之中。去處條之多少有無。縣官何以知之。而輒出其稅率哉。行不得之政也。”

⁴⁷ 『經世遺表』 권 14 「均役事目追議」, “(…)我國三面濱海。而魚鹽之利。盡歸私門。國家一無所賴。”

(아)

立案이라는 것은 무엇인가? 황무한 산간이나 험준한 봉만, 그리고 먼 갯벌이나 작은 섬은 천지개벽 이래로 강역 정리에 들지 않았는데, 지체 높은 대갯집들이 마음대로 문권을 만드니 이것을 입안이라 한다. 즉 한 포기 of 풀, 한 그루의 나무, 한 마리의 고기, 한 마리의 게라도 모두 내 것이라 하여 앉아서 조세를 받는다. 나무하는 길이 막혀 도끼 가진 것도 화가 되며, 어흥(漁筴)이 나라에 매이지 않고 염분(鹽盆)은 모두 사사 취념에 시달린다. 또 혹은 공신·척신의 먼 후손들이 매양 민간의 전지를 빼앗아 사패지(賜牌地)라 하는데, 온 구릉(丘陵)과 원습(原隰)을 차지하고 모두 내 땅이라고 하며 마음대로 약탈을 자행하여도 누가 감히 말하지 못한다. 여기서 세력 없는 백성들은 가산을 탕진하고 그만 잔멸(殘滅)하게 되는데, 비록 약하고 배알이 없는 목민관이라 하더라도 어찌 이것을 앉아서 보기만 하고 금하지 않을 것인가? 이것이 모두 오늘의 굳어진 풍습이다.

(사)와 (아)를 통해 볼 때 이른바 霸占과 立案 등을 통한 생산수단의 私占은 근본적으로 문서와 文券등의 계약과 소유권 및 수세권 등의 처리에 있어서 법적 엄밀성이 떨어지고 文闕 등 외적 요인들이 크게 작용하는 것에서 비롯한 것임을 알 수 있다. 이는 앞 장에서 보았던 정조대 충훈부에 의한 延日, 昌原 등지의 鹽田에 대한 私占의 사례에서도 확인된다. 鹽田에 대해서 생산수단인 鹽釜와 垆地의 소유권 및 수세권의 운영이 일정한 법적 원칙 대신 國王의 傳敎와 允許 등에 의존해 결정되는 모습이 나타나는 것이다.

이와 관련해 茶山도 우리나라의 경우 중국과 달리 法司의 關由 없이 개인이 문서를 만들기 때문에 공신력이 떨어진다고 설명하며 刑曹에 宮室, 田園, 奴婢의 매매 등에 대한 법적 처리를 주관하는 券契司라는 屬司를 신설하여 형조판서로 하여금 그 제조를 맡게 할 것을 주장한다.⁴⁸

(자)

생각건대, 《주례》에, 질제(質劑)와 권계(券契)를 모두 유사(有司)가 관장했는바, 그 속임수를 금하고 정송을 그치게 하기 위함이다. 지금 중국법은 무릇 매매하는 일이 있으면 홍계(紅契)를 요구하는데, 홍계란 인권(印券)이다. 우리나라는 모든 궁실·전원(田園)·노비에 대해서는 모두 개인 스스로 문서와 말을 만들 뿐, 일찍이 법사(法司)의 관유(關由)를 받는 일이 없다. 그러다가 사기가 탄로나고 정송이 일어난 다음이라야 비로소 법사에 통하는데, 법사인들 무엇으로써 그 사실을 알 수 있겠는가? 지금 마땅히 철(鐵)로 작은 판을 만들어 오직 연월일(年月日) 두어 글자 및 권계사 제준(券契司 題準) 등의 글자를 쓰고, 매매하는 사람의 성명 및 물건의 명목 등을 써넣을 공간을 남겨놓는다.(…) 매양 매매하는 일이 있거나 혹 자녀에게 분급(分給)할 일이 있으면 모두 본사에 와서 문권(文券)을 청구하며, 관에서는 글자를 써넣고 도장을 찍어서 발급하는 한편, 별도 문권에다 기록해서 본사에 비치할 것이며 그 물건 값의 100분의 1을 관에다 바치도록 할 것이고, 해마다 문권 수만 장을 여러 성에 갈라주어서 서울과 지방이 모두 같게 하엿다가 무릇 송사하는 자가 있으면 먼저 그 권계를 상고하여 만약 관에서 발급한 문권이 아니면 곧 접수[聽理]하지 않고 그 재물은 관에서 몰수한다.

⁴⁸ 『經世遺表』 권 2 「秋官刑曹」,“(…)臣謹案。周禮質劑券契。皆有司掌之。所以禁其詐僞。止其爭訟。今中國之法。凡有賣買。猶須紅契。紅契者。印券也。我 邦凡宮室田園奴婢之等。皆私自成文。私自成言。未嘗關由於法司。及其詐僞綻而爭訟起。然後乃關法司。法司何以知矣(…)我 邦凡宮室田園奴婢之等。皆私自成文。私自成言。未嘗關由於法司。及其詐僞綻而爭訟起。然後乃關法司

권계사는 (자)와 같이 토지와 궁실 등 여러 재물에 대한 매매와 관련한 일종의 등기 업무를 수행했다. 물론 해당 기사에서 어염 折受에 대한 언급이 직접적으로 나오지는 않는다. 하지만 토지와 궁실 등 여러 사항에 대한 매매와 권한에 대한 법적 처리를 엄밀히 하는 것은 折受,立案 등을 통해 漁鹽에 대한 私占이 일어나게 되는 근본을 미연에 방지하고자 하는 목적을 띄고 있었던 것으로 이해할 수 있다.

실제로, 다산이 이러한 권계사의 역할에 대해 ‘王者가 만민을 제어하는 大權’이라고 하며 50냥 이상의 재화의 거래에 대해서는 모두 관할할 것을 서술했다는 점에서 이는 어염을 포함한 매매와 거래 전반을 포괄하고 있음을 알 수 있다.⁴⁹ 이처럼 계권사의 등기업무를 통해 어염을 포함한 전반적인 재화의 거래에 있어서 지위와 배경의 개입을 지양하는 것은 궁극적으로 海民이 경영하는 어염 생산수단과 관련 재화에 대한 침탈을 막는다는 점에서 앞서 수원사의 마련과 마찬가지로 海民의 王民化를 뒷받침 하는 개혁안이라고 판단할 수 있다.

이 장에서는 연해지역 및 海民과 관련한 여러 행정기구와 법제에 대한 다산의 개편안에 대해 살펴보았다. 먼저 다산은 수원사와 계권사와 같은 기관의 마련을 통해서 海民과 연해지역에 대한 王化가 이뤄질 수 있는 바탕을 마련할 것을 제안하였다. 또한, 실제 지방 행정 및 수세 업무를 수행하는 중간 관리자에 대한 관리 방안을 제시하여 海民의 王民化가 안정적으로 지속될 수 있는 방안을 구상하였다.

⁴⁹ 『經世遺表』 권 2 「秋官刑曹」, “此亦王者馭萬民之大權也。若放債、賒貸、典當之等, 亦令受券, 勿書于版。若器用小物, 價不滿五十兩者, 聽其爲私券。若宮室、山林、田園、奴婢之類, 雖小勿許”.

V. 맺음말

한반도는 삼면이 바다로 둘러싸여 있으며, 서·남해를 중심으로 많은 섬이 자리 잡고 있다. 이러한 지리적 환경은 어염업의 발전을 불러왔으나, 다른 한편으로 연해지역에 중앙집권이 면밀히 작용하지 못하는 원인으로도 작용하였다. 이는 조선시대에도 마찬가지였다. 조선 왕조 정부는 연해 지역의 백성을 鮑作干이나 鹽干 등의 직역으로 파악·관리하고자 했으나, 전통시대 행정력의 한계로 인하여 연해지역 백성인 海民들은 중앙집권의 磁場에서 쉽사리 소외되었다.

이에 17세기 이후 왕조정부는 어염세를 중앙 재원으로 포섭하고, 연해지역에 행정기구를 증설하는 등의 방안을 통해 海民에 대한 중앙집권적 파악을 강화하려는 시도를 하였다. 특히, 18세기 중반 균역제도의 문제를 해소하기 위한 방안으로 마련된 균역법의 실시과정에서 여러 기관에 의해 사사로이 수취되던 어염세가 균역법 海稅條의 명목으로 定規稅化되고 중앙으로 귀속되면서 海民에 대한 중앙정부의 파악이 심화될 수 있었다.

하지만 여전히 연해 지역에 대한 행정기구의 설치는 미비했으며, 과세와 수세 등 균역법 海稅條의 운영 전반에서도 많은 문제가 露呈되었다. 19세기 초 연해지역인 전라도 강진에서 오랜 기간 유배생활을 했던 다산 정약용은 이러한 문제들을 몸소 경험하였기에, 『목민심서』와 『경세유표』에서 그에 대한 여러 현실적인 대안들을 정리하였다.

다산은 우선 均役法 海稅條와 관련해 합리적인 과세액 및 과세방안을 구상하였다. 이전 시기 지역별로 상이하게 마련되어 통일성이 결여되었던 과세규정과 달리 세액과 과세기준 등을 표준화하여 보다 일관된 세액 규정을 정비하였다.

그는 또한 어염세 및 어염재원의 중앙재정화 뿐 아니라 기존에 행정력이 미치지 못했던 연해 도서지역을 관리하는 행정기구 및 관련 제도에 대해서도 정리하였다. 연해지역에 주기적으로 균역낭관을 파견해 海民 및 어염 생산수단에 대한 중앙의 관리를 심화하고자 했다. 끝으로 刑曹의 屬司로 廢四郡등과 더불어 島嶼 지역에 대한 관리를 주관하는 綏遠司 및, 文券 등을 관할하는 券契司를 신설하여 연해지역에 대한 행정력을 제고하려는 시도도 구상하였다.

어염세와 연해지역 행정에 대한 다산의 개혁안들은 이전 시기 ‘국왕의 敎化’에서 소외된, 이른바 ‘化外之民’이었던 海民을 王民으로 포섭하는 것으로 요약될 수 있을 것이다. 이는 다산이 구상한 여타의 개혁안들과 마찬가지로 19세기 조선이 당면한 현실 위에서 유교국가의 이상향인 『周禮』를 실현하기 위한 심사숙고의 산물이었다, 따라서 다산의 海民 관련 개혁안에 대한 이해는 당시 연해지역의 실상과 그에 대한 조선 지식인의 문제의식을 이해하는데 주요한 단서를 제공해준다고 할 수 있다.

목차

1. 머리말
2. 1876년의 흉년과 진자확보책
3. 기민 선정의 실태와 ‘饑民’의 역할
4. 진자의 분배와 畢賑 결과
5. 맺음말

1. 머리말

불규칙적으로 발생하는 자연재해와 기근에 대응하여 조선왕조는 여러 층위의 진휼 제도를 정비해 나갔다. 중앙에는 진휼청과 같은 전담 기관을 두어 진휼 업무를 주관케 하였고, 지방에는 신속한 곡물 운송을 위해 거점마다 진휼 창고를 설치해 두었다. 평상시에는 곡물을 비축하여 흉년을 대비하였으며, 심각한 기근이 닥치면 중앙정부-감사-수령으로 이어지는 행정체계를 기반으로 기민을 구제하였다. 이와 동시에 지방 단위에서 이루어지는 진휼을 지원·감시하기 위한 목적으로 어사가 파견되었다. 17~18세기를 거쳐 정비된 진휼 제도의 큰 틀은 19세기까지 이어졌다.

진휼의 핵심은 국가적 차원에서 마련한 대규모의 환곡이었다. 환곡은 춘궁기를 버틸 식량과 농사를 이어갈 종자로 해마다 유상분급되는 곡물이었다. 흉년에 무상으로 지급되는 진휼곡 역시 대부분 환곡의 일부였다. 환곡제도는 진휼을 목적으로 시행되었으나 부족한 국가재정을 보충하는데 활용되면서 점차 그 기능이 변화하였다.¹⁾ 조선후기 환곡의 기능 변화에 대해서는 많은 연구를 통해 밝혀진 바 있다.²⁾ 특히 19세기에 접어들어 환곡은 본연의 진휼기능을 상실하고 점차 부세로 자리매김하였다고 이해된다.³⁾

환곡의 재정기능이 강화되는 추세 속에서도 19세기 전반까지 진휼 기능을 수행했다는 사실이 밝혀지기도 하였으나 1840년을 기점으로 그 기능이 위축되었다고 평가된다.⁴⁾ 환곡의 기능 변화와 함께 환곡을 중심으로 진행되었던 진휼도 위축 혹은 중단되었다고 이해되는 듯하다. 그 결과 19세기 중반 이후의 진휼에 대해서는 문란상이 강조되고 있다. 그러나 환곡의 부세화가 곧 진휼의 중단을 의미한다고 보기는 어렵다. 환곡의 기능변화와는 별개로 재해와 기근은 19세기 후반에도 반복되었던 만큼 이에 대응한 진휼도 어떠한 형태로든 지속되었을 것이라고 생각한다. 19세기 진휼의 추이를 이해하기 위해서는 환곡제도의 변동에 따른 진휼 방식의 변화를 검토할 필요가 있다.

19세기 중엽 전국적인 농민항쟁 직후 조정에서는 환곡제 개혁을 위한 논의에 착수하였다.

1) 송찬식, 1965, 「李朝時代 還上取耗補用考」 『歷史學報』 27.

2) 오일주, 1992, 「조선후기 재정구조의 변동과 환곡의 부세화」, 『실학사상연구』 3; 양진석, 1989, 「18, 19세기 환곡에 관한 연구」 『한국사론』 21; 송찬섭, 1992, 「19세기 환곡운영의 변화와 환모의 부세화」 『역사문화연구』 4.

3) 송찬섭, 2002, 『朝鮮後期 還穀制改革研究』, 서울대학교출판부.

4) 문용식, 2000, 『朝鮮後期 賑政과 還穀運營』, 경인문화사.

이때 환곡제의 대안으로 주목된 제도가 바로 사창제이다. 사창제는 주자가 시행했던 이상적인 제도로 인식되어 조선시대 내내 환곡제의 대안으로 제기되어 왔다. 임술민란 직후에는 환곡제의 폐지와 사창제의 시행이 적극적으로 제기되었다.

사창제와 관련한 연구는 환곡제 개혁론을 중심으로 진행되었다. 주자 사창법의 해석과 이를 변용한 개혁론에 대한 분석이 이루어졌다.⁵⁾ 특히 환곡제 개혁이 활발하게 논의되었던 19세기 중엽 삼정이정청의 활동이나 재야지식인들의 삼정개혁안들이 집중적으로 조명되었다.⁶⁾ 이를 통해 당시 환곡제의 문제와 조선 사회가 지향했던 개혁 방향이 무엇이었는지 밝혀졌다.

다만 고종 연간 실시되었던 사창제에 대한 연구는 소략한 편이다. 주로 「사창절목」을 분석하여 대략적인 운영방식만이 밝혀졌을 뿐이다. 사창제의 시행은 갑오개혁 단계에서 마련되는 「사환조례」의 바탕이 되었다고 평가된다.⁷⁾ 반면 어디까지나 환곡제를 유지하여 경비를 보충하려는 목적으로 시행되었다고 이해되기도 한다.⁸⁾ 이처럼 사창제의 시행 과정과 그 의의 및 한계가 지적되었으나 사창제 하에서 어떠한 방식으로 진휼이 운영되었는지에 대해서는 실증적인 검토가 이루어지지 못하였다.⁹⁾

본고에서는 이러한 문제의식 아래 1876~1877년 순천·여수지역의 사례에 주목하고자 한다. 이 시기는 전국적으로 큰 흉년을 맞이하여 사창제가 실시된 이후 최대의 진휼 사업이 전개되었던 기간이다. 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』에는 1876~1877년 순천·여수지역에서 진행되었던 진휼 사업에 대한 기록이 담겨있다. 이 자료를 분석함으로써 19세기 후반 군현 단위에서 운영되는 진휼의 실태를 고찰하고, 그것이 기존과 어떤 차이를 보이는지 살펴볼 것이다.

2. 1876년의 흉년과 진자확보책

1876년은 조선이 최초의 근대적 조약을 체결한 해로 알려져 있다. 1876년 2월 조선은 일본과 강화도 조약을 맺음으로써 대외적으로 큰 전환점을 맞이하였다. 그런데 이와는 별개로 대내적으로도 전례없는 기근을 맞이하여 대대적인 진휼 사업이 전개되기도 했다. 고종 즉위 이후 몇 년간은 큰 흉년을 면하였을 뿐 아니라 풍년에 가까웠다.¹⁰⁾ 여러 해의 풍년 이후 맞이한 흉년이지만 그 정도가 심각했을 뿐 아니라 국가의 재정도 궁핍하여 백성들을 구제할 방도를 마련하는 것이 시급했다.

1876년 봄의 보리농사는 풍년이었으나 3~6월까지 비가 내리지 않아 모가 다 타버리는 지경에 이르렀다.¹¹⁾ 7월에 이르러서도 모를 이앙하지 못한 곳이 많았고, 이미 이앙했더라도 비가

5) 조원래, 1985, 「18세기 순천부의 지방행정동태-부사황익재의 개선행정사례」 『남도문화연구』 1; 양진석, 1997, 「17세기 후반 이단하의 사창제 실시론」 『한국문화』 20; 문용식, 2009, 「17·18세기 사창을 통한 지방관의 재정 보충 사례」 『역사와 현실』 72; 김봉곤, 2009, 「노사학파의 환곡개혁책: 장성, 고창 지역을 중심으로」 『역사와실학』 40.

6) 송양섭, 2012, 「임술민란기 부세문제 인식과 三政改革의 방향」 『한국사학보』 49; 송기중, 2013, 「壬戌民亂期 省齋 柳重教의 三政論」 『역사와 담론』 65; 정옥재, 2013, 「性齋 許傳의 경제론 -「三政策」을 중심으로-」 『한국인물사연구』 19; 송찬섭, 2014, 「1862년 농민항쟁기 수령의 수습화동과 삼정책」 『조선시대사학보』 71; 송찬섭, 2014, 「1862년 삼정책문에 따른 경외대책의 검토」 『사람』 48; 임성수, 2016, 「임술민란기 秋琴 姜瑋의 현실인식과 三政改革論」 『조선시대사학보』 79.

7) 김용섭, 1982, 「환곡제의 이정과 사창법」 『동방학지』 34.


8) 송찬섭, 2002, 앞의 책.

9) 이와 관련한 연구로는 송찬섭, 2000, 「대원군시기 사창제의 운영 실태: 충청도 청산현 사창문서 분석」 『고문서연구』 17이 거의 유일하다. 군현 단위 사창 운영의 실태에 대한 분석이 이루어졌으나 실제 흉년이 닥쳤을 때 사창제 하에서 어떤 방식으로 진휼이 이루어졌는지에 대해서는 충분히 해명되지 못하였다.

10) 『비변사등록』 257책, 고종 13년 9월 10일; 『승정원일기』 2833책, 고종 13년 12월 7일(계사).

오지 않아 말라가고 있었다.¹²⁾ 봄, 여름 이래로 지속된 가뭄은 겨울까지 계속되어 땅에 있는 모든 벼들은 추수기에 절반밖에 수확되지 않았다고 한다.¹³⁾

<그림 1> 각 도의 재실분등과 순천부로의 진자 이동



<그림 1>의 왼쪽 지도는 평안도와 함경도를 제외한 전국의 고을별 재실분등의 상황을 정리한 결과이다. 이를 통해 1876년에는 대다수의 고을이 우심·지차에 속하였으며, 초실읍은 매우 드물었음을 알 수 있다.¹⁴⁾ 그 가운데 경상도 지역과 서남해안 지역의 피해가 심각하였다. 경상도는 내륙과 해안을 가리지 않고 재해가 극심했는데, 71개 고을 가운데 우심으로 판정된 읍이 62곳에 달했다.¹⁵⁾ 전라도, 충청도, 황해도, 경기의 연해 지역도 대부분 우심읍에 속하였다. 반면 상대적으로 내륙 지역은 상황이 조금 나은 편이었다.¹⁶⁾ 그러나 지차·초실읍으로 판정되었더라도 재해가 심각했던 것은 마찬가지였다.

이 해에는 전국적으로 13만 결에 가까운 재결이 지급되었는데, 이는 1809년과 1814년 이후 최대치였다. 이전까지는 대표적인 흉년으로 기사년(1809)과 갑술년(1814)을 언급하였으나 1876년 이후에는 병자년(1876)으로 대체할 정도였다.¹⁷⁾ 재해가 집중되었던 경상도, 전라도, 충청도, 경기 지역에는 진휼 자원으로서 각도에 저장되어 있던 사창 유고곡 20여만 석이 내려

11) 『매천야록』 권1, 上.

12) 『비변사등록』 257책, 고종 13년 7월 13일.

13) 『매천야록』 권1, 上.

14) 고을별 현황을 파악할 수 없어 그림에서는 제외하였지만 평안도의 경우 초실읍은 단 한 고을도 없었으며, 함경도 역시 24개 고을 중 5곳을 제외한 전 지역이 우심·지차에 해당했다(『연분재실요람』).

15) 순흥, 거창, 함양, 영천, 풍기, 개령, 문경, 안의 8읍은 지차로 판정되었는데, 대부분 내륙에 위치하여 전라도, 강원도와 접경을 이루는 고을들이었다. 청송만 유일하게 초실읍으로 구분되었다(『어영청등록』 129책, 병자 11월 초10일).

16) 조정에서도 삼남 지역이 모두 재해를 당했다고 하지만 畵田에서 파종을 하고 김을 맨 곳에서는 수확이 가능할 것이라고 예상했다(『비변사등록』 257책, 고종 13년 7월 13일).

17) 『梅泉野錄』 卷1, 上.

졌다.¹⁸⁾

오늘날 여수·순천 지역은 19세기 말 지방제도 개편 때 여수군이 창설되어 분리되기 전까지 순천부에 속해 있었다. 당시 순천부는 전라도에서 우심읍으로 분류된 32개 고을 중 하나였다.¹⁹⁾ 특히 순천부는 공진을 시행하기로 결정되어 공곡이 구획되었는데, 이 때의 공곡은 사창곡이었다.²⁰⁾ 전라도에 구획된 사창곡 51,600석은 전라감사의 판단에 따라 전라도 내 군현에 배정되었다. 그 가운데 순천부에는 903석이 할당되었는데, 이는 순천부 각면에 설치된 사창에 산재된 유고곡이었다.²¹⁾

당시 순천부사는 사창 유고곡만으로는 진휼을 이어나갈 수 없다고 판단하여 전라감사에게 다른 지역의 곡물을 요청하였다. 순천부사와 전라감사의 논의 끝에 <그림 1>의 오른쪽 지도와 같이 화순·동북·임실에서 사창곡을 옮겨오는 것이 결정되었다. 순천부와 가장 인접한 고을로는 구례, 낙안, 곡성, 광양 등이 있었으나 곡성을 제외하고는 모두 우심읍에 해당했다. 해당 지역에서도 진휼을 실시해야 했던 만큼 다른 지역에 곡물을 운송하기는 어려웠을 것으로 예상된다.

화순·동북·임실은 우심읍을 제외하고 그나마 순천과 인접한 고을들이었다. 세 고을은 지차읍으로 분류되었는데, 재해 피해가 덜하고 수송이 가능한 범위에 있다고 판단하여 순천부로의 곡물 운송을 지시한 듯하다. 이와 함께 여수 일대를 관할했던 전라좌수영에서도 곡물을 취해 쓰도록 하였다.

순천부에서는 본읍과 인근 고을에 저장된 사창곡 2,994여 석을 지원받았는데, 애초에 구획된 진자라는 의미에서 元賑資라고 구분되었다.²²⁾ 이 수량은 온전하게 순천부로 옮겨지지 않았다. 운반 과정에서 손실된 부분이 존재했기 때문이다. 임실현에서 옮겨온 사창곡의 경우 77석 가량이 줄어들었는데, 임실현에서 이미 축이 나서 처음부터 가져오지 못한 것이었다.²³⁾

이처럼 원진자 가운데 중간 과정에서 손실된 부분을 제외한 액수를 ‘실진자’로 기록하였으며, 실진자는 미와 전으로 나누어 운반되었다. 총 2,994석 중 960석 정도가 作錢되어 동전으로 옮겨졌다. 미곡의 작전가는 매석당 15냥으로 책정되었는데, 이는 감영에서 일괄적으로 지시한 것으로 추정된다. 이는 당시 時價보다 높은 수치였다. 그 이유는 흉년으로 인해 미가가 오른 상태이고, 중간 과정에서 발생하는 손실분을 예상했기 때문으로 짐작된다. 시가보다 높게 작전가를 정하여 동전이 옮겨졌을 때 해당 지역에서 곡물을 매입할 수 있도록 한 것이다.

임실현의 경우 다른 지역과 마찬가지로 매석 15냥으로 작전하도록 지시했으나 임실현감은 임실현의 쌀의 품질이 떨어져 미가가 8~9냥에 미치지 못한다고 보고하였다.²⁴⁾ 책정된 작전가보다 시가가 낮기 때문에 배정된 액수를 채우기 위해서는 실제로 더 많은 곡물이 투입되어야 했다. 결국 시가에 따라 작전하는 것으로 결정되었다. 당시 임실현의 시가는 8~9냥에 이르지 않았지만 15냥보다 낮은 12~14냥 사이에서 형성되었다.²⁵⁾

18) 사창곡의 마련 과정과 지역별 액수에 대해서는 송찬섭, 2002, 앞의 책, 209~213쪽을 참조.

19) 『여영청등록』 129책, 丙子 12월 초6일.

20) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

21) 1862년 임술민란 이후 환곡제의 폐단을 극복하기 위해 사창곡이 마련되었던 듯하지만 정확한 액수는 확인할 수 없다. 1866년과 1867년 각 지역에서 별비곡을 마련할 때 순천부에서는 7,255석을 확보하였다(『新增昇平志』).

22) 다른 지역에서 옮겨온 원진자는 화순 390석, 동북 171석, 임실 1169석, 좌수영 360석이다(『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』).

23) 임실현감은 공문을 보내 이 사실을 순천부에 알렸고, 순천부에서도 별도로 축난 액수를 기록하였다.

24) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

25) 652석을 상정가에 따라 작전했다면 9,780냥을 마련해서 보내야 했지만 시가에 따르면서 1천 냥 정

이렇게 확보된 진자는 공곡으로서 순천부 내 기민들에게 무상으로 지급되는 전곡이었다. 무상으로 지급하면 자연스럽게 사창곡의 규모는 줄어들 수밖에 없었다. 애초에 사창곡의 규모가 이전의 환곡에 비해 크지 않았던 만큼 이어지는 흉년에 대비하기 위해서라도 사창곡의 지출은 최소화될 필요가 있었다. 이를 위해서는 공곡 외의 진자를 확보해야만 했다.

<표 1> 순천부에서 확보한 賑資米·錢

구분	상세 항목	실진자미	실진자전(냥)	합(비율)
사창곡	순천	862석8두5승	615	42,645.18(62.08%)
	화순	373석3두4승	150	
	동복	65석	1,597.5	
	좌수영	210석	2,259.1	
	임실	439석	8,776.68	
감영	漁稅折半條		360.98	7,208.18(10.49%)
	節使錢		122.65	
	選武錢		450	
	秋耗作錢		2,380.2	
	考卜債		442.61	
	結排錢		488.46	
	民庫殖利錢		260	
	奎章閣紙錢		10.94	
	役價		1,686.74	
	節扇停免		300.6	
수령	巡邸吏役價		705	5,000(7.28%)
	官損補		5,000	
부민	願納		11,965	13,674(19.91%)
	私願納不入元賑資		1,709	
기타	加入/別救急賑餘	7석12두5승	44.97	162.47(0.24%)
합		1,957석9두4승	39,325.43	68,689.83(100%)

*전거: 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

순천부의 진흥을 책임지고 있었던 전라감사와 순천부사는 사창곡만으로는 진흥을 이어갈 수 없다고 판단하고 추가적인 진자를 마련하였다. <표 1>은 각 단위에서 마련한 진자를 정리한 결과이다. 먼저 전라감사는 인근 지역의 곡물 운송을 결정한 것과 별개로 순천부에서 경각사나 전라감영에 상납해야 할 각종 부세를 진흥 자원으로 쓸 수 있도록 구획해 주었다. 감영의 지원은 2차례에 걸쳐 결정되었으며, 그 액수는 7,208냥에 이른다.

한편 수령 역시 지역 내 진흥을 위해 진자확보에 나섰다. 당시 순천부사 서정순은 봉를 덜어내 진흥에 보태었는데, 그 액수는 전라도 내에서 수령들이 마련한 것과 비교해도 손에 꼽는 정도였다.²⁶⁾ 자신이 직접 진자전을 마련했을 뿐 아니라 권분을 통해서도 지역의 부민들에게 전곡의 납부를 독려하였다. 권분은 흉년이 닥쳤을 때 부민들에게 전곡 납부를 독려하여 곡물을 확보하는 방법으로 일찍부터 시행되었던 구황책이었다.²⁷⁾ 이를 통해 각면에서 원납전을 확보할 수 있었는데, 그 액수는 11,965냥에 달한다. 총 86명이 1만 냥이 넘는 원납전을 납부

도를 낮출 수 있었다.

26) 전라감사의 필진정책에는 서정순이 損補錢 6,103냥 8전 3푼을 마련했다고 기록되어 있다(『승정원일기』 2841책, 고종 14년 8월 21일).

27) 다산 정약용은 지역 단위에서 진흥 자원을 마련할 수 있는 실효성 있는 방법으로 권분을 뽑았다(송양섭, 2015, 「다산 정약용의 수령 진흥론에 나타난 주자진법의 적용과 그 당대적 변용-『목민심서』 진황조의 분석-」 『민족문화연구』 68, 187~189쪽).

했으며, 여기에는 마을의 요호·부민뿐 아니라 관에 소속된 인원들도 포함되어 있었다. 鄉廳, 將廳, 訓導廳, 作廳에 소속된 이들이 지역 내 진휼을 위해 동전을 납부했던 것이다.

원납전은 두 가지로 구분되는데 하나는 원진자에 포함되어 진휼 자원으로 활용된 것이고 다른 하나는 원진자에는 포함되지 않은 채 다른 방식으로 사용된 것이다. 후자의 경우는 공진이 아닌 민간에서 자체적으로 시행하는 私賑에 투입되거나 公納을 보충하는데 쓰였다.²⁸⁾ 기타는 진휼 과정에서 추가로 투입되거나 별구급을 시행하고 남은 자원으로 앞선 범주에 포함되지 않아 별도로 구분하였다.

순천부에서 확보한 진자 중 가장 큰 비중을 차지한 것은 사창곡이었다. 전체 진자의 2/3 이상을 차지할 만큼 진휼에 있어서 핵심적인 자원이었다. 특히 사창곡의 상당 부분이 미곡이었다는 점에서도 진휼곡으로서 가치가 높았다고 할 수 있다. 사창곡은 평상시에 경비 보충을 위해 활용되기도 했지만 흉년이 닥쳤을 때에는 진휼곡으로서 기능하고 있었던 것이다.

전체 진자의 20%에 달했던 부민의 원납전은 사창곡 다음으로 중요한 진휼 재원이었다. 1만 3천 냥에 달하는 액수는 순천부 내에서 확보했던 사창곡에 버금갔다. 10냥 이하의 소액은 기록하지 않았다는 점에서 원납전의 규모는 더 컸을 것으로 예상된다. 그만큼 부민에게서 받는 전곡은 지역 내에서 마련할 수 있는 주요한 진휼 재원이었던 것이다. 부민의 역할은 단순히 전곡을 납부하는 것에서 끝나지 않았는데, 이와 관련한 내용은 다음 장에서 살펴보려고 한다.

3. 기민 선정의 실태와 ‘饑民’의 역할

각 군현에서는 확보한 진자를 분배하기에 앞서 진휼 대상자를 선정해야 했다. 진휼곡은 환곡과 달리 무상으로 지급되었기 때문에 흉년에 백성들은 진휼 대상자로 선정되길 원했다. 그러나 기민을 무분별하게 선정할 경우 곡물이 소모되는 양이 늘어나 진휼을 끝까지 이어가지 못할 위험이 있었다. 진휼의 성패는 抄飢 단계에서 얼마나 정밀하게 기민을 선별하느냐에 달려있었다.

일차적으로 기민의 선정은 면 단위로 이루어졌다. 면마다 都監色을 두고, 매 동리마다 別有司를 임명하도록 했다. 도감색의 주관 아래 기민을 선별했는데, 이 때 별유사를 비롯하여 面任, 監官 등이 함께 참여하였다. 이들의 이름을 비롯한 각종 정보는 감영으로까지 보고되었는데, 기민을 선정하는 과정에서 농간이 적발될 시 처벌하기 위해서였다.

순천부의 경우 동리 단위까지 별유사가 임명되었는지는 알 수 없으나 면 단위로 分賑有司와 分賑色吏가 각각 1명씩 임명되었다.²⁹⁾ 순천부에서 진휼 업무를 담당했던 이들의 명단도 확인되는데, 명단에 등장하는 인물 가운데 일부는 원납자 명단에서도 확인된다. 특히 作廳에 소속되어 있으면서 원납을 했던 사람들은 대부분 戶長, 吏房이나 분진색리 등의 직책을 띄고 있었다. 이들은 作廳에 소속되어 있어 진휼과 관련된 실무를 담당하면서도 원납전을 납부하여 진휼을 도왔던 것이다.

한편 분진유사는 질청에 소속되지 않은 채 자신이 담당하는 면에 동전을 원납하였다. 아마도 분진유사는 지역의 유력한 사족이나 부민으로 생각되며, 면 내의 공론을 거쳐 임명되었던

28) 여기에서 私賑은 수령이 자비한 전곡을 나누어주는 것과는 구분되며, 민간에서 자체적으로 시행한 진휼 활동을 의미한다. 『진자미전래상급용하구별책』에서는 원진자의 액수에서 제외하였지만 이 역시 부민이 마련한 진자이기 때문에 표에는 포함하였다.

29) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

‘社首’와 유사한 역할을 수행했을 것으로 보인다. 정리하자면 순천부에서는 순천부사 아래 분진도감을 두어 좌수, 호장, 이방 등과 함께 부내의 진휼을 총괄하고 각 면에서는 면내에서 차정된 분진유사와 질청에서 파견된 분진색리가 함께 진휼 업무를 주관했던 것이다. 일차적인 기민 선별 역시 이들에 의해 이루어졌다.

기민으로 선정되기 위해서는 우선 호적에 등재되어야만 했다. 규정상 호적에 등재되지 않은 부류들은 진휼곡을 받을 수 없었다. 다만 경내에 거주하는 사람이라면 우선 기민으로 선정한 뒤에 진휼이 끝나고 호적에 입록하도록 하였다.³⁰⁾ 그런데 호적에는 등재되지 않은 누호가 많았기 때문에 실제 기민을 선정하는 과정에서는 家坐冊이 활용되었던 것으로 보인다. 가좌책은 호내구성원의 직역·성명·나이를 비롯하여 전답의 유무와 牛馬數 등 경제적 규모까지 일일이 기록한 자료로 지방 사회에서 부세 운영이나 호적 작성의 기초자료가 되었다.³¹⁾ 진휼에 있어서도 기민을 선정할 때 가좌책을 통해 빈부를 구별하고 빈궁한 정도를 파악하였다.³²⁾

원칙적으로 토지를 소유한 자는 진휼 대상으로 논하지 않았으며, 자기 토지가 아니더라도 다른 사람의 전답을 병작하는 자나 商工 등의 행위를 통해 생계를 도모할 수 있는 자, 품을 팔아 입에 풀칠할 수 있는 자들 역시 제외되었다. 친척이나 상전 등이 있어 의지할 곳이 있는 부류도 마찬가지였다.³³⁾ 오직 의지할 곳 없이 당장 진휼곡을 받지 않으면 목숨을 부지할 수 없을 정도로 빈궁한 사람들만을 선정하도록 했던 것이다.

기민은 우선 나이에 따라 16~50세는 壯, 51세 이상은 老, 11~15세는 弱, 10세 이하는 兒로 구분되었다. 이들은 다시 남녀로도 구분되었는데, 이에 따라서 진휼곡을 받는 액수가 달라졌다. 한편으로 절급한 정도에 따라 등급이 나뉘기도 하였다. 1~3등으로 분류하여 가장 위급한 자들을 1등으로 지정하고 그 다음을 2·3등으로 두었다. 등급에 따라서는 진휼곡을 받는 기간이 달라졌는데, 1등기민이 우선적으로 진휼곡을 받고 2·3등기민이 순차적으로 받는 방식이었다.

그런데 진휼이 시행되기에 앞서 선정된 기민의 수는 고정된 채 유지되지는 않았다. 10일 간격으로 이루어지는 분진 때마다 추가 인원을 기입하거나 기존의 기민을 진휼 대상에서 제외하는 작업을 통해 재조정되었기 때문이다. 예를 들어 처음에는 초기에서 누락되었으나 면임이나 친족이 관아에 呈訴하여 추가되기도 하였고, 호의 대표자가 직접 자신의 가족들을 追錄해달라고 요청하기도 했다.³⁴⁾ 반대로 기민으로 선정되었더라도 재조사를 통해 다른 지역으로 이거했거나 스스로 살아갈 수 있다고 판단이 되면 기민에서 제외되었다.

그렇다면 이러한 원칙 아래 진행된 순천부의 초기 결과를 살펴보자. 초기정책이 남아있지 않아 기민들의 등급별 구분은 알 수 없지만 분진 내역을 통해 성별과 나이에 대한 정보는 일부 확인이 가능하다. 순천부에서 선정된 기민의 정보를 정리하면 <그림 2>와 같다.

순천부에서 선정된 기민은 男壯, 女壯, 男女老弱, 男女兒로 나누어졌다. 네 범주로 구분된 기준은 진휼곡을 받는 액수였다. 壯은 남녀에 따라 진휼곡의 수급량이 달라졌지만 나머지는

30) 『丁丑春賑錄』.

31) 가좌책에 대한 연구로는 김용섭, 1995, 「조선후기 무전농민의 문제-『임천군가좌초책』의 분석」 『조선 후기농업사연구』(1), 지식산업사; 허원영, 2013, 「18세기 후반 순천부 농민의 존재양태와 농업경영: 『순천부서면가좌책』(1774) 분석을 중심으로」 『역사문화연구』 47; 김건태, 2020, 「조선후기 호적대장 호구차정 원리-언양현 가좌책을 중심으로」 『대동문화연구』 110; 송양섭, 2020, 「다산 정약용의 호구 운영론-『목민심서』를 중심으로」 『대동문화연구』 110 등을 참고할 수 있다.


32) 원재영, 2018, 「18세기 지방행정과 수령의 역할-충청도 예산현의 사례를 중심으로」 『한국사연구』 182, 317쪽; 『四政考』.

33) 『丁丑春賑錄』; 『賑簿』.

34) 『詞訟錄』(古5125-72).

동일하였으며, 老와 弱은 나이에 따라 구분이 되지만 진휼곡을 받는 액수가 같아 하나로 묶여 있다. 전체 기민 가운데 가장 많은 연령대는 16~50세였다. 남녀를 합치면 16~50세에 해당하는 壯이 전체 기민의 절대 다수를 차지하였다. 물론 16~50세에 해당하는 인구가 많았기 때문일 수도 있지만 기근이라는 비상 상황에서 각별한 선별 작업을 거친 결과이니만큼 선뜻 이해하기는 어렵다.

<그림 2> 순천부 抄飢 결과



진휼 대상자인 기민은 환곡과 달리 호 단위가 아닌 구 단위로 선정되었다. 같은 호 내의 가족구성원이더라도 모든 인원이 기민으로 선정되는 것은 아니었다. 호 내에서도 완급에 따라 일부의 인원만 진안에 등록했기 때문이다. 만약 호의 구성원이 6~7명이라도 보통 3~4명만을 기민으로 등록하도록 하였다.³⁵⁾ 호 내에서 노·약·아가 아닌 壯이 등재된 이유는 호 내의 대표자로서 진휼곡을 받기 위해 왕래가 가능하고 가장 많은 진휼곡을 받을 수 있기 때문으로 짐작된다. 남장이 여장에 비해 많은 현상도 같은 이유였을 것으로 생각된다.

문제는 기민으로 선정되지 못한 인원이 많다는 점이다. 각면에서 일차적으로 선별된 인원을 수량이 한차례 조정하고, 감영에서 다시 조정하여 付賑되는 인원이 최종적으로 정해졌다. 그 과정에서 인원을 줄이면서 진휼 대상자에서 제외되는 경우가 많았다. 이들을 별도로 돌보지 않는다면 사방으로 유산할 가능성이 다분했다. 이에 관아에서는 부민들의 힘을 빌려 이들을 구제하고자 했다.

요민·요호에 대한 조항은 감영 차원에서 규정으로 마련되어 각 고을에 배포되었다.³⁶⁾ 우선 면임들로 하여금 빈잔한 자들을 조사할 때 면내 각동의 富饒戶가 얼마나 되는지 하나하나 파악하여 관아에 보고하도록 하였다.³⁷⁾ 동리의 부요호로 하여금 이웃의 빈잔호를 책임지게 하기 위해서였다. 흉년에 기민을 파악하는 것만큼 요호를 파악하는 것이 중요하다고 언급될 정도였다. 만약 진휼을 돕기에 넉넉한데도 가난하다고 하면서 협조하지 않는 자는 일일이 지명하여 곡물을 징봉한 뒤에 처벌하는 조항을 마련해 두기도 하였다. 기민을 구제하는데 있어서 요호의 참여를 강제한 것이다.

35) 『四政考』.

36) 『丁丑春賑錄』.

37) 이는 다산 정약용이 제시했던 방법과도 유사한 측면이 있다. 정약용은 饒戶를 초록해 등급을 나누어 권분액을 책정한 뒤 그에 따라 飢口를 배당하여 사적으로 구제하는 방식을 제안하였다. 이때 각 요호에게 배당되는 기민은 가족, 인척, 이웃 순으로 정해졌다(송양섭, 2015, 앞의 논문, 196~197쪽).

순천부에서는 요호와 관련된 기록이 구체적이지 않지만 몇 가지 단서를 확인할 수 있다. 먼저 歲前救急의 내역을 통해 요민에게 기민을 분속했다는 사실이 확인된다.³⁸⁾ 순천부사 서정순은 본격적인 분진에 앞서 세전구급을 단행하였다. 세전구급이란 해를 넘기기 전에 가장 궁핍한 자들을 뽑아 곡물을 지급하는 것을 의미한다. 보통 수령의 판단에 따라 12월 하순에 1~2차례 진휼곡을 나누어 주는데, 이때에는 수령의 자비곡만으로 진휼이 이루어진다.³⁹⁾ 순천부에서는 5개 면에서만 세전구급이 시행되었다.

주목되는 부분은 세전구급이 시행되지 않은 나머지 지역이다. 나머지 지역이 세전구급 대상에 포함되지 않은 이유는 요민들에게 기민을 분속했기 때문이었다. 세전구급이 시행된 면에서도 요민들에게 우선 기민을 분속한 뒤에 남은 인원에게만 진자를 지급하였다.⁴⁰⁾ 사실상 모든 지역의 기민을 요민에게 분속했다고 할 수 있다. 공진이 시행되기 전에는 요민들이 기민구제를 책임지고 있었던 것이다. 공진이 시행된 이후에는 초기에서 제외된 가난한 부류들을 요민에게 배정하여 구제하도록 하였다. 요민의 활동은 진휼이 끝날 때까지 이어졌던 것이다.

몇몇 지역은 분진 기간 중에 공진 지역에서 제외되기도 하였다. 곡화목과 방답진의 경우 정월 중순부터 분진이 시작되었는데, 3월 초순과 중순에는 공진을 시행하지 않았다. 두 지역에서는 해당 기간에 사전을 실시했기 때문이었다. 이 때 사전을 통해 분급된 액수는 1천 냥에 가까웠는데, 모두 해당 지역의 요민들이 납부한 것이었다. 이 외에 요민들이 납부한 동전의 일부로 부족한 公錢이나 洞布를 보충하기도 했다. 각면에서 100냥씩 책출하여 기민들이 납부하지 못한 부세를 대신 충당하기도 했는데, 이때에도 요민들이 많은 부분을 부담했을 것으로 예상된다. 이러한 사실들은 진자에는 포함되지 않았으나 요민들이 직·간접적으로 진휼 활동에 참여하고 있었음을 보여준다.

19세기 향촌사회에서는 향회·향약을 비롯하여 면리 단위의 동회·동계 조직을 통해 ‘향중공론’을 형성하여 관과 대립 혹은 타협하면서 각종 현안을 조정해 나아갔다.⁴¹⁾ 이를 주도하는 세력 역시 지역의 유력한 사족이나 요호·부민이었다. 이들은 부세 운영과 같은 향촌 사회의 주요 현안에 참여하였을 뿐 아니라 기근이라는 비상 상황을 맞이해서도 기민 구제에 있어서 일정 부분의 역할을 담당했던 것이다.

4. 진자의 분배와 畢賑 결과

선별 작업을 거쳐 진휼 대상자로 선정된 자들에게는 진휼곡이 지급되었다. 먼저 선정된 기민들에게는 목패가 지급되었다.⁴²⁾ 이 목패를 가져와야만 진휼곡을 받을 수 있었으며, 만약 잃어버릴 경우 진휼곡을 받을 수 없었다. 진휼곡을 직접 받으러 오기 어려운 병자나 노인, 어린 아이의 경우 부자나 형제, 부부에 한하여 목패를 지참해 대신 받는 것이 허락되었다.

순천부사 서정순은 1월부터 시작되는 분진에 앞서 해를 넘기지 못할 것으로 판단되는 기민들을 대상으로 세전구급을 단행하였으며, 이와는 별도로 관아에서는 죽을 나누어 주기도 하였다.⁴³⁾ 1월 초순부터는 본격적인 공진이 시행되었다. 공진은 1월 초순을 시작으로 매달 초순,

38) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

39) 수령자비곡에 대해서는 문용식, 1999, 「조선후기 수령자비곡의 설치」 『조선시대사학보』 9를 참조.

40) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

41) 이와 관련해서는 배향섭, 2014, 「19세기 향촌사회질서의 변화와 새로운 공론의 대두」 『조선시대사학보』 71; 송양섭, 2016, 「19세기 부세 운영과 향중공론의 대두」 『역사비평』 116을 참조.


42) 『賑簿』.

43) 당시 먹을 것을 구하기 위해 관아 근처에서 열린 장시로 기민들이 몰려들었던 듯하다. 순천부사는

중순, 말순으로 나누어 10일 간격으로 한 달에 3차례씩 총 4개월간 진행되었다. 진휼을 마치는 시기는 지역에 따라 차이가 있었는데, 순천부의 경우 4월 말순까지 진자를 분배했다. 규정대로라면 기민을 분등한 결과에 따라 가장 절급하다고 판단되는 기민부터 진자를 분배해야 했다.

그런데 순천부에서는 경내의 각면을 피해 정도에 따라 구분하여 순차적으로 진휼을 시행하였다. 순천부사는 18개 면과 함께 諸島, 곡화목, 고돌산진, 방답진을 우심·지차·초실면으로 구분하였다. 그 결과 우심 7면, 지차 9면, 초실 6면으로 나뉘었는데, 주로 내륙 지역은 지차나 초실인 반면 연해 지역은 우심에 해당했다. 이를 정리하면 <그림 3>과 같다.

<그림 3> 순천부의 면별 재실분등 및 진자 이동



분진은 우심으로 분류된 7개 지역을 우선으로 하여 10일 간격으로 지차, 초실 지역을 추가하는 방식으로 진행되었다. 1월 초순에는 우심 7면에서 진휼을 시행하였으며 나머지 지차·초실면의 기민은 각면의 요민에게 분속되었다.⁴⁴⁾ 1월 중순에는 우심·지차면에서 진휼을 시행하였는데, 이 때에도 초실면의 기민은 요민이 담당했을 가능성이 높다. 1월 말순이 되어서야 모든 지역에서 진휼이 시행될 수 있었다. 기민의 등급에 따라 진휼의 순서를 정하지 않고 면 단위로 분등하여 진휼이 시작되는 순서를 정했던 것이다. 이는 면 단위로 분진이 시행되었기 때문으로 생각된다.

면 단위로 진휼곡의 분배가 이루어지면서 진휼곡을 운송하는 지점도 달라졌다. 기민들에게 분급될 진휼곡은 읍치가 아닌 각 면으로 운송되었다. 기민이 더이상 관아가 있는 읍치로 모이지 않고 각 면의 사창으로 집결하기 때문에 진자도 각 면으로 흩어져야 했다. 도내의 각 군현으로 진자가 분배되듯이 군현 내의 각 면으로 진자가 이송되었던 것이다.

먼저 화순·동북·임실에서 옮겨오는 사창곡은 주암면, 월등면, 송광면으로 들어왔다.⁴⁵⁾ 세 면

관아에 설죽소를 설치하고 12월 22일과 27일에 장시에 모인 기민들을 모이게 하여 쌀과 甘藷를 섞어 만든 죽을 제공하였다(『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』).


44) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

은 순천부의 북쪽에 위치해 있어 육로나 강을 따라 운송할 때 경내로 들어오는 입구에 해당했다. 이곳을 거쳐 각 면으로 다시 분배되었는데, 운송 작업은 진흙이 시행되는 중에도 계속해서 이루어졌다. 한 번에 많은 양을 옮기기 어렵고, 운반에 소모되는 시간도 상당했기 때문이다. 전 기간에 걸쳐 순천부 내에서 이루어졌던 전곡의 이전은 곡물 1,167석, 동전 5274.8냥에 이르렀다. 순천부 내에서도 전곡의 이동이 활발하게 진행되었던 것이다.

결과적으로 순천부 내의 진자는 초실면에서 우심면으로 향했다. 곡물 이동이 가장 활발했던 곳은 읍치인 소안면이었다. 다른 군현에서 옮겨온 전곡의 대부분은 소안면을 거쳐 다시 15개 면으로 분배되었다. 초실면이었던 황전면, 상사면에서도 각각 100석이 넘는 곡물을 다른 면으로 옮겼다.⁴⁶⁾ 상사면의 전곡은 하사면, 별량면은 물론 소라포면, 삼일포면, 울촌면, 여수면까지도 운반되었으며, 황전면의 경우 주로 서면과 해촌면으로 운송하였다. 인접하여 운송이 용이한 지역들 사이에서 곡물 이전이 진행되었던 것이다.

이렇게 옮겨진 진자를 바탕으로 순천부에서는 정월 초순부터 10일 간격으로 4월 말순까지 총 12차례의 분진을 진행하였다. 세전구급까지 더한다면 13차례의 진자 분배가 이루어지는 것이었다. <그림 4>는 세전구급부터 4월 말순까지 진행되었던 순천부의 분진 내역을 정리한 것이다. 꺾은선 그래프는 기민 수를 의미하고 막대그래프는 기민에게 분급되었던 진자의 액수이다. 진자의 경우 2월 말순까지는 미곡으로 지급되다가 3월 초순부터는 동전으로 지급되었는데, 매석 15냥으로 계산되었다.

<그림 4> 세전구급~4월 말순 分賑 결과



전거: 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

세전구급 이후로 정월 말순까지 순천부의 기민 수는 증가하는 추세를 보인다. 정월 초순 우심 7면을 시작으로 정월 중순에는 지차 9면, 정월 말순에는 초실 6면에서 순차적으로 진흙이 시행되었기 때문이다. 정월 말순부터는 순천부 내 모든 면에서 진흙이 시행된 것인데, 이때 진흙곡을 받은 기민은 13,611명이었다. 이후 기민은 4월 중순까지 거의 일정한 수를 유지하였다.

대체로 순천부의 진흙 대상자는 13,600명 내외를 유지했는데, 이는 순천부에서 파악된 호구의 30%에 가까운 인원이었다.⁴⁷⁾ 이들은 자활하는 것이 불가능하다고 판단하여 관에서 집중적

45) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

46) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

으로 구휼하는 대상이었다. 그러나 분급된 진자를 통해 생계를 이어나갔던 사람은 이보다 많았을 것으로 생각된다. 앞서 설명했듯이 같은 호 내의 가족구성원이라도 모두가 기민으로 선정되는 것은 아니다. 이는 기민으로 선정된 사람이 진휼곡을 받아오면 이를 함께 나누는 호내 구성원이 존재했다는 것을 의미한다.

실제로는 더 많은 기민들이 있었을 것으로 생각되지만 순천부에서는 13,600명 내외로 통제하고 있었다. 진자에 한계가 있는 상황에서 계속해서 기민을 늘려나간다면 4월까지 진휼을 이어나갈 수 없기 때문에 일정한 수를 유지했던 것으로 보인다. 기민에 포함되지 않았으나 형편이 넉넉하지는 않은 자들은 대부분 요민에게 배속되거나 환곡을 받았을 것으로 생각된다.

그런데 3월 말순과 4월 초순에는 진자가 분배되지 않은 반면 4월 중순에는 기존과 달리 16,000냥에 가까운 액수가 분배되었다. 이는 임실·동북·화순 등 다른 군현에서 옮겨오는 진자전의 운송이 지체되어 나타난 결과이다.⁴⁸⁾ 이미 순천부 내 전곡이 고갈되어 다른 지역에서 오는 진자가 도착하지 않으면 진휼을 이어갈 수 없었던 것으로 보인다. 3월 말순과 4월 초순에 지급되었어야 할 액수는 4월 말순의 분진 때 한 번에 분급되었다.

4월 말순에는 기민 수와 진자의 액수가 급격히 줄어드는데, 진휼을 마무리 하는 단계에 접어들었다고 이해할 수 있다. 이 시기는 보리 수확이 멀지 않았기 때문에 감영에서는 진휼의 인원을 줄일 것을 지시하였다. 이에 따라 순천부에서도 극히 일부의 기민만을 남겨두었다. 세전구급 때와 마찬가지로 가장 궁핍한 기민들만 진휼 대상자로 남겨두고 나머지는 모두 제외했던 것이다. 4월 말순을 마지막으로 11차례에 걸친 순천부의 분진은 마무리되었다.

마지막으로 순천부사는 그동안의 진휼 내역을 전라감영에 보고해야 했다. 기민들에게 분급한 전곡을 비롯하여 진휼 과정에서 지출된 각종 비용을 정리하여 보고하였다. 앞서 순천부의 진자 수입은 미 1,957석과 전 39,325.43냥이었는데, 지출의 총액은 미 1,969석과 전 39,325.43냥이었다. 수입과 지출의 액수가 거의 일치하는 모습을 보인다. 아마도 진휼을 마친 뒤 내역을 정리하면서 수입과 지출의 오차를 없애기 위해 인위적인 조정이 가해진 것이 아닌가 생각된다. 그럼에도 정리된 내용은 일관된 기준에 따라 진휼곡, 운송비, 체류비 등을 계산하고 있으며, 각 항목의 세세한 내역들이 기록되어 있는 만큼 실제 운영상이 반영되었다고 할 수 있다.

진휼 내역을 항목별로 살펴보면 11차례에 걸쳐 실시된 분진에서는 미 1,922석과 전 30,803.83냥이 사용되었다.⁴⁹⁾ 순천부에서 확보한 실진자의 85% 정도는 진휼 자원으로써 기민들에게 지급되었던 것이다. 실진자라고 하더라도 모두가 기민들에게 분급되었던 것은 아니다. 15% 정도는 진휼 과정에서 발생하는 각종 비용으로 지출되었다.

먼저 순천부 내 혹은 다른 고을의 전곡을 옮겨오는 과정에서 지출된 운송비 및 체류비에 해당하는 駄價와 資錢으로 미 47석 5두 5승과 전 5,903.76냥이 지출되었다.⁵⁰⁾ 전곡을 운반하는 짐꾼으로 보이는 ‘卜軍’ 혹은 ‘負持軍’은 각 지역에서 차출되었는데, 화순·동북·임실에서는 운반하는 전곡에 맞추어 각각 390명, 65명, 400명을 동원하였다. 이 외에도 짐꾼들을 이끌고 운반을 총괄하는 ‘領運監色’이나 장교 및 그들의 하인들이 존재했으며, 이들에게도 운반하는 기간 동안의 체류비가 지급되었다.

나머지는 진휼을 진행하는 과정에서 사용된 잡비를 의미하는 雜下로 처리되었다. 그 가운데

47) 『戶口總數』; 『順天府邑誌』; 『新增昇平志』

48) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

49) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

50) 『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』.

진휼 과정에서 특정 지역이나 대상에게 별도의 진자가 지급되는 경우가 있었다.⁵¹⁾ 또한 읍치에서 진휼을 총괄하는 기구로 보이는 ‘分賑都所’는 1876년 11월 17일부터 이듬해 5월 그믐까지 운영되었는데, 각종 출납 내역을 정리하는데 들어간 紙筆墨價나 전라감영에 보고할 때 들어가는 馬糞 등으로 322.18냥이 사용되었다.

이와 같은 필진 보고를 마지막으로 약 4개월이 넘게 진행되었던 순천부의 진휼은 마무리되었다. 당시 순천부의 진휼 사례는 전국에서도 모범이 되는 사례로 손꼽히기도 했다. 『매천야록』에서는 전라도의 순천부사 서정순과 경기의 진위현령 이승우가 전국에서 가장 진휼을 잘했다는 소문이 났다고 기록하고 있다.⁵²⁾ 순천부의 읍치에서도 순천부사 서정순이 대흉년을 만나 힘을 다해 백성들을 구제했다는 평가가 남아있다.⁵³⁾

5. 맺음말

지금까지 1876~1877년 여수·순천 지역에서 진행된 진휼 과정에 대해서 살펴보았다. 순천부 진휼에 있어서 핵심적인 진자는 각 면에 유치되어 있던 사창곡이었다. 당시 재해가 심각했던 경상도, 전라도, 충청도, 경기 지역에는 모두 사창곡의 유고조가 진자로 지급되었다. 흉년이 닥쳤을 때 사창곡은 진휼곡으로서 기능하고 있었던 것이다.

사창제의 실시는 진휼 운영에 있어서 변화를 야기했다. 우선 가장 큰 특징은 사창제가 면 단위로 시행되면서 진휼 역시 면 단위를 중심으로 전개되었다는 점이다. 진휼곡의 분급은 더 이상 관아에서 이루어지지 않고 면 단위로 설치된 사창에서 시행되었다. 진휼을 주관하는 주체 역시 바뀌었다. 면마다 사수나 분진유사들이 임명되어 사창곡 및 진휼곡의 보관 및 분배를 담당했다. 수령이 총괄하는 구조에는 변함이 없지만 실질적인 운영은 면 단위에서 담당하게 되었던 것이다.

그 가운데 주목되는 것은 부민의 역할이 확대되었다는 점이다. 순천부의 경우 총 진자 가운데 원납곡의 비중은 20% 정도였지만 진휼에 있어서 부민의 실질적인 역할은 그 이상이었다. 진휼 기간 동안 기민으로 선정되지 못한 가난한 부류들의 구제는 지역의 부민들이 담당했으며, 기민들이 내지 못한 각종 부세들도 부민들이 충당하였다. 이러한 행위들은 공식적으로 기록되지 않으나 흉년이라는 비상 상황에서 관민의 부담을 크게 덜어주었을 것으로 생각된다.

이 시기 부민들은 단순히 전곡을 납부하는 것을 넘어 실질적인 기민 구제 활동을 주도하고 있었다. 진휼에 있어서 부민들의 참여는 한두 해에 그치는 것이 아니라 흉년 때마다 반복되었다. 이를 단순히 부민에 대한 수탈 강화로만 설명하기는 어려우며 지역 사회의 공동대응이라는 측면에서 이해할 필요가 있다. 19세기 총액제적 부세 운영에 있어서 공동납의 형태로 대응해 나갔듯 지역의 사족과 부민을 중심으로 기근에 대응해 나갔던 것이다.

이처럼 19세기 중후반에도 환곡제의 문란과는 별개로 지방 사회에서는 기근에 대응한 진휼 사업이 전개되고 있었다. 진휼의 방식과 운영 주체는 달라졌지만 각 단위에서 꾸준히 자연재해와 기근에 대응해 나갔다는 사실은 분명하다. 관은 물론 민간의 영역까지도 지역 사회의 안정을 위해 기민 구제 활동에 참여하고 있었다. 이러한 활동은 가난한 농민들이 기근을 견디고 생계를 이어나가는데 일조했을 것이라고 생각된다.

51) 용두면에서는 세금을 거둘 때 추가로 입록된 기민들에게 별도로 분진을 시행하였으며, 三班의 가족이나 하인들을 대상으로 진자전을 나누어 주었다(『賑資米錢來上及用下區別冊』).

52) 『매천야록』 권1, 上.

53) 『昇平續誌』.

The Self-Diminishing Woman: Resistance through Metamorphosis in the Works of Han Kang

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Abstract:

This paper addresses the relation between embodiment and eco-ambiguity in Han Kang's works "The Fruit of My Woman" (1997) and "The Vegetarian" (2007). Using an interdisciplinary framework that brings together literary, feminist and post-humanist scholarship, I aim to analyse human to plant transformations and the reverberations of such interspecies hybrids in contemporary Korean society. In interpreting this transformation, I will trace it from "root" to "blossom", seeking to define the relationship between marginalization and post-human feminine identities. The paper will highlight how Kang's writings encompass a microcosm of Korean society that not only desires change but pursues it at any cost.

Key Words: Confucianism; Gender; Deleuze; Ecofeminism; Embodiment; Han Kang; trauma

Introduction

Since their publication, the works of Han Kang have attracted public and critical attention, becoming the subject of wide ranging inter and multi-disciplinary discussions. This paper inspects the transformation process undergone by Kang's lead female characters, drawing upon ecofeminism in its interpretation of vegetarianism, food refusal, bodily transfiguration and the implied deep-rooted connection between women and nature.

The seemingly unremarkable women Kang portrays resonate with a large number of real-life counterparts: young urban housewives, whose lives are still deeply impacted by adherence to rigid family structures and traditional values. They are not "wonder women" of rare and exceptional talent, rallying against injustice and dismantling conservative social norms. Indeed,

their rebellious acts may seem modest and often go unnoticed at first or are perceived as a whim by their milieu: this is the case of "*The Vegetarian*"'s main character, Kim Yeong-hye, whose refusal to eat meat triggers a series of events that reverberate through her family unit.

Sustained minor transgressions leave such women marginalized inside their family circle and society at large, whilst also resurfacing hidden personal trauma. For Kang's characters, they eventually set off a metamorphosis process, a physical and metaphorical shedding of both flesh and compliance to conventions from which they emerge with a new identity that defies patriarchal norms. Their post-human form reflects a deeper change of physiology, which enables them to achieve plant-like characteristics. However, the reader is left unsure regarding the viability of such a "body without organs". The aforementioned concept, proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, will be expanded upon in analysing bodily transitions.

Eco-feminist readings of "*The Vegetarian*" and "*The Fruit of my Woman*" have highlighted how both women and nature are "equally victimized by patriarchy" (Anupama and Chithra, 2). The ability of Kang's characters to not only become in tune with the natural world, but a new evolutionary addition bridging species poses complex quarries regarding agency and free-will. The author asserts that the novel derived from her "curiosity over whether a completely innocent human being could exist." (Kang, Kang-Sok). This central question was weaved inside a framework of "violence, beauty, desire, sin, and salvation" (Kang, Kang-Sok).

Assessing the status of Kang as an author is a necessary step in constructing the research framework and showcases her prominence in a "hierarchical, conservative, and overwhelmingly male literary establishment of scholars and literary critics (often one and the same)" (Fulton, 131). Born in 1970, Kang counts among her literary accomplishments, the twenty-fifth Korean Novel award ("*Baby Buddha*", 1999), the Yi-Sang Literary Award ("*Mongolian Mark*", 2005) and the Dong-ni Literary Award ("*Breath Fighting*", 2010). Both "*Baby Buddha*" and "*The Vegetarian*" were adapted into feature films, with the former being screened at the Busan and Sundance Film Festival to Korean and international acclaim. In 2016, Han has been awarded the Man Booker International Prize for her novel, "*The Vegetarian*".

It must however be emphasized that the transmutations suffered by the female body in "*The Fruit of My Woman*" and "*The Vegetarian*" are not a singular episode in the South Korean landscape. On the contrary, they highlight the adjacency and transposition of the corporal and the environmental as a literary motif. Ryoo Bo Sun states that "*The Vegetarian*" is part of the long-standing tradition of the body as a site of regulation, a micro-cosm of the strictly-enforced

social order. The researcher identifies two tendencies: that of the docile body and the violence to which it may be subjected, developed in the works of writers such as Hwang Jungeun, Cheon Un-yeong and Kim Young-ha. The second trend is the embodiment of an alternative body, which, through its differences, becomes exempt from the mechanisms of social control. This approach is especially present in the work of contemporary women writers, such as Moon Chung-hee and Kim Sun-Woo and Han Kang.

The incarnation of the transgressive body as a human-plant hybrid is present both in the work of Han Kang and Lee Seung-U and Kim Un-su. Although Kang has gained the most international recognition, Bo Sun highlights that Korean literature "does not begin and end" with "*The Vegetarian*". There are many other cultural productions and especially literary ones, in which the body (mostly female) is subjected to a process of metamorphosis, which excludes it from existing social paradigms.

East Asian societies are still deeply wrapped up in the doctrine of Confucianism, which regards human beings not as a single entity, but rather as the amalgamation of all other entities such as nature, animal and non-human beings. In Confucius's point of view, there is no absolute man or woman, because their existence is entangled and dependent on all other elements of the natural order. This further determines how gender rules are elaborated and imposed. If a person is embodied in a masculine or a feminine body, that person is circumscribed to act in a certain way and handle a certain role in society. To maintain the sustainability and consistency of this web of relationships, one has to abide to the implied gender roles. Therefore, the individual choice has no role in it, since there is no single entity in existence.

According to Anthony O'Hear (2014, 109) if a woman violates the very strict rules in which she should behave and live under Confucianism, she is not only diminishing the personal self, but she diminishes the self that exists in the web of social and natural relationships, damaging the reciprocal existence of the whole entities. Hence, it turns into a deadly sin for women to forgo their assigned role and disturb this delicate equilibrium. Such ancient rules still affect the life and the wellbeing of Korean women in terms of their freedom of expression and independence. In spite of laws which ensure women's equality, the Confucian customs and practices demand women to hold on to and fulfill the domestic roles promoted by them. As a result of the constant subjugation from men, Korean women start to use film, literature and art as a platform to question the gender inequality prevailing around them.

Confucian ideology, therefore, offers a framing both for the author's ascent and the narratives she puts forth. Kang's generation of writers has altered the traditional publishing structure, with a marked increase in the number of published women writers and women with important positions in the field. Subject-wise, they also offered a marked departure from their '70s and '80s forerunners through their concentration on seemingly trivial aspects of ordinary women's existence. These mundane experiences are often correlated with minutely recorded bodily "sensescapes", whose intricacies are often lost to Western audiences. Translator Deborah Smith asserts that, in aiming to reach out to a global audience, the international promotion of "*The Vegetarian*" left the author's nationality: "though not effaced, (...) also not foregrounded" (Smith). The present analysis draws away from cultural homogenization, taking into regard both eco-feminist and neo-Confucian ideals.

Methodology

The present study aims to identify ecofeminist, transhumanist and posthumanist discourse in Kang's works, "*The Fruit of My Woman*" and "*The Vegetarian*". Written in 1997, the short story "*The Fruit of My Woman*" is considered a forerunner of "*The Vegetarian*", outlining several elements that are fleshed out in the novel. Along these two main sources, a literature review was comprised, with a focus on recent scholarship. Finally, interviews of author Han Kang and translator Deborah Smith were included for further insight into the works' creation and the challenges of translating the text into English.

Rincy Chandran and Geetha R. Pai trace the origins of eco-feminism to its origins in the 1970s and the works of Rachel Carson and Françoise d'Eaubonne, who assert that women "have an affirmative and a close relationship with nature." Moreover, their oppression is interlinked and the liberation of one is impossible without the other. Furthermore, as Devika Kakkat and Sulagna Mohanty underline, in postmodern feminist theory partaking in animal consumption becomes an "instrumental tool" (221). This action has a "fundamental role in distinguishing vegetarian ecofeminism from ecofeminism" (224). In the context of Korean society, it is heavily linked with tradition, from the abundance of meat dishes at family meals to Yeonghye's memories of the killing and eating of the dog that bit her during childhood.

The late 20th century post-structuralist French philosophers, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari postulated about the use of the body as a shield against the status quo. In their magnum-opus *Anti-Oedipus* (2009) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), the two theorists propose the

reinterpretation of benchmark concepts of Western philosophy. One of the concepts they put forth is that of the Body without Organs and Desire. Instead of highlighting the duality of body and mind, Deleuze probed into their continuity and uniformity. The body becomes detached from the usual constraints of the organs, experimenting changes in interoception, and undergoing a process of destratification which may turn fatal. Yeong-hye's body is owned by her, or so it seems: the very concept, however, has different meanings in patriarchal, hierarchical societies, with the mere act of refusing to sustain it with meat becoming an act of protest. As Diane Hunter states, the "body signifies what social conditions make it impossible to state linguistically" (272).

Yoo Jin Choi (2013) examines "*The Vegetarian*" in terms of male violence inflicted on the female psyche and body. Yeong-hye's transformation marks a departure from the Confucian principles of the "wise mother, good wife" that have persisted to this day, as Korean women now juggle paid employment with the responsibilities of family life. The critiques brought by the character's husband and father rest upon what is perceived as an inadequacy in fulfilling wifely and filial duties. Choi notes that the dream which determines Yeong-hye to forsake meat signifies female suffering in a male-dominated society. He frames the hut depicted in her life-changing dream as a patriarchal stronghold, whilst the chunks of hanging meat are visual representations of its ideology, which women are forced to consume. Its rejection implies potential ostracization, at the same time implying a wild space, outside of male dominated social ones.

Magdalena Zolkos (2019) challenges the Aristotelian claims of plants as extraneous organisms, situated at the basis of the hierarchy of living things. The researcher relies on the post-metaphysical scholarship of Luce Irigaray and Michael Marder, making use of the concept of "plant idioms", to showcase that the vegetal is not inferior. Far from it, whilst "*The Vegetarian*" is "not explicitly named as a work of ecocriticism" (Zolkos, 103), it is still a worthy addition to the "vegetal turn", taking place in literature and approaching plants innate intelligence and soul, a change from the concept of "plants as incomplete and ontologically deficient beings" (Zolkos, 103)

Irigaray explores "the idea of vegetal life as non-violent, non-oppositional, and non-appropriative." (Zolkos, 105). It seems the life Yeong-hye desires as she steps away from patriarchal control: "leaves were growing from my body, and roots were sprouting from my

hands...so I dug down into the earth. On and on...I wanted flowers to bloom from my crotch, so I spread my legs; I spread them wide..." (*The Vegetarian*, 124)

In an interview with Bethanne Patrick, Kang states that the novel is multi-layered in its approach to violence, innocence and madness, with all their theoretical and practical intersections. Furthermore, she asserts that "this novel isn't a singular indictment of the Korean patriarchy" (Patrick, 9). However, the author is known to approach violent Korean events such as the 1980 Gwangju Massacre. Adelia Savitri highlights the presence of "han" in Kang's works, a Korean literary concept which may be described as "an element of suffering repeated until on the climax of sorrow" (1).

Analysis

"*The Fruit of My Woman*" portrays the dynamics of an anonymous Korean couple living in an urban environment and leading a seemingly typical life. The wife, aged twenty-nine, is undergoing a series of physical and psychological changes, which are described by the husband with disarming sincerity. He begins to notice bruises that "bloom" (Kang, *Fruits*) on the wife's body, which starts to suffer strange symptoms that affect her inherently feminine and aesthetic qualities.

Physical transformations are accompanied by the impossibility of consuming food, interpreted differently by the two partners. The husband evokes an episode from the recent past when, three years prior to the onset of the transformation, the wife wanted to abandon her relationship and, implicitly, her position in the social order. The desire to escape from a conventional lifestyle, in a patriarchal atmosphere, is expressed by women not so much as an act of feminist independence, but as a primordial feminine act. The metamorphosis of her existence is physiologically linked to a "desire for re-bleeding" (Kang, *Fruits*), to replace a degraded blood, which pollutes her body. Unable to carry out her plans to the end, she remains trapped in the typical existence of a young married woman, now resigned as a housewife.

As her condition worsens, the wife is repeatedly asked to submit to another incarnation of the patriarchal gaze, namely the medical one. Described by Michel Foucault in "The Birth of the Clinic" (1963), this way of looking transforms the individual, which needs to be observed,

examined and classified. The memory of a consultation performed by an elderly male doctor (himself at the top of the Confucian social order) reaffirms the connection between social and physical surveillance.

The inner changes such as organ atrophy thus become a double act of disobedience: In the first place, the body which the doctor supposedly fails to properly diagnose has become opaque, impenetrable to a gaze that though supposedly impartial to the male gaze: “Everything was declared ‘normal’. Stomach, liver, uterus, kidneys, they’re all fine” (Kang). Kang juxtaposes the wives’ anguish “Why couldn’t he see that these organs were slowly atrophying, soon to disappear?” The inner transformation of the body which sheds its human-like qualities is denied by the patriarchal medical gaze. The husband implies that a knowledge of self and familiarity with the inner are expected: “You know your own body, so you have to keep it in order, no?”. The inner body, must also be kept in strict order.

The wife undergoes the last stages of transformation into a plant hybrid under the care of her husband, who seems impassable to the absurdity of the situation. The gradual change anchors her in a border space (the balcony of the apartment), which is not completely inside and outside. The wife will lead a vegetal existence, watered (ie fed) and cared for by the husband, which clearly notes the transformations suffered. His lips intertwine, forever depriving her of her voice, but her wife's monologue reveals this transformation not as a deprivation, but as a form of archetypal, primitive, intense existence, even in the absence of the senses (Kang, Fruits).

This post-human existence is marked by the rhythms of nature, and adherence to a botanical life cycle: the change of seasons brings the fall of leaves that have replaced the hair and limbs of the wife, as well as palpable proof of the fertility of the natural world. The husband, without biological children, consumes some of the fruits grown on the consort-plant and plants the others next to his withered body. (Kang, Fruits). The body without organs has not lost its potential fertility. The line between nature and the supernatural is blurred, whilst in “*The Vegetarian*” it seems to everyone apart from the main character that the supposed transformation is the outward manifestation of mental illness.

The protagonist of the novel “*The Vegetarian*”, Kim Yeong-hye, is framed from three different perspectives: the reader comes to know Yeong-hye through the eyes of her husband, brother-in-law and, finally, her sister; each point of view being expanded on through a chapter.

Becoming a vegetarian stirs the family male violence “which is exhibited in verbal, physical, and sexual abuses.” (Choi, 25). She is slapped and forced to ingest meat, her resistance further provoking male anger.

Yeong-hye is a typical housewife, whose existence is built around her husband and family. Her refusal to eat meat is not the first outward sign of rebellion: she does not wear a bra and make-up, and chooses to not subject herself to cosmetic surgery. Zolkos identifies Yeong-hye’s passivity as an early sign of “already present vegetal proclivities” (112), establishing her plant-like characteristics even before her rejection of meat. Her husband would prefer her to comply with the prevalent norms of femininity, in order to improve her social image and, implicitly, his own. However, none of these small acts of dissent comes close to the refusal to consume meat, which sets forth a series of event that ripple through the family structure, forever altering it.

Her husband objectifies her, bluntly stating: “Before my wife turned vegetarian, I’d always thought of her as completely unremarkable in every way. To be frank, the first time I met her, I wasn’t even attracted to her” (*The Vegetarian*, 10). He rates her body and compares her with more conventionally-attractive women and is concerned about the hierarchy inside the couple. Won-Chung Kim considers that the relationships between characters “challenges binaries” (13). When it comes to domestic tasks, Yeong-hye’s role as a daughter and wife implies that she took part in preparing the cuisine of a “carnistic society” (Kim, 15). As the same time, the husband withdraws from caring for her, a task he may perceive as feminine.

The condition of the protagonist of the novel “*The Vegetarian*” is classified as pathological by doctors, who see in her behavior the symptoms of a mental disorder, and treat it with force: “I need to water my body. I don’t need this kind of food, sister. I need water.” (Kang, 124); „I don’t need to eat anymore.” (Kang, 124). Cornelia Macsiniuc analyzes the transgressive character of her supposed anorexic body. Macsiniuc brings to the fore the research conducted by Richard Gordon. He notes the connection between eating disorders in women and identity problems. As in other East Asian countries, such conditions are not commonly discussed in South Korea. The social transformations that have taken place since the 1990s have represented “an enormous and rapid cultural transition” (Gordon, 7). Anorexia has come to the attention of the public and led to debates about the pressures that women are subjected to. In the case of the protagonist of the novel “*The Vegetarian*”, the refusal to eat does not seem to be related to her body image.

Macsiniuc emphasizes that Yeong-hye does not fit into the biomedical discourse of anorexia in contemporary medicine, the symptoms being connected, in her case, with a spiritual experience (105). An article published in 2017 by the leading medical periodical *The Lancet* (Marchalik and Jurecic, 2017) asserts that Kang “refuses to romanticise or mystify mental illness in her novel, and offers no closing moments of redemption and no silver linings” (147). In the novel, her weightloss is often framed in connection with her sexuality: “Is Yeong-hye trying to turn herself back into a preadolescent? She hasn’t had her period for a long time now, and now that her weight has dropped below thirty kilos, of course there’s nothing left of her breasts. She lies there looking like a freakish overgrown child, devoid of any secondary sexual characteristics” (*The Vegetarian*, 127). Yeong-hye’s encounter with her artist brother-in-law may also be framed through the lens of ecosexuality and sexoecology: “he saw that the whole of his penis was stained green. A blackish paste was smeared over his skin from his lower stomach to his thighs, a fresh sap which could have come from either her or him (Kang, 96).

Sexual plurality characterizes the plantworld which, as Zolkos asserts based on the writing of Irigaray, “has the status of the *unthought*—it is not simply an act of omission, but a deliberate and systemic erasure” (107). Fecundity is linked to the natural world and, rather than being centred on procreation, it includes “the pullulation and exuberance of voluptuous desires, sensual pleasures and amorous gestures.” (Zolkos, 107). Thus, “there is *something plant-like* about intimacy and sexuality. Humans and plants are continuous beings in their sensorial orientation towards the other.” (Zolkos, 109). Zolkos uses Irigaray’s vegetal idioms of roots, as continuity and breath, as contiguity to interpret intercourse apart from the male sexual gaze. The brother-in-law, who paints her body with flowers, a dermal transposition with the natural world, is fascinated by her mongolian mark, a pigment deposit recalls “something ancient, something pre-evolutionary, or else perhaps a mark of photosynthesis” (Kang, 83). Her body seems to exude a type of natural energy that is “more vegetal than sexual” (Kang, 83).

Sister In-hye notices the brutality of the methods by which the medical staff strives to keep his sister alive: “The doctor's white robe, even his rolled-up sleeves, is full of splashes of Yeong-hye's blood. In-hye is absent from the bloody pattern on the robe, which gives it the impression of a huge vortex of stars.” (Kang, 237). The author emphasizes the viscosity of Yeong-hye, who still possesses a body kept alive by blood, and not by vegetable sap. The medical system is a representation of patriarchal society and how the male and medical gaze overlap. As in the case of her husband and father, doctors expect submission, and administer violent maneuvers.

As Yeong-hye resists, she will be disciplined, sent to another medical center, where she will undergo further investigations and interventions: “We have to transfer her to Central Hospital. Please go to Seoul. To solve the problem of gastrointestinal bleeding, they will have to inject proteins through one of the carotids. The effect will not be lasting, but it is the only way it can be kept alive.” (Kang, *Vegetarian* 237). Her relationship with Yeong-hye is perhaps the only truly non-violent one in the novel.

Conclusions

Kang’s writings breach the boundaries between human and non-human animals, the vegetal and anthropogenic world, uniting them in a post-human paradigm. The woman-plant or woman-hybrid lives in a deterritorialized body, which is no longer inwardly or outwardly subjected to the male gaze and its implied violence.

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Desire and Sin: Family Conflict in Korean Queer Cinema

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Abstract: In the late 20th century, South Korea gave birth to a large number of novel but controversial cinematic art works. In these works, queer groups are rejected by society because of their unique sexual orientation. On the one hand, they cannot get rid of their own natural special physical desires, on the other hand they are constantly struggling with their families. This strong conflict between sin and desire runs through almost all queer topics in Korean queer films from the end of last century. First of all, this conflict is embodied in the image of queer facing the family. Images can be roughly divided into three categories: resistant, obedient and avoidant queer images. Secondly, this paper explores the consequences of family conflict in the films. Only small part of them, which can be counter intuitive, ended with a bad ending such as family breakup or new construction of family. In most of them, conflicts are deliberately avoided or wisely solved, which I attribute to a traditional discourses emphatic about stableness in family and personal relationship.

Although the film works can not really realize the change and resolve the differences between queer and family. However, they enables the directors to vividly record the individual resistance experience and the history of group resistance. As long as queer group and family and society cannot reach a moral reconciliation, this debate will continue, and queer film works will inevitably continue to prosper.

Keywords: Queer Cinema, Korea, Family Conflict

Introduction

As a longtime marginalized existence, homosexuals have been deprived of discourses in a heterosexual society dominated by patriarchy. Homosexuality is still a taboo in most countries and the world. It is without doubt difficult for homosexuals to disclose their identity in the social and family context. Under the obscuration of mainstream values and cultural views, homosexuality and its culture can only survive in a dark corner. However, the film makers seem to have been an alliance with queer subcultures. Filmmakers express their personal thoughts and emotions with this special genre, writing about the survival and emotions of marginalized groups. Under the dominance of the traditional concept that heterosexuality has formed a complete set of values and structural concepts, and that heterosexuality is the only natural way of sexual behavior and emotional expression, queer cinema break this taboo. Also more inclusiveness and openness of society brought an increasing number of films with homosexuality as the theme. When these film works reflect the family conflicts, they discuss more concretely from multiple perspectives such as individual emotions, social conflicts, and family relationships.

American scholar Vito Russo categorized "queer texts" into "subtext" and "hidden text" in his book *Celluloid Closet*. "Subtext" is not necessarily a homosexual theme at the first glance, but will arouse special attention from homosexual viewers through spots such as male bodies, ambiguous eye contact between men, etc. . "Hidden text" underlines a theme of homosexuality explicitly or otherwise in an undetectable and secretive depth. This paper defines the homosexual films of the research as films that

explicitly take homosexuality as the theme or homosexual love as an important plot, that is, strictly queer films.

Through the history of Korean queer films, we can find the an increasingly important role of family. Before entering the 21st century, both queer couples that constitute a homosexual relationship in Korean queer films often do not have a complete or clear family background. More often, they are exposed as an independent individual. However, after entering the 21st century, family background, queer family situations, and conflicts within queer families appear in most queer films. Kim and Singer (2011) divided Korean queer cinema into mainly three periods, namely the Invisible Age (1976–1998), the Camouflage Age (1998–2005), the Blockbuster Age (2005–present). In this progress, Korean queer films are exposing a more “visible” sense of queer desire and real living condition. Arising of family conflicts in Korean queer cinema roughly corresponds with the latter two periods: the Camouflage Age (1998–2005), and the Blockbuster Age (2005–present). The films at stake in this paper span from *Broken Branches* (1996) to *Method* (2017), which differ from previous queer films whichi are lack of family conflict scenes.

Family conflict is a presumable, natural, and sometimes avoidable after queer people coming out considering their constructive conflict with heterosexuality, which through family carries out and is thus being reinforced. To be specific, heterosexuality refers to the superiority that surrounds the social behavior and cultural system of heterosexuality. Such as loyal partnerships, marriages and heterosexual families with both parents. The stronger manifestation of heterosexuality is to deny and derogate

any behavior, identity, relationship, and community that do not conform to the heterosexual model, that is, homosexuality and its culture.

Absolute homosexual partnerships often experience ups and downs and even break up due to huge social and family pressures. According to Michael Warner's analysis, heterosexuality is considered the only normal sexual orientation in the society in which we live (Michael 1991). Heterosexuality is not only constructed as a dominant emotional way by society, but also taken for granted. Institutionally rational heterosexuality constitutes a legal and social and sexual relationship standard that meets people's expectations. Through marriage and other marriage-based institutional arrangements, heterosexual orthodoxy turns into a powerful natural law.

Family, as the first executor and supervisor of the heterosexual system, has a profound and important influence on the gender and sexual awareness of its members. It provides a material-based living environment, heterosexual model, and heterosexual organization to be responsible for a male or female in the physiological sense is taught to be a heterosexual man and woman, that is, a person with masculine or feminine qualities. "Gay identity is defined and socially positioned in relation to family in these texts in that ... it appears as a problem within the networks of kinship obligations that constitute the family and bind the individual into it, and this trope constitutes a site of cultural hybridity and contradiction in which both selfhood as psychology or personality and selfhood as family role are rewritten."(Berry 2001, 213)

So in the following chapters, I will focus on the family conflicts in Korean queer films, to explore different types of queers facing or dealing with family conflicts. And

then I will analyze what cinematic ending the family conflicts led to in these films, by which we can get a grasp on some traits along with changes of Korean queer cinema.

Different Types of Queer Images

The identification of homosexuality, traditionally referring to coming out the closet can be divided into different phrases. The first is identification of one's own sexual orientation, and secondly disclosure to family and friends, and finally, to be recognized by society. Coming out is the most important life experience for queer people, and it plays a key role in establishing gay communities and supporting the gay liberation movement. However, when they come out, things do not normally go smoothly. Barry D. Adam's research on East Asian queer films found that modernity and globalization have promoted the emergence of new local gay identities, but the construction of East Asian queer identities is a complex process. The imitation of the western queer identity confronted a local traditional culture, to some extent, Asian values. The discord could be found in that queer people "both fulfils his family obligations and simultaneously produces a space for his gay identity within the family" (Berry 2001, 218). As Altman points out, this gay identity is something adopted from Western culture but necessarily hybridized in its transplantation into various local Asian cultures(Altman 1995). They counter both local and neo-colonial forces and discourses that objectify, oppress, or are simply blind to the existence and specificity of East Asian gay identities and cultures(Berry 2001, 213). Thus, family conflict is expected in Korea where the discourses of globalization and internalization of queer community confront the local ideology. The image of queer in the family is a concentrated manifestation of individual inner contradictions and social and cultural contradictions in queer film works.

1. Resistant Queer Images

The queer images in the films struggle between instinctive desires and the shackles of the traditional concepts conducted and strengthened by the family. In the face of conflicts, some people have the courage to resist the patriarchy in the family environment, and use their own maverick words and deeds to show a sharp and alternative queer image. After suffering from broken family relationships and unfair treatment, the sharp rebels in the queer film began to use radical and courageous words and deeds to resist the rigid family dogma. Once their natural sexual orientation of homosexuals has always been suppressed, this will force them to break through the moral bottom line and engage in various homosexual deviance behaviors as a signal of resistance.

Resistant queer images are mostly male homosexuals who had relatively more right of speech than their female counterparts in a patriarchal society. It comes to a head around the expectation that a son will get married and produce children to continue the patriarchal family line, as is expected in societies and cultures whose values have been informed by Confucianism (Hall and Ames, 1987, 1995). Thus, homosexual sons inevitably face conflicts between their family roles and their sexual identities (Berry 2001, 216).

No Regret (2006) is the first film in the history of Korean cinema that has a gay bar as a background. The film was released in less than two weeks from November 16, 2006, and the number of viewers exceeded 30,000. Soomin, who grew up in an

orphanage, came to Seoul to seek him out. One day he was hired to drive for Jae-min. As soon as he saw Soo-min, he liked him and suggested to him about his gay identity, but Soo-min rejected his kind intention and quit his job as a driver. The factory where Soomin worked started to lay off employees. Soomin, who had nowhere to go, finally left her pride and went to work in a gay bar. About to marry the fiancée arranged by the family, Jaemin goes to Soomin without hesitation. Although Soomin refused repeatedly, he found that his heart was gradually tied to Jaemin, and finally the two of them fell in love inevitably. The family conflict, though not a main plot, but an important turning point reaching to the climax of the film, Jaemin's mother found out about this relationship. Their love was at an impasse. Jaemin was in pain in the face of reality and love. Facing the conflict, in the film, Jaemin confessed his real thought to his fiancée, a “quasi-family”, in the elevator, “I’m sorry, the man we just passed by. He is the person I love.” Jaemin, therefore, as a rebel to patriarchy and heterosexuality at the expense of family stableness and “heterosexual benefits”, should account for a resistant queer image in Korean queer cinema. Compared with other types, resistant images are well recognized their own identity and are fully aware of their queerness. “The main characters of *No Regret* show no sign of doubt about their sexual orientation; feel neither shame nor guilt about their homosexuality. Just as heterosexuality is considered biologically natural in the romance film genre, *No Regret* adopts the strategy to make homosexuality look innate and natural” (Ch’oe 2009, 38)

In the face of family conflicts, there are actually not many rebellious queer images in Korean cinema. Even in *No Regret* (2009), though Jaemin refused to marry the

woman his family arranged, there is no obvious conflict scene with his mother, the representative of “fatherhood.” Especially when compared with Western queer films, this lack of sex scenes, which could be visually appalling to non queers, is particularly prominent. Specifically, Western queer films have a radical and exposed attitude towards the patriarchal system including but not limited to *Soldier's Girl*(2003), *Die Welle* (2009), *The Danish Girl* (2015), while Korean queer movies are more euphemistic and implicit. Korean gay movies mostly focus on the individual, expressing emotional experiences through beautiful and euphemistic storylines.

2. Obedient Queer Images

In many Korean queer films, most of the queer people we have seen are submissive images who suppress themselves and refuse to come out. This situation basically corresponds to the real situation, because the proportion of people who bravely explain their homosexuality to relatives and friends is very small. In addition to concealing individual special orientations which could make them marginalized, queer people seek mainstream understanding and support.

In the film *Our Love Story* (2016), Yunjoo, who was studying fine arts, met a girl who often caught her attention while preparing for the graduation show. Yunjoo felt warmth in the eyes of the opponent collided with him accidentally, and was gradually attracted by the Jiseo, who is doing part-time jobs. They had a great time before Jiseo was forced forced to go on a blind date. Being fully aware of her queer identity and

what she want, though, Jiseo still go to meet the man and even thought about embracing a man's love due to her father's expectation and obligation.

When she chat with the boy, she herself recognized that what she said and behaved in front of people, namely heterosexual people, was completely disguise. She is disguising herself in the overall sense, denying herself and her queer identity almost completely. The roles she played in Seoul and her hometown are basically different. Normally, coming out generally goes through several stages. Before revealing homosexuality to others and the society, homosexuals first need to come out to themselves. Because homosexuals grow up in a social environment dominated by heterosexual concepts, the socialization process they experience makes them also deny and devalue homosexuality, refuse to accept their own homosexuality, and develop hatred of themselves. This is internalized homophobia. If one dares to face it and show courage, then it is not a problem. This is actually the core narrative and moral logic in the film.

Also, we can see same logic in other lesbian films such as *Memento Mori* (1999), and *Ascetic* (1976). In these films, constructing the subjectivity of lesbians in the film, lesbian discourse is to use sisterhood and same-sex love as a reliable emotional refuge in the disappointment of men and the frustration of heterosexuality. This mode of expression reflects the influence of the acquired social environment on the formation of homosexuality. Same-sex friendship often becomes a space to show women's struggle against patriarchal society and their own emotional appeals. However, when they came back from queer relationship to family and other

patriarchal domains, they strategically conceal their romance, and act obedient as other heterosexual females do.

3. Avoidant Queer Images

Avoidant queer images differ from obedient queer images in that the latter has already finished self identification whereas the former consciously or unconsciously refuses recognizing self as queer in order to avoid family conflict. In Korean society, or saying in a more safer way, in K-dramaland, it is more common for queers to pretend to be a heterosexual lifestyle. In most cases, they not only have to deceive themselves and force self-denial, but also openly criticize the criminal nature of homosexual behavior and endure. The self-identification of homosexuality is relatively simple for some people, but for others it is full of difficulties and struggle. The cognition and confirmation of sexual identity is full of challenges to people reared in solid traditional culture. Contemporary homosexuals often bear the constraints of traditional morals and ethics on themselves. Although the society recognizes the identity of homosexuals, it cannot reasonably explain their identity, which leads to suspect of their own identity, hesitation and confusion. This confusion can be understood as the suppression of one's own instinctive desires in order to avoid family conflicts. It is a strategic way of cognition.

Avoidant queer images appear the most in Korean queer cinema, mostly are characterized as men with heterosexual wife. One typical example could be a recent Korean film *Method* (2017). In the film, a senior actor Jaeha and a popular idol

Youngwoo come to play a gay couple in a stage play. Youngwoo's attitude is arrogant and careless, which makes Jaeha, who is always devoted to performances, angry. The two often quarrel during rehearsals. During a certain rehearsal, Jaeha's superb performance touched Youngwoo, and he began to seriously devote himself to the performance. Jaeha, before starting practicing the play, was by all means a heterosexual with beloved wife Heewon. After meeting Youngwoo, however, the two gradually became affectionate and fell into the entanglement of love and hatred that is difficult to distinguish between the world in play and in reality. Jaeha, a heterosexual man turning into a homosexual man, or saying in another way, original and "inborn" homosexual man, falls in trouble of self-identification. These avoidant queer images maintain a heterosexual image that is almost indistinguishable from the public impression. They conceal their true sexual orientation, hoping to reduce the risk of revealing their true identity with uniform dress and posture, and try to use herd behavior to obliterate their relationship with mainstream heterosexual society.

These avoidant queer images under the disguise of heterosexuality have made many deceptive behaviors, but this also truly shows the plight of the queer group in the real situation. In a society dominated by heterosexuality, especially in Korea and other Asian countries that are deeply influenced by Confucian thought, heterosexuality has made blatant discrimination against queer groups. In order to ensure their normal life, queer people have to pretend and deceive to avoid harm from their surroundings. However, as Florance Tamagne pointed out in his book *Homosexuality in Europe*, the identity of homosexuality is formed around two parts: self-discovery and the gaze of

others. So without a self-discovery and with constant avoidance to facing selves directly, these characters fail in achieving a satisfying affinity.

After the Conflict

Qualities in queer people in many cases can contradict with those of family. Family, as well as society, asks for stableness, fixedness, and immovability to stay safe and secure. Queer community, however, is orthodoxically characterized, and in many cases, stigmatized as fluid desire, open relationship, and wandering identity. This structural conflict can contribute to a flourishing scenes of family conflict. What comes after the conflict basically depends on the original stableness of family, willingness of queer people, and affinity developed between heterosexual family members and queer people.

1. Breakdown

Breakdown indicates the falling apart of family after serious conflict and complete reconstruction of all traditional family relationships is highly destructive of postmodernism. Homosexuality is generally recognized as a moral evil or mental illness, which obliterates the legitimacy of homosexuality as a natural sexual orientation. There is a natural contradiction between the social taboos of homosexuality and the homosexual behavior of individuals. However, awakening in queer group this repression and resistance power to queerness is always bring out the best in each other and reinforce each other in the confrontation. They are connected by a complex and active mechanism of mutual stimulus.

Breakdown scene is not hard to find in many western films, partly because of many of the resistant type of queer people, the biggest fuse to the breakdown. The

popular TV series *Position* produced by FOX in the United States fully demonstrates the rejection of homosexuals by Christian families and further collapse of family relationship. High school student Rick grown up in a very conservative Christian family, but his father showed unbearable anger after discovering Rick's gay identity. He punished Rick with violence and expelled him from the house. However, similar family collapse endings in Korean queer movies are rare. This can be understood as the self-consistent world in the film and the characters' pursuit of a "sense of stability". In order to maintain the stability of the family and the environment in which they live, queer people do not hesitate to suppress their inner desires and obey the rules of family and intimate relations established by their parents. On the contrary, a sublime breakdown type exists, that is original one partly breakdown with new one building up. In *Hello, My Love* (2009), Hojeong and her boyfriend Wonjae have been in love for many years, and their relationship has always been very good. Now, Wonjae is studying in France. Hojeong only waits for him to return to Korea and they are ready to get married. However, when Wonjae returned to Hojeong's side, Hojeong found that he was a little weird and strange. It turned out that while studying in France, Yuan met a man named Donghwa. After the two got along for a long time, they even had a bromance relationship. Hojeong was heartbroken when she learned this, she couldn't accept it that she was "defeated" by a man. However, Hojeong's perseverance did not make her give up this relationship. On the contrary, she promised to keep this secret for Wonjae, in the premise of that Wonjae dates her for another month. In this case, traditional heterosexual relationship and prenuptial family structure were broke down,

though there is no literally intense conflict. Same story line and structure could be found in *Desire* (2002). For a long time, Rosa and Kumin have enjoyed a peaceful and happy married life, but just recently, Rosa found that her husband's whereabouts were a bit strange. Rosa, who was suspicious, began to suspect that her husband had a lover outside. Rosa, who was suffering from jealousy, decided to use her own strength to find this third party hiding behind her husband. Through tracking, Rosa finally witnessed the true face of this third person, however, she found out that the husband's lover is not a glamorous young woman, but a male prostitute with an enchanting posture. For a while, Rosa does not know what to do. Gradually, Rosa found that the figure of the male prostitute occupies all of her brain, and she was inexplicably attracted to him. After thousands of times, the two finally crossed the taboo line. In this sense, heterosexual relationship broke down and a new relationship structure, which is but not limited to homosexual relationship, began gaining its weight.

2. Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a most promising result for queer group after a family conflict, where in most cases heterosexual parents share empathy with their queer children and develop deep understandings. In *In Between Seasons* (2016), Soohyun and Yongjoon are homosexual young boys who love each other. Soohyun is kind, innocent and cheerful, and lives with her mother. Yongjoon committed suicide due to his father's early death and his mother suffered from depression, which caused him to become taciturn and gloomy. Soohyun's positivity and warmth touched Yongjoon, and he took

Yong Joon home. At home, Suhyun's mother, after learning about Yongjun's pitiful life, showed great care for Yongjun and gave her mother-like warmth. A few years later, after Soohyun retired from the army, he traveled with Yongjoon. There was a traffic accident during the trip and Soohyun fell into a severe coma. His mother blames Yongjoon for taking Soohyun on a trip, and attributes Soohyun's accident to Yongjoon. After accidentally learning that his son and Yongjoon are homosexuals, he rejects them even more and refuses Yongjoon to come to the hospital to visit his son. After being rejected by his mother several times, Yongjoon, who blames himself for guilt, still accompanies Soohyun and takes the initiative to take care of him. After the divorce, Soohyun's mother was finally moved by Yongjoon and recognized the relationship between the two of them. The reconciliation happens between heterosexual and queer group, but also among family members. The film ended with a shot of three of them lying down on the same bed where Soohyun lies in the middle. For parents, they cannot bear the fact that their children are not heterosexual, which in their eyes, not normal. But they also try to understand their children with love and empathy. When the latter process overweight the former, reconciliation can be achieved. The film, released in recent years, embraced a happy ending with conciliation between mainstream groups and queer people, so that some may argue that this can indicate a social changes in how people view minority group and a more open and inclusive social manner, but it is still at risk when we draw a parallel between cinematic world and real world. Likewise, an earlier Korean film *Bungee Jumping* (2001) also embraces a conciliatory ending by "finding ways of subsuming queer desires into a normative narrative of heterosexuality,

the action merely serves to disavow them rather than negate them” (Cagle 2007, 286–287)..

Foucault said that sex is constructed by power. In his *The History of Sexuality*, he profoundly reveals the relationship between sex and power, criticizing modern commodity society and the power mechanism of commodity production for the huge restraint of human free living space and the natural state of sex. Homosexuality’s “abnormal” attitude towards sexual relations has brought a way of speaking to mankind, subverting the traditional discourse of power and highlighting the subculture marked by the discourse of power as the “other”. In these queer films, as we see, the real transcendence factor is love, which is the ultimate motivation for individuals under taboos to break the restraints and gain freedom.

3. Compromise

Compromise is a between-state of the previous two. That is to say, it does not have a contradictory nature of the conflict itself, nor does it force the family power to provide an effective solution immediately, but strive to avoid direct discussion of the conflict, and use the name of love to increase the legitimacy of the derailed behavior.

Film *Two Weddings And a Funeral* (2012) presents with an ending where family members make compromise with their queer children. Female obstetrician Hyojin dreams of adopting a baby with her girlfriend, and Minisoo and his boyfriend also want to have their own lives. Because they belonged to the same hospital and developed closeness with each other, the four people who hit it off quickly decided to get married

in heterosexual form and moved their residences together. But one day, the unexpected visit of Minsoo's parents put the original seamless plan to the test. Although they tried their best to conceal, they finally decided to confess the facts to their parents. And also, their parents want to understand and accept this relationship, but they still can't accept it from the bottom of their hearts. At the final wedding, they still showed a look of reluctance and shame. Although no complete reconciliation between the two parties was achieved, this incomplete reconciliation eased the conflict in the family. The design of the ending not only considered the actual situation thus looked “realistic”, but also provided a utopian picture for future queer life.

This compromise, or the ambiguity of the parental attitude, complements the ambiguity of the film's homosexual plot, and together they avoid violent conflicts. Actually, ambiguity is one of the most distinctive and unique aesthetic characteristics of Korean queer movies. Ambiguity is mainly used as an artistic means of expression, which is reflected in the ambiguity of the content and plot of the queer film and the uncertainty of the form of expression. Homosexuals in the Western cinema usually obtain a new identity space independent of heterosexual families by coming-out, while queer Koreans try to solve the family ethical dilemma. Queer desires are incorporated into the heterosexual-dominated family system in an ambiguous way, rather than free from it. In Korean queer cinema, ambiguity also is a practical strategy of production in order to cope with the severe film censorship system. Through such an ambiguous representation, the film not only strategically avoids film censorship, but also uses real

or imagined homosexual imagery to serve the film's exploration of idealistic themes under humble reality and secular pressure.

Conclusion: Neither Here Nor There

The homosexual subculture in the films has not been more associated with violence and pornography, nor has it consciously intertwined with other subcultures such as sadomasochism, psychedelics, incest, etc., to form an discriminatory interpretation of the homosexual subculture. This is very different from Western or Japanese movies of the same type. This shows that the contemporary Korean writing and interpretation of queer images is foreclosing the possibility of stigmatizing but focus on their real living condition and emotions. The device of family conflict in Korean queer cinema, as the main focus of this paper, thus qualified them as “normal” people just as heterosexuals who may encounter family conflicts in choosing life partners.

Queer culture, including “queer-dramaland”, as a part of postmodernist culture, is an extreme reaction to mainstream culture. Postmodernists appreciate diversity in order to allow rather than suppress homosexuality. Homosexuality constitutes the diversity and richness of human love styles as a "third sex". Queer films are the interpreters and supporters of this diversity. The post-modern context promotes the freedom of value choice, and recognizes the diversity and multi-layeredness of aesthetic needs. The multiple and multidimensional value orientations, the innovation and transformation of aesthetic concepts, and the diversity and richness of aesthetic needs have also promoted the gradual introduction of homosexual themes into Korean films to some extent.

This paper focuses on Korean queer movies and finds that the pressure faced by queer survival does not come directly from the society, but from the origin and

fermentation in the family. Although we can say that many queer characters suffer from social oppression, it can be said that this oppression is the result of political indifference, legal negligence, and group prejudice, but it is undeniable that family members lack support and understanding of queer people. Queer people wander between the family and society yet find themselves “neither here nor there.” It has become the most important reason for queer collective trauma in every societies. Therefore, the postmodernist trend of thought has partially changed the living conditions of queer in the social environment, especially among young people. But the patriarchy and heterosexualism that stick to the traditional Korean family still dominate.

Korean queer films care about the living conditions and emotions of marginalized homosexuals by a special focus on their domestic situation. Queer cinema call for a tolerant attitude towards queerness, and have made a useful attempt to fight for equal rights for them. To a certain extent, it embodies the spirit of equality, freedom, and diversity of culture and the ideals of the times. The strong international repercussions of Korean queer cinema and the loudness of multiple voices embodied in Korean queer films will surely bring about a fission of traditional behaviors and moral concepts.

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“In the body of a woman”: the perception of self in the travelogues of Ŭiyudang Nam

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Introduction

In 1769, Lady Ŭiyudang (1727-1823) moved from her home in Seoul to the city of Hamhŭng, where her husband had been appointed governor. Upon her arrival and during the following years, she travelled to various famous sites and landmarks in Hamgyŏng province. She recorded these trips in *Ŭiyudang kwanbuk yuram ilgi* 意幽堂關北遊覽日記 (Ŭiyudang's Diaries of Travel in the Northeast), *Ŭiyudang ilgi* (The Diary of Ŭiyudang) for short. The text was discovered and republished in 1948. Despite the fact that the manuscripts have since disappeared, *Ŭiyudang ilgi* has received much attention as one of the first travelogues written in *ŏnmun* prose, and one of the very few authored by a woman. Ŭiyudang depicts turns of events, encounters, and her impression of nature in intricate, sometimes humorous detail, while interweaving the narrative with segments of her “inner journey,” as she writes in a very personal, untethered style about everything from negotiations with her averse husband, unfortunate weather conditions, and existential reflections on the meaning of life.

The travelogues are best known for their longest segment titled “Tongmyŏng ilgi” 東溟日記 (Diaries from Tongmyŏng) (Ryu 2007, 124). It is most famed for its lengthy description of the sunrise over the East Sea, employing original metaphorical language that vividly covers every shift in color and lighting to capture the author's personal impression, resulting in a disproportion of narrative and narrated time (Kim 2008, 150).

Early research on the text was mostly focused on the identity of its author. “Ŭiyudang” was ultimately uncovered to be a lady of the Ŭiryŏng Nam clan, the wife of Sin Taeson (1728-1788)

(Ryu 1977). Before this, she had been assumed to be the wife of Yi Hũich'an who had served as governor in Hamhũng starting in 1829 (Kang 1974). The correction thus predated the text by almost sixty years.

Ŭiyudang ilgi has long been praised for its literary value because of its elaborate and aesthetic descriptions in *ŏnmun* prose, not least fueled, presumably, by the influence of language patriotism that romanticized the Korean language and its script as a symbol of unity (cf. King 2007; Park 2020). In recent years, however, *Ŭiyudang ilgi* has received increased attention as the literary product of a travelling woman who defied social norms. Ryu (2007, 2014, 2016), including for analysis some less famous texts attributed to the author, has investigated the history of the sources and their textual characteristics, thus laying important groundwork on Ŭiyudang's life, her intellectual and literary background, as well as the social and political environment of her family. Based on that, Yi (2015) has noted the significance of female bonds that transcended the default familial structures generated by the patriarchal bloodline system, emphasizing Ŭiyudang's several (indirect) relations with women of the royal family, which likely influenced and aided her literary activities and development. Yi (2015) also draws a connection between Ŭiyudang's travelogues and the literary works of other women writers like Hŏ Nansŏrhŏn (1563-1589) and Song Tŏkpong (1521-1578) whose wish to explore the world, in contrast to Lady Ŭiyudang's, remained unfulfilled, leaving them to transform it into fantasies. Kim (2008) argues that the mode of presentation and narrative perspective in "Tongmyŏng ilgi" represents a shift in literary tradition by depicting nature not as an (idealized) concept but as individually perceived reality, evident not only in the inclusion of scenes from everyday life, but also by a shifting of gaze, which clearly positions the narrator *inside* the narrative, parallel to the emergence of the spectator in true-landscape painting (*chin'gyŏng sansuhwa* 眞景山水畫) of the 18th century. This tendency toward personal perspective and realistic-impressionist representation goes hand in hand with a shift in self-awareness that seeks meaning in life by positioning the author-traveler in relation to the environment (Kim 2008):

By leaving on a journey and taking in great views, [Ŭiyudang] attempts to find meaning in a fleeting life. At the heart of the logic that equals ‘seeing’ with ‘being alive’ lies the issue of vision (*sigak*) itself, because, [in reverse conclusion], to be dead means to be unable to see. [...] ‘Tongmyŏng ilgi’ reveals that [at the time of its creation] it has become possible to ask the question of what a meaningful life was for a woman. At the same time, it suggests the answer that seeing everything worth seeing, and storing it as a memory or in a record constitutes a meaningful act. (Kim, 2008, 162f)

The paper at hand picks up on the observation that there is an orientation toward the personal. If form and content of travel writing are indicative of a particular form of engagement with the world (Das & Youngs 2019, 3), *Ŭiyudang ilgi* may hold answers to how the author-traveler, as a woman, navigated and viewed the environment and society of her time.

After providing an overview of the contents of *Ŭiyudang ilgi* in section I, as well as some key points on the sociohistorical circumstances of women regarding travelling and writing in section II, selected passages from the travelogues will be analyzed in section III to investigate Ŭiyudang’s perception of self, closed off by a short summary of the findings.

I. Notes on the text

Ŭiyudang kwanbuk yuram ilgi is the title of a collection of five separate parts written by Lady Ŭiyudang Nam. Three of them form her travelogues, written in *ŏnmun* prose, whereas the remaining two comprise a collection of *ŏnmun* translations of ten biographical anecdotes (*sŏlhwa* 說話), titled “Ch’unil sohŭng” 春日消興,¹ and her *ŏnmun* translation of the poem “Yŏngmyŏng-sa tŭgwŏl-lu sangnyangmun” 永明寺得月樓上樑文 (Ridge Beam Blessing on

¹ Half of these are adapted and translated from *Unyangmallok* 蕓陽漫錄 by Yi Ŭihyŏn (1669-1745), and half from *Maeonghallok* 梅翁閑錄 by Pak Nyanghan (1677-?) (Ryu 2007, 125).

Moonlight Tower at Eternal Light Temple).² While these translations are not part of the travelogues, Ryu (2007) speculates they might have been included because they were produced around the same time.

The travelogues are composed of three parts, titled “Nangmin-nu” 樂民樓 (Nangmin Tower, or ‘Tower of the Happy People’), “Puksan-nu” 北山樓 (Puksan Tower, or ‘North Mountain Tower’), and “Tongmyŏng ilgi” 東溟日記 (Diaries from Tongmyŏng). They span Ŭiyudang’s travels in and around the city of Hamhŭng from 1769 to 1772.

“Nangmin-nu” records a visit to Nangmin Tower, with views over Sŏngch’ŏn River 城川江 and Manse Bridge 萬歲橋 (‘Bridge of Eternity’), in the 9th month of the year *kich’uk* (1769), directly after arriving from Seoul. “Puksan-nu” records visits to Puksan Tower and Mugŏm Tower 舞劍樓 (‘Sword Dance Tower’). While there is no date given for the first, the latter is dated to have taken place in the 10th month of the year *sinmyo* (1771).

Finally, “Tongmyŏng ilgi” records two trips to the East Sea, the first in the 8th month of the year *kich’uk* (1769) and the second in the 9th month of the year *imjin* (1772), including visits to Kwigyŏng cliff 龜景臺 (‘Turtle View Cliff’), Kyŏkku³ Pavilion 擊毬亭 and the seashore, a boat ride to Kach’i Island, and the sightseeing of the ‘Original Palace’ (Pon’gung 本宮), former palace of King T’aejo, founder of the Chosŏn dynasty. What led to the second trip to Tongmyŏng was that Ŭiyudang had been unable to see properly neither sun- nor moonrise the first time around due to unfortunate weather conditions, which was salvaged in the second trip. While the sunrise scene in “Tongmyŏng ilgi” has unarguably received the most attention, the remaining parts of the text have often been neglected. However, they contain insightful passages about the author’s motivation for and evaluation of her journeys.

² While the exact author is unknown, Ryu (2007) presumes that they stood in relation to Hong Sanghan (1701-1769), constructor of Yŏngmyŏng-sa (Eternal Light Temple) and distant relative of Ŭiyudang herself.

³ A kind of polo.

II. The female author-traveler

The traveling activity of Lady Ŭiyudang is remarkable considering that throughout the Chosŏn dynasty, women of the *yangban* class were increasingly curtailed in their freedom of movement. The legal codes *Kyŏngje yukchŏn* 經濟六典 and *Kyŏngguk taejŏn* 經國大典 already regulated that for women to wander or enjoy themselves in nature was punishable by law, as this was regarded, within the dominating interpretation of Confucianism ethics, a loss of a woman's chastity and dishonor to her family (Yi 2015, 283). This, along with the requirement for women of higher status to veil their faces in public and ride in a covered sedan chair, made it nearly impossible to leave the confinement of home, to walk in public, or to appreciate nature, extending even to places and spectacles close to one's residence. This reflects in Ŭiyudang's travel records, for she is dependent on her husband's approval, travels every distance in a sedan chair, and is, of course, always accompanied. Her records show that, for a woman of her standing, to leave the residence was generally not without great planning, preparation, and manpower, considering the servants involved.

With traveling proving so difficult, some *yangban* women who were fortunate enough to have not only the required level of education, but the spare time to produce literature, transformed their unfulfilled desire to travel into fictional stories and poetry (Yi 2012, 2015). However, "even if a woman were educated, in an environment that discouraged them from expressing their opinions the possibilities for women to write were restricted" (Koh, n.d., 35f). Nonetheless, *ŏnmun* texts, especially *kasa*, were avidly produced and exchanged among circles of *yangban* women.

Considering that women were not encouraged to travel or write, *Ŭiyudang ilgi* is rather peculiar because its mere existence manifests its author's participation in both spheres, transgressing several boundaries of what was deemed proper for a woman of her standing at once.

III. Analysis

It should first be noted that, as a personal record, *Ŭiyudang ilgi* presents its author's subjective interpretation of reality based on her individual experience, her socialization and beliefs, rather than facts. Furthermore, there is temporal and spatial distance between the experienced events and the time of writing, meaning that the travel record does not accurately represent the author's perception and awareness at the time of the experience itself, but its reevaluation, or at least recollection, at the time of writing. In other words, what made it to paper constitutes a selection of retrospective interpretation of events. That being said, *Ŭiyudang ilgi* is a testimony of its author because of what is included in it, and how this is presented.

While the descriptions in *Ŭiyudang ilgi* are interspersed with references to the social hindrances imposed on the author as a traveling woman, her experiences are shaped by concrete physical restriction as well. The sedan chair (*kama* or *tokkyo* 獨轎), the omnipresence of which in Ŭiyudang's undertakings becomes apparent from its repeated mentioning throughout the text, is often presented as marking a threshold between the author-traveler and the outside world:

On the way back [to the office], for a long while there was music played in front of the sedan, and while the *kisaeng* held dozens of pairs of silk lanterns, standing two-by-two, the office servants went along with countless torches. Inside the sedan it was bright as day. Outside, one may well have counted the tips of single hairs. The lanterns made of red silk and blue silk sewn together threw mottled shadows [all around me]. Never had there been such a magnificent view. (Ryu 2008, 44f)⁴

The means of transport used for travel necessarily affects both pace and route, and thus influences "the travellers' perception of the landscape and of themselves in relation to it" (Das

⁴ All translations are my own, based on the annotated version of the text in Ryu (2008).

& Youngs 2019, 13), which reflects in travel writing. As the quotation shows, the sedan chair influences Ŭiyudang's perception to such a degree that her travel record intricately depicts the atmosphere inside the transport, leaving her to speculate on the outside shielded from her view. It hence enforces a focus on the enclosed "inside" that seems to inspire self-reflection, perhaps most elaborate in the ensuing passage:

Not even the silk lanterns lit on the nightly journey of a military general could have been this magnificent. The military music that made my ears tremble and the bright light of the lanterns had my mind completely forget that I was a little woman [destined] to stay inside. [Now] I was carrying five official seals on my hip, and, with the body of a general-minister skilled in both the literary and the martial arts, I had fulfilled my greatly meritorious service in a war somewhere. And, as if I was heading back to the Palace of the Great Peaceful [Reign] to the sound of a victorious song, as if the light of the fires and the military music all around further intensified the surging *ki* (浩氣)⁵ within me, as if my body were driving a six-horse wagon along a main road - rejoicing and in high spirits I went. (Ryu 2008, 45f)

While the imagined self as a powerful and triumphant general could hardly be farther removed from the position of her real self, travelling in a covered sedan chair, the fantasy integrates elements of the journey (e.g., the road, torches, music) that emanate from her actual (recorded) experience, thus anchoring the fantasy within her reality. Ŭiyudang explicitly refers to herself as "a little woman [destined] to stay inside," an identity that the splendor and excitement of the journey let her forget and transform into the contrasting persona of a powerful general-minister. Thus, her sedan chair becomes a six-horse wagon, the sight-seeing she is returning from becomes a victorious battle, and her residence at the government office the Royal Palace. The

⁵ As the text does not include *hanja*, another possible semantics for *hogŭi* is 豪氣 (brave spirit), as suggested by Ryu (2008, 55).

mentioning of the body (*mom*) as a separate entity distinct from the thinking mind is picked up again in the following description of arriving back at the office:

Then we reached the gate of the government office, and as the sedan chair was set down in front of the inner porch, the magnificent lanterns disappeared like stars fading in the sunlight. So entranced was I that my body moved up the porch all on its own. As I touched my hair, I found it tied up neatly. As I touched my hip, there was a skirt wrapped around it. Clearly this body was [that of] a woman, I realized as I entered the house. (Ryu 2008, 46)

With the lanterns fading like stars meeting daylight, so does her fantasy, but only after touching the body that “moves on its own” - contrasting the skirt with the “five official seals” worn on the hip mentioned before - is she reminded that this body belongs to a woman (*hwangyŏni i mom-i nyŏjǎ-m-ŭl skǎidǎra*). Her dissociative state comes to an end when she takes a look around the room, realizing that “this body” is hers - and she a woman: “[Scattered] around me lay the threadwork I had been working on before. I clapped my hands and laughed” (Ryu 2008, 46). The mentioning of the threadwork (針線紡績, “sewing and spinning”) appears as a reminder of her designated space, activities, and duties, pulling her out of the fantasy and back into reality. The opposing images of the military general and the threadwork has been interpreted by Yi (2015) as representing the distance between dream and reality. Ŭiyudang’s reaction upon returning to reality is described as “clapping and laughing” without further commentary on her sentiment. Perhaps it can be taken as a reassurance that her fantasy is not to be taken seriously; that it does not amount to discontent with her position, so as to appear less deviant. Nonetheless, the metaphor of the general allows her to envision a self that is educated, strong, powerful, and free - properties which conflict with the Confucian image of an ideal woman -; an imagined self that may express yearning to escape both confined space and monotonous life, a desire other women of the time could only voice through imagined

travel (Yi 2015). At the same time, the persona of the general-minister evokes a stark contrast to her real self, which is reduced to “a little woman” with very limited autonomy and influence. The sedan chair becomes the place of self-reflection again in “Tongmyǒng ilgi” after the first attempt to view the sunrise over the sea fails due to cloudy skies:

After having seen all that, the sedan chair was turned and we headed back home. Inside the sedan, I mused how I, in the body of a woman, had been able to see the ten-thousand miles expanse of blue waves and the fishermen fishing in the sea; and so I promised to myself that this life was not in vain. (Ryu 2008, 55)

Again, Ŭiyudang notes the uniqueness of her circumstances, being able to witness the things she did “as a woman,” and even draws meaning for her life from this non-ordinary experience. This is what Kim (2008) identifies as a logic that equates “seeing” with “being alive” (162), elaborating that “seeing” is associated with “feeling something,” from which significance is drawn, whereas in male-authored travel records of the time, “seeing” is strongly associated with the acquisition of knowledge rather than feeling.

Ŭiyudang does express awareness that her chance to travel is against great odds, both in her reasoning and self-reflection, as well as in the persuasions of her husband that are included in the record. The beginning of “Tongmyǒng ilgi” describes how she first asked for permission to watch the sunrise over the East sea after hearing about its beauty from the *kisaeng*, the same year she arrived in Hamhŭng: “My mind was restless, so I implored the Governor (her husband). He replied: ‘How could I take lightly the coming and going of a woman?’ And as he firmly resisted and would not have it, there was nothing I could do, and that was it” (Ryu 2008, 51). However, other than these words suggest, Ŭiyudang does not leave it at that, but tries again two years later, in 1771, at which time her husband finally concedes to a joint trip to the coast. This first journey, although described with much appreciation, does not grant her clear views of the sky, leaving her unsatisfied: “That I had come this far with such efforts, yet had not been

able to see neither moon- nor sunrise; it was so bitter, there are no words for the misery it caused me” (Ryu 2008, 58). She explains that, although she desperately wished to go again, her husband disallowed it. But instead of giving up at this point, she implores him again the following year, and when he still withholds his approval, she displays her powers of persuasion: “Human life is limited. Once a person has died, there is no coming back. My sorrows and pain growing bigger, I am always depressed. To go out for once and lighten my heavy heart, I would not exchange it for ten thousand pieces of gold. Be so kind and let us go!” (Ryu 2008, 59). At this, her husband gives in, because they “had not been able to see the sunrise [the last time]” (Ryu 2008, 59).

Ŭiyudang's persisting rather than admitting defeat reveals something about the dynamics of her marriage that should prove difficult to find in other sources of the time. Although she describes her husband's decisions as non-negotiable, she does not accept them as final. She seems to credit herself with enough power to overturn these decisions, else there would be no point in challenging them in the first place. By doing so, she actively rejects the designated role of the “little woman destined to stay inside” (閨中小女). Weaving this arduous, yet triumphant process of persuasion into the narrative, she indirectly emphasizes her own willfulness and determination, which appears surprisingly honest, considering that travel literature served as a platform to present yourself in a favorable light. For a woman, at the time of the late 18th century, this would encompass traits like obedience, humility and modesty rather than the willfulness, persistence, and craving for adventure that Ŭiyudang exposes. This, again, can be viewed as a sign of self-approval and self-confidence.

Her deviation from the ideal, however, is counterbalanced to some degree through passages that express her deep appreciation and gratitude towards her husband: “That I, a fine lady whose place is inside, would be able to repeat last year's extravaganza on this day, because last time it had ended in failure, what of it could not be thanks to the Governor's grace?” (Ryu 2008,

61). Here, again, she makes reference to her gender, affirming her travels to be an extremely unlikely chance, at the same time indicating awareness that her roaming does not belong to the permissible activities for a lady of her standing. Later she extends her gratitude to the king, thanking him for providing them with the opportunity to live such a luxurious life in the first place: “That my husband serves as county magistrate, allowing us to eat our full on a stipend; and that, on top of that, I was able to witness such a spectacle by his favor - what of it is not for the mercy of our Wise King!” (Ryu 2008, 71). This is taken up again in an a more lengthy way at the end of her account:

It is only thanks to the immeasurable grace of the Wise King that I came to such great places; that I live comfortably, well-clothed and well-fed; that I got to see Kwigyŏng cliff in Tongmyŏng, as well as the seaside and Kyŏkku Pavilion in Unjŏn; that, in the end, I [even] saw with my own eyes the Original Palace [of King T’aejo]; that the venerable home of the Wise Ruler, Founder of the Peaceful Reign, was visited four hundred years later by this ignorant woman - how could any of this have just happened naturally? (Ryu 2008, 85)

In these words of acknowledgement, again, resonates some amazement over the fact that she achieved to undertake these journeys despite her position as an “ignorant woman” (*mujihŏn nyŏjŏ*). On the one hand, the repeated self-references that include her gender, which emphasize her being “out of place” in the spaces she visited, can be taken as an admission of transgression (cf. Kim 2008, 158), perhaps to avert reprehension, yet simultaneously they may indicate a grievance over the status quo that excludes her from the same spaces.

In any case, Ŭiyudang’s repeated noting of her identity as a woman of high social standing throughout the text suggests a heightened awareness of her difference from the others: from men, on the one hand - represented by her husband who controls her “coming and going” as well as the recurring image of the general - and from people of lower social standing, especially

women, e.g. the *kisaeng* who travel along, on the other. Ŭiyudang explicitly notes that she experienced and judged differently than the escorts to whom, she realizes, the sights that excited her were nothing but familiar: “The *kisaeng* bemoaned that the moonrise had not been [more] delightful, which greatly saddened me, because I had thought it to be a great spectacle as it was” (Ryu 2008, 71). When, in contrast, the *kisaeng* note the peculiarity of something, Ŭiyudang takes this as pronounced validation: “And how my heart marveled when [even] the *kisaeng*, who had seen the like before, sighed at the strangeness of this view!” (Ryu 2008, 68). Sharing a space she normally does not have access to with those who do, seems to make her acutely aware of the fact that she is missing out. The distance between herself and “the others” also shows in her descriptions of other people reacting, conversing, and experiencing rather than herself. The *kisaeng*, e.g., are repeatedly described enjoying food, dancing, riding, making comments, and moving from one place to the other, whereas Ŭiyudang sometimes appears almost stationary, assuming the role of a spectator that observes, and reflects on the observed. This supports Kim’s (2008) finding of an individualistic perspective and depictions aimed at conveying personal impressions.

Another scene that positions Ŭiyudang as the observer is one in which she describes the view from Mugŏm Tower at night, gazing at the countless stores and houses below, which remind her of Seoul. Amidst this, she spots a military general on his horse flocked by commoners: “Drenched in bright moonlight, a general crossed through the gate below on his steed, riding onto Manse bridge to the sound of music. The tumult and clamoring was just wonderful. The market-goers went about in groups, chattering, and joining their hands” (Ryu 2008, 49). This depiction of the glorious general evokes her imagined journey as a famous general that had her forget she was a woman. Whether this is coincidence or a deliberate reference, the general riding out appears as a manifestation of her fantasy, only that it is not her riding the steed. Standing atop Mugŏm Tower and watching him take off widens the distance between the reality she dreamed of, and the own she is living - the one that almost did not allow her to visit

this spot in the first place, “because it was amidst commoners’ homes (閭閻叢中)” (Ryu 2008, 47). The fact that the general is “drenched in moonlight” may further accentuate Ŭiyudang’s yearning for the autonomy and freedom of movement he enjoys, if the moon symbolizes deep sorrow (*han* 恨) and longing (Yi 1986, 96).

Her role as the observer contrasts with the agency she assumes in asserting her project in front of her husband to receive his approval. This passivity can be seen, e.g., in an elaborate account of an exchange that takes place shortly before sunrise between her husband and several other people, including *kisaeng*, who all voice their varying opinions on whether the weather conditions will allow them to watch the sunrise this time or not:

“‘Now that the sun has come up and disappeared behind those clouds, the red glimmer is going to dissolve altogether and turn into clouds!’ the *kisaeng* cried all upset and turned to leave. ‘That is not true,’ the Governor and Suk-ssi said. ‘We will see the sun soon enough.’ But Irangi and Ch’asŏmi smiled cold smiles, muttering: ‘This is not our first time - we have seen this so many times. How could we not know? Let us go quickly before the Lady brings grave sickness upon herself [from the cold]!’ Hearing this, I turned and sat back inside the sedan chair. But right then Pongi’s mother yelled in protest: ‘But the servants all said that the sun is coming up now. How can you leave? The *kisaeng* girls have no sense; they act all rashly!’ At that, Irangi clapped her hands and replied: ‘The servants [just] say that without even knowing. Do not take them for their word!’ And then she added: ‘Go and ask the boatmen instead!’ [And someone answered:] ‘The boatmen say the sunrise today will be splendid!’ Hearing this, I emerged from the sedan chair again.” (Ryu 2008, 75)

As Ŭiyudang only quotes what is being said by others, she appears to not have taken part in the discussion herself. Instead, she acts upon the conjectures of others, first getting back in and then out of the sedan chair again at the suggestion of others, like a cue ball bouncing off side rails. Not stating her own assessment, Ŭiyudang appears almost insecure, perhaps intimidated

by the diverging takes on a rather tense situation that she brought about in the first place by initiating the journey.

The way Ŭiyudang makes use of monologue, dialogue and descriptions of other people creates a strong boundary between herself and others, with herself positioned on the inside, reserved and quiet, whereas “the others,” respondent, spirited, and loud, represent the outside they occupy.

Conclusion

Through incorporating various self-reflective passages and depictions that reflect the author’s personal impression of reality rather than an idealized version, the travelogues in *Ŭiyudang kwanbuk yuram ilgi* assume a personal, individualistic perspective that makes it possible to trace Ŭiyudang’s perception of self.

It has been demonstrated that the sedan chair, an instance of physical restriction that creates a boundary between the author-traveler and the outside, while forcing her to withdraw and shielding from her views of the world, becomes a space inspiring self-reflection. It must be considered, in this regard, that the sedan, though it may appear as a cell to the modern reader, is the means of transport enabling her to go on her journeys in the first place. Nonetheless, it is while riding the sedan chair (as she tells it) that Ŭiyudang gets lost in a fantasy that turns herself, the “little woman destined to stay inside” into a famous general, hinting at an appetite for yet more freedom and autonomy. Only returning to the inside, with threadwork representing her designated activities, brings awareness back to her female body, bursting her bubble.

Ŭiyudang’s repeated bidding to her husband for permission to go out appears as a sign of subordination and dependence at first, but, at a closer look, turns out a sign of agency at the same time, because her successful persuasions present her as willful, influential, determined, and confident - traits she likely would not have consciously chosen to communicate openly, considering society’s ideal of an obedient, chaste and humble wife.

This is made up for, at least to some degree, by her expression of deep appreciation for the opportunities she was provided and words of acknowledgement toward her husband and the king.

The style of narration, integrating both monologue and lively depictions of scenes and events around her, clearly separates her own self and her own opinions from the others. These are not only the men, portrayed through the general as holding all the freedom and power in the world, but also the women of lower social status (servants and *kisaeng*), who, she realizes, enjoy at least some freedom she is not granted.

Finally, the repeated self-references that point to her identity as a woman can constitute an admission of transgression, conceding that she was “out of place,” but at the same time seem to indicate grievance over the status quo. If her travel records then, are read not solely as a token of remembrance, but as a medium able to convey those concerns that are virtually impossible to be voiced openly (Eggert 2003, 72), they indirectly express a yearning for more freedom and autonomy. This should not be understood as a wish to drastically change society. But, considering that Ŭiyudang did not shy away from transgressing the boundaries of her designated space, and leaving a record of it for the world to read, appears indicative of a self that is boxed in by society.

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Introduction

The starting point of this research is the 2017 presidential debate between Democratic Party's leader Mun Jae-in and Freedom Party's leader Hong Jun-p'yo, during which the latter asked said "The presence of homosexuals in the army weakens the defense capacity of the country? What is your opinion on this matter?", to which soon-to-become-president Mun Jae-in answered "I agree" (Korea Joongang Daily, 2017).

In South Korea, homosexual intercourse is not a crime, except in the army, where the transgression of article 92-6 of the Penal Military Code can be charged with 2 years in prison.

The goal of this paper is to understand how and why homosexual men are stigmatized and considered a threat to the South Korean society and military system.

I/ Rejection by the kyriarchic society

1. The religious impact on/and the politics of rejection

The 1983 New International Version of Leviticus 18:22 states “You shall not sleep with a man as you sleep with a woman. It is an abomination” thus proceeding to make the sexual act between two men a sin, an unnatural practice.

Although the majority of South Korea's population (46.6%) has no religious affiliation, Christianity (30.1%) is the most widely practiced religion in South Korea (Global Religious Futures, 2020).

Practicing Christian President-elect Mun Jae-in is committed to preventing the LGBTQI + community from establishing a law for marriage for all. During his election campaign, he opposed the rights of homosexuals and transgender people (South China Morning Post, 2017), motivated, according to some, by the idea of rallying the Christian lobby (Henry, 2018: 6) behind him.

Pastor Jonah Lee, who calls himself a "former gay," is the founder of the Homosexual Healing Counseling School (동성애 치유 상담 학교). During his life, Jonah Lee suffered from his homosexuality, to finally be “healed” after a theology seminar to become a pastor: he was euphoric, joyful, and finally discovered the beauty of women. He considers that if homosexuality was biological, a “gay” gene should have been discovered by science long ago. According to him, homosexuality is an addiction that one can get rid of. This vision, although personal to Pastor Jonah Lee, is transmitted among his followers, “cured” of their homosexuality.

Following the emergence of an LGBTQI+ discourse and a demand for human rights for sexual minorities (성 소수자) in South Korea in the 1990s, South Korean evangelists then followed the guidelines and lessons other democracies (Yi et al. 2017: 30). Lee Wondong and Joseph Yi conducted keyword research in articles of Kidok Sinmun (기독교 신문), from January 1, 1998 to October 4, 2019. Their objective was to show the existence of two narratives held towards North Koreans and homosexuals: the threat narrative and the outreach narrative (Lee & Yi, 2020: 2).

While the first focuses on the injustices perpetrated against Christians on the part of North Koreans and homosexuals, the second aims to show compassion to North Koreans and to open dialogue between cis-heterosexual Christians and queer Christians, to collect testimonies of injustices not from Christians, but from queer individuals. Indeed, in the 2010s, a narrative began to emerge: that of empathy, understanding and acceptance of queer individuals (Yi et al. 2017: 32). Their study shows the use of certain keywords depending on the type of speech engaged: a threat narrative will use terms such as “sin” or “AIDS” while the outreach narrative will use words such as “salvation” or “cure”.

This media coverage of the testimonies of queer Christians opens a sphere of dialogue between them and the Christian community, which could, in the long term, help “to bridge the LGBT and evangelical communities” (Yi et al. 2017: 33).

Since the fall of the Soviet bloc and the election of a left-wing president in favor of dialogue with North Korea, the Christian narrative towards the North Koreans has become more pacifist and open to the cooperation of the two nations, thus becoming an outreach narrative. However, this shift in narrative has not spread to homosexuals, who are still predominantly victims of threat narrative, since LGBTQI + movements and the election of a political administration that tends to tolerate queer individuals generate fear within the Christian community, which dreads

the loss of its rights and freedoms (Lee & Yi, 2020: 21). “Among politically right-wing evangelicals, homosexuality replaced North Korea as the greater, existential threat” (Lee et Yi, 2020: 14).

2. The struggles of pros and cons: construction of the social landscape

The term kyriarchy was coined by Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza in 1992 and used in her book *But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation*. The latter defines this word as being “a neologism, derived from the Greek words 'lord' or 'master' (*kyrios*) and 'govern' or 'dominate' (*archein*), which seeks to redefine the analytical category of patriarchy in terms of structures of domination [...]. Kyriarchy is theorized as a complex pyramid system of intersecting multiplicative social structures, super ordination and subordination, domination and oppression” (Ferguson, 2014). In a white supremacist, patriarchal, cis-heteronormative, and ableist system, all beings are not equal, in terms of chances and opportunities, and in terms of rights and duties. Kyriarchy recognizes that domination and unequal social relations are not only based on gender and it also admits that anyone can be oppressed and oppressor, depending on the context. As part of the Seoul Queer Culture Festival, the queer rights march is supervised by police, so that there is no overflow as conservative Christian religious associations protest in front of the festival entrance. Opponents explain that they oppose the festival because it is obscene, and that they want to help queer people “come to their senses and return to their religious values and Korean standards” so that “everyone has healthy values” and can “return to true love, the love that God has given us”.

However, the Holy Life movement, discussed earlier, criticizes these protests and encourages Christians to “enter the Queer Festival and to talk with individual participants” (Lee & Yi, 2020: 18). This “non-confrontational alternative” as well as the Holy Life Festival are judged by Kidok Simun to be a superior alternative to anti-gay protests (Lee and Yi, 2020: 18-19).

The notion of kyriarchy applies here in a complex dimension: the two opposing parties have “their” own truth, and think, rightly or wrongly, that they are right and will succeed in making their point understood. But the South Korean legislative system is based on a binary model of gender, itself based on heterosexuality (Na et al. 2014). As a result, the LGBTQI+ fight comes out the binary societal construct and endangers the gender paradigm. Becoming a threat to society, the queer individual is no longer seen as a good subject of the nation. Indeed, the Confucian and neo-Confucian philosophical streams which apply in South Korea establish that the individual exists only in his relation to the other (father - mother - wife - husband...). Anyone coming out of this social construct is a deviant subject and therefore violates the cisgender and binary heteronormative system. Claiming that sexual minorities and gender minorities are sympathizers of North Korea and carriers of AIDS, conservatives view queer individuals as social, political, and epidemiological threats to the survival of the nation (Henry, 2018: 6). As a result, a stigmatization is created, generating discrimination.

The term pink washing is used when a business enterprise that (punctually) uses LGBT representation to increase its popularity with queer individuals and to show its openness and ability to be modern. In the case of South Korea, pink washing is different in its idea of consumption: it is not about selling, but about approaching the festival as a place of fun (Yi and Munt, 2019: 38). In their article *Seoul Queer Culture Festival: Is it Pride or Just a Parade? - Politics of Gay Pride in South Korea* Yi and Munt noted that the Seoul Queer Festival is sometimes visited as a place of curiosities, or to receive free goods at various stalls, or just for fun, such as at a festival lights, for example. If the Seoul Queer Culture Festival aims to give visibility to queer culture and fight for rights to the LGBTQI + community, non-queer visitors see it as a simple festival, which allows them to display a pseudo- support for the movement and a modern openness (Yi and Munt, 2019: 43).

The aim of their research was to try to understand whether the Seoul Queer Culture Festival is a true expression of the pride and fight for LGBTQ + rights or a well-intentioned but meaningless parade. Their conclusion is that the festival is both at the same time: “Seoul Queer Culture Festival itself proves that there has been progress of visibility and rights of queer community in South Korea, seeing the fact the SQCF is held at Seoul Plaza, the right center of central, every year. It provides a site for queers to celebrate their rights and identity and for all to communicate. [...] Still, public involvement in the SQCF is confined to merely commercial and political consumption rather than a further understanding of queer communities. People are likely to consume SQCF as a one-time entertaining event and homosexuality is used as a political device” (Yi & Munt, 2019: 51).

3. Evolution of vision: fiction, representations and anti-discrimination law

From 2007 to 2020, the anti-discrimination law was proposed 8 times, without success (Kim, 2020). However, since 2003 the country's National Human Rights Commission has been calling for an anti-discrimination law to be passed, a law “that bars discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, nationality, disability, political inclination, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, illness and sexual orientation. The law outlines punishment of violators and measures for those discriminated against, seeking to achieve equal protection of the law under the Constitution” (I, 2017).

The enactment of such a law is not easy but has been the subject of discussion again since June 29, 2020, when Justice Party MP Chang Hye-yŏng proposed an anti-discrimination law, including LGBTQI+ people, at the 21st National Assembly (Kim, 2020).

On the same day, “anti-homosexual” Christian organizations demonstrated in front of the National Assembly. One of their arguments is that the enactment of the anti-discrimination law will endanger freedom of expression. But the proposed law does not intervene in the religious sphere and does not prohibit homophobic discourse: it intervenes during the purchase of goods or the use of a public service, during job hunting and in the workplace, during education or vocational training in a school, and when providing or using an administrative service (BBC Korea, 2020).

In 2019, the TVN drama *Designated Survivor: 60 Days* (60일 지정생존자) discussed the enactment of the anti-discrimination law. In the context of the drama, Acting President Pak Mu-jin wants to enact an anti-discrimination law that includes queer people, but is told that although the content of the anti-discrimination law states that no one should be discriminated against for their sexual orientation or gender identity, South Korean society believes that the law approves

and encourages homosexuality. Soon after, Confucians and religious communities united to demand his resignation.

This evocation of the anti-discrimination law was welcomed by some viewers, but it did not go unanswered by Christian communities and protesters: the Solidarity of Christian Citizens Anti-Homosexuality (반 동성애 기독교 시민 연대) and the Citizen Movement for The Free Practice of Human Rights (자유 인권 실천 국민 행동) reacted by demanding an apology from tvN, because it encourages viewers to have a negative point of view towards religious communities (Kim, 2019).

Since the beginnings of movements for the rights of LGBTQ + individuals in the 1990s (Bong, 2008: 89), representations of queer characters have had a different proportion. Formerly invisible, queer characters now have visibility in the media, films and dramas, which opens up a new perspective of understanding for the public, which therefore accesses the possibility of glimpsing the LGBTQ + community in a context that is not that of the Seoul Queer Culture Festival.

Sociologist George Gerbner's The Cultivation Theory links individual worldviews and morals with the length of exposure to television content. According to the number of hours passed watching television, light (less than 4 hours a day) and heavy (more than 4 hours a day) viewers might have a different perception of society and of the world (Gerbner et al. 1979: 185), so much so that the subject "cultivates images and ideas matching what is seen on TV, and that long-term television exposure do influence social change" (Mosharafa, 2015: 35). The public, the media, society, and the world are influenced by the television content, and vice versa (Mosharafa, 2015: 35).

Indeed, recently, the representations of LGBTQ + characters on the small screen have become more present, and although the latter are not the main characters of the fiction in which

they appear, this visibility, even partial, allows a restructuring of the discourse towards queer people.

We can also highlight the importance of the female audience: in her study entitled *Straight Korean Female Fans and Their Gay Fantasies*, Kwon Jugmin studies the role of heterosexual South Korean women in the creation of a new space of homosexual representation in South Korea. She explains that “in their own way, they created fantasy spaces separate from the male-oriented elements in the Confucian and patriarchal society surrounding them. [...] Women fans were able to disclose their cultural preferences, triggering changes in society” (Kwon, 2019: 16). Since the national success of the film *The King and the Clown* (왕의 남자) in 2005, in part thanks to the female audience, homosexual representations - here, mostly male - have been more numerous, as directors have admitted to targeting a young and female audience with the inclusion of homosexual content in their productions (Kwon, 2016: 1573). “Surely, it is meaningful that the fandom contributed to the increasing gay portrayals in mainstream media. However, it remains to be seen whether and how the commodification will bring relevant changes to the lives of members of the Korean LGBT community and whether it will encourage positive attitudes toward them among mainstream society or even influence government policy beyond the popular cultural sector” (Kwon, 2016: 1577).

4. Marginalization and victimization: the silence or death of the subject of the nation

This exclusion of queer individuals from South Korean society can be explained by disgust, which can be physical or moral (Margat, 2011: 20). Opposing something pure, the object of disgust provokes rejection and “must be excluded”. Disgust is not something innate, but acquired: while it can be personal, disgust is nevertheless often shared, and the result of social learning. With the collective dimension of disgust (Margat, 2011: 17), social norms are then internalized and reproduced in a pattern of social exclusion of the object of disgust, here, queer individuals. Consequently, homosexuals will be led to silence their sexual orientation, considered as a “deviance”. Seen as “an affront to filial piety, if not national allegiance” (Henry, 2018: 14), homosexuality will therefore become a secret. In 2019, 87.5% of South Koreans who knew someone who was gay were comfortable having a gay friend. But of those 87.5% only 55% say they are comfortable having a homosexual family member. Indeed, South Korea is a Confucianist country which is based on strong values such as filial piety.

In South Korea, homosexuality is often seen as out of the ordinary because coming from abroad. Indeed, for some South Koreans, homosexuality, like the Catholic religion upon its arrival in the peninsula, is seen as an ideology from the West, something foreign to South Korean culture. “On the fringes of a South Korean societal conception” homosexuality is therefore the subject of an othering process, aimed at defining what is part of the norm and what is not. A policy of “Us versus Them” then operates, excluding any individual whom the self-proclaimed “normal” group considers as “alien”. The idea is that homosexuality is a “concept” originating in the West, and therefore extrinsic to South Korea.

Sin Ju-yŏng, a young gay South Korean man living with HIV, explains that South Koreans generally know very little about HIV and AIDS and therefore considers them to be frightening illnesses. Due to the lack of education on this subject, people think that people with HIV are “disgusting” and that they “have done something wrong”. The perception of people with HIV is therefore negative. Sin Ju-yŏng reveals that many Christians consider that only homosexuals have HIV, a thought generally shared among the South Korean population. As a result, homosexual individuals are also deemed to be HIV carriers, and therefore rejected out of fear and lack of information.

The absence of a law prohibiting discrimination against LGBTQ + people or a comprehensive anti-discrimination law in the workplace gives them free rein to express themselves, while queer individuals are often not hired because they fall outside the heteronormative cisgender and binary social construct. Thus, “LGBTI people generally feel that the workplace [in South Korea] is not secure in the face of discrimination and violence against LGBTI people. Of those polled, 67.7% believe that in the workplace, taunting and discriminatory violence occurs 'frequently' and 'often' against LGBTI people” (Na et al. 2014: 32). This discrimination in hiring and in employment is based on binary gender norms. Thus, silencing one's membership in the LGBTQ + community helps maintain a status quo (Bong, 2008: 98).

In South Korea, the wangtta (왕따) are the victims of this homonymous phenomenon, harassed for reasons such as: low self-esteem, low social skills or a lack of self-confidence (Yoo, 2014: 1186). Victims are therefore “victims are at a higher risk of mental health problems such as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and even self-injurious and suicidal behavior”. We can therefore assume that queer individuals fall into this category of individual victimized by their peers. This harassment can take place throughout life, in school, in the professional sphere and even more brutally during the compulsory military service of South

Korean men. An individual may therefore be made to be a wangtta throughout their life, excluded but the target of oppression by the larger group.

The suicide rate of South Koreans and therefore by analogy, members of the LGBTQ + community is very high. Overall, South Korean men are three times more likely to commit suicide than women, including military suicides. In addition, among South Korean gay and bisexual people, the rate of suicidal thoughts is 7.51 times higher than among heterosexual people, and the rate of suicide attempts is 9.25 times higher. (Pak, 2020).

II/ Human Rights

1. Us influences in the South Korean Military Penal Code and homophobic policies

In order to better understand the status of the South Korean army vis-à-vis male homosexuality, it is essential to explain the evolution of policies by the country which has greatly influenced South Korea and continues to do so: The United States of America. Since World War II (1939-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), and the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, the United States and South Korea owe each other mutual assistance in case of an armed attack and South Korea allows the US military to station in the country. US influence in South Korea's military penal code can therefore be assumed.

During World War II, there were two types of military discharge in the United States: a discharge with honors (white), given to people who did not have the required degree of adaptability or who had enuresis, and a discharge without honor (blue), awarded to all those who were judged physically or mentally disqualified because of their conduct (Brill). This notion of honor did not appear until 1945, because previously the color of the discharge did not matter. However, after the establishment of such a policy, the color of the discharge from military duties influenced the social status of the discharged individual (Brill). This discharge did not allow the individual to have the benefits of veterans and on the contrary, could be a hindrance in the search for employment in civilian life. During World War II, most of the US health workers were inexperienced and influenced by the measures and rules of the military framework, subject to the injunction to identify gay soldiers and report them for dismissal. Beyond the dimension of hypothetical psychiatric and therapeutic care, their mission was then administrative and no longer medical (Bérubé, 2010: 150). It then became “common practice

to give 'discharge without honor' (blue) to any individual discharged because of homosexuality, on the premise that homosexuality constituted an undesirable trait of character” (Brill).

By analogy, discharge for medical reasons related to sexual orientation has also existed in South Korea. Gay soldiers who wished to be relieved of their military duty had to receive official authorization from military medical personnel: “As they have to submit hard evidence that the servicemen are being discharged for legitimate medical reasons, medical officers would require the servicemen to submit photographs or video clips showing their involvement in sexual acts with another male” (Bong, 2008: 91).

We find a desire for military cohesion in the prerogatives established by the military dictatorship of President Pak Chŏng-hŭi who seized power through a military coup in the early 1960s, and which remained in power for more than 15 years. He “adopted and enforced the neo-Confucianism of the Choson dynasty, which disparages homosexuality because it disrupts the kinship tradition that emphasizes gender hierarchy, duty and family over personal priorities and preferences [...] Such mobilization, in turn, solidified the binary and hierarchical conceptualization of gender that regards homosexuality as a foreign and un-Korean value” (Bong, 2008: 88).

The South Korean Military Penal Code was put in place in 1962, and article 92-6 thereof states “that a person guilty of anal intercourse or other misconduct shall be sentenced to a maximum sentence of two years in prison” (국가 법령 정보 센터), criminalizing all homosexual intercourses, whether consented or not. However, the article has been criticized several times for its lack of clarification on “the place, time, method, and coercion of the act” (Yun, 2020). It is in fact not stipulated whether the act is incriminated within the framework of the military base or outside it if it concerns only members of the military corps or can also be put into force if a civilian is concerned.

The influence of the United States on South Korea being present in several fields (economy, politics, society, culture), we can therefore suppose that "the military structure of the South Korean army, that is to say the hierarchy and the procedures, is made on the American model" (Rouillard, 2018).

2. The importance of military service in affirming the (hyper)-masculinity of the subject of the nation

North Korea and South Korea have not signed a peace treaty and are therefore still at war. As a result, the South Korean military service was therefore set up to train any man able to fight to defend his country and its values. Any man between 18 and 35 years old must complete a minimum of 21 months of active service depending on the branch he joins, or 24 to 36 months if he performs non-active service. However, some may be exempt, due to disability (physical or mental), or because they have HIV or if they are naturalized citizens. But “given that conscription and masculinity operate within one another, exemption also indexes a failure of hegemonic militarized masculinity” (Gitzen et al. 2018: 384).

The soldier is a devoted subject of the nation and acclaimed for his ability to defend the latter, under the governance of a nationalist policy, instilling in the people a fear of the North Korean communist threat, justifying all aspects of the military code of this nation this way (Lie, 1998: 114). The South Korean army, and compulsory conscription, become indispensable tools for becoming a “real” citizen, but above all a man, an ideal of masculinity saving the nation from communism, through the process of militarization. “Militarization in Korea as a technique of masculinity is not only cultivated within the military, but also continuously felt and experienced before and after military service” (Gitzen et al. 2018: 382).

Historian George L. Mosse explains that taking up arms was decisive in the construction of the stereotype of virility, masculinity and what makes a young boy a “real” man: “the masculine stereotype was created during a period of revolution and war. Heroism, death and sacrifice became associated with manliness. [...] The ideals of manliness viewed through the prism of war penetrated into the general population” (Mosse, 1996: 50-51). Militarization is thus seen

as a vector of masculinity, as a rite of passage towards the assurance of accomplished virility. In addition, this notion of war and sacrifice for the homeland has reinforced the association between masculinity and patriotism in the construction of an ideal hero of the nation, which responds to the stereotype of masculinity sublimated and exalted by nationalism (Mosse, 1996: 53).

The South Korean army is therefore defined as a cis heteronormative patriarchal endogamic kyriarchic structure which perpetuates its dominance even outside its institution, namely in society, by exporting its values of strength, hyper- masculinization against the North Korean threat. As a result, any entity considered “abnormal” will therefore be a threat to this institution. The hyper-masculinized military environment is becoming toxic to queer individuals, and even to some straight, cis men.

This model of masculinity taken to its climax to satisfy a certain domination, whether over other men or women, Virginie Despentes describes it in her book *King Kong Théorie*, published in 2006: “traditional virility is an enterprise as mutilating as assignment to femininity. What exactly does it take to be a real man? Suppression of emotions. To silence one’s sensitivity. To be ashamed of one’s delicacy, of his vulnerability. [...] Having to be brave, even if you don’t want to. Valuing strength no matter one’s character. Be aggressive. [...] Fear homosexuality because a man, a real one, must not be penetrated” (Despentes, 2006: 22).

And it is this notion of a collective body that is at the heart of militarization and of South Korean society: the individual no longer exists but is part of a unified whole that must remain so. As a result, as Despentes says, a man, “a real one”, cannot be penetrated, cannot be feminine, cannot show a sign of vulnerability, in which case he would come out of the social construct attributed to his biological sex and would no longer have any category to conform to. We can assume that the isolation of these men and their cohabitation for almost two years allows them

to develop a community spirit. So military service is a prolific spatio-temporal context for the evolution of a vision of the virile and hyper-masculinized man, who conforms to military and social norms. These standards are integrated and reproduced in the different spheres of society.

Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu explains that the internalization of gender roles then supplants the desire to express one's individuality and go beyond societal norms. According to Bourdieu, the binary division of genders and the roles conferred on them are not the fruit of the dichotomy between the biological sexes, but the result of a social construction: masculinity “combines and condenses two operations: *it legitimizes a relationship of domination by inscribing it in a biological nature which is itself a naturalized social construction*” (Bourdieu, 1998: 39).

In her study entitled *The good, the bad, and the forgiven: The media spectacle of South Korean male celebrities' compulsory military service* published in 2017, Yao explains the phenomenon of the social impact of the media coverage of the military service of male celebrities, which she describes as a “media spectacle” having seen the light of day since the mid-1990s. This phenomenon is called “militainment”, a neologism born from the fusion between “military” and “entertainment”. Yao argues that through this consumption of military entertainment, cultural codes shared by the societal collective are established, while the media spectacle of the conscription of famous South Korean men “suggests that the universal issue of fair and just sharing of the national security burden is defined, produced, checked and consumed as 'militainment' in contemporary South Korea” (Yao, 2017: 307). This militarized entertainment reinforces the idea that compulsory military service is a “sacred” duty (Yao, 2017: 297).

3. Institutionalization of discrimination: sexual violence, group effect and spectator effect

If Article 92 of the South Korean Military Penal Code which states as follows “a person who by violence or threat rapes someone [...] will be punished by imprisonment with work for a limited period of at least five years” (국가 법령 정보 센터), condemns any sexual assault or rape, regardless of the gender and sexual orientation of the aggressor and the victim, the very existence of Article 92-6 helps the establishment of discrimination against homosexual soldiers, through the criminalization of anal sex, whether consensual or not. The South Korean government states that Article 92-6 is “needed to deter sexual abuse in the army, which is almost entirely male” (Ch'oe, 2019).

Criminalization “creates an environment where discrimination is tolerated, and even encouraged, based solely on who someone is” (Amnesty, 2019 :7), and “helps to construct societal attitudes. It sends the clear message that people who identify as gay, bisexual or transgender – or anyone who engages in any form of same-sex consensual sexual activity or whose self-defined gender identity or gender expression differs from acceptable ‘norms’ of gender and sexuality – can be treated differently. It is, in other words, not just the conduct that is censured but also the individual who engages in it” (Amnesty, 2019: 17).

Dehumanization and humiliating attacks are not uncommon in the army and the group is a “facilitator of aggression” since it “brings anonymity and deindividuation conducive to a decline in control and a temporary suspension of standards opposed to violence” (Bègue, 2006). As a result, it is easier to participate in the collective aggression of a subject “whose presence represents an identity threat” (Schiavinato, 2011), than to oppose the group. The perpetrator

uses rape, and sexual abuse in the broad sense, as a vector of power and dominance, thus viewing the sodomized individual as humiliated and “inferior”.

“Military life [is] a regular opportunity to practice gang rape, 'for a good cause.' It is first of all a warlike strategy, which participates in the virilization of the group which commits it while it weakens the opposing group by hybridizing it and this is the case since the wars of conquest exist” (Despentes, 2006: 27).

The notion of “spectator effect” can also explain the lack of responsiveness on the part of witnesses to these attacks, thus prompting their perpetuation. This “spectator effect” is a social phenomenon in which individuals who witness a crime do not offer any form of assistance to victims when other people are present. Since the responsibility of witnesses is divided among them, each considers that they do not have to intervene, since they all think that “someone” will do it. This division of responsibility also occurs with guilt: everyone considers that “all” could have acted and did not, so no one is guilty of not having intervened. They then become complicit in the aggression, by their lack of reaction, and by their silence. In the case of the South Korean army, the behavior of witnesses varies, but the lack of reaction is justified by the fear of violating the established hierarchical order and of being the victim of torment in turn during the remainder time in military service. But “the fact that so many bystanders witnessed sexual abuse yet remained silent contributed to the perpetrator's trivializing his abusive behavior” (Kwon et al. 2007: 1038).

A 2007 study entitled *Sexual Violence Among Men in the Military in South Korea*, conducted through surveys and interviews with assailants, victims and witnesses of violence in the military, shows that in all cases identified, the perpetrator is a senior officer, who sexually assaults the lower ranks to assert his authority over them, since “the right to control and to abuse the body is a very useful method for the military to reaffirm its hierarchical order” (Kwon et al.

2007: 1035). The mentioned sexual assaults are multiple: forced embrace, forced kiss, touching the chest and / or buttocks and / or penis, genital penetration or attempt, forced masturbation, forced caresses (mainly of the penis), forced oral sex, sleeping with the 'aggressor, anal penetration with a stick, verbal and / or psychological aggression and so on ... On “the premise that they could better adjust to military life if they accepted sexual abuse as a 'play', [the victims] cooperated in concealing sexual violence” (Kwon et al. 2007: 1034). The witnesses interviewed then report a number of incidents and a seriousness of the facts much more important than the victims.

The repetition of such acts leads to normalize this phenomenon: for the aggressors, it becomes “normal” to be violent, for the victims, it becomes "normal" to be abused. This publicly and frequently occurring sexual violence suggests that such acts are ordinary, and part of the daily life of the military (Kwon et al. 2007: 1037).

But it goes even further: among the aggressors questioned, 83% declared having themselves been victims of sexual violence when they had a lower rank (Kwon et al. 2007: 1028), which reinforces the idea of a perpetuation of the military system based on violence and hyper-masculinity, in order to “retrieve” their scorned masculinity, the victims in turn become aggressors when their hierarchical position allows them to. Sexual violence between men in the military is used “to maintain ranking-based hierarchical order” (Kwon et al. 2007: 1040), because “men who are victimized by sexual violence, then, become someone whose masculinity is lacking or damaged. Hierarchical order reasserts itself amid all this, and men collectively try to be on the offensive to affirm their aggressive masculinity” (Kwon et al. 2007: 1036).

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Decoding the Buddhist Narrative:

Patronage and Salvation of Royal Women in the late 16th Century Joseon Dynasty¹

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In 1576 Joseon Korea, a Buddhist painting that had been frayed by years of dust and insects caught the eyes of two Buddhist nuns. They decided to reproduce the work after receiving a donation from the royal palace. The inscription on the reproduced painting states that the particular arrangements helped to regain the distinct colours and forms of the original painting (Songcheon et al. 2011, 294). The painting is titled *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do* (安樂國太子傳變相圖, Figure 1), and it delivers the story of Prince Allakguk and how his devoted family attained salvation through the endurance of painful ordeals. The painting encountered a fateful tribulation after the outbreak of the Japanese Invasions of Korea (壬辰倭亂, 1592-1598) that later resulted in its transfer to Japan (Park 2010, 309; Kim 1994, 94; Hirai 2008, 33).² The painting is currently kept under the property of Seizan Bunko (青山文庫), a private library in the remote village of Sakawa (佐川) in Kochi prefecture (高知県).

¹ This paper is the result of the fieldwork evaluation that had been undertaken at Seizan Bunko (Japan), for the examination of the painting.

² The detailed information of the painting's transfer to Japan needs yet to be investigated further. According to the bequeathal document of the painting, its ownership is known as Chōsokabe Motochika (長宗我部 元親, 1539-1599), a Japanese Senkoku daimyō who ruled the Tosa Province (土佐) in Shikoku Island. Motochika won the domestic war between the fights of Tosa-Ichijo clan (土佐一条) but soon defeated by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉) who later ordered him to participate the invasions of Korea. It is presumed that Motochika seized the painting during his first invasion of Korea between 1592 to 1593.



Figure 1

Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do (安樂國太子傳變相圖), Joseon 1576

Hanging scroll, colors on silk, 105.8cm×56.8cm

© Seizan bunko

This paper focuses not only on a visual analysis of the painting but also examines the activities of female patrons and the broader context of female salvation. It will first discuss Joseon royal women's Buddhist patronage that emphasizes a specific class of society and questions how their sponsorship networks interlinked with art and monastic orders. The implication of royal sponsorship also examines religious quarters as Buddhist convents and the governmental offices in charge of the royal finance. My study into these issues aim to determine the behind-the-scenes of Buddhist patronage associated with the painting, based on the practices of royal women that had largely deviated from the customary Confucian social code.

The paper will further interpret the intrinsic value of the painting by deconstructing its narrative through the reference of *Worin seokbo* (月印釋普, The Buddha's Biography and its Eulogy), a distinct Joseon Buddhist text, and the Visualization Sūtra (觀無量壽經) which is a scripture of the Pure Land doctrine. *Hangeul* scripts in the painting also invite to look into the functional aspects of the Buddhist image concerning its educative promotion in religious learning for nuns and elite women. Lastly, the paper calls attention to a Buddhist character, Lady Won-ang (鴛鴦夫人), the female protagonist in the narrative of the painting. Cultural codes evolved around this female character employed diversified interpretations in Buddhist stories and vernacular practice of Korean folk tale. Her transformative character illuminates the feminine manifestation of Avalokiteśvara, which again questions the idea of female salvation and how this particular icon connects to the agency of the Joseon royal women in Buddhist patronage.

❖ Part 1: Buddhist Record and Patrons

In Korean named as *hwagi* (畫記), Buddhist record provides essential information of artist, patron, and the production plans of the commissioned image. Buddhist record of *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do* details the production date, names of patrons, and royal women in which the last group was listed as the subjects to receive Buddhist blessings (Figure 2).



Figure 2
Buddhist Record of *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do*

The record indicates two Buddhist nuns, Hyewon (慧圓) and Hyewol (慧月) as patrons of this work.³ However, it omits information about where those nuns had affiliations and their relationship with the Joseon royal women at the time of the Buddhist commission. The nuns Hyewon and Hyewol must have had a close association with the palace for the record provides clues with a line that reads ‘*bogwon geumjung deuk yakgan jae* (普勸禁中 得若干財).’ It specifies the royal palace with a word ‘*geumjung* (禁中)’, and by recommending the patronage (to the royals), the nuns were able to collect small sums of money to engage with the

³ Due to the cursive handwriting of the record, it is a debatable issue whether the Chinese characters of Hyewon (慧圓) should be deciphered as Hyein (慧因) or Hyeuk (慧國).

reproduction of the painting. Four other names of Gim (金氏), Eopga (業加氏), Gwon (權氏), and Mukseok (墨石氏) that follow after the royal women in the record further suggest the collaborative circle of patrons that shared an interest in the sponsorship of the painting. They could have been either court ladies (內人, K. *nain*) associated with Buddhist cloisters or closer relatives of the nuns, as mentioned above (Choe 2011, 165). One clear piece of information is registered on the Buddhist term ‘*boche* (保体, i.e. to protect the body)’ next to their names which generally indicates living patrons in dedicatory prayers (Lee 2012, 163). In this Buddhist record, the group of names attest to collective activities that succeeded in collecting funds and replicating the image, with (unidentified) individuals who presumably financed the commission with additional resources.

Four Joseon royal women listed in the record are identified as queens, crown princess, and royal concubine (Diagram 1).⁴ They remained the occupants of the inner palace (內宮, *naegung*) throughout the four reigning periods of Joseon kings in the late half of the 16th Century. Spanning the years from 1550 to 1580s, three other Buddhist paintings and a sculpture also record the official ranks of the same royal women, which indicate their prolonged Buddhist commissions for dedicatory purposes.⁵ As the head members of the inner palace and pious

⁴ The identified royal patrons are as follows: Queen Inseong (仁聖王后, 1514-1578); Lady Hyebin (惠嬪 鄭氏, ?-?); Lady Deokbin (德嬪 尹氏, 1552-1592); and Queen Ui-in (懿仁王后, 1555-1600). For their accurate royal genealogy, please refer to the diagram 1 emphasized in bold red colors.

⁵ Except the Buddhist sculpture, all the paintings are currently kept under the authorities of Japanese Buddhist temples and private library. The works are listed as follows: Thirty-two Bodily Manifestations of Avalokiteśvara

Buddhist devotees, Joseon royal women often confronted ideological criticisms that strongly disparaged any activities of Buddhist practice. Neither the aforementioned royal women decisively advocated Buddhism nor elucidated their positions as patrons of Buddhist arts.




Diagram 1

Royal Genealogy of the 11th to the 14th Kings and Queens of Joseon Dynasty

(*Gwaneumbosal samsibi eungsindo* 觀音三十二應身圖, 1550); Kṣitigarbha and the Ten Kings of Hell from the Temple of Jasugung (*Jasugung jeongsa Jijang siwang do*, 慈壽宮淨社 地藏十王圖, 1575-1577); Amitābha's Guidance of the Dragon Boat towards Nine Levels of Western Pure Land (*Seobang gupum yongseon jeobinhoe-do*, 西方九品龍船接引會圖, 1582); and the Seated Wooden Statue of Amitābha Buddha in Bongam-sa Temple (*Bongam-sa Mokjo Amitabul jwasang*, 鳳巖寺木彫阿彌陀佛坐像, 1586).

Historical commonalities show that they were not blessed with the happiness of bearing royal heirs and all suffered early widowhood, except Queen Ui-in (懿仁王后, 1555-1600) who died shortly after the end of Japanese invasion. Lady Deokbin (德嬪 尹氏, 1552-1592), a former crown princess whose royal title also appears in the record is only briefly mentioned in the *Joseon wangjo sillok* (朝鮮王朝實錄) as a literate individual who was devoted to teaching court ladies at the inner palace (JWSBS 1997-2003, 238).

Throughout the history of Joseon dynasty, vociferous criticisms by the Neo-Confucian elites anticipated the disruption of the Buddhist foundation, who condemned the economic exhaustion of the lavish monastery construction and the lenient state rules over the governance of the monastic population (Buswell 1999, 137). Despite the tighter control of Buddhist practice as stated in the *Gyeongguk Daejeon* (經國大典; Complete Code of Law), the reinforced social convention could not deter elite women from their participation in religious service, which was all the more apparent in the examples of the devout queens and royal concubines. Within the dominant rule of Neo-Confucianism, Joseon royal women were never to break free from the demanding systems of sovereignty and were constantly weighed down by the obligation of carrying the royal lineage. Strictly required to serve as the female role model of Confucian principles, the royal women could hardly raise their voices inside the confinement of palace walls. In relieving the emotions of *won* (冤), the psychological and rewarding exit was discovered in another *won* (願), which proclaimed royal women as

benevolent patrons grouped under religious solidarity (Buswell and Lopez 2014, 662).⁶

However, psychological tensions and hardships of palace lives should not be accounted as conclusive reasons for the recurred Buddhist sponsorships of Joseon royal women. Indication of royal patronage reflected in this painting also questions the associative link with monasteries and official organizations supporting royal women's Buddhist pursuits. The connection between Joseon royal women and monasteries remained undiminished until the late 16th Century, which enhanced the roles of two governmental and religious sectors involved with the palace. One was the administration office of royal finance (內需司, K. *Naesusa*), which played a




Figure 3

Worship of Buddha in the Palace (宮中崇佛圖), detail
Joseon mid-late 16th Century, fragment of a handscroll
Colors on silk, 46.5×91cm
© Leeum Samsung Museum of Art

pivotal role in the royal Buddhist commissions, primarily involved with rituals and temple renovations (Kim 2001, 25-26). Queen Mun-jeong (文定王后, 1501-1565) was one pro-

⁶ This 'won' is often used as 'balwon (發願)' in Korean Buddhist terms. It may take the form of an oath, in which one promises to achieve an aim, or the form of a prayer, often accompanied by the dedication of meritorious offerings.

Buddhist individual who detected the value of *Naesusa* in her vast sponsorship focused on the support of royal Buddhist shrines (內願堂, *Naewondang*; 王室願堂, *wangsil wondang*, Figure 3) (Shin 2009, 331; Han 2013, 97-98). Notwithstanding the fierce disapproval of the National Confucian Academy and juridical authorities, Queen Mun-jeong's Buddhist policy recovered the social status of monastics and accelerated the production of Buddhist artworks, albeit for a short period. Financial resource governed by *Naesusa* was the crucial asset that had enabled royal women to utilize its official economic power in various Buddhist commissions (Shin 2014, 275). Even after the Buddhist heydays of Queen Munjeong, *Naesusa* continued to receive orders from the inner palace, which indicates its prolonged connection with Joseon royal women and administrative power over Buddhist patronage (*JWSBS* 1997-2003, 36, 208).⁷

While *Naesusa* had the supervisory power over the royal finance served in Buddhist commissions, the Buddhist convent, *Jeongeob-won* (淨業院), was a cloister that accommodated the extensive religious practice of royal women (Lee 2001, 158). Provisions of royal supplies to Buddhist convents also opened up opportunities for nuns to reach closer to the circle of the inner palace. With the assistance of queens and royal concubines, nuns could expand the domains of religious activities, and some even ameliorated the monastic livelihood through the benefits of royal protection (Jorgensen 2011, 131). Although it remains a debatable argument, the aforementioned nun-patrons Hyewon and Hyewol recorded in the painting

⁷ According to the Veritable Records of King Seonjo (宣祖實錄) dated in 1574, government officials severely criticized the communication prevailed in between monastics and *Naesusa* who had been secretly receiving orders from the Queen Dowager. In the same year, it further records how a royal concubine of the king initiated religious services to invoke Buddhist blessings for the prince, in which the court historiographer disapproves its heavy expense financed by *Naesusa*.

presumedly had an affiliation with Buddhist convents, accounting for *Jeongeop-won* as one of the potential cloisters. Indication of close Buddhist association between nuns and royal women further proposes to account other convents as *Jasugung* (慈壽宮) and *Insugung* (仁壽宮) for the residential cloisters of the nun-patrons (Kim 2014, 308). Both buildings were once employed as the retirement halls of royal concubines, and as the representative nunneries housed within the palace precincts, it may have provided easier accessibility for nuns to reach the enclosed quarters of royal women.

Joseon Buddhist convents, however, gradually lost their position as the innermost sanctums in the capital city. Petitions of Confucian fundamentalists disapproving female monastic community further laid restrictions on building or renovating cloisters for nuns. Female clergies who had bridged the palace and monastery came to encounter stricter regulations enforced by the Neo-Confucian hegemon. To what extent did *Naesusa* subsidize the reproduction plan of this Buddhist painting, and which convent accommodated the nun-patrons as their residential cloister remains open discussions. The intermediate roles of *Naesusa* and Buddhist convents surface as an appealing combination in outlining the behind-the-scenes of royal patronage. At the same time, the nuns could be considered religious consultants of royal women whose reciprocal relationship emphasized the reproduction of the painting as a meritable action for attaining enlightenment.

❖ Part 2: The Narrative – Origin and Functional Aspect

At one glance, *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do* is an assemblage of repeated characters and *hangeul* scripts arranged in labyrinth-like picture composition. Buildings, distant clouds, and trees are portrayed as scenic props in the picture, while the Buddhist characters are dispersed

from top to bottom, challenging the audience in following a coherent sequence of the narrative. The painting's overall synopsis is outlined as follows:

In the Kingdom of Brahman (梵摩羅國), **Buddhist sage Gwang-yu (光有聖人)** asks his



Figure 4

disciple monk to visit the palace of **King Sala (沙羅樹王)** and to ask for the **eight palace ladies (八姝女)** to serve as Buddhist attendants. The disciple monk visits the palace a second time, asking for more Buddhist donation. The devout king and his royal consort **Lady Won-ang (鴛鴦夫人)** decides to offer their assistance by renouncing all the worldly comfort and glory (Figure 4). During the journey, the pregnant Lady Won-ang is struck with illness. Not to overburden her husband's Buddhist path, the Lady asks to be sold as a servant in the household of a wealthy master. She donated all her contract expense to the monk, and the royal couple bid tearful farewell by singing the verses of rebirth in Buddhist Pure Land (Figure 5).

disciple monk to visit the palace of **King Sala (沙羅樹王)** and to ask for the **eight palace ladies (八姝女)** to serve as Buddhist attendants. The disciple monk visits the palace a second time, asking for more Buddhist



Figure 5



Figure 6

After seven years, the boy **Prince Allakguk** (安樂國太子) escapes the exploitative household of the wealthy master, leaving his mother Lady Won-ang behind. The prince is dramatically reunited with his father, King Sala,

who urges the son to return and take good care of Lady Won-ang. The prince hurriedly returned, but only to discover the corpse of his mother whom the evil master had brutally murdered. The devastated prince knelt in prayer to the Amitābha Buddha, wishing his mother's rebirth in the Pure Land (Figure 6).



Figure 7

Lady Won-ang miraculously revives back to life. Both the mother and son board on the Dragon Boat (龍船) with the Buddha, taking their final journey to the Pure Land (Figure 7).

The climax of the narrative is focused on the last two scenes, which show the prince praying before the skeletal remains of Lady Won-ang and their boarding on the Dragon Boat. Initially, the Buddhist narrative of Prince Allakguk (*Allakguk taejajeon*) is included in the 8th volume of *Worin seokbo*, which unfolds a revelatory ending of the characters as the manifestations of Amitābha Buddha and other figures of the Buddhist pantheon (refer to Table 1). The painting, however, portrayed Lady Won-ang and the prince still in secular identities, except King Sala, who is in the full manifestation of Amitābha Buddha holding a pole ready to lead the Dragon Boat to the Pure Land. Instead of representing a grand finale of Buddhist manifestation of all the characters, the painting delivers an empathic ending that evokes the ultimate attainment of salvation to the audience.

Buddhist sage Gwang-yu (光有聖人)	Śākyamuni Buddha (釋迦牟尼佛)
Disciple Monk (勝熱婆羅門)	Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī (文殊菩薩)
King Sala (沙羅樹大王)	Amitābha Buddha (阿彌陀佛)
Lady Won-ang (鴛鴦夫人)	Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara (觀音菩薩)
Prince Allakguk (安樂國太子)	Bodhisattva Mahāsthāmaprāpta (大勢至菩薩)
Eight Palace Ladies (八姝女)	Eight Great Bodhisattvas (八大菩薩)

Table 1
Manifestation of Buddhist Figures as described in *Worin seokbo*

The textual compilation of the *Worin seokbo* and its visual adaptation in *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do* reflect how the Joseon royal family sponsored Buddhist arts to fulfil vows and accumulate merit through generations. According to the preface of *Worin seokbo*, its

author, Prince Suyang (首陽大君, also known as King Sejo 世祖, 1417-1468) laments over the untimely death of his mother, Queen Soheon (昭憲王后, 1395-1446). He further explains how his father, King Sejong (世宗), advised him to copy and translate a Buddhist sūtra as a dedicatory vow for praying the queen's rebirth in the Pure Land (*WISB* 1, 9a-11a).⁸ The motive behind the publication of *Worin seokbo* is also linked with the premature death of Crown Prince Uigyeong (懿敬世子, 1438-1457), the eldest son of King Sejo. The king supervised the compilation of *Worin seokbo* to offer the accumulated merits of publication to the deceased parents and son, hoping that this may escort everyone to "board on the cloud of wisdom, escape this world of misery, and attain enlightenment" (*WISB* 1, 16a-18b; Jeong 2019, 78).⁹ The dedication of merits continues until the end of the preface, where the king concludes with the list of its beneficiaries, including the royal family, retainers and the general public (*WISB* 1, 24b-25b). The written record of *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do* also states the dedicatory vow which prays for immeasurable fortunes of royal women and how the virtuous power attained from reproducing the painting would deliver sentient beings to the state of tranquility.

The preface of *Worin seokbo* confirms that the contents of the text were selected from the Buddhist Tripitaka and edited by those who had mastered the teachings of the twelve *sudara*

⁸ One of the illustrations of ancestral tablets (神位) in *Worin seokbo* also presents the royal title of Queen Soheon which is paired with a short Buddhist idiom that states as 'acquire correct awakening (同證正覺).'

⁹ The preface of *Worin seokbo* testifies that King Sejo was not alone in the process of compilation by listing a group of Buddhist monks as the members of the publication advisory committees.

(十二部修多羅) (Jeong 2019, 34-35; Buswell and Lopez 2014, 276).¹⁰ The question about which division of the Buddhist canon did the story of Prince Allakguk originate from, the Visualization Sūtra (觀無量壽經, Sūtra of the Meditation on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life), one of the three principal scriptures from the Pure Land school, has been proposed as a relevant reference (Sa 1996, 300-301; Kumagai 1969, 1067). While the story of Prince Allakguk is included in the second half of volume 8 in *Worin seokbo*, the first half of the volume focuses on the sermons of the Śākyamuni Buddha to Queen Vaidehī (韋提希), on sixteen meditations as means of attaining rebirth in the Pure Land (*WISB* 8, 6a-59a; 69a-76a). Queen Vaidehī is the female protagonist in the Visualization Sūtra, whose achievement of Buddhist salvation also interlinks with family tragedies of separation, treason and death. However, volume 8 of *Worin seokbo* does not narrate the distressing story of Queen Vaidehī and quickly moves the scene from her contemplation on the Pure Land to the story of Prince Allakguk. The role entrusted to Queen Vaidehī in *Worin seokbo* was introducing the idea of visualizing the Pure Land, whereas Lady Won-ang was an indigenous exemplar who had epitomized the attainment of salvation through an ordeal of sacrifice and display of humbleness.

¹⁰ Also known as the twelve-part division of the canon (十二部經). They include: the Buddha's discourses (經, *sūtra*); aphorisms in mixed prose and verses (祇夜, *geya*); verse part of a discourse (伽陀, *gāthā*); historical episodes (尼陀那, *nidāna*); fables of Buddha and his disciples in past lives (伊帝目多伽, *itivṛttaka*); Buddha's previous life stories (闍多伽, *jātaka*); Buddha's miraculous acts (阿浮達磨, *adbhutadharma*); heroic narratives (阿波陀那, *avadāna*); didactic instructions (優婆提舍, *upadeśa*); Buddha's meaningful expressions (優陀那, *udāna*); Buddhist catechisms (畏佛略, *vaipulya*); prophetic teachings of future attainment (和伽羅, *vyākaraṇa*).

The Buddhist record and arrays of *hangeul* scripts also offer clues for the functional aspects of the painting. A word of ‘*geumbeok* (金壁, Golden wall)’ in the record alludes to the display of the image either at the royal palace or a Buddhist hall (Hwang 2011, 261).¹¹ Buddhist nuns or anyone accustomed to the narrative sequence could have also used the picture as a visual source for teaching the didactic message of salvation to the audience. Although it is plausible to interpret the painting as an educational material appreciated by nuns or royal women, outlining the method of its usage remains a challenging task. As for the *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do* and *Worin seokbo*, they all share the distinguished linguistic element, which is the dominant use of *hangeul*. In the painting, except for the Buddhist record written in Chinese characters on the uppermost space, the entire scenery descriptions are written in gold ink using the *hangeul* alphabets. The singular use of *hangeul* in the narration denotes the painting not as an abstruse religious material but a comprehensible visual device that easily appealed its edifying value to the audience.

Linguistic measures of early Joseon reflect the dominant usage of *hanmun*, the classical Chinese, as the major documentation tool, whereas *hangeul* remained as the literate assistance for women in general. Despite the gendered segregation in linguistic abilities, early Joseon *yangban* also promoted female education and valued the cultural contributions of women within the spheres of the Confucian principles (Jungmann 2014, 52). In the Buddhist context, extending women’s understanding of religious texts became a critical task. Up to the late 15th Century in Joseon, the majority of Buddhist sūtras still used Chinese characters, mainly

¹¹ In the *Joseon wangjo sillok*, ‘*geumbyeok*’ is usually referred to the decorative elements in the towery Buddhist pavilion (樓閣) or the buildings of Buddhist convents.

discussing the topics of doctrinal exegesis. This challenged readers for grasping its contents and restricted women's easy access to Buddhist manuscripts. As a resolution, some monastics who had close affiliations with royal women began to translate the popular Buddhist texts and *dharanis* into *hangeul* scriptures that focused on the reading and pronunciation guides (Jorgensen 2011, 138-139).¹² The efforts of *hangeul* translation succeeded in promoting Buddhism linguistically and increased women's capacity for religious learning. The usage of *hangeul* in the *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do* could be understood as an extension of such Buddhist development in the textual endeavour. Undoubtedly, the amalgamation of *hangeul* in the painting must have enhanced the easy readability of the narrative, whether the image was an educative material used in convents or a property that belonged to the inner palace.

❖ Part 3: Transformative Power of a Buddhist Heroine

Of all the characters featured in the *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do*, Lady Won-ang has multi-roles of a virtuous wife, mother, and devout Buddhist queen. In *Worin seokbo*, she is described as the manifestation of Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara (觀音菩薩, K. *Gwaneum bosal*), the most venerated and beloved figure in the East Asian Buddhist culture. Avalokiteśvara in the secular guise of an attractive and wise lady has been portrayed as one of the popular themes in

¹² With the establishment of the *Gangyeong dogam* (刊經都監, Directorate of Sūtra Publication) under the orders of King Sejo in 1461, Buddhist scriptures for monastic studies and invocation practice were translated into *hangeul*. The representative sūtras were the *Jijang-gyeong* (地藏經, Sūtra of Kṣitigarbha), the *Cheonsu-gyeong* (千手經, Sūtra of the Gwaneum with a Thousand Hands) and *Wongak-gyeong* (圓覺經, Sūtra of the Complete Enlightenment). Other Buddhist texts as *Yeombul bo gwonmun* (念佛普勸文, Texts Exhorting the Practice of Buddhist Recitation) promoted the practice of invocation through the chants and ritual texts in *hangeul* translations.



Figure 8

Fish-basket Guan-yin (魚籃觀音)

Attrib. Chao Meng-fu (1254-1322), Yuan

Hanging scroll, colors on silk, 122.6cm×61.3cm

© National Palace Museum, Taiwan

Japanese and Chinese Buddhist paintings.

Among the auspicious tales of Avalokiteśvara in Japan and China, the narrative of Malangfu Guanyin (馬郎婦觀音, J. Merofu Kannon)

similarly depicts the deity as a female protagonist - an explicit instructor of Buddhist practice and the demonstrator in the attainment of salvation (Kaminishi 2006, 70; Yü 2001, 185). In this tale, Avalokiteśvara is metamorphosed into a young lady who adopts her sexual charm as a persuasive agency to enlighten people. During the Song and Yuan China, Malangfu Guanyin was more popularly known as the Fish Basket Guanyin (魚籃觀音, Figure 8) whose story equally

reflected ideas about liberation and the emptiness of all perceptions. Although Malangfu Guanyin used sexual desire as a teaching device to introduce people to the

profound Buddhist teachings, the moralistic puritanism of Neo-Confucianism also criticized the story's unconventional value as too shocking and irreverent for general consumption (Weidner 1994, 167-168). For the imperial women in Edo Japan, this indigenous deity was recognized as a Buddhist celebrity of the unrivalled beauty who saved people from spiritual

downfall, becoming the ideal exemplar of attaining enlightenment (Fister 2007, 421, 427).

Neither the narratives of Malangfu nor Fish basket Guanyin appeared in didactic tales of Joseon Buddhism. However, a similarly indigenous character of Lady Won-ang delivered the doctrinal lesson of the Pure Land belief and equally fulfilled the role as the conveyor of Buddhist salvation. These different narratives of Avalokiteśvara share a similar context that a specific Buddhist icon had embraced the feminized manifestation to enlighten sentient beings and awaken their religious capacities. Considering how the feminine virtue of Malangfu Guanyin has been praised in dedicatory poems and paintings, one could also ask in return to what extent the narrative of Lady Won-ang had prevailed in Joseon Buddhist arts. An independent and separate illustration of Lady Won-ang similar to Malangfu Guanyin had not been discovered to the present. Images of Avalokiteśvara, however, was one of the themes widely acknowledged among the inner circle of Joseon royal women, which also led to the sponsorship of the relevant images in paintings. Two scroll paintings that each date the 15th and the mid-16th Century represent the Avalokiteśvara in which both have a reference from the “Universal Gateway” chapter (觀世音菩薩普門品) of Lotus Sūtra (法華經). The 15th Century painting portrayed the seated Water-moon Avalokiteśvara (水月觀音圖, Figure 9) in the coastal cavern of rocks and trees. Another is the painting of the Thirty-two Bodily Manifestations of Avalokiteśvara (觀音三十二應身圖, *Gwaneum samsib-i eungsin do*, 1550, Figure 10), which records Queen Inseong (仁聖王后, 1514-1578) as its patron.¹³ Through the various depictions

¹³ As the consort of King Injong (仁宗, 1515-1545), the royal title of Queen Inseong also appears in the Buddhist record of *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do*. Please refer to the diagram 1.

of hardships in a defiled world, both works emphasize Avalokiteśvara as the savior who alleviates the sufferings and calamities of sentient beings. Simultaneously, the images underline the importance of blessings gained by Buddhist practice and characterize compassionate activities of the deity (Kim 2019, 62-63, 65-66).

Joseon royal women who sponsored these Buddhist paintings, including *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do*, were aware of their religious practice dedicated to specific groups, such as the communities of the palace and family that they belonged. Being widows, some



Figure 9
Water-Moon Avalokiteśvara (水月觀音圖)
Joseon 15th Century
Gold on silk, 170cm×90.9cm
Saifuku-ji, Japan



Figure 10
Details of the Thirty-two Bodily Manifestations of Avalokiteśvara (觀音三十二應身圖)
Joseon 1550
Colors on silk, 201.6cm×151.8cm
Chion-in, Japan

queens expressed their Buddhist devotion for the repose of late kings while others wished for the secure succession of the throne and family lineage. In the same context, Avalokiteśvara was recognized as one of the core Buddhist icons in Joseon royal women's religious networks. For instance, Queen Inseong, as mentioned above, was the exemplary individual who, as the head of the inner palace and the pious Buddhist, believed in the miraculous efficacy and manifestative power of Avalokiteśvara. Buddhist records on the painting testify that her sponsorship of the image would invoke the deceased king's heavenly rebirth and how the accumulated merit of the patronage would be dedicated to national prosperity and welfare (Oh 2014, 50). Arguably, Avalokiteśvara stood as the role model and provided a road map of spiritual cultivation for Joseon royal women who had to withstand the events of unexpected death and power struggle at the inner court.

The revelatory transformation of Buddhist characters in *Allakguk taejajeon* came to embody another indigenous change in the shamanistic narrative (敍事巫歌) of Korea. Accompanied by the vernacular practice and the derivative of folk belief, this complete variation of the *Allakguk taejajeon* is entitled as *I-gong bon-puri* (이공본풀이) (Jin 1991, 5-6).¹⁴ Still preserved as a shamanic oral performance in Korea's Jeju island, the tale delivers didactic promotion of virtuous deeds and reproof of vice (勸善懲惡). *I-gong bon-puri* can be translated as the 'Narrative Song of the Flower Deity' in the Jeju dialect in which the flowers of miraculous power surface as the provocative symbols throughout the story (Jo 2000, 30-31). In this tale, Lady Won-ang (in the native name of Won-gang ami) goes through the same ordeal

¹⁴ In studies of the Jeju shamanism, '*Bon-puri*' has the following four meanings: A narrative account of a deity; relieving the anger of the deity; deliverance from an evil spirit; bringing stability in mind and body.

of suffering, but her revival from death is assisted by the flowers of the underworld instead of the attainment of Buddhist salvation. The climax of the *I-gong bon-puri* narrates the scene where the vengeful Prince Allakguk wields flowers of destruction and restoration to destroy the house of the evil master and to reawaken his mother from death. Neither the *Worin seokbo* nor *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do* portrays the supernatural aspects of these flowers. This revised tale of Buddhist salvation concludes with the deification of characters in the netherworld. The distinctive aspects of *I-gong bon-puri* are that it connotes patriarchal narratives of hereditary occupation and habitational ancestry passing down to the male members of the family (Jin 1991, 82).¹⁵

While Lady Won-ang in *Allakguk taejajeon* was a feminine incarnation of Avalokiteśvara, *I-gong bon-puri* concludes by revealing her final identity as the goddess of the underworld (저승어명, K. *jeoseung eomeong*). Female shamans in Jeju island repeatedly performed the vernacular practice of *I-gong bon-puri* as a consoling ritual dedicated to revengeful spirits who had suffered premature death (Pyeon 1991, 334).¹⁶ The contrasting narratives between the *Allakguk taejajeon* and *I-gong bon-puri* again questions the story's origin regarding their multifaceted features as the Buddhist legend and folk literature. However, it should be incorrect to regard Buddhist sources as the predominant asset and dismiss the value of the regional folktale as secondary to the development of this story. Transcending boundaries

¹⁵ At the end of the story, the prince inherited the occupation of his father, as the Guardian Deity of Flowers (花監觀), and the tale highlights this hereditary value which further established the habitational custom exclusively succeeds down to fathers and sons.

¹⁶ The miraculous flowers in the *I-gong bon-puri* are interpreted as the indigenous device that assist vengeful spirits to reconcile and attain their long-cherished hopes.

of religion and indigenous mythology, Lady Won-ang is the agent of enlightenment and spiritual redemption, ever encouraging the audience to realize the power of faith.

❖ Continuing the New Interpretation

Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do is a painting that invites interdisciplinary frameworks to decode its narrative and the involvement of royal patronage. The painting is yet to yield answers to many questions such as the origination of the story, Buddhist affiliation of the nun-patrons and their associative links with the royal women. Neither the *Joseon wangjo sillok* nor historical documents paid great attention to the small group of royal women written in the Buddhist record of the *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do*. Despite the marginal identities, other Buddhist artworks state the ranks of the same royal women, which mirrors their prolonged supports in producing devotional images. The painting further provided clues on how women played vital roles in its reproduction process and outlined the doctrinal background based on the Pure Land teachings, including the direct reference from *Worin seokbo*. A distinguished use of *hangeul* as the narrative tool of the painting further proposed conjectures about the functional aspects of the image as the educative reference for nuns and elite women. A separate study focused on Lady Won-ang also prompted to examine the agencies of Joseon royal women that illuminated the belief of Avalokiteśvara and the sponsorships of relevant images dedicated to their surrounding royal communities.

Intricate patterns of religious syncretism in the *Allakguk taejajeon* still requires further research, leaving an extra new challenge to comprehend the cultural diffusion of folk belief. Indigenous mythic element in *I-gong bon-puri* has been recently introduced through the reinterpretation in Korean and Japanese mass media – as the subject in comic books. First

published as part of a comic book series “Along with the Gods (신과 함께 K. *Singwa hamkke*, 2012)” in Korea, the remake version in Japanese edition was also published under the title of *Kami to tomoni* (神と共に, 2016). This process of amalgamation with elements of religion, folklore, and even contemporary mass media dissolves the interpretative boundary of *Allakguk taejajeon byeonsang-do*. As a subject in Joseon Buddhist arts, the painting demonstrates how the concepts of agency, networks, and collectivity were in full operation behind its production, providing a virtual doorstep in understanding women’s realization of the Buddhist faith.

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