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History*

Presented By

Center for Korean History, Korea University
Department of Korean History, Korea University
Global Human Resource Development Program in
Korean History, Korea University
Research Center for Fostering K-History

KUGS Conference Timetable

From	Event	Presenter				Discussant	Moderator
09:00-9:15	Opening Remarks	Heo Eun (Director, Center for Korean History, Korea University)					이정현(Korea Univ.)
9:15-11:30	Panel A	Cristina Dinu (Univ. of Bucharest)	Karen Ren (McGill Univ.)	Sungik Yang (Harvard Univ.)	Patrick Vierthaler (Kyoto Univ.)	Kyu Hyun Kim(UC Davis)	Chelsea Proctor (Korea Univ.)
9:15-11:30	Panel B	Aaron Molnar (Univ. of British Columbia)	Ga Eun Cho (Johns Hopkins Univ.)	최동녕 (Korea Univ.)	김동영 (Korea Univ.)	Jeong-il Lee (NAHF)	Emily Ambrose (Korea Univ.) & 이강원 (Korea Univ.)
11:30-13:00	Lunch Break						
13:00-15:15	Panel C		Minah Kang (Johns Hopkins Univ.)	Yefrem Yefremov (Al Farabi Kazakh Natl Univ.)	Shin, Dongil (Kyungpook Univ.)	Lisa Min (RIKS)	고현정(Korea Univ.)
15:15-15:30	Break						
15:30-17:45	Panel D	Marc Denisa-Georgiana (Univ. of Bucharest)	Sabina Sava (Univ. of Bucharest)	Lida Cossu (Ca'Foscari Univ. of Venice)	천관우 (Korea Univ.)	Myungho Hyun (Study of Korean Modernity at Wonju Yonsei University)	Claudia Soddu (Korea Univ.)
17:45-18:00	Closing Remarks	Leighanne Yuh (Dept. of Korean History, Korea University)					이정현(Korea Univ.)

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9:15-11:30

Panel A

Discussant Kyu Hyun Kim (UC Davis)

Moderator Chelsea Proctor (Korea University)

Presenters
Dinu Cristina-Mădălina (University of Bucharest)
Karen Zhiyi Ren (McGill University)
Sungik Yang (Harvard University)

The Dystopian Space in the Novel *I'll Be Right There* by Kyung-sook Shin

Dinu Cristina-Mădălina

The aim of this paper is to identify the oppositions between the urban and rural space, and the public and private space, which define the dystopian space in the novel *I'll Be Right There*, written by Kyung-sook Shin. I consider that the author suggestively outlines a dystopian space through the two contrasting pairs, which highlight the spatial symbolism of the novel. In this paper I will analyze the opposition between the urban and rural space, and the opposition between the public and private space, using as examples relevant sequences in which these spaces are described in the novel. In the first part of my paper, I will note the contrast between the city of Seoul and the countryside, represented by Professor Yoon's house in the countryside. In the second part of the essay, I will capture the typical dystopian features of the novel observed through the contrast between the private space, represented by Miru's room, and the public space.

Before I start my analysis, I want to talk about the historical context that this novel refers to. In October 1979 the assassination of Park Chung-hee gave Koreans hope that an era of democracy was upon them. However, things took a bad turn when another military coup took place because of political instability in the country and the absence of authority. New President Choi Kyu-hah and his cabinet had very limited control over the growing power of General Chun Doo-hwan, who gained power

through a military coup on 12 December 1979. Citizens from all over the country were enraged by this situation and started protesting all over the country. In March 1980, demonstrations escalated by teachers and students seeking democratic reforms for the country, such as rebuilding student unions and abolishing martial law. The government responded with a violent crackdown on demonstrations and extended martial law nationwide on 17 May 1980. But democratization movements in the country, suppressed during President Park's reign, were reviving. In the first semester of 1980, professors and students who were expelled for their pro-democratic activities returned to their respective universities and student unions were formed. They led national demonstrations to initiate a series of reforms, including the lifting of martial law, declared after the assassination of President Park, democratizing the country, raising the minimum wage, and developing freedom of the press. These activities culminated in the demonstration of the anti-martial law in Seoul on 15 May 1980, which was attended by about 100,000 students and other citizens. Kyung-sook Shin was part of the 386 generation (*sampallyuk sedae*), a generation that participated in and witnessed these events from the '80s and '90s. She is one of the most acclaimed contemporary writers and the most internationally successful Korean author, nicknamed "the first lady of Korean literature" in the West. The speed

with which her novels prevailed and her volumes of short stories made literary critics talk about the "Kyung-sook Shin syndrome". She was born in 1963 in Jeongeup, Jeolla Province, and graduated from the Seoul Institute of the Arts. As part of the 368 generation (*sampallyuk sedae*) of those born in the 1960s who attended university in the 1980s, a disordered period in Korean history, dominated by social protests, her book *I'll Be Right There* represents a universal story about friendship, a story about the political turmoil in Seoul, a story about loss and death. The novel starts with Jung Yoon, one of the main characters talking on the phone with her ex-boyfriend from her youth, Myungsuh. This phone call triggers her memories from her years as a student in Seoul, those years being marked by the constant protests against the military coup. The rest of the novel is basically her story from her youth. Kyung-sook Shin's novel, manages to paint, through the individual stories of the main characters of loss and death, the setting and atmosphere of these historical events in South Korea.

First of all, in order to be able to analyze the dystopian characteristics of the urban landscape in this novel, we must first define the concept of dystopia.

In *Utopia / Dystopia: Conditions of Historical Possibility*, dystopia is defined as:

Dystopia is not simply the opposite of utopia. A true opposite of utopia would be a society that is either completely unplanned or is planned to be deliberately terrifying and awful. Dystopia, typically invoked, is neither of these things; rather, it is a utopia that has gone wrong, or a utopia that functions only for a particular segment of society." (Prakash, Tilley and Gordin 2010, 1)

Starting from this definition, it can be understood that through a dystopia various

ideas are expressed and a certain social order or way of governing is criticized. As Peter Fitting argues, dystopia, like traditional utopia, focuses predominantly on the urban space (2010, 120), because the spatial language of the city is much more appropriate to express the complexity of building a social order. Dystopia is a narrative of ideas in which the construction of space has a prominent structural function. Thus, traditionally, the action of a dystopian novel has as its main framework the urban space. Dystopian cities are associated either with elegant, barren, technologically developed and well-organized places or with dirty, chaotic, disintegrating spaces (Terentowicz-Fotyga 2018, 32). In the novel *I'll Be Right There*, Seoul seems to fall into the second category. Throughout the novel, this city is characterized by chaos and riots, which seem to have no result. Every day, in the streets of the city, riots take place, and sometimes people get caught in the middle of them even without their will. This is what happens to Jung Yoon, who is caught by a crowd of protesters on the way home, and the image described at the time is representative of the riot-stricken city of Seoul:

Just then, a tear gas canister exploded overhead, and a huge crowd of protesters surged into the underpass to try to avoid it. I was shoved forward with them, but the roll-down gates at the bottom of the stairwell were closed as well. There was nowhere to go, but the people at the top kept pouring in and falling on top of us. The people in front of the security gates began to collapse on top of one another. There was no time to think about how to get out. I fell down with someone and felt someone else fall on top of me. (Shin 2014, 65-66)

In this fragment, we can see all the elements that define the urban dystopian space of this novel: violence, protesters, confusion, and tear gas. The latter is a permanent element of

the story, its pungent smell being present everywhere in the city. This smell not only penetrates even the classrooms, but it polluted the atmosphere of the city so much that even the plants in flower gardens withered. When Jung Yoon buys her table palm from a small flower shop, the reader can better understand the intensity of the smell of tear gas from the seller's reply:

“When will this country ever stop rioting?” She sighed. “I can’t open my shop. It’s closed most of the time, and there’s so much tear gas in the air that all the flowers have wilted. Look at this. I was raising two birds in this cage, but they died yesterday. And look at my face. Even at this age, I have acne that won’t go away. It’s from breathing tear gas every day.” (Shin 2014, 79-80)

The woman complains that even two birds she was holding in the cage died due to the smell of tear gas. Thus, the whole city seems to be suffocating in the strong smell of tear gas, while the riots are already part of everyday life. The constant riots, tear gas and the chaos of the streets full of protesters make Seoul a disorganized dystopian city on the brink of disaster.

In dystopian novels, these urban spaces of anarchic chaos are juxtaposed with quiet rural spaces. Crowded labyrinthine cities, and their buildings, contrast with the vast, deserted, and often rural natural landscapes. The structural spatial contrast between urban and rural characterizes dystopian narratives, because the visual extremes, projected through these two frames, function as clear symbols of the extreme forms of social order (Terentowicz-Fotyga 2018, 32). This contrast is also present in the novel *I'll Be Right There*. The space of the noisy city, suppressed by the tear gas of the daily riots, comes into opposition with the peaceful space of the countryside. In the

novel, Professor Yoon's house in the countryside becomes a refuge for young people who want to escape the chaos of the Seoul riots. The following excerpt describes the village where Professor Yoon lives:

As we went around yet another bend, I started to worry, too. But just then, the village unfurled below us. The rest of the path looked like someone had just swept it clean.

The village was surrounded by mountains and completely blanketed in snow. There were only a few houses. The whole world had turned white. The path continued on like a line on a map. We traced it with our eyes. It meandered down the mountain and into the village, widening and then narrowing again. The swept path stood out clearly against the snowy landscape. It came to a stop in front of a house. (Shin 2014, 230)

This winter landscape of the quiet and secluded village from the rest of the world contrasts with the hustle and bustle of Seoul. Arthur Blaim analyzes the dialogue of utopias with the pastoral tradition of contrastive views on nature and civilization (2016, 151), and these contrasts can also be used to define the dystopian space. Following this model, nature is associated with freedom, simplicity, democracy, sincerity, innocence, and order, while society is represented by hierarchy, artificiality, chaos, complexity and violence. This idea can be seen in the novel *I'll Be Right There*, as Professor Yoon's house in the countryside is not just a place of refuge for young people living in a disorganized society, this space also becomes a symbol of peace, freedom and happiness for them. One of Jung Yoon's earliest memories in the novel is the day she and her former university colleagues gathered at Professor Yoon's house to pick apples from the trees. Jung Yoon remembers how happy they all were, but also how sad they were when they realized that they would

never be able to relive such a carefree day. These young people were forced to constantly fight for their future, protesting and participating in the riots in the heart of the city, and they realize this cruel reality even when they are far from these worries, in the middle of nature. They all realize that they cannot run away from their responsibilities and that they must cherish the moments of happiness spent in the professor's yard because they will no longer have such joys in their uncertain future. As Peter Fitting argues, in dystopias, the rebels find in the pastoral space the freedom they lack in society, and the organic character of the countryside is the opposite of the controlled dystopian society in the urban space (2010, 120). Thus, even these young people in the novel find in the rural space the freedom and happiness that is denied to them in the city where the riots have suppressed any trace of humanity.

Second of all, the defining narrative model of dystopias, which focuses on the relationship between the individual and the state, translates into a particular construction of space in which the boundary between the individual space and the state's space becomes a crucial place of meaning (Terentowicz-Fotyga 2018, 16). Thus, a basic principle of dystopian spaces appears, namely the division between the private, individual space and the public, common domain. The close relationship between space and ideology in the dystopian narrative suggests that social and political ideas about the gloomy reality are symbolically expressed through the construction of the narrative space. Thus, spatial language functions as a visible expression of social order. And as dystopias usually construct

extreme visions of society, spatial language also tends to be based on extreme descriptions. This principle can also be seen in the novel *I'll Be Right There*, in which Kyung-sook Shin is building a society dominated by chaos and riots, in which public life seems to be defined only by the constant struggle of the people to get their rights. From the very beginning of the novel, one can observe the gloomy and chaotic atmosphere of the city shaken by the daily riots. Jung Yoon remembers the first course she attended taught by Professor Yoon and describes how the street riots were so violent that they affected the course:

I looked up at his eyes instead. They gleamed sharply behind his glasses. He turned to look out the window. The shouting of the student demonstrators outside had been disrupting classes. Tear gas wafted into the room, carried on the still-cold March wind. Before class began, someone had struggled to shut the hinged windows. Professor Yoon stood in the window for a long time, watching the demonstrators. He did not move, so we all gradually joined him at the window. Riot police were chasing a group of students. White clouds bobbed above their heads in the frigid air. That day, Professor Yoon had just one thing to say to us: *What is the use of art in this day and age?* I could not tell whether the question was aimed at us or at himself, but I saw his keen eyes grimace in pain. In that moment, when I first began paying attention to his eyes, a sharp, unfamiliar pain pricked at my heart. (Shin 2014, 12)

From this quote, we can deduce the features of the public space outlined in the novel. The public space here is characterized by chaos and violence, being the visible expression of oppressive politics and the revolt of individuals demanding their rights. The contrast between the cool, serene spring day and the commotion in the street accentuates, even more, the unnatural,

inhuman violence that was unleashed in the city. The spring breeze, instead of bringing freshness to the classroom, instead brought the strong smell of tear gas that stifled the atmosphere. Professor Yoon's reply suggests his despair because he understands that in a world dominated by riots, injustices and violence, art can no longer find its place. He realizes that in these times of oppression and suffering, art no longer has the power to bring relief to the souls of people struggling for survival. Art is an important element of the civilized world, it is a symbol of sensitivity, elegance and culture. But in the world outlined by Kyung-sook Shin, in which life seems to be limited to riots, and people are caught up in the fight for their fundamental rights, art is already a negligible aspect that loses all importance in such a primitive and barbaric world. Thus, the anarchic, tense atmosphere that dominates the public space within this novel is outlined.

The structural theme of dystopias is the relationship between the individual and the oppressors. The plot of a dystopian narrative is generally represented by the moment when the protagonists have a revelation and are suddenly aware of the injustices of the social and political reality in which they live. Consequently, of course, they revolt, and most of the time, their revolt is useless or even severely punished. This is also the case in the novel *I'll Be Right There*. Although it is true that this narrative is more of a revolt of society as a whole and a common struggle of all citizens against the oppressive state, we can see the individual drama through Myungsuh, which can be considered a symbol of the whole nation's drama, or the voice of the whole people who are constantly struggling to gain their freedom and bring about change:

"I just want something to change. Nothing ever changes no matter how hard we fight, so we become lethargic. Sometimes I find myself wishing that someone would steal all the books, just take them all, every last one, even from the libraries. I wish the schools would close so that no one could go, not even if they wanted to. Everything is the same. It only feels like time is passing, and only the characters change. We are torn apart and chased around. We fight back and get chased some more... We all stare at the walls and complain of loneliness. All we have to do is turn around, but instead we keep our faces to the walls. It's depressing to think that this will never change. Things were no different last spring, either." (Shin 2014, 76)

Here, Myungsuh directly expresses his frustration with his futile efforts to bring about change, and his words seem to voice the frustrations of the entire state-oppressed society. Their efforts thus seem futile, and the feeling of helplessness destroys their spirit and desire to fight. Myungsuh feels lonely, despite fighting alongside his friends because feelings of loneliness persist in a society where no one seems to hear their protests and no one sees them struggling alone in the dark. Time also loses its value because every day brings them the same disappointments, the same wasted efforts. Thus, Myungsuh finds it difficult to distinguish the days, in a world where nothing changes, and the riots also end up seeming in vain. All these things help us to better understand the characteristics of the public space in this novel. The constant riots that have no results, the tear gas and the chaos of the streets full of protesters shape a dystopian disorganized public space that is on the verge of disaster.

In contrast to the public space, there is the private space that is represented by Miru's room. When Jung Yoon goes to Miru for the first time, she feels like she's breaking away from the rest of the world:

The stairs led way, way down. Each time I thought we had surely reached the bottom, we turned the corner to find another set of steps. It felt like we were climbing back down the hill we had just come up. Miru's small studio was at the bottom of the stairs. She took a key from her pocket and fit it into the lock. The door opened, and she reached inside, flipped on the light, and called out, "Emily!" I glanced back at the stairs. It felt like we were cut off from the surface of the earth. Her room was much darker than the abandoned house she had taken me to after the bathhouse. She probably had to keep the light on even during the day. (Shin 2014, 129)

This dark room at the bottom of the stairs becomes the space that shelters them from the outside world. This is the space where the three, Myungsuh, Jung Yoon and Miru strengthen their friendship. Here, too, Miru feels safe telling Jung Yoon her sister's tragic story. Miru's house seems to be the unifying element of the three friends. In the midst of a deafening world, they find in Miru's house an oasis of peace, calmness and quiet. Whether or not this artificial peace is just an illusion cannot be clear, but what is clear is that this space is also emptied of its significance in the end, with the

disappearance of Miru. Thus, like all other elements in dystopias, the private space is destroyed, and with it the three friends part ways. Symbolically, with the abandonment of the private space represented by Miru's room, the connections between the three friends are also destroyed, because nothing remains untouched by the toxic outer space.

The world of chaos in which they live is far too harsh for their relationship to endure.

In conclusion, Kyung-sook Shin outlines in her novel a dystopian anarchic space through the image of the city of Seoul shaken by riots, in which public life revolves around the relentless struggle for justice. This urban landscape contrasts with the peaceful image of the countryside represented by the village where Professor Yoon lives and the moments of peace that the three friends have in the private space of Miru's room. From the analysis of the key sequences that describe all these spaces, it was observed the opposition between their symbolism and the fact that they build a typical dystopian space.

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The Cinematic Burnout Society: *Peppermint Candy* and *A Brighter Summer Day*

Karen Zhiyi Ren

In a frantic world that celebrates instantaneity and speed, digital media has become easier and faster for people to consume exemplified by the widespread mobile phone and TikTok videos (De Luca and Jorge, eds. 2016). However, a number of “slow cinemas” that embrace contemplation, silence and duration have developed significantly, resonating with a larger sociocultural movement that aims to slow down the accelerated tempo of late capitalism in recent years, such as the “cittaslow” and Slow Food movement in Italy (Çağlayan 2018, 8). As Byung-Chul Han suggests, the society of achievement and activeness is generating excessive tiredness and exhaustion, especially for East Asian countries because of their collectivism and Confucian ideologies (Han 2020, 31). Korean filmmaker Lee Chang-Dong and Taiwanese filmmaker Edward Yang are both keen to depict the repressed and often censored histories in their slow-cinema storytelling styles. Their films demand patience, attention, and imagination, that are designed to transform idleness and monotony into a productive way of social and political reflection (Çağlayan 2018, xiii).

Both focusing on the counter-narratives of the marginalized characters, Lee Chang-Dong’s *Peppermint Candy* (1999) and Edward Yang’s *A Brighter Summer Day* (1991) document the emotional developments of people living under the

atrocious trauma, the Gwangju Uprising and the White Terror, respectively. As Gandy concludes, many of the proliferating “negative affects” appear to be self-generated under the aegis of late capital, governmentality, and surveillance (Gandy 2017, 353–74, 362). Considering the relationship between this uneasy atmosphere and government control, this paper first uses Byung-Chul Han’s fatigue society theory to analyze how the reverse-chronological narrative in *Peppermint Candy* and the unique composition of spaces in *A Brighter Summer Day* similarly construct a “society of tiredness”, or “burnout society”, in South Korea and Taiwan, where it not only led to social catastrophes but also mental collapse. Furthermore, both films’ unique night spaces construct an “unterritorialized” Lefebvrian “counter-space” that allows emotional venting and resistance. The incorporation of lighting, deep spaces, slow cinema cinematography, and rain into these night spaces further provoke an “affective atmosphere” that amplifies the on-screen characters’ intense emotions and allows the audience to experience them. Finally, by echoing South Korea and Taiwan’s democratization processes with each film’s distinctive slow cinema choices, this paper sheds light on how this “cinema of boredom” has the potential to be a space to digest the traumatic past remaining in the dark.

Made in 1999, Lee Chang Dong’s

Peppermint Candy portrays a twenty-year period in the adult life of its protagonist, Yong-ho, beginning in Spring 1999 and ending in fall 1979. With its episodic structure framed by images of railroad tracks and chapter titles, this mediation on memory moves back to the past without resorting to conventional flashbacks. This film sifts through defining moments in South Korean history, namely the Gwangju Uprising and the IMF Crisis, placing them within a complex filmic narrative (Chung and Diffrient 2007, 119). Similarly, Edward Yang's *A Brighter Summer Day* also embodies an important time period in Taiwanese history. Set in the 1960s Taipei, under the overshadowing martial law, while the parents, the immigrants from the mainland, project their fear and uncertainty onto their children, the protagonist, Si'er and his classmates formed street gangs to search for identity and strength their sense of security. This film's visual style superimposes the secondary education onto the larger political repressions of the White Terror period, where the schoolyard politics become a microcosm of the militarized and authoritarian civil society (Yeh and Davis 2005, 104). Both films are keen to use long cylindrical shots, tracking shots, deep focus, and pools of darkness, which are key elements of the slow cinema. This cinema of interval, of waiting, then underpins a mix of intellectual engagement and emotional affection through its formal aesthetics, which provokes a "virtual engagement with the other" regarding the historical restaging in both films (Çağlayan 2018, 22).

Starting with *Peppermint Candy*, the Gwangju tragedy is at the heart of Yong-ho's moral and spiritual deterioration and represents a repressed trauma for both the

individual and the nation. On May 18, 1980, the approximate setting of the film's penultimate chapter, local citizens arose against the soldiers and police of the South Korean government, demanding the eradication of martial law and the release from jail of their political leader, Kim Dae-jung. The Gwangju Uprising was brutally suppressed by Chun Doo-hwan's paratroopers, who indiscriminately injured and massacred protesters and bystanders (Katsiaficas and Na 2006). According to official records, 154 were killed, 47 were missing, and 2,711 were wounded during this ten-day clash (Chung and Diffrient 2007, 123). Another event that overshadows Yong-ho's life is the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Crisis. Under the sway of the Southeast Asian currency collapse and mounting foreign debts, South Korea was suddenly confronted with national bankruptcy (Ito 2007, 16–49). Even though the Korean government resorted to a \$57 billion bailout loan from the International Monetary Fund, a number of businesses went bankrupt, and millions of laborers and employees lost their job.

At the same time, neoliberalism imported by foreign rescuers was rapidly spreading and penetrating Korean society (Lim and Jang 2006, 1–28). As Paul Roquet suggests, neoliberalism as an ideology often depends on sustaining the illusion of an autonomous self (Roquet 2016, 14). The fantasy of a totally autonomous self and the fantasy of merging with the atmosphere, such as dissolving the self into a stream of sense impressions or letting go of personal responsibility and becoming one with the larger landscape, are both essential to neoliberal biopolitics (Roquet 2016, 15). Film theorist Matsuda Masao also proposed

that, power was no longer manifesting as a clear struggle between two opposing forces but was increasingly becoming dispersed into the landscape itself, part of the anonymous background infrastructure of everyday life (Furuhata 2013, 118). A neoliberal “fatigue society”, where human subject has willingly subjugated its needs to capital had appeared in South Korea (Gandy 2017, 362). The use of reverse chronology in *Peppermint Candy* thus provokes intense sentiments and everyday tiredness in Yong-ho’s personal life and in Korean society in terms of restaging the mental collapses under the social catastrophe.

The first two chapters are both set in 1999, portraying Yong-ho as a subject of tiredness. As Han suggests, the late-modern achievement-subject is incapable of intensive bonding (Han 2020, 43). Yong-ho is a similar isolated “subject” that lives alone in an abandoned greenhouse and is preparing for his suicide. The suicide sequence ends with a frozen screen of Yong-ho’s twisted angry face, which intensifies his psychic infarctions at the end of his life. In the third chapter, Yong-ho declares a mysterious motto, life is beautiful, in a time when his business was still quite successful. This motto is given an ironic twist following his financial and moral downfall in the preceding chapters. In the fourth chapter, we get to know that Yong-ho ironically quotes this motto from the diary of Myong-sik, a student activist, after severely torturing him. In the fifth chapter, Yong-ho was forced to torture a labor activist, who seems so aggressive and impulsive. He also pushes away Sun-im, his girlfriend, where life seems to be a burden to him. The following chapter reveals his military experience during the Gwangju uprising, where he accidentally shoots and kills an

innocent girl, as the key event of his personality change. In the final chapter, Yong-ho’s fatigue is saturated with a bitter aftertaste, for indeed life was once beautiful for Yong-ho when he was still young and innocent. Throughout the seven chapters, the audience is invited to piece out Yong-ho’s life and answer questions that we raised in the previous chapters. We see Yong-ho becomes younger and happier on screen, however, already knowing about his tragic suicide, a sense of desperation and agony is delivered to the audience.

As Han suggests, deep tiredness loosens the strictures of identity. Things flicker, twinkle, and vibrate at the edges (Han 2020, 33). Considering Yong-ho’s desperation and self-abandonment in the first two chapters, the reverse-chronology becomes a dissection process into the “fatigue society” of Korea through Yong-ho’s inability to establish self-identity. While the Gwangju Uprising embodies national trauma and Korean people’s doubt about democracy, the IMF Crisis also ignited serious social problems such as the increase in crimes, divorces, desertions of children, and suicides (Shin and Chang 2000). Yong-ho then represents many Koreans that lived through the 80s-90s, who are tired of and anxious about the constant disappointment and failure. While the reverse-chronology refrains from providing a possible solution to Yong-ho’s ruined life, the final destination of innocence, hope, and happiness in the last chapter of the film appears as an unreachable goal for many Koreans living with intense fatigues (Chung and Diffrient 2007, 127). The separating and isolating effect of solitary tiredness forbids them to resonate with the neo-Confucian collective Korean society, which leads to a “burnout society”

that people are buried in loneliness and are “too alive to die, too dead to live” (Han 2020, 31, 51). Furthermore, the reverse-chronology also induces a more active mental orchestration of fabula events for the audience, where the narrative becomes self-reflexive and allows us to reflect on the fatigue in our contemporary, ongoing burnout society (Chung and Diffrient 2007, 121).

Similarly, this sense of tiredness and construction of the burnout society are also present in Edward Yang’s *A Brighter Summer Day*. This film is set in 1960 under the overshadowing of the White Terror. The White Terror refers to Kuomintang’s suppression of political dissidents following the February 28th anti-government uprising. The period of martial law lasted 38 years from 1949 to 1987 (Lin 2007, 4-6). Kuomintang (KMT) labelled most of those prosecuted as “communist bandit” and punished them as such. The White Terror led to 90,000 arrests and about 45,000 executions by the KMT throughout the 38 years (Manthorpe 2007, 204). This film’s protagonist, Si’er’s family are the immigrants, or waishengren, from the mainland during the Kuomintang retreat at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The term waishengren is often seen in contrast with benshengren, which refers to ethnic Chinese people in Taiwan who arrived prior to 1945 and had lived under Japanese colonial rule. Finding themselves destitute in a foreign land with no local connections, some of the waishengren turned to violent crime or suicide. In the late 50s, waishengren crime rates and suicide rate were double that of benshengren, especially for the young people because they have a hard time digesting their parents’ intense nostalgic

emotions and their own confusion (Yang 2021, 70-71). The Taiwanese youth in the 1960s then were experiencing similar “solitary tiredness” as Yong-ho and the 1990s Korea because the martial law under the White Terror prohibits them from expressing their thoughts and emotions. As Han suggests, tiredness of this kind provokes violence because it destroys all that is common or shared. A violence that may have expressed itself through distorting the other (Han 2020, 31). The Chinese title of the film, Guling jie shaonian sharen shijian, literally translated as Youth Homicide Incident on Guling Street already set this film as a story of the “burnout” youth. Different from *Peppermint Candy* which uses its narrative structure to recreate the tiredness and boundedness, *A Brighter Summer Day* uses its composition of cinematic spaces to achieve these sentiments.

As Emilie Yeh suggests, tunnel vision is a characteristic figure of style in *A Brighter Summer Day* that is composed of a long shot through arches, doorways, windows, and various other frames, promoting active exploration of a deep space (Yeh and Davis 2005, 104). One significance deep space throughout the film is a passageway that connects the school and the outside world. This space both connects and separates the school from the actual city. At the beginning of the film, the passageway is introduced to us as a space where the protagonist, Si’er’s gang, Little Park Boys usually hangs out. Using the flashlight as the only light source, we see the gang members run towards the passageway one by one. The contrast between the light and the dark isolates these boys, which creates a sense of surveillance. A lot of fights between the boys also happen in this passageway. One of the most memorable scenes is around the middle

of the film when the boys got revenged for attacking a boy from another gang on the school's basketball court. With an eye-line match, a basketball comes out of the other side of the passageway that is dark and we cannot see anything or anyone. With another 180-degree reverse-angle match, we see the boys again, caught between two dark spaces with potential danger in front of and behind them, leading to unspeakable horror. A sense of claustrophobia is created, where the extreme contrasts between light and darkness also induce suspense. Edward Yang then chooses to skip the actual fighting, which personifies the passageway as the only witness of that fight. The passageway then is not only a container that contains the boys' emotions but also a member of the gang, silently observing and participating in the boys' self-discovery journey.

The Victorian style of this passageway, presumably built by the Imperial Japanese during the colonial era, also provokes a nostalgic sentiment, which signifies a sense of uncertainty for the future. The passageway is always depicted using deep focus like a tunnel, leading to a dark, mysterious space inside. This "liminal space" that traps between the school that is full of disciplines and the city that is haunted by the White Terror then becomes an unescapable place. Even though the boys seem to be able to vent their anxiety through fighting and chatting in the passageway, the short-lived freedom is paradoxical. The boys become "performance-machines", where excess performance escalates into auto-exploitation (Han 2020, 35). The boys never expressed happiness in the passageway. Instead, the passageway is full of their complaints about the disciplines at school, as well as exhaustion caused by the "achievement

society" at home where their parents perpetrate high hopes on their academic achievements. Under such complex emotions, the deep space of the passageway when becomes the embodiment of the "burnout society" for the Taiwanese youth where they cannot see any bright lights in their future, just like the passageway, trapped between the traumatic past and hopeless future. Towards the end of the film, Si'er always waits in the passageway to find opportunities to kill his love interest's boyfriend after he dropped out of school and gave up on his future. The claustrophobic nature of the passageway then piles up his tiredness of "behaving well" and moral degradation, leading to self-destructive violence in the end.

In order to construct the cinematic burnout society more extensively, both films also create a certain atmosphere to make the on-screen spaces more affective. As Gandy suggests, the political salience of urban atmospheres is most strikingly revealed through "atmospheric events" such as fogs, smog, or the effects of extreme temperatures (Gandy 2017, 364). Both *Peppermint Candy* and *A Brighter Summer Day* have a preference to use heavy rain as a background during the most violent and desperate moments on screen. These heavy rain moments also always happen during the night. As Robert Williams suggests, darkness breaks down social borders, because social codes of conduct can be more easily broken when we are wrapped in the night (Williams 2008, 514–32, 519). Similarly, both films use the night space to portray socially "unacceptable" events such as mental breakdowns, fights, or murder. However, different from Williams' idea that nights "reterritorialized" the urban spaces, the night spaces in these two films are

“unterritorialized” spaces that are accessible for venting, escaping, and resistance. The night spaces thus become the embodiment of the “affective realm of late capital” that allows the audience to relate.

One of the first emotional explosions for Yong-ho in *Peppermint Candy* is towards the beginning of chapter two. The heavy rain juxtaposes with the long shot that has minimum lighting, where the camera pans to follow Yong-ho walking in the rain. This scene also reveals Yong-ho’s living condition that he lives in an abandoned greenhouse in the middle of nowhere. He is basically homeless. While Yong-ho is trying to unlock his home, the camera frames him from inside the greenhouse where he is reduced to a shadow, suggesting his lack of identification with the outside world. After the stranger he encounters, the husband of his first love, helps him to open the door, Yong-ho walks in and turns on the light in his home. This medium-long shot then portrays Yong-ho under the light in the foreground and the rainy night outside in the background, creating a clear boundary between the public and private spaces. However, because of the shabby nature of the abandoned greenhouse, the door cannot be closed completely. Wind and rain constantly come out of the wobbly door, suggesting the penetration of social control and capitalism into everybody’s personal life.

The next sequence is one of the only few moments where Yong-ho explicitly expresses his real emotion and anger. In shallow focus, the camera slowly pushes forward as Yong-ho shouts and cries to describe the people he wants to kill. The sound of the rain is present throughout this scene, where the humidity in the air

intensifies the tension on screen. In *Ambient Media*, Paul Roquet describes that ambient sound serves as a tool of atmospheric mood regulation while providing compelling material for open-ended reflection (Roquet 2016, 4). On the one hand, the sound of the rain intensifies the “disordered” nature of the nighttime and Yong-ho’s desperation. On the other hand, this sound creates an “affective atmosphere”, which regulates the audience’s perception and invites the audience to be self-reflexive. The atmosphere of the rain then creates a space of intensity that overflows on screen, where Yong-ho’s tiredness living in the late capital affects the audience. The medium shots and shallow focus keep isolating Yong-ho from the rest of the world, while encouraging the audience to identify with him, amplifying the sense of isolation felt by everybody living in this neo-liberal society. With no emotional background music, the juxtaposition of the rain and the night space in this sequence successfully recreates the affective realm of feeling trapped during the 1999 Korea under the economic crisis, available to relate to the audience from any time period and any cultural background. Yong-ho’s emotional explosion embedded in the night space in this scene thus is an “unterritorialized” space where there is no hierarchy or exclusion. Everybody is encouraged to reveal their fatigue and confusion with no restriction.

For *A Brighter Summer Day*, one of the climaxes of the film and the most violent sequence happens during a typhoon night. Similar to *Peppermint Candy*, the major space of this sequence, the pool hall, is also an open private space that is constantly affected by the public space. This sequence happens two hours and twenty minutes into the film. This sequence uses parallel

narrative where it intercuts between the Little Park Boys and their enemy, the 217 Boys. It starts with a soldier taking advantage of the Little Park Café's owner and abandoning her. In a long shot, the camera quickly follows the soldier as he leaves the café and continues to follow the military car that he is driving, while juxtaposes with the Taiwanese and American flags inside the café. As the military car leaves the on-screen space, the camera shifts to follow three suspicious tricycles while they stop in front of the Little Park Café. All of these are done in one shot with deep focus, which implies the military and nationalism infiltration into people's lives during the White Terror. The heavy rain constantly blurs our vision, where a kind of suspenseful atmosphere is established.

The scene suddenly cuts to the 217 Boy's lair, which is a long room with two pool tables set end to end. Presiding over this narrow space is the gang leader, Shandong. He is at one end, the pool tables are in the middle, along with various characters conducting the business of intimidation, and in the far background the room opens out on the street where people pass by. The power outage caused by the typhoon turned this place into darkness. The darkness and the flickering candles give the room an eerie, even ritual air, but it also makes 217 vulnerable, letting the Little Park Boys gang penetrate the space and take violent revenge for their leader, Honey's death. With a static long shot pointing towards the opening door, the sound of the rain once again dominates the scene. Behind the raindrops, we see the tricycles arrive at the pool hall. The narrative of Little Park and the 217 have been linked together, implying that a potential encounter between these two groups is about to happen. The Little Park Boys walk silently into the

pool hall using a flashlight as their light source. The camera portrays Shandong again, as he blows out the candle when he noticed the footsteps. With a ten seconds black screen, we cannot see anything and can only hear an ambient sound of rain. This ambient sound then strengthens the fear in the air. With a flashlight suddenly shining on Shandong's face, the fight bursts out.

Interestingly, this fight scene does not explicitly show the bloody actual fight. It is shown through the frantic movement of the flashlight and the screaming sound. The flashlight presumably belongs to Si'er, who stole it from the movie studio and appears here as aggressive and defensive. As the flashlight moves up and down and bounces off the blades, paralleling the action of beating and stabbing the 217 boys, this only light source in the dark visually represents the Little Park Boy's anger. As Gandy writes, the varied properties of light, and its affective realm, can serve as the focal point for specific kinds of cultural and political mobilization (366). The chaotic flashlight in this scene then embodies a collective memory of the gang violence among the Taiwanese youth, as well as the atrocious trauma among the Taiwanese mass under martial law. The static and slow camera that adopts minimum movement contradicts the violence and mobility on screen with its stillness and "affective lethargy", manifesting the resistance to "growing up" and "moving on" (Çağlayan 2018, 195).

The invisibility of the darkness turns to pool hall into "a space of resistance and also a space of representation". On a narrative level, the Little Park Boys take advantage of the darkness to resist the 217 Boys who killed their leader. The dark pool

hall allows them to revenge, which would be dangerous and threatening for them because they always complain that 217 Boys outnumbered them and always win. The space of the pool hall then represents a space of power as the base for 217 Boys. On a metaphorical level, because of the juxtaposition between the pool hall and the tanks during daytime available through deep focus, the pool hall at night then becomes a Lefebvrian “counter-space”, which emerges as a result of political struggle. They exceed and oppose the rules of the dominant space (Lefebvre and Harvey 1991, 281). The extreme violence in this invisible space then implies the vulnerable political struggle under the White Terror. They can only fight against the hierarchical “authority” represented by the 217 Boys in the concealed darkness. The flashlight then lights up a local history that would rather remain in shadow. Different from the daytime cinematic world that is filled with orderly corridors, intersections, and windows, suggesting the on-screen spaces as a rigid imposition of control and surveillance, the night spaces with heavy rain thus blurs all these boundaries and inspections (Yeh and Davis 2005, 117). The pool hall at night then also becomes an “unterritorialized” space that social control and surveillance are not present, where the resistance towards hierarchical social power is possible.

Peppermint Candy also has a similar sequence where the chiaroscuro lighting matches with the slow cinema cinematography, which creates an affective counter-space. This sequence, titled “Military Visit, May 1980”, starts with Sun-im, Yong-ho’s girlfriend, visiting the military camp where he is stationed, but her request is rejected due to martial law. Inside the

military camp, Yong-ho frantically assembles his combat gear, spilling a bag of *Peppermint Candy* in the process, and is ordered into a military truck. With the sound of military officers’ whistles, commands, insults, as well as the military songs, filling in the soundscape, the military camp during daytime is portrayed as full of imprisonment, control, and orders. With elliptical editing, the scene turns into the night when Yong-ho and the other soldiers arrive in Gwangju, which produces a sense of confusion for time. In a long shot with a hand-held camera, the shaky camera glances through all the soldiers, creating a sense of chaos. The only source of light is the military truck’s headlight throughout this scene. Similar to the flashlight in *A Brighter Summer Day*, the headlight in this scene exposes a history in the shadow, namely the brutal military suppression.

When the soldiers arrive at the railroad where the student activists are hiding, the lighting now solely depends on the natural lighting. With minimum lighting, the audience cannot see the faces of the soldiers clearly, reducing them to the symbols of the authoritarian government. The sound of this scene is filled with footsteps and gun fires, which intensifies the terror on screen. As the soldiers run away, in a reverse shot, the shaky camera now positions statically to portray the silent railroad and Yong-ho, who is left behind because he got shot on his feet. The camera stays still as we see Yong-ho hesitantly looks around for the other soldiers. With a quick cut, we now take Yong-ho’s perspective as he looks inside the train. With no artificial lighting, the audience helplessly look for potential danger, however, the darkness inside the train forbids us to see anything clearly. With his breathing sound,

the audience now identifies with Yong-ho and experiences his fear. As Gandy argues, atmospheres are both experienced and created. They encompass extant features of emotional and material life, as well as their staging or manipulation. The atmosphere of insecurity and fright in this scene then is created through the uncertainty embodied in the night space and experienced through the point-of-view shots.

Later in this sequence, the injured Yong-ho sits on the ground and sees a young lady walking toward him. With an eye-line match, we see the lady in the dark, but we cannot tell who she is because we cannot see her face clearly. With the moonlight, the lady is first revealed to be Sun-im. She then walks into another shadow where her face is concealed again and then reveals to be a random college girl as she walks into the light again. This identity change through night space thus exemplifies its ability to “de-territorialize” the space again. The shadows seem to become a space where identity is fluid and memories can flood out without restrictions. Yong-ho finally meets Sun-im, which is prohibited during the daytime, even though it is not real. This is a moment that expresses “opposition to the linear rhythms of work and the expression of human joy that is not commodified”. The night space in this sequence thus is also a counter-space for Yong-ho, where he does not need to follow the military order and enjoy a short moment of happiness. As Yong-ho accidentally kills the girl, the flashlight that shines on him creates a chiaroscuro effect making him morally ambiguous while the static camera recreates his shock. The night space that embraces him thus becomes affective as he screams, and a sense of guilt and helplessness is amplified.

Both films’ formal choices to embody the slow cinema conventions also speak to South Korea and Taiwan’s similar, yet different, democratization processes. First of all, both South Korea and Taiwan experienced a time of military dictatorship, as exemplified in both films. Both territories concerned a struggle between authoritarianism and nascent democratic forces in the 1950s. On the one hand, South Korea was ruled by a military government from 1948 to 1987 until mass demonstrations forced the rewriting of the constitution and granting of free presidential elections (Keum and Campbell 2018, 34). On the other hand, Kuomintang during the Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Ching Kuo eras declared the martial law in Taiwan on 19 May 1949 and ended on July 15th, 1987 (Lin 2007, 4-6). Both territories experienced almost forty years of atrocity. The similar uses of long shots and long takes in both films thus walk us through the long process of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. The endless cycles of nights and days in *A Brighter Summer Day* match with its deep spaces and static camera, which provoke a sense of claustrophobia, imitating the isolation and boundedness Taiwanese people felt under the White Terror. The never-ending train tracks that represent Yong-ho’s memory in *Peppermint Candy* similarly match with the camera that patiently follows it, which manifests a sense of helplessness that people like Yong-ho can never escape from their traumatized memory of the atrocious Korean past. As André Bazin suggests, the long shots and long takes have an aesthetic of reality due to their uninterrupted portrayal of profilmic action in which the spectator is confronted with reality in its actual temporality (Cağlayan 2018, 44). The long shots and long takes that dominate

both films thus force the audience to learn and experience the historical pain on-screen, while directly reflecting on the politics in contemporary society, such as the newly formed “Green Terror” in Taiwan (Wang 2021).

Wakabayashi suggests that one of the most important differences between the two territories has been their patterns of political development. While they faced similar totalitarian challenges from the 1950s to the 1980s, the end of the Cold War forced them to open up democratically, but the ways they did so differed dramatically (Wakabayashi 1997). Korea’s democratic transition was relatively rapid, centred on constitutional redrafting and holding of the first completely free presidential election since the republic’s founding, both in 1987. Taiwan’s transition, on the other hand, took about a decade, as the government gradually introduced local elections, then elections for the Legislative Yuan, and finally a free presidential election in the mid-1990s (Keum and Campbell 2008, 38). The two protagonists, Yong-ho’s and Si’er’s different tragic endings in *Peppermint Candy* and *A Brighter Summer Day*, on the other hand, speaks to South Korea and Taiwan’s different democratic transitions, however, similar outcomes.

When *Peppermint Candy* was introduced to Korean audiences in 1999, the national economy was still struggling to recover from the financial crisis that devastated the region in the summer of 1997 (Choe 2008, 134). Yong-ho is shown consistently on the wrong side of contemporary South Korean history, and much too stubborn to give up his idealized, distorted masculinity. Even though South

Korea had a much more secure international recognition, Yong-ho’s inability to carry on his life reveals the impossibility of the existence of the modern democratic nation. The rapid changes in the capitalist Korean society are destructive and overwhelmed people’s life. For Taiwan, it has the worst performance among the four Asian “tiger” economies, lagging far behind South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Keum and Campbell 2008, 41). Even though the government promoted the “Taiwan Economic Miracle”, it was to some extent a strategy to cover up their atrocious martial law. Si’er, who lives in a Waishengren family and was interrogated for their connection with the mainland, developed a kind of psychic turmoil. While the larger Taiwanese society was witnessing fast development and globalization, the young Waishengren lived a mentally divided existence. Their culture is traditional Chinese, but it is framed by that of the native Taiwanese, who speak their own dialect, and by the lingering Japanese influence (Cheshire 2022). This social divide not only slow down the democratization process of Taiwan but also caused identity confusion. The intervening capitalism and martial law in Taiwan thus caused people living in stagnation, like Si’er’s family, unable to survive, leading to their self-destructive violence.

In conclusion, *Peppermint Candy*, and *A Brighter Summer Day* both connect national history and personal story. *Peppermint Candy* gives us a chance to reflect on Yong-ho’s inability to digest the trauma caused by the Gwangju uprising and economic crisis in contemporary South Korea. *A Brighter Summer Day* similarly touches upon the devastating multigenerational trauma of the White Terror

in Taiwan. According to Byung-Chul Han in *Burnout Society*, there seems to be a tendency for contemporary society to evolve into a state of general exhaustion, a society of tiredness. *Peppermint Candy* and *A Brighter Summer Day* both exemplify this exhaustion in their own distinctive ways. *Peppermint Candy* uses its reverse-chronological narrative structure to intensify the unescapable tiredness embedded in the neo-Confucian South Korean society. Through piecing out Yong-ho's traumas behind his suicide, the narrative becomes self-reflexive and allows the audience to reflect on our contemporary, ongoing burnout society. For *A Brighter Summer Day*, through the composition of spaces, such as the passageway, the claustrophobic nature of the passageway piles up the Taiwanese youth's tiredness and moral degradation in a society of repression. It also becomes an observer and participant of Si'er's self-discovery journey. However, the passageway's constant linkage with violence manifests the director's concern for the "burnout" youth's future. Trapping between the traumatic past and the hopeless future, there is no way out for Yong-ho and Si'er in this burnout society, except to be self-destructive.

As Han suggests, in a society where "achievement" is the watchword, acceptance of boredom is progressively smaller, with acceleration there is no time to "lose", and non-doing is immorality. This inability to tolerate boredom could become highly problematical, since "the cultural achievements of humanity, which include philosophy" require a "deep, contemplative attention" (Han 2020, 13). As masters of the slow cinema, Lee Chang-Dong and Edward Yang thus both produce night spaces with hypnotic lighting and contemplating rain,

constructing a cinematic "counter-space" that is unterritorialized and encourages emotions and resistance which are not allowed at daytimes. While Lefebvre considers night as a modifier of diurnal rhythms that slows them down, the slow cinema aesthetics in both films' night spaces thus "slow down" the society of tiredness during the daytime and attempt to provide some remedy for the neo-liberal fatigue (Lefebvre, Kofman, and Lebas 1996). *Peppermint Candy* and *A Brighter Summer Day* also accomplish their goal to "provoke social significances through boredom". The tragic lives of Yong-ho and Si'er parallel South Korea and Taiwan's democratization processes, which both provoke a sense of inability to survive in these modern democratic capitals. As Andrei Tarkovsky writes, "The image is not a certain meaning, expressed by the director, but an entire world reflected as a drop of water" (Tarkovsky 1986). Lee Chang-Dong and Edward Yang's cinematic burnout society thus are like the heavy rain in their films, affective and reflexive. Considering both films' popularity and the political conversations they provoked, cinematic devices have the power to mediate between the fictional world and the real world, lighting up the historical traumas hiding in the dark.

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Portraying the Death of a Dictator: South Korean Politics and Divergent Filmic Depictions of the Assassination of Park Chung Hee

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One of the most pivotal moments in South Korean history was the assassination of then-president Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) on October 26, 1979, by his Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) chief, Kim Chae-gyu (1926–1980). After a dinnertime argument at a KCIA compound in Kungjŏngdong about suppressing the Pusan-Masan demonstrations (the so-called Pu-Ma Incident) that arose earlier that month, Kim shot and killed both Park and his chief bodyguard Ch’a Chi-ch’öl, with whom Kim had had especially sharp conflict. Kim’s act has had a mixed legacy in the ensuing four decades, wrapped up in the complex legacy of Park’s regime itself. While he has often been credited for shepherding South Korea’s meteoric economic rise, Park had ruled South Korea through authoritarian means for close to twenty years between 1961 and 1979. However, while Kim had brought an end to Park’s dictatorship through his act, he was not embraced by the democratization movement due to his long association with the Park regime for years prior to the assassination.

Given its significance, there have been several depictions of this momentous event in South Korean media. The most notable was the 2005 film *The President’s Last Bang* (*Kŭ ttae kŭ saramdŭl*). In this film, Kim emerges as more or less a cynical individual with a personal vendetta, a man

with few ideals and even fewer plans to deal with the aftermath of his deed. “Democracy” is a mere afterthought in this portrayal. However, the 2020 film *The Man Standing Next* (*Namsan ŭi pujangdŭl*) offers a drastically different interpretation of the KCIA chief. The figure of Kim Chae-gyu (renamed Kim Kyu-p’yŏng to skirt South Korean libel laws) is depicted as a flawed but ultimately heroic individual seeking to turn the country back onto the road of revolutionary ideals with which the military regime had begun. This later film shows that public memory of Kim Chae-gyu have drastically changed in the fifteen years between the two films’ production. But the question is raised as to why this change occurred.

One can trace the origins of this broader reappraisal of Kim and his legacy back to the political turmoil that engulfed the presidency of Park Geun-hye (2013–2017), Park Chung Hee’s daughter, in late 2016. The presidency of Park Geun-hye was inevitably tied to memories of her father. Park Geun-hye, after decades out of the public eye upon her father’s assassination, returned to politics first as a National Assemblywoman and then as the main conservative party’s presidential candidate in 2012. Her time in politics has from the beginning been shrouded in controversy due to her father’s lengthy and oppressive rule. But rather than evade her father’s legacy, she consistently embraced it, emerging as a stout

defender of the elder Park's rule and anti-democratic activities.¹ Actions such as the dissolution of the opposition United Progressive Party, the creation of a cultural blacklist, and the attempt at imposing a single state-produced historical textbook for all students caused critics to opine that Park Geun-hye sought to emulate her father in terms of a more authoritarian ruling style as well. Thus, the two Parks were invariably linked to authoritarian politics.

Once the younger Park fell, the star of Kim Chae-gyu, as the figure responsible for the end of the elder Park's regime, correspondingly rose, as Koreans sentimentally looked back to a previous time when a Park had been removed from power. If Park's rise to power was propelled by a wave of nostalgia about her father's rule—a phenomenon labeled as “Park Chung Hee syndrome,” due to the socioeconomic uncertainties and dislocations arising out of the 1997 economic crisis (nicknamed the “IMF Crisis”) and a desire for strong leadership and competent economic management by the state that Park Chung Hee represented—then Kim became a symbolic counterpoint. One can find a similar “Kim Chae-gyu nostalgia” among opponents of Park Geun-hye's administration, although perhaps smaller in

scale than the Park Chung Hee syndrome. But the positive reevaluations of Kim in the aftermath of the impeachment scandal demonstrates his transformation into a symbol of Korean democracy, although there remain questions about his suitability for that role.

Park Chung Hee Syndrome and the Rehabilitation of Authoritarian Rule

To understand the nature of opposition to Park Geun-hye's rule, one must first examine the nostalgia of the Park Chung Hee era, often dubbed “Park Chung Hee syndrome,” that carried her to the presidency and sparked critical backlash of both the father and daughter. Initially, when Park died, the mood in Korea was somber but reserved. Even certain South Korean government officials admitted that “his time had come,” while Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke claimed that “There wasn't a wet eye in Seoul.”² Massive demonstrations in support of democracy erupted soon after his death in what is known as the “Seoul Spring,” indicating public disaffection with dictatorship and readiness to adopt democratic government, although these were soon suppressed upon Chun Doo Hwan's rise to power and eventual assumption of the presidency in 1980. But by the late 1990s,

¹ One example included her labeling of Park Chung Hee's military coup d'état on May 16, 1961 as a “revolution to save the country” (*kuguk hyōngmyōng*), which converged with how the elder Park and his accomplices' characterized their act. “Ch'ōngwadae, 'Pak Kūn-hye '5.16 kuguk hyōngmyōng' parōn, yōksa e taehan modok,” *Han'gyōre*, July 20, 2007. Accessed April 22, 2022. <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/bluehouse/223704.html>.

² Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 90. This sentiment might be

contradicted by the scenes from Park's funeral, as broadcast by *Taehan nyūsū* (Taehan News) No. 1264-5, in which crowds of mourners visibly and audibly display emotion at Park's passing. Perhaps there is a performative aspect to their public mourning, but it is difficult to assume the lack of authenticity on everyone's part. This footage can be seen on the official YouTube channel operated by Kungmin Pangsong (or Korea TV (KTV)) that provides archives of *Taehan nyūsū* broadcasts. Accessed April 16, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rs0p42Eib9w>.

although the harsh, oppressive nature of Park's authoritarian regime continued to color many Koreans' views on his rule in the decades afterward, there was a notable revival in more celebratory interpretations of the era. Nostalgic reminiscences of the Park regime experienced a marked upswing to the point that the term "Park Chung Hee syndrome" began to be applied as a general social phenomenon during this time.

The main trigger for this was the onset of economic crisis in 1997 with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis, nicknamed the "IMF Crisis" in South Korea due to the drastic economic restructuring advised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which led to massive layoffs and a persistent sense of insecurity that has pervaded South Korean collective psychology to the present day. With South Korea facing unprecedented economic downturns, many in the public yearned for strong political leadership and effective economic management by the government, both of which were embodied by Park and his regime.³ In polls asking respondents who they believed was the greatest president, Park won by a landslide, receiving over three-quarters of the vote in an April 1997 survey, while Park was also voted as the greatest Korean historical figure ahead of even King Sejong the Great, who helped invent *han'gŭl*,

and Admiral Yi Sun-sin, the hero of the Imjin War against the Japanese invasions of Korea in the 1590s.⁴ While critical views of Park continued to be promoted by progressive intellectuals, it was the celebratory, "hagiographic portrayals" of Park as a "superhuman leader" and a thrifty, selfless, self-sacrificing, and "tragic hero" whose contributions to South Korea's development were immeasurable that gained ascendancy among the public in the early 2000s.⁵

There has been a strong generational component to Park nostalgia. Well into the 2010s, the "baby boomer" generation of Koreans who were born in the mid- to late-1950s have been noted to hold intensely nostalgic memories of the Park regime due to its successes in industrializing the South Korean economy and lifting them up out of poverty, even if it came at the expense of democracy, which was waved away as either unworkable at the time or even potentially infiltrated by communists.⁶ Park himself has been given the lion's share of the credit for economic growth, with positive attributes converging with those found in the narratives produced amidst the post-1997 "Park Chung Hee boom," and even decades after the democratic reforms of 1987, many members of this generation were noted to favor "strong leadership" in the vein of Park and even Chun Doo-hwan.⁷ This older generation of

³ Won-Taek Kang, "Missing the Dictator in a New Democracy: Analyzing the 'Park Chung Hee Syndrome' in South Korea," *Political and Military Sociology: An Annual Review*, Vol. 38 (2010): 4–8.

⁴ Seungsook Moon, "The Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung Hee," *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 7, Issue 19, No. 5 (May 9, 2009). Accessed April 17, 2022. <https://apjif.org/-/Seungsook-Moon/3140/article.html>.

⁵ Seungsook Moon, "The Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung Hee."

⁶ Kyoung Hee Ma and Hye-Kyung Kim, "Collective Memory and Formation of the 'Unconscious' Political Generation: Focusing on the Former Period Baby Boomers in Korea," *Development and Society*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (June 2015): 87–96. Residents of Honam were a notable exception to this aversion to the democratic movement and (progressive) opposition parties, however. See Ma and Kim, "Collective Memory and Formation of the 'Unconsci'us' Political Generation," 97–106.

⁷ Ma and Kim, "Collective Memory and Formation of the 'Unconsci'us' Political Generation," 106–111.

Koreans have made up the core of the so-called T'aegŭkki (Korean national flag) rallies that emerged as counter-demonstrations against the anti-Park candlelight vigils, emphatically supporting Park Geun-hye, and then becoming a vocal force protesting against the Moon Jae-in administration.⁸

Nostalgia for Park Chung Hee was manifested in the presidential elections in 1997. One of the presidential candidates, Rhee In-je (Yi In-je), notably resembled Park in looks and even allegedly deliberately fashioned his hair and attire in Park's style to appeal to nostalgic voters.⁹ Meanwhile, various candidates sought to emphasize their own ties to the Park regime and its modernizing drive, including highlighting literal kinship (in the case of Kim Chong-p'il, who was Park's nephew by marriage).¹⁰ Even Kim Dae Jung, the victor in the elections and one of the most prominent and persecuted critics of the Park regime, announced that he would support the construction of a memorial for Park Chung Hee.¹¹ Such was the power of Park Chung Hee nostalgia, such that even his political opponents scrambled to capitalize on his now-positive legacy.

This nostalgia remained powerful into the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections, in which Park's daughter Park Geun-hye launched presidential bids.¹² Park consistently praised her father, his leadership, and his accomplishments in her autobiography and on the campaign trail, including adopting the slogan of "Try to Live Well."¹³ It is also probably no coincidence that Park's coiffed hair strongly resembled her mother Yuk Yŏng-su, a beloved figure among supporters of the Park regime.¹⁴ In those ways, Park appealed to voters as the successor to both of her widely-admired parents. This paid dividends as older Koreans voted for her in droves and propelled her to the presidency in 2012.¹⁵

What of Kim Chae-gyu, then? Kim remained an ambiguous figure throughout the early years of the twenty-first century. When there was consideration by the government to officially recognize Kim as a democratization activist there was opposition from not just pro-Park conservatives, but also from some progressives. The latter's reasoning was twofold. First, Kim himself had no relation to the broader democratization movement, and as leader of the KCIA, his recognition as a

⁸ See Myungji Yang, "Defending 'Liberal Democracy'? Why Older South Koreans Took to the Streets against the 2016–17 Candlelight Protests," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (September 2020): 365–382.

⁹ Seungsook Moon, "The Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung Hee"; Hwang Chun-bŏm, "'Ttal' hyanghae purŭnŭn 'Pak Chŏng-hŭi serenade,'" *Han'gyŏre*, November 14, 2007. Accessed April 16, 2022.

https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/250120.html.

¹⁰ Chin Jung-kwon (Chin Chung-gwŏn), "The Dead Dictator's Society: An Analysis of the 'Park Chung-hee Syndrome,'" in *Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity*

in the Republic of Korea, ed. Lee Byeong-cheon, trans. Eungsoo Kim and Jaehyun Cho (Paramus, N.J.: Homa & Sekey Books, 2006), 297.

¹¹ Seungsook Moon, "The Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung Hee."

¹² Park lost to Lee Myung-bak in their party's 2007 presidential primary.

¹³ Hyejin Kim, "A Link to the Authoritarian Past? Older Voters as a Force in the 2012 South Korean Presidential Election," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (December 2014): 59–60.

¹⁴ Hyejin Kim, "A Link to the Authoritarian Past?," 60.

¹⁵ Hyejin Kim, "A Link to the Authoritarian Past?," 50–51.

democratization activist would merely insult other activists who had been persecuted by the institution he led. Second, Park's assassination merely sped up the inevitable process of the collapse of the *Yusin* system, which was well on its way as seen in the Pusan-Masan protests that rocked the regime in October 1979. In fact, progressive intellectuals contended, Kim's action only led to the continuation of dictatorship through Chun Doo-hwan's seizure of power; if he had not shot Park, the regime could have collapsed on its own and democracy could have been achieved eight years earlier. The end of *Yusin* and the death of Park by themselves did not consist of "democratization."¹⁶

The President's Last Bang

In the midst of this resurgence in Park Chung Hee nostalgia and skepticism about Kim's democratic credentials, the film *The President's Last Bang* was released. Given the wave of positive reassessments of Park, it is little surprise that the film was immediately met with controversy given its genre as a black comedy that lampoon the event of assassination as well as the major players involved, including the president. But importantly, Kim Chae-gyu was not spared; the film reflected no desire to elevate Kim. Rather, it showed Kim as deep down in the mud with the rest of the unpleasant cast of characters that made up the Park regime.

In *The President's Last Bang*, there are no heroes, least of all Kim Chae-gyu. The film depicts not just the main individuals involved, but the larger institution of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

The KCIA's brutal nature is shown in the opening scenes as the camera pans through various interrogation rooms as agents torture democratization activists and insult their genitals and manhood. In a recreation room, agents play pool while laughing about the ways the Defense Security Command (Poansa) can use the law to frame and convict people of spying for North Korea and violating the Anti-Communist Law (*pan'gongbop*). This is the KCIA, the dreaded enforcement arm of the authoritarian regime, and an institution that Kim Chae-gyu leads and in which he is fully ensconced.

Another unsavory aspect of not just the KCIA, but the regime in general, that the film underscores is the pervasiveness of Japanese influence, referencing the Japanese colonial period and the accusations that Park and his regime were extensions of it. This is highlighted by regime-associated characters' repeated lapses into the Japanese language, a scene of one agent practicing of kendo just within the gates of the KCIA compound, and Park's request that the invited singer (played by rock musician Kim Yun-a) sing a Japanese *enka* song. Notably, Kim himself partakes in this use of Japanese. He is introduced in the film as calling himself a samurai. Then, moments before shooting Park in the head, Kim Chae-gyu calls the president by his Japanese name (Takaki Masao) and insults him, all in Japanese. The omnipresence of Japanese in the Park regime reflects Park's personal reputation in the public as a pro-Japanese collaborator given his eager participation in the Japanese military during the Japanese colonial era (1910–1945). With deep anti-Japanese

¹⁶ Pak Ch'ang-sik, "Kim Chae-gyu ege 'minjuhwa hunjang' ūl tarajul kōsin'ga," *Han'gyōre* 21, August

11, 2004. Accessed April 22, 2022. <https://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/PRINT/11784.html>.

nationalist sentiment entrenched in South Korean society, the association of Park with Japan acted as a disadvantage and earned him lasting suspicion. That Kim also actively uses Japanese in the film thus marks him as something different than a heroic protagonist, but someone stained with the same corruption as the rest of the Park regime.

As a black comedy, it perhaps should not be a surprise for the film's portrayal of Park Chung Hee to diverge from the mainstream view of him as a stolid, frugal man completely devoted to the affairs of the country he ruled. Film scholar Kyung Hyun Kim notes how *The President's Last Bang* "primitivize[s] or infantilize[s] Park Chung Hee, to end up challenging the orthodox image of him that has persisted as a hypermasculine and military corporate man."¹⁷ Instead, *The President's Last Bang* characterizes Park as an intensely lonely, lecherous old man devoted to fulfilling his voracious sexual appetite. It appears that there was some truth behind this, as An Tong-il, a lawyer for Kim Chae-gyu, claimed that Park visited the safehouse in Kungjŏngdong almost excessively for his rendezvous with women.¹⁸ Kim notably discouraged Pak Sŏn-ho from testifying about Park's philandering, which *The President's Last Bang* references at the end of the film.

By contrast with his portrayal in *The Man Standing Next*, Kim is given no such

heroic motives in *The President's Last Bang*. The idea of fulfilling the unfinished revolution is not mentioned in the film. There is passing reference to Kim's more moderate stance toward demonstrators, as he mildly pushes back against suggestions, usually made by Ch'a Chi-ch'öl, for bloody suppression, stating that the protesters were merely students and should not be beaten so much. There is no hint given that Kim is planning anything before the dinner except him requesting Army Chief of Staff to join him for dinner after hearing Park will be in the safehouse, and loading his gun in his office while talking to Colonel Min (Pak Hŭng-ju). Of course, this has ramifications down the line because no one else at the agency has any idea what is going on, what to do, what the next steps are, and as such this lack of planning leads to their downfall. With his failing health and his rage at Ch'a and Park, the film sets up Kim's decision as a spur-of-the-moment one, reflecting the historical reality in which there is evidence for both some degree of planning as well as spontaneity in Kim's assassination of Park. Indeed, according to the film scholar Noh Kwangwoo, the whole assassination, from planning (or lack thereof) to execution to aftermath, "is treated as an absurd, poorly planned, and disorganized affair."¹⁹ Not only is the assassination itself rather abrupt, but Kim in the film offered no guidance to his subordinates on what to do afterwards, even

¹⁷ Kyung Hyun Kim, *Virtual Hallyu: Korean Cinema of the Global Era* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011), 85.

¹⁸ An asserted that the number of women Park met with exceeded 200, and that among these women were included actresses, models, and other figures in the entertainment industry. In addition, An alleged that an incident similar to the opening scene in which the mother (played by Yun Yŏ-jŏng) of a young

woman urges that her daughter be given another meeting with Park actually happened. Kim Sun-hŭi, "Kim Chae-gyu pyŏnhoin An Tong-il pyŏnhosa ka t'ŏrŏnoŭn 'taet'ongnyŏng ŭi sasaenghwal,'" *Sin tonga*, December 14, 2005. Accessed April 21, 2022. <https://shindonga.donga.com/3/all/13/105024>.

¹⁹ Noh Kwangwoo, "The President's Last Bang," *Cineaste* (Spring 2006): 57.

something as basic as how to dispose of Park's corpse. Kim shows no concern for the aftermath of his deed, telling Chief Agent Ju (a stand-in for Chief of Protocol (*ũijŏn kwajang*) Pak Sŏn-ho) that there is nothing to worry about and to clean things up, giving no further instructions.²⁰ In addition, as I will discuss further below, Kim readily acquiesced to the Army Chief of Staff Chŏng Sŭng-hwa's request to travel not to the KCIA headquarters, where Kim would be secure in his power, but to Army headquarters, leaving him vulnerable to capture—and indeed, once the truth is revealed by Secretary Yang (representing then-Presidential Chief Secretary Kim Kye-wŏn), Kim is quickly arrested by the military, leaving his subordinates out to dry and get arrested themselves.

Moreover, the film scoffs at Kim's supposed democratic motivations. Minutes before the final confrontation with Ch'a and Park, Kim storms out of the dining room muttering, "I'll show you today how frightening the KCIA can be," indicating that personal resentment against Ch'a was a prime motivator for the violent act. As Kim gathers his direct subordinates ("Colonel Min," the fictional name given to Kim's aide Pak Hŭng-ju and "Chief Agent Ju," the stand-in for Chief of Protocol Pak Sŏn-ho, played by Kim Ŭng-su and Han Sŏk-kyu, respectively) for one last meeting before the violent deeds commence, he says to them after a sigh, as an afterthought, "For the sake of democracy, we're offering our lives."

²⁰ The spontaneity of the whole day is punctuated when it seems Kim failed to notify many of his agents of the presence of the Army Chief of Staff; when Chief Agent Ju asks an agent who was in the car with Kim as Kim and the Army Chief of Staff Chong drive away, the agent replies that all he knows that it was the president of a university, but does not

Paek Yun-sik's performance as he shoots Park in the head—letting out a strangled cry as he pulls the trigger—truly personifies Kim's famous saying that he "shot at the heart of *Yusin* with the heart of a wild beast" (*yasu ũi simjŏng ũro Yusin ũi simjang ũl ssoatta*), but whether this savagery that overtook Kim in this instance was derived from democratic motivations or from personal frustration is unclear, although the strong indication is that it was the latter motive. Kim makes a brief reference to revolution when he tells Kim Kye-won during a lull in the emergency cabinet meeting convened after the assassination that "revolution is not a cocktail party; it's a bloody war," but his mention of revolution comes off as self-serving with no ideological heft behind his words. When he is being interrogated after his arrest at the end of the film, Kim's desperate pleas that he killed Park for democracy ("with the heart of a wild beast") come off as disingenuous as a result. The ending narration, provided by Youn Yuh-jung (Yun Yŏ-jŏng), who also portrayed the opportunistic mother at the beginning of the film, derisively mocks Kim's attempts at associating himself with democracy. She asks rhetorically, "Does he look like a revolutionary champion of democracy? Or a megalomaniacal Don Quixote?"²¹ Her skepticism of Kim's sincerity indicate to the viewer that the latter is more correct.

The Ch'oe Sun-sil Scandal and Kim Chae-gyu's Emergence as a Hero of Democracy

know which specific university (making a play on the word "*ch'ongjang*," which can refer to both the Army Chief of Staff (*Yukkun ch'ammo ch'ongjang*) and a university president (*taehak ch'ongjang*).

²¹ "*Hyŏngmyŏngjŏk minju t'usa ro poipnikka? Animyŏn kwadae mangsang e ppajin Tonk'ihot'esŭ yŏssŭlkkayo?*"

Kim's revival of reputation gained serious momentum in the opening months of the Ch'oe Sun-sil scandal that broke out in the fall of 2016, when it became widely known that he had expressed serious reservations of Ch'oe's father Ch'oe T'ae-min in the late 1970s and his undue influence over Park Geun-hye. Ch'oe T'ae-min, dubbed as a Korean "Rasputin" figure, was a founder of a religious sect called the Church of Eternal Life who tried to ingratiate himself with Park after her mother Yuk Yŏng-su's death. He approached Park, telling her that Yuk had asked him in a dream to help her daughter. Park quickly found solace in Ch'oe and his purported ability to act as a medium between Park and her mother, and Ch'oe was able to profit much from this association. There were rumors about how deep this relationship between Park and Ch'oe went, with the American Embassy mentioning in a 2007 cable that some Koreans believed that Ch'oe "had complete control over Park's body and soul during her formative years and that his children accumulated enormous wealth as a result," and some rumors even indicated a sexual relationship between the two, although this was denied by Park.²²

Even during the 1970s, this unusually close relationship between Park and Ch'oe did not escape notice, including by the KCIA. Kim Chae-gyu had apparently repeatedly reported on their "inappropriate relationship" (*pujŏkchŏrhan kwan'gye*) to Park Chung Hee, only for the elder Park to disregard Kim's warnings.²³ Indeed, during his trial, Kim mentioned that Ch'oe's influence over the younger Park, and Park Chung Hee's failure to restrain the elder Ch'oe, was a factor in his decision to assassinate the president.²⁴ Even well after Kim had been arrested, he reportedly continued to rage to his lawyer that Ch'oe was someone who had a "cancerous existence for the country" (*nara ŭi amjŏk chonjae*) and needed to be "punished" (*ch'ŏdan*), whether by a car accident, for the sake of the country.²⁵

Interestingly, in a 2005 interview, Kim Chae-gyu's lawyer An Tong-il noted that one of Kim's stated motives for killing Park was in part a reaction to Park's immoral private life as well as problems related to his children. But here, it was not so much Ch'oe T'ae-min's alarming involvement in Park Geun-hye's life, but rather the degree to which Park was intervening on behalf of enlarging his children's public roles. The one

²² Choe Sang-Hun, "A Presidential Friendship Has Many South Koreans Crying Foul," *The New York Times*, October 27, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/asia/south-korea-choi-soon-sil.html>; and Bae Hyun-jung, "Mystery of Park's Heavy Reliance on Choi," *The Korea Herald*, October 30, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2022. <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20161030000180>.

²³ Kim Ŭn-bin, "Kim Chae-gyu, Pak kwa 'pujŏkchŏrhan kwan'gye' Ch'oe T'ae-min hyanghae 'ch'ŏjhaeya hal nom' kyŏngno," *Chungang ilbo*, November 29, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2022. <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/20935808>; Han Hong-gu, "Kwŏllyŏkhyŏng kaein piri Ch'oe T'ae-

min, ch'ongch'ejŏk kukchŏng nongdan Ch'oe Sun-sil," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, November 4, 2016. Accessed April 22, 2022.

https://www.khan.co.kr/feature_story/article/201611042107005.

²⁴ Choe Sang-Hun, "A Presidential Friendship Has Many South Koreans Crying Foul," *The New York Times*, October 27, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/asia/south-korea-choi-soon-sil.html>.

²⁵ Kim Ŭn-bin, "Kim Chae-gyu, Pak kwa 'pujŏkchŏrhan kwan'gye' Ch'oe T'ae-min hyanghae 'ch'ŏjhaeya hal nom' kyŏngno," *Chungang ilbo*, November 29, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2022. <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/20935808>.

time An mentioned Ch'oe in this interview was to note how the latter came out on the wrong end of a power play. Park, who had begun to fuss over his children after his wife's death, intervened to make Park Geun-hye the president of the Women's Volunteer Corps for National Salvation (Kuguk Yösöng Pongsadan) and Ch'oe T'ae-min the honorary president—a role with no real power—whereas previously their roles had been reversed. Kim in general was said to have felt disdain for how Park Geun-hye was being worshiped by the people despite being merely the daughter of the president and also was contemptuous of the son Park Chi-man's behavior as an Army cadet.²⁶ What this demonstrates is how it was only after the news coverage of the Ch'oe Sun-sil scandal in late 2016 brought to light Park Geun-hye's relationship with Ch'oe T'ae-min that Kim's comments about seeking to contain Ch'oe's influence became widely known.²⁷

As a result of this revelation, there was greater public attention paid to Kim Chae-gyu and his assassination of Park, accompanied by a reevaluation of Kim himself as someone who not only ended the *Yusin* dictatorship but also foresaw the troubles and corruption surrounding Park

Geun-hye. Episodes of the SBS television program “Unanswered Questions” (*Kŭ kōsi algo sipta*) that featured a reassessment of Kim Chae-gyu aired in January 2017 and attained high ratings above 10 percent, reflecting high public interest in revisiting Kim's story.²⁸ In early 2017, it was reported that there was a swell of visitors to his gravesite where they left copies of newspapers of the day the Constitutional Court removed Park Geun-hye from office, indicating how public goodwill toward Kim clearly surged as a result of the revelations about his involvement in trying to stop Ch'oe T'ae-min's association with the Parks, as well as bottles of the Chivas Regal whisky which was infamously known to have been drunk by Kim and Park on the night of October 26, 1979.²⁹

Reassessments of Kim recast him as a “martyr” (*ŭisa*) for the cause of democracy. Another of Kim's lawyers, An Tong-il, published a book in 2017 shortly afterward the impeachment called *I Was Kim Chae-gyu's Lawyer*.³⁰ While this was a revised and enlarged edition of a previous book published in 2005, the fact that the 2017 version was retitled to explicitly include a reference to Kim Chae-gyu—proudly

²⁶ Kim Sun-hŭi, “Kim Chae-gyu pyŏnhoin An Tong-il pyŏnhosa ka t'ŏrŏnoŭn ‘taet’ongnyŏng ŭi sasaenghwal,” *Sin tonga*, December 14, 2005. Accessed April 21, 2022.

<https://shindonga.donga.com/3/all/13/105024>. Even in an interview in 2017, An downplayed the mention of Ch'oe T'ae-min in Kim's court testimony. Chŏng Hŭi-sang, “‘Kim Chae-gyu ŭi pyŏnhoin’ An Tong-il pyŏnhosa ŭi chaksim t'oro,” *Sisain*, August 3, 2017. Accessed April 21, 2022. <https://www.sisain.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=29721>.

²⁷ In addition to the *Chungang ilbo* article above, SBS also reported on Kim's views on Ch'oe. See Chŏng Yun-sik, “Kim Chae-gyu ‘Ch'oe T'ae-min ūn kyot'ong sago rado naesŏ ch'ŏjhaeya hal nom,” *SBS*

Nyusŭ, November 25, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2022.

https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1003907340.

²⁸ Wŏn Ho-sŏng, “‘Ku kōsi algo sipta’ Kim Chae-gyu chaep'yŏngga, sich'ŏngnyul 3 chu yŏnsok 10% tol p'a,” *Sŏul kyŏngje*, January 22, 2017. Accessed April 22, 2022.

<https://www.sedaily.com/News/NewsView/NewsPrint?Nid=1OAX11WJAZ>.

²⁹ Kim Min-uk, “Pak Kŭn-hye p'amyŏn toen nal, Kim Chae-gyu myo e Sibasŭ Rigal noin kkadak,” *Chungang ilbo*, March 16, 2017. Accessed April 22, 2022. <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/21376885>.

³⁰ An Tong-il, *Na nŭn Kim Chae-gyu ŭi pyŏnhoin iŏtta* (Kyŏnggi-do P'aju-si: Kimyŏngsa, 2017).

informing the reader of the author's association with Kim—is telling of the turn in public sentiment.³¹ An had long been involved in trying to rehabilitate Kim's image, and his original 2005 book was also part of this effort.³² In the Afterword of the 2017 edition, An unambiguously labeled Kim an “admirable righteous person” (*hullyunghan ūiin*) who had “resuscitated liberal democracy for the people.”³³ He stated in an interview shortly after the book's publication that he believed that Kim had acted out of a motivation to return South Korea to democracy and avoid further bloodshed in the suppression of demonstrators in Pusan and Masan.³⁴ Likewise, in May 2020, there were calls by the bereaved of Kim Chae-gyu as well as an organization of lawyers calling for a re-trial of Kim, arguing that there were irregularities in Kim's trial, such as interference by the Defense Security Command (Poan Saryŏngbu), and that ultimately, Kim's assassination of Park should not be considered an act of rebellion because it was an “unavoidable shooting (*pudŭgihan sasal*) for the sake of recovering liberal democracy.”³⁵

³¹ See An Tong-il, *10.26 ūn ajikto sara itta: An Tong-il pyŏnhosa ka tŭllyŏ chunŭn 10.26 sagŏn, kŭ chinsil kwa kŏjit* (Seoul: Raendŏm Hausŭ Chungang, 2005).

³² Kim Sun-hŭi, “Kim Chae-gyu pyŏnhoin An Tong-il pyŏnhosa ka t'ŏrŏnŭn ‘taet’ongnyŏng ūi sasaenghwal,” *Sin tonga*, December 14, 2005. Accessed April 21, 2022.

<https://shindonga.donga.com/3/all/13/105024>.

³³ An Tong-il, *Na nŭn Kim Chae-gyu ūi pyŏnhoin iŏtta* (Kyŏnggi-do P'aju-si: Kimyŏngsa, 2017), 427.

³⁴ Chŏng Hŭi-sang, “‘Kim Chae-gyu ūi pyŏnhoin’ An Tong-il pyŏnhosa ūi chaksim t'oro,” *Sisain*, August 3, 2017. Accessed April 21, 2022. <https://www.sisain.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxn=29721>.

³⁵ Kim Myŏng-il, “Pak Chŏng-hŭi sihae Kim Chae-gyu ch'ŭk chaesim ch'ŏnggu ‘chaep’yŏngga haeya’

The Man Standing Next

It is in this context that *The Man Standing Next* was made and released in 2020. Kim's portrayal in this film noticeably diverges from his counterpart in *The President's Last Bang* in being imbued with a more conflicted and idealistic personality. His assassination of Park builds on accumulated slights and betrayals and growing sense of guilt over unfulfilled revolutionary promises, the last of which I will explore further below. Predictably, this seemingly positive portrayal of Kim in the film sparked conservative backlash which downplayed Kim's “heroism” and “righteousness.”³⁶ Kim was no righteous hero, but a murderer of a great man (Park), and had already been judged officially as a murderer who had killed for the purpose of “insurrection.”

Despite these accusations of whitewashing history, Kim Chae-gyu (“Kim Kyu-p'yŏng”) is not portrayed as a flawless man, but a complex one. Kim is directly implicated in Kim Hyŏng-uk's (“Pak Yong-gak”) disappearance and death, directly ordering an operative to carry out the murder

vs ‘yŏksa twijipki,” *Han'guk kyŏngje*, May 27, 2020. Accessed April 17, 2022.

<https://www.hankyung.com/politics/article/2020052702217>.

³⁶ A book by Nam Chŏng-ok titled *Kim Chae-gyu Was Neither a Righteous Man nor a Hero* (Kim Chae-gyu nŭn ūiin to yŏngung to anida) was published in March 2020, shortly after the release of the film in January that year. A review of it was featured on the conservative website *New Daily* (*Nyu teilli*). See Cho Kwang-hyŏng, “Kim Chae-gyu, chasin ūl mangnae tongsaeng ch'ŏrŏm akkyŏjun Pak Chŏng-hŭi e ch'ongburi kyŏnwŏ,” *Nyu teilli*, April 18, 2020. Accessed April 14, 2022.

<https://www.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2020/04/17/2020041700189.html>.

of the latter, with the added pleasure that the KCIA successfully gets to him before Ch'a Chi-ch'öl's ("Kwak Sang-ch'ön") team.³⁷ It is plain that in real life, Kim Chae-gyu did order his agency to be involved in Kim Hyöng-uk's disappearance, but it is unclear if this was what historian Han Hong-gu called Kim's "last act of loyalty" to Park or if there were other motives.³⁸ But at least in the film, this act is done not out of cold blood, but due to Kim Chae-gyu's belief that getting rid of Kim Hyöng-uk would put him back in the good graces of Park. Of course, as Kim Hyöng-uk had warned him earlier, this only gave Park a reason to make Kim Chae-gyu a scapegoat and put him decisively out the door. So even this act of ordering Kim Hyöng-uk's murder is depicted as carried out through Park's Machiavellian machinations.

Indeed, Park himself is portrayed as unscrupulous in his greed for not just power, but also money. If *The President's Last Bang* centered its depiction of Park in his sexual proclivities, it is control of money that drives him in *The Man Standing Next*. Park suspects both of his KCIA chiefs, Kim Hyöng-uk and Kim Chae-gyu, of corrupt dealings in money and property and withholding funds from the state and uses those suspicions as pretexts for

removing them. Furthermore, there are repeated mentions of Swiss bank accounts that Park allegedly had to hold slush funds.³⁹ Finally, Chun Doo-hwan ("Chön Tu-hyök"), revealed as the "Iago" that managed those Swiss bank accounts, is shown at the end of the film staring at the president's empty seat and cartoonishly sweeping gold bars from a Blue House safe into a military rucksack, foreshadowing his own rise to power and accumulation of his own massive slush funds, which reportedly reached the billions of dollars at one point.⁴⁰

As for why Kim shot Park, the film does not give a straightforward answer. One popular rumor has been that Kim believed the U.S. was hinting that it wanted Park removed from the scene, although American accounts vehemently deny that this happened.⁴¹ In *The President's Last Bang*, there is a passing mention during the emergency cabinet meeting of Kim's conversations with the U.S. ambassador William Gleysteen, but otherwise, the Americans are absent. However, in *The Man Standing Next*, not only does the American ambassador ("Robert" in the film) appear in several scenes, he is a menacing presence to Kim, speaking in a highhanded manner while

³⁷ However, unlike in the film, Yi Sang-yöl, the South Korean diplomat in Paris (named Yun T'ae-ho in the film), was working with the KCIA in dealing with Kim Hyöng-uk. See Han Hong-gu, "Kü kösün Kim Chae-gyu üi majimak ch'ungsöng iötta," *Han'györe*, April 26, 2013. Accessed April 18, 2022. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/584787.html.

³⁸ Han Hong-gu, "Kü kösün Kim Chae-gyu üi majimak ch'ungsöng iötta," *Han'györe*, April 26, 2013. Accessed April 18, 2022. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/584787.html.

³⁹ See Oh Seung-hoon, "Allegations Come Out of Massive Park Chung-hee Slush Fund in Switzerland," *Hankyoreh*, February 24, 2017.

Accessed April 22, 2022.

https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/784067.html; Nam Jeong-ho, "Pandora's Box Opens," *Korea JoongAng Daily*, May 27, 2013. Accessed April 22, 2022.

<https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2013/05/27/columns/Pandoras-Box-opens/2972199.html>.

⁴⁰ Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 297. The film also foreshadows the outcome of the Kwangju Massacre in showing Chun suggesting to the president to send in an airborne brigade (i.e., paratroopers) into Pusan to suppress demonstrations there, just as the military paratroopers began committing indiscriminate violence against the citizens of Kwangju in May 1980.

⁴¹ Oberdorfer and Carlin, 90–91.

making sinister threats. The U.S. is discovered to have bugged the Blue House, something that happened a couple years before the main film plot, and also has knowledge of Park's alleged Swiss bank accounts.⁴² But even more alarming, the ambassador even threatens to pull troops out of South Korea in response to Kim denying any KCIA involvement in Kim Hyŏng-uk's disappearance.⁴³ When Kim asks, "What is it that you want from me?", the imperious ambassador states, "Prepare for the next step! Before we have to intervene. Park is finished." With regards to what the "next step" entails, the ambassador gives no concrete answer, but the implication is that the U.S. wants Kim to remove Park.

Another possible reason is survival: Kim preempting an imminent purge from power. Throughout the film's narrative, Kim begins to fear—for good reason—that he is falling out of favor with the president. One symbol of closeness with the president is the provision of cigarettes and lights for the president. Progressing through the film, Kim ends up empty-handed while both Ch'a Chich'ŏl and Chun Doo-hwan are both ready with a cigarette and lighter, reflecting the latter two characters' growing intimacy with the president. In addition, Kim had hoped that disappearing Kim Hyŏng-uk would leave him back in Park's good graces, but Park merely uses the same line he used with Kim Hyŏng-uk in making the KCIA chief a scapegoat. In another scene, Kim sneaks into a room and overhears Park talking to Ch'a and then on the phone, during which Park

expresses his distrust of Kim and conspires to eliminate him. This sense of distance from the president and anger at the latter's betrayal clearly is one motivation for Kim to kill Park. The question arises, does Kim kill Park mainly because of his fears of being the next Kim Hyŏng-uk, or because of idealism?

If preempting one's removal was one possible motivation for the assassination, the film emphatically removes another reason often given, that Kim had hoped to replace Park in a massive shift of power. Here, a major plot divergence with *The President's Last Bang* becomes significant, namely the fact that *The President's Last Bang* continues the narrative after the assassination and to Kim's downfall and arrest, while *The Man Standing Next* ends with the shooting itself. In *The President's Last Bang*, as mentioned above, Kim is shown to be lackadaisical in his handling of the post-assassination situation, changing his destination from KCIA headquarters, his power base, to Army Headquarters on a whim at the panicked suggestion of General Chŏng Sŭng-hwa. He even takes a nap while the emergency cabinet meeting is in brief recess. Kim Chae-gyu acts like he is in complete control of the situation and only has his aide-de-camp there with him; he is promptly detained once knowledge of his actions reaches the Army Chief of Staff's ears as Secretary Kim Kye-wŏn ("Secretary Yang") babbles about Kim's direct involvement in the death of the president. The treatment of Kim's post-assassination actions—the spontaneity, false confidence,

⁴² For a report on U.S. bugging of the Blue House, see Richard Halloran, "U.S. is Reported to Have Bugged Korea President," *The New York Times*, June 19, 1977. Accessed April 21, 2022. [https://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/19/archives/us-is-](https://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/19/archives/us-is-reported-to-have-bugged-korea-president-spying-yielded-data.html)

[reported-to-have-bugged-korea-president-spying-yielded-data.html](https://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/19/archives/us-is-reported-to-have-bugged-korea-president-spying-yielded-data.html).

⁴³ This is likely a reference to President Jimmy Carter's longstanding commitment to withdrawing US troops from Korea, although Carter had to back down on this issue eventually.

and immediate downfall—offer an interpretation of Kim himself as someone with no plan in place for the transfer of power, someone whose only goal was to eliminate Park but with no thought given to what a post-Park Korea might entail, or even what to do with Park's corpse. Kim in this film has no goal of revolution or democracy (other than a quick allusion to it), and instead appears to have killed Park on a whim, due to the numerous slights and petty personal grievances that had piled up too high by that fateful night.

On the other hand, the narrative of *The Man Standing Next* ends with Kim's fateful decision to turn around to the Army Headquarters with no explanation given as to the reasons for it nor any depiction of what happened next. Kim is in a daze, staring at the blood on his hands and his socks. The implication is that he was too shocked to think rationally. But one option that is ruled out is whether he truly wanted to succeed Park. He had no plan in place to consolidate power; his actions certainly removed any possibility of this. Kim felt betrayed by Park for many reasons, including the failure to fulfill the promises of the revolution; he had no ambition to power, or at least, not enough to carefully plan his next moves.

Thus, while both films, similar to historical events, show the seeming spontaneity of Kim's head-scratching decision to not head to the safety of Namsan in favor of the uncertainty of the Army Headquarters, the reasons for that decision are different. In *President's Last Bang*, Kim does so because of his self-assuredness that everything would go his way as well as his lack of care for anything or whimsicalness in carrying out the assassination. In *The Man Standing Next*, Kim is in emotional and

mental turmoil whose vengeance on behalf of himself and the people was carried out; taking power was not part of his goal. Perhaps, and the film leaves open the possibility, Kim wanted to end his life to an extent. He mutters, "It's finished" over and over as he walks away from the scene of the killing.

The film ends with contrasting accounts of Kim's motivations. The first is the summary of the findings of the official investigation led by Chun, read out by Chun himself in a television broadcast, in which he stated that Kim was seized by "megalomania" (*kwadae mangsangjŭng*) and sought the presidency himself. The irony here, of course, is that Chun himself was plotting to take over the presidency in the aftermath of Park's assassination. This clip is followed by audio from Kim's final testimony during his trial, in which he declared that he wanted to "restore liberal democracy" and block further sacrifice of the people. He emphatically stated that he did not commit his acts, which he deemed revolutionary, to become president. He called himself a "soldier" and a "revolutionary" (*hyŏngmyŏngga*).

Here, one can find one sign that the film favors the argument that ultimately it was Kim's idealism that caused him to pull the trigger. Kim's testimony about his democratic ideals is given the last word, leaving a lasting impression in the viewer's mind. It is clear that Chun's testimony should be considered unreliable—perhaps projecting of his own intentions to seize power.

In contrast, Kim's assertion of his revolutionary purpose is imbued with more credibility, especially given how the film has been building up his growing ideological disillusionment with the Park regime. Kim's

growing use of the word “revolution” (*hyŏngmyŏng*) throughout the film reflects this development. In a fictional meeting in the U.S. between Kim Hyŏng-uk and Kim Chae-gyu amidst the Koreagate scandal, the former asks the latter, “Why did we risk our lives and go through with the revolution?” Kim Hyŏng-uk’s lasting words about revolution reverberate in Kim Chae-gyu’s head later in the film, including while he inspects the uprisings in Pusan from his helicopter, ultimately causing him to ultimately view Park as having betrayed the promise of revolution and democracy. Right before shooting Ch’a and Park, Kim asks, “Why did you start the revolution? Why did we risk our lives and participate in the revolution?” Surely not to crush and kill one to two million citizens with tanks, Kim exclaims. And right before shooting Park in the head, Kim declares, “I punish you as a traitor to the revolution.” By the end, the film makes its position clear that Kim was primarily driven by his desire to fulfill the unfulfilled promise of the revolution of May 16 and end the authoritarianism and corruption that had permeated the Park regime.

But here, a puzzle emerges. In *The Man Standing Next*, as mentioned above,

Kim Hyŏng-uk rhetorically asks Kim Chae-gyu why they joined in the May 16 coup. Later on, Kim reminisces about the night of the May 16 coup with Park, asking the latter if he remembers how they crossed the Han River guarded by the military police. In this story, Kim himself speaks as if he were there, mentioning how he followed Park even as bullets flew past their ears. Kim states that Park asked him what they should do, and that it was Kim who urged him to move forward with the coup.⁴⁴

But the problem is that Kim was famously not involved in May 16. During the planning for May 16, Kim was judged as someone who was disinterested in participating in the coup.⁴⁵ In fact, Kim Chae-gyu not only did not participate in the May 16 coup, he was even arrested as a suspected anti-revolutionary in the coup’s aftermath, saved only by Park Chung Hee’s intervention.⁴⁶ In reality, it was not Kim, but Han Ung-jin, who, as bullets came flying toward them, shouting to Park, “It’s okay, it’s okay.”⁴⁷

Despite Kim’s lack of participation in the coup, his close friendship with Park facilitated a rapid ascent. He was likely rescued by the fact that he was from the same hometown, Kumi, and the same class year as

⁴⁴ Kim is said to have been a colonel (*taeryŏng*) at this point, although in reality, he was a one-star brigadier general (*chunjang*).

⁴⁵ Cho Kap-che, *Pak Chŏng-hŭi: han kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga ūi pijanghan saengae*, vol. 3: *Hyŏngmyŏng chŏnya* (Seoul: Cho Kap-che Tat’ŏm, 2015), 143. At the time of the coup became the head of the General Affairs section (*ch’ongmu kwajang*) of the Ministry of National Defense. See also Yi Man-sŏp, 5.16 kwa 10.26: *Pak Chŏng-hŭi, Kim Chae-gyu, kŭrigo na* (Kyŏnggi-do P’aju-si: Nanam, 2009), 79. In 1960, Kim was the Vice-President of the ROK Army College (Yukkun Taehak) and after a car accident, was rescued by the President of the college, Kim Kye-wŏn, who would later be the Chief

Presidential Secretary to Park in 1979 and was present at the scene of Park’s assassination. See Cho Kap-che, “Pak Chŏng-hŭi ūi ch’oehu rŭl chik’yŏ pon yuilhan saengjonja Kim Kye-wŏn chŏn Ch’ŏngwadae Pisŏsilchang, 18 nyŏn man e tasi ip yŏlta: ‘Kim Chae-gyu nŭn sahyŏngjang ūro kkŭllyŏ nagada nae pang ūl hanch’am paraboatta,’” *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*, February 2006. Accessed April 17, 2022. <http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=&nNewsNumb=200602100068>.

⁴⁶ Yi Chŏng-sik (Chong-Sik Lee), *In’gan Kim Chae-gyu* (Paoli, PA.: P’anmaech’ŏ, C. S. Lee, 1980), 20.

⁴⁷ Kim Ch’ung-sik, *Namsan ūi pujangdŭl*, vol. 2 (Seoul: Tonga Ilbosa, 1992), 325.

Park in the Korean Military Academy. Within a month of the coup, the junta had named Kim as the head of the Honam Fertilizer Corporation (Honam Piryo Chusik Hoesa).⁴⁸ Kim continued to be promoted within the military, reaching a final rank of Lieutenant General (*chungjang*), and attained several key posts in the military while also serving in the government, including serving in the National Assembly as a legislator and being named Minister of Construction, before reaching his final post as head of the KCIA from 1976 onward.⁴⁹ Despite his closeness with Park that caused his appointment to the top position in the KCIA, however, the fact remains that Kim was never involved with the events of May 16 and was even suspected of “anti-revolutionary” sentiments.

So why did the filmmakers explicitly have Kim involved in the coup, regardless of the historical record? It is because linking Kim with the ideals of May 16 was the best way to give credence to Kim’s final words about his revolutionary motives for shooting Park. The problem of Kim never having participated in May 16 is outright ignored, as it proves inconvenient for this narrative. Without May 16, there is a real danger that the idealistic characterization of Kim crumbles, for there is little else in his life history to give him such impetus for drastic action outside of the usual explanations of personal animosity as seen in *The President’s Last Bang*. The legacy of May 16—and the

failure to uphold it by the regime and its leaders—propels Kim forward in an attempt to belatedly achieve what had been lost on the wayside, but it is false implanted in Kim’s biography.

Conclusion

While no historical film or novel is free from taking liberties with “what happened” in the past, *The Man Standing Next* makes the deliberate decision to not only distort a key moment in history, but to magnify the distortion in order to elevate a historical figure and his role in the fight against authoritarianism.⁵⁰ Namely, the film’s key historical distortion is connecting Kim Chae-gyu with the May 16 coup d’état that launched Park Chung Hee to power. The decision to do so appears to reflect a growing tide of support for Kim in the wake of the massive candlelight vigils in opposition to Park’s daughter Park Geun-hye and the related swelling tide in support of Korean democracy, to which the two Parks were deemed central figures in opposition.

If we think more broadly as well about Park’s own deep association with her father’s legacy, the revival of Kim Chae-gyu during the time of her impeachment and its aftermath serves as a rebuke to not just Park Geun-hye and whatever relationship she had with Ch’oe T’ae-min as well as his daughter, but also to Park Chung Hee himself and his legacies. The revival in interest in Kim and in his reputation after 2016 has consequently

⁴⁸ “Hobi sajang e Kim Chae-gyu junjang,” *Chosŏn ilbo*, June 17, 1961.

⁴⁹ See “Kim Chae-gyu,” *Han’guk minjok munhwa taebaek kwa sajŏn* [Encyclopedia of Korean Culture]. Accessed April 17, 2022.

http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Index?contents_id=E0010328.

⁵⁰ The director U Min-ho claimed that he was not making any political statement or an attempt at reevaluating Kim Chae-gyu, but rather was basing his film on real events. See Pak Chun-ho, “Kim Chae-gyu chaep’yŏngga yŏron kŏse . . . Pak Chŏng-hŭi simjang sson ‘hyŏngmyŏng,’” *EBN*, February 18, 2020. Accessed April 22, 2022.

<https://ebn.co.kr/news/view/1022528>.

acted to counteract the Park Chung Hee Syndrome, in combination with the fallout from the Ch'oe Sun-sil scandal and subsequent disappointment with Park Geun-hye.⁵¹ This has involved taking Kim at his word that he was shooting at “the heart of *Yusin*” and subsequently elevating Kim as the champion of democracy, especially in light of the resurrection of Park in the form of his daughter’s presidency. Kim thus emerged as a champion of democracy through his act of assassination, which not only ended Park’s *Yusin* regime but also was an attempt at preventing the continuance of his rule through his daughter and her associates in the Ch’oe family. Perhaps what is arising now is a more minor, but not insignificant, counterpart to Park Chung Hee Syndrome, that is, Kim Chae-gyu Syndrome or Nostalgia.

But as we see in examining *The Man Standing Next*, this nostalgia for Kim has the real potential for deep historical distortion

that mythologizes not just Kim’s role in the assassination of Park Chung Hee, but also Kim’s own ideals and life history, particularly his association with the supposedly revolutionary ideals of the May 16 coup. Just as Park Chung Hee syndrome can rightfully be criticized for downplaying key aspects of Park’s authoritarian rule, this new Kim Chae-gyu nostalgia has the potential to transform Kim into someone he did not appear to be when alive: an idealistic, revolutionary figure. This does not mean that Kim did not believe in democracy or was motivated in part by alarm at the growing oppressiveness of the *Yusin* system. But to ascribe revolutionary ideals is perhaps a step too far. The fact that a film like *The Man Standing Next* had to resort to distorting Kim’s participation (or lack thereof) in the May 16 coup to achieve that characterization suggests the innate difficulty in discovering irrefutable idealism in Kim and his fateful act.

⁵¹ Paek Ch’öl, “Pak Chŏng-hŭi sindŭrom ŭi chongmal ũn onŭn’ga,” *Chugan kyŏnghyang* No. 1207, December 27, 2016. Accessed April 17, 2022.

<https://weekly.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&artid=201612191730461&code=113>.



고려대학교
KOREA UNIVERSITY

Friday, May 27th 2022

9:15-11:30

Panel B

Discussant Jeong-il Lee (NAHF)

Moderators Emily Ambrose (Korea Univ.) & 이강원 (Korea Univ.)

Presenters Aaron Molnar (University of British Columbia)

Ga Eun Cho (Johns Hopkins University)

최동녕 (Korea University)

김동영 (Korea University)

Felling Forests and Fallowed Fields: Establishing a Narrative of Ecological and Climate Change in Mongol Era Koryo

Aaron Molnar

University of British Columbia

Introduction:

Both anthropogenic ecological change and climate change are important factors that have only begun to impact our historical narratives in premodern East Asia. For Koryo, outside of very few studies, this has largely remained the purview of science researchers. However, as historians of China have shown, state policies greatly impacted ecological change. Brian Lander for one has demonstrated that the Chinese state and its expansion in Guanzhong significantly altered ecologies through a process of state-sponsored agrarian settlement (Lander 2021). Ruth Mostern too has highlighted how settlement and land use fundamentally altered ecologies and settlement patterns on the loess plateau and the flood plain of the Yellow River (Mostern 2021). More modern narratives have also linked the process of European colonial and imperial expansion with the fundamental alteration of the fauna and flora of the New World (Crosby 2015). Koryo too was subject to both Mongol imperialism and colonialism, and though there has been intense research into how this affected the human geography, commercial relations and material conditions of Koryo, its environment and ecology are largely questions marks. Yet, this is primarily an anthropogenic narrative of ecological change. Climate change was also operative at this

juncture as Timothy Brook has elucidated with archival proxies for Yuan-Ming history. At least by Qubilai's rise to power in 1260, the climate of East Asia had begun to transition from the more favourable Medieval Warm Period(MWP) to that of the Little Ice Age(LIA). (Brook 2017, 27-58) This paper argues that Mongol imperialism altered agro-ecologies in Koryo, destroying old ones, promoting their recovery and opening new ones. The inclusion of Koryo in the larger political and commercial realm of the Mongol Empire also stimulated the utilization of land for ginseng cultivation outside of its usual native habitat in the north. Mongol imperialism also impelled the adoption of new species and land use patterns, particularly on Jeju island. These agro-ecological changes also coincided with the waning of the MWP and the onset of the LIA that both provided the foundation for silvan exploitation, but also exacerbated detrimental anthropogenic ecological changes such as deforestation and disturbed agro-ecologies.

The Korean peninsula is largely dependent on the Asian monsoon for the majority of its rainfall. It creates a warm and wet summer, but a cool and dry winter. The majority of annual precipitation falls during the summer months. A weakening or disruption of that monsoonal cycle had direct

effects on the climate of the Korean peninsula. Decreased solar radiation and the weakening of the Asian monsoon likewise decreased both temperatures and the amount of precipitation (Yi 2011). However, as Bruce Campbell has pointed out, the change in climate due to the fluctuation in solar radiation would have also caused climate instability and changed atmospheric circulation, not a unidirectional downturn in temperature and precipitation (Campbell 2016, 3-29, 44-5). Thus, though aggregate temperature and precipitation may have decreased, the weather itself might have been more erratic, oscillating between drought and floods, something that is borne out in the textual records for Koryo.⁵² It was this transition from the MWP to the LIA that coincided with Mongol domination of the Korean peninsula and largely exacerbated its effects during the immediate period of invasion and socio-economic dislocation in the mid-thirteenth century.

The confluence of climate, imperial expansion and ecological change challenged both the agro-ecologies of the peninsula and its socio-economic stability. The Mongols executed a number of invasions over three decades 1231-1259. Though rebellions such as that of the Three Watches persisted until around 1269 when the capital was returned to Kaesong and King Wonjong restored to the throne, peace was ultimately sealed with a marriage alliance between Kubilai's imperial line and the Wang royal house in 1274

(Henthorn 1963, 183). However, this prolonged period of warfare left Koryo devastated materially and environmentally, though the latter is much harder to assess due to the chaos wrought. A semi-colonial administration was then imposed upon Koryo whereby Mongol overseers, a system of garrisons, and extractive organelles such as the 鷹房 *Yingfang* 응방 coerced the movement of human and material resources from Koryo to Qubilai's empire. These structures were used by the Mongols to mobilize resources for their continued campaigns against the Song and Japan. This had a direct impact on forest ecologies in Korea.

Climate Transition on the Korean Peninsula

First, it is necessary to establish that the MWP was both operative and impactful on Korean forests during the Koryo period. For this, paleoclimatology has provided convincing evidence that the Korean peninsula during Koryo was wetter, warmer, and with a marked increase in arboreal growth. Pollen proxies collected at sites along the East coast demonstrate that the Korean peninsula experienced increased temperatures from about c.700CE-1200CE, neatly corresponding to dates established for the climate variation established for the adjacent continental steppe region.⁵³ Evidence from the southern coast shows that increased rainfall in that part of the peninsula

⁵² KS.79: 志 卷第三十三 > 食貨 二: 三十四年八月 忠宣復位. 十一月 下教, “農桑, 衣食之本, 宜有司勸課, 不至曠損. 無賴之徒, 不得縱牛馬, 食踐禾稼. 其遭水旱去處, 各道提察檢聞, 可蠲免一年租賦.”

⁵³ The LIA period sets in quite quickly after the turn of the century and appears to concur with

documentary evidence for the cooling of Mongolia and China in the same period. Jungjae Park, “A modern pollen-temperature calibration data set from Korea and quantitative temperature reconstructions for the Holocene,” *The Holocene* Vol. 21, No. 7 (2011): 1125-1135.

was due to intensified summer monsoon conditions. The summer monsoon is when Korea receives 70% of its annual precipitation and thus is crucial for determining vegetation. Temperatures likewise increased, and this caused a noticeable increase in C3 plants all around. As trees are C3 plants, this means forest growth occurred during the MWP here as well (Lim, et al. 2014, 11-16). Larger times scales of analysis for wetlands on Jeju Island similarly present a situation where gradually warmer and wetter conditions over millennia privileged C3 plants over C4 plants, leading to an increase in forest cover and a decrease in arid grasslands (Lim 2011, 2487-2497). Moors in central Korea near the current DMZ corroborate coastal evidence for increased temperature and precipitation, making it much more likely this was a pan-peninsular phenomenon during the MWP (Yoshioka et al. 2016, 555-559). Likewise, northeast Asia in general appears to have experienced increased precipitation. Based on pollen collected at the Maili bog, all taxa of vegetation, but noteworthy here arboreal pollen increased, indicating a corresponding increase in this type of vegetation between approx. 950CE – 1270CE. Importantly, this was in spite of increased human habitation and activity, which one would assume would have decreased vegetation on the whole (Ren 1998, 1931-1934). This latter point reasonably applies to Koryo in general, as human activity in forest-areas was on the increase (Kong 2000, 38-40). Other adjacent areas such as the Primorye also exhibited an increase in growth of Korean pine-broad-leaved forests (Razjigaeva et al. 2020, 785). Forest seem to have expanded despite population pressures in Japan as a whole, but Totman, the authority on the subject,

attributes this to prescient rural forest utilization strategies (Totman 1989, 35-37). The increased temperatures and precipitation had a direct effect on the growth of pine forests and zelkova growth for the period leading up to the Mongol invasions (Lee 2017, 62). This would suggest that Koryo forests were quite healthy and abundant, priming them for exploitation by a resource hungry imperial overlord. However, it should be noted that not all research agrees that vegetation, especially arboreal increased. Research conducted on Jirisan, for example, does not support this thesis (Jang et al. 2006, 287- 293).

The documentary record from early Koryo also seems to corroborate favorable climate and a process of afforestation. However, here we find a strong anthropogenic stream for forest growth. Trees and forests were central to the ideology of the Koryo state and part of their interpretive landscape. The founding myth of Koryo centered Korean pine and its mountain ecosystem. The story goes that the official Kim P'alwon on a journey near Mount Puso near Kaesong prophesized to a local man, Kangch'ung, upon viewing the denuded mountain slopes that whoever were to reforest it would unify the realm. Kangch'ung promptly seeded pine, the ridge being renamed "Pine Ridge". Kangch'ung's great-great grandson Wang Kon would go on to found Koryo while the ridge and its vicinity would host the capital, Kaesong. Kaesong's bond with Korean pine would endure in its alternative name Songdo 송도/松都, the "City of Pines" (Rogers 1982-1983, 6-7). Koryo era architecture also reflected the privileging of pine and Zelkova serrata during the MWP. One investigation found

that 71% of Koryo era buildings surveyed used pine while 21% used Zelkova. This trend increased during the Choson period (Park and Lee 2007, 9-28).

Deforestation did occur in Koryo before the advent of Mongol domination, but this too seems to confirm abundant sylvan resources. Bans on forest use during the Koryo period probably only affected the capital region and were geared toward the conservation of resources during the celebration of the lunar new year. In 988 the official Yi Yang proposed prohibiting the felling of trees after the midpoint of the first lunar month to conserve resources. In 1030 this was reaffirmed. Forest resources were allocated to officials and other magnates in the capital area in order to compensate them for service to the state or placate them. These prebends *sajong* were heavily used in the period before the Mongol invasions and testify to the fact that areas of forest were being cleared in land reclamation efforts. These areas were taxed by the state and recovered upon the holder's death (Duncan 2000, 44).

This adumbrates a further issue related to deforestation: the alleged inability of the central government to curtail the power of local elites. John Duncan has argued that rooted in Silla's Chinese prefectural system and local strongman traditions, the foundation of the early Koryo regime rendered local society well-organized, fairly orderly, but conversely primed to resist the imposition of central rule (Duncan 2000, 30-32). One scholar has used this to argue Koryo could not assert its control over sylvan resources in a structural sense as a result, rendering it incapable of enacting any protectionist program (Lee 2017, 51-8, 63-6).

Yet, as we saw above, the state was actively using its limited control over sylvan resources to placate these elites and profited from it. What is more, no policy initiatives were enacted in the pre-Mongol period to curtail rampant encroachment by local land-thirsty elites.

It appears that no larger policy initiatives existed to limit their cooption of forests. No protected forest areas were established between 1030-1325. At one point in 1088, the government did levy a tax on nut-producing pines to take advantage of this resource. However, by the end of the dynasty land clearance and deforestation were abundant and attributed to these landowners (Kong and Lee 1974, 19-20). When placed beside the paleoclimate reconstructions, the lack of interest in policies to curtail deforestation in early Koryo might have been due to the abundance of the resource itself. However, by the end of the dynasty the peninsula was already in the throes of the LIA where the arboreal privileging conditions disappeared. This might account for the surge in sylvan protectionism. Yet, the period of Mongol domination does seem to provide more convincing evidence that local elites were responsible for deforestation and ecological change. Huge amounts of material wealth were removed from the country through the institution of the court and Mongol colonial apparatuses, including sylvan resources as will be discussed below (Yi 2017, 63).

Mongol Invasion and Agro-Ecological Change

By the time the Mongols arrived, the Korean peninsula was reasonably well-

provisioned by forests and this served as an important pretext for the large-scale deforestation and ecological change that followed. Yet, the first and most immediate ecological consequence was the massive socio-economic dislocation warfare caused. Sadly, to date there has not been a study of the larger environmental and ecological consequences of the multiple invasions suffered by the peninsula. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the scale. “Wasteland” was increasingly converted into agriculturally productive lands. This is an interesting concept in pre-modern agrarian states, and usually refers to areas that have not been brought under the plow because they were ecologically less desirable, such as water-logged areas, moors, coastal regions etc. These areas were far from wastes in an ecological sense, but their transformation was an important terraforming project that altered ecologies. An interesting episode of this transformation occurred after the retaking of Kangdong from Khitan forces by a combined Mongol-Koryo force in 1219, a fleeting highwater mark in an otherwise bellicose relationship. As an act of good faith, along with the return of Koryo prisoners captured by the Khitan, the Mongol general awarded Khitan POWs to the Koryo commander Cho Ch’ung. These prisoners were then resettled in their own colony on reclaimed “wasteland”, a community which proved quite enduring.⁵⁴ Wastelands were

also opened up to counterbalance the disruption of agricultural lands as will be discussed below.

Large-scale destruction and disturbance of agro-ecologies was arguably just as devastating as the deaths incurred in battle. The northern border regions suffered widespread depopulation from brutal Mongol tactics as well as forced migration to fortresses and mountain redoubts, leaving agricultural lands empty, especially around cities. The most dramatic was the removal of the urban and hinterland population of Kaesong to the island stronghold of Kanghwa to protect the Choi government during the initial invasions. The destruction of agro-ecologies, both from the abandonment and Mongol occupation was evinced in a missive from the Koryo government to the Mongol leaders, indicating that their requirement that the capital be returned to Kaesong and tribute be paid was not feasible; it would take at least three years for the agro-economy of the Koryo heartland to recovery both to support the return of government personnel as well as the collection of tribute for the Mongol court.⁵⁵

However, the Choi military government was obstinate and refused to return the capital or satisfy the Mongols’ demands for the King to call upon the emperor, render military aide and submit material tribute.⁵⁶ Each

⁵⁴ Henthorn, 19; Koryosa 고려사高麗史(hereafter KS), 卷一百三 > 列傳 卷第十六 > 諸臣 > 김취려 : 冲以契丹俘虜, 分送州縣, 擇閑曠地居之, 量給田土, 業農爲民, 俗呼爲契丹場. ALSO KS110:太祖命哈眞·札刺兩將帥討罪, 天寒雪深,

餉道不繼. 我忠憲王遣趙冲·金就礪等, 助兵與糧, 一舉破賊. 於是, 兩國同盟, 萬世子孫, 無忘今日, 因分所虜生口爲信, 今小邦有契丹場, 是也.

⁵⁵ KS.26: 世家 卷第二十六 > 元宗 9 年 > 2 月 21 日.

⁵⁶ An example of the year prior demonstrates how the Mongols proceeded. KS.24: 世家 卷第二十四 > 高宗 40 年 > 8 月 14 日:

campaign deepened the ecological destruction of the peninsula.

Jalairtai-qorci's invasion of 1254, for instance, wrought immense destruction. The Mongols carried out a scorched earth policy that left the countryside in ashes.⁵⁷ The renewed evacuation of civilians to Kanghwa, the erstwhile island fortress-capital and other mountain forts had successfully drained the population of a large portion of the realm. However, this meant that agriculture productivity plummeted, and food became scarce, causing the government to decide in 1256 to reclaim wasteland along the coast and distribute it.⁵⁸ The hunting practices Mongol troops brought with them also proved disruptive. Numerous passages in both the Yuanshi and Koryosa chastise or ban such behaviour as destructive to agriculture. This was even the case on Jeju island which played host to a Mongol garrison. The problem was so serious that Qubilai ordered his intendent to end all such behavior in 1281.⁵⁹ Though it is difficult to know the extent of the destruction from the occupation and a scorched earth policy, the fact that previously undesirable lands with potentially low productivity were being cleared points to

the long-term spoilage of agricultural lands, especially since this is happening during a period of population decline.

Parallel to ecological change from warfare were the effects of climate change. Korea by the time of the Mongol invasions, like the Yuan (Brook 2017, 27-58), was starting to suffer the effects of the LIA from reduced temperatures and precipitation. Instances of drought, including lack of snowfall, are common in the records and were combined with Mongol troops pillaging to produce widespread famine.⁶⁰ Between 1200-1229 drought is only noted for five years in thirty in the Koryosa.⁶¹ However, from the 1230s to the end of the dynasty drought was a consistent challenge. Of those 162 years, sixty-three mention drought occurring or the long-term effects of drought. Some entries mention that drought had occurred for several years consecutively in a particular region. Though some years were particularly bad, where starvation set in, farmers sold their daughters, troops rebelled for lack of food etc..., it is difficult to assess the severity per year and on a regional basis. However, the trend is obvious: out of ten years of the 1280s, only 1284 seems to have

蒙兵三千來屯高·和二州之境，候騎三百餘至廣州，焚燒廬舍。

⁵⁷ Ibid., 128.; KS: 24 : 高宗 41年 > 12 월: 是歲，蒙兵所虜男女，無慮二十萬六千八百餘人，殺戮者，不可勝計。所經州郡，皆爲煨燼，自有蒙兵之亂，未有甚於此時也。

⁵⁸ Ibid., 140; KS:78 志 卷第三十二 > 食貨 一 > 전제 > 경리: 四十三年十二月 制曰, “今想, 諸道民不聊生, 彼此流移, 甚可悼也。其避亂所, 與本邑, 相距程不過一日者, 許往還耕田。其餘就島內, 量給土田, 不足則, 給沿海閑田及宮寺院田。

⁵⁸ ⁵⁸ Ibid., 140; KS:78 志 卷第三十二 > 食貨 一 > 전제 > 경리: 四十三年十二月 制曰, “今想, 諸道民不聊生, 彼此流移, 甚可悼也。其避亂所, 與本邑, 相距程不過一日者, 許往還耕田。其餘就島內, 量給土田, 不足則, 給沿海閑田及宮寺院田。

⁵⁹ YS.11.231 敕耽羅國達魯花赤塔兒赤, 禁高麗全羅等處田獵擾民者。

⁶⁰ Henthorn, 135 : KS: 53志 卷第七 > 五行 一: 冬無雪, 飢疫相仍, 僵屍蔽路。銀一斤, 直米二斛。

⁶¹ 1213, 1216, 1219, 1226 and 1229.

emerged unscathed. The peninsula as a whole was much drier.⁶²

Lack of normal precipitation quickly grew into larger catastrophes. In 1255 no snow was reported that winter leading to disease in the capital, most likely from malnutrition.⁶³ The next year again no snow was reported leading to such disease and starvation that corpses covered the roads.⁶⁴ Another key to understanding why no snow compounded agroecological disturbances, was barley in Korea, a winter crop seeded in autumn. Though the majority of the precipitation came in the spring/summer, in order for barley to survive the winter months then grow and be harvested in spring, it needs the winter snowfall.⁶⁵ Snow cover protects the crown of the plant and ensures that low air temperatures do not dehydrate it causing injury (Dickson 1979, 152-154). Additionally, many of the passages in the KS and KSJY indicate that in a given year floods and drought alternated with each, leaving officials perplexed as to how to deal with the situation. This is particularly prevalent towards the end of the dynasty and accords with Bruce Campbell's theory of climate destabilization during the transition from the

MWP to the LIA.

The above link to barley is a further reflection of the ebb of a warmer and wetter climate. Barley is far hardier than wheat or rice, and requires far less water and a shorter growing season. Historically, barely was grown in places wheats and millets could not, such as mountain and hillsides. It can flourish at much cooler temperatures. This made it a common food of peasants and developed a cultural association with commoners (Spengler 2019, 115-117). Barley had long been cultivated to some degree in Koryo. The travel report of the eleventh century envoy Xu Jing remarks about its cultivation at the time of his 1123 embassy from the Song Empire to Koryo (Veermeersch 2016, 159). Yet, late Koryo evidence for barley seems to indicate a turn towards this drought tolerant and more easily grown staple as the examples above indicate. A 1217 passage in the Koryosa indicates that barely/wheat was being growth in the areas of Wonju and Chungju where rebels were being pursued.⁶⁶ Excavations from the Taen Mado shipwreck dated to 1260-1268 demonstrate that barley was being shipping to the erstwhile capital on Kanghwa Island as a foodstuff. In fact, barley is the only grain found with a wooden tablet

⁶² In the years that mention the long-term fallout of multiple years of drought, it is difficult to assess if that year itself was drought-free and so I have counted it also. For example, KSJY.32 辛禍三 > 禍王 十二年 > 4 월: 漆原府院君尹桓卒. 桓家鉅富, 嘗, 乞告歸漆原, 歲大饑, 人相食, 散家財, 以賑之, 取貧民稱貸契券, 悉燒之. 時, 方久旱, 水涌桓田, 浸及人田大熟, 慶尚之民稱之不已.

⁶³ KS:24世家 卷第二十四 > 高宗 42年 > 12 월: 是歲. 冬無雪, 京城大疫.

⁶⁴ KS: 24 卷二十四 > 世家 卷第二十四 > 高宗 43年 > 12 월: 冬無雪, 飢疫相仍, 僵屍蔽路. 銀一斤, 直米二斛.

⁶⁵ Henthorn, 142; This is still an issue for farmers. See Becky H. W. Zhong et al., "Assessment of Winter Barley in Minnesota: Relationships among Cultivar, Fall Seeding Date, Winter Survival, and Grain Yield," *Crop, Forage and Turf Management* Vol. 5, No. 1 (2019): 1-8.

⁶⁶ KS:22世家 卷第二十二 > 高宗 4年 > 7 월: 庚辰崔元世·金就礪追丹兵于忠·原二州間, 戰于麥谷, 追至朴達峴, 大敗之, 賊踰大關嶺而遁. The term being used for grain here is 맥곡(麥谷) and is a catch all term for barley and wheats.

marker of shipment at the site (Koh 2015, 165-169). The conspicuous absence of rice elusively points to greater consumption of barley and the collapse of the rice paddy system in a period of agroecological dislocation brought on by cooling temperatures, drought and the destruction wrought by Mongol armies. The government was so acutely aware of this relationship between warfare, demographic dislocation and climate, that upon the conclusion of a peace agreement in 1259, the first order of business was to return peasants who had sought refuge in mountain redoubts and fortresses to return to the land (Henthorn 1963, 139). This seems to have had the desired effect. A report to the throne from 1272 on the state of agriculture and the provisioning of troops mentions that the barley and wheat harvests were successful.⁶⁷ However this was certainly not consistent. Barley shoots were nowhere to be seen in the second month of 1382, probably worthy of note in the official annals as a marker of drought.⁶⁸ The Mongol military colonies also disturbed agricultural fields as soldiers often hunted there, compelling the court to forbid hunting in Jeolla province in 1280.⁶⁹

The disruption to agro-ecologies was significant, and this was not lost on the Koryo

government. A closer look at the records reveals that returning farmers to the land was part of a larger policy that attempted to both resuscitate and maximise productivity from agro-ecologies. Between the 1255-1301 the Koryo government regularly employed agricultural commissioners 勸農使(勸農使) to reallocate lands and distribute wastelands in order to effect the recovery of the agricultural economy and re-establish the tax base. They were deployed to all provinces.⁷⁰ In fact, this type of official policy intervention in times of natural disaster had been extant since early Koryo. In the spring of 1039, the court ordered agricultural commissioners to be deployed to the northeastern route after severe flooding had left ordinary farmers destitute. They were to distribute grain and salt to stabilize the disaster zone.⁷¹ The usefulness of such commissioners must have been effective as it was made a regular office in the government by at least 1173.⁷² These officials, however, were also part of the royal governments local tribute exaction (read tax) efforts that were inseparable from the efforts to recovery and expand agro-ecologies. An instance from 1289 clearly states that court officials are to be sent to reallocate lands and collect local products.⁷³ Their efforts seem also to have been in support of the larger military contribution to the

⁶⁷ KS: 27 今則大小麥已收, 而禾穀向熟, 釋者不過八月, 其接秋糧餉, 當限何月, 乞降綸音。

⁶⁸ KS: 55: 八年閏二月 無麥苗。

⁶⁹ YS 11: 禁高麗全羅等處田獵擾民者。

⁷⁰ KSJY.17: 高宗四 > 高宗 四十二年 > 5 月: 分遣諸道勸農使。

⁷¹ KS.80 志 卷第三十四 > 食貨 三: 四月 制, “東北諸州, 去年大水, 漂沒禾稼, 百姓貧乏. 其令本路勸農使, 發倉米鹽, 賑之.”

⁷² KS77 志 卷第三十一 > 百官 二: 勸農使. 五道兩界, 皆有之. 明宗三年, 七道按察使【慶尙州

道·晉陝州道·全羅州道·忠清州道·楊廣州道·西海道·春州道】, 五道監倉使【北界, 雲中道·興化道, 東界, 溟州道·朔方道·沿海道】, 皆兼勸農使, 後別置勸農使. 忠烈王十三年, 以各道勸農使聚斂傷民, 罷之, 以按廉使兼其任。

⁷³ KS.79 志 卷第三十三 > 食貨 二: 分遣朝臣于各道, 稱為勸農使, 擇公私良田, 聚民耕種, 除其貢賦. 又牒郡縣, 戶斂銀紵皮幣油蜜, 至於竹木花果, 悉皆徵納, 輸之內庫. 勸農使纔得六品而往者, 不數年間, 超拜大官, 或登樞府. 由是, 為勸農使者, 爭以掊克聚斂為事, 郡縣日益凋弊. 內庫之物, 上即分賜諸黃門, 及左右嬖幸, 亦無所儲。

Yuan. A 1271 plea from King Wonjong to Qubilai not to ratify the proposal to impose military colonies on Koryo mentions how these agricultural commissioners were already doing their best to support the military, presumably referring to the Three Watches Rebellion.⁷⁴

In the muddled jurisdictional landscape that was the Mongol Empire, the Yuan also sent agricultural commissioners to Koryo. This office was in common use in the Yuan Empire to increase arable land and productivity.⁷⁵ It could be imagined that the Yuan court had a vested interest in helping its satellite state recover, as this was crucial in its ability to supply men and material to the Yuan war effort against Japan and contribute to the empire more largely. Yet, we learn about them in the Korean records as they acted in the latter capacity described above as extractive colonial agents of the Yuan government. It seems according to Koryo officials, this was more damaging to the recovery of agro-ecologies and the economy than helpful. In a 1274 missive to Qubilai, the court wonders if there will be any people to fulfill the orders of the agro- commissioners

if they are sent again into Koryo.⁷⁶ Thus, in the office of the agricultural commissioner, we can see again the confluence of the recovery from ecological destruction, adaptation to a changing climate and continued stress put on those ecologies by Mongol imperialism.

Mongol Imperialism and Silvan Ecologies

Agro-ecologies were not the only victims of the confluence of Mongol imperialism and climate dislocation. Silvan ecologies were also fundamentally challenged. It was during the period of cooling and after Koryo's submission to the Mongols that deforestation is in evidence. This was unequivocally the result of Qubilai's insistence that Koryo provide men and material, first for the invasion of the Southern Song, but more importantly, the two expeditions against Japan. Military colonies were established in 1259 and the system was greatly expanded in 1270. One of their express purposes was the construction of ships for the Mongol navy. This was accompanied with edicts and missives directing Koryo to prepare ships. In 1266 Qubilai sent an envoy to instruct Wonjong to

⁷⁴ KS27 世家 卷第二十七 > 元宗 12 年 > 1 月: 時蒙古中書省, 請於高麗置屯田經略司。王寄書中書省曰, “竊聞, 有人請於小邦置屯田, 未知信否。小邦自林衍逆命, 王師問罪時, 有不軌之人, 妄自疑懼, 遂構亂而南下, 又有宿憾於小邦者, 幸其本國之有難, 因利乘便, 方小邦, 去水就陸之時, 放兵大掠, 由是, 中外嗷嗷愁怨。今又因逆賊之未除, 王師猶在於南鄙, 小邦人民, 外則勞於逆賊攻討之事, 內則困於兵馬資糧之費。而內外蓄積, 去年爲逆賊偷掠無遺, 粗得出居臣民, 其將保喘供職難矣。而此輩人有是請, 蓋嘗狃於去年, 亦欲東來, 名爲屯田, 而實欲殘害。乃以小邦之所難堪者, 多般乞請。萬一朝廷聽從其言, 則彼必恣行侵害, 靡所不至, 小邦人民, 殆無孑遺矣。小邦今已欽奉詔旨所諭資糧事, 已差遣諸道勸農使, 盡力措辦, 伏望諸相公, 善爲敷奏, 以遏奸人屯田之請。”

⁷⁵ YS.191.4355: 元初風氣質實, 與漢初相似。世祖始立各道勸農使, 又用五事課守令, 以勸農繫其銜。故當是時, 良吏班班可見, 亦寬厚之效也。然自中世以後, 循良之政, 史氏缺於紀載。今據其事蹟之可取者, 作良吏傳。

⁷⁶ KS.28 世家 卷第二十八 > 忠烈王 卽位年 > 12 月: 十二月 乙巳 遣判閣門事李信孫, 將軍高天伯如元, 賀正, 又付別箋以奏曰, “小邦, 自來分遣州郡守令, 勸課農桑, 又令諸道按察使, 督察播收之事。比來連年, 供給官軍, 民頗凋弊。今若上國, 又遣諸道勸農使, 則予遣之民, 供給元來貢賦者, 幾何, 應副勸農之命者幾何? 猶有國名, 想於聖意, 謂不至此, 所恨, 三韓之地, 未得一經天眼, 謂臣誣妄。乞遣剛明重實之臣, 審其虛實, 而以勸農之事, 一委於臣。臣將率籲百姓, 課其勤怠, 以副聖上憂民之意。”

build ships for the Song and Japan campaigns. However, Wonjong demurred and was consequently subjected to a blunt missive in 1268 delineating the Six Duties of a vassal state under the Mongol aegis: supply troops and food two among them. Again the Koryo sovereign stalled. This reluctance to fulfill Quabilai's requests was most likely due an awareness of the huge cost in human and natural resources it would entail after nearly four decades of warfare. Wonjong's envoy Li Cangyong articulated the Koryo position, whose anxieties were summarily dismissed by Qubilai. Li relented and Yuan officers were sent to Koryo to oversee preparations. The original requisition was for 1000 large blue-water naval vessels of 3-4000 seok capacity (Henthorn 1963, 208). A Mongol overseer Toqto'a was sent to inspect Huksan Island and T'amna (Jeju) Island as places for construction. In the seventh month of 1268 Jeju was ordered to construct 100 warships alone,⁷⁷ yet in 1274 this number seems to have been raised to 300.⁷⁸ The Rebellion of the Three Patrols interrupted this naval buildup and was notable for its naval engagements as it stretched from Jin Island to T'amna. The Mongol-Koryo navy, though ultimately successful in putting down the rebellion, lost 132 ships in total to naval action and storms (Henthorn 1963, 208-9). It is estimated that between 700-900 ships of Korean make set out for the first ill-fated invasion of Japan in November 1274 (Sasaki 2015, 25-26). The failure of the 1274 invasion prompted Qubilai to order

immediate preparations for a second in 1281. The Koryo king's readiness report given in person in Daidu on the eve of battle indicated that 900 warships had been mustered (Lo 2013, 264-266). It serves to reason that Koryo constructed all these ships in the same locales in Jeolla and Jeju (Henthorn 1963, 223; Lo 2013, 264). If we take the total of both fleets, that would be a stupendous 1800 ships, yet probably a misleading total since many Koryo ships returned from the first expedition and were presumably refitted.

Where did the wood for these ships come from? How much wood would have been required? The latter is hard to estimate, but it must have been considerable. Koryo-era ships were built with very substantial timbers. Though ships were no more than 20x7m, the internal strength of the vessels came from heavy bottom and side planking. Through beams could range from 12x4-8cm to a heftier 30x30cm, while bottom planks could measure as much 50x30cm. This allowed a much greater cargo capacity and crew complement than contemporary Western ships (Sasaki 2015, 38). Though in the first invasion, the 900 or so vessels were a mix of water transport and combat craft, the second invasion seems to have contained only combat craft and constituted the main flotilla, and thus would have been more robust in their build. Qubilai even commented at one point that southern Chinese vessels though large, were no match for their sturdy Korean counterparts (Sasaki

⁷⁷ YS: 6.111:

詔遣都統領脫朵兒往閱之，就相視黑山日本道路，仍命耽羅別造船百艘以伺調用。

⁷⁸ KS 卷二十七 > 世家 卷第二十七 > 元宗 15年 > 4 月: 小邦地褊人稀，兵農無別，加以凋殘已甚。

故往者，耽羅赴征兵卒·蒿師，今又悉赴造船之役，今東征兵卒·梢工，亦當就向件役槩而調出耳，洪茶丘移書金方慶云，‘船三百隻，梢工水手一萬五千人，預先備之。’其數甚多，豈可止用小邦人而足矣？

2015, 53).⁷⁹ 900 Koryo ships carried between 57-65,000 troops in the first expedition (Sasaki 2015, 55). Many of the Koryo ships escaped disaster and returned in 1281. Archaeological excavations revealed a preponderance of Chinese-constructed fir and camphor built ships, rather than the Korean pine among the casualties. This is commensurate with the documentary archive and a testament to the Koryo fleets durable construction. (Sasaki 2015, 91) Moreover, evidence from timbers recovered indicates that shipwrights were using top quality sylvan specimens and not lower quality timbers as one would expect in a case of already stressed forests. This would seem to indicate two Koryo fleets of robust ships were built and maintained with no expense spared in the quality of timbers, making it highly likely that a very substantial amount of sylvan resources were utilized (Sasaki 2015, 118-9, 142-6).

A number of colonial organelles were mobilized to construct the ships. One of the primary purpose's of the military colonies 屯田 was to build ships. A clue to their location is found in an exposition recorded in 1388 on developing coastal areas. The author argues that military colonies could be established by naval myriarchs or circuit commanders. They are clearly useful in building warships and countering the perennial threat of piracy and bandits, while

also pacifying the populace of the area. They could further be provisioned with agricultural fields established on islands. Thus, one could deduce that these earlier colonies were indeed located in coastal areas or adjacent islands of Jeolla or Jeju.⁸⁰ A supervisory bureau for the construction of warships and the provisioning of troops was also established in 1272 called *chonham pyongnyang togam* 戰艦兵糧都監.⁸¹ This all indicates that a sophisticated system for exploiting forest resources in Jeolla and Jeju was established by the 1270s for the first invasion of Japan.

Actual documentary evidence for denuding the slopes of Jeolla or Jeju is, however, in short supply. One passage in the *Koryosa* does speak to massive deforestation in Jeolla. An army of woodcutters in the winter months of 1273-4 was mobilized to build 300 ships recently ordered. The Korean general Kim Panggyong, tasked to lead the Korean contingent in the first expedition, conscripted a force of some 30,500 shipwrights, carpenters, caulkers, riggers, and sailmakers to build the ships.⁸² These particular woodcutters were most likely clearing areas in Haenam and Byeonsan, places that were later protected from private exploitation and supplied the Choson navy with timbers.⁸³ Jeju's transition to a more forested environment in MWP as noted above, as well as its harbours, made it an

⁷⁹ Quoted Ota from YS

⁸⁰ KS:82 卷八十二 > 志 卷,第三十六 > 兵 二水軍萬戶, 各道元帥, 能立屯田, 能修戰艦, 能結人心, 能施號令, 能滅賊, 能安邊者, 賜之島田, 世食其入, 傳之子孫, 其失一城堡, 一州郡者, 軍法從事, 毋得輕有, 以示勸懲

⁸¹ KS:27 卷二十七 > 世家 卷第二十七 > 元宗 13年 > 2 月甲辰 置戰艦兵糧都監, 又置鈿函造成都監, 以皇后欲盛藏經而求之也。

⁸² KS:27: 世家 卷第二十七 > 元宗 15年 > 2 月

⁸³ Bibyeonsa Teunglok 17.8.24: “禁松”; Lee, *Protect the Pines*, 60.

ideal place to source timber and build ships. In the passage noting General Kim's preparations for the first expedition, the Koryosa notes how shipbuilding was underway on Jeju and closely linked to the military colony which is mentioned in one breath with the shipbuilders.⁸⁴ For the second expedition to Japan, Qubilai personally ordered the expedited construction of warships using timber from Jeju island.⁸⁵ Current studies on the spatial distribution of old growth forest on the island indicate it still retains signs of logging at easily accessible points. Much older trees are absent and afforestation project stands are in evidence. Researchers suspect that such anthropogenic disturbances took hundreds of years to accumulate (Shin 2017, 1-12).

Ginseng Cultivation

Another key aspect of changing environments and ecologies is the beginning of large-scale ginseng cultivation. Though there has been much more interest in the ginseng trade and its cultivation during the Choson period, most experts agree that cultivation itself started during early Koryo. Knowledge of Korean ginseng and its popularity abroad preceded the Mongol period, but it was only after submission to the Mongols in 1259 that its popularity and

demand surged to unprecedented heights. A notable encounter in 1277 between a chess-champion Cho Yun-tong and Qubilai underlined the importance of Korean ginseng to the Mongol ruling strata. Qubilai notes that Cho's homeland is famous for ginseng. Cho immediately picks up on the emperor's hint and assures Qubilai that if he were put in charge of procurement, there would no lack of good ginseng. Qubilai's takes him up on his offer and appoints him the imperial procurement official for ginseng in Koryo.⁸⁶ Though King Chungnyeol and his officials opposed the subsequent direct exploitation of ginseng that undermined its use as a royal tax item, the Chinggisid royal house was involved in the blossoming ginseng trade with the Yuan Empire.⁸⁷ Chungnyeol's Mongol Queen, Qubilai's daughter, according the Koryo-sa was intimately involved in collecting and selling ginseng.⁸⁸ We can assume this was on the international market as a poem by the literati official An Sok describes how ginseng was exported *en masse* to the farthest reaches of the Mongol realm (Suh et al. 2011, 5331-5336).

We know from contemporary *materia medica* and cookbooks that Korean ginseng became fused not just with Chinese medicinal culture, but with the hybrid

⁸⁴ KS:27世家 卷第二十七 > 元宗 15年 > 2 月: 又於至元十年十二月, 奉省旨, 濟州百姓一萬二百二十三人, 悉行供給, 又比來軍馬糧料, 無可營辦, 凡斂官民者無算. 又年前, 營造戰艦, 至四月, 大軍入耽羅討賊, 至五月晦還, 故百姓未得趁時耕作, 秋無收穫, 又斂官民, 始應副造船契匠及屯住經行軍馬, 與濟州百姓等糧料, 計四萬餘碩.

⁸⁵ YS:11.224: 造船三千艘, 敕耽羅發材木給之.

⁸⁶ KSJY.19 > 忠烈王一 > 忠烈王 三年 > 4 月: 中郎將曹允通還自元. 初, 以善棋被召, 帝謂曰, “世傳, 人參出汝國者, 甚佳. 汝能爲朕致之乎.” 對曰, “若使臣採之, 歲可得數百斤.” 帝命遣之. 自是, 允通歲巡州郡, 發民採參, 或小有朽敗, 或非地產, 而未及納期, 輒徵銀幣, 以營私利. 民甚苦之.

⁸⁷ It was a local tribute item from at least 1036. KS.6: 靖宗 2年 > 7 月.

⁸⁸ KSJY.21: 忠烈王三 > 忠烈王 二十一年 > 7 月: 公主遣宦官諸道, 求人參松子. 先是, 公主科斂人參松子, 送江南買賣, 甚獲利. 故特遣內臣, 雖不產之地, 悉皆徵納, 民多怨咨.

Eurasian cuisine that flourished under the *Pax Mongolica*. In the Yuan, numerous medical books exclusively prescribe Korean ginseng (referred to as Silla Ginseng or Koryo Ginseng) as opposed to the more common Chinese varieties. *Yinshanzhengyao* details dishes for the imperial elite specifically requires Korean ginseng at a number of points for restorative food items (Buell et al. 2000). Indeed, the Koryosa and Koryosajeolyo record seven instances of tribute ginseng being submitted to the Yuan court between 1279 and 1358.

With such a high demand for ginseng abroad, ginseng collection and cultivation intensified in Koryo. Here we return to the case of Cho. In memorials castigating Cho and requiring his removal, his method for supplying the voracious appetite for ginseng is described. Armed with imperial authority and the *carte blanche* to use the postal relay system as he saw fit, Cho had gone around the country requiring ordinary individuals to submit ginseng. The memorial notes that though ginseng grows in the northern reaches of the realm, the center and south were not the plant's native habitat.⁸⁹ Cho seems to have been forcing peasants to grow ginseng in other parts of the country. Where might this ginseng have been grown? We know that ginseng can be field-cultivated or forest-cultivated. Forest and agricultural ecologies were largely disturbed and destroyed in the second half of the thirteenth century. Yet, this may have provided an opportunity as it

opened up areas previously inaccessible to human exploitation. Ginseng could fit into this pattern as it can be cultivated in forest ecologies accessible to humans: saplings are started in a controlled environment and then transplanted to the forest floor: the shading and protection thus gained reduce the labour otherwise required in field cultivation (Suh et al. 2011, 5331-5336). Whether field or forest cultivation the human ecological dislocation might have provided a key opportunity to give ginseng cultivation a more enduring foothold. Koryo was also a time when forest ecologies were awarded as prebends, especially around the capital, for service to the state. The concomitant increase in landless tenants might have provided the perfect opportunity for landlords to force tenants into ginseng cultivation there. However, the specifics, admittedly, are conjecture.

The outline of this hypothesis seems to be supported by a report submitted by a "court favourite" named Yeong Bugeum in 1343. Chunghye sent Yeong Bugeum on mission to Kangneung province (Kangwon) to collect ginseng in the spring of that year. Yeong discovers that the ginseng in Kangneung is expensive and in short supply, so collects other taxes and returns for fear of being punished by the king. This is a telling incident, since it points first to the involvement of the royal house in the ginseng trade: Yeong's note of the price of ginseng speaks to the fact he was sent to purchase it,

⁸⁹ KS.123: 列傳 卷第三十六 > 嬖幸: 曹允通, 耽津縣人。以碁知名, 又善玄鶴琴, 所製別調行於世。元世祖召, 與南人善碁者試之, 允通輒勝, 帝許乘傳隨意往來。忠烈時, 遣使召允通挈家入朝。帝問曰, "世傳, 人參產汝國者嘉, 汝能爲朕致乎?" 對曰, "臣若管其事, 歲可得數百斤。" 帝賜傳遣之。自

是, 允通歲巡州郡, 發民採之。或小有朽敗, 或非地產, 未及期者, 輒徵銀幣, 以營私利, 民甚苦之。王遣張舜龍奏曰, "曹允通奉聖旨, 採人參, 人參唯產東北界, 允通強令諸道民, 就產處採納。臣請隨所產處, 以時採貢。" 帝又命允通, 管東界鷹坊, 王亦賜紅鞵。官至贊成事致仕卒。

not exact it as a levy. He opts, after all, to collect other taxes to defray the ire of Chunghye.⁹⁰ It seems that Chunghye was continuing Queen Jangmok's commercial interests. Second, this is the first specific mention of ginseng being grown in the Kangneung area in the official records and implies the spread of ginseng cultivation to that area of Koryo. An's poem on the exploitation of commoners in the ginseng trade also points to this sort of forest cultivation. He specifically mentions picking ginseng in mountain valleys, and later points to the selection and planting of roots in distant places. One could infer then that forest cultivation must have been common then in the peninsula for An to make such a comment (하응백 2022, 13-37). However, as with other forest products, like pine seeds, this was far from lucrative or preferable work for commoners. Yet, the international trade in Korean ginseng was: *Nogeoldae* a fourteenth century Korean textbook that teaches commercial travelers Chinese has the Korean merchant protagonist take a large quantity of ginseng to Daidu to trade (Wang 2005, 28-30). Despite woefully little evidence, What we can say definitively, is Mongol invasion and Koryo incorporation into the larger imperial economy increased demand. That pushed more people to collect, grow and export ginseng, including the royal house. This also contextualizes the abundant sources left from Choson that ginseng became a cultivated plant so omnipresent that

it served as a form of currency in commercial interactions in northeast Asia (Kim 2017).

1391 and the Fall of Koryo

Ultimately, the fall of the royal house cannot be removed from ecological and climatic factors. The *coup de grace* was the penultimate year of the Koryo kingdom, 1391 when drought and flooding caused famine and disease. Yet, as the Koryo records often point out particular socio-political catastrophes were built of multi-year cycles of disastrous climate change. Despite, the long lead-up, no other year before 1391 in the Koryo official histories has more entries for drought.⁹¹ The king pardoned all criminals in two rounds in late spring and summer to placate heaven; alcohol was banned to conserve the precious little grain to be harvested. Yet, even these earnest acts of supplication were no match for the confluence of drought, flooding, famine, disease, pestilence and rebellion the royal government faced. These events according to one official were annual catastrophes, terrible portents that required larger moral and political reform.⁹² More importantly, they coincided with unseasonal weather events, like summer frost. It was against this backdrop that Yi Songgye made his fateful decision to cross the Yalu and overthrow the government. This provides a crucial corrective to the largely political narratives that explain to fall of Koryo in terms of socio-political decay and

⁹⁰ KS.124: 列傳 卷第三十七 > 嬖幸: 嬖人竊夫金使江陵道, 索人參, 參貴所得少. 懼王罪己, 擅徵職稅, 還說王曰, “臣往江陵, 見朝士退居鄉里病民者衆, 臣徵其職稅, 藏州郡以待上命. 朝士居外者, 非獨江陵, 五道皆然, 若從臣計, 有利於國.”

⁹¹ KS.46 世家 卷第四十六 > 恭讓王 3 年 > 9 月: 今年水旱霜雹之灾, 飢饉疾疫之患並起,

又有貢馬萬匹之命, 使中外騷然, 加之以蕞城開河之役, 民之憔悴, 莫甚於今日. See for instance, John B. Duncan and David Robinson in English.

⁹² KSJY.35 > 恭讓王二 > 恭讓王 三年 > 5 月故邪氣凝而陰陽失道, 夏霜殺草, 日食星變風雹水旱無歲無之, 天之示警至矣.

geopolitical turmoil (Duncan 2000, 154-203). As Brook points out for the Yuan, the fall of Koryo was multi-faceted and cannot discount climate (Brook 2010).

One then can draw a number of conclusions from this initial foray into the confluence of imperialism and climate change in Koryo. Climate transition both fed into the Mongols imperial expansion and designs for the conquest of East Asia. Yet, the fact that very period of conquest coincided with climate and ecological change on the Korean peninsula compounded the socio-economic and ecological dislocation that resulted. Agro-ecologies were destroyed, recovered and newly created. Though it is tempting to draw the conclusion that Mongol imperialism drained too much and contributed to the collapse of the kingdom in terms of ecologies, the evidence points rather to the long-term pressures of climate transition as being a causal factor in the kingdom's decline. It might not have been a necessary factor, given the geopolitical situation of the late fourteenth century, but it was undeniably a compounding one. More research is certainly required to flesh out how climate, particularly on a regional level, operated in the turbulent times of the Mongol period. Yet, this approach serves to bring Koryo into larger discussions of how climate transition merged with political factors in historical change across the globe in the transition from the MWP to LIA and the role of anthropogenic imperialism therein.

Both 고려사 and 고려사절요 can be found digitized on the official website of the National Institute of History (국사편찬위원회): <http://db.history.go.kr/KOREA/>

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Making Koreans Through Emigration: Transnational Adoption and Agricultural Emigration to Latin America During the Park Chung-Hee Administration

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Introduction

“The military coup d’etat was ... a surgery to remove all the illegalness of the past in one. move...it is too late to use moxa cautery or medication to completely heal our nations from the pathogens gnawing upon it ().⁹³

This paper analyzes two sets of emigration policies utilized by the Park Chung-hee administration, agricultural emigration to Latin America and transnational adoption to reveal the nature of Korean-making through emigration policy of the Park Chung-hee administration. At first sight, the two policies have few aspects in common. While agricultural emigration to Latin America was voluntary, and required willing emigrants and often the Korean government, in terms of settlement subsidies, to pay a great sum of money from the process, transnational adoption was conducted through civilian adoption agencies which received a great sum of money from adoptive parents,

involuntary, and devoid of agency of the adoptees themselves in the process. Yet, both policies were established in the beginning of the administration, faced criticism in the 1970s, curbed in response to the criticism, yet resumed in an even greater force in the regime that followed the Park dictatorship. Thus, a comparative analysis of the decision-making process of the two policies reveals the common strategy of nation-making through emigration of the Park regime that existed across a spectrum of emigration policies of the state.

Analysis of government documents produced during this period reveal that a similar logic of developmental citizenship is

⁹³ Chung-hee Park, *Uri Minjogui Nagal Gil* [Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction] (Seoul: Kiparang, 2017), 142. Here on the quotes from four books written by Park are the author's translations of the series published in 2017 by Kiparang. The title and original year published are as follows:

Uri Minjogui Nagal Gil [Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction] (1962)

Gukgawa Hyeokmyeonggwa Na [The Country, The Revolution, and I] (1963)

Minjogui Jeoryeok [To Build a Nation] (1971)

Minjok Junghungui Gil [Korean Reborn: A Model for Development] (1978).

used in the discussion of both agricultural emigration and transnational adoption policies. The government, drawing from the prejudices inherent in the society, reconstructs the notion of citizenship to distinguish those who contribute to the modernizing nation from those who do not. As the country develops and the state realizes the growing need to adhere to international norms in the 1970s, both state-led emigration policies are pressured to revision. In fact, as the Korean immigrants were often the only few sources for the receiving state to understand the Korean state and the people, the fact that the South Korean state used emigration to rid of its problematic population becomes the pivotal reason that the international society comes to view the Korean emigration policies as problematic. Yet, the adjustments made by the Korean state to address the criticism from the international society are only superficial, and do not entail a fundamental reconsideration of the emigrants as Koreans suitable for the developmental state. Therefore, with minimal change in conditions in favor of the emigration policy, the Korean state recontinued the same, quality-based emigration policies, with an even larger force in the 1980s.

Literature Review: Creating the nation through diaspora

Existing studies of diaspora and citizenship focus on the impact of the experience of diaspora on the identity formation on the diasporic population (Delano and Gamlen 2014; Bruabaker 2005; Delano and Mylonas 2019; Troyakova and Tracy 2018; E. Chung 2010). Such formation of identity through diaspora is understood in

tandem with strategies of nation-building in the host or receiving countries through their immigration incorporation policies (Pakhomov 2012; J. Kang 2008). The diaspora of a population not only impacts the diasporic population's understanding of the nation, but also impacts the host country's definition of its own nation through its interaction with the foreign other, the diaspora. Jaeun Kim (2014) describes how the Korean migration to Manchuria during Japanese colonial empire created and problematized both Chinese and Japanese definition of citizenship and nationhood. Likewise, Angie Chung (2007) outlines the gradual process through which the Korean diasporic population in Los Angeles, not only shaped the geopolitical racial configuration of the area, but also resulted in the unique political strategies of the local politicians.

In the last few decades, a new trend in diaspora studies have focused on the return migration of diasporic populations (H. Lee 2005; Saveliev 2010; H. Choo 2006), which has been possible through innovations in transport and communication technologies, increased mobility due to the fall of the Soviet Union and resulting thawing of political restrictions in movement, and the increased interest in economic opportunities made possible by neoliberal economic structure. As such, research in diaspora and citizenship have turned towards understanding the impact of diaspora and especially the diasporic return in the imagination of nationhood from the country of departure (Brubaker 2005; Chung et al 2020). Erin Chung et al (2020), for instance, shows how the Korean government's efforts to exclude from national visas to those from post-Soviet or communist states have led to a hierarchy of diasporic population in South

Korea. Under the hierarchical visa regime, those who the Korean government, striving to recover from the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, believed will contribute financially to the motherland, such as those from North America, were favored, and those who the government believed were to be low-skilled labor, were denied. Other research also underscores how the policies and motivations of the government in the country of departure regarding its diasporic population create and shape diasporic identity (J. Kang 2008; H. Kim 2018; Freilich 2016; J. Won 2020). Another strand of research reveals an insight on how the diaspora or diasporic return challenges and reinforces the imagination of the national identity on the non-diasporic population of the country (N. Kim 2008; Park and Chang 2005; H. Choo 2006; J. Lee 2015). By focusing on those remaining, such studies allow the analysis of the impact of the diaspora in a broader sense, on those that neither receive the population in the host country, nor the diaspora themselves.

Despite this recent turn towards the impact on the sending country's identity formation through its diaspora, however, few studies focus on the motivations and the strategies of the sending states in terms of creating its national identity (J. Kim 2014). This is a gap in literature, because there already exists significant research that shed light into other types of nation-making strategies wielded by states, such as their laws on family and patriarchy, military service, or industrial reformation (D. Kim 2010). Although literature do mention the role of diaspora in problematizing such strategies of the state (J. Kim 2014, M. Kim 2014; Brubaker 2010), the emigration policies that are used by the state for the goals

are missing. Michael Kim (2014) describes how the unreported migration of Koreans, among other reasons, undermined the Japanese colonial empire's efforts to define the Koreans.

On the other hand, most literature that studies the formulation of emigration policies by the states are mostly focused on the states' motivations in terms of economic development (J. Song 2019). Jung-mi Hwang (2018) is one of few attempts that analyzes the emigration policies of the Park regime in terms of its ideas of developmental citizenship, by analyzing the gendered typologies of emigration that was reinforced by the state and embodied by the migrants. Thus, this study builds on the literature on diaspora and citizenship strategies of the state, to show how the sending state shapes its nationhood through diasporic policies, and in turn how such strategies impact the identity of the diasporic population.

Economic modernization and exclusion of problematic population

From the beginning of its establishment via coup d'état in 1961, the Park Chung-hee military junta pursued modernization as a key goal of the regime (J. Kang 2012; D. Kim 2010). For Park, modernization was achieved through economic development. In his 1971 autobiography, *To Build a Nation*, Park clearly underlines this priority: "Only after (the people) are fed and kept alive, there will be politics, the freedom to enjoy culture, and

the development of the society.”¹ Park also spends a significant portion of *Our Nation's Path* in 1962 on the inevitable priority of economic development for democratization. To Park, such priority is unavoidable, and only in countries that establish economic development will democracy be rooted successfully.² Furthermore, in the book, Park states that the military coup d'état was a “surgery to remove all the illegalness of the past in one move,” because “it is too late to use moxa cautery or medication to completely heal our nation from the pathogens gnawing upon it.”³ Following this statement, surgical removal of what was deemed as problematic for the nation, be it immaterial statistics such as poverty and pre-modernity, or people such as the unemployed or orphans, became a key aspect of the Park regime.

An important feature of economic modernization was population control. The Korean government viewed the rapid increase of population as not only a threat to the sustainability of the developing nation but also as a result of pre-modern, unhygienic reproductive practices (A. Sohn 2013). Such a view was in tandem with those of the larger post-war international society: the UN, IMF, and CIA simultaneously tackled the high population growth rate of developing countries in a quest for “reproductive Westernization” with the fear that overpopulation and poverty in third world countries will lead to communism (E. Cho 2018). Under this goal, the Korean government took various measures to limit

population growth in Korea such as birth control, massive emigration and limiting immigration of Korean descendants overseas.

Population control for the Park administration did not only mean control in quantity, but also quality. Modern migration control has been associated with the state's definition of social citizenship, such as developmental, familial, or responsible citizenship discourses that have real implications on policy and understanding of a population (Brubaker 2010; Bloemraad et al 2019; J. Lee 2015; K. Chang 2018) For instance, according to Chang Kyung-Sup, Korean society was structured under ‘familial liberalism,’ which meant that those excluded were primarily outside of the modern family structure of a working father, a motherly mother, and one or two children (K. Chang 2018).⁴

In fact, as the administration's modernization was essentially modernization through “surgical removal” of the pre-modern, in the case of population control, the government sought to remove pre-modern reproductive practices and family structures. Slogans for family planning in the 1960s, such as “Blindly laying babies will lead to inevitable poverty,” or “Have the perfect number of children and raise them well” define the family structures in the status quo as ‘not perfect’ and barbaric, and that which must be eliminated to achieve modernization. Park also argued that “to establish a healthy and mutually helpful society, there must first

¹ Park, *Minjogui Jeoryeok* (1971).

² Park, *Uri Minjogui Nagal Gil*, 162-166.

³ Park, 148.

⁴ Park Chung-hee also underlines that “the youth should also hone the ability to earn their living in their future and realize their responsibility to the society,” in *Uri Minjogui Nagal Gil*, 197

be a righteous and steady family culture”⁵ Indeed in 1962, at the early stages of the regime, the state passed a new family law to normalize the patriarchal small or nuclear family as the modernized Korean family (H. Kim 2015).

Massive, government-led immigration policy was one way the Park administration quantitatively and qualitatively controlled its population. A review of immigration policy published on February 18, 1971, for instance, writes that immigration was a means “to gain foreign capital or an outlet to relieve the overpopulation,” and further argues that the state was also “motivated to homogenize the people’s conscience by providing an escape for pessimistic and passive individuals.”⁶ Those who did not contribute to modernization were labeled as unfit, pushed out of the country, and denied social citizenship despite being Korean citizens by law. For instance, despite being Korean citizens according to the Family Registration Act, biracial children were labeled ‘mixed-blood and were exempted from the mandatory military service if they looked distinctly “foreign” and denied social citizenship in the society that defined men as those who completed military service.

Developmental citizenship at work: creation of the system of transnational adoption

This section analyzes the logic of developmental citizenship underlying the formulation and practice of transnational adoption from South Korea. During the two decades of the Park Chung-hee regime,

orphans not part of a ‘normal’ family were unwanted in the Korean society and massively adopted overseas. The number of children transnationally adopted each year increased from 254 in 1961 to 6,597 when it peaked in 1975. Transnational adoption began unofficially in 1955 and was codified into law via “Inter-country adoption law with regard to the orphans” in September 1961. Transnational adoption was legalized with the “Inter-country adoption law with regard to the orphans” on September 20, 1961. The law was revised on February 23, 1966. The codification and revision of the adoption law and the discussion process reveals that the government discriminated the population according to their contribution to the modernizing nation and attempted to evade its responsibility to provide social welfare, passing on such duty to adoption agencies by exchanging social welfare provision and rights to monopoly.

First, behind the adoption law in the 1960s was the discrimination and exclusion of those denied social citizenship in the developmental society. As seen in Table 1 below, the majority of children adopted overseas up to 1966 were biracial or disabled. The Korean War (1950-1953) resulted in numerous casualties and left many children in need in Korea, including biracial children, especially those born between UN forces and Korean women, as well as orphans of war and children abandoned. For the Park administration which emphasized economic modernization, children between Korean women and UN forces were also problematic because they reflected fact that Korea was reliant militarily and economically on the

⁵ Park, 195.

⁶ *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, Feb. 18, 1971.

United States. For Korean society, they also challenged the notion of a normal, patriarchal, and homogeneous Korean family. For instance, an article in 1965 describes biracial children as proof of the infidelity of Korean women: “War makes women lonely, and such loneliness prompts women to lay sad seeds.”⁷

Table 1 Composition of Adoptees: Biracial, Disabled, and Gender

Year	Biracial	Disabled	Total	Male	Female
1958~60	1,159 (45.8%)	1,588 (62.7%)	2,532	734	1,798
1961~70	2,659 (36.5%)	2,064 (28.4%)	7,275	2254	5,021
1971~80		4,598 (9.5%)	48,247	17320	30,927
1981~90		16,378 (25.1%)	65,321	30460	34,861
1991~2000		8,987 (40.6%)	22,129	12009	10,129

Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2017

The addition of the non-disclosure article in the 1966 revision of the law cites the public opinion that considers biracial children and other children in need as shameful as the reason transnational adoptions need to be confidential and therefore simplified. When asked if it wouldn't be shameful if the transnational adoptions were seen as exporting orphans, the Vice Minister of Health and Welfare, out of nowhere, responded with the statement, “I partially agree with the question of national shame. That the Korean race would meld with a foreign person and have a child that is not homogenous is indeed a matter of great shame.”¹⁰¹

However, from as early as the 1960s, the majority of children sent overseas were not biracial or disabled, but those from

impoverished families, single mothers, or those left without a guardian due to the dissolution of the family. In other words, the removal of social citizenship as symbolized by the transnational adoption of a child evolves in its targets in tandem with Korean society. The change shows that social citizenship was being denied not only to the biracial children who were problematic to the pure-bloodist society but to all children who were not protected in the structure of a ‘normal’, modernized family – in essence, without a father. A newspaper article quoting a prominent social worker in 1970 complains, for instance, “Unlike Korean War orphans, who, despite being orphaned by war, surely had parents and a family, orphans nowadays are mostly runaways or real orphans, and thus qualitatively lacking.”¹⁰²

⁷ *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May. 1, 1965.

¹⁰² *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, Jun. 24, 1970.

¹⁰¹ National Assembly Minutes (6th Assembly, 48th, 1st Health and Welfare Committee, 1965. 3. 3), National Assembly Bill Information System.

The government evaded the responsibility to provide welfare to those denied social citizenship and not contributing to modernization. From 1961 to 1966, for example, there were 7,300 children abandoned each year and an average of 50,000 to 70,000 children in facilities around the nation. Yet the government only provided 25% of the revenue for such facilities, leaving them to rely over half of its operations upon foreign aid and the rest from donations.¹⁰³ The adoption law in 1961, was designed to simplify transnational adoption so that fewer children needed welfare provision in Korea and to manage the “business” that brings foreign capital. As this was the case, the discussants in the Ministry actively prevented clauses directly related to child welfare, such as prevention against sending children who were not orphans up for adoption disguised as one, or parents falsely adopting children to abuse them or exploit their labor. To a discussant’s criticism that the law does not mention punishment for human trafficking or illegal adoption, the Vice Minister simply answers that they are sure that “there haven’t been cases of abuse ...and there will not be such cases in the future” and that the U.S. has strict welfare laws to prevent such crimes. When pointed out that simply saying there will not be cases of abuse doesn’t make it true, the Vice Minister promises that “we will study it from now on,” evading the issue of false adoption or child abuse by passing on the issue to other

agencies, the U.S., or by saying they will further study the issue.¹⁰⁴

In the turn of the latter decade of the regime, however, the global reception of transnational adoption turned sour, and the confidence of the Park administration in the international society peaked, resulting in a modification of the transnational adoption policy. As a result, the government attempted to limit and control transnational adoption by temporarily suspending adoption to Northern European countries¹⁰⁵ in 1970 and again in 1974, and by passing a new law promoting domestic adoption in 1976. However, both attempts ultimately fail to curb transnational adoption, as the modification of the policy did not entail a fundamental reimagination of the adoptees as developmental citizens and was only aimed to avoid international scrutiny.

As South Korea developed economically in the 1970s, the increased confidence of the Park administration led the state to turn its eyes towards its national image and also extend its influence over Korean nationals abroad. This new confidence meant that Korea could now face the international society with pride. Park Chung-hee’s diary on November 6, 1975, reads, “It is clear that our people changed a lot in recent years. They developed confidence and pride, and are confident that we can stand shoulder to shoulder as a developed country.”¹⁰⁶ Koreans readily

¹⁰³ *Dong-A Ilbo*, Jan. 10, 1969; *Maeil Business*, Feb. 22, 1969; *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, Jun. 24, 1970.

¹⁰⁴ National Assembly Minutes (6th Assembly, 48th, 5th Health and Welfare Committee, 1965. 3. 15), National Assembly Bill Information System.

¹⁰⁵ Although Netherland, Belgium, and Switzerland are not a part of Northern Europe, the term Northern Europe is used in this paper to refer to all six countries subject to suspension as it was the term Korean primary sources used during this period.

¹⁰⁶ Chung-hee Park’s diary, Nov. 6, 1975.

embraced such logic as well. For instance, Professor Song Yo-in in 1968 argued that as “Korea has become an adult,” it should stop transnational adoption because it was harming “the favorable image Korea is receiving in the U.S. due to economic development and deployment to Vietnam.”¹⁰⁷

With this newfound confidence, South Korea began to curb practices that would harm Korea’s image to the outside world. In February 1975, Park Chung-hee addressed the Ministry of Health and Welfare to prioritize domestic adoption of orphans, because, primarily, “Now that we have expanded our national power, we have the ability to resolve the problems of orphans within the country.”¹⁰⁸ As a result, the Adoption Agency Business Guideline in 1975 was edited to require that “Agencies engaged in transnational adoption are obliged to conduct domestic adoption and protection projects. Transnational adoption must be conducted within the target number. No new transnational adoption agencies will be given permits,” thereby requiring domestic adoption and limiting the number of adoption agencies and transnational

adoption.¹⁰⁹

In 1976, the Special Adoption Act replaced the Inter-country adoption law with regard to the orphans of 1961. After the Special Adoption Act was passed, the number of Koreans adopted overseas each year decreased from 6,597 to 4,148 in three years. However, in the 1980s the number began to rise exponentially, peaking in 1986 when 8,837 babies were adopted abroad. The five-year plan to abort transnational adoption that the Park administration began was also soon abandoned. In essence, all attempts by the Park government to curb transnational adoption in the 1970s, from the suspension of adoption to Europe to the five-year plan all ended without fruition. This is a stark contrast to how other population policies enacted by the government, such as emigration policy or birth control were extremely successful.

The Park Chung-hee regime’s attempts to control transnational adoption in the 1970s failed because such policies were driven to avoid the criticism from international scrutiny and did not intend to deconstruct the system of transnational adoption upheld by the Korean government, adoption agencies,

¹⁰⁷ Yoin Song, “Mendicant Mentality,” *The Korean Herald*, Jan 23, 1968, cited from Jane Jeong Trenka, “A Million Living Ghosts: Structural Violence, Social Death and International Adoption from South Korea,” *Journal of Feminist Theories and Practices* 22 (2010): 50.

¹⁰⁸ “Beginning of Year Address by the President (Ministry of Health and Welfare),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012.

Note that the box of primary sources used in this paper regarding transnational adoption is Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

“Foreign Affairs Documents 2011-61/84(1981) [electronic]” (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012). However, for clarity and understanding, I have cited in the footnotes the original author (or agency), document title (translated), and date when available. Embassy to Denmark, “Status and Issue of Korean Orphan Adoption” Nov. 9, 1974, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012.

¹⁰⁹ “Adoption Agency Business Guideline 1975,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012.

the Korean society, and the international demand for adoption. The superficiality of the state's efforts to curb transnational adoption is evident from the government documents during this period. For instance, in his address to the Ministry of Health and Welfare in February 1975, Park follows up the point on restricting "the method of massive transnational adoption" with the suggestion that as the Korean people "will be reluctant to take orphans and raise them," that "the orphans would stay at the orphanage and the people can pay for their support and education, and perhaps invite them to their house on holidays or weekends."¹¹⁰ As can be seen in the suggestion, the new turn in policy was not one created with the interests of the children in mind, but only to avoid criticism from the international society. Park also stressed that "foreigners adopting orphans individually is good, but massive adoption should be done with care as there may be malignant propaganda from North Korea," reasoning that transnational adoption is not problematic as long as South Korea can avoid criticism from the international society.¹¹¹ Neither did the 1976 law explicitly limit transnational adoption. The government even gives the reason for drafting the law as "simplifying the adoption process of children in need in facilities," and "fixing the deficiencies in the original law on inter-country adoption to promote domestic and transnational adoption of orphans."¹¹²

What caused the failure to restrict transnational adoption in this period?

¹¹⁰ "Beginning of Year Address," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012.

¹¹¹ *Dong-A Ilbo*, Feb. 17, 1975.

Transnational adoption policy is an example of the developmental state's expulsion or exclusion of problematic population for its economic development and modernization, defined by those not belonging to a modern, patriarchal, and homogeneous Korean family. This idea helped create and foster the system of transnational adoption with the collusion of the Korean society, adoption agencies, and the demand of the international society, creating a system of transnational adoption that would outlive the regime itself.

Exporting excess labor: failure of agricultural emigration to Latin America

Children sent for adoption were not the only group of the population targeted by the state as suitable for expulsion for its goals of modernization through economic development. In fact, state-led, massive emigration was a key feature of the modernization through population strategy of the Park Chung-hee regime. As such, one of the first plans reviewed by the regime was the "Policy for overseas migration (1961)," that would "1) contribute to family planning and address the problem of the yearly increase of population density, and stabilize the national economy 2) also work as a solution to the increasing number of unemployed people," that the country may possibly reap foreign currency and contribute to the future of the humanity if successful.¹¹³ This first law farmers and their families to emigrate to Latin America, beginning with 17 families

¹¹² Bill Draft, "[090541] Special Adoption Act(State)," National Assembly Bill Information System.

¹¹³ "International Immigration Policy (Draft)," Ministry of Social Welfare, 1961.

(91 individuals) who departed for Brazil in December 18, 1962. As such, most evident motivation behind the plans for massive agricultural emigration were to reduce the number of the unemployed in the country.

Unemployment and the unemployed were a threat to the modernizing nation, not only because of their reliance on the state resources, but on a fundamental level, of their symbol as social unrest. In 1962, Park writes, for instance, that “It is clearly evident that the high number of the unemployed results in the current deplorable numbers in national GNP...Poverty and nakedness [of the rural farmlands] have led to all sorts of social crimes, such as theft and murder”.¹¹⁴ Striking in this passage is that unemployed farmers are specifically called out as the roots of social deprivation. Farming symbolized a feudal lifestyle, the key enemy of the state’s modernization. Furthermore, unemployment is not only linked to poverty, but a deprivation of morals in the Park regime. The point is emphasized again in the final pages of the autobiography: “Needless to say, the most difficult issue our society must overcome is the salvation of the countless number of the unemployed. Unemployment is not only a simple waste of resources but brings moral deprivation of the unemployed”.¹¹⁵ As such, sending agricultural emigrants abroad was not only an economic decision, but another method of qualitative population control and eviction of a target population that was unwanted in the Korean society under the goals of

modernization.

The first 91 immigrants that left the port of Busan with much fanfare, landed in the port of San Paulo in 54 days on February 23, 1963. Despite the high hopes, however, immediately upon landing, the immigrants were led straight to an immigration detention facility.¹¹⁶ This first flow of immigrants, however, failed to settle, as the local broker for the immigrants had not secured land for settlement prior to receiving them. Although situation in the state-run refugee camp for the South Koreans was reported to be better than for refugees from within Brazil in the same facility, the “dormitory that resembled a military barrack with rows of beds” was not what would have been expected for the immigrants to arrive at.¹¹⁷

That the Korean state, even aware of such problems from the onset, continued to blindly send emigrants to Latin America, reveals the underlying motivation to simply send unwanted population abroad and avoid the costs associated with them. As early as February 25, 1963, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Health and Welfare summarized to the press that “the government has no responsibility” regarding the failure of the first immigrants to settle in Brazil.¹¹⁸ Despite the state-led nature of the emigration, the Vice Minister claimed in the press conference that “the emigrants left for Brazil according to a contract between Brazil and a private organization, the Organization for Migration, and their settlement is to be determined by the free will. Hence, that the

¹¹⁴ Park, 45

¹¹⁵ Park, 184

¹¹⁶ *Chosun Ilbo*, Feb. 23, 1963.

¹¹⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, Mar. 2, 1963.

¹¹⁸ *Dong-A Ilbo*, Feb. 26, 1963.

state is not responsible.” In the same conference, the Vice Minister added that the second and third flows of emigration were to be conducted without revision, and so unchanged is their plans to send the envoy to Guatemala to negotiate immigration with the state.

The second, third and fourth flow also did not settle in their designated location in San Paulo, as they were in fact not farmers with ability nor motivation to till the farmland, as they were contracted, but educated middle-class with no experience with agriculture who signed up to escape South Korea (G. Kim 2017). As such, the emigrants defied the efforts of both the South Korean and Latin American governments in sending excess agricultural labor from South Korea to Latin America. The government set the requirements for agricultural emigration to Latin America to families that have at least three individuals in the family who are in the working age, between 17 to 50, resulting at least seven hastily adoptions to meet the requirements.¹¹⁹ Moreover, each family was required to be in possession of at least 3,000 dollars (390,000KRW) in 1962, and an additional 283 dollars was needed for each adult (free for babies, a quarter of the price up to age 3, and half up to age 12). As such, only families with at least 400,000 KRW could afford to apply, leading to only middle-class and wealthier families to depart. It was analyzed that “more than half of those who departed in the first round of agricultural emigration graduated from colleges...and the head of household even included one doctor and one oriental doctor.”

This pattern of middle-class escape

under the guise of agricultural emigration continued until 1969, when the Brazilian government outlawed agricultural emigration from South Korea. Despite the ban, however, Koreans continued to migrate to Brazil by entering neighboring countries such as Paraguay or Bolivia as agricultural emigrants and illegally migrating to Brazil, where “they thought the prospect of success was bigger” (S. Lim 2018, 76). Agricultural immigration in other Latin American countries such as Argentina fell out in similar patterns, of recruitment of emigrants unsuitable and inexperienced in farming, lack of information about the area of settlement, and unwillingness or inability of the South Korean state to provide basic agricultural machinery such as tractors (J. Song 2019).

After 15 years of futile attempts to send agricultural emigrants to Latin America, the Park regime halted emigration to Latin America in May 1977. Why did the Korean government finally stop agricultural emigration in this period? As in the case with transnational adoption, the suspension was not intended by the state as a turn of policy to provide social welfare for the unemployed and take care of the population within the country. Instead, the suspension was intended to be a temporary action until the government reviewed its emigration policy. Ever since the first group of settlers landed in San Paulo in 1962, the authoritarian state had maintained the contradictory principle of sending as many people as possible to Latin America as possible while not taking responsibility for the individuals. Therefore, when the government was criticized by the

¹¹⁹ *Chosun Ilbo*, Dec. 6, 1962.

Brazilian embassy in 1975 regarding its plan to send more emigrants to the country, the Korean government grudgingly admitted that the failure of the Koreans to settle reflected poorly on the international image of Korea, an image, as mentioned in the previous section, that the Korean government was increasingly unwilling to taint. Among other issues, the Brazilian embassy disparaged that “in regard to immigration, South Korea does not send talented skilled laborers, and more than 90% of Koreans currently living in Brazil are migrants who are not contributing to the Brazilian economy.”¹²⁰ Thus, to avoid further criticism, the South Korean government suspended emigration to Latin America.

Conclusion: legacies of Park Chung-Hee regime’s emigration policies

Although the trajectory and trends of migration are different for transnational adoptees and state-led agricultural emigrants, the strategy of the Korean government in both policies have striking similarities. In both cases, the emigration targeted a proportion of the Korean population that the authoritarian regime saw as problematic to the modernizing country. For both the children sent for adoption and the unemployed farmers, the state had in mind not only quantitative population control, or reducing as much of the population as possible, but also by qualitative goals, by the removal of the “pathogens” of the society in the modernization and Westernization process of the state. Through the removal, the

state defined the desirable Korean population under its developmental agenda, allowing only the developmental citizens in the territory.

In the 1970s, both practices of removal are problematized in the international society. Transnational adoption was criticized as a practice of “selling babies abroad” while the continued failure of agricultural emigrants to settle finally garnered the attention of the state when the embassies of the receiving states pressured the Korean government on the issue. In both cases, the strategy of the Korean government to deny social citizenship to those unwanted by sending them out of the country through colluding with private agencies, had backlashed. In fact, the same problematic population would often become the first, if not the only, source of understanding of Korea from the point of the people in the receiving states. The Korean adoptees, thus, would become a symbol of South Korea’s poverty and inability to care for its children, and the emigrants in Latin America would be portrayed as evidence of Korean people’s lack of work ethics or skills. Mixed with the Park Chung-hee regime’s increased confidence and aspiration to shape a favorable international image during the détente, such factors forced the administration to review its policies on Latin American emigration and transnational adoption.

A divergence occurs in the revision of the policies in the mid-1970s. While the regime relatively succeeded in curbing emigration to Latin America, primarily due to reduced incentive to migrate to Latin

¹²⁰ “Problem of Immigration and Farmland Purchase in Brazil,”

compiled by the office of the President, Feb. 1, 1975.

America in the 1980s, transnational adoption continued, and even peaked in the decade following the fall of the Park regime. The fundamental break only took a nosedive with the democratization of South Korea in the 1990s, when the state finally began an actual reflection on its expulsion of its unwanted population. Only with the liberalization, did the Korean state finally discover the children in need as Koreans, and design social welfare programs to raise them in Korea.

The Adoption History Project, <https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/index.html>.

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한국사에 있어서의 담론과 반대담론 : 고려시대 지방제도 연구성과와 여러 담론들

최동녕(고려대)

1. 고려시대 지방제도의 운영체제와 특징

918년 태봉의 뒤를 이어 등장한 고려는 각지의 호족세력들을 포섭하고 신라와 후백제 지역을 차지하며, 마침내 936년에 전국을 통일하였다. 오랜 기간 분열되어 온 지역들을 하나의 국가로 통일하게 된 만큼 각지를 다스리기 위한 방편들이 수년간 이어졌다. 새로운 지배질서를 구축하기 위한 노력도 있었지만, 북방에서 세력을 확장해오던 거란의 압박을 대비하기 위한 군사적 방어체계 및 교통·운송체계도 적절히 마련해야만 했다. 매우 복합적인 요소들이 작용하였겠지만 큰 틀에서는 각 지역의 특수성을 고려하면서도, 한편으로는 시기적 추이에 따라 당시대에 적합한 운영체제를 구축하기 위해 대안과 고민들이 꾸준히 모색되어 왔다. 따라서 고려시대 지방제도의 개편과 운영체제의 변화상을 고찰하는 작업은 고려시대의 지역성과 시대성을 복합적으로 이해해야만 하는 과정이라고 할

수 있다.

먼저 지역적인 특수성을 감안한 측면에서는 전국을 경기와 5도 양계로 구분했다는 점을 들 수 있다. 『高麗史』地理志는 권56에서 권58까지 기록되어 있는데, 그중 왕경개성부를 가장 먼저 기재하고 이어서 5도와 양계를 차례대로 서술하고 있다¹. 지리적 위치를 고려하여 기재순서를 정한 것으로, 실질적인 운영체제도 제각기 달랐다. 왕경을 둘러싼 기보 지역은 京畿로 설정하여 왕경을 보호하도록 하였고 (尹武炳 1956; 邊太燮 1971; 朴龍雲 1996; 鄭銀禎 2009; 鄭學洙 2009; 윤경진 2009; 박종진 2012; 박종진 2017; 최은규, 2017), 남쪽에 위치한 南道[5道]는 조세수취의 기능에 집중하도록 하였으며², 북방의 접경지역에 위치한 兩界는 군사적 기능을 담당하도록 하였다 (尹武炳 1953; 末松保和 1956; 이기백 1965; 金南奎 1969; 邊太燮

¹ 『高麗史』 권56, 志10 地理1

王京開城府·楊廣道 ; 『高麗史』 권57, 志11 地理2
慶尙道·全羅道 ; 『高麗史』 권58, 志12 地理3
交州道·西海道·東界·北界.

² 전국에 광범위하게 존재하던 民田은 국용과 녹봉으로 쓰였는데, 그중에서도 양계의 민전은 官이 收租하여 군수에 충당하였다(姜晉哲, 1980, 「公田支配의 諸類型」, 『高麗土地制度史研究』, 高麗大學校出版部).

1971; 金南奎 1973; 金南奎 1989; 趙仁成 1981; 崔貞煥 1997; 신안식 2005; 이정기 2008; 한정훈 2008). 양계의 경우에는 북방의 거란으로부터 군사적 위협을 방비하기 위한 조치로서 비교적 이른 시기인 성종대에 병마사를 파견하고 주진체제를 갖추게 되었다. 반면에 경기와 5도는 점진적인 변화를 통해 서서히 형성되어 갔다. 나말여초 이래로 호족세력에서 연원하는 향리층이 여전히 건재하였고 (金光洙 1979; 北村秀人 1984; 姜恩景 1999; 하일식 1999; 具山祐 2000; 尹京鎭 2002), 이로 인해 어떤 성격의 외관을 어느 정도의 규모로 파견해야 할지 고민을 거듭하면서 개편과 재편을 반복했던 것이다.

그 다음 시기적 추이에 따른 측면에서는 태조대 (李樹健 1984; 邊太燮, 1987; 全基雄 1987; 朴宗基, 1987, 1988; 金甲童 1986, 1988, 1992), 성종대 (河炫綱, 1962, 「高麗地方制度の一研究(上)·(下)一道制를 中心으로」, □史學研究□ 13·14 ; 河炫綱 1988; 浜中昇 1977; 禹太連, 1987·1988·1989; 具山祐 1993, 2003; 尹京鎭 2001, 2002), 현종대 (尹武炳 1962; 邊太燮 1968, 1971; 李義權 1986; 具山祐, 1994, 2003; 金甲童 1995; 尹京鎭 2001; 박종진 2015, 2017)에 걸쳐 대대적인 변화가 이루어졌음을 꼽을 수 있다. 『고려사』 지리지의 서문에

따르면, 태조대 처음으로 여러 주부군현의 명칭을 고쳤고, 성종대 10도와 12주절도사 체제를 마련하였다가, 현종대 4都護·8牧으로 정비해 온 과정들을 소개하고 있다³. 실제로 남도지역의 군현별 연혁기사를 살펴보면 ‘高麗初’, ‘성종’, ‘현종’ 시기에 군현의 개편사실들이 상당수 기재되어 있어 수차례에 걸친 개편 과정을 엿볼 수 있다. 이에 따라 당시의 사회상을 조망하면서 시기적 추이에 따른 지방제도 개편에 대한 연구들이 적지 않게 축적되어 왔다 (千寬宇 1958, 1979; 旗田巍 1960, 1972; 李基白, 1965, 1968; 邊太燮 1968, 1971; 河炫綱, 1977, 1988; 周藤吉之 1980; 李純根, 1983). 이러한 고려전기 지방제도의 개편과정은 중앙의 집권력과 지방의 호족세력 간에 힘의 역학관계와 밀접하게 연관되었기에 (千寬宇 1958, 1979; 李基白 1965, 1968; 河炫綱 1977; 金甲童 1990; 李鎭漢 2004), 새 왕조의 지배질서가 확립되는 과정을 설명하는데 주효했다.

이렇듯 여러 차례에 걸쳐 개편을 거듭해온 끝에 1018년(현종 9)에는 4도호·8목·56지주군사·28진장·20현령을 설치하는 것으로 일단락되었다⁴. 이때 이룩한 지방제도 운영의 틀은 主縣-屬縣 제도로 정리해볼 수 있다 (尹武炳 1962; 邊太燮 1968, 1971; 李義權 1986; 具山祐, 1994, 2003; 金甲童 1995; 尹京鎭 2001; 박종진 2015,

³ 『高麗史』 권56, 志10 地理1 序.

⁴ 『高麗史節要』 권3, 顯宗 9년 2월.

“罷諸道安撫使 置四都護 八牧 五十六知州郡事 二十八鎮將 二十縣令”

2017). 흔히 외관의 설치 유무를 기준으로 외관이 상주하는 군현과 그렇지 않은 군현으로 구분하는데, 전자는 주현으로 보고 후자는 속현으로 파악한다. 그러므로 4도호·8목·56지주군사·28진장·20현령처럼 외관이 설치된 군현은 주현이 되며, 나머지 군현들은 속현으로 파악되는 것이다. 게다가 주현 중에 대부분이 양계의 주진에 설치되어 있었으므로, 남도의 주현은 그 수가 매우 적었다. 주현의 수가 적었다는 것은 하나의 주현이 관할하게 된 속현이 많았다는 것을 의미하는데, 많게는 20여 개가 넘는 속현들이 하나의 주현에 소속되어 있을 정도였다. 그만큼 적은 수의 주현으로 다수의 속현들을 간접적으로 다스리고자 했던 의도가 깔려 있는 것이다.

주현으로 설정된 군현은 상주하고 있는 외관을 통해 고려조정으로부터 왕명을 하달 받았으며 다시 보고할 사항을 조정에 직접 상달하는 直牒 관계에 놓여있었다(邊太燮 1968; _____ 1971, 130~133쪽.). 주현의 관할 범위에 소속된 속현은 주현을 매개로 고려조정과 통할 수 있었다. 따라서 시기가 내려갈수록 속현이 주현에 종속되어 갈여지가 다분했고, 고려 말 조선 초에 이르면 전국적으로 속현이 주현에 병합되거나 直村化 되는 추세였다(李樹

健 1978, 1984; 金東洙 1990). 하지만 고려전기에만 해도 주현과 속현을 막론하고 모든 郡·縣 및 部曲과 같은 특수행정구역에서도 邑司를 두고 자체적인 지방행정을 이끌어나갔다(李樹健 1989). 읍사의 구성원에는 호족에서 연원하던 향리층이 있었으며, 향리들 사이에서 戶長 이하 9등급의 직제가 마련되어 담당업무를 분담하였다⁵(李惠玉 1988; 김갑동 1998; 윤경진 1998; 姜恩景 2000, 2002). 따라서 주현과 속현이 읍격 상에 엄연히 차이가 있었음에도 불구하고 속현은 독자적인 경제권과 자율성을 유지해나갈 수 있었다.

이러한 주현과 속현의 관계를 염두에 둔 탓인지 『고려사』 지리지에서는 주현과 속현을 엄격히 구분하는 동시에 속현이 단위군현으로서 지니는 성격을 온전히 살려주는 방식으로 정리하였다. 가령, 水州의 경우 1018년에 지주주사[知州事]가 파견되어 주현이 되었고, 안산현·영신현·쌍부현·용성현·정송현·진위현·양성현이 수주에 내속되어 속현이 되었다⁶. 이때, 수주와 그 속현들 간의 상하관계를 반영하여 『고려사』 지리지에는 안산현 이하 군현의 연혁이 수주보다 한 단 아래 낮추어 서술되어 있다. 그리하여 1行에 17字를 기록하고 있는 『고려사』에서

⁵ 『高麗史』 권 75, 志 29 選舉 3 銓注 鄉職 顯宗 9 年·文宗 5 年.

⁶ 『高麗史』 권 56, 志 10 地理 1

水州·安山縣·永新縣·雙阜縣·龍城縣·貞松縣·振威縣·陽城縣. 진위현은 신라 경덕왕대에도 이미

수주[水城郡]의 영현이었다가 그대로 속현으로 편제된 것이고, 양성현은 현종 5년에 수주에 내속되었다. 그밖에 나머지 지역들은 모두 현종 9년에 내속되었다.

수주는 16자를, 그 속현들은 15자를 서술하면서 위계의 차이를 나타낸 것이다⁷. 비록 한 단 아래로 낮추어 서술되어 있긴 하지만 속현도 표제어를 갖춘 채 기록되어 있다. 이는 『삼국사기』 지리지⁸ 및 『세종실록』 지리지⁹의 서술방식과 대조된다. 신라 경덕왕대를 기준으로 정리된 『삼국사기』 지리지에서는 郡-領縣 체계에 맞추어 군까지만 표제어로 제시하고 있으며, 조선 세종대를 기준으로 편제된 『세종실록』 지리지에서는 속현에 표제어가 갖추어지지 않거나 세주로 기록되어 있기 때문이다. 따라서 각 군현별로 표제어를 설정하고 있는 『고려사』 지리지에는

상대적으로 속현이 단위군현으로서 가지고 있는 성격이 강조되었다고 하겠다.

『고려사』 지리지의 찬자들도 그만큼 고려시대의 지방제도가 1018년에 정비된 주현-속현제도로 특징지을 수 있다고 인식하였다¹⁰. 즉, 주현-속현제도가 ‘고려시대적’인 지방제도의 유제로서 대표성을 띄고 있었던 것이다. 실제로 고려에서는 주현-속현제도를 보완해줄 수 있는 다양한 장치들을 갖추고 있었다.

외관제 내지는 外官員吏의 운영도 그중 하나였다. ‘외관’이란 범주는 크게 군현 단위로 상주하던 수령과 도 단위

⁷ 이러한 『고려사』 지리지의 서술체계에 대해서는 朴宗基, 1986, 「高麗의 郡縣體系와 界首官制—《高麗史》地理志 分析—」, 『韓國學論叢』 8; 박종기, 2002, 『(지배와 자율의 공간) 고려의 지방사회』, 푸른역사; 박종기, 2016, 『고려사 지리지 역주』, 한국학중앙연구원출판부.

⁸ 『삼국사기』 지리지의 사료검토에 대해서는 윤경진, 2012, 「『三國史記』地理志의 기준 시점과 연혁 오류」, 『韓國史研究』 156; 윤경진, 2012, 「『삼국사기』 지리지 수록 군현의 三國分屬」, 『한국사학보』 47; 송영대, 2016, 「『三國史記』「地理志」의 구조 및 역사성 분석」, 『東아시아 古代學』 42; 전덕재, 2017, 「『三國史記』地理志의 原典과 編纂—新羅志를 중심으로—」, 『大丘史學』 129; 전덕재, 2018, 「『三國史記』地理志의 原典과 撰述에 대한 考察—高句麗志와 百濟志, 三國有名未詳地分條를 중심으로—」, 『白山學報』 110; 전덕재, 2021, 『三國史記 잡지·열전의 원전과 편찬』, 주류성 참조.

⁹ 『세종실록』 지리지의 사료검토에 대해서는 김동수, 1992, 『『世宗實錄』地理志의 研究—특히 產物·戶口·軍丁·墾田·姓氏項을 中心으로—』, 서강대학교 박사학위논문; 김동수, 1993, 「『世宗實錄』地理志의 기초적 고찰」, 『성곡논총』 24; 서인원, 1999, 「世宗實錄地理志 編纂의 再檢討(1)」, 『역사와 교육』 7·8합; 서인원, 2000, 「世宗實錄地理志 編纂의 再檢討(2)」, 『역사와 교육』 10.

¹⁰ 일부 지역들을 제외하고는 대부분의 군현들은 1018년(현종 9)을 기준으로 한 주현-속현제도에 맞추어 기재되어 있다는 점도 이를 반증한다. 그러므로 후에 감무가 파견되는 지역들조차도 모두 속현과 같은 15자로 기록했던 것이다. 이상 고려사 지리지에 나오는 영속관계의 기준연대에 대해서는 다음과 같은 연구도 참고된다(배종도, 1991, 「《고려사》 지리지의 일 고찰—영속(領屬) 관계의 기준연대 추정을 중심으로—」, 『역사와 현실』 6; 윤경진, 2012, 『高麗史 地理志의 分析과 補正』, 여유당).

로 파견되던 감찰기구를 통칭하던 의미였다. 수령들은 주현의 읍격에 따라 員吏의 직제와 구성을 달리하였다. 읍격이 높은 경·목·도호부에는 정3품 이상의 使, 4품 이상의 副使, 6품 이상의 判官, 7품 이상의 司錄兼掌書記, 8품 이상의 法曹, 9품의 醫師와 文師 등이 상주하였다. 그보다 읍격이 낮은 지주군 단위에서는 5품 이상의 使, 6품 이상의 副使, 7품의 判官, 8품 이상의 法曹 등이 있었고, 가장 낮은 현 단위에서는 7품 이상의 縣令, 8품의 縣尉가 있었다¹¹. 이들은 모두 주현에 상주하며 봉행 6조에 따라 중요한 6가지 업무를 수행하였는데¹² 그중에서도 주현-속현의 관할 범위 내[任內]에 향리들을 관리·감독하는 업무가 주가 되었을 것이다(李惠玉 1985). 대체로 대읍일 경우에 속현 수가 많았지만, 그만큼 외관원리

의 구성이 뒷받침되었기에 많은 속현들을 관할할 수 있었다.

흔히 경·목·도호부 등 대읍은 ‘界內의 首官’이란 의미에서 계수관으로 일컬어졌다. 계수관은 주현의 하나로서 그에 소속된 속현들을 거느리기도 하였지만, 광역의 영역을 관할하는 계내의 수관으로서 인근에 위치한 여러 주현들과 그 주현들에 속한 속현들까지 포함하는 범위를 모두 거느렸다¹³. 오늘날로 비유하면 도 단위에 버금가는 영역이었던 셈이다. 계내의 여러 주현 중에서도 가장 읍격이 높아 영역의 대표성을 띠는 만큼 상표진하·외옥수추검·향공선상 등과 같은 지방의 상급행정기구로 기능하였다¹⁴.

계수관보다 높은 道 단위는 2~4개의 계수관을 묶어놓은 형태였다. 성종대

¹¹ 『高麗史』 권77, 志31 百官2 外職. 다만, 수령의 임명사례들을 분석한 연구에 따르면, 고려전기에는 ‘○품 이상’이라는 규정이 ‘○품 이하’로 보아도 무방할 만큼 수령의 제수자격이 실제보다 낮았다(李鎮漢, 2002, 「고려시대 守令職의 제수 자격」, 『史叢』 55 ; 이진한, 2003, 「高麗時代 守令의 京職 兼帶」, 『震檀學報』 95). 한편, 고려후기에 집중된 것이긴 하나 선생안의 흠어진 자료들을 모아 수령의 명단을 분석한 연구도 참고된다(張東翼, 1983, 「高麗後期 守令任命 實態—14세기 慶州·永川·安東·羅州先生案을 중심으로—」, 『慶北大學校論文集』 36 ; 윤경진, 2003, 「고려후기 先生案 자료를 통해 본 外官制의 변화」, 『國史館論叢』 101).

¹² 『高麗史』 권75, 志29 選舉3 銓注 凡選用守令 顯宗 9년 2월. “新定諸州府員 奉行六條

一察民庶疾苦 二察黑綬長吏能否 三察盜賊姦猾 四察民犯禁 五察民孝弟廉潔 六察吏錢穀散失”

¹³ 계수관의 범위에 대한 이견이 있긴하나 대체로 경·목·도호부를 계수관으로 파악하고 있다. 이에 대해서는 2장에서 설명할 것이다.

¹⁴ 계수관의 기능에 대한 대표적인 연구로는 다음과 같다. 金皓東, 1987, 「高麗 武臣政權時代 地方統治의 一斷面—李奎報의 全州牧 ‘司錄兼掌書記’의 活動을 중심으로—」, 『嶠南史學』 3 ; 구산우, 2002, 「고려시기 계수관(界首官)의 지방행정 기능과 위상」, 『역사와 현실』 43 ; 2003, 앞의 책 ; 윤경진, 2004, 「고려전기 界首官의 운영체제와 기능」, 『東方學志』 126 ; 박종진, 2005, 「고려시기 계수관의 기능과 위상」, 『역사와 현실』 56 ; 2017, 앞의 책.

10도제를 운영하긴 했지만 사실상 잘 활용되지는 못했는데 (河炫綱 1962, 1988; 邊太燮 1968, 1971), 아마도 계수관을 실질적인 지방의 상급행정기구로 설정해 놓고 필요에 따라서 도의 영역을 바꿔가며 사신을 파견했으리라 여겨진다. 그때그때 사안에 따라서 도의 영역은 6도·7도·8도·9도 등으로 유연하게 변동되었다. 그러나 고려 중기 무렵이 되면 서서히 안찰사가 파견되는 도제로 확립되어 가고 그것이 5도로 정착하게 되었다. 수령 및 향리의 실태를 감시하는 감찰기구로서 안찰사는 6개월마다 교체되어 도 영역을 순찰해왔고, 정기적인 제도로서 도제의 확립을 이끌었던 것이다¹⁵.

그런데 고려 중기에 도제나 안찰사제

가 확립되는 과정에는 비슷한 시기에 일어난 감무의 파견도 중요한 요인이 되었던 것 같다. 감무가 처음 파견된 시기는 1106년(예종 1)으로 서해도의 유망민들을 안무하기 위해 일부 속현을 대상으로 취해진 조치였다¹⁶. 이후로도 예종대, 명종대, 공양왕대 등에 걸쳐 상당수가 곳곳에 증치되었다. 유망안집을 위한 것이 본질적인 목적이었지만, 의도했든 의도하지 않았든 결과적으로 감무의 파견은 지방제도의 운영체계에 적지 않은 변화를 불러일으켰다 (李樹健 1984; 元昌愛 1984; 羅恪淳 1988; 金東洙 1989). 기본적으로 최소한의 군현에 관리를 파견하고, 이들을 통해 다수의 속현을 관할하고자 했던 것이 주현-속현제도의 본질이

¹⁵ 邊太燮, 1968, 앞의 논문; 1971, 앞의 책; 金潤坤, 1985, 「麗代의 按察使制度 成立과 그 背景」, 『嶠南史學』 創刊號; 2001, 『한국 중세의 역사상』, 영남대학교출판부; 이인재, 1993, 「高麗末 按廉使와 都觀察黜陟使」, 『역사연구』 2; 洪淵津, 1993, 「高麗前期 道制의 成立과 그 性格」, 『釜大史學』 17; 崔貞煥, 1998, 「高麗時代 5道 兩界의 成立」, 『慶北史學』 21; 崔貞煥, 1998, 「高麗後期 5道 兩界의 變遷」, 『한국중세사연구』 5; 2002, 『高麗 政治制度와 祿俸制 研究』, 신서원; 박종진, 2003, 「고려시기 안찰사의 기능과 위상」, 『東方學志』 122; 2017, 『고려시기 지방제도 연구』, 서울대학교출판문화원; 윤경진, 2006, 「고려전기 道의 다원적 편성과 5道の 성립」, 『東方學志』 135; 윤경진, 2013, 「고려 按察使의 연원과 ‘五道按察使’의 성립」, 『한국문화』 61; 윤경진, 2014, 「고려시대 按察使의 기능에 대한 재검토—군사 및 사법 기능을 중심으로—」, 『한국문화』 65. 최근에

안찰사의 명단을 복원하는 시도가 꾸준히 진행되고 있다(한기문, 2016, 「상주본 『慶尙道營主題名記』의 고려 경상도 안찰사 명단 검토」, 『大丘史學』 125; 한기문, 2017, 「고려시대 상주계수관 연구」, 景仁文化社; 허인욱, 2017, 「『호남읍지湖南邑誌』의 고려시대 안렴사按廉使 명단 검토」, 『국학연구』 32; 허인욱, 2017, 「『慶尙道營主題名記』의 고려시대 按察使 명단 검토」, 『전북사학』 50; 허인욱, 2021, 「고려시대 서해도안찰사(西海道按察使) 명단의 복원」, 『한국중세사연구』 64).

¹⁶ 『高麗史』 권12, 世家 睿宗 원년 4월 庚寅. “詔曰 頃因所司奏以西海道儒州安岳長淵等縣人物流亡 始差監務官 使之安撫 遂致流民漸還 産業日盛 今牛峯免山積城坡平沙川朔寧安峽僧嶺洞陰安州 永康嘉禾青松仁義金城堤州保寧餘尾唐津定安萬頃富閭楊口狼川等郡縣人物 亦有流亡之勢 宜准儒州例 置監務招撫”

었는데, 이제는 감무의 증치를 통해 속현들이 主縣化되는 현상이 곳곳에서 일어났던 것이다. 전국 각 군현에 수령을 파견하고 이들을 통해 지방통치를 실현하고자 했던 조선시대 지방제도의 큰 틀이 고려중기 무렵부터 점차 싹트기 시작했다고 볼 수 있을 것이다. 고려에서 감무를 증치하기 시작하면서 속현들이 점차 주현화되고, 이것이 점차 전국적으로 확산되는 추세 속에서 조선시대 지방제도 운영의 틀이 서서히 자리잡아가는 계기가 되었던 셈이다.

2. 고려시대 지방제도 연구의 담론과 반대담론 : 主縣-屬縣제도를 중심으로

그동안 고려시대 지방제도 연구는 초기연구자들부터 깊은 관심을 받으며, 수많은 성과물들이 축적될 수 있었다¹⁷. 이에 지방제도에 대한 이해가 심화되고 중요한 역사적 사실들이 새롭게 밝혀질 수 있었다. 그럼에도 여전히 논쟁이 지속되어 풀리지 않는 사안들도 많았다. 그러한 과정 속에서 담론을 생산

해 내고, 생산된 담론들에 대하여 반대하는 담론들도 꾸준히 제기되어 왔다. 이러한 담론과 반대담론이 축적되고 논의가 진행될수록 사학사적 의미는 더해져간다고 여겨진다. 이에 본고에서는 고려시대 지방제도 운영의 가장 중요한 특징으로 꼽히는 주현-속현제도에 대한 담론들에 대해 되짚어보고자 한다. 그것은 크게 세 가지로 (1)주현-속현제도의 출발은 언제부터라고 보아야 하는가, (2)주현-속현제도의 성격이란 무엇인가, (3)주현-속현제도의 변동은 언제부터 일어나게 되었는가에 대한 내용으로 구분해 보았다.

(1) 주현-속현제도의 출발 : 주현-속현제도의 시작은 태조대인가?

□고려사 『지리지』에 따르면, 각 군현의 연혁기사 가운데 ‘高麗初’, ‘(至)高麗’ 시기에 개편된 곳들이 적지 않게 기록되어 있다. 대부분이 군현의 명호를 고친다는 기사인데, 마침 940년(태조 23)에 주부군현의 호칭을 고쳤다는 기록이 있으므로¹⁸ 어느 정도 연관성이 있다고 여겨진다. 이에 따라 고려의 지방제도나 지방의 호족세력 및 후삼국의 통일과정에 관심을 가졌던 초기 연구

¹⁷ 고려시대 지방제도에 대하여 연구사적 검토를 수행한 논문으로는 박중기, 1988, 「고려시기 군현제 연구성과와 「국사」 교과서의 서술」, 『역사교육』 44; 채웅석, 1995, 「군현제와 향촌사회」, 『한국역사입문②』, 풀빛; 구산우, 1999, 「고려전기 향촌지배체제 연구의 현황과 방향」, 『부대사학』 23가 참조된다.

¹⁸ 『高麗史』 권2, 世家2 太祖 23년 3월. “改州府郡縣號”; 『高麗史』 권56, 志10 地理1 序. “高麗太祖興於高勾麗之地 降羅滅濟 定都開京 三韓之地 歸于一統 然東方初定 未遑經理 至二十三年 始改諸州府郡縣名”; 『高麗史』 권57, 志11 地理2 慶尙道 金州. “太祖二十三年 改州府郡縣名 爲金海府”

자들이 지리지에 기재된 ‘고려초’의 시점에 주목하게 되었다 (기전외 1960; 기전외 1972; 이수건 1984). 특히 지방제도 연구자들에 의해 ‘고려초’의 구체적인 시점이 논의되었는데, 대부분은 후삼국 통일과정에서 이루어진 개편이었다는 점에서 고려 건국의 의미를 강조하였다 (이희권 1986; 김갑동, 1986, 1988, 1990; 박종기 1987, 1988, 2002; 김일우 1989, 1996, 1998; 김갑동 1992; 구산우 1998, 2002; 권진철 2000; 류영철 2005; 김기섭 2006).

나말려초에 여러 지방 호족세력들의 등장으로 인해 전국이 분열된 상황에서 고려는 적극적으로 이들을 포섭해 나가는데 (하현강 1974), 그 과정에서 고려에 귀순하던 고을이나 태조의 후비를 들인 고을에는 ‘州’라는 명칭을 하사하였다 (김갑동, 1986, 1990)). 반면에 전쟁에서 패하거나 고려에 배반하던 고을에는 ‘縣’으로 강등시키기도 하였다. 그 대표적인 지역이 下枝縣이다. 923년(태조 6)에 하지현 사람이던 元逢이 고려에 귀순한 공이 있어 順州로 승격되었는데, 930년에는 견훤에게 함락되었다는 이유로 다시 縣으로 강등되었다¹⁹.

고을의 읍호에 州라는 명칭을 부여한다는 것은 매우 상징적인 조치였다. 그 이전시기까지 州는 여러 郡이나 縣을 관할하던 ‘광역주’의 의미가 있었다

(김창석 2017). 신라의 주가 고려에는 계수관으로 이어지게 되는 것인데 (윤경진 2005; 김아네스 2008), 그만큼 당시 사람들에게 州가 지니고 있던 의미가 클 수밖에 없었을 것이다. 본래 縣이었던 고을이 고려로부터 州라는 읍호를 하사받았다면, 고려에 협력하였거나 후비를 배출하였던 지역이란 상징성을 부여받은 것이라 할 수 있기 때문이다. 고려는 읍호를 매개로 이점을 적극 활용하여 우호적이었던 고을에 대하여 포상의 의미를 보여주려던 것이었다. 그러므로 936년에 통일을 완수한 후에 940년에는 전국적인 읍호의 명칭을 개정하는 조치도 논공행상이 주된 목적이었다고 여겨진다.

그런데 이때 취한 조치가 과연 주부군현의 명칭을 개정하는 것에 그쳤을지, 아니면 소속관계의 대대적인 변동까지 함께 이루어낸 것인지에 대한 논의가 뜨겁다. 초기 연구자들은 대체로 이때의 개편이 주현-속현제도를 지향하는 조치로 보았지만, 비교적 근래에 들어서는 부정적인 견해가 많다 (윤경진 1996; 최규성 1997; 황선영 1999; 윤경진, 1999; 김아네스 2008; 정요근 2009; 박종진 2015, 2017). 우선 지리지에 기록된 ‘고려초’라는 시점에 대하여 이를 꼭 태조대라기 보다는 태조~현종대 사이에 있던 사실로 파악한다²⁰. 그렇게 된다면 태조대의 개편은 실제

¹⁹ 『高麗史』 권57, 志11 地理2 慶尙道 安東府 豐山縣. “太祖六年 縣人元逢 有歸順之功 陞爲順州 十三年 陷於甄萱 復降爲下枝縣”

²⁰ ‘고려초’의 대부분이 현종대였을 것이라고 파악하는 견해도 있다(정요근, 2009, 「후삼국시기 고려의 주(주)·부(부) 분포와 그 설치 의미」, 『역사와 현실』 73).

로 그 수가 현저히 줄어들게 된다. 또한 태조대의 지방제도 개편은 주현-속현제도를 지향하기 보다는 신라의 郡-領縣 체계를 계승하는 측면이 강하다는 점을 지적하기도 한다 (윤경진, 1996; 박종진, 2015, 2017). 신라 때부터 이어져 온 군-현 사이의 소속관계를 그대로 계승하는 정도였다는 지적이다.

실제로 지리지의 연혁기사를 시계열적으로 편년화할 때, ‘현종대’가 가장 많은 비율을 차지하고 있다. 이는 현종대가 가장 커다란 개편을 일궈낸 시기라는 점을 방증하는 것인데, 특히 ‘현종대’의 대부분은 ‘來屬’ 또는 ‘仍屬’으로 기록되어 있어 소속관계의 변화 사실을 분명히 엿볼 수 있다. 그러므로 ‘고려시대적인’ 주현-속현제도의 정비는 현종대 이루어진 것이라고 보는 것이 타당하지 않을까한다.

그러나 소속관계의 변화가 대부분 현종대 정비되었다고 하더라도, 일부 지역에 따라서는 이미 그 이전에 개편되는 양상도 보인다. 즉, 천안부의 사례처럼 태조대에 개편된 지역도 있고²¹, 靑臯縣처럼 성종 5년에 예주에 속하게

되는 경우도 있다²². 이는 지역적 여건과 시대적 필요에 의해 그 양상이 달라질 수도 있었음을 보여준다. 조금 더 복합적인 요인을 고려하면서 지역 사례별로 세밀한 분석을 시도해볼 필요가 있다.

한편, 주현-속현제도의 성립 시기 문제와는 별개로, 983년(성종 2) 이전까지 공식적인 외관 파견 없이 어떻게 중앙과 지방이 소통할 수 있었을 지에 대한 고민도 필요하다. 합리적인 추론상 지방의 실권자인 호족들에게 官階를 제수하면서 포섭하고, 이들을 매개로 중앙과 지방이 소통할 수 있었을 것이라는 견해는 주목해볼만 하다 (김일우 1996, 1998). 태조대에 신라의 군-영현 체계를 계승했다고 하더라도, 그것은 지방에서 중앙과 소통할 수 있는 창구가 있어야만 가능했을 것이기 때문이다. 게다가 州 읍호를 지닌 고을이 전국적으로 비대해짐에 따라 지역과 지역 간의 위계에 있어서 혼선이 빚어질 여지도 분명 있었을 것인데 (朴恩卿 2008), 이점을 어떻게 극복했을 지에 대한 의문도 여전히 해결되지 못하고 있다²³. 따라서 이에 대해서는 나

²¹ 천안부는 930년에 東兜率과 西兜率을 합쳐 만들어진 고을로, 태조가 이곳에 도독부를 설치하면서 후백제를 정벌하기 위한 군사거점으로 삼았다(김갑동, 2002, 「나말려초 天安府의 성립과 그 동향」, 『韓國史研究』 117; 김아네스, 2017, 「고려시대 지방제의 운영과 천안부」, 『한국중세사연구』 48).

²² 『高麗史』 권57, 志11 地理2 慶尙道 禮州 靑臯縣. “成宗五年 更今名 來屬”

²³ 대체로 983년(성종 2)에 12주목에 외관을 설치함으로써 읍호에 따른 위계상의 문제가 해결되었으리라고 파악하고 있다. 그러나 940년에 주부군현의 명칭을 고친 시점부터 대략 40여 년간 이러한 문제를 안고 있었으리라고는 생각되지 않는다. 983년 외관을 설치하기 이전에 어떠한 조치가 있었을 것인데, 그것은 지방 실권자에게 官階를 제수하고 이를 통해 지방과

말려초의 고승비나 금석문 등 당대 자료를 토대로 재검토해볼 필요가 있다.

(2) 주현-속현제도의 성격 : 주현-속현의 행정단위는 각각 어떤 기능을 하였나?

주현-속현제도의 성격을 이해하기 위해서는 주현과 속현이 지닌 각각의 지위와 역할을 살펴보는 것이 중요하다. 실제로 속현은 조선후기까지도 존속하는 곳들이 있는데, 고려시대의 그것과 질적으로 어떻게 다른지 이해해야 왜 고려시대를 주현-속현제도라고 특징지을 수 있는지 알 수 있기 때문이다.

주현 가운데서도 읍격이 높은 경·목·도호부 등은 신라의 州와 같은 광역행정단위로서 영역 내에 지주부군사나 현령을 거느리고 있었고, 그러한 지주부군사나 현령에 속한 속현들까지 영역 내에 포함되어 있었다. 그리하여 초기 연구자들은 경·목·도호부 등을 계수관으로 보고, 지방제도가 ‘계수관-영현(주현)-속현’의 3층 구조로 운영되었다고 파악하였다 (尹武炳 1962; 邊太燮 1971; 河炫綱 1988). 계수관은 기본적으로 주현의 임무를 수행하지만, 주현 중에서도 상급행정기구였으므로 상표진하·향공선상·외옥수추검 등을 추가적으로 담당하였다 (변태섭 1971). 이를 반영하듯 실제로 지리지의 서술에서도 계수관-영현-속현의 3층 구조로 체계화되어 있다. 즉, 1行에 17字를

기록하고 있는 □고려사『에서 계수관인 곳은 17자를, 영현인 곳은 16자를, 속현인 곳은 15자로 서술하였다. 군현의 계서성을 고려하여 위계의 차이를 나타낸 것이다.

그런데 이에 대한 반론도 있었다. 계수관은 ‘界內의 首官’이란 의미에서 계내에 속현을 거느리던 주현을 지칭한다고 본 것이다 (朴宗基 1986; 박종기 2002, 198~205). 계내의 범위에 대한 문제제기인 셈인데, 이러한 입장에 의거하면 ‘주현=계수관’이며 ‘계수관(주현)-속현’의 2층 구조로 운영되었다. 읍격이 높은 경·목·도호부뿐만 아니라 지주부군사나 현령과 같은 주현도 계수관이 될 수 있다는 것이다. 군현제의 본질적인 기능인 조세수취와 역역징발의 기능이 주현에게 있었다고 파악하여, 속현을 거느리면서 계내의 수관과도 같은 역할을 한 주현에 크게 의미부여를 한 것이다.

위의 연구로 인해 고려시대 지방제도 분야는 크게 두 가지 측면에서 학계의 관심을 불러일으켰다. 첫째는 계수관의 범위에 대한 논쟁으로 이어졌다는 것이고, 둘째는 주현과 속현의 부세수취 기능에 대한 논의를 이끌어냈다는 것이다. 전자가 ‘계수관-영현’ 간 상급행정단위에 대한 논의라면, 후자는 그보다 낮은 단위인 ‘영현-속현’ 사이의 기능에 대한 논의였다. 이에 따라 고려시대 지방행정 단위를 놓고 각각의 기능

지방 간에 위계질서를 바로잡는 조치가 아니었을까 싶다.

을 고찰해보는 계기가 되었다²⁴.

먼저 계수관의 범위에 대한 논쟁에는 역시나 종래의 견해와 같이 ‘계수관=경·목·도호부’라는 재반론이 등장하였다(金東洙 1994). 『고려사』에 기록된 ‘계수관’의 용례를 분석하고, 인물의 출신지 표기에서 나타나는 연칭표기에서 소속관계를 알아본 후에 기존의 견해를 뒷받침한 것이다. 실제로 각종 금석문에서 ‘高麗國尙州界知京山府事 任若木郡’(1031년 작성), ‘全州泰山郡人’(1218년), ‘廣州牧管内水州人’(1075년) 등 지명의 연칭표기 사례가 나타나는데, 상주·전주·광주와 같은 牧 단위와 경산부·태산군·수주와 같은 지주부군사를 거느리는 상급행정단위로 제시되어 있었다(金東洙 1994, 648-649). 특히 『경상도지리지』에서 “고려 때에 (晉)州와 慶州·尙州·安東이 4界首官이 되었다²⁵.”는 기록으로 보아, 진주목·동경유수관·경주·상주목·안동도호부와 같은 경·목·도호부가 계수관이었음을 실증할 수 있었다(金東洙 1994, 650~654).

이후로도 계수관의 범위에 대한 논의는 지속되었고²⁶ 대부분의 연구자들은

초기 연구에서 제시했던 ‘계수관=경·목·도호부’라는 견해를 받아들이고 있다.

그 다음으로 주현-속현 사이에서 부세수취의 기능에 대한 논의를 살펴보자. 앞서 지방제도의 틀을 2층 구조로 설명한 연구에 따르면, 주현은 고려 조정과 직접적으로 연결되어 있었고 이에 따른 수취체제도 주현의 책임 하에 이루어졌다고 보았다(朴宗基 1986; 박종기 2002). 수취구조 상에서 주현이 강조될수록 상대적으로 속현은 주현에 종속적인 입장이 되고 수취단위로 기능하지 못했다는 결론으로 이어지게 된다(박종기, 1986, 1999, 2002; 김재명 1994). 속현의 예측성을 강조한 입론이라고 할 수 있다. 그러나 이에 대한 반론으로 속현 또한 주현과 같이 하나의 수취단위로 운영되었음을 강조하기도 한다(朴鍾進 1987). 속현이 수취와 지방재정 운영면에서 개별적인 단위로 기능했다는 주장인 것인데(박종진 1997, 1999, 2017; 尹京鎭 2001), 실제로 속현 단위로 量田이 시행되거나 勸農이 강조되기도 하였다(박종진 1997). 속현의 단위성을 강조한 입장

²⁴ 이점에 대해 해당 연구자는 장 제목을 ‘지방행정단위를 둘러싼 논쟁’이라고 제시하기도 했다(박종기, 2002, 앞의 책).

²⁵ 慶尙道地理志』晉州道 晉州牧官. “在高麗時州與慶州尙州安東 爲四界首官”

²⁶ 朴宗基, 1999, 「高麗時代 界首官의 범위와 성격」, 『韓國學論叢』 21 ; 2002, 앞의 책 ; 김동수, 2002, 「고려시대 界首官의 범위에 대한 재론」,

『全南史學』 19 ; 尹京鎭, 2003, 「고려전기 界首官의 설정원리와 구성 변화—『고려사』 지리지 계수관 연혁의 補正을 檢하여—」, 『震檀學報』 96 ; 2012, 『高麗史 地理志의 分析과 補正』, 여유당. 한편, 고려 후기 계수관제의 범위문제에 대해서는 최동녕, 2020, 「고려 충선왕대 지방제도의 개편」, 『역사와 담론』 95 참조.

인 셈이다.

그동안에 지방제도 분야에 대한 연구가 고려 조정과 지방 사이에 행정명령 체계에 주목했던 것이라면, 이때의 논의 후에 ‘주현’과 ‘속현’의 개념 내지는 주현과 속현 간의 지배·예속 관계를 어느 수준까지 볼 수 있는가에 대한 논의로 발전하게 되었다 (尹京鎭 2001).

그런데, 주현이나 속현이나를 떠나서 전국의 각 군현마다 邑司가 설치되어 있었고, 해당 읍사에서는 향리층의 주도로 지방행정이 운영되었음을 상기해 볼 필요가 있다 (李樹健 1989)²⁷. 속현에는 외관이 부재하더라도 읍사의 향리들이 해당고을에 대한 실무를 담당하는 구조였다. 남도 전역에서 주현보다 속현이 압도적 다수를 이루었다는 것은 고려조정이 실질적인 지방행정을 향리층에게 일임하였음을 의미한다. 반대로 말하면, 향리층이 없이는 고려의 군현제가 실현될 수 없었을 것이다. 향리나 읍사의 지방행정을 그대로 인정했다는 것은 곧 속현이라도 지방행정의 고유한 단위성을 그대로 보장해주

겠다는 취지였을 것이다. 고려의 주현-속현제도의 성격이란, 곧 주현을 통한 행정명령 체계를 지니면서도 각 속현에 대한 단위성을 그대로 인정해주는 선에서 이루어졌다고 하겠다. 이와 같은 운영체계가 적은 수의 주현으로도 다수의 속현을 다스릴 수 있었던 핵심이었던 것이다.

(3) 주현-속현제도의 변동 : 감무의 설치와 속현의 主縣化를 이끌었나?

초기연구자들은 대체로 고려 중기부터 조선 초까지 감무 내지는 현령이 전국적으로 확산되어 가는 추세였음을 강조하였다 (李樹健 1984; 元昌愛 1984; 羅恪淳 1988; 金東洙 1989). 수령이 파견된 곳을 주현으로 보고 수령이 파견되지 않은 곳을 속현이라고 보는 입론에서, 고려 중후기 감무나 현령의 증치는 곧 속현의 主縣化를 보여주는 중요한 근거였다. 이는 향후에 전국 각 군현에 수령이 상주하게 되는 조선시대 지방제도로 이어지는 과도기였던 셈이었고²⁸ 그만큼 감무나 현령이 증치

²⁷ 약간의 이론이 있지만 향·소·부곡과 같은 특수행정구역에서도 읍사가 설치되어 자체적인 지방행정을 운영해 나갔다.

²⁸ 조선전기 지방제도 연구자들이 조선시대 지방제도의 정비과정을 살펴볼 때, 감무를 우선적으로 검토한 것도 이와 같은 맥락이라고 할 수 있다. 조선전기 지방제도에 대한 대표적인 연구로는 다음과 같다. 李樹健, 1984, 앞의 책; 李樹健, 1989, 『朝鮮時代 地方行政史』, 民音社; 李存熙, 1990, 『朝鮮時代地方行政制度研究』,

一志社; 金東洙, 1992, 『朝鮮初期 郡縣體制的 改編—主縣化 및 屬縣化, 任內的 이속작업 및 越境地의 정비작업을 중심으로—』,

『擇窩許善道先生停年紀念 韓國史學論叢』,

一潮閣; 任先彬, 1997, 『朝鮮初期 外官制度

研究』, 韓國精神文化研究院 博士學位論文;

한국역사연구회(조선시기 사회사 연구반), 2000,

『조선은 지방을 어떻게 지배했는가』, 아카넷;

임용한, 2002, 『朝鮮前期 守令制와 地方統治』, 혜안.

하는 현상은 1018년(현종 9) 이래로 유지되어 온 주현-속현제도의 근간을 무너트리는 상징과도 같은 것이었다.

그러나 이에 대한 반론도 제기되었다(이인재 1990; 배종도 1991; 尹京鎭 2000; 임용한 2002). 전국에 걸쳐 다수 증치된 감무가 여전히 속현으로 유지되었다는 입장에서, 종래의 주현-속현제도가 고려 말까지 그대로 존속되었다는 것이다. 감무를 속현으로 봐야 하는 이유에 대해서는 크게 두 가지로 정리해볼 수 있다. 먼저 『고려사』 지리지의 서술체계를 근거로 들었다. 1106년(예종 1)에 감무가 설치된 保寧縣은 속현으로 표기된 반면에, 1144년(인종 22)에 현령이 설치된 富城縣은 주현으로 표기되었다는 점이다²⁹. 부성현이 보령현보다 늦게 현령이 설치되었음에도 한 단 높게 기재되어 주현처럼 표기되었고, 먼저 감무가 설치된 보

령현은 한 단 낮게 속현으로 표기되었다는 점을 지적하였다(이인재 1990, 117-118). 또 다른 근거로는 공양왕대의 ‘新定監務’ 이후부터 감무에도 속현移屬이 수반될 수 있었으며, 그 이전까지는 속현 이속 없이 단독 군현에만 감무가 설치되는 정도였다는 점을 지적하였다(尹京鎭 2000, 280-284). 이와 같은 반론으로 인해 초기 연구에서 무비판적으로 수용해오던 ‘감무 설치 군현=主縣’이란 도식을 재조명해볼 수 있는 계기가 되었다. 또한 고려 중후기에 증치되는 현령과 감무를 동일시해오던 연구경향에서 벗어나서 양자 간의 차이점을 뚜렷하게 밝혀낼 수 있었다³⁰.

다만, 감무 또한 엄연히 한 군현을 책임지는 수령관으로서 그 기능과 역할에 대해서는 재검토의 여지가 있다³¹. 최근에는 감무를 주현이라고 단정할

²⁹ 『高麗史』 권56, 志10 地理1 楊廣道 洪州 保寧縣; 권56, 志10 地理1 楊廣道 富城縣.

^{30,31} 공양왕대 ‘신정감무’의 여파로 여말선초에 전국에 걸쳐 월경지가 발생하게 되었다는 견해가 있다. 감무의 성격이 바뀔에 따라 소속관계의 변동이 대대적으로 일어나면서 주현에서 멀리 떨어진 속현들은 월경지화 되었다는 것이다(최종석, 2012, 「조선초기 월경지(越境地)의 인식과 발생에 관한 재검토」, 『조선시대사학보』 62). 그러나 감무를 주현과 가까운 성격이라고 파악한 연구에서는 월경지가 이미 고려 중기 무렵부터 발생해왔다고 보기도 한다(정요근, 2013, 「전남 지역의 고려~조선시대 越境地 분석」, 『한국문화』 63; 정요근, 2015, 「고려~조선시대 낙동강 상류 지역의

越境地 분석」, 『한국문화』 71; 정요근, 2017,

「충청도 월경지 분석에 기초한 고려~조선시대 下三道 월경지의 유형 분류」, 『역사와 담론』 84). 이 또한 감무를 둘러싼 성격을 어떻게 파악하느냐에 따라 달라질 수 있는 양상이라 하겠다.

³¹ 고려시대 관료제적인 운영의 틀에서 감무직은 조사외관직으로 운영되었으며, 여타의 조사외관직 임명 형태와 크게 다르지 않았다(최은규, 2020, 「고려시대 감무(감무)의 운영과 그 특징—임명 사례의 분석을 중심으로—」, 『역사와 현실』 118). 이는 곧 감무가 파견된 현이 주현인지 속현인지에 대한 논의를 떠나 엄연히 수령이 소재하는 군현임이 분명했다는 것을 보여준다.

수는 없지만, 종래에 관할을 받던 주현 으로부터 벗어난 독립 군현의 지위는 가지고 있었다고 보기도 한다 (정요근 2017, 45-46쪽.). 예종대~명종대인 12 세기에 전국의 140군현에 감무가 신설 되었고, 이때 신설된 감무가 일회성으 로 그치는 것이 아니라 후대의 조선시 대까지 이어지게 되는 점을 강조하였 다. 이러한 입장에서 12~15세기에 걸쳐 감무가 증치되는 군현을 도별로 분석하는 작업으로 이어지게 되었다 (정 요근 2019, 2021). 이는 단순히 감무 에 대한 관심에서 끝나는 것이 아니라 전국 각 군현 단위에 수령을 중심으로 하는 지방제도 운영이 이미 고려중기, 즉 12세기에는 일단락되었다는 점에 주목한 것이기도 하다. 이에 고려에서 조선으로 이어지는 통시대적인 관점에서 왕조교체가 지니는 의미를 되돌아 보는 데 기여한 측면이 있다 (정요근 외, 201

17~18세기 개혁론과 封建·郡縣 논의 - 吳光運을 중심으로 -

조선후기 석사 2학기 김동영

I. 서론

전근대 동북아시아의 정치체제는 封建制와 郡縣制로 나타났다. 중국에서 기원한 두 체제는 관리 임용, 지방 통치, 토지 운영 등 다방면에서 많은 차이를 두고 있었다. 먼저 夏·殷·周 三代에 이루어졌다는 봉건제는 天子가 제후에게 영토를 분봉하여 藩屏으로 삼았는데, 제후의 세습적 지위를 인정하였으며 井田을 바탕으로 토지를 운영하였다. 반면 秦代 이후에 실시된 군현제는 皇帝가 관리를 선발한 후 지방에 파견하여 다스리게 하였고 관리의 세습적 지위를 인정하지 않았다. 토지제도에 있어서는 私的 소유를 기반한 阡陌制가 나타났다. 서로 다른 두 형태의 정치체제 중 무엇

이 더 통치에 적합한지를 두고 중국에서는 秦漢代부터 清末까지 끊임없이 논의되었으며, 이러한 논의 과정은 인근의 한국과 일본에도 영향을 미쳤다. 예컨대 근대의 새로운 정치체제가 유입되기 전까지 중국을 중심으로 한 동북아시아는 봉건과 군현을 적절히 선택 혹은 융합하면서 국가를 운영하였던 것이다.¹

민두기는 중국의 봉건·군현 논의를 진한 대부터 청말까지 시계열로 분석하면서 핵심 논점을 公·私天下의 문제, 復古論과 是今論의 문제, 法治論과 人治論의 문제로 정리하였다. 먼저 公·私천하의 문제는 군주의 성격을 어떻게 볼 것 인가하는 문제와 연결되었다. 봉건 지지자들은 군현제에 대하여 군주가 독점적

¹ 중국을 비롯한 동북아 각국에서 나타난 봉건·군현 논의에 대한 흐름은 다음의 논문들을 참고하였다. 민두기, 1973, 『中國近代史研究』, 일조각; 李成珪, 1989, 「中國文明의 起源과 形成」, 『講座 中國史 I』, 지식산업사; 송재운, 2011, 「제국적 통합과 집권화의 이념- 유종원 「봉건론」의 정치철학적 함의」, 『동양철학』

35; 오항녕, 2011, 「동아시아 봉건 담론의 연속과 단절」, 『사총』 72; 미야지마 히로시, 2013, 「봉건제와 Feudalism의 사이-인문학과 정치학의 대화를 위하여」, 『일본의 역사관을 비판한다』, 창비; 박훈, 2017, 「‘봉건사회’ - ‘군현사회’와 동아시아 ‘근대’ 시론(試論)」, 『동북아역사논총』 57.

지위를 가지고 권력을 행사한다고 파악하여 사천하로 규정하였다. 반면 봉건제는 왕과 제후, 제후와 경·대부의 관계를 각각 大宗과 小宗의 혈연관계로 규정하고, 天命에 따라 德能을 갖춘 異姓의 개인도 제후로 임명할 수 있다는 사상적 논리를 구축함으로써 공천하로 파악하였다 (민두기 1973, 74).

복고론과 시금론 논쟁은 봉건제를 현재 실현할 수 있느냐의 문제를 두고 전개되었다. 복고론은 현재 聖人이 없다 할지라도 삼대의 봉건을 다시 실천할 수 있다는 믿음에서 봉건제를 지지하였다. 반면 시금론은 성인도 없는 상태에서 군현제를 실시하고 있는 현재에 봉건제의 재현은 불가능하다고 주장하였다. 따라서 시금론자들은 군현제를 지지하였는데, 하지만 시금론을 지지한다고 해서 모두 반봉건으로 연결되지는 않았다. 대부분의 시금론자들은 군현제가 실시되는 현상태에서 봉건제를 완벽하게 구현할 수는 없지만 군현제의 틀 안에서 봉건의 이상을 접목시켜보자는 절충론적 입장을 표방하였다. 이것은 특히 明末淸初의 지식인이었던 顧炎武와 黃宗羲에게서 두드러졌다. 한편 시금론의 입장에서 반봉건을 주장하였던 학자로는 王夫之가 대표적인데, 그는 고대의 정치체제를 긍정하고 현재의 정치체를

부정하는 통념부터 비판하며 군현제를 지지하고 봉건제의 실현을 부정하였다 (민두기 1973, 229~235).

마지막으로 법치와 인치의 문제가 있는데, 이 논의는 봉건 제후의 세습 문제와 관련이 있다. 제후의 지위가 세습되면 不肖한 후손이 봉토를 다스리는 경우도 발생할 수 있는데, 이에 대하여 봉건론자들은 봉건의 제도 자체가 완벽하기 때문에 후손이 불초하더라도 통치는 정상적으로 이루어질 수 있다고 주장하였다. 즉 정치체제는 사람이 아닌 제도에 의해 움직인다고 본 것이다. 반면 군현론자들은 제도의 한계성을 주목하며 賢者를 선발하여 통치해야함을 주지하였는데, 특히 士大夫의 등장과 함께 인치론은 힘을 얻게 되었다.

이상의 중국 봉건·군현 논의 연구를 바탕으로 미야지마 히로시와 박훈은 동북아시아 삼국의 봉건·군현 논의를 비교하였다. 먼저 미야지마는 중국 사회에서 봉건은 이념적으로 중요시되었음에 주목하며 군현제 안에 봉건의 뜻을 담고자 노력하였다고 지적하였고, 에도 시대 이후에 봉건·군현 논의가 시작된 일본은 幕藩體制를 봉건제로 규정하면서 자신들의 사회를 긍정적으로 평가하였다. 한편 조선의 봉건·군현 논의에서는 정전제의 실현 가능성, 양반과 제후

의 유사성 문제를 특징으로 지적하였다 (미야지마 히로시 2013, 135~140).

박훈은 서구의 Feudalism과 봉건제가 다른 개념임을 지적하면서 봉건제 사회와 군현제 사회의 차이를 비교하였다. 전자는 지방분권적 성격을 바탕으로 강고한 신분제, 혈연주의, 공동체 주의의 성격을 가지고 있는 반면 후자는 중앙집권적 정치체제로서 느슨한 신분제, 능력주의, 유연한 공동체 사회 등의 성격을 가지고 있다고 파악하였다 (박훈 2017, 301~304). 한편 서구 근대 의회제도와 봉건제의 유사성을 밝힘으로써 봉건제 사회였던 일본이 근대 의회제도로 이행함에 있어 조선과 중국보다 유리하였음을 지적하였다 (박훈 2017, 308~309). 이상의 연구들은 중국을 중심으로 동북아시아에서 나타난 봉건·군현 논의를 바탕으로 당대의 정치사상적 흐름을 조명하고 있으며, 봉건·군현 두 정치체제가 근대 사회와 충돌하였을 때 어떠한 작용을 하였는지를 밝혀주었다. 이러한 연구 흐름 속에서 본고에서는 조선의 경우는 어떻게 논의가 이루어졌고 당대 사회에 어떠한 기능을 하였는지 주목해

보고자 한다. 한편 조선시대의 봉건·군현 논의에 대한 연구로는 박광용, 조성산, 김선경의 연구가 있다².

박광용은 18~19세기에 각 당파별로 나타난 봉건·군현 논의를 정리하였다. 먼저 吳光運, 李重煥, 李瀾, 蔡濟恭, 丁範祖, 李獻慶, 李家煥, 丁若鏞 등의 南人 계열은 대개 봉건제의 세습성을 비판하며 군현제와의 절충적 입장을 표방하거나 군현제를 옹호하는 입장을 표방하였다. 少論계열 및 老論 계열 서얼 출신도 이와 비슷한 양상을 보였는데, 소론 李勉昇은 봉건제의 정신에 입각한 군현제 절충론을 주장하며 경화벌열을 비판하였고, 소론 柳壽垣은 보다 강력하게 군현제로의 개혁을 주장하며 정치 세습의 폐단을 지적하였다. 노론 서얼 출신이었던 成大中, 成海應 부자도 봉건제보다 군현제를 지지하며 당시 벌열화가 진행 중인 정치 세태를 비판하였다. 반면 李德相, 趙璈 등의 노론계열은 원론적 봉건론을 주장하며 世卿, 世臣과 같은 세습적 지위를 옹호하였다. 이것은 19세기 세도정치기에도 지속되었는데 안동김씨를 비롯한 세도가들은 원론적

² 박광용, 1998, 「18-19세기 조선사회의 봉건제와 군현제 논의」, 『한국문화』 22; 김선경, 2005, 「조선후기 정치체제론의 전개-봉건제 군현제론을 중심으로-」, 『조선후기 체제변동

과 속대전』, 혜안; 조성산, 2017, 「18-19세기 조선 봉건 · 군현제 논의의 역사적 전개」, 『역사학보』 236

봉건론을 지지함으로써 자신들의 지위 세습을 정당화하였다. 예컨대 박광용은 18~19세기 정치권력이 소수 당파 및 가문에 별열화 되어가는 과정에 집중하여 기득권이었던 노론 핵심 세력과 비노론 세력으로 나누어 봉건·군현 논의가 진행되었음을 주목한 것이다.

조성산은 이상과 같은 박광용의 연구가 당색 중심으로 이루어진 것에 문제를 제기하며 시기별로 봉건·군현 논의 과정을 재분류하였다. 먼저 18세기는 세습적 지위를 비판하며 군현제에 입각한 개혁론이 등장하였고 이에 따라 군주 중심 집권체제가 정당화되었다 (박광용 1998). 반면 19세기는 군현제의 한계가 드러나면서 봉건론이 제기되었는데 능력주의에 대한 과도한 믿음이 불러온 폐단들 때문이라고 조성산은 지적하고 있다 (조성산 2017).

한편 김선경은 柳馨遠과 유수원을 비교함으로써 조선의 봉건·군현 논의가 어떠한 방향으로 흘러갔는지 설명하였다. 유수원은 봉건론에 입각하여 정전제를 어떻게 실현할 수 있을지 고민하였고 그 결과 公田制와 限田制의 실시를 주장하였다. 또한 공거제, 향당제 등을 실시함으로써 군현제 국가이 조선이 최대한 봉건의 정치 제도를 실현할 수 있도록 개혁 방안을 구상하였다. 반면

유수원은 군현론에 입각하여 조선에서 더 이상 봉건의 제도를 재현할 수 없고, 재현해서도 안 된다고 생각하였다. 따라서 정전제의 실시를 부정하고 額田制를 주장하며 군역에 있어서는 부병제를 부정하고 병사 운영비용을 국가에서 책임져야 한다고 주장하였다 (김선경 2005).

이상의 연구 성과를 바탕으로 조선시대의 봉건·군현 논의를 살펴보면 두 가지 특징을 주목할 수 있다. 첫 번째는 봉건·군현 논의가 사회 개혁의 이론적 틀을 제공해주었다는 점이다. 앞서 서술하였듯이 봉건·군현은 서구 근대 체제가 유입되기 전까지 조선을 비롯한 동북아시아에서 정치체제론으로 기능하였다. 때문에 당대 사회를 진단하고 개혁론을 주장할 때 봉건·군현의 논의가 함께 등장할 수밖에 없었다. 두 번째는 봉건·군현 논의가 17세기 이후 조선후기 사회에서 중점적으로 나타났다는 점이다. 앞서 진행된 연구 모두 17세기 이후의 인물들을 중심으로 봉건·군현 논의를 다루고 있다. 또한 미야지마는 봉건제에 대한 개념이 실록상에 조청 관계를 규정할 때에만 등장한다고 지적하였는데 (미야지마 히로시 2013, 137~138), 이와 같은 지적 역시 봉건·군현 논의가 활발하게 진행된 것이 17세기 이후였기 때문이라 생각된다.

따라서 본고에서는 봉건·군현 논의가 집중적으로 나타난 17세기 이후 조선 사회에서 어떠한 역할을 하였는지 먼저 주목해보고자 한다. 봉건·군현에 대한 이해가 17세기 이후의 조선 사회를 어떻게 변화시켰는지 살펴봄으로써 당대 지식인들의 개혁논리를 탐구해보고자 한다. 다음으로 봉건·군현 논의 속에서 오광운은 어떠한 입장을 가지고 있었고, 왜 그러한 입장을 가지게 되었는지 살펴보려고 한다.

오광운은 영조대 탕평파를 이끌었던 핵심 세력 중 한 명이었다. 특히 노·소론 중심의 탕평 정국이 구성되었던 시기에 남인임에도 불구하고 탕평파에 소속되어 영조대의 정국운영에 주도적인 역할을 하였다 (이근호 2016, 42-43). 특히 그는 許穆門人으로서 남인 門外派를 주도하였고 노소보합만의 탕평은 진정한 탕평이 아니라고 비판하며 근기 남인은 물론 영남남인까지 포함한 대탕평이야말로 진정한 탕평이라고 주장하였다 (유봉학 1983, 11~13). 따라서 오광운의 정치사상을 밝힘으로써 18세기 영조대의 정치적 특징을 살펴볼 수 있을 것으로 기대한다.

II. 17~18세기 개혁 논의 속에 나타난 封建·郡縣 담론

16세기 이래 『小學』, 『近思錄』 등의 보급이 활발해지고 『性理大全』, 『朱子大全』의 연구가 진행되면서 학파의 분화가 나타났고 성리학의 이해가 심화되었다 (고영진 2012, 343~345). 성리학에 대한 이해가 깊어지면서 당시 지식인들이 조선 사회를 인식하는 방향도 이전과는 다른 양상으로 나타났다. 성리학적 이상 체제를 어떻게 더 구현할 수 있을지 고민하였으며 특히 양반 이후 무너진 정치제도를 어떻게 성리학적 이상에 부합하게 재정비할 수 있을지 고민하였다. 그리고 이러한 고민 속에 당시 봉건·군현의 제도가 체제 개혁의 근거로 적용되었다. 특히 봉건을 古禮, 古制로 인식하면서 봉건의 이상을 어떻게 제도 안에 담아낼 수 있을지 고민하는 모습이 나타났다.

17세기 인조대부터 18세기 숙종대까지 확대 실시되었던 대동법은 기존의 현물납체제에서 米나 布로 납부하는 방식으로의 전환을 의미하였다. 대동법을 전국적으로 확대 실시하기까지 오랜 시간이 걸렸던 것은 대동법이 올바른 정책이었는지에 대한 당대인들의 고민이 있었기 때문이다. 특히 대동법을 실시할 때 가장 문제가 되었던 것은 任土作貢의 원칙을 버릴 수 있는 가였다. 임

토작공은 우왕에 의해 시행되었던 제도로써 해당 지역의 토산물을 공물로 바치는 제도였다³. 조선 건국 초기부터 나타난 이 원칙은 정종이 즉위하면서 반포한 교서에도 확인되는데 “郡縣의 貢物은 土産에 따라 액수를 정하고 不産之物은 收納을 면제할 것⁴”을 명시하고 있다. 건국 초부터 나타난 임토작공의 원칙은 삼대의 이상적 형태로서 인식되었으며, 조선에서도 이 원칙을 통하여 공물을 징수하고자하였다.

하지만 시간이 지나면서 임토작공에 따른 공물 부과는 많은 문제를 야기하였다. 무엇보다 防納의 폐단이 심각하였는데 양난 이후 문제가 더욱 심화되면서 이에 대한 개혁론이 등장할 수밖에 없었다. 방납의 문제를 해결하기 위한 개혁론은 두 가지 측면에서 이루어졌다. 첫째는 공안개정론이었다. 공안개정론은 방납의 원인을 임토작공의 원칙을 충실히 지키지 않고 不産之貢을 부과했기 때문이라고 인식하여 공안에 잘못 기입된 것을 고쳐 방납을 변혁하고자 하였다. 두 번째는 대동법 실시론이었다. 대동법 실시론은 임토작공의 문제점을 지적하면서 더 이상 현물을 징수하지 않고 米나 布로 징수해야함을

지적하였다 (이정철 2010, 153-159).

한편 두 논점에서 주목되는 것은 무엇이 더 고례, 고제에 더 적합한지를 두고 논쟁을 벌였다는 점이다. 공안개정론은 일찍이 禹王의 良法으로 인식되어 실시되었던 임토작공을 성리학의 이상적 제도로 인식하였다. 반면 대동법 실시론은 이에 대해 비판하며 임토작공이 오히려 고례, 고제에 어긋난다고 지적하였다. 특히 이와 관련하여 반계 유형원의 비판이 주목되는데 유형원은 임토작공이 고례, 고제에 어긋난다는 점을 지적하면서 봉건제에서 시행하였던 원칙과 현재 시행되고 있는 공납제가 다르다고 주장하였다.

옛 封建 제후의 나라에서 토산물을 공물로 받지 않을 수가 없었을 것이니 도리에 있어서도 그렇게 해야 했을 것이다. ... 지금은 이와 달리 서울 안에서 소요되는 각종 물품을 모두 지방에다 정하기 때문에 내는 것은 백성이지만 點退하는 것은 京司이므로 일이 거꾸로 되고 만 것이다. ... 任土作貢이 비록 古法이라고 하지만 古制를 자세히 상고해 보면 오늘날 말하는 그것과는 다르다. 대체로 옛날에는 畿內에 米粟을 바치고 따로 貢物이 없었으며 畿外 諸侯에게 貢物을 받았는데 이 또한 그 國內의 10분의 1세 중에서 구하여 바쳤다. 백성이 내는 것은 田稅뿐이었었다.

³ 『태종실록』, 권26, 13년 11월 5일.

⁴ 『태조실록』, 권15, 7년 9월 12일.

그런데 지금은 田稅를 받고 또 貢物이 있으니 소위 貢物이란 것은 郡縣마다 모두 각종 물품을 바치고도 또 別徵이 있어 범으로 삼았는데 어찌 폐단이 되지 않겠는가? 이것은 이름은 같으나 내용이 다르기 때문이다.⁵

위의 내용은 『반계수록』에 나타난 유형원의 주장이다. 유형원은 봉건제에서 운영된 임토작공의 의미가 지금 조선에서 실시하고 있는 그것과 전혀 다르다고 지적하였다. 봉건제 하에서 군주가 제후에게 받았던 토산물에는 點退가 존재하지 않았다. 제후는 군주에게 봉토에서 나오는 토산물을 바칠 뿐이었고 군주 역시 이것을 거부하지 않았다. 애초에 군주가 따로 공물을 부과하지도 않았고 제후도 부담 없이 자신들의 토산물을 바칠 수 있었다. 이것이 봉건제 하에서 이루어졌던 임토작공의 의미였다. 그런데 당시 조선에서 실시되었던 임토작공의 원칙은 중앙에서 지방에 부과하였으며, 점퇴는 민인에게 부담을 작용하였다. 따라서 유형원은 현재 조선에서 실시되

고 있는 임토작공과 점퇴가 봉건의 제도와 맞지 않다고 지적하면서 오히려 대동법을 통한 부세 징수가 봉건의 이념에 더 적합하다고 주장하였던 것이다. 예컨대 대동법 실시의 논의과정에서 핵심이었던 임토작공에 대한 논쟁이 벌어질 때에 주요 논리 근거로 사용된 것이 봉건제였으며 무엇이 더 봉건제에 적합한지를 두고 논의되었음을 알 수 있다. 18세기 나타난 전제 개혁론에도 봉건·군현 논의와 함께 진행되었다. 먼저 韓元震은 정전제를 이상적 제도로 인식하였지만 조선에서는 그것을 실시하기 어렵다고 보았다.

땅이 작고 평평하며 공허한 즉 井田을 획급할 수 없다. 풍속이 兩班과 常漢의 구별이 있어 田을 균질되게 줄 수 없다. 그리하여 田稅를 1/10세로 하고 澤梁을 금하지 않아서 大民은 田을 가지고 小民은 佃作을 하게 하여 田이 있는 자는 부세를 가볍게 해주어 스스로 넉넉하게 하고 田이 없는 자는 佃作에 종사할 수 있게 하여 재물을 얻을 수 있게 하되 부세를 징수하지 않게 한다. 그러면 또한 족히

⁵ 유형원, 『반계수록』 권3, 經費

蓋古者封建 則諸侯之國 不得不貢厥土宜. 非唯禮當如此. … 今則異於是 京中所用百物 皆定於外方 而辦出者民間 點退者京司也. … 任土作貢 雖曰古法 詳考古制 則有不如今之所謂者. 蓋古者畿內 則有米粟之輸 而無貢 畿外

諸侯 乃有貢. 而所貢之物 亦自其國 以什一稅入貢備以貢 民之所出 則只是田稅而已. 今則既有田稅 又有貢物 而其所謂貢者 令逐郡逐縣 皆供百物 而別徵以納爲法 如此則安得不弊? 此所以名同 而實則異也.

自給을 할 수 있을 것이다.⁶

위의 내용은 한원진이 정전을 현재 시행할 수 없다고 지적한 대목이다. 그는 조선의 토지 형태상 정전을 실현할 수 없음을 지적하면서 현재 토지가 균질되지 못한 원인으로 양반과 상한의 구별에 주목하였다. 이에 대한 해결책으로 그는 1/10세를 주장하였는데 토지를 소유한 大民에 한해서 1/10세를 징수한다면 대민은 부세 부담이 줄어서 좋고, 토지를 소유하지 못한 小民은 부세를 부담하지 않아서 좋다고 지적하였다. 이와 같이 한원진은 봉건의 제도가 조선에 곧이곧대로 실시할 수 없기때문에 봉건의 이상을 현실에 적절하게 담아내는 것이 더 중요하다고 여겼던 것이며 시금론의 입장에서 봉건제를 군현제 안에 담을 수 있도록 노력하는 입장을 취하고 있던 것으로 생각된다.

한편 유수원은 한원진과 달리 봉건론 자체를 부정하며 군현제에 입각한 체제 개혁을 주장하였다. 특히 전제 운영 면에서는 전결을 통 틀어 각 읍마다 전액을 편성하는 額田制를 제시하였다⁷.

액전제에 대하여 유수원은 양전이 굳이 필요하지 않다고 지적하였다. 유수원은 양전이 오히려 전등을 낮추게 만들어 전세를 징수함에 있어 장애가 된다고 인식하였다. 따라서 양전을 따로 실시하지 않고 編審을 하여 전세량을 파악하고 총액을 부과하여 징수할 것을 주장하였다. 이와 같은 유수원의 주장은 당시 현실을 반영한 것이었는데, 숙종 46년(1702)에 실시된 경자양전이 사실상 실패로 돌아가면서 면세지를 통제하고 은루결을 파악하여 총결을 확대하지 못하였다 (이철성 2003, 73-79). 즉, 18세기는 더 이상 양전을 통해 국가 전국의 토지를 파악하여 수세를 할 수 없는 상황이었다. 이러한 상황 속에서 양전이 필요 없이 군현 단위에 총액만을 부과하여 전세를 징수하자는 유수원의 주장은 상당히 현실적이었으며, 영조대 비총제의 실시로 연결되었다.

유수원의 이와 같은 현실 인식은 무엇보다 봉건의 제도를 더 이상 조선에 접목시킬 수 없다는 문제의식 속에서 나타났다는 점이 주목된다. 유수원은

⁶ 한원진, 『남당선생문집』 권38, 雜織
地少平曠。則井不可畫矣。俗有兩班常漢。則田不可均授矣。然田稅什一。澤梁無禁。而大民有田。小民佃作。則有田者既以稅輕而自優。無田者得以佃作業貨而無征稅之出。則亦足以

自給矣。

⁷ 유수원, 『우서』 권6, 論田政
或曰。額田之法。其果何如。答曰。收一國之田結。邑邑編成田額。以其田等。定其稅額。逐歲徵稅可矣。

현재의 제도가 阡陌에 기반한 군현제였기 때문에, 봉건과 다르고 정전과는 반대였기 때문에 世祿을 시행해서는 안 된다고 주장하였다⁸. 앞서 서술한 유형원과 한원진 등이 봉건론에 입각하여 조선의 현실에 어떻게든 적용시켜 보려 하였던 것이라면 유수원은 조선이 봉건제 사회가 아닌 군현제 사회이기 때문에 봉건의 제도를 실현시키려 하는 것 자체를 부정적으로 인식하였다고 할 수 있다.

이상과 같이 17~18세기 개혁론에 대한 논쟁은 봉건과 군현에 대한 이해를 바탕으로 이루어졌다. 봉건제를 원론적으로 수용하여 적용시키고자 하였던 방향, 봉건제를 군현제의 현실에 어떻게 담아낼 수 있을 것인가 하는 방향, 봉건제를 부정하고 군현제에 입각한 개혁 방향 등 세 가지 조류로 나타났다. 이와 같은 봉건·군현 논의를 바탕으로 사회 개혁론이 등장하였던 데에는 성리학의 이해가 심화되면서 고려후·고종에 입각한 성리학적 이상 사회를 구현하고자 노력하였던 당시 지식인들의 역할이 크게 작용하였다. 양난 이후 무너진 체제를 복구하기 위해 당시 지식인들은 그

들이 연구할 수 있는 수준에서 최대한으로 노력하며 고민하였던 것이다.

한편 이 당시는 정국 운영에 있어서도 다양한 변화들이 나타났던 때이기도 하다. 숙종의 한국정치와 영조의 탕평정국이 운영되었던 시기인데, 특히 18세기 영조대 탕평파의 등장은 군주에 대한 인식과 사회 개혁에 대한 논의가 다양한 층위에서 검토되었는데 다음 장에서는 탕평파의 일원이었던 오광운을 중심으로 봉건·군현 논의가 당대 정국에 어떻게 반영되고 있었는지 살펴보고자 한다.

III. 吳光運의 봉건·군현 인식과 개혁론

오광운은 남인계열 인물로서 영조대 탕평정책에 적극 참여하였던 인물이다. 그는 인조대 대제학 吳竣의 현손으로 처부는 허목의 문인 權愈의 아들이었으며, 오광운 본인도 허목의 문인이었다. 또한 이익의 부친과 중형 문집 간행 시 서문을 부탁 받는 등 이익과도 일정한 관계를 가지고 있었으며, 오광운의 고모할아버지 趙相槩는 趙顯命의 일족이었고 채제공은 친형 吳弼雲의 사위였다 (이근호 2016, 75~76).

⁸ 유수원, 『迂書』 권2, 論門閥之弊
後世則不然。阡陌之制。反於井田。郡縣之法。

異於封建。則世祿。亦安能獨行耶。

오광운은 숙종 45년(1719)에 문과를 급제한 후 事變假注書로 첫 관직 생활을 시작하였다⁹. 이후 그는 경조 4년(1724) 윤 4월에 司書에 임명되는데, 이것이 그의 정치 생활에 큰 전환점이 되었을 것으로 보인다¹⁰. 司書는 世子侍講院의 정6품 관직으로, 세자를 상대로 서연을 진행하고, 세자의 정치 견해를 자문해주는 역할을 하였던 직책이었다¹¹. 경종대 당시 경종에게는 세자가 없고 훗날 영조가 되는 연잉군이 세제로 있었는데, 오광운은 연잉군을 상대로 서연을 진행했던 것이다. 이는 이후 영조 정권에서 그가 주요 인물로 발탁될 수 있음을 시사한다.

위와 같은 배경 속에서 오광운은 남인임에도 불구하고 영조대 탕평 정국에 참여할 수 있었다. 그리고 그는 당대의 사회·정치적 문제들을 해결하고자 노력하였다. 특히 오광운은 스스로를 반계 유형원의 제자라고 생각하며 유형원의 『반계수록』의 서문을 작성하였던 점이 주목된다.

오직 礪溪 柳先生은 은거하면서도 이 세상을 건지고저 이 글을 저술하여 '隨錄'이라 이름하였는데 田制로써 기본을 삼아서 井形을 구획하지 않고도 井田의 알맹이를 얻을 수 있게 하였으며 또 그것이 실시된 뒤에는 養士·選賢 任官·制軍 禮教·政法 規模·節目이 조리 있게 구비되어 훌륭하게 모두 천리로서의 원칙에 합치되어 있다.¹²

위의 내용은 오광운이 『반계수록』 서문에서 유형원이 정전을 현실 상황에 맞게 실현한 것에 대한 서술이다. 오광운은 유형원의 공전제에 대하여 정전을 곧이곧대로 토지를 9등분하여 실현하지 않았지만 원래의 정전의 이상에 부합하게 하여 변형하여 적용하였다고 평가하였다. 이와 같은 평가에서 오광운이 정전제를 이상적 제도로 인식하고 있었음을 알 수 있는데 다음의 대목에서 오광운의 인식이 더 잘 드러난다.

井田制야말로 얼마나 좋은 것인가! 그것을 실행하면 천하의 어떤 夫이든지 병사가 아닌 사람이 없을 것이며 어떤 마을이든지 방비가 조직되지 않는 데가 없을 것이며 어떤 데서나 전투 연습을 하게 되어

⁹ 『己亥四十五年增廣榜□; □승정원일기』 520책, 숙종 45년 12월 7일.

¹⁰ 『승정원일기』 567책, 경조 4년 윤 4월 26일.

¹¹ 『대전통편』, 이전, 경관직.

¹² 유형원, 『반계수록』, 서문

礪溪柳先生隱居著書 以寓夫拯揀惻怛之志 名曰隨錄. 其書以田制爲本 不畫井形而得井田之實. 然後養士選賢 任官制軍 禮教政法 規模節目 不泥不礙 沛然皆合於天理.

方伯 連帥의 통솔과 통제가 유기적으로 연결되지 않는 데가 없을 것이기 때문에 설사 어떤 외적 백만의 침략이 있더라도 이렇게까지 유린되게는 못하였을 것이다. 文天祥[文山]이 4개 군단을 설치하자고 건의할 때에 몽고가 그 정보만을 듣고도 겁을 내었거늘 하물며 井田에서 결속된 군인을 선발하여 나라에 충성하는 사상으로써 교양하며 또 方伯들로 하여금 통솔케 하는 데야 매를 들어 침략자의 등을 치는 것쯤은 문제도 되지 않을 것이다.¹³

오광운은 정전제가 단순히 부세 수취의 기능 뿐 아니라 군사 방비로도 적합한 정치라고 인식하였다. 정전제가 민인들을 토지에 긴박시켜 각각을 모두 군사로 만들어 외적의 침입에 대비한다는 점에서 봉건의 이상적 제도로 인식하였던 것이다. 하지만 앞선 한원진의 지적처럼 오광운도 정전제를 조선의 현실에 곧이곧대로 적용하기 힘들었다고 생각하였던 듯싶다.

혹자가 말하길 삼대의 제도로 말하자면 반드시 封建의 井田이 있으니 先儒들은 봉건을 행해하고자 하며 정전에서부터 반드시 시행하여야한다고 말하였는데 그대

는 井田은 복구하길 원하면서 封建은 어찌 폐하고자 하는가. 이에 말하길 나는 소위 州縣이라고 말하는 것에 또한 封建의 遺制를 담을 수 있다고 한 것이다.¹⁴

위의 서술에서 오광운의 봉건·군현론에 대한 생각이 잘 드러나있다. 오광운은 정전제가 이상적인 제도인 것을 알았지만 봉건제로의 복구는 어렵다고 보았다. 때문에 오광운은 군현제의 틀 안에서 정전제를 최대한 실현할 수 있도록 고민해야함을 지적하였으며 정전제의 취지를 현실에 맞게 개편하여 새로운 체제를 제시한 유형원에 대하여 긍정적 평가를 내렸던 것이다.

한편 정전제를 긍정하면서도 적용이 어렵다고 지적한 오광운의 논지에서 그의 현실 인식을 알 수 있다. 오광운은 봉건의 제도를 긍정하지만 군현제 사회인 조선의 현실을 직시해야 한다고 생각하였다. 때문에 그는 시금론의 입장에서 봉건·군현에 절충적 자세를 취하며 봉건제를 긍정하면서 군현제가 현재 지속되고 있으며 상황에 맞게 제도를 개혁해야 함을 지적하였다. 이와 같은 군

¹³ 유형원, 『반계수록』, 서문

善哉. 井地之制也 天下無一夫而非兵 無一里而非守 無一時而非服習 而方伯連帥 羅絡相望. 虜雖有鐵騎百萬 安得猖獗至此. 文山請建四閫 虜聞之吐舌. 況以井田和睦之兵 而明親上事長

之義 以統於方伯連帥 則其於制挺撻虜也何有.

¹⁴ 오광운, 『약산만고』, 권14, 史評 下
或曰. 言三代之制者. 必曰封建井田. 先儒言欲行封建. 必自井田始. 子欲復井田而廢封建何歟. 曰. 吾所謂州縣者. 亦封建之遺制也

현재 인식론은 柳宗元과 봉건에 대한 그의 평가에서 이와 같은 모습이 확연히 드러난다.

封建의 공은 一世의 공이며 時王의 공이다. 州郡의 공은 萬世百王의 공이다. 聖人이 다시 일어나도 바꿀 수는 없다. 郡縣을 제정한 秦의 정사에 대하여 사람들이 그 법을 廢하지 않았고, 郡縣을 옳다고 한 柳宗元에 대하여 사람들이 그 말을 廢하지 않았으니 또한 聖人の 공이다.¹⁵

위에서 오광운은 유종원의 군현론을 지지하며 봉건의 공을 일시의 공으로 군현의 공을 만세의 공으로 평가하였다. 이것은 秦代 이후 제정된 군현제가 현재까지 유지되고 있었던 이유를 설명하고자 한 것이며 당시의 조선도 군현제 사회였음을 지적하고자 한 것이었다. 따라서 유종원은 군현제 사회 안에 봉건의 이상을 담는 형식의 제도 개혁론을 주장하게 된 것이다.

한편 오광운이 군현제 사회 현실을 강조하였던 것에는 당시 정국의 상황도 고려되어야 할 것이다. 앞서 서술하였듯이 오광운은 영조대 탕평정국에 있어서 핵심 세력이었다. 그는 영남남인

까지 아우르는 대탕평을 주장하였으며 탕평정국을 주도함에 있어서 국왕의 중요성을 강조하였다. 堯·舜·禹·湯의 執中은 至公이며 子莫의 執中은 私意라고 지적하면서 요순의 집중을 따라 군주가 황극을 세워 탕평의 중심이 되고 노소뿐 아니라 남인 모두까지 수용하는 대탕평의 주도자가 되어야 한다고 제기하였다 (이근호 2016, 162~165). 예컨대 오광운은 자신이 처한 정치적 입지를 확고히 하기 위하여 군주의 역할을 강조할 필요가 있었고 이로 인하여 요순의 삼대지치를 이뤄내야 한다고 지적하면서 군주를 公天下로 규정하였던 유종원의 군현제 논리를 확대재생산할 필요가 있었던 것이다.

이러한 흐름 속에서 오광운은 당시 벌열화되고 있던 탕평파에 대한 비판도 제기하였다. 그는 世卿에 의해 정치가 운영되는 세태를 비판하였는데 다음의 서술에서 확인할 수 있다.

『春秋』에서 世卿을 기롱하였는데 『周書』에 나오는 尹氏, 武氏, 仍叔之子과 『魯書』에 나오는 季友, 仲遂이 그러하다. 그 경계를 심도 있게 고하였는데 魯代의 三家가 이렇게 망했고, 晉代의 六卿이 이렇게

¹⁵ 오광운, 『약산만고』 권14, 史評 下
封建之爲公者. 一世之公也. 時王之公也. 州郡之爲公者. 萬世百王之公也. 聖人復起. 不

可易也. 制郡縣者秦政. 而不以人廢法. 是郡縣者宗元. 而不以人廢言. 亦聖人之公也.

망했고 齊代의 田氏가 이렇게 망하였으니 두려워하지 않을 수 있겠는가. 우리 왕조는 世祿이 있고 世卿은 없으니 聖王之의 제도였다. 그러나 나라의 풍속이 오로지 門閥만을 用人하고 있으니 문벌이 아닌 한미한 가문[冷族]은 비록 伊尹과 傅說의 재주를 가지고 있다 할지라도 名塗에 들어설 수 없다. 父兄의 자리를 잇는 것만이 오로지 등과할 수 있게끔 절차가 변하여 모두 宰輔에게 이르게 되었으니 이것 또한 世卿이다. 聖神은 서로 이어 권세를 멸하고 그 위에 있으니 黨議로써 分裂하는 것을 무겁게 하였다. ... 名塗에 用人함에 있어 한 번도 옛 흔적을 돌아보지 않으니 어찌 世卿의 禍가 없다고 하겠는가.¹⁶

위에서 오광운은 『춘추』에 나오는 世卿을 비판하며 조선은 원래 世卿은 없고 世祿만이 있었는데 어느 순간부터 조선도 門閥만을 등용하면서 세경이 나타났음을 비판하였다. 때문에 아무리 능력이 있는 인재라도 문벌이 아니면 등용될 수 없는 현실을 지적한 것이다.

한편 이와 같은 오광운의 지적은 앞서 지적한 당시 정국과 연관 지어 살펴볼 수 있을 것이다. 영조대의 탕평정국은 초반에 소론 중심의 탕평에서 己

酉處分과 辛酉大訓을 거치며 노론 중심의 탕평으로 전환되어갔는데, 기본적으로 노론과 소론 중심으로 탕평 정국이 운영되었다 (정만조 1985, 109~111). 또한 노론과 소론의 대표적인 탕평파의 각 가문은 서로간의 혼인, 왕실과의 혼인을 통하여 벌열화가 진행되었다 (이근호 2016, 89~93). 따라서 남인이었던 오광운은 탕평파 내에서 자신의 입지를 강조하기 위해서라도 군주의 권한을 강조하고 세경을 비판하면 벌열화되는 현상을 비판할 수밖에 없었던 것이다.

오광운이 군주를 공적 대상으로 인식하였음은 그의 君師論에서 잘 나타난다. 오광운은 三代를 理世界, 그 이후를 氣世界, 당대를 私世界로 규정하며 사세계에서는 군주는 있지만 신하가 없기 때문에 군주가 스승이 되어 신하들을 가르치고 이끌어야한다고 주장하였다. 여기에 더하여 군주를 理로 신하를 氣로 규정하여 군신관계를 이기론으로 설명함으로써 君師의 지위에 있는 군주가 신하들을 통솔해야하며, 신하들은 군주에게 복종해야함을 지적하였다 (이근

¹⁶ 오광운, 『약산만고』, 권13, 史評 上
春秋譏世卿。於周書尹氏，武氏，仍叔之子。
於魯書季友，仲遂。其告戒深矣。魯以三家亡。
晉以六卿亡。齊以田氏亡。可不懼哉。我朝
有世祿無世卿。聖王之制也。然國俗專以門閥

用人。單門冷族。雖抱伊，傅之才。無以通於
名塗。承藉父兄者。一登科第。節次推遷。皆
至宰輔。此亦世卿也。聖神相承。威權在上。
重以黨議分裂。… 用人之塗。一循舊轍。則安
知無世卿之禍耶。

호 2016, 111~115). 예컨대 오광운은 군주를 탕평정국의 중심 역할자로 규정하고 있었는데 이것은 군현제에 입각하여 군주의 존재를 공천하로 규정하며 통치의 정당성을 부여하였던 것이다.

IV. 결론

전근대 동북아시아에서는 봉건과 군현이라는 정치체제를 중심으로 사회체제를 이해하였다. 당대의 지식인들은 두 체제를 적절히 수용함으로써 사회문제를 해결하고자 노력하였다. 토지 제도, 관리 임용, 군주의 통치 정당성 등 다양한 층위에서 봉건·군현의 논의가 검토되어 나타났다. 특히 이와 같은 논의는 중국에서 먼저 시작되었으며 이후 조선과 일본에서도 성리학의 발달과 함께 사회 개혁의 논리 근거로서 사용되었다.

17세기 이후 조선의 지식인들은 양난의 피해로부터 사회를 복구시키기 위해 많은 개혁론들을 제시하였다. 본고에서는 특히 대동법과 전세 비총제를 중심으로 살펴보았는데 부세제도를 개혁함으로써 민인의 부담을 덜어주는 한편 조정에서는 안정적으로 재원을 확보하고자 노력하였다. 한편 대동법과 전세 비총제의 개혁론은 봉건·군현에 대한 이

해를 바탕으로 전개되었다. 봉건제에서 시행하였던 임토작공과 정전제가 군현제 사회였던 조선의 현실과 맞지 않았기 때문에 이것을 어떻게 적용할 수 있을지 논의한 것이다. 이때의 논의과정은 원론적 봉건론에 입각하여 정전을 어떻게 실현하자는 의견이 있었는가하면 군현제 사회 현실을 지적하며 봉건제의 형태를 시행해서는 안 된다는 입장도 존재하였다. 한편 대부분의 의견은 군현제의 현실 속에 봉건제를 담아내고자 하는 방향으로 진행되었는데 18세기 영조대 탕평파의 일원이었던 오광운도 이와 같은 절충론적 입장을 가지고 있었다.

오광운이 절충적 입장을 지니게 된 것에는 당시 정치 현실과 맞물려 있었다. 그는 문외파 남인으로서 노소중심의 탕평정국에서 소수의 입장을 지니고 있었다. 때문에 탕평파의 핵심 가문들이 서로 혼인관계를 형성하여 정치권력을 독점해나가는 모습에 비판적 시선을 보낼 수밖에 없었다. 『춘추』의 예시를 들어가며 세경을 비판하고 유종원의 군현론을 적극 수용하였던 것도 탕평파의 벌열화를 경계하고자 하는 노력에서 나타났다. 또한 군주의 공적 지위를 강조하면서 대탕평의 중요성을 피력하였는데 문벌가문들이 권력을 독점하는 것에

대해 군주가 경계해야함을 지적하였던 것으로 이해할 수 있다.

오광운이 봉건제의 폐단을 비판하면서 군현론을 수용하는 자세를 보여주었지만 유수원과 같은 원론적 군현론자는 아니었다. 그는 정전제를 긍정적으로 평가하였고 삼대의 제도가 이상적이

었음을 인정하였다. 다만 지금의 현실에 그것을 구현해내기 어렵기 때문에 군현제의 상황에 맞춰 변용하여 수행해야한다고 보았던 것이다. 따라서 오광운은 군현제의 틀 안에 봉건의 이념을 담고자 노력하였던 절충론자로 분류할 수 있을 것이다.

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고려대학교
KOREA UNIVERSITY

Friday, May 27th 2022

13:00-15:15

Panel C

Discussant Lisa Min (RIKS)

Moderator 고현정 (Korea University)

Presenters Patrick Vierthaler (Kyoto University)
Minah Kang (Johns Hopkins University)
Yefrem Yefremov (Al Farabi Kazakh National University)
Dongil Shin (Kyungpook University)

From Journalism towards Academia: Conservative Memory Constructs of Syngman Rhee since the late 1990s

Patrick Vierthaler

Preface¹⁶⁸

No society can be said to possess a unified and static historical memory. Multiple memory communities co-exist within a society, each affected by the social organization of transmission and the different media within a given society (Burke 1997, 53). To understand the plurality and dynamics of memory communities, we ought to inquire who remembers something, and how (Assmann 2002, 62-63). As Ernest Renan assesses, “while triumph [...] inevitably turns into the past, the memory of defeat points towards the future [,] ultimately strengthening national unity.”¹⁶⁹ Victors, as Peter Burke points out, “can afford to forget history,” whereas “the losers are unable to accept what happened and are condemned to brood

over it, relive it, and reflect how different it might have been (Burke 1997, 53).”

This is particularly the case on the Korean peninsula. Divided since 1948, (South) Korean modern and contemporary history can be narrated as a series of traumatic events: colonialization (1905/10–45), division and war (1945–53), followed by a period of three consecutive dictatorships (1948–87).¹⁷⁰ The “losers,” in this context, are the Korean nation, the *minjok*, remaining divided, in an internalized “structure of division,” and the oppressed masses, the *minjung*, in their struggle against autocratic rule. Following democratization (1987), South Korea was in a process of transitioning from autocracy to democracy throughout the 1990s.¹⁷¹ Despite the South Korean people as the central actor in bringing about change,

¹⁶⁸ Romanization in the present paper follows McCune-Reischauer, except for names used widely in English under a different spelling, such as: Seoul, Syngman Rhee, Roh Moo-hyun, *Chosun ilbo*, *Donga ilbo*, *Joongang ilbo*, *Hankyoreh*, *Kyunghyang sinmun*. An earlier version of this research has been presented at academic workshops in Tokyo (Nov. 2021) and Tel Aviv (Dec. 2021). This manuscript, in a slightly longer version, is currently submitted to a peer-reviewed journal and awaiting editorial decision as whether to send it to peer review or not.

¹⁶⁹ Quoted after Assmann, *Der lange Schatten*, 65.

¹⁷⁰ Political scientist Choi Chang-jip speaks of colonial rule, division and authoritarianism as three fundamental cleavages for political conflicts in South Korea, re-surfacing in society

depending on a changing international context. Quoted after Henry Em, “National Discourse in Modern Korea, Minjok as a Democratic Imaginary” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1995), 140. Similarly, Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson speak of de-colonialization, division and democratization as “three unresolved issues” in contemporary South Korea. Cf. Gi Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, MA and London: University of Harvard Press, 1999), 2.

¹⁷¹ A proponent of this view as democratization as an on-going process is the political scientist Choi Chang-jip. Cf. Ch’oe Chang-jip, *Minjuhwa ihu ūi minjujuŭi* (Seoul: Humanitas, 2002).

the democratization process itself had been largely top-down (Choe 2002, 36-37, 110-122). Continuities between the authoritarian and post-authoritarian period, notably in the National Security Law (NSL) and the socio-political structure of South Korean society, are apparent (Kraft 2006, 627-635). And while a process of historical fact-finding and transitional justice has begun in the 1990s,¹⁷² South Korean society and its relationship with the past remains highly polarized to this day. In post-authoritarian South Korea, institutionally, “conservatives” (*posu* 보수) are usually defined as the Cold War establishment and their heirs, whereas “progressives” (*chinbo* 진보) trace their legitimacy to the democratization and opposition movement of the 1960s–80s, in particular to the Gwangju Uprising.¹⁷³ Constituting the two major memory communities in post-authoritarian South Korea, this conservative-progressive divide stretches far beyond the mnemonic realm. Manifesting itself in politics, mass media, civic activism, and to some extent into academic scholarship, it sustains what Aleida Assmann terms an “asymmetry in

remembering”:

As long as [this asymmetry] continues, the war continues. Triumphant victors prolong the oppression [of the defeated] into peacetime. A civil war is only overcome when the *symmetry of remembering* is restored and both sides can set aside their opposed memories in a collective, higher frame (Assman 2002, 71).

The contested memory of Syngman Rhee (1875–1965), a life-long independence activist and both the ROK Provisional Government’s (1919–25) and the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) first president (1948–60), illustrates this asymmetry.

Since the 1980s, besides from settling the colonial (1910–45) as well as the more recent autocratic past (1961–87), the liberation period (1945–48/53), and with it the history surrounding the North-South division of the Korean peninsula, was at the center of attention from Korean historians.¹⁷⁴ The institutionalization of “contemporary history,” the post-1945 history of South Korea as a subject, was led by former democratization activists.¹⁷⁵ As a result,

¹⁷² For this process, cf. the articles by Suh Jae-jung, Kim Dong-choon and Lisa Yoneyama in *Critical Asian Studies* 42, no. 4 (2010).

¹⁷³ Although dividing South Korean society in two camps is simplifying, this division into conservatives and progressives is widely accepted in Korea. Two extensive studies on conservatives and progressives are: Nam Si-uk, *Han’guk chinbo seryōk yōn’gu*. Rev. and ext. ed. (Seoul: Chōng midiō, 2018); Nam Si-uk, *Han’guk posu seryōk yōn’gu*. Third, rev. ed. (Seoul: Chōng midiō, 2020). The centrality of Gwangju is argued e.g. by Park Myōng-lim, *Yōksa wa chisik kwa sahoe: han’guk*

chōnjaeng ihae wa han’guk sahoe (Seoul: Nanam, 2011), 39–44.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Yu Yōng-ik, ed., *Sujōngjuūi hwa han’guk hyōndaesa* (Revisionism and Korean contemporary history) (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1998), 9–14.

¹⁷⁵ The late 1980s saw the establishment of three important research institutes that were to become the center of (progressive) historical research in post-authoritarian South Korea: the Institute for Korean Historical Studies (Yōksa Munje Yōn’guso 역사문제연구소, est. 1986), the Korean History

progressive, state-critical narratives of Korean history through a *minjung* lens, focusing on the unresolved collaborator issue, and stressing re-unification as the central task of national history, proved especially popular in the years after democratization.¹⁷⁶

Prior studies on historical writing, memory and activism in post-authoritarian South Korea mostly focus on the 1980s counterculture or developments since the 2000s.¹⁷⁷ One study on conservative efforts to re-gain hegemony over historical discourse in post-authoritarian South Korea connects conservative reappraisals of

Syngman Rhee to the so-called “New Right” and the dissemination of neoliberalism (Macrae 2016, 332–338). However, first calls for a “re-evaluation” of Syngman Rhee surfaced in the early/mid-1990s, long before a “New Right” began to constitute itself.¹⁷⁸ Equaling the early/mid-1990s and the mid-/late 2000s — a span of roughly twenty years — under the banner of “neoliberalism” overly simplifies complex historical developments. Rather, a re-orientation of conservative historical consciousness after democratization, leading to the formation of a “New Right,” should be grasped as a

Society (Han’guk Yōksa Yōn’guhoe 한국역사연구회, est. 1988, IKHS), and the Kuro Institute of Historical Studies [Kuro Yōksa Yōn’guso 구로역사연구소, present-day Institute of Historical Studies, Yōksahak Yōn’guso 역사학연구소, est. 1988, IHS]. For example, the KHS was established with the aim to “create a scientific historiography not blinded by ideology,” from a “democratic [...] ethnic perspective on Korea”, seeking “a historical scholarship that is conscious of the people (*minjung*) as the main agent in furthering social change” with the ultimate goal to “achieve the historical task of autonomous re-unification”. Source: “Ch’angnip sŏn’ŏnmun,” *Han’guk Yōksa Yōn’guhoe*. <http://www.koreanhistory.org/about/>

¹⁷⁶ The six-volume *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* (Korean history before and after liberation) series (1979–1989) and the historiography of Kang Man-gil, are exemplary for this stream of historiography. Cf. Henry Em, *The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 150–155 and Park, *Yōksa wa*, 44–53. To this date, the *Insik* series remains among the best-selling treatments of post-liberation history.

¹⁷⁷ For 1980s *minjung* historical views, cf. Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca, NA: Cornell University Press, 2007). For 1980s historiography and a right-wing counter in the 2000s cf. Em, *The Great Enterprise*, 150–155; For a study on civic activism in the 2000s cf. Jiyeon Kang, *Igniting the Internet: Youth and Activism in Postauthoritarian South Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016); Kim Chŏng-in. *Yōksa chŏnjaeng: kwagŏ rŭl haesŏk hanŭn ssaum* [History wars: the struggles over the interpretation of the past] (Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2016).

¹⁷⁸ Generally, late 2004 is accepted as the point of emergence of the “New Right” as a (civic and intellectual) movement. In long-term, their rise could be traced back to 1998, when a group of intellectuals (who in November 2004 launched the first “New Right” organization) launched the monthly *Sidae Chŏngsin* [Zeitgeist]. Cf. Vladimir Tikhonov (Pak Noja), “The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement,” *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (2019): 9–14, and Patrick Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration of the New Right’s Formative Period (2003–2008): Conservative Experiences, Mass Media and Cultural Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea,” *European Journal of Korean Studies* 20, no. 1 (2020): 39–42, 52.

gradual, on-going historical process, culminating in what could be described a “cultural trauma” among conservatives by the mid-2000s.¹⁷⁹

In this article, I will thus shift the focus to the mid-1990s. To conservatives, who saw themselves on the defensive against the progressive *Zeitgeist* of the early 1990s,¹⁸⁰ the end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to construct a historical narrative to re-center the country’s ruling elite as the bearers of history within South Korean Cultural memory. Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union and its satellites, a sense of post-Cold War triumphalism reached Korean conservatives. Against the collapse of the North Korean economy, the inter-Korean rivalry appeared to have been “won” by the South. Newly declassified primary sources proved that North Korea had initiated the full-scale war in June 1950, giving legitimacy to the Southern side. In this atmosphere, “re-evaluating” Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s first president, as the nation’s “founding father” who laid the groundwork for the country’s later economic and social development, constituted a first of several attempts over the next years to place positive

“achievements” into the core of South Korean Cultural memory against progressive, elite-critical narratives of division, war, and failed de-colonialization.¹⁸¹

Through a mnemohistorical approach, I will trace where the roots of these re-evaluation efforts lie and how they unfolded, focusing on an exhibition and an extensive article series in *Chosun Ilbo* on the fiftieth anniversary of liberation in 1995, and analyze how these developments and the disputes surrounding it set a blueprint for later contestations over South Korea’s Cultural memory. To do so, I will first outline the memory of Syngman Rhee up until the early 1990s. Following, I will re-construct the historical process of the 1995 *Chosun*-centered re-evaluation efforts, grounded in a critical discourse analysis of mass media and public history surrounding the commemorations. I argue that the contestations over Syngman Rhee, as one of the first open mnemonic contestations over South Korean contemporary history in the wake of democratization, are critical to understand the further development into the “psycho-historical fragmentation” (Kim ed. 2019) of South Korean society concerning its history and memory that was to become

¹⁷⁹ Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 40–41. Earlier, I argued that the New Right essentially lay bare an institutional rift within South Korean academia of (conservative) political, economic and Western history as opposed to a (progressive) contemporary history. Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 51–53 and Vierthaler, “The New Right,” 25–26.

¹⁸⁰ To Macrae, presenting a new discourse on modern Korean history was “a task of particularly pressing importance” for conservatives after democratization. Macrae, “Post-Cold War,” 351.

¹⁸¹ An example for this is the 2008 Foundation Day Dispute [*kŏn’gukchŏl nonjaeng*], when New Right scholars influenced state-led commemorations under the (conservative) Lee Myung-bak government. Cf. Patrick Vierthaler, “How to Place August 15 in South Korean History? The New Right, the ‘1948 Foundation’ Historical View and the 2008 Kŏn’gukchŏl Dispute,” *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 10 (2018): 159–160.

characteristic since the mid-2000s.

1. The Memory of Syngman Rhee Until the 1990s

Until the 1990s, any commemoration of Syngman Rhee remained strictly confined to a small circle of Rhee's family and his former aides. In 1975/76, a "Committee to Commemorate Dr. Syngman Rhee" (Yi Sŭng-man Paksa Kinyŏm Saŏphoe 李承晩博士記念事業會, henceforth Rhee Committee) was established with Yun Chi-yŏng¹⁸² as its chair.¹⁸³ The committee was involved in the construction of several Rhee sculptures since the late 1970s in places connected to Rhee's

life such as Pai Chai middle and high school in Seoul or Inha University of Engineering in Inch'ŏn.¹⁸⁴ In the mid-1980s, the Ihwajang, Rhee's former residence was re-modelled into a small museum commemorating his life, attracting a steady flow of visitors in the first weeks following its opening.¹⁸⁵ According to a public opinion poll from early 1995, Rhee was remembered as the "most corrupt" political leader in South Korean history.¹⁸⁶ According to another 1995 Gallup/*Chosun ilbo* opinion poll, the First Republic (1948–60) mostly evoked negative feelings among respondents: "poverty" (62.25%), "chaos" (58.1%), and "darkness" (35.8%).¹⁸⁷ Hence,

¹⁸² Yun Chi-yŏng (尹致暎, 1898–1996) served as the first ROK minister for internal affairs (17 July–24 Dec. 1948), and as a vice-speaker to the Korean parliament from July 1952 to May 1954. Not joining the Liberal Party until January 1960 (but nevertheless supporting Syngman Rhee), Yun twice failed to get re-elected in 1956 and 1958. Dismissing the April Revolution as an "incident," Yun went on to become an influential politician in the Park Chung-hee era, joining Park's Democratic Republican Party and serving as the party's chairman from May to December 1963 and again from June 1968 to December 1970, supported Park's re-election in 1969, left the party in 1980, and served as an advisor to Chun Doo-hwan during the 1980s.

¹⁸³ "Ko Yi Sŭng-man paksa 10-chugi maja kinyŏm saŏphoe ch'angnip chunbiwi palgi (故李承晩博士 10周忌 맞아 紀念事業會創立準備委員長)," *Donga ilbo*, July 12, 1975; "Dokja kesip'an (読者게시판)," *Chosun ilbo*, March 26, 1976.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. e.g. "Yi Sŭng-man paksa tongsang chemak Inhadae sŏ, 4.19 ttae ch'ŏlgŏ twi ch'ŏūm (李承晩막사 銅像제막 仁荷大서, 4.19에撤去되처음)," *Donga ilbo*, February 26, 1979.

¹⁸⁵ "Ihwajang konggae ...ŏje 4-ch'ŏnmyŏng mullyŏ (梨花莊 공개....어제 4천명 몰려)," *Chosun ilbo*, March 27, 1988.

¹⁸⁶ Mentioned in "'Yi Sŭng-man...'-chŏn kaemak taedam: 'Inmul t'amgu nŏmŏ hyŏndaesa chae-p'yŏngga kyegi ro' (「이승만...」展 개막 대답 "人物탐구 넘어 現代史재평가 계기로)" A conversation on the occasion of the Rhee Exhibition opening: "a chance to overcome studies into the person and instead re-evaluate Rhee in the context of contemporary history)," *Chosun ilbo*, February 5, 1995.

¹⁸⁷ "'Kajang hullyung han chŏngch'i chidoja nŭn nugu imnikka?" Pak Chŏng-hŭi–Kim Yŏng-sam–Yi Sŭng-man sun ("가장 훌륭한 정치지도자는 누구입니까?" 朴正熙-金泳三-李承晩順 "Who is the most excellent political leader?" No. 1 Park Chung-hee, no. 2 Kim Yŏng-sam, no. 3 Syngman Rhee)," *Chosun ilbo*, March 5, 1995.

in the mid-1990s, Syngman Rhee was far from being remembered as a “founding father” within South Korean Cultural memory.

Historian Yu Yǒng-ik (柳永益, *1936–), a scholar of Syngman Rhee’s life, traces the roots of a negatively connotated memory concerning Rhee back to the early 1960s, and explains this predominance of a fiercely negative narrative with the influence of progressive historical narratives onto South Korean society since the late 1970s (Yu 2006, 396–400). While Yu acknowledges that a small number of writers — notably Rhee’s trusted aide Robert T. Oliver (1909–2000)¹⁸⁸ and the protestant pastor Kim In-sō — did write positively on Rhee, these narratives were all but ignored by South Koreans. Negative narratives, on the other hand, were far more influential. Quoting an essay published in *Sin donga* back in 1965, a sense of “70% errors versus 30% achievements” was dominant among South Korean intellectuals during the 1960s and 1970s (Yu 2006, 409). According to Yu, a critical account of Rhee’s legacy, published in 1960 in the US by John M. Taylor (under the pseudonym Richard C. Allen),¹⁸⁹ had greatly influenced the writings of journalist Song Kōn-ho, whose *Haebang chōnhusa ūi insik* series was a highly, if not the most-influential work of contemporary history among democratization activists and

progressive historians in the 1980s and 1990s. In Taylor’s account, Rhee is presented as a “patriot degraded through power” who, through gradually transforming South Korea into an autocracy, had damaged his credibility as a life-long independence fighter beyond repair himself (Yu 2006, 396–397). Song introduces Taylor’s narrative to South Korea and, in a 1984 essay, constructs his argument upon Taylor’s memoir to emphasize “three great errors” of Syngman Rhee: “going along with the national interest of foreign powers and being at the forefront of dividing the country,” “clouding the national spirit by sticking up to those pro-Japanese traitors who betrayed the ethnicity during the colonial period,” and “transforming this country not into an autonomous, but into a country subjugated to foreign powers.” (Yu 2006, 397) In other words, Rhee was held directly responsible for division, failed de-colonialization, and an anti-communist rhetoric becoming the official state view in a ROK closely aligned to the US during the Cold War, in a narrative greatly influencing a generation of South Koreans since the 1980s.¹⁹⁰ Further even, Song argues that Rhee’s political actions were “first and foremost” responsible for the “present [...] suffering of the Korean people,” (Yu 2006, 397) i.e. the root for decades of military dictatorship under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan — and the torture, violence and massacres brought along with it

¹⁸⁸ Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co, 1954); Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea: 1942–1960* (Seoul: Panmun, 1978).

¹⁸⁹ Richard C. Allen [= John M. Taylor] (1960): *Korea’s Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait* (Rutland, VT: Tuttle, 1960).

¹⁹⁰ The influence on Song’s essay on a negative memory of Rhee, culminating in a historical writing characterized by “powerful binaries” of “genuine nationalism versus mindless anticommunism, and *minjung*-oriented democracy versus mere formal democracy” has also been argued in Em, *The Great Enterprise*, 152–153.

against the perceived threat of a communist, North Korean invasion.

2. First Calls for a “Re-Evaluation” of Syngman Rhee

Against this prevalently negative memory of Syngman Rhee, in the early 1990s, first calls for a “re-evaluation” (= *chae-p’yōngga* 再評價) and “re-examination” (= *chae-chomyōng* 再照明) of Syngman Rhee’s life and legacy emerged beyond Rhee’s former aides and family. In a letter to the editor of *Chosun ilbo* published on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Rhee’s death in July 1990, the arguments and terminology found in this letter foretells the coordinates that were to define later contestations over the memory of the liberation period and the First Republic:

The negative history [Rhee] left is a fact. That Rhee has amended the constitution by force and carried out fraudulent elections are clearly visible mistakes. However, in spite of these errors, we must not hide his legacy as an independence activist and in the process of establishment of the Republic of Korea.¹⁹¹

Differing from earlier calls stressing the need for compiling and sorting Rhee’s legacy, the letter criticizes “a small number of radical [= *kūppinjōk* 急進的, i.e. “progressive”] academics who condemn [Rhee’s establishment of the ROK] as anti-unification” as distortions of history, the author describes a full “communization” of the Korean peninsula as an alternative possibility that must not be forgotten.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ “Unam 25-jugi maja kū ōpchōk chae-p’yōngga rūl

(雲南25주기 맞아 그 업적 재평가를),” *Chosun ilbo*, July 23,

1990.

Written in the wake of the Eastern European revolutions of 1989–90 and the Tiananmen Massacre in China, but before the dissolvment of the Soviet Union, the closing argument states that:

[...] in thought of the sweat and blood that has flown in the name of communism, I cannot help but think of anything else that Rhee’s decision for establishing [= *kōn’guk* 建國] [the ROK] was *very much* the right decision.¹⁹³

In other words, even before the eventual fall of the Soviet Union the following year, in this letter, a long-standing, implicitly anti-communist rhetoric blended with an emerging sense of post-Cold War triumphalism. Furthermore, the terminology employed by the author — “establishment,” “radical progressives,” “anti-unification” — foreshadows the mnemonic polarization between conservatives and progressives over the issue of division and unification that would openly erupt into disputes over Cultural memory a few years later.

While this letter remained an isolated call for such a re-evaluation within established mass media at that time, similar calls were voiced in more orchestrated fashion within the far-right monthly *Han’guk nondan* (Korea Forum 韓國論壇) after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Established in September 1989 by Yi To-hyōng (李度珩, 1933–2020), a former journalist and editorialist at *Chosun ilbo* (1964–89), *Han’guk nondan* was a mouthpiece for outspokenly anti-communist,

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid. Italics added by the author for emphasis.

far-right voices in post-authoritarian South Korea, particularly prior to the advent of online media in the early 2000s.¹⁹⁴ Besides from an interview with Rhee Committee chairman Yun Ch'i-yŏng in September 1991 (arguing for a re-evaluation of Rhee),¹⁹⁵ another interview with Rhee's adoptive son Rhee In-su in August 1993,¹⁹⁶ and the publication of parts of Rhee's diary in August–September 1993,¹⁹⁷ the magazine extensively dealt with Rhee's legacy in a series, “re-thinking and re-reading Korean contemporary history” (1992),¹⁹⁸ and a special issue titled “great men of Korean contemporary history: Syngman Rhee” (1993).¹⁹⁹ In 1995, amidst the *Chosun ilbo*-

centered re-evaluation of Syngman Rhee, a reader of *Han'guk nondan* thus noted with satisfaction that the small journal, as a pioneer in advocating such a re-evaluation, had paved the way for South Korea's largest newspaper to lead large-scale commemorations of Syngman Rhee as South Korea's founding father.²⁰⁰

3. *Chosun ilbo* and the 1995 “Re-Evaluation” of Syngman Rhee

To conservatives, the fiftieth anniversary of liberation in 1995 provided an opportunity to aim for a revision of South Korean Cultural memory concerning the memory of division.

¹⁹⁴ In the first issue, Yi To-hyŏng, amidst a “historical period of change” of democratization and the final moments of the Cold War, expresses concerns over an “eroding of morals [and] authority” and a “chaotic state of intellectual thought” against an emerging “far-left extremist camp,” setting the aim of *Han'guk nondan* in providing “a forum to seek a correct [= *olparŭn*] Korea image of tomorrow.” Source: “Ch'anggansa (창간사 Statement on starting the journal),” *Han'guk nondan* 1 (September 1989): 26–27.

¹⁹⁵ “Int'ŏbyu: Wŏllo chŏngch'iin Yun Ch'i-yŏng ‘Yi Sŭng-man ŭi minjujuŭi’ ije chae-p'yŏngga toeya handa (인터뷰 : 원로 정치인 윤치영 ‘이승만의 민주주의’ 이제 재평가 돼야 한다),” *Han'guk nondan* 25 (September 1991): 69–77.

¹⁹⁶ “Na ŭi abŏji Yi Sŭng-man: widaehan nakcho (나의 아버지 이승만 : 위대한 落照 My father Syngman Rhee: a great setting sun),” *Han'guk nondan* 48 (August 1993): 104–112.

¹⁹⁷ “Ponji tokchŏm: ch'oech'o ro konggae toenŭn Yi Sŭng-man ilgi (본지독점 최초로 공개되는 이승만 일기 Exclusive: The

diary of Syngman Rhee made public for the first time),”

Han'guk nondan 48 (August 1993): 75–97; “Ponji tokchŏm 2-hoe yŏnjae: ch'oech'o ro konggae toenŭn Yi Sŭng-man ilgi (ha) (본지독점 2 회연재 / 최초로 공개되는 이승만 일기 (하))

Exclusive series: The diary of Syngman Rhee made public for the first time, 2),” *Han'guk nondan* 49 (September 1993): 140–161.

¹⁹⁸ “Re-thinking and re-reading contemporary history (다시 생각하며 읽는 현대사),” *Han'guk nondan* 29–41 (Jan.–Dec. 1992). Series in 11 installments.

¹⁹⁹ “Syngman Rhee – a great man of Korean contemporary history (한국 현대사의 거목 이승만),” *Han'guk nondan* 48 (August 1993): 28–52. Special issue with 3 articles.

²⁰⁰ “Tokja p'yŏnji: *Han'guk nondan* i ap'sŏn Yi Sŭng-man chae-p'yŏngga (독자편지: < 한국논단 > 이 앞선 이승만 재평가),” *Han'guk nondan* 67 (March 1995): 247.

Centering on *Chosun ilbo*, with ample support from *Joongang ilbo*, two of the three largest newspapers undertook a “re-evaluation” of Syngman Rhee through public history to reach a large audience within South Korean society. These 1995 re-evaluation efforts centered on two pillars: a *Chosun*-sponsored exhibition on Syngman Rhee in February–March, and an extensive series of articles on Syngman Rhee’s life and legacy.

On 1 January 1995, preceding the first of 65 instalments on Rhee’s life, *Chosun ilbo* details its motivation for such a re-evaluation with a need to correct the mostly negative memory of Syngman Rhee:

Syngman Rhee. There are many phrases to describe Rhee. “Anti-Japanese fighter” [= *hang’il t’usa* 抗日闘士], “guardian of pro-Japanese collaborators” [= *ch’inilp’a ūi pihaja* 親日派의 庇護者], “pro-American flunkeyist” [= *chin-mi sadaejuiija* 眞美事大主義者], “ringleader of the solidification of division” [= *pundan kojakhwa ūi wonhyung* 分斷固着化의 元兇], “Dr. Syngman Rhee”, “old patriot” [= *no-aegukcha* 老愛國者], “founding president” [= *kŏn’guk taet’ongnyŏng* 建國大統領], “father of the nation” [= *kukpu* 國父], ... and “dictator.” [...] This is how we call the leader of one historical period. It feels as if the whole people have become the political enemies of Syngman Rhee. From now on, we must properly evaluate this figure. Rhee’s tragic ending transcends the misfortune of an individual, as it is part of our [national] history. Of the six presidents to date, the only one to resign (in orderly fashion) was Roh Tae-woo.²⁰¹

Acknowledging the divided memory surrounding Rhee, the author emphasizes a need to look at history as a continuous process, not a narrative of ruptures.²⁰² South Korea’s contemporary history would be re-examined through a case study of its first president. *Chosun ilbo* further connected this issue to contemporary domestic politics, by hinting at the need for orderly successions of government, with ex-presidents ought to spend their final days as elder statesmen, not in court rooms, prisons, or early deaths.²⁰³ Amidst the on-going investigations against Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, this argument seems cynical. Yet, considering that among the following presidents, one was driven into suicide (Roh Moo-hyun) and two were sentenced to prison for corruption (Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye), the fate of Korean presidents as a tragedy of South Korean contemporary history bears some element of truth in it.

As South Korea’s largest daily newspaper, *Chosun ilbo* continued to wield a significant influence onto post-authoritarian South Korean society. Firmly conservative, i.e. anti-communist and pro-US in its editorial stance, it seems logical that the incentive to revise South Korean Cultural memory on Syngman Rhee was initiated from *Chosun ilbo*. Unlike the activities carried out by the Rhee Committee, which remained largely confined to close aides of Rhee and failed to reach a larger audience, *Chosun ilbo*’s 1995 attempts to rebrand Syngman Rhee as the “father of the nation”

²⁰¹ Rhee series, 1st installment, *Chosun ilbo*, January 1, 1995.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ This statement is noteworthy considering the decades that followed after, with Roh Moo-hyun taking his own life in 2009,

and both Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye being sentenced to prison for corruption.

constitute one of the first, if not the first dispute over domestic South Korean history pushed forward by the former ruling elite in the changing atmosphere following democratization.

From 5 February to 7 March 1995, an exhibition on Syngman Rhee's life and legacy was held at the Seoul Arts Center (Yesŭl ŭi Chŏndang 藝術의殿堂) in Seocho District, located in the southern area of Seoul. Titled "Syngman Rhee and nation-building" (*Yi Sŭng-man kwa nara seugi* 李承晩과 나라 세우기, henceforth Rhee Exhibition), the exhibition was formally held on the occasion of commemorating fifty years of liberation as well seventy-five years since the first publication of *Chosun ilbo*. Organized by *Chosun ilbo*, it was sponsored by Sunkyung Group, South Korea's third-largest *chaebol* — whose chairman is, on a side-note, married to Roh Tae-woo's daughter.

Asides from holding an exhibition, a second pillar the Rhee 1995 re-evaluation lay in introducing Rhee's biography through a series of newspaper articles. Between 1 January and 26 December 1995, a total of 65 instalments on Syngman Rhee's life were published in *Chosun ilbo*. Titled "Series on rediscovering contemporary history through Korean presidents: the great 90-year life of Syngman Rhee" (Hyŏndaesa chae-palgyŏn 'han'guk taet'ongnyŏng' sirijŭ: ŏdae-han saengae Yi Sŭng-man 90-nyŏn 現代史재발견 「한국 대통령」시리즈 어대한 생애李承晩 90년), each of the installments was a full-page article of roughly 600–800 characters in length, accompanied by several figures.

The author behind this series was Lee Han-u (李翰雨, *1961–), a journalist and translator

with a PhD in philosophy from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. After briefly working for *Joongang ilbo*, *Newsweek Korea*, and *Munhwa ilbo*, Lee entered *Chosun* in 1994, where he started to work in the cultural section. His first articles, on Jürgen Habermas and Karl Popper, are dated early December 1994. Apart from regular articles on philosophical matters and reporting cultural events, Lee was crucial in the 1995 re-evaluation of Syngman Rhee. Alongside from writing the 65-instalment series on Rhee's life and legacy, Lee also authored most of the reporting on the Rhee exhibition — and, over the following years, turned into a journalistic spearhead among conservative memory activists. In 1998–99, Lee himself was prominently involved in South Korea's "history wars," in 2002–03, Lee was the chief editorialist at *Chosun ilbo*.

Quintessentially, Lee Han-u portrays Syngman Rhee as the historical figure who was central in establishing a modern nation-state on the Korean peninsula, laying the foundation for a thorough transformation of Korean society. In Lee's history, Rhee is portrayed a realist among idealists, a statesman concerned with long-term interests over politicians blinded by nationalist rhetoric. (...) Similar to the Rhee Exhibition, Lee Han-u simplifies the liberation period as a political struggle between Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku.

4. The Memory of Syngman Rhee After 1995: A Rhee Bust in the National Assembly and the Institutionalization of Research on Syngman Rhee

In September 1995, the Rhee Committee held a meeting to "re-vitalize" and promote

its activities. Having gained steam through the 1995 re-evaluation efforts, the committee renamed itself as the “Committee to Commemorate the Founding President Dr. Syngman Rhee” (Kŏn’guk Taet’ongnyŏng Yi Sŭng-man Paksa Kinyŏm Saŏphoe 建國大統領 李承晩博士記念事業會). Analogue to *Chosun ilbo*’s 1995 re-evaluation efforts to counter popular progressive narratives, the formal declaration at this re-vitalization meeting, recited by Yi To-hyŏng (the editor of *Han’guk nondan*), constituted a direct rebuttal to perceived “backwards” contemporary historians:

The dedication of Syngman Rhee for our people, as well as the proud history of foundation, have been mercilessly trampled on by the backwardness of our scholars of contemporary history as well as revisionist historical views. [...] We [re-] establish this committee to shed light on the ROK establishment’s legitimacy within our people’s history [and on Rhee’s legacy of] adopting the thorny road of independence activism to achieve the motherland’s independence [= *kwangbok* 光復] and re-gain a national self-esteem.²⁰⁴

Through celebrating Syngman Rhee’s “spirit of autonomous independence” and his “great achievement of foundation,” the re-vitalized Rhee Committee hoped to firmly place the memory of Syngman Rhee as the ROK’s founding father within South Korean Cultural memory. With the terminology of “founding president” (*kŏn’guk taet’ongnyŏng* 建國大統領) entering the

committee’s official name, this name-change heralds a shift in conservative historical consciousness towards a “foundation”-centered narrative after 1995.²⁰⁵

A particular episode on how the committee aimed to achieve this are illustrated in its efforts to construct a Rhee bust in the South Korean national assembly building. On 28 July 1997, the Rhee Committee sent a formal petition to the assembly, demanding the construction of a Rhee bust within the main building’s central Rotunda Hall.²⁰⁶ Reported first in *Chosun ilbo* on 19 September, speaker Kim Su-han of the New Korea Party (NKP) essentially supported the petition, bringing the issue onto the legislative agenda. According to the short, mostly neutrally written *Chosun ilbo* article, the petition was taken by speaker Kim into discussion between the three political parties, with no opposition from neither the ruling NKP nor the smaller conservative United Liberal Democrats (ULD) of Kim Chong-p’il. Only within Kim Dae-jung’s National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), the major opposition party at the time, despite “individually no objections” from its party speaker Park Sang-ch’ŏn, further discussions on the matter seemed necessary.²⁰⁷

Two days following these first reports in *Chosun ilbo*, *Hankyoreh* reported on the developments, asking “who brought the Rhee bust construction onto the agenda?” in a

²⁰⁴ “Yi Sŭng-man kinyŏm saŏphoe palgi ch’onghoe

(李承晩기념사업회 발기총회 General meeting of the Syngman Rhee commemoration committee),” *Chosun ilbo*, September 21, 1995.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ “Kukhoe e Yi Sŭng-man hyungsang kŏllip (국회에 이승만

홍상건립 Syngman Rhee bust to be constructed in parliament),” *Chosun ilbo*, September 19, 1997.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

headline.²⁰⁸ At the time, a bust of Yi Tongnyŏng (李東寧, 1896–1940), an independence activist who served, with a short interruption, as president of the ROK provisional government from 1927–1940, was the only such sculpture found within the assembly building. Citing NKP floor leader Mok Yosang, constructing a Rhee bust would be carried out on the occasion of commemorating 50 years of the ROK national assembly in May 1998, together with the construction of a bust of the national assembly’s second speaker Sin Ik-hŭi (申翼熙, 1892–1956).²⁰⁹ In NKP speaker Kim’s eyes, not doing so would be “inappropriate in regards to the parliament’s legitimacy and its dignity vis-à-vis foreign countries” as Syngman Rhee was both the first president of the ROK Provisional Government and the ROK and also its first speaker.²¹⁰ In an interview with *Joongang ilbo* on 25 November, speaker Kim further clarified his views directly:

If it wouldn’t be for Syngman Rhee, the founding of our country might have been impossible. Seen in this regard, Dr. Rhee’s contribution [to our history] was absolute. [...] Of course, [mistakes like] the March 15 elections are historical

²⁰⁸ “Yi Sŭng-man hyungsang kŏllip kongnonghwa, nuga nasonna (이승만 흉상건립 공론화 누가 나섰나 Who brought the Rhee bust construction onto the agenda?)”

²⁰⁹ Sin Ik-hŭi was foreign minister of the ROK Provisional Government from March 1943 to August 1945, speaker of the Southern Interim Assembly from June 1946 to May 1948, and the second speaker of the ROK parliament from August 1948 to May 1954.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

facts. However, such mistakes should be recorded and studied. Syngman Rhee is a person on line with China’s Sun Wen or India’s Gandhi [...]. These figures are commemorated as their country’s founding fathers. The time has come for us too to laud the outstanding figure [of Syngman Rhee] and to create conventions and legitimacy.²¹¹

Against these developments, once again progressive media, centering on *Hankyoreh* and *Mal*, vividly voiced their opposition towards these plans. On 24 September, *Hankyoreh* reported “strong opposition” from Korean historians, citing Sŏ Chung-sŏk of the IKHS and Kang Chŏng-su.²¹² In their eyes, the Rhee Committee’s activities, and support for the plan within the NKP and ULD constituted “anti-historical actions flowing against the current of Kim Yŏng-sam’s historical policies.”²¹³

On 19 November 1997, *Chosun ilbo* reported that the construction of a Rhee bust had been indefinitely postponed, mainly due to strong opposition within the NCNP. On the eve of a presidential election (and the Asian Financial Crisis), plans for constructing a

²¹¹ “Yi Sŭng-man/Sin Ik-hŭi hyungsang kŏllip ch’ujin hanŭn Kim Su-han kukhoe ŭijang ([인터뷰] 이승만.신익희 흉상건립 추진하는 김수환 국회의장 [Interview] Speaker Kim Su-han, who supports construction of Syngman Rhee and Sin Ik-hŭi busts),” *Joongang ilbo*, November 25, 1997.

²¹² “‘Yi Sŭng-man kukhoe hyungsang’ yŏksa hakkye k’ŭn panbal (‘이승만 국회흉상’ 역사학계 큰반발 Sharp opposition against the ‘Syngman Rhee parliamentary bust’ from historians),” *Hankyoreh*, September 24, 1997.

²¹³ Ibid.

Rhee bust were put on hold indefinitely.²¹⁴ However, roughly two years later, on 2 December 1999, a bill to construct sculptures — not busts — of Syngman Rhee and Sin Ik-hŭi in the Rotunda Hall was finally being voted on, securing a safe majority of 127 votes in favor against 34 votes against and 20 abstentions.²¹⁵ Although not in time for the 1998 commemorations, a Rhee sculpture was eventually constructed in the central Rotunda Hall of the national assembly's main building, standing to the left of a large inscription of the ROK founding constitution's preamble. Among the small number of lawmakers opposing the bill was Roh Moo-hyun, the later president, who, ever since his early days as a politician in the late 1980s, had shown a vital interest in shedding light onto the ROK's darker history.

A second development in the late 1990s was the formal institutionalization in academic research on Syngman Rhee. Once Rhee's widow passed away in 1992, their adopted son Rhee In-su invited historian Yu Yŏng-ik to help compiling the private legacy of Syngman Rhee stored at the Ihwajang. Yu had experienced the First Republic and the April Revolution as a young man,

remembering feelings of strong dissent against Rhee, whom he held responsible for the wide-spread misery in Korean society at the time.²¹⁶ While studying at Harvard University, however, Yu's perceptions of Rhee took a sharp turn after reading his 1904 essay *The Spirit of Independence*, leading Yu to see Rhee as an intellectual "fairly above" Sŭn Wén or Fukuzawa Yukichi. Lacking access to primary sources during his student days, Yu happily accepted Rhee In-su's request, beginning to compile the private legacy in 1993. In March 1997, the Institute of Modern Korean Studies (IMKS) was established at Yonsei University with generous financial support, roughly 5 bill. Won (approx. 6.2 mill. USD), from Samsung president Yi Kŏn-hŭi.²¹⁷

With Yu as its first chair, over the next years, the IMKS held regular symposia on Rhee's life and legacy,²¹⁸ carried out the task of compiling the historical primary sources acquired from Rhee's family, eventually publishing Rhee's telegrams, diaries and other documentation, as well as a catalogue of all presidential papers stored at Yonsei

²¹⁴ "Yi Sŭng-man hyungsang köllip kyehoek 'musan' (李承晩勲상 건립계획 '무산' Construction of a Rhee bust postponed indefinitely)," *Chosun ilbo*, November 19, 1997.

²¹⁵ "Yi Sŭng-man hyungsang köllip ankŏn, kukhoe ch'ŏnban nollan kküt ŭigyŏl (이승만勲상 건립 안건, 국회 찬반논란끝 의결 The bill to construct a sculpture of Syngman Rhee passed following an intense discussion)," *Donga ilbo*, December 2, 1999

²¹⁶ "'Yi Sŭng-man ŭn tongsŏyang hangmun e t'ongdal, tangsi ch'oego ŭi chisŏng'in' ("이승만은 동서양 학문에 통달, 당시 최고의 지성인")," *NewDaily*, August 17, 2011.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ The topics of the first symposia were: reflections on and possibilities of Korean contemporary history (1997), Syngman Rhee' independence activism and the ROK foundation (1998), re-evaluating land reform (1999), South Korea and the Korean War (2000), re-examining the history of the 1950s (2002), re-evaluating Syngman Rhee (2004).

University.²¹⁹ From the very start, through criticizing the strong influence of Bruce Cumings and the *Insik* series on scholars of contemporary history in its first edited volume *Revisionism and Korean contemporary history*,²²⁰ the IMKS can be evaluated as a conservative attempt to counter progressive narratives through source-based, academic research. Moreover, with the IMKS's affiliation in global Korean studies rather than national or contemporary history, an institutional gap between scholars and institutes of Korean contemporary history (such as the IKHS), and the IMKS remained in place. Rather than restoring a symmetry in remembering, the asymmetry between conservatives and progressives regarding the memory of Syngman Rhee increased over the next years.²²¹ Through its choice of topics, but more so through the terminology employed in IMKS publications, such as “re-evaluating” the ROK “foundation” and the 1950s as a fundament for later “success,” the IMKS research remains surprisingly close to Lee Han-u's and *Chosun ilbo*'s 1995 re-evaluation efforts of Syngman Rhee.

Conclusive Remarks: Was the Rhee “Re-Evaluation” a Success?

With a sense of post-Cold War triumphalism taking hold among conservatives, conservative thinkers, in opposition to progressive narratives of violence and

division gaining steam following democratization, began to construct South Korean contemporary as a history of success. Utilizing new evidence regarding the Korean War and the 1950s, narrating South Korea's first president Syngman Rhee as the nation's founding father who, through his land reform and education policies, created the institutional groundwork for the country's rapid economic development after the 1960s, was the first step in such a process. In this conservative counter-narrative, Rhee's harsh anti-trusteeship stance and his calls to establish a southern government were presented as “realist choices” amidst the onset of the Cold War. Not purging former collaborators from the bureaucracy was evaluated a necessity in the larger context of state-building. Progressive narratives, through their emphasis on Kim Ku's opposition to the ROK establishment and the unresolved collaborator issue, are deemed to damage a “national spirit,” and, in conservative eyes, “idealistic” at best, “political commentary” and “alternative history” at worst. In the 1995 Rhee re-evaluation, the course of world history, i.e. the global Cold War, takes center stage. Although Rhee's autocratic nature was criticized directly, the state violence surrounding the ROK establishment remains mostly “forgotten” in this narrative, with the ends justifying the means.

However, in the face of opposition from progressive historians, just how

²¹⁹ These include the publication of the compiled documents in Chinese and Korean (1998) and English (2000), and a catalogue of the presidential papers stored at Yonsei University (2005).

²²⁰ A backlash to a perceived progressive hegemony is found at Yu, *Sujongjuui*, 14–22 and 286–296.

²²¹ The rise of the New Right movement and subsequent mnemonic disputes surrounding division illustrate this. Cf. e.g. Vierthaler, “How to Place,” 141–166 or Vierthaler, “The New Right,” 7–24.

successful were these conservative attempts to revise Cultural memory? Looking at several opinion polls published after 1998, the answer suggests that conservatives failed spectacularly. A 1998 poll by *Han'guk nondan* and Gallup Korea suggests that among university students, Syngman Rhee had a more negative image than Kim Il-sung and was mostly remembered as a “pro-US flunkeyist” (53%), an “anti-national traitor” (18%), or the “ringleader of permanent North-South division” (18%), not South Korea’s “founding father” (1.3%).²²² Several polls from 2007–08 support this picture. In opinion polls from August 2007 and July 2008, Kim Ku was named by far the most respondents as the “founder” of the modern ROK, with Rhee in a distant second (or even third, after “the people”).²²³ Contestations over the memory of South Korea’s establishment, such as the 2008 Foundation Day Dispute, the 2008–2012 discussions surrounding the construction of the National Museum of Korean Contemporary History, or the on-going contestations over when to trace the exact date of the ROK’s “foundation” — 1919 or

1948? — underscore this observation of conservative failure in their re-evaluation efforts.²²⁴

Contrasting the 1995 Rhee re-evaluation efforts to later developments, the present research has revealed that by the mid-1990s, the quintessential coordinates for the further development of South Korea’s “history wars” surrounding the memory of liberation and division were already firmly put in place. While conservative efforts moved gradually from a “re-evaluation” of Syngman Rhee towards a broader, “foundation”-centered narrative, the quintessential fault lines remained static for the next two decades. While conservatives emphasize the global dimensions of the Cold War and the institutional framework of the South Korean state in enabling the country’s economic development, progressives focus on state violence, de-colonialization, and reunification in their historical narrative. With both sides accusing each other of revisionism, an asymmetry of remembering remains firmly in place.

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²²² Quoted after Yu, “Yi Sŭng-man,” 395–396.

²²⁴ Cf. Vierthaler, “The New Right,” 13–14.

²²³ “Yi Sŭng-man yŏn'gu pum (李承晩 연구 붐 A boom in

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From the “East Asian Cold War” to the “East Asian Postwar”

Minah Kang

1. Introduction

After the defeat of Imperial Japan in 1945, Japan and China faced a lack of authority and order of national legitimacy and had the task of rebuilding their postwar states. In China, achieving “Chinese national unification” became the key issue, whereas the key issues in Japan were “the emperor’s responsibility for the war” and “the legitimacy of the Meiji state.” These national initiatives were rooted in domestic and traditional contexts and were driven to materialize through the process of enacting the new Constitution. After the Korean War, however, Japan and China established the leading roles in the East Asian Cold War front. How did the two countries solve the task of postwar national rebuilding? How could the domestic and traditional national initiatives of “Chinese national unification” and the restoration of “Meiji Japan” be adjusted into the international order of the Cold War?

Existing research struggles to explain the issue of enacting a new Constitution in the political context of individual states, such as the Pacifist Constitution in Japan and the launch of the Communist Party’s revolutionary government. This study aims to investigate the new Constitution in the context of “East Asian Postwar” as a competitive process for nation building. This study shows the similar processes that the various demands for peace and democratic reform spread socially in the

postwar period (post-1945) and soon the new governments of Japan and China monopolized the momentum of postwar state reconstruction during the Korean War. As such, I argue that Japan and China shared the regional context of postwar national reconstruction, beyond the contexts of individual countries or a confrontation between the communist regimes and democracies.

Basically, this study is comparative historical research on the cases of Japan and China. The primary literature used in the study includes state official documents, such as “*Foreign Relations of the United States*,” published by the U.S. State Department; documents related to the Korean War and Sino-Soviet Alliance, as an appendix to “*Uncertain Partners*,” uncovered and translated by Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue; and the “*Postwar Japan’s Defense Problem Sourcebook*,” compiled by Hideo Otake. Furthermore, anthologies, memoirs of diplomats, and testimony were reviewed.

2. Literature Review

Since the 1980s, as the data of major participating countries have been declassified, the Korean War has become the subject of full-scale academic inquiry, going beyond the Cold War ideology (Park 2011, 83). In this regard, studies were primarily conducted by drawing from arguments between revision and refutation toward the school of traditionalism that presumes the Korean War was part of the Soviet Union’s expansionist foreign policy and the

objections thereto. This was linked to the question of whether to view the nature of the Korean War as an international proxy war, a civil war on the Korean Peninsula, or as an international civil war (Jeong 2006, 75-80).

A comprehensive look at the pre studies of China, Japan, and the Korean War confirms that the expansion of the research topic and attempts to use various approaches tend to go beyond reducing the Korean War to a proxy war of the Cold War. For example, research has been conducted to focus on domestic political societies in Japan and China (Nakamura 1975; Kim 1998; Strauss 2006; Lim 2009; Rawnsley 2009; Jeong 2010; Lim 2011; Sun 2011; Kim 2014; Nam 2015; Choi 2017) or examine international variables such as US-Japan relations and Sino-Soviet relations in a more three-dimensional manner (Igarashi 1986; Chen 1994; Zhang 1995; Wada 1995; Igarashi 1995; Kim 2005; Xu 2007; Qing 2007; Shen 2013; Kim 2014; shin 2014; Lee 2016; Nam 2016; Niu 2018).

These attempts allow for the development of a fuller account of the Cold War order in East Asia that is sensitive to the historical contexts of Japan and China. There is growing interest in the diversity and dynamics of political choices made in East Asian countries rather than positing the roles of Japan and China as secondary to those of the US and the Soviet Union.

However, despite these attempts, most studies of Japan and China during the Korean War focus on individual countries. In particular, even if the studies concentrate on the East Asian regional experience beyond the framework of the proxy war, there are limited studies that comprehensively discuss China in the

eastern bloc and Japan in the western bloc.

2. From the “East Asian Cold War” to the “East Asian Postwar”

This study seeks to develop a discussion founded on prior studies but attempts to explore the political implications of the Korean War in forming the Cold War system at the East Asian regional level rather than at each country’s individual level. Specifically, it begins the discussion with the political and social context of the “East Asian Postwar,” after 1945, when qualitative changes occurred in domestic and foreign political conditions in Japan and China.

1) Background: Difficulty Comparing Postwar China and Postwar Japan

The modern political history of Japan and China has been written based on different standards and issues, which stem from their dissimilar experiences encountering Western powers in the 19th century. As China was experiencing the so-called “100 years of shame” after the Opium War of 1840, Japan was undergoing a century of “imperialistic expansion” after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Thus, it became increasingly difficult to continue to discuss the two countries as one civilization or region. However, after the end of World War II, the international statuses of China and Japan changed once again. China was liberated from a state of semi-colonial rule under imperial Japan, while Japan became a loser state in World War II. From these different starting points, postwar China and Japan have been discussed only in the context of their individual national political history. This is because, both academically and realistically, it was a more urgent task to

understand and analyze the two countries' heterogeneous political ideologies, systems, and processes than the historical context they shared at the regional level.

The "socialist revolution" in the study of Chinese political history and "postwar occupation of Japan" in the study of Japanese political history particularly became the center of discussion. On the one hand, as major research topics, the study of modern Japanese politics has focused on analyzing the disconnected nature of Imperial Japan and postwar Japan, as well as the distinctiveness of its postwar regime, and has developed the concept of "postwar" exclusively in the East Asian intellectual history. On the other hand, in China's case, the main research topics have been a review of the Communist Party victory in the Chinese Civil War and the establishment of a new China regime in 1949 instead of the end of World War II in 1945.

Also, as the international order of the postwar period and the Cold War overlapped, it became even more difficult to find a joint comparison between China and Japan. In the Cold War order, China and Japan took opposite paths again, as they belonged to the socialist bloc and free world, respectively. In other words, the international order in postwar East Asia was overshadowed by the period designation of the Cold War order. This was also because East Asia's security was directly linked to the Cold War's conflict structure. The problems regarding the survival of East Asian countries, such as the Korean Peninsula's division, inter-Korean conflict, cross-strait relations, and the US-Japan alliance, required an understanding of the Cold War order, which is why the Cold War-centered approach has

played a leading role in postwar East Asian research.


2) Criticism of the Great Power-Centrism and Its Limitations

As reviewed in previous studies, attempts are constantly being made to overcome the biased views of the great powers and focus on regional and historical contexts in discussing the Cold War order in East Asia. This study collectively refers to the Cold War research approach based on critical thinking to re-examine the regional order rather than the international order centered on the world's great powers as in the "East Asian Cold War" approach. In addition to the individual studies reviewed in previous research, editorial works can be found that intend to develop the "East Asian Cold War" as an analytical framework (Jager and Mitter 2007; Institute for East Asian Studies at Sungkonghoe University 2008; Hasegawa 2011; Institute of International Affairs at Seoul National University 2015; Lüthi 2015; Ota and Heo 2017; Shin and Kwon 2019). These studies are unique in that they mainly characterize the Cold War as an international order and "East Asia" as a regional order to shed light on the bottom-up experiences of East Asian countries.

However, even in such editorial works, the concept of the Cold War and the issue of establishing the scope of East Asia remain ambiguous. The idea of a "region" is a fluid, complex mixture of historical trajectories, constantly changing and being redefined (Pempel, 2005). Even in the process of creating the analytical framework of the "East Asian Cold War," terms such as "Non-West," "Far East," "Northeast Asia," and

“Asia Pacific” are used interchangeably. Moreover, although the Korean War is repeatedly emphasized as a critical juncture in forming the “East Asian Cold War,” it is difficult to find a discussion about how the individual and heterogeneous experiences of the Korean Peninsula, China, and Japan were structurally connected. The work to clarify the heterogeneous historical contexts of individual countries is not being extended to the question of how they intersect at the regional level in East Asia.

3) An Alternative Approach: “East Asian Postwar” Complementing “East Asian Cold War”



[Figure 1] A study of the comparative history of Japan and China during the Korean War

Therefore, to promote the regional level discussion, it is necessary to clarify how the “diverse” forms of the Cold War were structured at the regional level, in addition to investigating the various forms of the regional order’s conflict with the international order. This is to clarify the political dynamics operating as a regional order in East Asia by supplementing considerations about the structural linkage between domestic politics and the international system (Park 2012, 15-25). Rather than revealing regional diversity as an “exception” in the Cold War, its purpose

is to consider the “rules” of the Cold War order in East Asia. The historical sociology view is closest to this study’s view in that it integrates the pressures of the international order and the domestic social processes. In particular, Michael Mann’s discussion has great implications, as it emphasizes political variables such as war and competition among states (Mann 1988, 146-147).

The “East Asian Postwar” approach presented in this study begins with a search for a reference point to discuss the heterogeneous political experiences of Japan and China comparatively to confirm the political and social contexts and conditions the two states shared at the regional level while examining the process of constructing the Cold War order in East Asia, using the Korean War as a turning-point event. Rather than being satisfied with describing the “diversity” of regional experiences that unfolded in postwar East Asia in parallel, the goal is to trace how domestic politics and the international system became structurally connected and then unfolded by paying particular attention to the antecedent conditions that caused the “diverse” experiences of Japan and China. If Japan and China can be compared with a focus on the political task of state reconstruction concerning the East Asian postwar antecedent condition, the political dynamics that operate as a regional order in East Asia can be revealed.

4. Japan and China’s New Constitution

This chapter examines the attempt to enact a new Constitution as the first scene, which was carried out both in Japan and China immediately after 1945. In previous

studies, the issue of enacting a new Constitution has been discussed in the political context of individual states, such as the Pacifist Constitution in Japan and the disputes on the Japanese Emperor's responsibility for war and the Chinese civil war, the launch of the Communist Party's revolutionary government. This study aims to re-examine the attempts to enact a new Constitution in the context of "East Asian Postwar" as a competitive process for nation-building.

First, the study examines the process of competition to institutionalize various postwar political demands as constitutional order was unfolding, and second, it investigates the development of international politics of great powers in the internal competition for national construction. Third, it confirms the postwar initiative of the national reconstruction established in the above process. Through this comparison, it traces back the tensions in state-society and state-international relations in Japan and China in order to shed light on under what conditions they made similar and disparate political choices for the national reconstruction.

1) Reconstruction of the Defeated Japan and the Reconstruction of "Meiji State"

A. Spread of Social Demand for Postwar Democratic Reform

After the declaration of defeat, a sense of crisis was formed in Japan that the emperor could be prosecuted in a war crimes trial (Maruyama 1997),²²⁵ and this caused a

debate about the legitimacy of the "kokutai (国体, national polity)," a state system based on the emperor's absolute authority, and the postwar state reconstruction. There was a fierce debate about the continuation and disconnection of postwar Japan with the "Meiji State" Japan, the only country that achieved modernization among the non-western countries after the Meiji restoration in 1868, and the imperial Japan, which pursued an imperialist expansion in the 20th century, under the name of the great East Asian co-prosperity.

Nevertheless, what stands out most in postwar Japanese society is the disengagement from war and the spread of aspirations for postwar democracy. Maruyama Masao, a distinguishing postwar Japanese thinker, highlighted the declaration of surrender on 15 August as a revolutionary phase in which postwar democracy began (Maruyama 1997). It is an interpretation that the Japanese people finally became "free subjects" after ending Japanese militarism and breaking out of absolute nationalism. At the same time, this was an attempt to discover the possibility of a modernized national form of the state by emphasizing the nature of "reasonable" constitutionalism within the monarchy as the national form of state (Kang 2004, 119-122, 159).

While the legitimacy of postwar state reconstruction was up for debate, a radical voice for socialist revolution beyond democratic reform was also raised. In particular, the Japanese Communist Party secured an unprecedented support base after World War II as it was the only political force that raised the Emperor's responsibility for

²²⁵ Whether or not the International Prosecution Section will prosecute the Emperor in the war crimes trial was a subject of debate in Japan even before the prosecution took effect on March 11, 1946,

and also the debates over the emperor's legal and moral responsibilities for war continued within Japan. See Herbert Bix (1992).

the war even before the war ended. After the declaration of surrender, the postwar reform of the GHQ led to the abolition of the Public Security Preservation Laws and the Ideological Crime and Probation Act, and the Japanese Communist Party was formally legalized, laying the foundation for progressive forces. In particular, the number of union members increased from about 380,000 at the end of 1945 to 6.7 million by mid-1948, reaching the majority of the non-agricultural population (Okouchi 1961).

In October 1945, GHQ Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) announced the need for a constitutional amendment to enforce the postwar provisions of the Potsdam Conference.²²⁶ After MacArthur's announcement, various constitutional amendment bills were introduced competitively by political parties, private groups, and individuals other than the Japanese government. The debate on the form of state was embodied as a competition over the amendment bill. The competition over the constitutional amendment bill contained various voices on the postwar nation-rebuilding, and the discussion on the continuation and severance of the Meiji Constitution became a key issue. The Meiji Constitution refers to the Constitution of Imperial Japan based on modern constitutionalism, promulgated on 11 February 1889 and in effect on 29 November 1890. The emperor's absolute authority was also declared officially and in modern way by the Article 1 of the Meiji Constitution.²²⁷

According to public opinion polls at the time, only 16% of the people wished to maintain the status of the emperor as in the Meiji Constitution, and the view that “the emperor's status should be redefined as a moral compass” showed the highest support rate (Koseki 2010, 178).

As the fight over the amendment bill spread socially, discussions on human rights and the constitutional order of democracy in addition to the issue of the Emperor's war responsibility and institutional continuation began²²⁸. The “Japan Bar Associations” proposed a constitutional amendment to strengthen the power of parliament by limiting the power of the emperor and establishing a referendum system, which became the focal point of legal debate. The “Constitutional Research Association” argued that national sovereignty rests with the people, not the emperor and that the role of the emperor should be reduced to the ritual part, which confirmed the concept of the emperor's symbolic status. Meanwhile, the socialist, Takano Iwasaburo (高野岩三郎, 1871–1949), and the Communist Party's constitutional amendment bill were unique in that they advocated the abolition of the Emperor.

The Japanese government also launched the “Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee” composed of experts on the constitution (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 1970: 603–604). Legal scholar Joji Matsumoto (松本烝治, 1877–1954) was the chairman, recommended by then Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida (吉田茂, 1878–

²²⁶ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1970), 82–88. [Hereafter PRJ].

²²⁷ Meiji Constitution is also known as the Constitution of the Empire of Japan or the Constitution of the Empire and was greatly influenced by the German constitutional monarchy. Article 1. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of

Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” Japan National Assembly Library, Accessed December 5, 2019, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/etc/j02.html>

²²⁸ For an overview of the various draft amendments, see Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (1970). *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1970), 94–98.

1967). The ruling class of the then government cabinet, including Matsumoto, had doubts about the necessity of a constitutional amendment bill proposed by GHQ and took a position that democratic reinterpretation of the old constitution rather than the amendment was sufficient enough. The discussion of the committee's constitutional amendment proceeded in a fairly conservative direction.

B. Conservative Japanese Government and GHQ Amendment Proposal

On 31 January 1946, the first draft of the amendment bill of the Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee, upon continuing demands for amendment, was announced to the world. While maintaining the basic principle that the emperor embodied the sovereignty, it was said that the emperor's authority of "sacred and inviolable" was adjusted to the authority of "supreme and inviolable" while the power of parliament was expanded. The GHQ determined that the Japanese government had no will and ability to resolve the postwar issues discussed at the Potsdam Conference, and began to directly lead the establishment of the constitution on behalf of the Japanese government.²²⁹

On 5 February 1946, MacArthur

proposed so-called the "MacArthur Three Principles", which included constitutional monarchy, renunciation of war as a "sovereign right of the nation", and the abolition of feudalism.²³⁰ Furthermore, a "constitutional assembly" was formed and instructed to complete the draft constitution based on the three principles. The "constitutional assembly" was made up of enthusiastic democracy supporters whose average age was about 30 years younger than the Matsumoto Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee, and the drafting was done thoroughly and secretly. The request for the Potsdam Conference and the amendment bill raised by the private sector was reviewed, and in particular, the principle of sovereignty of people and a clause on the emperor's symbolic status were stated to establish the legal basis for the postwar symbolic emperor system.

On 13 February, GHQ presented a draft of the new Constitution to the Japanese government. The Army General Courtney Whitney (1897-1969) said that the GHQ amendment draft, unlike the Japanese government one, was a sound centrist draft that "constitutes a sharp swing from the extreme right in political thinking – yet yields nothing to the radical concept of the extreme left (Dower 2000, 373; Koseki 2010, 148-149)." ²³¹ He emphasized that it was

²²⁹ Koseki pointed out the draft amendments of the Matsumoto Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee set all starting points in the Meiji Constitution of 1889, while most of the postwar civilian drafts on constitution were based on research of the US, Soviet, and German Weimar constitutions (2010, 96-98). For GHQ's evaluation, see *PRJ*, 98-101, 605-616. Meanwhile, the draft of the Matsumoto Committee has been a target of criticism not in Japan as well as GHQ. According to the editorial of the Mainichi Newspaper, most people felt deep disappointment at the government's draft, which "simply seeks to preserve the status quo" and lacks "the vision, statesmanship, and idealism needed for a new state structure." In addition, the committee was criticized as "no understanding that Japan is in a revolutionary period (Dower 2000, 359-360)."

²³⁰ *PRJ*, 102

²³¹ General Whitney announced the proposed amendment to the GHQ to the Matsumoto Committee and delivered: "As you may or may not know, the Supreme Commander has been unyielding in his defense of your Emperor against increasing pressure from the outside to render him subject to war criminal investigation. He has thus defended the Emperor because he considered that that was the cause of right and justice, and will continue along that course to the extent of his ability. But, gentlemen, the Supreme Commander is not omnipotent. He feels, however, that acceptance of the provisions of this new Constitution would render the Emperor practically unassailable (Maki 1980, 326-328)."

the only alternative to protect the emperor from his opposition force. He also added that the acceptance of the GHQ amendment draft would be the last chance for the conservatives, who maintained the power through a close relationship with the emperor's authority, to survive the postwar period (Maki 1980, 376). It was GHQ's ultimatum targeting hard-liner conservatives such as Matsumoto.

The background of MacArthur's active promotion of the GHQ amendment bill could confirm international political variables. In February 1946, when MacArthur ordered the drafting of the GHQ Constitution, the creation of the Far Eastern Commission was imminent to replace GHQ. Since the Potsdam Conference (US, UK, Soviet Union, and the Republic of China), the Allied Powers were planning to establish the Far East Committee as a governing body of Japan after the tripartite meeting in Moscow (US, UK, and the Soviet Union) in December. The Potsdam talks did not agree on specific rules for the occupational regime amid allied tensions over Japanese postwar treatment, and the supreme commander's authority was also considered temporary. Even the US administration was wary of the establishment and implementation of MacArthur's arbitrary Japanese occupational system that did not take full account of Washington's situation.

The proposed amendment by the GHQ against this backdrop was the result of strategic considerations directly linked to MacArthur's occupational authority.

MacArthur attempted to present a Constitutional amendment bill that would gather support from the Japanese society as a whole more quickly than other allied councils while completing the task of the Potsdam Conference. In particular, MacArthur emphasized the principle of Constitutional monarchy and insisted that the emperor would survive as a symbol of national unity²³². This reflected the "moral" and political position of the Emperor's presence in Japan while improving the efficiency of the GHQ occupational rule (Toyoshita 2009). This was also an effort to occupy Japan's postwar national initiative that differentiated it from Washington as well as other allies. Hence, the form of state was able to maintain its symbolic status even in the new Constitution.²³³

In the Japanese government, a faction that supported the GHQ amendment proposal was formed with Yoshida as the leader. As the pressure from the international community increased the claim that the Japanese government could only protect the current form of the state through amendments proposed by the GHQ under the occupation of GHQ seemed realistically persuasive. Crucially, the Emperor supported the GHQ amendment proposal, so the Japanese government also had to turn its position to accept it. In addition, as concerns were raised that the authority of the Japanese government would be compromised if the amendment draft was disclosed in the name of GHQ, the Japanese government took the

²³² Under the pressure of the international community against the Emperor's responsibility for war crimes, MacArthur tried to preserve the Emperor's Emperor. For specific comments, see General Whitney's remarks (footnote 7).

²³³ In addition to the strategic considerations of MacArthur and the Emperor regarding the survival of the post-war state system, there are discussions that emphasize the aspect of the Cold War ideology of anti-communism. It emphasizes the Cold War confrontation

structure of the Truman regime and the anti-communist collusion of liberals including Yoshida, who were "imperial diplomats" within the Japanese government (Kang 2004, 125-130). This is an important point, but in order to emphasize the tension between MacArthur and other GHQ and Washington, and between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, discussions on anti-communist collusion will be described later in the section on Yoshida's declaration of post-war national initiative.

initiative in preparing to announce the amendment bill given the time when the social demand for postwar democratic reform was raised. Eventually, on 6 March, 1946, the “Summary of the first draft of the constitutional amendment” based on the GHQ proposal was released with the emperor’s decree, and on 22 May of the same year, the first Yoshida administration was commenced.

C. Postwar National Initiative: Ikeda Mission in April 1950

The fight over the constitutional amendment that unfolded in the postwar Japanese society was a competition for national reconstruction over the severance and continuation of the “Meiji State.” Yoshida, who came to serve as the first prime minister under the new Constitution, experienced firsthand the dramatic moment in which the imperative task of protecting the form of state came to materialize amid political struggles between various political views from the Japanese government, the GHQ, the international society, and the domestic publics. In postwar Japan, the Constitutional amendment was not just a legal matter, but a matter of saving the country and independence. In other words, it confirmed the possibility of national reconstruction under the postwar political conditions of defeat and occupation.

Yoshida was envisioning a postwar state reconstruction through the restoration

of the spirit of the Meiji Restoration while transferring responsibility for the war of Imperial Japan to the military immediately after the defeat²³⁴ He was succeeding to the two spirits of “modernization” and “recovery of the authority of the form of state” in Meiji Japan in the postwar national initiative (Kim 2016). For instance, after the enactment of the new Constitution, he repeatedly appealed that Japan should abandon its right to engage in warfare and “to contribute to the establishment of world peace by standing still at the forefront with peace-loving countries (Otake 1991, 137-140).” It officially expressed a break from imperial Japan’s militarism and attempted to materialize the postwar national concept of a peaceful “Meiji State” reconstruction.

Meanwhile, as the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union deepened, the US policy toward Japan changed rapidly. In March 1947, with the Truman Doctrine as the starting point, a containment policy against the Soviet Union was announced, and Japan was regarded as a strategic base to check Soviet power in Asia. In particular, Japan’s economic reconstruction was given priority for Asian economic revival. To this end, the need for active aid measures such as easing postwar compensation issues, trade sanctions, and foreign currency input was raised.²³⁵ Instead of the postwar 2D reform policy emphasizing democratization and demilitarization, the so-called “reverse course” diplomacy was

²³⁴ “If the devil had children, it would be Tojo (1884-1948). (...) However, **the energy for reconstruction of the empire country** is hidden. **If we remove the cancerous element of politics as military** (...), the defeat will not necessarily be bad. After the rain, heaven and earth are even more beautiful. We are thrilled by the end of the war by the determination of the emperor, and it is believed that the heavens have not abandoned us yet (1945/8/27). “It is necessary **to go back to the time of the Meiji Restoration** and further advance the nation, seek knowledge of the world, raise morality and morale, and establish a new reinforcement policy by

introducing foreign capital technology on a large scale (1945/9/2) (Yoshida 1994, 553-554, 558).” Yoshida was a symbolic figure representing the ethos of the Meiji era. John Dower points out that Yoshida grew up as a Meiji, showed an individualistic and liberal character as an imperial diplomat, and at the same time had a number of disparate dispositions, such as admiring the emperor (1979).

²³⁵ William Henry Draper, “The Report of Draper (1948/5/18),” *PJDPS*, 190-193.

implemented to promote Japan's economic revival and reorganization.

With the formation of the Cold War's international order, the Yoshida administration started preparing for negotiations on the peace treaty. As the reverse course diplomacy was implemented, the postwar treatment with Japan had both punitive and active aid measures, and the issue of postwar settlements with Japan became more complex. As a result, the Treaty of Peace with Japan was being delayed owing to the conflict of interests within the Allied Powers. However, it was clear that a qualitative change was taking place concerning the nature of the occupational rule since various constraints on Japan were being practically lessened.

As Yoshida later recalled, the delay in the pacification process was "never a disadvantage" from Japan's point of view.²³⁶ After World War I, the Japanese government sought several measures to prevent the victorious countries from demanding punitive conditions against the defeated countries, as in the case of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. Japan's Ministry of foreign affairs, led by Yoshida, prioritized relations with the US, and made an English report on the current situation of the Japanese political economy, and sent it to the US government to improve the level of understanding of the Japanese situation in the US.²³⁷ The report particularly appealed for the economic inferiority of postwar Japan, the lack of war reparation capabilities, and

efforts for the departure from militarism in the past and the democratic reform.

In September 1947, Yoshida, through Commander Robert Eichelberger (1886-1961), conveyed to the US government the idea of a US-Japan security agreement that entrusts Japanese security to the US.²³⁸ Yoshida's letter contained the assertion that the United Nations was facing difficulties in the execution of its mandate as the Cold War intensified, and that even after Japan's independence, US troops could have to remain in Japan in preparation for a Soviet Union invasion. In other words, the initial concept of the US-Japan security alliance to realize Japan's demilitarization was projected on the continuum of the postwar state reconstruction as a peaceful "Meiji State."

The Ikeda Mission in April 1950 was a secret mission to convey Yoshida's postwar national idea to Washington. Ikeda (池田勇人, 1899-1965) emphasized the fact that while the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union was intensifying, an argument for an *overall peace settlement* of Japan and many allied forces, including even socialist countries, was gaining support in Japan domestically.²³⁹ Moreover, Yoshida's administration conveyed its belief that such overall peace settlement could "delay Japan's independence by attracting countries that were emotionally hostile to Japan," and expressed a willingness to conclude an *independent peace settlement* with the US as soon as possible.

²³⁶ "As a defeated country, the greatest concern is to avoid the harsher conditions than the peace treaty, especially the unfavorable conditions that bind national independence and freedom in the future. If the peace treaty had been concluded shortly after the end of the war, the atmosphere of the war would not be resolved, and the allied nations would naturally have imposed harsh conditions on Japan. However, as the settlement was delayed, the allied side's hostility and hatred toward Japan were gradually resolved, while the deeper awareness of Japan gave them time to devise better measures

of settlements. In this way, the delay in the peace treaty was actually a favorable condition for Japan." Shigeru Yoshida, "Preparations on the Japanese side for peace," *PJDPS*, 283.

²³⁷ Takeso Shimoda, "The preparation of the settlement at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *PJDPS*, 284-286.

²³⁸ Shigeru Yoshida, "Letter to Eichelberger (1947/9/13)," *PJDPS*, 305-306.

²³⁹ Giyichi Miyagawa (Assistant secretary of the Ikeda Mission), "Secret Mission for Washington," *PJDPS*, 335-337.

This was also a work of constructing a foundational logic to oppose the theory of Japanese remilitarization raised both inside and outside Japan as the international order was overwhelmed by the Cold War. As will be described later in the next chapter, the US government at that time raised a claim about the necessity of remilitarization of Japan, a strategic base for containment of Asia. Moreover, in Japan, hard-lining conservative forces insisted on re-armament to restore the glory of imperial Japan while some progressive thinkers advocated for the remilitarization to defend Japan's sovereignty against the imperialism of world great powers. Against this backdrop, Yoshida was devising a non-military security alliance with the US as a way to rebuild the peaceful "Meiji State."

"The current feelings of the Japanese people are similar to the feelings when the US minister of Defense came to Japan in February of 1949 and said Japan was strategically worthless for the US. In particular, the US attitude toward Taiwan is ambiguous, so the Japanese are quite skeptical about whether the US will really protect Asian countries until the end. The communist power is growing even in French Indochina. South Korea is also in a very unstable situation, and there were doubts that the US would abandon South Korea in the event of an emergency (1950/04)."²⁴⁰

As shown in the record of the Ikeda Mission above, Yoshida's non-military US-

Japan security alliance initiative, advocated just right before the outbreak of the Korean War, reflected the urgent conditions in Japan. It was true that sanctions on Japan were eased, and Japan's geopolitical status as an anti-communist strategic base was enhanced, starting with reverse course diplomacy. Nonetheless, the issues of the overall peace settlement and the independent peace settlement, and Japan's re-armament issue, accompanied by this transformation were developed more complexly. Ikeda added that even if the independent peace settlement between the US and Japan was not possible immediately, the US should guarantee a system that would ensure Japan's independence. However, as for Japan's remilitarization, it was difficult to reduce the gap with Washington's stance. Until 23 June 1950, the US regarded Japan's demilitarization as a naive stance, "like being in a green paradise without knowing that the storm of the international community is going violently."²⁴¹

2) Post-Colonial China and the Reconstruction of the "Chinese Unification"

A. Spread of Social Demand for Postwar Democratic Reform

After the surrender of imperial Japan, in postwar China, expectations for a peaceful restoration of daily life and socio-economic prosperity expanded. However, the leaders of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) were returning to a confrontation over the issue of reconstruction of the "Chinese unification"²⁴² as the cause

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 336.

²⁴¹ Takeshi Watanabe, "Secrete meeting with Mr. Dulles," *PJDPS*, 338.

²⁴² In this period, the "Chinese" is based on the idea of "Zhonghua minzu (Chinese people)." "Zhonghua" is a term used since the Yu-Jin period (220~420) and was initially used as a term for astronomy.

of the United Front against the Anti-Imperial Japan expired. As the influence of the CPC increased during the anti-Japanese struggle, it secured the right to make a voice in postwar state construction as well.²⁴³

However, the sudden end of the anti-Japanese war²⁴⁴ was an unpredictable event for both the KMT and the CPC, and as the situation changed sharply, rapid discussions on postwar national planning were prompted (Chen 2001, 20-26). Since 28 August, 1945, a discussion between Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石, 1887-1975) and Mao Zedong (毛泽东, 1893-1976) over the postwar national initiative was held in Chongqing, the interim capital, and on 10 October of the same year, the Double Tenth Agreement was signed. Although the issue of political integration in the Liberated Zone, the base of the CPC, under the jurisdiction of the CPC and the reorganization of the CPC's armed forces into National Army remained, the agreement had a declarative meaning as a principle agreement to avoid civil war and realize political democratization.²⁴⁵

The Chongqing Negotiation was promptly promoted despite the planned confrontation between the KMT government and CPC because of social aspirations for a

period of peace and a unified government after the war. At the end of the long period of war, it took considerable political burdens to start a civil war again. As Zhou Enlai (周恩来, 1898-1976) repeatedly emphasized, "to oppose the civil war and to insist on peace" was "the best program for earning humanity (Kubu 2013, 19-20)." Second, it was because the voices of the non-KMT parties including the CPC got louder. Non-KMT parties, including the CPC, the Youth Party, the Democratic League, and community leaders demanded an end to the reign under the one-party rule of the KMT and implement constitutionalism based on a codified constitutional order.²⁴⁶

The signing of the Double Tenth Agreement and the conclusion of the Chongqing Negotiation were the first attempts by major political forces in China to rebuild a unified regime after World War II. It was also the agreement that the social rejection of war and the newly emerging demand for democratic reform in principle led to. During the anti-Japanese cooperation period, such demands of the postwar political society were exerting influence on the part of the restructuring process of the KMT and the CPC. Since both parties had established political authority in the process of opposing

Then it referred to the civilization order of East Asia rather than referring to a specific species or region. For material specific to the CPC's intellectual history of "Zhonghua" see Han Je Park, "Disintegration of the Sino-Centered World Order and the Responses of Neighboring Countries: the Development of a Multi-Centered World Order in the East Asia from the Third to Sixth Centuries," *Journal of Chinese Studies* 54 (December 2006): 251-279; Seung-hyun Choi, "A Study on Chinese Communist Party's Perception of "Chinese nation": The Relationship between Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 23, no.1 (March 2018): 5-24.

²⁴³ Even in the period of United Front between the KMT and the CPC, Chiang of the party propagated that "there will be no place for the Communist Party in China after the war," and Mao of the CPC criticized the Chiang as "the dictatorship to destroy the Communist Party and other progressive forces in China." In particular, at the 6th National Congress in May 1945, when the policy to secure the leadership of the KMT was announced at the 6th National Congress,

the CPC criticized this by raising the idea of a multi-party coalition government at the 7th National Congress.

²⁴⁴ The Sino-Japanese War during World War II would be classified as the Northeast Front of the World War II or referred to as the "Pacific War" with a focus on the expansionist foreign policy of Imperial Japan. Here, the term "anti-Japanese war" is used to pay attention to the agency of China and the anti-Japanese United Front after the Manchurian Incident of 1931.

²⁴⁵ For more details of Mao's view, see "Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei," October 10, 1945, in History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF: fond 0100, opis 40, delo 7, papka 248, listy 39-44. Translated by Sergey Radchenko.

<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122809>

²⁴⁶ Enlai Zhou, "Statement on the Second Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (March 1946)," *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai Vol. 1* (PEKING: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), 250-257.

imperial Japan, it was difficult for them to take the dogmatic method reminiscent of imperialism. The Chongqing Negotiation was promoted against this backdrop.

In particular, it is worth pointing out the implementation of the Political Consultative Conference, which allowed many factions to participate equally. The Political Consultative Conference, held in January 1946, was held by a council of 38 members, including 8 KMT members, 7 communist, 9 Democratic League members, 5 Youth Party members, and 9 non-party.²⁴⁷ The council discussed issues of representation in the national congress which has been dominated by members of the KMT and also organized Constitutional Committee.²⁴⁸ They reached agreements that the draft constitution now in preparation by Constitutional Committee will be definitive and the only document presented to National Assembly for acceptance, and all parties are under moral obligation to have their delegates to National Assembly support draft constitution as presented.²⁴⁹ This symbolically shows the rise of new political forces and the demand for democratic politics in postwar Chinese society.

B. Domestic and International confrontation intensified

However, shortly after the signing of the Double Tenth Agreement of 1945, the discussion on Constitution enactment would come to a deadlock. This is because the small-scale armed conflict continued in the

Liberated Zone in northeast region and mutual distrust between the KMT and the CPC was heightened. As a result, the task of rebuilding the unified government was delayed.

Meanwhile, while the tension between the KMT and the CPC intensified, the anxiety of the international community also increased with the speech of “Iron Curtain” in March 1946. From this background, the discussion on the intervention of the US and the Soviet Union for the tense relations of the KMT and the CPC began. For example, in Washington, it was argued that the Soviet Union expanded its influence in Northeast China, also called as Manchuria, through Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the KMT government.²⁵⁰ From a geopolitical point of view, the US needed to support the KMT to check the power of the Soviets in East Asia, but concerns were raised that these measures could rather induce Soviet Union’s intervention.

After a series of discussions, on 15 December, 1945, US President Truman (1884–1972) announced his policy toward China, which stated that the US will continue to support the KMT government but will not engage in military intervention in China’s domestic politics.²⁵¹ In addition, in March 1946, the Chief of Staff of the Army, George Marshall (1880–1959) was dispatched as a special envoy to take the role of arbitrator in the agreement. This effort made a significant impact in the early stage. The talks resumed

²⁴⁷ Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Sprouse), January 1, 1946, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 9: 133. [Hereafter *FRUS 1946*].

²⁴⁸ Charter for the Interim Government of the Republic of China, in *FRUS 1946*, 9: 139-141

²⁴⁹ The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State, March 21, 1946, in *FRUS 1946*, 9: 158.

²⁵⁰ The Consul General at Vladivostok (Clubb) to the Secretary of State, December 6, 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 7: 1048-1050. [Hereafter *FRUS 1945*].

²⁵¹ Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, in *FRUS 1945*, 7: 755-757.

as both KMT and CPC actively cooperated with Marshall's diplomatic efforts. The Political Consultative Conference was held as stated above, and the Armistice Agreement between the KMT and the CPC was concluded in January 1946.

However, owing to Marshall's arbitration, international political variables became more influential in the postwar nation rebuilding project of the KMT and the CPC. CPC leaders discussed asking the Soviets to participate in the talks to keep the US in check and to join the CPC's voice. On the other hand, this also led to the blatant assertion of the "use foreigners to subdue foreigners (以夷制夷)" mantra, that is, "defeat the barbarians using other barbarians." Meanwhile, there was an expression of internal opposition to the Soviet Union's participation within the CPC, criticizing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which was signed between the KMT and the Soviets.

Nevertheless, Marshall's arbitration had a direct effect on the Soviet Union as well as China. The Soviets violated the alliance treaty with the KMT and began aiding the CPC troops when the economic talks in the northeast region addressed in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship were delayed. On 18 April 1946, when the Soviet forces withdrew from Changchun, the buffer zone in the northeast region disappeared, and the communist forces occupied the area

immediately afterward, raising the possibility of a total armed conflict between the KMT government and the CPC. The communist forces successively occupied major northeastern cities such as Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar, and the Chinese civil war started as the KMT government forces attacked the CPC defense forces in Siping, located at the southern tip of Changchun.

C. Postwar National Initiative: Mao's Visit to Stalin in December 1949

China's postwar nation rebuilding competition eventually caused an outright armed conflict and civil war. As a result, Mao and other CPC leadership realized that the conflict in China could not be resolved only by the intervention or compromise of the great powers. Here, it is necessary to review Mao's idea of the intermediate zone. After the outbreak of the Chinese civil war, Mao paid attention to the "vast" intermediate zone that existed between the great powers rather than the confrontation and intervention of the US and the Soviets.²⁵² He believed that even though the "American Rebels" declared confrontation with the Soviet and built military bases all over the world; this was not actually against the Soviet, but rather a strategy to sustain numerous countries in the intermediate zone, as in the cases of the British Empire and Imperial Japan.²⁵³

Mao's intermediate zone theory reflects

²⁵² Zedong Mao, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong (August 1946)," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. IV* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 91-96. Mao presented the concept of "middle ground" for the first time in a conversation with Strong. The Middle Ground Theory can be seen as the first attempt to theorize Mao's revolutionary nationalist idea, and for a detailed discussion, see Jun Niu, *The Cold War and the Origins of Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China*, trans. Dae-hoon Park, (Seoul: Hankukmunhwasa, 2015): 19-31.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 99. "The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S.

reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question. In the Pacific the United States now controls areas larger than all the former British spheres of influence there put together; it controls Japan, that part of China under Kuomintang rule, half of Korea, and the South Pacific. (...) Using various pretexts, the United States is making large-scale military arrangements and setting up military bases in many countries. The U.S. reactionaries say that (...) are preparing to set up all over the world are aimed against the Soviet Union. (...) At present, however, it is not the Soviet Union but the countries in which these military bases are located that are the first to suffer U.S. aggression."

the idea of revolutionary nationalism in that it emphasizes the “different struggles” of the “people of each country” as the center of international politics rather than the politics of the great powers such as the US and the Soviet.²⁵⁴ In particular, he argued that fearmongering about nuclear weapons and World War III was only a “paper tiger,” emphasizing the US ambition to dominate the world and the struggle of the democratic people against it.²⁵⁵ The intermediate zone theory was Mao’s first attempt to theorize revolutionary nationalism and confirms a unique early interpretation of Marx-Leninism (Lee 2016, 343-381).

On 1 October 1949, New China was established, and Mao was inaugurated as the first chairman of the country. Even after the establishment of the state, the task of postwar state reconstruction continued. For instance, the Common Program adopted by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s new Political Consultative Conference (PCC) emphasized the state integration rather than socialist reform of the CPC. Article 1 of the Common Program set forth the “dictatorship of the people’s democracy” through “the unity of the democratic class” and “the unity of the nations in the country” as the founding ideology.²⁵⁶ It placed the task of rebuilding the “unified country of the Chinese people” in the front. This was more evident compared to New China’s first constitution that was enacted in 1954. The first Constitution focused on socialist reform rather than state reconstruction and designated the period from the establishment of the country to the

enactment of the first Constitution as the transition phase to prepare “the necessary conditions” for a “gradual transition to socialism.”²⁵⁷

Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union, which lasted from December 1949 to February 1950, publicly proclaimed the postwar national initiative of state unity and transitional socialist reform. As discussed earlier, the postwar CPC continued to be politically involved with the Soviet Union. The Soviets emerged as an enemy who stood by the KMT until the attempts by the KMT government to enact a new Constitution were developed into a civil war. It also reigned as an ideological comrade or teacher of the CPC. Postwar new China and the Soviet Union maintained alliance relationships and hostilities depending on justifications such as socialist ideology, relations with the US, and strategic interests.

In particular, as the logic of the cold war gradually overwhelmed the overall international order, the ideological “comrade” relationship between the new China and the Soviet Union became prominent. In September 1947, the Soviet Union rang an alarm for the formation of the US-Soviet cold war structure in Warsaw’s Cominform (Communist State Intelligence Agency), suggesting that the world was being organized into two major factions centered on the US and the Soviet Union. It emphasized that the CPC of each country, centered on the Soviet Union, needed to create a united front to fight the imperialist aggression and exploitation of the US. Even

²⁵⁴ Ibid., “Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation (April 1946),” 87-88.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., “Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong (August 1946),” 100.

²⁵⁶ “The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,” *The Common Program and Other Documents of the First Plenary Session of The Chinese People’s*

Political Consultative Conference (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1950), 1-20.

²⁵⁷ “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954),” PKULAW, Accessed February 1, 2019, https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/089435da920a5457bdfb.html?keyword=1954%20constitution%20original

within the CPC, a discussion took place that the new China would not be free from the dynamics of the Cold War. Starting with the Warsaw Cominform, it stopped using the concept of “intermediate zone” officially.

Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union in December 1949 was a natural and ceremonial procedure, given the international political circumstance, which was already engulfed by the Cold War. However, as an extension of the postwar national reconstruction effort, Mao’s intention to obtain national recognition from the Soviet Union and the international community can be assumed. Although the New China officially obtained the approval of the Soviet Union the next day after the proclamation of the state, the Political Bureau of the CPC set abolition of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliances between the KMT and the Soviet, and establishment of renegotiation with the CPC as top priority agendas by preparing for a meeting with Joseph Stalin (1887–1953) in November 1949.²⁵⁸ The new China was aware of the tensions with the Soviet Union, which continued until then, and tried to consolidate the Sino-Soviet alliance through renegotiation of Sino-Soviet relations. It was particularly necessary to pay extra care to Stalin’s birthday event, as it was an event attended by various countries of the Communist International (Comintern),

including the Soviet Union.

In fact, in Moscow, voices warned that Mao was a nationalist before a comrade of the Comintern, which delayed discussions on the renegotiation of the Sino-Soviet treaty.²⁵⁹ Furthermore, it was difficult to gain momentum for renegotiation, as Stalin revealed several times his intention not to give up the benefits in the northeast region that it had acquired through the past Sino-Soviet treaty. Until the beginning of January 1950, neither side had a full-fledged discussion on the Sino-Soviet treaty.²⁶⁰

Mao took various strategies to establish the international status of the new China as the tension with the Soviets persisted. He mobilized ideological rhetoric, saying, “I wish the world’s working class to achieve unprecedented unity under Stalin’s leadership,” showing off its status as “Soviet’s friend.” Nonetheless, he was actively involved in diplomatic relations between non-Communist states and the Western world. For example, at the end of December 1949, Mao emphasized foreign trade relations with the Soviet Union as a top priority, but directed trade agreements with the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, India, and other countries from a “perspective that considers the whole situation.”²⁶¹

On 14 February 1950, the existing Sino-

²⁵⁸ Prior to Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union, the Political Bureau of the CPC prepared for a meeting with Stalin. The following were focused on the meetings: first, the renegotiation of the small and medium-sized treaty, second, Zhou Enlai to take the actual responsibility of the agreement, and third, the official reason for the visit to the Soviet Union is to be adjusted to participate in Stalin’s birthday celebration. For details about this meeting see “Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai,” February 01, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 17–24. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946–February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), 43–48. Translated by Sergey Radchenko. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110003>

²⁵⁹ Representatively, Soviet consul Ivan Kovalev submitted a critical report to Stalin on Mao’s policies, such as “a few policies on the leadership of the CCP and real problems.” It particularly criticized Mao’s domestic policy and accused him of deviating from Stalin’s teachings.

²⁶⁰ N.S. Goncharov., J. W. Lewis, and L. Xue, “Documents on the Sino-soviet Alliance and the Korean War,” *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, trans. Korean Contemporary History Study Group of Sungkyunkwan University (Seoul: Ilzogak, 2011), 171, 178–179.

²⁶¹ Ibid., “Message from Moscow by Mao Zedong on the preparation of a trade agreement with the Soviet Union (December 22, 1949)”, 197.

Soviet treaty was annulled, and the new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed. Mao's multilateral diplomatic strategy, speculative reports on Sino-Soviet relations in Western media, and Dean Acheson (1893–1971)'s theory of crisis in Asia²⁶² spurred the re-negotiation of the Sino-Soviet treaty. However, although Sino-Soviet relation was reorganized in response to such external pressures, the annexed agreement of the treaty confirms the provisions of invasion of sovereignty, such as Soviet intervention in the Xinjiang region, Soviet's insistence on long-term joint operation of Changchun Railway, and recognition of Soviet's extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. Even after the re-negotiation of the Sino-Soviet alliance, toxic clauses that could be fatal to the reconstruction of postwar united China were included.²⁶³

3) New Governments' Nation Building and the Friction with the International Order

I reviewed the process of fierce competition in nation building over postwar national reconstruction in Japan and China until the outbreak of the Korean War. The contention of postwar national reconstruction was carried out in the form of a controversy and struggle over the enactment of the new Constitution, and various political voices were raised in unison as aspirations for postwar peace and democratic reform spread in both countries. It was revealed that while the fatigue accumulated during the war and the feelings of emptiness caused by the

sudden end of the war remained, the possibility of new political reforms and various political imaginations coexisted. Meanwhile, the state visits by Japan and China to the great powers, which took place just before the outbreak of the Korean War, suggests that these new administrations' postwar initiatives of reconstruction of a "peaceful Meiji state" and a "Unified Chinese Nation" were not taken seriously by the US and the Soviet Union.

5. Conclusion

Based on a comparison of the cases of China and Japan during the Korean War, this study could confirm the processes of various historical paths developed in the "East Asian Postwar" paving the way for the "East Asian Cold War" in the wake of the "Korean War." In particular, a similarity between the political and social contexts shared at the regional level and the political selection processes was derived from the disparate war experiences of individual countries.

The Korean War was a pivotal event for the political dynamics of the "East Asian Postwar," which were overwhelmed by the hostile confrontation of the Cold War order, and, as the postwar process of imperial Japan became institutionalized as the San Francisco system, the value norms of postwar treatment took over international legality. In short, the political legacy of the Korean War was that the Cold War's international order overwhelmed the political dynamics of postwar East Asia across national and international levels.

This study's significance lies in its

²⁶² On January 12th, Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State pointed out the territorial ambitions of Stalin and Mao as the main culprit of the "Asian crisis."

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 236-239.

attempt to reexamine the Korean War and the construction of the Cold War in the regional basis through the context of “East Asian Postwar.” The historical context that is shared by the East Asian region is examined, beyond the contexts of individual countries or a confrontation between the communist regimes and democracies. As a result, it was possible to re-examine the dynamics of the postwar East Asian political society, which had been invisible in the

confrontation structure of the Cold War, and to examine how the hostile impulses of the Cold War, which was embedded in the Cold War order in East Asia, spread and became a consolidated local order. Moreover, this study may contribute to conceptualizing a regional order that reflects East Asia’s historical context by structurally linking the layers of individual countries and regional order.

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The features of identities of Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan

(based on the findings of a sociological survey)

Yefrem YEFREMOV

Kazakhstan has become home to people of different ethnos, languages, religions, and cultures. According to the national statistics agency, the country's population speaks 23 different languages and professes Islam, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, and Judaism. Although the share of the indigenous ethnos, Kazakhs, is slightly less than 70%, Kazakhstan can be rightly called multiethnic, poly-confessional, and multicultural because significant subpopulations, such as Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Tatars, Uighurs, Germans, Koreans, and others are represented as well.

In Kazakhstan, there are approximately 100,000 ethnic Koreans with ethnonym "Koryo Saram", and it can be argued that the overwhelming majority of them are urbanized. This determines the multi-ethnic environment surrounding the diaspora. This factor determines the high degree of acculturation. They are part of the global Korean diaspora around the world.

Koryo Saram's diasporic identity is a composite of numerous identities based on a shared cultural heritage and has mosaic character. Despite Koryo Sarams are focused on preserving their ethno-cultural identity, "otherness" and "Koreanness", the situation of long-term co-existing and adaptation to the new socio-cultural conditions determines the process of acculturation and assimilation.

The primary factor in defining the identity among the respondents is the factor of ethnic origin. Nationality is the second most significant component in establishing Koryo Saram's identity. The maintenance of "Koreanness" of Koryo Sarams in the context of a multiethnic community, particularly in Kazakhstan, is based on genetic elements as well as the preservation of the culture.

It is worth drawing further attention to the phenomenon of the historical experience of representatives of the Korean diaspora, which also influences the formation of diasporic identity. An historical (nostalgic) experience is considered as the direct experience of a person in regard to a historical event that, at the same time, has historical distance between the past and the present. The basis of such an experience is the emotional experience of losing something vital. In 1937, approximately 172,000 ethnic Koreans were forcefully relocated to Central Asia on cargo trains by the Soviet government. For Koreans it was a losing of their homes and connection with their Homeland. Thus, the memory of suffering from the deportation of Koreans from the Far East to Central Asia has formed one of the

important factors of memory and the basis of the Korean diaspora's consciousness in Kazakhstan.

At the same time, the main factor in the diaspora identification of Kazakh Koreans are the ethnic origin and elements of ethnic everyday culture, traditions, and customs. On the one hand, Koryo Saram have much in common with Koreans living both on the Korean Peninsula and beyond, but on the other hand, the diaspora of Koryo Saram is extremely different from both Koreans of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereinafter, DPRK), as well as from other Korean diasporas such as Joseonjok (조선족) in China or Zainichi Chosenjin (在日朝鮮人) in Japan.

According to Valeriy Khan and Sim Hong Yeong, Koreans of Central Asia residing in constant contact with representatives of various ethnic groups became flexible and had largely positive psychological attitudes towards ethnic diversity, flexible models of behavior in a multiethnic environment, which affected the formation of diasporic identity (Khan and Sim 2014, 135)

Consequently, the diasporic identity of Koreans in Kazakhstan is a construct of various identities based on a single cultural basis, on which the identities of representatives of the multiethnic society and the country of residence are superimposed. Thus, it is acceptable to not only discuss double identity, but there could be triple or even more complicated types of identities. An option of the existence of a whole set of identities is possible, among which, nevertheless, the basic one plays the main role.

In the Korean diaspora community, intangible heritage plays an important role in preserving Korean identity in its diasporic interpretation. Hahm Han Hee and Lee Seong In argue that the intangible heritage of the Koreans of Central Asia is a means of preserving the group's (in this case, the diaspora) identity (Hahm and Lee 2015, 3). In particular, the folk song "Arirang" performed by members of the diaspora conveys "diaspora grief" (Hahm and Lee 2015, 4). It is also worthwhile to note the gastronomic culture of the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan which, in the process of formation and taking into account regional characteristics, underwent transformation and assimilation. Examples include the so-called,

“local” Korean salads: morkovcha²⁶⁴, kadicha²⁶⁵, fish khe²⁶⁶, funchoza²⁶⁷, chimchi²⁶⁸. You can see traces of the manifestation of diasporic identity in the main dishes as well, for example soups: puktyai²⁶⁹ (soup made from courgette and soybean paste) with the addition of cilantro or dzhusai, or kuksi. Some dishes of the Kazakhstani Korean diaspora’s cuisine are not represented at all in the cuisine of the Republic of Korea, for example, pyagodi²⁷⁰ - steamed buns stuffed with meat and cabbage.

To examine the phenomenon of diaspora and diasporic identity, conditions, and factors influencing the transformation and development of identity in a multiethnic society in Kazakhstan the author has conducted a sociological survey to find out the main features of the identity of Koryo Saram diaspora. The author makes a shot at depicting the degree of ethnic, cultural, and diasporic identity of Koryo Saram, and which effect on the preserving Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan do they have.

The following elements impacting the above-mentioned identities were investigated in the survey:

1. criteria by which Koryo Saram perceive themselves to be Korean,
2. attitude of Koryo Saram to their ethnicity,
3. degree of feeling of ethno-cultural similarity between Koreans of Kazakhstan and Koreans of the Republic of Korea,
4. degree of association of Koreans of Kazakhstan with other Koreans living in other CIS countries,
5. degree of practicing Korean traditions,

²⁶⁴ Spicy marinated carrot salad created by Koreans after moving to Central Asia.

²⁶⁵ Salad made from fried slices of eggplants.

²⁶⁶ Marinated scraps of fish with spicy sauce and vegetables

²⁶⁷ A replica of a Korean salad called japche, consisting of Chinese Vermicelli Noodles, strips of beef, sometimes chicken, and fried vegetables, and sesame seeds.

²⁶⁸ A replica of a Korean salad called kimchi, consisting of pickled Napa cabbage, mixed with garlic and Chili pepper.

²⁶⁹ Sort of 된장찌개

²⁷⁰ 왕만두 or 편수 or 맨새

6. Koryo Saram's attitudes towards interethnic marriages,

7. features of the *Koryosaramness*

Let's move on to discussing the results of the survey.

To the closed question: “By what criteria do you recognize yourself as a Korean?”, out of 100% of respondents, 75% indicated genetic origin as the first most important factor, in addition to this, the second most important factor was the anthropological factor - appearance was chosen by 59% respondents. The third most important factor, according to which the respondents identify themselves as Koreans, was the common mentality, as is commonly believed, for the diaspora community of Koreans in Kazakhstan. Under the concept of "mentality", presumably, the respondents implied a general ethnic character, as a system of manifestation of stable features inherent in members of a particular ethnic community, taking into account the specifics of their psychological and social qualities²⁷¹. The next most important factors were knowledge of culture and, in particular, Korean traditions and customs. Korean language proficiency is the least significant factor in identifying oneself as Korean in the survey.

Next, the average hierarchy of the significance of the factors that determine Koreanness is displayed in the form of a pie chart (Figure 1).




Figure 1. The average hierarchy of the significance of the factors that determine Koreanness

²⁷¹ Мункуева, Р. Б., Серебрякова, Ю. А. Понятие национального характера / Вестник Бурятского

Государственного Университета. № 3. Т. 3. 2018. - С. 32-36. С.33

In addition, it was revealed that the majority - 3/4 of Koreans, experience a sense of pride from belonging to their ethnic group (see Figure 3). This, in particular, is due to the prestige of the ethnic group – heterostereotypes about Koreans in Kazakhstan are largely positive. For example, in the Forbes-50 list of Kazakhstan, ethnic Koreans are in first and second places in 2021. It also turned out that 1/5 of all respondents are indifferent to their ethnicity.



Figure 2. Attitude of respondents to their ethnicity

A question was also raised to identify the degree of feeling of ethno-cultural similarity between the Koreans of Kazakhstan and the Koreans of the Republic of Korea. The scatter of responses, as seen in the scatter plot (Figure 3), is very large. Presumably, the respondents' answers were influenced by their level of knowledge about the Koreans of the Republic of Korea.




Figure 3. Degree of feeling of ethno-cultural similarity between Koreans of Kazakhstan and Koreans of the Republic of Korea

The mode (the most common value) among the answers was determined by the value "50" - this indicates that the majority of the interviewed Koryo Saram perceive the Koreans of the Republic of Korea at an average level of kinship. Perhaps this is a consequence of the fact that the survey respondents were mainly young Koreans of Kazakhstan, who are largely familiar with South Korean culture, and identify themselves as both Koryo Saram and Hanguk Saram.

However, the average value was "45", this shows that among the Koryo Saram there is still a large proportion of those who, in general, are more inclined to believe that they and the Koreans of the Republic of Korea are more alien to each other than close.

At the same time, an attempt was made to determine the extent to which the Koreans of Kazakhstan consider themselves to be part of the general group of Koreans of the CIS (Figure 4). As can be seen from the responses received, slightly more than half of the respondents - 51% (the sum of the answers "yes, a huge difference" and "yes"), believe that both groups - the Koreans of Kazakhstan and the Koreans of other CIS countries, are different, to one degree or another. Thus, it can be assumed that this group of respondents does not associate themselves with their ethnic homeland in the current period of time, but rather already considers themselves to a greater extent a member of only the community of Koreans in Kazakhstan. Presumably, this shows a high level of integration of Koreans into the society of their current homeland.




Figure 3. Степень ощущения близости между корейцами Казахстана и корейцами прочих стран СНГ

To the question “Do you observe ethnic Korean traditions and customs?” the following responses were received (Figure 4.). In general, Korean traditions, as can be seen from the above diagram, are observed to some extent by the majority of respondents - 88% (55% with the answer "yes" + 33% with the answer "selectively").




Figure 4. Degree of observance of Korean traditions and customs

As can be seen in Figure 5, the main customs and traditions practiced by the Koreans of Kazakhstan are associated with human life cycles, so-called “3 tables of Koryo Saram”,

also funeral and memorial rites. Thus, the ritual culture of Koryo Saram has preserved, albeit in a modified form, all so-called "4 tables" of modern Korean culture.

This testifies to the preservation in the Korean diaspora of Kazakhstan of the importance of ethnic culture at the household level, and not just its declaration.




Figure 5. Cultural codes which are being observed

In the question of the attitude of Koreans towards hetero-ethnic marriages (Figure 6) - 86% (48+38) of the respondents are not against such marriages, so in 48 cases out of 100 the respondents answered that they have a positive attitude towards them. This can be interpreted as the fact that they admit the possibility that their spouse will be a member of another ethnic group. Also, 38% of respondents who answered "indifferent" are presumably not opposed to ethnically heterogeneous marriages in general. However, 12% of respondents answered that they are against inter-ethnic marriages with non-Koreans.




Figure 6. Koryo Saram's attitude towards inter-ethnic marriages (in general)

However, as seen in Figure 7, when it comes to marriage itself, 41% (23+10+9) prefer to start families with ethnic Korean partners. Thus, despite the fact that the majority of respondents are tolerant of the so-called. "mixed" marriages, yet a considerable part of them adhere to the principle of "ethnic purity". 49% of respondents answered that it does not matter to them what ethnicity their spouse will be. These answers indirectly confirm the results of the previous question, as almost half of the respondents do not attach importance to the ethnicity of their spouse.




Figure 7. Personal spouse preference scale

Respondents were also asked to answer the question “Should Koryo Saram feel personally responsible for creating a positive image of the diaspora?”. As seen in Figure 8, the vast majority agree that every Koryo Saram should behave in a way that does not damage the image of the Koryo Saram diaspora.




Figure 8. The level of personal responsibility to the diaspora

As the main qualities that define Koryo Saram as an independent community, and, consequently, as a full-fledged diaspora, the respondents indicated in the first place such properties as originality of historical destiny and symbiosis of different cultures [represented in the region], such as Russian, European, [Central] Asian. In the next place are such 2 qualities as possessing of the dialect language called "Koryo Mar" and the identity of Koryo Saram.




Figure 9. Distinguishing features of Koryo Saram from other Koreans

Finally, as can be seen from Figure 10, the absolute majority of the asked Koreans identify themselves as members of the Koryo Saram society (i.e., diasporic group).




Figure 10. Do you consider yourself Koryo Saram

Findings

Based on the results of the sociological study, it can be concluded that the Koryo Saram of Kazakhstan has a very high level of positive ethnic identity, and also confirms a relatively

high level of integration into the multi-ethnic society of Kazakhstan and tolerance towards other ethnic groups. This is observed, in particular, in the fact that almost half of the young Koreans surveyed in Kazakhstan are positive about interethnic marriages.

At the same time, it can be argued that the Koryo Saram of Kazakhstan formed into a separate diaspora group and have their own diasporic identity. This is expressed in their obvious opposition to the rest of the Koryo Saram groups of the CIS countries. Also, the Koryo Saram of Kazakhstan has a high degree of identifying themselves with the Koryo Saram diaspora, i.e. they have a strong sense of belonging in diasporic contexts (Figure 8) and positioning themselves as a Koryo Saram (Figure 10), not just a Korean.

The maintaining of “Koreanness/*Koryosaramness*” in the conditions of the multi-ethnic society of Kazakhstan still occurs on the basis of genetic factors, according to, so-called, the principle of pure blood, as well as due to the preservation of ritual and everyday culture.

As a conclusion, the high level of preserving Korean identity is being observed in Korean Diaspora of Kazakhstan. And, assumedly, a renaissance of the diasporic identity of Koreans in Kazakhstan is being observed nowadays.

Despite, there is an existing possibility of the weakening of manifestation of diasporic identity with an increase of the proportion of hetero-ethnic marriages among Koryo Saram. Natalya Yem notes a steady increase in the number of interethnic marriages between Koreans and other ethnic groups, particularly in Almaty (Yem 2004). Such high rates of ethnic intermarriage demonstrate the involvement of Koreans in Kazakhstan in the process of assimilation into the local community.

Their diasporic identity of Koryo Sarams is a “border” phenomenon: on the one hand, representatives of the diaspora are focused on preserving their ethno-cultural identity and “otherness” concerning the ethnic majority; on the other hand, the situation of living in a foreign country and new socio-cultural conditions form the identity of a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Which State is Legitimate for Decolonization? – Choi Duk-shin’s Strange Career from South Korea to North Korea.

Shin Dongil

Introduction

In November 1961, the U.S. State Department wrote several confidential biographic sketches about South Korean officials prior to their planned visit with president J. F. Kennedy. According to the report, all seven South Koreans, including President Park Chong-hui, were treated with considerable detail as ambitious, intelligent, and pro-American figures in actual control of the South Korean government. Among them, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Duk-shin was prominently described as not only pro-American but also an ardent Korean patriot, fervent anti-communist, and a passionate anti-Japanese.²⁷² Indeed, Choi’s immense career from a veteran of World War II against the Japanese empire as a staff officer of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea under the Chinese Nationalist Party to the South Korean representative of the Korean War armistice conference and the UN general assembly shows Choi’s very clear thoughts of anti-communism and pro-American.

Choi’s asylum in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK] in 1985, thus, was one of the most paradoxical events in the Korean

contemporary history. For many South Koreans, it is hard to understand why this enthusiastic anti-communist fled from South Korea and converted to an anti-Americanism. To interpret this drastic shift, the South Korean government and intellectuals both mobilized binary Cold War rhetoric that Choi was a betrayer who converted from an anti-communist to a communist follower loyal to North Korea’s premier Kim Il-Sung’s family. In doing so, the government tried to undermine Choi’s moral status as a pope [Kyō-ryung] of the Chōndo-kyo church by determining the cause of Choi’s flee as a face saving to conceal his accumulative embezzlement and privatization of church property.²⁷³ And intellectuals considered Choi’s treachery as an absolute schizophrenic attitude in comparison to his commitment to the 1951 Geochang Massacre as an eleventh division commander, the slaughter of innocent civilians framed as communists. Hence, prominent political scientist Park Myung-Lim, nearly the only scholar to have dealt with Choi Duk-shin, insisted that Choi’s conversion and high-ranking designation in DPRK precisely shows a distorted aspect of inter-Korean competition in Cold War era.²⁷⁴

However, these binary Cold War

²⁷² RG 84, Korea, Seoul Embassy, Classified General Records, 1960-62, Entry CGR 56-63, Boxes 25, 26.

²⁷³ 외무부 미주국 북미과, 최덕신 전 외무장관 미국 망명 및 반한 활동, 1977-1978, CA0136245, 1977.

²⁷⁴ Park Myung-Lim, “Nation-Building and Internal Pacification: A Case Study of the Keochang Incident during the Korean War,” 2002, 84-85.

narratives that frame Choi's defection as a distorted chapter in Korean history have given too much importance to his original sins, such as the Geochang Massacre, church fund misappropriation, and an ultimately treachery. Thereby, they have largely ignored Choi's methods and tools that facilitated him to navigate both sides of Korea across the Cold War barrier. Indeed, Choi was one of the emblematic Korean who was frequently forced to choose one side of ideology in a tremendous tide of binary, incompatible -isms and dreams for nation-building that collided and intertwined. Nationalism and imperialism, communism and anti-communism, militarism and anti-militarism, and pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism were all dichotomous thoughts that penetrated Koreans, which in turn, shaped their conceptions and positionings between anti-South Korea and anti-North Korea.

This research, thus, focuses on how Choi was able to navigate between these dichotomous discourses and counter-discourses toward Korean nation-building, by examining his life trajectory and inner conflicts rather than confining his complex life into the limited binary framework. By historicizing his kaleidoscopic political career as a military officer, diplomat, and religious leader,²⁷⁵ I contend that Choi could steer himself beyond the dichotomous thoughts through his evolving belief in militarism focused on using force to achieve international recognition and racialized nationalism centered on Asians throughout his long career. Therefore this article shows how fragile the dichotomy of

the Cold War narratives was; in so doing, it also examines the complexity and dynamics of Koreans' thoughts and dreams toward their own decolonization and nation-building.

This paper consists of three sections. The first section traces Choi's military career in the early 1940s and 1950s when his militarism and racialized nationalism began to formulate. As an advanced guard who carried out military operations and armistice conferences with the U.S. army in Burma and Korea, he keenly sensed the Republic of China [ROC]'s increasing international prestige by using force and American racialized perception toward East Asians. The second section reveals Choi's changing conception toward US-led international order through his diplomatic career during the late 1950s and 1960s. Still favor to American ideology, he projected his discontent with the American policy toward East and Southeast Asia by overlapping the Korean situation with that of Vietnamese. With an examining his anti-government activities and rhetoric, the last section shows how Choi could flee to North Korea while maintaining his status as the Chōndo-kyo leader. In developing this narrative, this paper uses diverse primary sources, including Choi's autobiographies and letters, as well as newspaper articles and government documents.

Military career, formulating militarism and racialized nationalism

In 1921, eight year-old Choi Duk-Shin moved to Beijing from northern

²⁷⁵ After graduating from Huangpu and the American military academy, Choi participated in both World War II and the Korean War. And during the Korean War, he even committed Geochang Massacre and served as a representative of South

Korea in an armistice conference. Following the armistice, he was appointed the first South Korean ambassador to South Vietnam and the ninth South Korean foreign minister before defecting from South to North Korea as a Chōndo-kyo leader.

Korean county of Ŭichu to live with his father, Choi Dong-Oh, who served as an officer of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Provisional Government of the Korea. While growing up, Choi Duk-Shin and his father both consented that Choi should become a military officer to contribute to the realization Korean independence against the Japanese colonization.²⁷⁶ After he graduated from Whampoa Military Academy of the ROC, Choi joined the Chinese Nationalist Army in the 1930s, and following the outbreak of the Pacific War, he was sent as a staff officer in Sun Li-ren's new 38th Division to protect the Burma Road against the Japanese imperial army.

Indeed, Choi and his father were common Koreans who extensively internalized militarism under the hyper-militaristic Japanese rule. Following the protectorate period when the Japanese empire usurped the Korean diplomatic sovereignty in 1905, the nationalist writers widely called for Koreans to abandon their fixation on *mun* [literary] and rather pursue the militaristic ethos to navigate the era of Darwinist survival of the fittest. Moreover, after the annexation, some Koreans even urged the Japanese Government-General to introduce military training education in the Korean secondary schools in order to reform Korean students' feeble spirit.²⁷⁷ In this extensive militaristic milieu, Choi and his father, thus, also intensively possessed this militaristic sense to fulfill national independence from Japanese imperialism.

Therefore, despite his fierce criticism of Japanese militarism, Choi could not abandon or stay away from this

militaristic ethos but even reinforced it during the Burma campaign. As a colonized, he was inspired by ROC's first overseas deployment of troops and concerted operation with western powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. In his view, the ROC army's march into Burma and India had significant meanings. In his first autobiography, *Inmyŏn Hangil Chŏnki* [Record of anti-Japanese war in India-Burma campaign] written after his return to liberated South Korea, Choi thought that the ROC army could gain international recognition as an efficient, modern force through the deployment of troops, which would in turn substantiate its international status.

ROC army stationed in Burma and India bravely readvanced into this region and wiped out Japanese invaders so that ROC could reinforce its international prestige... British army had a big faith in the ROC army, and they deeply expressed it through thumbs-up, a western gesture to show their satisfaction... The ROC's national flag was hoisted with the British, American, and Russian flags in the Indian capital, Delhi, in a military parade for the first time... How did ROC army achieve such glories on the international stage, even in remote foreign capital like Delhi?²⁷⁸

Through his rhetorical questions in which Choi clearly expressed his envy toward the achievement of the ROC army on the

²⁷⁶ Choi Duk-Shin, "[Interview] Nae Kohyang Chikŭmŭn, P'yŏngpuk Ŭichu," *Pukhan* 28, 1974, 206.

²⁷⁷ Carter Eckert, *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism, 1866–1945* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 56–61.

²⁷⁸ Choi Duk-Shin, *Inmyŏn Hangil Chŏnki* (P'yŏnghwa-tosŏ-chusikhoesa 1948), 2–13. My translation

international stage, he sought to investigate how the ROC achieved its international recognition. And he concluded that the ROC's all achievements during World War II resulted from the militaristic mental training of the ROC soldiers that boosted nationalistic morale against imperialism by risking their lives.²⁷⁹ For Choi, militarism of using force and showing capabilities of national army was one of the most efficient ways for the colonized and the semi-colonized nations to prove their capacity to be independent.

Subsequently, Choi's militarism continued when he became a representative of Republic of Korea [ROK] at the Korean War armistice conference in 1953 and even connected with his racialized nationalism and perception on Korean refugees. Even before in Burma, Choi was conscious of prevailed western thoughts of racism and orientalism. Hence, he wrote in his autobiography that the achievements of the ROC army also changed the whites' sense of disdain toward colored races. And he was convinced that militarism would be a panacea to cure not only colonialism but also racism.²⁸⁰ Furthermore, Choi's racial feelings continuously constituted his dissatisfaction as a ROK representative toward the awkward atmosphere at the armistice conference. In his second autobiography, *Naeka Kyōkkūn P'anmunchōm* [My experiences in P'anmunchōm] written in 1955, Choi elaborated the details of the exact sight of conference.

I looked on the opposite side, and the
People's Republic of China [PRC]

representatives sat face to face with me. People of the other side, including North Koreans, were familiar East Asian like us in spite of different clothes, while our side of people were almost all tall and white westerns except for three Asians, including me. The very scene of the conference looks like the meeting of eastern people against western people... Naturally, this armistice conference was held to resolve the Korean situation and deal with communist North Koreans, so it would be right and convenient for Koreans, concerned parties of the war, to be chief representatives at the conference. The Americans, however, obstinately set up American interpreters, and I wonder if they distrust our Koreans. It was beyond my imagination that the conference, supposed to be a venue of fierce ideological debate, was extremely silent due to waiting for interpretations in Korean, English, and Chinese.²⁸¹

In his overall impressions of the armistice conference, he articulated the Americans' negligence and distrust toward the Korean agency with his subtle racial intimacy with North Koreans and Chinese as East Asians.²⁸² And this articulation and impression of Choi, which the later sections will show, implicates his subsequent conversion from pro-American to racialized nationalism, anti-American.

However, by then, his sense of racial intimacy with DPRK and PRC was highly restrained by anti-communism;

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 13; Choi Duk-Shin, "Ch'onglyōkchōn," 518-522.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 13-16.

²⁸¹ Choi Duk-Shin, *Naeka Kyōkkūn P'anmunchōm* (Samchokmunhwasa, 1955), 38. My translation

²⁸² Choi Duk-Shin, *Naeka Kyōkkūn P'anmunchōm*, 13.

therefore, his answers and reactions toward the question of who were exact Koreans suitable to fulfill the decolonization were also contradictory and complex. As a result, during the Korean War, he conducted highly contradictory military operations and repatriation petitions: the 1951 Geochang Massacre and the 1953 petition to the senior delegate of the UN, William Harrison. But these conflicting performances did not come from his schizophrenic distorted by Cold War rather militarism learned from World War II. When Choi reinforced his militarism in Burma, he was obsessed with one military strategy named the Che-o-yŏl [fifth battle line] that originated from Spain dictator Francisco Franco's gimmick using the refugees to capture a castle. He was very proud of exterminating the Che-o-yŏl, disguised as a monk in Southeast Asia, and inordinately applied it to the Korean War.²⁸³ In his view, the ordinary people in Southern Korea of Geochang were all doubtful sympathizers, the fifth battle line made up of North Korean partisans who deserved death, not the fruits of decolonization.

Of course, Choi's then range of nations was too vague and variable. While he alienated authentic South Koreans who lived in Geochang county with hostility, he ironically carried big-hearted toward Korean POWs in DPRK, both North Korean birth and civilian internees. In the 1953 petition about repatriation to Harrison, Choi loudly demanded to take back the sick

and injured POWs from DPRK,²⁸⁴ composed of ambiguous people, neither communist nor anti-communist.²⁸⁵

Choi's unstable and contradictory conception of nationhood implicates both his naïve then anti-communistic nationalism, however inconstant about the range of nationalism. Subsequently, his keen racial sense of difference to Americans, in turn, would lead to racialized nationalism encompassing North Korea and East Asians, excluding all foreigners, in particular, Americans. In his another message to Harrison at 29 May, Choi even argued that Koreans, representing Oriental mind, is in a better position to know Communist belligerent in Korea than any other western people.²⁸⁶ Although knowing Communist was essential in his message, Choi ultimately declared that Koreans were in an untouchably better position to deal with the Korean situation than any other westerners, especially Americans.

Diplomat career, changing conception toward US-led international order

Of course, anti-communism was Choi's then deepest ethos that conditioned his perception of both national and international affairs. And his experience of concerted operations with the U.S. army in Burma and Korea made him feel familiar with the United States rather than the Soviet Union.²⁸⁷ Under the anti-communism,

²⁸³ Choi Duk-Shin, *Inmyŏn Hangil Chŏnki*, 87-89; Choi Duk-Shin, *Naeka Kyŏkkŭn P'anmunchŏm*, 89.

²⁸⁴ Letter, General Duk-Shin Choi to General William K. Harrison, JR. On Civilian Internees, 4 May, 1954, B-379-017.

²⁸⁵ The category of POWs and civilian internees was just a bureaucratic category of warfare that did not reflect the on-the-ground experiences of the prisoners of war. Monica Kim, *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold*

History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019), 95-97.

²⁸⁶ Department of the Army Staff Communications Office, Secret Security, 29 May, 1953, NARA CX62717.

²⁸⁷ Choi Duk-Shin, *Naeka Kyŏkkŭn P'anmunchŏm*, 89; Choi Duk-Shin, *Namhan Tangesŏ 30nyŏn* (T'ongilp'yŏnglonsa. 1985), 8.

however, the undercurrent of militarism and racialized nationalism continuously existed in Choi's thoughts. And during his diplomatic Career in the South Vietnam, Choi even unconsciously intensified those thoughts which led to his shifting conception toward US-led international order.

In 1955, ROK president Rhee Syngman sent then Lieutenant General Choi to the South Vietnamese capital, Saigon, to drum up cooperation with South Korea's potential anti-Communist and anti-Japanese partners in Asia.²⁸⁸ At this juncture, only ten years after the liberation, the South Korean government saw Southeast Asia as a stepping-stone to becoming an independent nation-state converting its nominal sovereignty – affirmed with the establishment of the ROK in 1948 – to *de-facto* sovereignty.²⁸⁹ In doing so, Rhee wanted Korea to become a center of Asian People's Anti-Communist League [APACL], thereby serving as a model of anti-communism and anti-imperialism to counter the ambitions of PRC, the Soviet Union, and Japan.²⁹⁰ As a part of his plan, Rhee even militaristically requested to U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower to dispatch a volunteer army to Indochina in 1954.²⁹¹

In this keynote of foreign policy, Choi conducted various activities to take diplomatic initiatives in Southeast Asia, which would reinforce the ROK's

legitimacy on the international stage by receiving more international votes for UN membership.²⁹² Choi, thus, constantly sought the way South Korea could give military aid and instructor to Republic of Vietnam [RVN] in 1956 in order to solidify the anti-communist nation's legitimacy against DPRK and Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRVN].²⁹³ Furthermore, one year later, Choi, who had become the first ambassador to Vietnam, reported to his President that Southeast Asia was facing the "Two-Fold Danger" of communism from the Soviet Union and China as well as imperialism from Japan. Choi also suggested that South Korea should take the diplomatic initiative by using this danger to induce neutral states into the anti-communist and anti-imperialist camp.²⁹⁴

However, Vietnam was not a region that only showed a common militarism of Choi and Rhee but rather a venue where Choi's unconscious racialized nationalism, which led to his discontent with the American-led international order, was projected. Although Choi told South Vietnamese premier Ngo Dean Diem that America had no territorial ambition in Asia and only sought freedom of all people, he could not help being dissatisfied with the U.S. policy toward South Vietnam.²⁹⁵ In particular, Choi's discontentment would be more clear in cross-reading his third autobiography, *Che2ŭi P'anmunchŏmŭn ōtilo?* [Where is the second P'anmunchŏm?]

²⁸⁸ Charles Kraus, "The Danger is Two-Fold: Decolonisation and Cold War in Anti-Communist Asia, 1955-7," *The International History Review*, Aug 2016, 260.

²⁸⁹ Shin Dongil, "To Realize Our Decolonization: South Korea's Deployment of Troops to Vietnam," *International Journal of Korean History* 27, (Feb. 2022), 68-69

²⁹⁰ Cho Moohyung, "The Establishment and Decline of APACL," *SekyeChŏngch'i* 10, (Winter 2008), 211-213.

²⁹¹ Yoon Chungro, *Social History of the Vietnam War* (Seoul: P'ulŭnyŏksa, 2015), 82.

²⁹² Kim Domin, "A Study on the Diplomacy of South and North

Korea towards 'Neutral Countries' from 1948 to 1968," (PhD diss, Seoul National University, 2020), 229-230.

²⁹³ Report on a Conversation with the American Ambassador in Saigon, 25 May 1956, [B-333b-072]; CDS Rept No. 3 from Choi Duk Shin to the President (Syngman Rhee), 1 June, 1956, [B-333b-050].

²⁹⁴ Draft Letter from Saigon for Heads of State, 19 December 1957, [B-334-003]

²⁹⁵ Choi Duk Shin, Report on a Trip to Vietnam (March 28 to April 20 1955), Annex C.

with his official report.

We are invited to the American Embassy for lunch. There we met Gen. Collins. He was very cordial and seemed very glad to see us. He said that he admired the spirit of our mission in coming to Vietnam to help them. And said that we may get better results than Americans or French because we are of the same people and the situation of both countries are the same except the South Korea is much stronger militarily and the government is stabilized.²⁹⁶

In the Vietnam War, South Vietnam, being invaded by North Vietnam, ironically possessed weak justification than Ho Chi Min since the allied force, (including the United States and ROK army), conducted eighty percent of combat, which appeared as a foreign intervention into national conflict.²⁹⁷

These two historical materials, the report on a trip to Vietnam in 1955 and the autography written in 1968, precisely summarized thirteen years of American policy toward the Vietnamese situation and Choi's critical evaluation of that policy. As Gen. Collins noted, South Korean diplomats were thought of like the same people as Vietnamese and were anticipated to solve the Vietnamese problem more than former colonizer French and the new hegemony, white Americans. However, Collins' compliment toward Choi's

delegation reveals his racialized international order: first rank United States, second rank South Korea, and third rank South Vietnam. In his logic, South Korea, militarily stronger than Vietnam, should solve the Vietnam problem to serve the militarily strongest America because Korean and Vietnamese were the same people.²⁹⁸ And as Choi's comment on the Vietnam War, American policies based on this racialized division to perform the warfare undermined not only justification of warfare but also the legitimacy of South Vietnam itself.

Then, Choi sharply captured this dismal scene of the war by overlapping the Korean War with the Vietnam War. With his experience as a ROK delegate in Korean War armistice conference, Choi was convinced that the U.S. secret negotiation with enemies always finished by sacrificing small nation's situation.

Although hundreds of thousands of US soldiers directly intervened in the Vietnam War, Americans could not settle the Vietnamese situation. How did it happen? In my view, it resulted from Free World leader, US official's failure to recognize that Vietnam's problems could only be resolved within... I cannot understand why Americans didn't know all eastern nation-states feel humiliated when they get any tiny impression about being puppet country of other powers. Thus, If the United States proceeded with the negotiation in such a secret way, while South Vietnamese still

²⁹⁶ *Ibid*, Annex F.

²⁹⁷ Choi Duk Shin, *Che2üi P'anmunchömun ötilo?* (C'öngunmunhwasa, 1968), 176-177. My translation.

²⁹⁸ Indeed, South Korean soldiers as a sub-imperialist force in Vietnam War faced ambiguous and contradictory positions

between ambivalent racial identifications and their racial transvestism. Lee Jin-Kyung, *Service Economies: Militarism, Sex Work and Migrant Labor in South Korea* (University Of Minnesota Press, 2010), 65-66.

have had antagonism toward whites originating from French colonialism, South Vietnamese would not trust their government and would break away from America and Free World.²⁹⁹

In the latter part of his autobiography, Choi intensely condemned the U.S. policies in Asia, unlike in previous autographs. After the Vietnam War, he firmly forged his racialized nationalism seeking self-government by Asian nations themselves without white western intervention especially Americans. Furthermore, he even argued that the United States' international prestige was decreased compared to the Korean War, and was suspected of provoking racial discrimination toward colored people.³⁰⁰

At this juncture, however, Choi still believes that the United States would bring peace and freedom to the whole world and requested the Giant, America to exercise its full powers. At least then, he considered the United States as a friend, thereby tone downed the criticism at the end of autobiography. His fundamental conversion from pro-America to anti-America occurred in the 1970s when he was a Chōndo-kyo leader.

Religious career, fundamental conversion to anti-America and anti-South

Then an ambassador to West Germany, Choi's diplomatic career ended

in 1967, taking responsibility for the Korea Central Intelligence Agency [KCIA]'s espionage activity in East Germany. And following his father's career, who served as a Chōndo-Kyo representative in the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, Choi became a Chōndo-Kyo leader in South Korea.³⁰¹ Given Choi's political career and his relationship with President Park Chung-hee, which continued from 1946 as a headmaster and military cadet, the development of Chōndo-Kyo was almost guaranteed under Choi's reign. Therefore, President Park, in response to Choi's request, aided him with substantial financial support, including a 200 million won bank loan and a 500,000 dollar foreign loan.³⁰² And Choi, by using this finance, aggressively expanded the church. He established a memorial for the 1894 Donghak Peasant Revolution in the First Sino-Japanese War and instructed to translate Chōndo-Kyo scriptures to English.³⁰³

In return for President Park's financial support, Choi mobilized the believers for the 1971 electioneering tour and officially announced his backing to Park Chung-hee. However, their honeymoon relation did not last for long. After the election, Park kept his distance from Choi, and Choi was deeply disappointed that he was cast out from Park.³⁰⁴ And at that precise time, 1972 joint communique between the South and North Korea was presented on 4 July at 10 a.m.

1. The two sides agreed on the

²⁹⁹ Choi Duk Shin, *Che2üi P'anmunchōmün ōtilo?*, 162-175.

My translation.

³⁰⁰ Ibid, 179.

³⁰¹ *Donga Ilbo* [Donga Daily], 11 September 1967.

³⁰² Choi Duk-Shin, *Namhan Ttangesō 30nyōn*, 165-166.

³⁰³ *Kyunghyang Shinmun* [Kyunghyang Press], 13 November 1969; *Donga Ilbo*, 12 November 1973.

³⁰⁴ Choi Duk-Shin, *Namhan Ttangesō 30nyōn*, 174.

following principles as a basis of achieving unification: First, unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference. Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, without resorting to the use of force against each other. Third, a great national unity as one people shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems...³⁰⁵

In his last autobiography, *Namhan Ttangesŏ 30nyŏn* [Thirty years in South Korea], written in 1985, Choi recalled the joint communique as a heartwarming statement that he had never heard since the 1945 division.³⁰⁶ In particular, he was impressed by the phrase that stressed independent unification without depending on foreign powers and interference, and transcending differences in ideas.

Indeed, the 1972 joint communique was a historical document that shows the very possibility of reunification by set on South-North communication into orbit. After the communique, Lee Hu-Rak, Director of the KCIA, used the term North Korea instead of the North Korean puppet regime, and the presses also changed their writing in the same way.³⁰⁷ Nonetheless, there was huge misapprehension between South and North Korea about the definition of foreign powers and interference. While Lee considered the UN a universal institution, North Korea stated that the UN was a foreign power, so the American imperialist

army also had to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula.³⁰⁸

Regarding this problem, Choi's thoughts about foreign interference were familiar with the North Korean ones. With his experienced conception of US-led international order from the Korean War and Vietnam War, he concluded that the foreign power means just external influence as the word itself. For him, If one force originated from the exterior of the Korean nation, that force is foreign powers, whether it is an international institution or one nation-state.³⁰⁹ In sum, his unstable political status in the 1970s and détente mood in Korean Peninsula extensively touched his nationalistic sense, that is his racialized nationalism.

(Further revision is needed with anti-government activities recorded in 오|무부 기록.)

³⁰⁵ <https://peacemaker.un.org/korea-4july-communique72>.

³⁰⁶ Choi Duk-Shin, *Namhan Ttangesŏ 30nyŏn*, 174-175.

³⁰⁷ Hong Seuk-ryule, *Puntanŭi Hisŭt'eli*, [Hysteria of the Division], (Ch'ang-pi, 2012), 193-196.

³⁰⁸ Ibid, 197-198.

³⁰⁹ Choi Duk-Shin, *Namhan Ttangesŏ 30nyŏn*, 178.

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고려대학교
KOREA UNIVERSITY

Friday, May 27th 2022
15:30-17:45

Panel D

Discussant	Myungho Hyun (Study of Korean Modernity at Wonju Yonsei Univerisity)
Moderator	Claudia Soddu (Korea University)
Presenters	Marc Denisa-Georgiana (University of Bucharest) Sabina Sava (University of Bucharest) Lida Cossu (Ca'Foscari University of Venice) 천관우 (Korea University)

Physical and Mental Suffering in *The Vegetarian* by Han Kang

Marc Denisa-Georgiana

One of the most predominant feelings in the novel *The Vegetarian* (2007), written by Han Kang, is suffering. This feeling is reflected by the experiences that the protagonist, Yeong-hye, must go through in order to maintain her integrity as a human being in a patriarchal society. This essay will analyse how human suffering is reflected in Han Kang's novel, but also how this individual suffering can be related to a collective level. The essay will begin with a short analysis of the concept of suffering, based on the ideas of Eric J. Cassell (1928-2021) and Emmanuel Lévinas (1905-1995), who analyse this concept from a medical perspective, and a psychological perspective respectively. The paper will then continue with the analysis of certain elements and key moments of the novel, which trigger and amplify the feeling of suffering.

Suffering is a process in which the individual goes through situations full of physical or moral discomfort, and it could also be often defined as a mental illness ([Suffer \(Verb\) Definition and Synonyms: Macmillan Dictionary](#)). This meaning, of mental illness, is closely related to Yeong-hye's life, as her suffering becomes so profound that it destroys both her body and her mind. Eric J. Cassell, in his essay titled *The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine* (2008), identifies three main aspects with regards to suffering. First, suffering is experienced by the person as a

whole, both mind, and body. He places great emphasis on the unity of mind and body and regards it as essential to understanding how suffering affects the individual (Cassell 2008, 131). In Yeong-hye's case, this becomes visible the moment that she starts having nightmares. The internal suffering that she feels due to the fact that she can neither accept herself, nor the society that she lives in, can reflect on the exterior world as well, especially through her refusal of eating meat. Then, in the novel, she eventually refuses to eat any food, develops anorexia and, according to the diagnosis given by the doctors treating her, schizophrenia (Choudhury 2020, 4).

Second, Cassell discusses how suffering appears when imminent destruction of the person is perceived. Moreover, suffering involves not only physical pain but is also a state of severe mental pain associated with events that endanger the integrity of the person (Cassell 2008, 131). Yeong-hye was living in a patriarchal society, in which women were disregarded in the favour of men in most aspects of both public and private life. Her life was constantly dictated by various social norms that subjugated her identity not only as a woman, but also as a human being. Two of the most important roles of a woman in Korean society, depicted in this novel, were to get married and give birth to offspring. Yeong-hye was a married woman, however, it is never

mentioned whether she had a job or not. The purpose of her existence seems to be only to please her husband, and to grant his wishes, which could include providing warm food, clean and ironed clothes, or physical intimacy. The narrator of the first chapter of this novel is her husband, who describes her as being “the most run-of-the-mill woman in the world” (Han 2015, 5). Nonetheless, the negative feelings that Yeong-hye has kept inside her heart all those years emerge once she starts having nightmares. These nightmares allow Yeong-hye to realize that her integrity as a person is endangered by the patriarchal ideology that dominates the society she lives in. The refusal of her husband to communicate with her and understand her, the attitude of superiority of his work colleagues during the dinner regarding her decision to not wear a bra, and to not eat meat, the negative reaction of her family concerning her decisions and, last but not least, her internal struggle with regards to her own identity, all these factors, have triggered in Yeong-hye the feeling that her integrity is in danger and, as a result, the profound feeling of mental distress takes control over her.

Third, another aspect of suffering addressed by Cassell is that it has a significant influence on every aspect of the life of the individual (Cassell 2008, 131). Because of her suffering, Yeong-hye is rejected by her husband, her family, and ultimately, by society. She becomes a “social anomaly”, and because she is “different”, and she can no longer fit into society. On a personal level, she is abandoned by her family, an element considered to be essential in Korean society. On the social level, the community she lives in discards her because

of her behavior: she does not behave according to the socially accepted rules. Also, she is misunderstood mentally and spiritually, which intensifies her suffering even more. For example, even her sister, who is supposed to be her closest friend and confidant, fails to understand her bizarre behavior in the beginning, believing that she has lost her mind for no reason. What is more, no one around the protagonist seems to be genuinely interested in the reasons behind her behavior, and this amplifies the mental and physical suffering Yeong-hye feels. The doctors at the hospital are trying to do everything they can to save her, but they do not seem to understand why she refuses to cooperate. They only focus on the medical, and physical aspects of her suffering, but do not go deeper to seek the inner, or immaterial causes as well. The gap between the protagonist and society deepens even more when she begins to say that she wishes to be a tree, to feed only on water and the sun. Consequently, her behavior turns into a form of resistance to the atrocities she was subjected to throughout her life in the society in which she lived.

Emmanuel Lévinas, as opposed to Cassell, in his essay *Useless Suffering* (1982) investigates the “inner psychological landscape of the suffering person”, defining suffering as something “in excess”, a “too much” that exceeds the powers of the individual concerned (Bernasconi and Wood 2003, 156). This can also be observed in Yeong-hye’s life. Because of the brutalization she has been subjected to since childhood, both by her abusive father and from the Korean society that places pressure on women’s shoulders, the burden that is placed on her becomes so unbearable that she

is unable to carry it alone. Thereupon, she seems to be crumbling under this weight, and the feeling of suffering consumes her body and mind to the point where she no longer wants to be human, but eventually starts wishing to escape from the society she lives in and become a plant. This desire could be explained by the fact that plants are not restricted by any kind of social norms and can live a simple life, feeding only on water and sunlight, in comparison to humans, who are social creatures, and who are ruled by social norms, and forced to obey the expectations of the society they live in.

Another feature of suffering that Lévinas focuses on in his essay is passivity: “it is something that engulfs a person, forcing him to submit to it” (Bernasconi and Wood 2003, 157). Suffering generates a total passivity, and this can be observed in the behaviour of the protagonist. When she realizes that no one is trying to understand her, she becomes completely passive and refuses to speak to anyone. The intense passivity can also be recognized in the two cases of rape Yeong-hye is subjected to by her husband and brother-in-law. This passivity could indicate an advanced and profound stage of pain as Yeong-hye reaches a point where nothing can hurt her anymore. She isolates herself from those around her and denies any access to her soul. Young Ahn Kang goes further and elaborates on Lévinas’s idea that “in suffering, we lose all our prerogatives. In suffering there is no plan for the future, no activity” (Kim 2019, 3). Regarding this perception of the future, Cassell mentions the feeling of anxiety that can arise when the person who suffers thinks about the future (Cassell 2008, 134). Yeong-hye seems to be giving up any kind of wishes

or plans in the social sphere, her only desire being to become a plant. That is because wishing for anything else would mean continuing to be caged into the societal norms and rules. By wishing to gain her freedom, Yeong-hye becomes passive and disconnects herself from the world around her, and consequently, from the social norms that confine the human being.

“Yeong-hye’s suffering is rooted in her two great refusals: to stop wearing a bra and to stop eating meat” (Kim 2019, 3). The bra, according to Won-Chung Kim could represent a patriarchal symbol of the oppression of the female body (Kim 2019, 3). Yeong-hye fervently refused to wear bras because she felt as if she was suffocating. This suffocation could be both physical, since a bra can be very tight, but also mental. The message she is trying to convey to her husband when she tells him about the reasons behind her refusal to wear a bra is much more profound than a simple preference of wearing, or not wearing a piece of clothing. Yeong-hye feels the obligation to wear a bra and hide her breasts as patriarchal society’s control over her. Exercising this control, even when it comes to her personal body, coerces her to feel asphyxiated. Therefore, the refusal to wear a bra could be interpreted as a rebellion, as a form of resistance against the social norms imposed on women. She wanted to be free, to breathe without any constraints, but society seemed to be trying to put her in a cage, just like the bra encloses the chest. Her husband does not seem to understand her behavior, and this can be seen in the first chapter of the novel, where a dialogue between the couple regarding the problem of the bra is depicted. Infuriated by her decision, he urges her to wear the bra, but she responds

by telling him that he will never be able to understand how it feels:

She tried to justify herself by saying that she couldn't stand wearing a bra because of the way it squeezed her breasts, and that I'd never worn one myself so I couldn't understand how constricting it felt. Nevertheless, considering I knew for a fact that there were plenty of other women who, unlike her, didn't have anything particularly against bras, I began to have doubts about this hypersensitivity of hers. (Han 2015, 7)

This short conversation between the two of them has a social layer. He, as a man, would never be able to understand the physical or behavioral constraints that women are forced to undergo in Korean society. Furthermore, the fact that she, unlike other women, hated so fiercely the bras should have been an alarm signal for her husband. However, he never hears it. Yeong-hye could represent the image of many Korean women who are unhappy with their own person, unhappy in the society they live in, unhappy in their own marriage, and who must go through profound suffering that nobody could understand. Hence, her refusal to wear a bra is a natural response to her pain: it is an attempt to grasp her remaining physical and mental freedom. Her husband's ignorance is also emphasized by the fact that he wanted her to wear a bra just so that he does not lose face in front of his work colleagues and friends. His motivation has a social character which shows, again, how important it was to obey the social norms in order to be perceived (or not) a certain way by the others. Yeong-hye, on the contrary, wanted to be seen for what

she was, and not for what the social norms expected her to be. However, her true self did not correspond with society's criteria and, consequently, a rupture between her and society takes place.

In this novel, if the bra represents the external control over the body of a woman, then meat represents the internal control (Kim 2019, 3). Yeong-hye is waging a one-person war against multiple enemies. The moment she decides to stop eating meat, her husband, her family, and the whole society become her rivals (Kim 2019, 3). By refusing to eat meat, she questions the validity of meat-eating and the patriarchal values behind this custom. The profound rupture between Yeong-hye and society is revealed in the scene where she, together with her husband, goes to dine with his boss and other co-workers, who were also accompanied by their wives. Those at the table were shocked to see that she was not wearing a bra, and her refusal to eat meat made the situation even more embarrassing. When she tried to explain her motives behind her choices, her husband interrupted her and would not let her speak. That might be because he did not want to acknowledge the reality that his wife was an anomaly, at least in his eyes. What he really wanted was, in fact, to maintain a clean social image that conformed to social norms.

By the time the trauma-triggering dreams emerged, Yeong-hye ate meat like everyone else, which was a normal habit in Korean society. However, once she started having nightmares and refused to eat meat, she became isolated from this society. According to Won-Chun Kim, Yeong-hye managed to adapt well to the patriarchal society where eating meat was the norm, but

her identity as a woman was constrained by it (Kim 2019, 3). That is why she, after having those nightmares, tried to break free from society and regain her own identity. Hence, Yeong-hye's repeated dreams play a crucial role in this novel because they represent the elements that triggered her suffering that had been buried deep in her body and mind:

My bloody hands. My bloody mouth.
In that barn, what had I done? Pushed
that red raw mass into my mouth, felt
it squish against my gums, the roof of
my mouth, slick with crimson blood
[...]. My face, the look in my
eyes...my face, undoubtedly, but
never seen before. Or no, not mine,
but so familiar...nothing makes sense.
Familiar and yet not... (Han 2015, 11)

In these dreams, the moment she sees herself in the pools of blood, she feels as if she is seeing her face for the first time and has difficulty acknowledging the fact that the woman in the reflection is indeed herself. Thus, she realized that she is not only a victim of the patriarchal meat-eating society, but also an accomplice in that she has been eating meat all her life and has allowed herself to be subjugated by unjust social norms (Kim 2019, 3). This realization makes her inner suffering deepen even more in her soul.

Moreover, Yeong-hye's traumas have their origins in her childhood. First, she was a victim of her father's abuse. She was the one who was constantly beaten by him because, in his eyes, she was unable to live up to his expectations. Second, Yeong-hye witnessed the brutal death of her family's dog, which was later served for dinner. During

dinner, she ate some of the dog's meat and was constantly remembering the dog's eyes popping out of their sockets. As if in a trance, she ate an entire bowl of food, then said "but I don't care. I really didn't care" (Han 2015, 33). This behavior seems to be her self-defense against the trauma that marked her childhood. By denying its importance, life could go on, but in doing so, the burden on her subconsciousness becomes heavier and heavier.

Another relevant scene that seems to be the turning point in the life of the protagonist is the family dinner at her sister's house. There, Yeong-hye confesses to her family that she no longer eats meat. Her refusal to eat meat could be interpreted as a denial of her father's authority. As a result, the father has an aggressive reaction and slaps her across the cheek with force:

Don't you understand what your father's telling you? If he tells you to eat, you eat! [...] In an instant, his flat palm cleaved the empty space. My wife cupped her cheek in her hand. [...] He'd hit her so hard that the blood shower through the skin of her cheek. Her breathing was ragged, and it seemed that her composure had finally been shattered. (Han 2015, 30-31)

He then orders his two brothers-in-law to restrain her while he tries to force a piece of meat into her mouth. The abusive and unempathetic behavior of her family, but especially that of her father's, compels Yeong-hye to lose her temper. She reacts violently, growls like an animal and, because of the deep distress that she feels, tries to slit her wrists in front of everyone. At that

moment, she was like a cornered animal: “[...] my wife growled and spat out the meat. An animal cry of distress burst from her lips. “Get away!”” (Han 2015, 32). Following this episode, the relationship between her and her family completely fell apart. Instead of trying to empathize with their daughter, her parents choose to break any ties they have with her because they did not want to be associated with her and lose face in front of everyone they knew. For them, as for her husband, the way the other members of society viewed them was more important than the health of their daughter.

As a consequence of this incident, it can be seen that Yeong-hye is victimized and degraded, eventually losing her status as an autonomous human being (Kim 2019, 6). She becomes a mere animal rejected by everyone around her. Therefore, later in the novel she chooses to stop using words to express herself, in an attempt to isolate herself from the world that causes her so much pain.

The final stage of her transformation ends with her desire to turn into a plant. Despite the severe physical suffering she goes through, she does not give up her final yearning, which seems to be the only thing keeping her alive (Kim 2019, 8). “By shamelessly showing her anorexic body and how she has been cruelly victimized she becomes a “model” of the suffering person who repeatedly comes back to us” to ask for our help (Kim 2019, 6). Her strong determination shows that even though she has been rejected by her family and society, she continues to try to maintain her integrity as a woman, but not as a woman after the model imposed by the social norms, but as she imagined herself to be. The profound

suffering she experiences does not prevent her from fighting for what she wants until the end.

The cruel effects of Korean society are also being felt by her sister. In-hye is the only member of the family who remains beside Yeong-hye’s side and becomes, as the novel progresses, very protective of her (Stobie 2017, 797). This can be seen in her behavior: she tries to cook vegetarian food for her, even though she knows her sister will refuse it, and attacks the doctors when they try to put tubes down her sister’s throat in order to feed her: “She bites the arm of the carer holding her and throws herself forward again [...] In-hye takes Yeong-hye in her arms, soaking her blouse with the blood her sister has vomited up [and says] Stop it, for god’s sake. Please stop...” (Han 2015, 125-126). She, in turn, experiences her own drama, working since she was very young to make a good living for herself, and marrying a man whom she did not really love. Like her sister, she lived her life according to the social norms imposed by the patriarchal society and denied any sense of sadness or rebellion. Nonetheless, the transformation Yeong-hye goes through, and the betrayal of her husband, help In-hye realize the feelings of revulsion and dissent she has buried inside her heart. Consequently, by the end of the novel she understands Yeong-hye and inherits her suffering. What had kept In-hye alive for so long had been, in fact, her son whom she loved dearly. Yeong-hye, unlike her, had no support, no way out of the cruel reality, she only had herself. Therefore, she had to wage this war against the patriarchal and meat-eating society on her own.

The novel ends with the image of the

ambulance taking Yeong-hye to another hospital because her state had aggravated too much. In-hye is by her side, and remembering the fact that she wanted to abandon her son and kill herself, tells her that maybe it is all just a dream:

In-hye squeezed Yeong-hye's shoulders. Perhaps this is all a kind of dream [...] I have dreams too, you know. Dreams... and I could let myself dissolve into them, let them take me over...but surely the dream isn't all there is? We have to wake up at some point, don't we? Because...because then... (Han 2015, 131)

The image of the dream has a negative connotation in this novel, and it is illustrated as a prison, or as the root of suffering, since both sisters have dreams that torment them physically and mentally. Moreover, the dream might represent the way in which In-hye tries to cope with the trauma that marked her and her sister's life. If it's just a dream, then they might be able to wake up someday, and reach happiness. They were "forced to sleep" by the societal norms and obliged to "dream" their lives according to the society's expectations of women. However, Yeong-hye sees her true self in her dreams and, consequently, "wakes up" from the "real world dream". In-hye's realization in the end of the novel seems to imply the same idea: inheriting her sister's pain, she is finally able "to wake up" and see the reality for what is: cruel, limiting, and unfair. This realization is

followed by feelings of revolt and protest, depicted by the final image of the novel: "In-hye stares fiercely at the trees. As if waiting for an answer. As if protesting against something. The look in her eyes is dark and insistent" (Han 2015, 131). The trees are presented as "blazing" with wildfire and resembling a wild animal. This image might be a metaphor for the cruelty of the society they lived in, who burned everything around them, and was always ready to "attack" whenever the individual made a wrong move and disobeyed the rules, just like a massive animal attacks its prey.

In conclusion, in the novel *The Vegetarian* abject suffering can be analyzed from both a medical and psychological point of view. Her pain is caused by social constraints that, since childhood, have taken control of her integrity as a woman. Her refusal to wear a bra and to eat meat are two forms of resistance Yeong-hye tries to exert against the social norms that make her feel suffocated. Also, they represent the roots of her suffering. Despite this dreadful feeling, Yeong-hye continues to struggle to regain her identity, to preserve her integrity, and goes through a profound physical and mental transformation: from human to animal and, finally, to plant. The suffering of Yeong-hye could mirror the feelings of many Korean women who feel oppressed by the society's strict norms, but in this case, Yeong-hye comes to realize these constraints and tries to fight them, giving up on her position as a social animal to find her own salvation.

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Figurative Language in the Poetry of Two Feminine Lyrical Voices: Hwang Jini and Florencia Pinar

Sabina Maria Sava

I chose as an object for the present study two female personalities who were almost contemporary and who, although far off in space but not in time, separated by two continents, faced similar conditions regarding their position in society.

In those days, in the 15th and 16th centuries society, both in Spain and in Korea, women were subjected to ideological or religious circumstances that forbade them the access to culture and excluded them from public life.

Christian ideology preached a type of woman whose main attributes should be the dedication to family or monastic life. In those times' Spain, unlike noble ladies, humble women, peasants or those which participated in certain handicrafts and in small businesses enjoyed a certain degree of freedom, undoubtedly a limited one, much lower than that of men of any social stratum. In this society married women were held in higher esteem than single women who, unlike the widows, could not live alone because they would be considered dishonest. As a consequence, in the words of J. E. Ruiz Doménec, popular imagery captured a distorted figure of women, unreal and tending to extremes. The feminine figure appears represented as an angel or a devil, as the mother of God or the temptress and loser

of man. It is a simplistic, partial assessment, in which two extremely conflicting traits come into play, motherhood and sexuality, from which two types of women are derived: the prostitute and the mother. (Ruiz Doménec 1986, 26) For centuries, access to knowledge in Spain was possible through the Latin language and women could not learn Latin without ecclesiastical authorization. Without knowing Latin there was very little that could be learned in any field of science and any literary domain.

Likewise, in the same epoch, the Confucianism that penetrated into Korea from China, limited the existence of women, requiring them to comply with the 'The Three Obediences', the 'Three Cardinal Bonds', the 'Five Moral Virtues', the 'Seven Grounds for Divorce'. The role of women during this period is very different to their male counterpart since they were expected to obey their husbands and stay at home while their husbands participated in social activities. The society during the Joseon Dynasty, highly influenced by Buddhism and Confucianism, restricted women so much that they were unable even to express their emotions and thoughts. (Lee 2008, 22)

Women were taught that proper conduct, speech, appearance and chastity, obedience, and duty were emphasized as the supreme female virtues. They were

encouraged to emulate the self-sacrificing models of virtuous women. Korean women had long been excluded from public participation, and similarly to those in Europe, this exclusion also meant the denial of formal education.

Two remarkable women's personalities, Florencia del Pinar and Hwang Jini, about whose lives there are similarly too few historical data, can be reconstructed both from the stories created around them and, to a greater extent, from the writings that have come down to us from them.

Even if the historical documents about the lives of the two poets are missing, in addition to the rich oral tradition from which we find details about them, their poetry best reveals their personalities. Not much is known about Florencia del Pinar as in the case of most personalities in Spanish literature of the time. It is known that she was a lady in waiting at the court of Queen Isabella I of Castile, and the first woman poet who participated in *justas poeticas*, poetic games and competitions organized at the royal court. She was also one of the two female poets included in the great anthology of lyrical poetry compiled by Hernando del Castillo, called *El Cancionero General*. First published in 1511 in Valencia, it comprises the poems of 200 poets, of which only two are women, the Marquise de Cotron and Florencia del Pinar. That she was of a noble origin is indicated by the way she was defined in the *Cancionero*, with the title of *dama* or *señora*, that is 'lady', very ceremonious names with which the members of the upper classes were appointed. It is also presumed that she had great notoriety and recognition as a poet since her works were included in an anthology of such magnitude,

along with the most important poets of the time.

Although we have neither a biography, nor a portrait to represent her, we can realize that she was a cultured and talented lady, the product of an era in which humanism encouraged education from childhood for both girls and boys of the upper classes, which initiated a whole generation of educated women, especially writers and philologists.

Florencia came from a family with literary interests, knowing that she was the sister of the poet Jeronimo del Pinar, the creator of a famous poem called *El Juego Trobado*. *El Juego Trobado*, found in *El Cancionero General*, is, according to Roger Boase, "a poem composed as a card game for the entertainment of the Spanish royal court and dedicated to Queen Isabella I of Castile", at which the queen participated with her son, Prince Juan, her four daughters and forty of her courtly ladies that offers „access to the mentality and collective memory of a group of educated ladies from the court of Isabella the Catholic, revealing their knowledge of poetry, proverbs, and sentimental fictions, their ability to interpret the symbolism of birds and trees, and many facts that are not found in the official documents." (Boase 2018, 199) During her reign, the arts and culture flourished. The queen surrounded herself with a group of learned women known as *Puellae doctae*. These women educated since childhood in the classical languages, Latin and Greek, and who were instructed with all the knowledge of humanism were part of the peninsular Renaissance courts during the 15th and first half of the 16th century. Among them there

were Beatriz Galindo, nicknamed *La Latina*, who taught the classical Latin language and culture not only to the queen's children but also to the queen herself. Or Francisca de Nebrija, the daughter of the famous humanist Antonio de Nebrija, author of the first Castilian grammar he dedicated to the queen of Castile, and whom she managed to replace at the University of Alcalá, being one of the two first women to teach at a university in Spain and in the world. The other one was Luisa de Medrano a Spanish poet, thinker and professor at the University of Salamanca. They were able to develop a cultural activity from which women were excluded in those times in Europe, due to the protection of Queen Isabella I of Castile. Unfortunately, later not much of their works were preserved and by order of Isabella's descendent, Carlos I, a much more backward emperor in those respects even the references to many of those prominent women were erased.

As many other scholars have pointed out, Louise Mirrer also observed that:

„Castilian women writers of the Middle Ages occupied a peculiar position in the world of literary production. Excluded from most of the powerful structures of law and doctrine appear totally incapable of writing, an activity that constituted a great source of power in the Middle Ages. This undoubtedly explains why few women writers emerged in Castile during this period, and why those women who wrote did so in such a defensive way, using language considered by many modern critics as self-absorbed and cliché.” (Mirrer 2018, 95-96)

Florencia Pinar is one of these educated, cultured, loving women of classical culture. Her level of culture and her

social position clearly result from the language used in her poetry. Pinar wrote her poems in the Castilian of the time, which was systematized just then by Antonio de Nebrija in his *Grammar*, language that will be the basis of modern Spanish. Aspects of her personality can be understood also from the content of her lyric. It comes out definitely that she had benefited from good education, typical for the upper class. It is justified by the form of her writing in which she uses words, phrases, forms characteristic for the cult language. She is a character who revolutionized the world of poetry with her special form of writing, based on a metaphorical language that aims at describing the vastness of the concept of love from different perspectives. From the lyric of Florencia Pinar, we have left six songs and a gloss attributed to her, having as a title the first verse of each one: „¡Ay! Qué hay quien más no vive”, „Destas aves la nación”, „El amor ha tales mañas”, „Hago de lo flaco, fuerte”, „Cuidado nuevo venido”, „Tanto más crece el querer” and „Mi dicha lo desconcierta”.

The other poetic personality we have focused on is Hwang Jini, a famous Korean poet also known by her courtesan name, Myeongwol, meaning "bright moon", who lived in the 16th century during the reign of King Jungjong, the 11th king of the Joseon dynasty, in the city of Songdo, now Kaesong in modern-day North Korea. As in the case of the Spanish poet, no official documents have been found regarding her biography, so all we know about her life are the details that come from unofficial histories and oral traditions according to which Hwang Jini was the illegitimate daughter of a nobleman, *yangban*, and his concubine, a blind *kisaeng*.

Legend says that the beautiful and talented young woman was trained in the art of dance and music by her own mother and that her education was completed by the celebrated Confucian scholar So Kyongdok.

As in the case of Florence Pinar, there are no historical evidence but only indirect evidence about her, but unlike the Spanish poet, the oral tradition and indirect testimonies referring to Hwang Jini are very numerous. O'Rourke devotes an entire study to systematizing and analyzing this evidence. In Hwang Jini's case we even have an alleged portrait of her attributed to one of the most famous 16th century painters in Joseon, Hyewon. The legend of the beautiful, seductive and talented courtesan from Joseon is recomposed from the most diverse testimonies, from that of an eighty-year-old man who enjoys the perfume she leaves behind, which appears in Yi Tokhyong's written record, to the poems of the scholar So Kyongdok that are dedicated to her. Written half a century after her disappearance, these testimonies that consist of *yadam*, unofficial version of historical evidence, belong to scholars, such as Hong Manjong, and indicate that some shared such high regard for *kisaeng* poetry and praised Hwang Jini, considering her poetry worthy to rival the *literati*'s. (O'Rourke 2003, 114).

With the complete Confucianization of society in the Joseon era, the social status of a woman is established only according to the men in her family, women almost completely lost their identity. Therefore, in most cases, even the names of many women writers or artists of the classical era remain unknown to us. However, as Young-Key Kim-Renaud stated: "Even in the most unfavourable times for women, a

noblewoman often exercised considerable power by virtue of her birth, status and upbringing." (Young-Key Kim-Renaud, 2003, 4)

The first known book written by a Korean woman which has been preserved to this day, dates from the 15th century. It is called *Naehun*, "Instructions for Women," and, in fact, it is a guide to Confucian morality that proposes a model of behaviour for women, whose author was Queen Sohye, a member of a powerful *yangban* family. Nevertheless, since the 16th century, we have information about several figures of women with literary and artistic interests and extraordinary talents. For instance, one of these illustrious figures was Sin Saimdang, a painter, calligrapher, writer and poet, the mother of the Confucian scholar Yi I, considered at the same time a model of respect for Confucian ideals, for which she was called *Eojin Eomeoni*, "Wise Mother". (Lee, 2008, 42) Or, Heo Nanseolheon, the daughter of a neo-Confucian official, the sister of ministers and writers and considered a poetic prodigy, who wrote hundreds of *hanshi* poems, but failed to occupy a position because of her status as a woman. Even if in terms of quantity, feminine cultural and artistic contribution may seem minimal, as Young-Key Kim-Renaud rightly ascertains:

"However, a few works by identifiable women authors, and by countless anonymous others who are clearly women, allow us a glimpse of the world of women and an idea of their sensibility, intelligence, and dignity. In almost every work, there is a surprising sense of self-confidence or self-awareness on the part of the author or creator as an important and often daring and innovative

participant in artistic life, even when some women may have been lamenting their destiny.” (Young-Key Kim-Renaud, 2003, 7-8)

And yet, this is exactly the historical and social context in which "creative women have known their artistic triumph." (Young-Key Kim-Renaud, 2003: 6) This is due without any doubt to the fact that during the Joseon period Confucian principles that greatly emphasized learning as a means of improving oneself, proposed distinct ways of educating men and women, respectively. While the men belonging to the nobility received a Chinese-based classical education, *yangban* women, the noble ladies, were prepared only for domestic sphere and taught in the Korean phonetic system established by king Sejong, *hangul*. In spite of these many intelligent women in Joseon, like those in Spain did to learn Latin, managed to learn Chinese, as they say, ‘over the shoulder’, from their fathers or brothers.

Besides these noble ladies, maybe precisely due to the rigid way in which Confucian principles regarding the role of women in society, against this background it appears the concept of ‘talented woman’, an idealized image to some extent similar to that of Japanese geisha or Venetian ‘cortigiana onesta’, honoured courtesan. This interesting phenomenon consists in “the effort to build an idealized pairing of the literate man, a female counterpart in romance as an intellectual and artistic equal of her lover”. (Lee 2010, 12-14)

Paradoxically, the Joseon dynasty in which neo-Confucian ideals were promoted and in which these women and their work were contrary to cultivated ethical principles was period of glory of the *kisaeng* system.

Although they belonged to *cheonmin*, the lowest class in Joseon, *kisaeng* were permitted to enjoy a greater degree of freedom than noble ladies, they were able to express their emotions and thoughts through music instrument performances and songs. Therefore, they were allowed to learn poetry, dance and music which other women were prohibited to. All these women were cultured women, endowed with artistic qualities and were trained in special schools called *gyobang*. In addition to dance or music, many of the *kisaeng* also devoted themselves to composing *sijo* poems. As their activity was related to the aristocratic environment, although they were not part of the *yangban*, they tried to be assimilated to this class by their poetic talents.

“A *kisaeng* could sometimes talk (and write) as an intellectual equal to men. Although stigmatized by her Confucian culture because of her knowledge and never considered socially respectable, she could be respected as individual, even loved and longed for by scholar-poets.” (Contogenis and Choe 2016, 6)

From the Joseon era the memory of some famous *kisaeng* and many *sijo* poems written by them have been preserved. Among the most interesting stories from the 15th century is that of Uhwudong, who seems to have been the first *kisaeng* woman of aristocratic origin, who was accused of adultery and forced to divorce and thus becoming a *kisaeng*, while from the 16th century remains in memory that of Joo Nongae and the ‘Rock of Righteousness’ from which she cast herself along with a Japanese general into the river.

But surely the most renowned of them all

remains Hwang Jini who in spite of being a member of a despised class, a registered *kisaeng*, “associated freely with aristocrats, scholars and artists, and gained a reputation for defying the accepted social conventions of the time“, reason why she stands today as a symbol of art and free spirit, a woman who battled the odds to express her thoughts and emotions. The poems she wrote contrast with the *sijo* poems written by male Confucian poets whose main characteristics are formality and strictly defined rules. The age in which Hwang Jini lived, the beginning of the 16th century, in which *hansi*, the poetic form written in Chinese by *literati* and noblemen, destined to the erudite class able to read and write Chinese, began to be less cultivated and a new poetic form was gaining ground and becoming increasingly more popular. This new poetic form, the *sijo* became the main poetry genre since it was written in Korean, in *hangul*, and therefore more suitable to express personal feelings and thoughts and, at the same time, due to the rhythm, easier to be sung. (O’Rourke 2003, 97)

Hwang Jini poetry includes both *hansi* and *sijo* poems, fact that testifies her high degree of education and cultural refinement. Tradition says she was able to compose her poems while singing them in front of her guests. As far as her remaining works, six *sijo* and seven poems in Chinese, we have no document written by herself, only those compiled by other scholars and some of her guests. As O’Rourke mentions, among the sources that relate events of Hwang Jini’s life, “only four of them make direct reference to the poems: Im Pang records the *hansi* ‘Farewell to So Yanggok’; Yi Tongmu gives ‘Songdo’, which is also a *hansi* ; So Yuyong

has *Cheongsan-ri Byeokgyesu*; and Kim T’aegyong gives two *hansi* ‘Fond thoughts of full moon terrace’ and ‘Song to the half-moon’”. (O’Rourke 2003, 112)

In many of her poems Hwang Jini makes great use of figurative language either for artistic reasons or for being able to express their own emotions and thoughts without openly confronting the constraints imposed by neo-Confucianism. All her poetry attests for her extraordinary skill in using the words in a different sense from the literal one, in giving them a new meaning that the interlocutor must unravel it in order to understand.

In the poem *Long Winter Night*, the central theme is love, theme that the *kisaeng* were allowed to cultivate unlike the scholar poets as long as the perspective was one of lamentation or fear of abandonment.

Long winter night

冬至 첫달 기나긴 밤을 한 허리를 잘
라 내어
春風 이불 아래 서리서리 넣었다가
어론님 오신 날 밤이여든 구뵈구뵈 펴
리라

(Hwang - Filinich, eds., 2005, 44)

I will break in two

this long midwinter night,

Roll it up and put it away

Under the springtime coverlet

And when my loved one comes back
again

I will unroll it to lengthen the time. (Rutt,
1998, 77)

As the critical approach states, these verses

which apparently does not seem to suppose the contrast set by the standards of Confucian ideas in the society of Joseon between the love of a woman and that of a man, it actually represents a real indirect and subtle challenge of them since this seemingly simple love poem where in the lyric voice manifests the desire of reunion with the loved one, if interpreted “against the background of the censorship imposed on Koryo love songs by Joseon [...] must have been a daring poem in its time”. (Young-Key and Kim-Renaud 2003, 116-117)

This short poem condenses a very powerful imagery which is transmitted through an extraordinary suggestive, symbolic power at the level of language. The metaphor of this ‘long cold winter night’ represents the terrible loneliness of a soul in the absence of love. But even from this absence, from this longing, the hope of reunion is nourished. If in the first verse the phrase ‘long cold night’ receives a negative connotation, at the end of the poem the same phrase acquires a positive connotation since from it the sharing of love like a fragrant spring could blossom. From a perspective of temporal perception, the cut pieces of this waiting time will generate an extension of the reunion time. The lyric self, the feminine voice, does not limit itself to lamenting the absence of the lover but acts, ‘cuts’ this long night,’ ‘folds and unfolds’ it. The term Hwang Jini uses for her lover (어른님) has two meanings, alluding to both him and a person who has been frozen by the winter cold. The lyrics are full of a subtle feminine sensibility, but also poetic originality and convey a strong sense of loneliness. The central image is that of an eternal night, cold and without love which is transformed, by

the desire of the lyrical self, into a warm spring night, full of love. The contrast between warm and cold images, elementary transient and eternal, may suggest that human life is as transient as the seasons that follow one another.

Cheongsan-ri Byeokgyesu

청산리벽계수(靑山裏碧溪水)야수이감을
자랑마라

일도창해(一到滄海)하면다시오기어려워
라

명월(明月)이 만공산(滿空山)할 제 쉬어
간들 어떠리

Green water, do not boast

Of your rapid flow from the blue
mountains.

It is hard to return

When you’ve reached the blue sea.

A full moon graces these peaceful hills:

Won’t you rest a while?

(Bannon, 2008, 10-13)

The poem was written to a man famed for his virtue, Byeokgyesu, whom Hwang Jin Yi aims to seduce. She is not on duty yet she sets out to seduce Byeokgyesu because he represents a challenge for her power of seduction.

In this poem, if we lacked the context, we could only see a very vivid, colorful, visual image of natural elements at the literal level. Or at a first level, the verses associated meaning to the plain language could make us believe that, like the scholars of the time, Hwang Jini seems to express the ideas of

Confucianism, especially those concerning the transient condition of the human being in the universe, but also the cultivation of the contemplative life in search of harmony with nature. But the linguistic technique the poet used was the pun: “green water” is a pun on Byok’s name (벽계수 碧溪水), while “full moon” is a play on Hwang Jini’s pen name, Myeongwol (literally, “bright moon”; 명월) that confers a playful tone to the verses. In fact, the poet makes a clever and satirical use of the words that show not only her wit but a virtuous poetic sense and strong sense of irony that all led to innovations in the *sijo* writing.

The same elements at the language level ‘green waters’ and ‘blue mountains’ convey a different meaning in a different context.

Blue mountains are my heart

청산(靑山)은 내 뜻이오 녹수(綠水)는
님의 정(情)이,

녹수(綠水) 흘러간들 청산(靑山)이야 변
(變)할 손가.

녹수(綠水) 도 청산(靑山)을 못 잊어 우
러 예어 가는고. (Contogenis and
Choe 2016)

*Blue mountains are my heart; Green
waters are my love’s love’*

*Though green waters flow away, can blue
mountains change?*

*Unable to forget blue mountains, green
waters weep as they go their way.
(O’Rourke 2003, 114)*

We can find here an obvious example of how a type of *simil* or metaphor may not simply signify what they seem but have a hidden

meaning depending on its use and its context. The central images of mountain and flowing water allude this time to Confucian ideas about love relationships between men and women that, in spite of wisdom or goodness, are inevitably ephemeral. The poem seems to be also “a paradoxically statement of the inevitability of parting and of abiding nature of love.” (O’Rourke 2003, 112) Besides this, in *Green waters and Blue mountains*, the lyric voice expresses the acute feeling of vanity of all the frivolity she had enjoyed with her lovers. Flowing waters, the metaphor for fleeting love relationships, cannot escape feeling sad. Even if they satisfy the vanity of the poet’s heart, suggested by the metaphor of the blue mountain, they cannot help her avoid the sorrow generated by the relentless fate of her own condition which condemns her to loneliness: “*can blue mountains change?*”

Like the Hwang Jini's *sijo* poems, the poems written by Florencia del Pinar were intended to be sung, as indicated even by their name, *cancion*, meaning songs, but unlike *sijo*'s poems, the *canciones* do not have a fixed form. Beyond this formal aspect, analysing Pinar’s poetry one may observe how the Castilian female writers of the Middle Ages occupied a peculiar position in the world of literary production. First of all, the fact that they were excluded from most of the power structures undoubtedly explains why few women writers emerged in Castile during this period and why those women used the language in such a defensive way, somewhat unusual from a linguistic point of view. They had to resort to different linguistic codes which turned out into an innovative style that was often considered a language ‘of women’.

Love is the main theme of Florencia Pinar's poetry in which she gives an image far different from courtly love and brings us closer to real women who suffer for love. The three Pinar's poems included in the *Cancionero General* are all poems in which the attitude toward love is ambiguous. In contrast to the *cancionero* poetry, in which the abstractions concerning love are generally emphasized and love is exalted, in her poems the power of love to cause pain through deceit seems to stand first and foremost among the complaints to which Florencia gives voice. Showing her skill in the use of figurative language, her verses are often considered ambiguous and with double meanings. Her poetic language based on the style of *conceptism* is characterized by directness, simple vocabulary, metaphors and puns and a rapid rhythm. As J.T.Snow states: "Her allusive language and precise imagery allow us to perceive, through the *persona* of the poems –especially the last two- another dimension of the complaints against love and another, more subtle use of its accepted conventions." (Snow, 1984, 327)

Although it may seem her poetry treats the theme of love as universal feeling, an approach to the language highlights that it is treated in the first person as an intimate feeling that provokes a continuous and painful restlessness in the person that loves. *¡Ay! que hay quien mas no vive*, the first of her poems which appears in the *Cancionero*, represents a long series of lamentations, an accumulation of complaint and regrets related to the feeling of love, expressed by means of the frequent repetition of the exclamation 'ay' used as a pun based on the homophony between an interjection and a verbal form ('ay; 'hay') which is

unfortunately lost in translation ('oh'/'alas'; 'there is'). Another linguistic strategy used to emphasize the dual nature of love is the use of antinomic word pairs, (sp:'placeres'; 'pesares'- engl:'pleasures'; 'regrets').

Cancion de una dama que se dice Florencia Pinar

¡Ay! que hay quien mas no vive
 porque no hay quien d'ay se duele,
 y si hay, ¡ay! que recele
 hay un ay con que s'esquive
 quien sin ay vivir no suele.
 Hay placeres, hay pesares,
 hay glorias, hay mil dolores,
 hay, donde hay penas de amores,
 muy gran bien si dél gozares.
 Aunque vida se cativa
 si hay quien tal ay consuele
 no hay razón porque se cele,
 aunque ay con que se esquive
 quien sin ay vivir no suele. (*El Cancionero General* editado por
 Hernando del Castillo, folio cxxv)

Song of a lady who calls herself Florencia Pinar

Oh! there is who does not live
 because there is no one who hurts day by
 day,
 and if there is, alas! that he mistrusts
 there is a woe with which s'esquive
 who without woe to live does not usually.
 There are pleasures, there are sorrows,
 there are glories, there are a thousand
 pains,
 there are, where there are sorrows of love,
 very great good if you will enjoy it.
 Although life is cativated

if there is someone such oh comfort
 there is no reason why it is celebrated,
 although oh with that it is dodged
 who without woe to live does not usually.

Focusing on another poem of Florencia Pinar such as, *Destas aves su nacion*, it clearly appears at the text level the connection between this peculiar language ‘of women’ and the passive role of women as poetic pattern and theme. As L.Mirrer noticed, “from the start, the poem is aggressively feminine incorporating, in its first stanza, a rhyme scheme that depends exclusively on the grammatical feminine gender—each line ends in feminine noun or pronoun”.(Mirren 2018 , 97)

The poet uses with mastery the lament register and the multiple perspectives, including the poetic self. She resorts to very expressive images, such as the love prison or the love chain. But the most striking is the imagery involving animals whose symbolic and bestiary associations are absorbed into the personal expressions of the poet as she transposes onto them her own feelings about the traps and lures love sets for the unwary. Expert in the use of figurative language, her verses are sometimes considered ambiguous and with double meanings due to literary technique such as the paronomasia between terms like ‘perdiendo’ and ‘perdices’. Pinar shows both great attention to realistic detail and intense use of metaphorical discourse and symbol. The poem is undoubtedly an allegory about the condition of the woman. Her poetic language uses the powerful metaphor of caged birds prevented from singing with which the lyrical voice identifies itself, suggesting the lack of

freedom, but also the aspiration towards it.

Otra cancion de la misma senora a unas perdices que le enviaron vivas

De estas aves su nación
 es cantar con alegría,
 y de verlas en prisión
 siento yo grave pasión,
 sin sentir nadie la mía.
 Ellas lloran que se vieron
 sin temor de ser cautivas,
 y a quien eran más esquivas
 esos mismos las prendieron.
 Sus nombres mi vida son,
 que va perdiendo alegría,
 y de verlas en prisión
 siento yo grave pasión,
 sin sentir nadie la mía. (*El Cancionero General* editado por Hernando del Castillo, folio cxxv-cxxvi)

Another song of the same lady to some partridges sent her alive

These birds were born
 singing for joy;
 such softness imprisoned
 gives me such sorrow--
 yet no one weeps for me.
 They cry that they flew
 fearless of capture
 and those whom they shunned
 were those who seized them:
 their names write my life
 which goes on, losing joy;
 such softness imprisoned
 give me such sorrow--
 yet no one weeps for me.

If in the poem *Destas aves* love is presented at the level of poetic language through the metaphor of the hunting, in the last of the three songs of the *Cancionero*, the animal imagery is even stronger, love being likened to a “worm”, symbol of deceptive appearance and destructive power.

Cancion de Florencia Pinar

El amor ha tales mañas
que quien no se guarda dellas,
si se l'entra en las entrañas,
no puede salir sin ellas.
El amor es un gusano
bien mirada su figura:
es un cáncr de natura
que come todo lo sano.
Por sus burlas, por sus sañas,
dél se dan tales querellas
que, si entra en las entrañas,
no puede salir sin ellas. (*El Cancionero General* editado por Hernando del Castillo, folio clxxxv)

Song by Florencia Pinar

Love has such tricks
that who does not keep from them,
if it enters the bowels,
you can't go out without them.
Love is a worm
take a good look at his figure:
it is a natural cancer
who eats everything healthy.
For their mockery, for their anger,
there are such complaints
that, if it enters the entrails,
you can't go out without them.

The critique suggested various interpretations such as Whinnom's, for example, who stated that much *cancionero* poetry is "a tissue of veiled eroticism and doubles entendres". (Whinnom 1974, 6) The main motive is the description of love like a disease "who eats everything healthy", that destroys the one who loves on the inside and can bring to a fatal end. This poem is the expression of Pinar's vision of the love's tyranny whose harmful effects are conveyed through linguistic terms indicating pain,

suffering and illness. Implicitly talking about herself and her times, her lyrics are strongly imbued with a vision of love as destructive suffering.

By comparison, Hwang Jini's poetry in spite of expressing the torments of love, the sadness of parting, the loneliness and the grief of abandonment manages also to convey a keen sense of the beauty of nature.

Despite the scarcity of data about their biography and their poetry, the voices of these two women poets have reached us and continue to impress us even today due to the poetic mastery as well as to the courage with which they were able to express their own feelings and vision of life.

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해방기 영어옹변대회와 미공보원의 냉전 문화 정치-생활양식으로서의 민주주의

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1. 서론

이 연구는 해방기 한국에서 미공보원 주최로 진행했던 영어옹변대회를 냉전 문화 기획의 일환으로서 살펴보고자 한다. 이 연구는 남한에서 해방기부터 90년대 초중반까지 지속되었던 냉전 문화로서의 반공옹변대회의 기원을 살펴보기 위한 목적으로, 미군정 초기의 공보 정책에 따른 옹변대회 성격을 살펴보고 본격적으로 반공옹변대회가 실행되기 이전까지 그 형태와 주최 방식을 파악하고자 한다.

미국의 문화 냉전과 공보 정책 전반을 선구적으로 다룬 연구들은 기밀문서의 해제 이후 양대 진영 최고 지도자들의 관계를 보다 상세히 밝히고, 냉전 체계의 구축과정에서 문화적 이데올로기의 확장이 이루어진 사실들을 실증하였다 (백원담 2015, 96). 최근의 냉전연구는 양대 강국 중심의 정부와

정부 관계 중심의 연구를 넘어서 냉전관을 탈중심화하여 한층 더 복합적이고 중층적인 냉전상을 제시하고, 일상의 심급에서 작동하는 냉전의 효과를 살펴보기를 촉구한다. (기시 도시히코, 쓰치야 유카 2008) 냉전은 미국과 소련의 선전, 첩보전, 군비 경쟁, 경제적 대결로 한정된 것이 아니라 출판, 언론, 교육, 예술, 오락을 비롯하여 지식 생산과 인적 교류와 생활양식 전반을 포괄하는 전방위적 심리전 체제였던 만큼 냉전 시대를 살아온 이들의 내면을 형성하는 삶 그 자체의 문제이기 때문이다. (유승진 2020) 따라서 최근 냉전사학계에서 제출된 연구들은 한국 내에서 미국이 전파한 대중문화의 정치성을 재즈등 음악이나 스포츠, 박람회 등으로까지 확대하여 조명시키고 있다. (임성모 2015) 이 연구 또한 삶의 영역을 포섭한 냉전 문화의 일상적 층위를 살펴보기 위한 목적으로, 반세기 가

카이 지속되어온 ‘반공웅변대회’의 역사를 재구성하기 위한 작업의 일원이다. 냉전문화사가 생활사, 일상사 내에서 냉전 문화의 확산을 보다 미시적으로 살펴볼 것을 요구한다는 것을 전제하였을 때, 반공웅변대회는 보다 주목을 받아야 하는 현상이다. 반공웅변대회는 반공 강연이나 반공영화, 반공포스터 그리기, 표어 짓기, 반공 글짓기와 함께 반공교육의 일부로써 언급되거나 반공이 일상화되어간 현상 중 하나로서 다루어진다. 그러나 반공웅변과 웅변대회 그 자체를 중심으로 한 연구는 지극히 드물어 보이는데, 웅변대회로는 일제강점기 현상웅변대회를 살펴본 윤금선의 논문 이외에는 연구를 찾을 수가 없다. (윤금선 2021)

냉전의 역사는 일반적으로 소련의 해체로 종언을 이루었다고 여겨지지만 체제가 구축해놓은 대립의 구조는 외양을 달리하면서 지속적으로 새로운 적을 재구성해왔다. 지젝 (Slavoj Žižek)은 ‘탈이념 사회’라는 관념을 반박하며 이념의 시대에서 자유로워졌다는 언급 자체가 오히려 이념적인 발언이라는 점을 지적했다. 권헌익은 이념의 종언과 마찬가지로 ‘냉전의 종식’이나 ‘1989년 이후의 세계’라는 관용구는 연

대기적 장치가 아닌 이념적인 언술로 작동하고 있으며 그렇기에 냉전의 역사를 시기별로 끊어 나누는 일도 성찰과 검토의 대상이 되어야 한다고 주장한다 (권헌익 2013, 27). 미-소에서 미-중으로의 지정학적 재편으로 신냉전시대가 개막했다고 선언되는 현재에 냉전시대는 이미 선형적으로 종결되었다고 여겨진다. 냉전 상태의 지속을 위하여 분할되어 배치되었던 정치적 상상력들 또한 이제는 더 이상 유효하지 않은데, 이는 ‘적이 소멸’ 되었다기보다 ‘불온’한 것들이 새롭게 갱신되고 그 운용법이 지속적으로 변화하고 있기 때문일 것이다 (임유경 2015, 4).

한국의 냉전 문화가 종결되었다는 믿음 또한 이와 유사하게 작동했다. ‘반공교육’이 ‘통일안보교육’으로 이행하여 북한에 대한 이해와 포용이 강조된 것은 5차 교육과정 시기(1987~1991)였다. (박찬석, 2014) 92년도에 전교조 서울초등지회가 서울시내 30개 초등학교를 상대로 표본 조사한 결과, 91년까지 ‘호국보훈의 달’이면 연례행사로 되풀이되던 “반공”, “승공” 주제의 글짓기대회가 한 학교에서도 실시되지 않았으며 웅변대회는 열리지 않았다.

또한 동부교육청에서 주최한 ‘민족공동체의식 함양을 주제로 한 나의 주장 발표 대회’에서는 북한을 원색적으로 비판하던 경쟁에서 벗어나 동질감을 회복하는 방안을 설득력 있게 제시한 쪽에 높은 점수를 주는 쪽으로 사상 기준이 바뀌었다고 보도하고 있다.¹ 1994년도에 반공웅변대회는 이미 “시대착오적인 발상”으로 여겨졌고 “통일조국에서 살아가게 될 21세기 아이들의 때 묻지 않은 생각에 기성세대의 오염된 논리를 강요해서는 안 된다.”²는 목소리가 부상하고 있었다.

이 시기에 반공웅변대회는 이미 90년대 출판된 구효서의 “라디오라디오”와 황석영의 “오래된 정원”등의 작품에서 등장인물의 유년 시절의 풍속으로 다루어지거나, 칼럼이나 자서전에서 자신의 어린 시절 경험이나 추억으로 언급되는 고루한 대상이 되어있었다. 웅변대회에 대한 다양한 증언과 재현들은 각각의 주체가 반공웅변대회를 각자

다르게 기억하고 있다는 사실을 단편적으로 보여주고 있다. 이 글에서는 따로 자세히 그 증언에 대하여 다루지 않겠으나 주목하고자 하는 지점은 첫째로 반공웅변대회가 두 세대 전반을 관통하는 반공 활동으로써, 국공립교육을 받은 사람이라면 굉장히 보편적인 사실로 그 존재를 기억하고 있다는 점이다. 둘째로 같은 시기에 열린 웅변대회라 해도 그것을 기억하거나 감각하는 방식은 각각 다르다는 것이다. 이를테면 어릴 적부터 ‘대가’가 되기 위해 웅변대회에 참가하고, <아세아웅변협회>의 회장까지 역임하며 여러 반공웅변대회를 직접 주최했던 서예가 박정일이 증언한 반공대회에 대한 경험³과, 방북을 혐의로 감옥에서 황석영이 구상한 <오래된 정원>에서 형상화한 반공대회에 대한 재현⁴은 전혀 다른 성격을 갖는다. 이 작품에는 빨치산인 아버지와 ‘뿔 난 도깨비’를 공산당으로 그려 반공대회에서 우수상을 수상하는 딸이 한 가족 내에서 겪는 딜레마를

¹ 「국교 반공글짓기 사라져」, 『한겨레』, 1992.06.25., 15면.

² 「‘반공웅변’ 시대착오적 발상 통일세대에 강요 곤란…참가비도 너무 비싸」, 『한겨레』, 1994. 7.1.

³ 박정일, 「나의 젊음, 나의 사랑 서예가 박정일(2)」, 『경향신문』, 1996.05.29, 31면.

⁴ 황석영, 「오래된 정원」<44>, 『동아일보』, 1999.2.21.

그리고 있다. 요컨대 반공 그 자체를 훈장으로 여기는 삶의 형태와 반공이 공산주의 부역자임을 위장하거나, 스스로의 결백을 지속적으로 증명하기 위한 장치로 작동하는 삶의 형태 안에서 반공옹변대회는 완전히 다르게 경험될 수밖에 없는 것이다.

일찍이 이하나는 반공주의가 지식인 차원에서 발화와 동시에 완성되는 사상이 아니라 사회적으로 확산되고 유통되는 과정에서 완성되는 하나의 감정·정서였다고 주장했다. 그는 반공주의가 단일한 논리와 정서가 아니라 상이할 뿐 아니라 상충되는 다양한 논리와 정서를 포함하고 있으며 중층적이고 모순적이라고 지적했다. (이하나, 2012, 233)

반공옹변대회의 증언 스펙트럼을 소급하여 생각해보았을 때 반공대회의 경험이 다면적이라면, 냉전 문화를 일상에서 적극적으로 받아들이거나 거부하거나 전유한 주체들의 역사까지도 함께 서술할 수 있는 대상이며 냉전 문화의 미시사를 풍부하게 살펴볼 가능성이 있다고 생각된다. 이 글은 그러한 작업에 대한 초석으로 삼아 해방기에 냉전 기구와의 네트워크와의 연계에 초점을 맞춰 옹변대회를 살펴보고자

한다.

2. 혁신의 언어로서의 국어 옹변대회와 세계적 지성으로서의 영어옹변대회

해방기에 각축하고 길항하고 있었던 강연회와 좌담회, 각종 대회는 일시적인 검열로부터 벗어나 자신의 의견을 자유롭게 표명할 수 있는 담론장의 역할을 했다. 일제강점기에도 옹변대회는 활발하게 진행되었었는데, 항일운동에도 적극적으로 활용되어 다수의 청중이 참관하여 사회 문제를 공론할 수 있는 현상이었다. 규모가 큰 대회는 속기로 옹변 내용을 기록하여 대회 후 게재하기도 했으며 잡지사의 지면과 라디오 방송을 통한 옹변대회가 개최되었다. 옹변술을 연구하기 위한 연구회와 학회 등이 결성되었고 동시에 교양인이 지녀야 할 조건, 자기계발이나 처세술과도 연결되어 강조되었다. 다만 1920년대 중기까지 활발하게 이어졌던 대회가 1930년대에 이르면 교내 옹변대회까지 임석경관의 통제 대상이 되어 시국에 관련된 논제는 다루기 어려워졌다. (윤금선, 2021)

이러한 규제에서 풀려난 해방기에는 각종 옹변, 강연, 좌담회가 이 시기 발

족된 수많은 정당과 단체 그리고 위원회의 명단의 수십 배를 넘어 개최되었다. 이들은 ‘취지서’와 ‘선언’ 그리고 ‘격’, ‘격문’, ‘급고’, ‘경보’ 등의 표제를 앞세운 많은 전단지들을 배포하였으며 이 단체들은 일련의 정치적 일정과 연합군환영대회, 각종 기념식 등에 전방위적으로 동원되어서 목소리를 높였다. 이러한 ‘빠라의 수사학’과 ‘선전 선동의 언어’들은 각각의 정치적 이해의 선명성을 강조하여 자극적이고 격렬한 언어로 구성되어있었다. (김현식, 2011)

해방 직후의 웅변대회들은 근대계몽기의 연설과 토론의 연계선상에 놓여 구체적으로 웅변대회와 명확하게 분리되지 않은 성격의 대회들이 열리기도 했다. 즉 연사들이 모여서 다양한 지방을 순회하며 특정한 주제에 대해서 강연하거나 자유롭게 토론하는 대회와, 특정한 주최자가 현상금을 걸거나 어떤 목적성을 가지고 먼저 원고를 받아 선발한 뒤에 정해진 시간 내에 연설하는 대회가 혼재하고 있었는데, 이러한 대회를 분리하지 않고 ‘강연회’ 혹은 ‘웅변대회’라고 불렀다. 예를 들어 1945년

“혁신웅변회” 주최로 기독교청년회관에서 10월에 1일, 2일에 열렸던 <제 1회 전국남녀웅변대회> 프로그램을 살펴보면 1일에 19명의 연사가 연설하고 2일에 17명의 연사가 연설을 하기로 되어 있는데, 대회 일정을 보도하는 기사에서도 이를 ‘웅변’이라 명명하지 않고 ‘강연회’가 있을 것이라고 설명하고 있다. 연설 주제 또한 고정된 것이 아니라 참가하는 각 연사가 자신이 선택한 주제에 따라 자유롭게 발언할 수 있는 형태였다. 대부분 조선 독립과 관련된 주제로, “민족완전독립의 길” 이나 “민족반동자를 타도하자”, “무엇이 되려느냐”, “조선독립은 세계평화에 이바지한다.” 등의 당대에 직면한 주제들이 선택되었다.⁵

영어웅변대회는 이와는 다른 성격으로, 영어교육에 대한 관심이나 학생들의 언어 함양을 기르기 위한 목적성이 더 강했다. 냉전기의 자장 속에서 영어는 새로운 자본이자 권력으로, ‘미국’이라는 강대국과 접촉되어 있다는 심상을 마련해주는 강력한 표상으로 작동하고 있었다. 영어는

⁵ 「建國의 獅子吼 革新雄辯會의 講演」, 『新朝鮮報』 1945.11.02., 「革新雄辯會 1, 2일

대강연」, 『自由新聞』 1945.11.01.

단순히 외국어로 간주되는 것을 넘어 미군정이라는 통치체와 동일시되었다. 국어로서의 정립을 위한 규범화 작업이 지행 중이었던 조선어와 식민 통치의 잔재로 말소시켜야 했던 일본어에 비해 영어는 언어 민족주의적 영향으로부터 상대적으로 자유로웠다. 또한 지속적인 통역과 번역의 가능성을 내포하는 만큼, 완결성을 지닌 특수한 언어로서의 위상을 획득하여, 영토와 주권 국가의 위상에 따라 국어와 영어는 다르게 위계화되고 재편되었다. (임세화, 2019) 영어는 학문과 교양이라는 언어의 층위로도 분화되었는데 이는 미국 사회에 대한 지적 욕구를 해소시켜주는 동시에 독립된 국가의 주체이자 동시대성을 획득한 세계적 인간형으로서 거듭나기 위한 수단이기도 했다. 해방 이후에도 지속된 선진과 후진의 대립적 구도에서 영어로 인한, 영어로 구성된 것들은 선진 지식의 위치를 점하고

있었다.

이러한 선진에 대한 감각은 각종 국가 재건을 위한 당면 과제 사이에서 문화 재건의 목소리와 함께 교차되면서 최신의 지성에 대한 열망을 더욱 가중하였다. 민족 문화를 빠르게 수립하여 세계문화 발전에 공헌하자는 세계주의적 선언들 또한 쏟아져 나오고 있었다.⁶ 그러나 1946년 하반기부터 용지 부족과 책값 상승, 수용자의 미약한 서적 구매력, 미군정의 출판법령 개정 등으로 출판물 규제가 강화되었으며 외국과의 교역의 통제되는 사태까지 발생했다. 외국 지식·교양의 보급과 습득의 활로를 모색하는 과정에서 공보원의 문화 사업은 단연 지배적이었다. 한미교류를 홍보하는 잡지 발간, 『민성』, 『신천지』 같은 종합지들의 외지 참조·번역 기사를 통해 세계정세와 해외 문화계 동향을 소개했다. 미 공보원은 1948년부터 미국문화연구소를 설립해 영문 서적의 열람 및 대출 서비스를 제공했는데, 도서관은 개관 직후 1

⁶ 해방기의 문화 재건에 관한 대표적인 언설들은 다음과 같다. 「변혁기와 문화」, 『동아일보』.1945.12.24.; 이헌구, 「민족문화정신의재인식-의 문예시감에 대하여」, 『백민』, 13, 1948.3.; 「문화건설의 적극적 대책」,

『동아일보』, 1949.8.5. 이용희. 2018, “한국현대 독서문화의 형성-1950~60년대 외국서적의 수용과 ‘베스트셀러’라는 장치-”성균관대학교 박사학위논문, 48쪽 참고.

주일 동안 5만 여명이 방문하고 하루 평균 40권의 영문 도서와 대출될 만큼 영어와 외국 문화를 향한 앓의 열기는 뜨거웠다. (이용희, 2018, 48)

영어에 대한 초미의 관심사가 나날이 증가하는 상황 속에서 중앙여대는 어린 학생들을 대상으로 대회 참가자를 모집하여 일찍이 영어웅변대회를 주최하기 시작했다. 중앙여대는 해방 후 3개월도 채 지나지 않은 10월 26일에 12월에 대회를 예정하여 신문을 통해 모집하였다. 이 대회의 목적은 “머지않아 세계적으로 진출해서 화려한 국제무대에서 활약할 조선 여성에게 외국어의 중요성을 주지시키는 한편 영어에 대한 홍추 수사(鴻樞 修辭) 기능과 변재(辯才)를 장려하기 위함⁷”이라고 명시하였던 것으로 보아 당대의 국제적 조류에 참가할 수 있는 인재로 영어에 능통한 후속 세대를 양성하기 위해 발 빠르게 대회를 추진했던 것으로 보인다. 대회 참가와 연제에 대한 조건도 주목해볼직 한데, 당시 좌우익 진영간의 긴장감이 형성된 진행된 시기가 그리 길지 않았음에도 불구하고 “본

대회는 북위 38도선 이남 여성 중학교에 한하여 참가할 수 있음” 이라고 이북 학교들의 참가를 처음부터 금지하고 있다. 한편, 연제 내용은 “명문번역”과 “창작연설”이 모두 가능하나 5분 내에 발표를 하도록 강조하고 있으며 그 주제에 대해서는 따로 정확하게 지정한 바가 없어 참가 학생이 자유롭게 선택할 수 있도록 여지를 남겨놓고 있다.

영어웅변대회 일정이 신문의 「문화행사」란에 실리고는 했다는 것도 특이할만한 점인데, 『경향신문』은 11월 한 달간 예정된 문화행사를 소개하는 지면에 15일과 16일에 중앙여대강당에서 실시될 “여자중등영어웅변대회”를 예고하고 있다. 같은 지면에는 각각 다른 날짜에 예정되어있는 “에스페란토강습회”, “이화연주회”나 “건국과학강연회”, “미식축구영화회”, “향토예술경연대회”, “즉흥시현상대회”같은 일정이 함께 배치되어있다.⁸ 즉 영어웅변대회는 단지 참가자만을 위한 행사가 아니라 대중이 음악회나 영화상영회에 가듯이 문화체험의 일부로 여겨지기도 했던

⁷ 「女子中等英語雄辯大會；中央女大主催·本社後援으로」, 『한성일보』 1946.10.26.

⁸ 「文化行事」, 『경향신문』, 1946.11.17.

것으로 보인다.

해방기 영어옹변대회는 영어에 대한 관심사, 미군정 당국이 추진 하는 영어 교육관련 정책, 국제적 장에 진입하기 위한 세계주의적 욕망등과 결합하면서 각종 대학의 언어과, 영어교육학회, 종교 단체 등에서 주최하며 점진적으로 증가하기 시작했다. 그러나 미공보원에서 영어옹변대회를 주최한 목적은 영어교육을 중시했다기보다 그들의 공보 정책의 일원으로써 대중의 의견을 수집하기 한 목적이 더 강했다. 다음 장에서는 그 과정을 자세히 살펴보도록 하겠다.

3. 미공보원(O.C.I)의 공보 정책과 영어옹변대회의 ‘민주주의와 생활양식’

미공보원에서 처음 옹변대회를 주최한 것은 1947년 6월 26일로, 부산도내 남녀중등학생을 대상으로 부산대인문과와 공동주최하였다. 이 옹변대회는 미공보부가 주한미군 산하 공보원 (O.C.I: The Office of Civil Information) 으로 개칭한지 얼마 되지 않은 시점으로, 5월 30일에 하지 중장에게 직접 보고하는 특별 참모부서로 설립된 직후였다. 즉 한국

기관 관할 하 공보부 (DPI: The Department of Public Information)와 공보원이 공존하며 미국의 선전기능만 공보원으로 이관된 상황이었다(김학재, 2017).

이러한 상황은 미 육군 24군단 공보부장 (Public Relations Officer, United States Army Forces in Korea) 겸 과도정부의 공보부 고문인 제임스 스튜어트 (James L. Stewart)가 1947년 4월 14일 군단장이었던 하지 장군 (General John R. Hodge) 에게 군정 기구를 통해서만 공보활동을 하는 것이 미국의 메시지를 제대로 전달하지 못한다고 우려하는 보고서(G-2, 1947 7,78)를 제출한 것을 계기로 업무의 성격이 다소 변화한 것이었다. 한국에 대한 미국의 정책을 알리는 기본적인 임무는 변함이 없으나, 현실적인 시행 방법에 있어서 공보(Informational)과 홍보(Public Relations)가 강조되었으며 하지 중장에게 직접 보고하는 특별 참모부서가 되었다.

당시 공보원 국장으로 임명된 스튜어트는 1942년 제 2차 세계대전 때 창설된 미국 전시 공보국(Office of War Information)에서 중국 지역 심리전 담당 책임자로 일한 경력이 있었다 (김병희, 2016, 104). 즉 그는 여론을 주도하

여 정보 수집과 전달하는 것이 유용하다는 것을 무엇보다 잘 알고 있었으며, 정부의 시각을 대중이 수용하도록 하고 언어, 시청각 자료나 상징적인 방법을 사용하고 이용하는 조직적인 시도, 즉 선전(Propaganda)에 누구보다 일가견이 있었던 책임자였다 (Belmore, 2008, Doob, 1948). 그가 고문이 된 이후 공보원에서 제출한 업무는 각종 미디어를 포함한 민간통신의 통제와 미국 민주주의 원칙 배포라는 원론적인 공보 활동 지침에서 한층 더 계획적이고 자세한 열 네 가지 사항들로 명시되었다 (박수현, 2018).

이 중 이 연구에서 중요하다고 생각되는 몇 가지 항목을 살펴보고자 한다. 첫째로, 지방 공보원을 전주, 청주, 전주, 춘천, 인천, 개성, 광주, 대구, 대전, 부산과 서울에 각각 설치하여 지방 공보 활동을 확대하였다(1). 이는 남한 정세 파악과 언론 통제가 서울이나 지방 대도시에만 한정되었던 단점을 보완하도록 했다. 다른 항목들을 살펴보면, 철도나 차 등으로 벽지의 지방등지를 순회하며 문학, 연설, 전시, 드라마, 영화 등의 발표(6), 연극이나 인형극 창작 및 발표(7), 미국 정책 전달과 정보 수집을 위한 우수한 한국인과의 접촉(9), 한국

인의 의견과 동향을 조사하기 위한 현지 조사와 결과 분석(11), 동요가 있는 지역을 방문하여 대중 정서를 규범화하는 특별 임무(12) 등이 포함되어 있었다. (G-2, 1947, 6-11)

이 중에는 영어옹변대회 진행에 대한 구체적인 지시는 없었다. 그럼에도 불구하고 영어옹변대회를 실행한 목적에 대해서는 가설을 세워볼 수 있다. 첫째로, 옹변대회 목적이 미국 대학 내에서 이미 보편화되어 있었던 스피치와 토론 교육을 남한에 이식하는 과정에서 생긴 하나의 민주주의 교육이 방식일 수 있다. 미국 독립 초기 대학들은 시민들이 자신의 주장과 의견을 합리적으로 표현하고, 공동체의 관심사를 토론을 통해 결정할 수 있는 시민성을 증진하기 위하여 교양교육에서 스피치와 토론 교육을 강화하였다. 민주주의의 시민의 판단과 결정을 위해서는 공공 사안에 대해서 자유롭게 공개하고 서로에게 전달할 수 있어야 했다 (Dewey, 1997). 즉 이러한 공공 사안을 위한 논쟁, 토론을 위한 의사소통과 설득이라는 수단 자체가 민주주의적 국가를 만드는 수단이자 그 생활양식이라고 생각하여 청년층을 위한 옹변대회를 추진했다고 볼 수 있다.

둘째로 공보원 직원들이 해방기에 실행되었던 응변대회가 정보 수집에 특수화된 현장이라는 것을 파악했을 가능성이 높다. 즉 영어응변대회를 통해서 미공보원은 전국 지역 조사, 정보수집과 공보원이 원하는 정책 선전을 동시에 수행할 수 있었다. 보편적으로 응변대회는 특정한 주제를 주최 측에서 제시한 뒤, 참가자를 모집하고 그 대상을 원고를 통해 직접 선별하였으며, 심사위원 측에서 우승자를 선별하여 간접적으로 어떤 의견이 선호되는지 영향력을 행사하였다. 또한 응변대회 참가자들의 응변을 통해서 학생들의 특정 주제에 대한 의견을 수집하고, 응변을 듣기 위해 모여든 청중의 반응을 주시할 수 있었다. 물론 이는 미군정이 정오 무렵 혹은 종로나 남대문, 명동입구, 노량진 등에서 통행인 수백 혹은 수천 명을 대상으로 하는 ‘몰 인터뷰 mall interview’ 방식을 통한 여론 조사와는 다소 성격이 달랐다. (전상인, 1997) 객관성이나 정확성의 측면에서 보다 정밀했다고 하기는 어려우나 최종적인 정책 방향과 일치하는 질문을 제시하여 참가자가 그 주제를 통해 5분에서 7분가량의 연설을 위해 기승전결이 있는 논의를 직접 창작했다는 점에서 보

다 심화된 의견을 살펴볼 수 있었다. 이를 영어응변대회의 주최 시기와 당대 미군정의 목표가 일치하는 것 통해 살펴보고자 한다.

앞서 언급했던 <도내 남녀중등학생응변대회>의 연제는 “미소공동위원회”였는데, 대회가 열리기 한 달 전, 1947년 5월 22일에 제 2차 미소공동위원회 재개가 결정되었다. 신탁통치에 반대하는 한국 단체를 참가시키느냐 마느냐의 문제를 놓고 1946년에 위원회가 휴회한 상태에서 미군정은 우익과 좌익의 선전에 대항하고 한국인들의 미소공동위원회 지지를 이끌어내야 했다. 이를 위해 1947년 1월 주한미군사령부 공보과 산하에 특별참모부서로 강연과가 설치되었던 점, 그리고 사실상 5월에 공보원이 강연과를 모태로 창설된 것을 전제로 하였을 때, 미소공동위원회에 관련된 여론조사는 강연과에서 공보원으로 이전된 상당히 시급한 업무였던 것이다 (박수현, 2018).

이 영어응변대회가 주최된 이후 대회 우승자 이름과 학교명등을 기사에 실은 『부산신문』에 따르면 대회당일 “‘짚샛트’ 도장관에 ‘에반손’ 학무국 장관 이하 조미관계자가 다수 참석하였

다.”⁹고 보도하는데 당시 미군정 경남 군정장관이었던 질레트(F.E Gillette)와 미군정 학무국장인 인물로 추측되는 에반슨(Evanson-?) 이 중등학생들이 발표하는 영어옹변대회에 참석했다는 것은 대회의 중요성을 짐작하게 한다. 학무국에서 조선에 선거를 통한 미국식 민주주의를 이식하여 과도정부를 수립하고, 친미세력을 키울 목적성 갖고 있다는 점에서 미국식 민주주의를 전파하고자 했던 공보원의 목적과 일치했다 (김동선, 2020). 두 인사가 모두 참석했다는 것은 이 대회의 목적이 학생들의 언변을 듣고 사기를 북돋는 것에서 그치는 것이 아니라 학생들의 연제 내용을 공보원에서 직접 제시하여 의견을 듣고, 이를 심사하는 과정에서 그들이 선호하는 내용을 간접적으로 전달하면서 영어옹변대회를 듣기 위해 모여든 청중의 반응과 여론을 함께 살펴보기 위함이었다.

그 다음해 공보원은 12월 11일 <시내 남녀전문대학생 영어옹변대회>를 개최하여 다양한 신문을 통해 대대적으로 홍보를 했는데, 『한성일보』, 『동아일보』, 『조선일보』와 같은 신문과, 다소 성격이 다른 『수산경제신문』, 『부인신보』에서 까지 미공보원 주최 영어옹변대회 예선을 광고하고 있다. 주최 측은 주로 서울 공보원문화연구소였으며 연제는 “민주주의적 생활법”으로 제시하였다.¹⁰ 비슷한 시기인 12월 24일 전남 공보원에서 “민주주의 생활방식”이라는 거의 같은 주제로 중등학생을 대상으로 <남녀중등학교영어옹변대회>를 열기도 했다. 당시 옹변대회의 상황은 불명확하나, 이 때의 “민주주의적 생활법”이라는 주제가 선택된 것은 1948년 5월 제헌선거를 치렀던 상황과 무관하지 않을 것이다. 당시 영어옹변대회 참가자들은 유권자가 아니었지만 자신보다 연장자인 학생이나 부모세대

⁹ 미군정 학무국장이었던 “에반슨”이라는 인물에 대해서는 자료를 면밀히 살피지 못하여 인물을 실증하지 못하였다. 추후 연구에서 보완하도록 하겠다. 「優勝의 榮冠은 釜中에, 男女中等學生英語雄辯大會盛況」, 『부산신문』, 1947.6.28.

¹⁰ 보다 면밀한 과정은 보도자료를 대조해야 하나, 서울미국공보원 문화연구소 외에 미

국공보원광주문화연구소에서 이 대회를 주최했음을 확인하였다. 「문화소식」, 『동아일보』, 1948.11.25., 「남녀전문대학생영어옹변대회」, 『한성일보』, 1948.11.25., 「학생영어옹변대회, 미공보원주최」, 『수산경제신문』, 1948.11.26.,

가 처음으로 자유민주주의체제의 선거를 경험하고 자신의 주권을 행사를 목격한 후였다. 이들은 길게는 5년 짧게는 3년 내에 선거를 치르게 될 나이였다. 다르게 말하면 이들은 스스로를 주권자로서 상정하고 사고하기 시작했다는 것을 의미했다. 남한단독선거를 통해 이들은 보다 구체적으로 국가의 미래를 상상하고, 또 ‘국민’으로서의 자신의 범위와 성격을 결정 짓기 시작했다. 주권을 가진 ‘국민’은 이제 민주주의의 범주 바깥에 있는 이들을 포함하지 않은 것이었다. 이는 공보원이 갖고 있었던 목표, 즉 미국에 대해 협조적이고 그들의 정치를 이해하며 UN에 협조적인 경향을 갖는 정부의 수립을 완수하고, 미국적 생활방식을 대중화하고 민주주의에 대해 본격적으로 논의할 수 있는 시기에 도달했음을 의미했다.

1949년 5월 1일에는 전라남도 문화연구소의 주최로 <제 3회 전남학생웅변대회>가 개최되었다. 이 때 열린 대회에서는 연제가 보다 다양하고 자세하게 제출되었다.

△ The Republic of Korea looks ahead

(前塵大韓民國)

△ The Progress of Korean Woman (飛翔하는大韓女性)

△ The Mission of E.O.A. in Korea (E.O.A...Economic, Corporation, Administration). (駐韓美經濟協調處의 使命)¹¹

1년이 지난 사이에 웅변대회 주제는 ‘전진 대한민국’, ‘비상하는 대한여성’, ‘주한미경제협력처의 사명’으로 제출되어 학생들에게 대한민국의 경제 발전과 미국과의 협력, 국내에서의 여성의 위치와 역할에 대해서도 논의하도록 확장된 것을 확인해볼 수 있다. 한편 한국전쟁이 다가오던 시점 1950년 5월 14일에 개최된 <중등남녀학생웅변대회>에서 제시된 두 가지 모순된 주제를 살펴보면 “국제연합과 세계평화”, “극동에 있어서의 방어 보루인 한국인의 사명”으로, 냉전 상태가 고조되고 있는 것이 확인된다.¹²

4. 결론

이 연구는 미 공보원의 공보 정책의 일환으로서 해방기 영어웅변대회가 주최되었음을 밝히고 공보원의 정치적

¹¹ 「公報院主催本社後援 英語雄辯大會」, 『호남신문』 1949.4.21.

¹² 「中等男女英語雄辯大會開催」, 『동광신문』, 1950. 4.11.

계획에 따라 웅변 연제가 지속적으로 변화했음을 살펴보았다.

국어로 진행되던 웅변대회는 토론을 통한 최고의 연설을 선발하는 것에 목적이 있기보다 각 진영의 정치적 의견을 적극적으로 개진하기 위한 담론장으로 이용되었다. 한편 대학교에서 주최되던 영어웅변대회는 권력의 언어이자 세계의 언어로서 기능하던 영어를 습득하기 위한 목적성이 강했으며 한편으로는 음악회나 언어 강습을 듣는 것처럼 하나의 문화생활로서 여겨지기도 했다는 단서를 발견하였다. 공보원에서 주최했던 영어웅변대회는 학생들의 영어실력 함양을 기르기보다는 그들의 임무를 완수하기 위한 목적이자 수단으로서 활용되었다. 한편 미국의 민주주의에서 ‘공적 말하기’가 중요한 역사적 재료였던 만큼, 한국사회에서의 ‘공적 말하기’를 보다 정제된 형태로서 가공하기 위해 영어웅변대회를 추진했던 것으로 보았다.

이 글에서는 미공보원이 한반도에서 구축하고자 했던 냉전 문화적 방향성을 일부 살필 수 있었다. 주로 공보원 정책문서와 당대 웅변대회 모집이나 후속 기사를 통해 논의하였는데 실질

적으로 영어웅변대회에서 참가한 학생들이 연설한 내용이나 청중들의 반응은 따로 실증할 수 없었다는 한계를 지닌다. 이러한 주제에 대해서 당대 중등학생들이 어떤 식으로 언술하였을지는 아직 미지수이다. 이들이 자유 민주주의 가치에 입각하여 새로운 주제에 대해서 자유롭게 사유하고 발화할 수 있는 기회가 주어졌고, 또 직접적으로 원고를 작성했다는 점에서 어느 정도 주체성을 확보하고 있다고 예측해볼 수 있다. 그러나 이들의 자유 민주주의라는 것은 냉전 이데올로기에 포획된 윤리와 도덕에 의해 지지되는 것이었다. (정영진, 2010) 즉 민주주의에 포함되지 않았다고 여겨지는 가치들은 윤리적이지 않은 것이었고 이것에 위반하는 언어들은 이미 발화되기 이전부터 은폐되었을 가능성이 높다. 그렇기에 주최측이 지정하는 문법들로 구성된 웅변대회는 단선적인 일방향의 운동을 보여주는 장면일 수도 있다는 주체성의 한계 또한 내포한다. 그러나 삶을 긴박시켰던 냉전적 조건들에 대해서 학생들이 생각해 볼 수 있는 기회가 있었다는 점, 국내의 정치적·사회적 의제와 더불어 한국의 지정학적 위치를 사유하게 하는 주제들이 제출되었

던 점에서 웅변대회의 주제가 완전히 피는 것이 보다 입체적으로 웅변대회 반공주의로 수렴되기 이전, 대안의 미 의 역사적 구조를 추적해나가는 방식을 상상하고 발화했던 경험의 역사 일 것이다. 이는 추후 과제로 남겨두도가 있었다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 웅변 록 하겠다.

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領選使行 전후 金允植의 국제관계에 대한 인식과 ‘交渉’구상(1881-1882)

석사수로 천관우

1. 머리말

본 발표문에서는 개항 이후 ‘交渉’으로 공식화, 고착화되었던 조선의 국제관계 양상의 성격에 대해 구명하고자 한다. 개항 이후 朝鮮은 새로운 국제관계에 직면하게 되었다. 중화질서에 의거한 淸과의 사대관계가 계속 유지되는 가운데 일본 및 서양 열강들과 자주국으로서 조약을 맺고 교류하게 된 것이다. 이른바 ‘(近代)外交(=diplomacy)’가 인식되기 시작한 것이다. 이는 조선에는 새로운 현상으로 인식되고 있었는데, 그 중에서도 양 질서의 병존에 대해 어떻게 인식하고 대처할 것인지 예민하게 포착한 인물이 바로 金允植이었다.

金允植은 당대 시대상을 면밀하게 관찰한 후 사대관계와 외교관계를 모두 포섭할 수 있고, 外交라는 언명을 피할 수 있는 ‘交渉’이라는 구상을 고안해내었다. ‘交渉’의 공식화 과정에서 주도적인 역할을 한 인물이 바로 金允植이다. 이는 김윤식이 영선사로서 이홍장 막하 양무관료들과 정치적, 개인적으로 교류했던 것과 함께 外交라는 국제법 질서상의 대

외관계를 두루 관찰하고 인식한 결과였다.

이 문제에 접근하기 위해서는 우선적으로 당시 국제질서 시스템 자체에 대한 분석이 선행되어야 한다. 1876년 개항 이후 조선이 조약을 통해 국제관계를 맺는 국가가 점차 확대되기 시작한다. 이렇듯, 개항 이전과는 다른 방식의 국제관계양상이 나타났다는 것은 널리 인정되고 있지만, 그러한 역사적 변화상을 어떻게 이해하고 명명할 것인지는 견해가 나뉘어 있다.

크게 대별하여 보면, 한국학계는 交隣에서 外交로 변해가는 동태적인 부분에 주목하는 반면 (金壽岩 2000; 유바다 2019), 일본학계는 淸의 종주권을 보다 강조하며 交隣의 연속이라거나 (岡本隆司 外 2021), 상이한 두 질서의 交着같은 상징적 개념화를 시도하고 있다 (森万佑子 2017). 다소 예외적으로 조선의 ‘전략’을 부각하는 연구도 있긴 하나청의 종주권에 대해 과대평가하는 관점은 크게 다르지 않다.¹ 요컨대 개항 이후 조선의 국제관계를 보는 두 관점이 대립하고 있다

¹ 사카이 히로미(酒井裕美)는 지금까지 흔히 ‘수세적 대응’으로 취급되었던 개항기 조선의 외교 상의 행보를 과감히 ‘전략’으로 격상시켜 적극적으로 평가하였는데, 최근의 관련 연구 중 단연 돋보이는 연구성과라고 생각한다. 그러나, ‘전략’이라는 호명

을 통해 만들어낸 새로운 연구의 가능성에도 불구하고, 저자는 종주국으로서의 청의 영향력을 ‘절대적’이라고 묘사하였는데, 그로 인해 ‘전략’의 입지가 줄어들어 아쉬움을 남겼다(酒井裕美, 『開港期朝鮮の戰略的外交(1882~1884)』, 大阪大学出版会,

고 할 수 있다.

이에 관하여, 최근의 연구들에서 논의의 핵심에 통리교섭통상사무아문을 위치시키고 있다는 점에 주목할 필요가 있다². 이는, 개항기 조선의 국제관계를 분석하기 위해서는 통리교섭통상사무아문에 집중해야 함을 의미한다. 통리‘교섭’통상사무아문의 존재는 조선정부가 공식적으로는 새로운 국제관계를 ‘교섭’으로 인식하였음을 시사하는 것이다. 그런데 정작 ‘교섭’의 의미³에 대한 분석은 거의 이루어지지 않은 채 당대 국제관계의 양상에 대한 후대적인 평가(외교인가 교린인가)나 또는 상징적인 개념어(교착, 전략)가 범람하고 있는 실정이다.

개항 이후 외아문을 새로이 설치했다는 점에서 조선은 분명 기존과는 다른 국제관계에 대비하고 있었다고 봐야 한다. 그러므로 이를 단순히 交隣의 연장으로 파악하는 것은 충분하지 않다. 그런 한편, 조선은 안팎으로 ‘外交’라는 언명을 자제하고 있기도 하였기 때문에 당

시의 국제관계를 과감히 外交라 명명하기에도 무리가 따른다고 본다 (閔會修 2018).

해당 시기의 사료를 면밀히 검토하면, 임오군란(1882)의 수습 이후 조선의 새로운 국제관계는 交涉으로 공식화되었다는 것을 알 수 있다. 그러나 이전 연구들은 조선이 스스로 명명한 ‘交涉’의 연원과 그 의미를 면밀히 검토하지 않았다. 그리고 조선에서 ‘交涉’의 공식화 과정에서 주도적인 역할을 한 인물이 바로 金允植이었다.

金允植은 중국과 서양이 조우하고 교류하는 당대 시대상을 면밀하게 관찰하여, 조선의 입장에서 사대관계와 외교관계를 모두 포섭할 수 있고, 또한 外交라는 언명을 피할 수 있는 交涉이라는 기획을 고안해내었다. ‘交涉’이란 淸은 물론이고 새롭게 확대된 서양 국가들과의 관계에도 대처해가기 위해 김윤식이 구상한 것이었다⁴.

2016).

² 통리교섭통상사무아문의 이해에 관해 기초가 되는 연구는 李光麟, 「統理機務衙門의 組織과 機能」, 『梨花史學研究』 17·18, 1988; 田美蘭, 「統理交涉通商事務衙門에 關한 研究」,

『梨大史苑』 24·25, 1989; 金壽岩, 앞의 박사학위논문, 2000 등이 있다. 이러한 연구들을 통해 통리교섭통상사무아문의 연원과 기능, 성립의 등이 밝혀졌다. 그러나, 예전의 연구동향은 외아문에 짝하는 통리군국사무아문이나 내무부에 맞추어진 경향이 있었다. 또한, 최근의 관련 연구와 마찬가지로 외아문의 핵심이 되는 ‘교섭’에 대해서 분석한 것은 아니었다.

³ 최근 민회수는 근대 외교의 ‘하위개념’으로서 ‘지방대외교섭(地方對外交涉)’이라는 개념을 제시하였다(민회수, 「근대 한국의 ‘지방대외교섭(地方對外交涉)’ 개념에 대한

시론(試論)」, 『한국사연구』 194, 2021; 「19세기 말 외국인 관련 사건의 사례로 본 ‘지방대외교섭(地方對外交涉)」, _____,

『한국학연구』 64, 2022). 민회수는 해당 연구에서 근대 외교의 아래에 위치한, 지방차원의 외교를 교섭으로 본다. 요컨대 (지방대외)교섭과 외교는 서로 층위가 다른 것이다. 그러나 당대에 교섭을 정의한

『성초지장』에 따르면, 交涉은 通使의 例에 대응하는 사무를 통칭한다. 즉 교섭이란 본래 국가 간의 교제를 지칭하는 개념이다. 물론 이를 분해하고 지방이라는 장소성을 결부시켜 ‘지방차원의 교섭’을 특정할 수도 있겠으나, 본 발표문에서는 사료상에 제시된 본의에 집중하여 ‘交涉’의 의미를 밝히고자 한다.

⁴ 한편, (서)유럽에서는 군주 개인 간의 관계를 지칭하는 교섭에서 국가 간의 관계를 의미하는

이는 익히 알려져 있는 김윤식의 兩便兩得論을 현실에 구현하는 일이기도 하였다.

그러나 이러한 ‘구상’은 김윤식의 의도대로 조선에 兩便하고 兩得하도록 하는 것이 아니라, 도리어 조선을 自繩自縛할 가능성이 높았다. 왜냐하면 ‘交渉’이란 당시 국제관계상에서, 중주국 淸을 제외하고 다른 나라들과는 조선이 ‘自主’함에도 불구하고, 명백한 ‘自主의 영역’마저 淸의 중주권에 의해 억압될 수 있는 대외관계 구조를 자인하고 그대로 ‘공식화’한 것이기 때문이다. 그런 의미에서 김윤식은 조선의 새로운 국제관계를 예민하게 포착하고, 이를 ‘交渉’으로 고안했지만, 한편으로 스스로 한계 지은 복잡한 인물이라고 평가할 수 있다.

본 발표문에서는 ‘交渉’이란 김윤식이 자신의 양편양득론을 현실의 대외관계에 적용시키고자 한 구상이라는 점을 논한다. 임오군란 이후 淸의 간섭이 점증하는 정치적 조건 속에서 김윤식의 구상대로 조선의 새로운 국제관계 구도가 결국은 淸의 擔任을 전제하는 ‘交渉’으로 공식화되었음을 밝히고, 한편으로 交渉의 문헌적 근거와 성격에 대해 제시하고자 한다.

金允植은 친청파의 대표적인 인물로

거론되어왔다. 그러나 親淸이라는 비판이 앞선 결과, 실제로 親淸이라는 함의가 대외관계에 미친 영향을 구체적으로는 분석하지 못했다. 이는 임오군란 친청파의 득세라는 사실에 주목하여 조선의 정치구도를 다소 평면적으로 파악했던 것과 관련이 깊다. 金允植의 親淸이라는 혐의는 이제 김윤식이 구상한 淸의 擔任을 전제하는 ‘交渉’이라는 개념/구상의 역사적 의미와 함께 구명되어야 한다.

한국에서 金允植 개인에 대한 연구는 開化黨 중심의 정치사연구에 대한 반성으로 시작되어 이미 상당히 축적되어 있다. 김윤식은 유교적 세계관을 유지하는 온건개화파(李光麟 1973; 崔眞植 1984; 정옥자 1985)⁵, 개량적 개화파(姜在彦 著, 鄭昌烈 譯 1981; 趙景達 1985)=시무 개화파(하원호 1998) 내지 동도서기론자(강만길 2008; 김성배 2009, 23)의 대표적인 인물로 평가되어왔다. 구체적으로는 영선사의 군계학조단(權錫奉 1962) 및 연미사행(宋炳基 1984a, 1984b), 혹은 후속조치인 기기창설치(金正起 1978) 등 일련의 개혁정책과 관련하여 김윤식의 역할이 부각되었고, 이후 연구는 김윤식 개인의 일생 전체를 조망하는 수준까지 일찍이 도달하였다(李相一 1996; 김성배 2009.).

외교로 개념의 변화가 나타난다고 알려져 있다(金容九, 「외교 개념 연구」,

『학술원논문집(인문·사회과학편)』 50(1), 2011, 270쪽). 외교 개념이 일종의 계열성(系列性)을 갖고 발전해간 것이다. 그런데 일찍부터 집권국가가 들어서고, 국가 간의 관계가 일찍부터 정립·운영되었던 동아시아에서는 서유럽의 사례를 적용하기는 어렵다고 본다. 조선에서

‘交渉’이라는 것은 청과의 사대관계와 서구와의 외교관계(=조약에 의거한 관계) 모두 대응해야 했던 상황 속에서 생겨났던 특수한 역사적 현상이라고 생각한다.

⁵ 이 중에서 오늘날 특히 김윤식에 대한 이해의 기초를 이루는 것은 특히 최진식의 연구이다.

이러한 앞선 연구들은 대체로 김윤식에 대해, 청의 간섭이라는 현실적, 혹은 근본적인 한계에도 불구하고(李相一 1996, 62; 崔眞植 1984, 32-33) 나름대로 ‘自強’을 추구했던, 소위 ‘온건개화파’의 대표적인 인물로 평가하였다.

이러한 연구들은 김윤식의 개혁적인 측면을 부각하는 데 주된 목적이 있었다. 그렇기 때문에 김윤식이 각종 개혁적 사업에 집중하기보다 친청적 행보에 치중하게 될 때, 의미부여에 난항을 겪어왔다.

그런 의미에서 박은숙의 연구는 예외적이다. 박은숙은 갑신정변 이후 시기까지의 김윤식의 친청적 행보들을 살폈다. 해당 연구에서는 김윤식이 임오군란 이래로 청에 적극적으로 협력하여 淸에 대한 종속을 초래하고 조선의 자주적 근대화를 가로막았다고 하며 적극적으로 비판하였다 (박은숙 2015, 523). 박은숙의 연구는 기존 연구와 달리 김윤식의 개혁가로서의 측면에 가려졌던 朝鮮의 對淸從屬을 초래한 부역자로서의 모습을 부각하였다는 의미가 있다. 그렇지만 해당 연구에서는 김윤식 관련 선행 연구에서 조명되었던 김윤식의 개혁적인 측면들과의 관계가 명확하게 구명되지 않았다. 한 인물을 두고 사뭇 상반된 평가가 공존하는 것이다.

또한, 박은숙 역시 김윤식의 활동을

親淸을 비판하였을 뿐 親淸적 행위에 대한 합리적 설명은 시도하지 않았다. 김윤식의 행동의 준거가 되는 ‘親淸’의 함의에 대한 적절한 역사적 구명은 충분하게 이루어지지 못했다. 그 중에 한 지점이 바로 청의 양무관료들과 친밀한 관계를 유지했고, 정치적으로 동조한 결과 조선의 대외관계를 淸의 擔任을 전제하는 ‘交涉’을 정착시켰다는 혐의에 대한 것이다.

한편, 영선사행 등 초기 활동과 관련하여 김윤식의 ‘외교론’ 자체는 애초부터 주목받았다. 이른바 양편양득론 (宋炳基 1985), 속방속국론⁶ 등이 대표적이다. 그러나 이러한 김윤식의 ‘외교론’에 대한 연구는 소위 유교적, 사대주의적, 혹은 친청적이라는 김윤식에 대한 기존의 평가와 표리관계를 이루고 있을 뿐, 어떠한 의미를 구체적으로 분석한 것은 아니었다.

그러므로 최근 유바다가 지정한 바와 같이 (유바다 2015) 김윤식의 대외관계에 관한 사고를 유교나 전통만을 중심으로만 해석하는 것은 적절하지 않다. 유바다는 소위 ‘양편양득’으로 규정되는 김윤식의 외교론을 국제법의 시각에서 분석하였다. 이를 통해 특히 ‘自主’와 ‘親淸’이 반드시 모순되는 것은 아니라는 점을 밝혀냈다. 이는 소위 ‘자강론자’이면서도 청에 협조한 일견 모순적 인물상으로 귀결되었던 지점에

⁶ ‘속방속국론’이 영선사행을 전후한 시기부터 이미 갖추어졌던 논리인지는 재고의 여지가 있다. 그 근거가 되는 사료는 「추보음청사」에서 전하는데, 이는 1891년에 ‘공사가 다망하던 때’를

회고하며 쓴 글이다. 그러므로 『음청사』에서 분명하게 제시되는 양편양득론에 비해서 과연 당시에 갖고 있었던 생각인지는 불분명하며, 이에 대해서는 별도의 검토가 필요할 것이다.

관하여, 기존 연구가 놓쳤었던 난점을 상당히 극복한 것이라고 할 수 있다. 다만 해당 연구는 국제법적 정합성을 위주로 검토하였기 때문에 역시 현실에서 김윤식의 관련 활동의 구체적 모습들이 어떠했는가 하는 것에 대해서는 검토의 여지를 남겨두었다.

또한, 청의 종주권은 때때로 국제법에 규정된 것 이상으로 작용하고 있었다는 점에서 역시 연구의 여지는 남아 있다. 현실에서 청인들에 의한 국제법에 대한 자의적, 편의적 이해와 적용은 빈번하게 나타났다. 특히 조선과 관계된(혹은 이홍장 막하의) 주요 인물들은 이러한 경향을 공히 보여주고 있다. 그러므로 유바다가 제시한 국제법에 근거한 비판 이상의 논의도 필요하다고 본다.

물론 청의 양무관료들의 논거는 특히 파사주경, 통사입약의 주체 등 국제관계와 관련된 핵심문제에 관하여, 일차적으로는 『만국공법』, 『성초지장』 등 문헌에 관련하여 근거하지만, 자의적으로 해석하는 부분이 많았다. 그러므로 그 영향을 받은 김윤식이 인식한 국제관계의 양상 역시 청의 영향력을 고려해 보았을 때, 현실적으로 서양의 공법과 중국의 법이 혼합된 무엇인가였을 가능성이 높다. 요컨대 김윤식은 영선사행을 전후하여 양무관료들과 본격적으로 교류하는 한편, 국제법서적과

양무서적의 영향을 두루 받고 조선의 ‘交涉’을 기획하게 된 것이다.

그러므로 당시 김윤식이 인식한 국제관계 시스템을 묘사하는 준거로서 해당 시기에 출판된 한역 국제법서적과 양무서적을 모두 활용하고자 한다. 특히 주목되는 것은, 변화되고 있는 국제관계를 염두에 두고 설명하며 교섭을 제시하고 있는 국제법 서적 『성초지장』⁷ 과 양무서적 『이언』⁸이다.

『성초지장』에서는 통사입약을 곧 交涉으로 표현하고 있으며 아울러, 시세에 따른 대외관계의 가변성 역시 인정하고 있다. 또한, 정관옹이 저술한 『이언』은 洋務論⁹을 종합한 서적이며, 조선에서 언해본을 따로 간행하였던 만큼 그 파급력은 여러모로 상당했던 것으로 판단된다. 그럼에도 불구하고 기존 연구에서 적극적으로 활용되지 않았다.

『이언』의 핵심은 서양의 부강함을 인식하고 그들(=夷狄)과의 공존을 전제한 상태에서 중화의 법과 서양의 좋은 법을 모두 쓰는 것이다. 김윤식 역시 그러한 대전제에 동의하였다. 한편, 교섭을 별도로 하나의 목차로 다루고 있는 서적은 당시에 『이언』이 거의 유일한 것으로 보인다. 『이언』은 국내에 큰 논쟁을 불러일으켰으면서도, 조정에서도 널리 읽히기 위해 언해본으로 만들어 배포할 정도로 중요한 서적이었다. 그러한

⁷ 다음의 판본을 활용한다. 『星軺指掌』(奎中4108).

⁸ 『易言 影印版』, 弘文閣, 1992은 서울대 규장각 소장 『易言』(奎1786)을 영인한 것으로 확인된다. 이하 인용시 해당 영인본의 쪽수

를 표기하도록 하겠다.

⁹ 洋務論에 대한 개괄적인 내용은 민두기, 『中國近代改革運動의 研究』, 一潮閣, 1985 참조.

『이언』에서 각국과의 관계를 ‘교섭’으로 풀어가고 있는바, 통리아문을 통리‘교섭’통상사무아문으로 개칭함에 있어 국제법서적 『성초지장』과 함께, 양무서적인 『이언』이 문헌적 근거로 참고되었을 가능성이 높다. 조선에서 개항 이후 대외관계를 특별히 ‘교섭’으로 특정할 수 있는 이유는 이 때문이다.

이러한 새로운 국제관계는 기존 연구에서 대비해왔던 방식, 즉 규범(사대)대 현실(공법/균세)의 충돌¹⁰ 따위의 문제가 아니라, 중국과 서양이 본격적으로 조우하고 공존하는 전에 없던 상태 그 자체에 ‘현실적’인 대응을 요하는 것이었다. 그렇기 때문에 국제법 서적도 조선이 대면한 새로운 국제관계를 온전히 묘사하는 것은 아니었다. 오히려 『이언』으로 대표되는 양무서적은 청이 주도하는 국제관계를 충실하게 반영하고 있었으며 김윤식은 이를 따랐던 것으로 보인다.

실제로 김윤식은 위의 『성초지장』을 직접 국내에 들여왔을 뿐만 아니라¹¹

‘교섭’이 강조되는 어제 효유문을 대찬하거나, 스스로도 교제/교섭사무라는 표현을 즐겨 썼다. 또한, 갑신정변 이후로는 외아문의 독판으로서 김윤식은 위의 사안들에 대한 대응을 총괄하기도 했다.

그는 서구 국제법의 ‘원리’=국가 간의 교제를 명확히 인식하면서도 한편으로는 『이언』에서 묘사하는 수준의 세계관의 구도를 무리 없이 받아들였

다. 즉 그것은 청 중심의 국제관계를 전제한 채 서구문명의 발전을 어느 정도 인정하고, 중국과 서양 양 문명의 공존을 인정하고 있었다. 이러한 생각이 영선사행 당시 양편양득론으로, 그리고 영선사행 이후로는 조선에서의 ‘交涉’의 공식화에 반영된 것이다.

이는 그가 영선사행 당시부터 청의 양무관료들과 친분을 쌓았던 것과도 관련이 있다. 그 결과 外交를 피하기 위해 ‘교제(=교섭)’라는 표현을 채택하는 데 영향을 미쳤고, 스스로 설정한 ‘교섭’의 영역에 충실하면서 활동했다.

마지막으로 핵심사료에 대해서 설명하겠다. 기존 김윤식 연구의 핵심자료가 되었던 『음청사』 『속음청사』, 『운양집』, 및 상호교열을 위해 『김윤식전집』을 기본자료로 하되, 교섭의 의미를 살펴보기 위해, 국제법서적 『만국공법』, 『성초지장』과 함께 양무서적 『이언』을 검토한다. 이를 통해 개항 이후 조선이 처했던 국제관계 ‘交涉’으로 공식화하는 과정과 그 가운데 김윤식의 영향력이 있었음을 밝히고 이러한 ‘交涉’이야말로 당대 조선의 대외관계의 특징이자, 조선을 제약했던 핵심적인 요소였음을 논하겠다.

2. 金允植의 국제관계에 대한 인식: 外交와 交際

김윤식은 우리나라는 ‘外交를 잘 몰랐다’라는 표현을 여러 군데에서 썼다

¹⁰ 대표적인 연구는 김용구 『세계관 충돌과 한말 외교사: 1866-1882』, 문학과지성사, 2001.

¹¹ 『陰晴史』, 國史編纂委員會, 1958, 169쪽; 김성배, 앞의 책, 2009, 67쪽에서 재인용.

12. 이렇듯 조선이 ‘外交’에 무지했노라 거듭 밝혔던 김윤식은 흥미롭게도 개항 이후 대외관계의 일선에서 오랫동안 활동하였던 인물이기도 하다. 김윤식은 개항 이후 조선의 대외관계를 交涉으로 특정하는 데 영향을 미치고, 또 스스로 한계지은 인물이었다.

이미 알려져있듯 김윤식은 개항 이후 변화해가는 세상에 대해서 많은 공적, 사적 기록을 남겨두었는데 이를 통해서 김윤식이 서양을 驅逐하고자 하는 해방론적 사고에서 점차 중국과 서양 문명이 공존하는 국제관계를 받아들이게 되는 모습을 살펴볼 수 있다. 김윤식이 구상하고 공식화한 조선의 새로운 국제관계양상=교섭(=교제)라는 언명과 구상은 한편으로 이러한 개인의 사고의 변화의 결과가 국가의 공식적인 정책으로 반영된 것이었다.

2차 아편전쟁이 일어났다는 소식이 조선에 전해진 1860년대에 이르면, 서양(‘泰西’)이 淸의 수도까지 함락시킬 정도로 강성해져 세상이 혼란스러워졌

다는 것은 널리 인식되고 있었으나, 이에 대한 조선의 대응은 海防論적 논의가 주를 이루고 있었다¹³. 이는 개항 이후로도 별반 다르지 않았으며, 김윤식도 원래는 해방론적인 사고방식을 갖고 있었다.¹⁴ 이를 구체적으로 살펴보면, “바다 건너 수만 리 밖으로부터 오는 일 자체는 전에 없던 일¹⁵”이지만 “서양 오랑캐에 대한 근심은 어디까지나 여러 일 중에 하나에 불과¹⁶” 했던 것이다. 이렇듯 조선에서도 서양의 존재는 이미 개항 이전에 인식되고 있었으나, 그것이 서구와의 공존을 인정하였거나, 문호를 개방하고자 한 것은 아니었다.

최근의 여러 연구가 지적하고 있는 것처럼 조선이 새로운 국제질서를 받아들이고 개념화해나가는 과정은 점진적이었다. 마찬가지로, 일본과 병자수호조규(1876)를 체결하여 開港했다고 해서 곧바로 새로운 국제질서가 들어선 것은 아니었다¹⁷. 다만, 개항 이후 정부 차원에서 새로운 국제관계를 인식

12 『운양집』 권7, 「漢城開棧私議(1885)」(『(국역)운양집』 4, 2013, 128-136쪽); 『운양집』 권12, 「書璣齋集洋舶咨文後(1911)」(『(국역)운양집』 6, 2013, 139-142쪽) 등. 특히 이 중에서 「書璣齋集洋舶咨文後」는 망국 이후인 1911년에 쓰인 것이므로 “본래 조선에 ‘外交’가 없었다”라는 김윤식의 인식은 매우 일관된 것으로 평가할 수 있다.

13 海防論에 대해서는 다음의 학위논문을 참조. 崔鎭旭, 『19세기 海防論 전개과정 연구: 申櫨의 海防論을 중심으로』, 고려대학교 사학과 박사학위논문, 2008.

14 『운양집』 권 11, 「洋擾詩答某人書」(□(校勘標點)雲養集』 3, 해안, 2015, 218-220쪽; 『(국역)운양집』 5, 2013, 383-387쪽).

15 『운양집』 권11, 「洋擾詩答某人書」(위의 책, 2015, 218쪽). “自古有駕七艘船, 越海數萬里外, 窺人家國, 乃加是者乎?”

16 『운양집』 권11, 「洋擾詩答某人書」(위의 책, 2015, 219쪽). “至若洋夷之憂, 猶屬第幾件事(위의 책, 219쪽), (...)”

17 “그것을 동아시아 전통질서와 유럽 질서의 만남으로 이해할 수도 있지만, 동아시아가 이해한 국제법적 질서와 유럽 질서, 특히 ‘주권’을 기초로

하고 그 위에 자리매김하기 위해 탐구를 추구하기 시작했는데 이는 특히 각종 견문사절 파견을 통해 이루어졌다. 그 중에서도 특히 淸에 파견될 영선사행을 맡게 된 이가 바로 김윤식이었다. 그는 영선사행 당시에 다음과 같은 상소를 올렸다.

사료 A

지금 세상의 형편이 크게 변하여 다른 지역의 다른 무리(異域殊類)들이 각기 군사를 강화하고 배를 몰아 합종연횡(合從連橫)하면서 병력을 서로 겨루며, 법률로 서로 버티는 일이 세상에 가득 차서 육로와 해로로 점차 통하게 되니, 이것은 기미가 나타났을 뿐 아니라 형적이 이미 현저히 드러난 것입니다.¹⁸

스스로 밝히길 세상이 크게 변하였기 때문에 이제 더 이상 서양과의 관계는 군사적인 방비만을 하면 되는 여러 일 중에 하나가 아니라, 영선사가 맡은 중요한 업무가 되었다. 또한 여기에서 앞으로 김윤식의 교섭활동에서 핵심이 되는 서양의 法律에 대한 인식도 드러난다. 영선사행의 목적 중 하나가 미국과의 조약체결이었던 바 (宋炳基 1978), 이미 김윤식은 서양의 여러나라들과 새로운 국제관계를 맺어야 함을 인정하고 있었으며, 영선사로서 그 양상을

목도하게 된다.

부강한 서양의 존재를 인식하되 그것을 막아야 한다는 것과, 서양과의 공존을 인정하고 교류하는 것은 전혀 다른 이야기이다. 김윤식은 이미 영선사행을 전후하여 새로운 국제관계에 대해서 개념화하고 있었는데, 이는 점점 더 구체화 되어간다.

한편, 김윤식은 구체적으로 개항기 조선의 대외관계를 교섭 내지는 교제로 표현하였는데, 이는 단순한 은유가 아니라, 개항기 조선의 대외관계를 특정하는 말이었다. 이는 김윤식이 통리고섭통상사무아문 독판으로 재임 중이던 1885년의 다음의 기록에서 명확하게 나타난다.

사료 B

속약이 이루어지고 나는 外署에 배치되었는데 交際의 마땅함을 강론할 때에는 쉬지 않고 이야기를 나누었다¹⁹

흔히 국가 간의 관계를 사람 사이의 ‘교제’로 표현하는 것은 본연이 유학자였던 김윤식이 은유하여 표현한 것으로 보거나, 유교적으로 윤색된 세계관을 갖고 평가하는 경향이 있다. 그러나 김윤식이 국가간의 관계를 ‘교제’로 표현하는 것은 오히려 만국공법(=국제법)에 대한 정확한 인식을 갖고 있었기

한 만남은 다양한 형태를 지니고 있었다고 보는 편이 자연스러운 것이다(안종철, 「19세기 ‘국제법’의 성격과 조일수호조규(1876)」, 『역사비평』 114, 130쪽).

¹⁸ 『고종실록』 권18, 18년 11월 4일 壬辰, “方今宇內氣運大變, 異域殊類, 各治兵駛船,

合從連橫, 以兵力相雄, 以法律相持, 彌滿天下, 水陸漸通, 此非特幾微之見, 而形跡已大著矣.”

¹⁹ 『운양집』 권9, 「送琢園歸日本序」(『(국역)운양집』 4, 2013, 559쪽).

때문에 나타날 수 있는 개인기록이다.

당시 조선인들이 인식한 국제법의 기본이 되었던 『만국공법』 한문본에서는 홉스의 견해를 인용하면서 만국공법의 연원을 밝히고 있는데, “성법은 두 가지로, 하나는 보통 사람들의 왕래를 내용으로 하고, 다른 하나는 국가들의 교제, 즉 만국 공법을 내용으로 한다.”라고 적혀있다²⁰. 마찬가지로, 1장 제10절에는 헤프터의 견해를 인용해놓았는데, “로마법이 곧 만국공법이며 국가들간의 교제에서 사용될 뿐만 아니라, 사람들이 왕래할 때에도 또한 이 법을 따르며, 권리가 있으면 행할 수 있고, 직분이 있으면 지켜야 하고, 각국의 법률에 나올 뿐만 아니라 어디서나 다름 없이 통용된다,”라고 적었다²¹. 이렇듯 『만국공법』에서는 여러 학자의 견해를 인용하는 방식으로 국가 안 사람들 사이의 교제와 국가 간의 교제가 같다고 서술했다. 김윤식은 이를 보고 ‘교제’를 국가간의 관계로 인식하고 표현했던 것이다. 이는 매우 적절한 이해를 보여주고 있는 부분이다. 그러므로 ‘交際’를 유교적 인식의 일단으로 파악하는 것은 인물의 일반적 지적 배경과

문제의 핵심을 혼동하는 것이므로 적절하지 않다.

그런 한편, 실각 이후, 유배 중이던 1892년에 예전 영선사행을 회고하며 썼던 「천진봉사연기」에는 새로운 국제관계에 대한 인식이 좀 더 종합적으로 드러나 있다. 이를 제시하면 다음과 같다.

사료 C

우리나라는 평소 다른 교제(他交) 없이 오직 북쪽으로 청을 섬기고 동으로 일본과 통할 뿐이었다. 수십 년 이래 세계의 사정과 형세가 날로 변했다. 유럽이 웅장해지자, 동양의 여러나라가 공법을 좇게 되었으니²² (...) 우리나라가 청에 복종해 섬기는 것은 수 백년 서로 지켜온 전례가 있는 것이다. ㉔해군이 열리게 되어 우리나라도 또한 자주국으로 만국 중에 서게 되었다. 그러므로 (청이, 조선의) ㉕내치와 외교(外交)에 간섭하기 불편하다. 그런데 우리나라는 ㉖교제에 어두우니 만약 청의 도움이 없다면 반드시 하는 일마다 실수하고 그르칠 것이다²³.

²⁰ 『만국공법』 1권 1장 5절(헨리 휘튼 저, 윌리엄 마틴 한역(漢譯), 김현주 역, 『만국공법』, 인간사랑, 2021, 26 쪽).

²¹ 『만국공법』 1권 1장 10절(위의 책, 2021, 37 쪽).

²² 『운양집』 권 14, 「天津奉使緣起(1892)」(□(校勘標點)雲養集』 4, 혜안, 2015, 53 쪽; 『(국역)운양집』 6, 2013, 437 쪽). “我國素無他交, 惟北事清國, 東通日本而已。自數十

年來, 宇內情形日變, 歐洲雄長, 東洋諸國, 皆運其公法 (...)”

²³ 『운양집』 권 14, 「天津奉使緣起(1892)」(위의 책, 2015, 54 쪽; 위의 책, 2013, 440 쪽). “我國服事清國, 自有數百年相守之典禮。然海禁既開, 我國亦以自主立於萬國之中, 則內治外交, 清國不便干涉, 而我國素昧交際, 若無清國動助, 則必隨事失誤 (...)”

이렇듯 영선사행 당시부터 실각 이후의 기록까지 검토하면 김윤식이 인식한 새로운 국제관계의 핵심은 국제관계가 더 이상 북쪽의 淸, 동쪽의 日本에 한정되지 않는다는 점, 요컨대 육로와 해로가 열리게 되었다는 점, 그리고 기존에는 존재하지 않았던 서양이 등장하고 공존한다는 데에 있었다. 이러한 새로운 국제관계(서양과의 관계)가 시작된 것은 전통적 사대관계를 청산하는 것과는 관련이 없었다²⁴. 김윤식의 판단으로는 오히려 그 반대로, 조선도 서양의 여러 나라가 출현하고, ‘공법(국제법)’을 준수하게 되었지만, 여전히 조선은 청과의 사대관계는 유지하면서 계속 淸의 도움을 받아야 했다.

淸과의 관계설정에서 달라진 점은 사대관계 그 자체가 아니라, 다만 해금이 해제되었다는 사실에 있고(㉔), 이는 대표적으로 <조청상민수륙무역장정>²⁵을 되도록 준수하는 것으로 나타난다. 이렇듯 김윤식은 청과의 관계에 있어서도 변화의 양상을 짚어내고 있는 것이다. 그러므로 김윤식은 오랜 사대관계에 입각한 당위적인 세계관에 빠져 있던 것은 아니었다. 그의 ‘交涉’구상도 이러한 생각의 틀을 전제로 전개되었다.

다만, 위의 사료에서 보이듯 조선이 처한 국제관계의 새로운 지점들을 읽어

내면서도 청의 도움을 바라는 태도는 <수륙장정>에도 명확하게 규정되어 있지 않고, 사대관계 상의 의례도 아닌 것들에도 그저 순응하는 태도로 흐를 위험성이 내재하고 있었다.

한편, 김윤식은 개념적으로 內治와 대비하여서는 外交라는 표현을 쓰고 있다(㉕). 이것을 보면 마치 外交를 內治에 대비되는 국제관계 전반을 의미하는 듯 보이기도 한다. 그러나 여기서도 外交란 어디까지나 조선이 자주국이므로 “淸이 간섭하기 불편한” 국제관계 즉 일본 및 서양과의 관계를 지칭하고 있다. 즉 김윤식의 인식 속에서 外交란 事大와는 구별되는 것으로 ‘上國’ 淸과의 관계는 포함할 수 없는 것이었다. 실제로 김윤식도 현실에서의 국제관계 전반을 명확하게 지칭할 때는 ‘外交’가 아니라 ‘交際’로 칭하고 있다(㉖). 여기서 ‘交際’란 위에서 인용한, 『만국공법』에서 정의한 국가 간의 관계를 의미하는 것이다. 실각 이후로도 김윤식은 外交와 事大를 명확하게 구별하고 있었던 것이다. 그러므로 김윤식에게 이러한 문제의식은 매우 일관된 것이었다고 할 수 있다. 이는 영선사행 당시 고종에게 보고했던 내용에서도 알 수 있는 것이다.

사료 D

우리나라가 중국의 屬邦이라는 것은 천

²⁴ 유바다, 『19세기 후반 조선의 국제법적 지위에 관한 연구』, 고려대학교 한국사학과 박사학위논문, 2017, 377쪽 등을 참조.

²⁵ 이하 <수륙장정>으로 약칭.

하가 모두 아는 바입니다. 항상 중국이 (우리나라를) 착실하게 담당할 뜻이 없을까 염려스럽습니다. 우리나라가 孤弱한 형세가 되어 大邦의 보호가 없으면 실로 자립(特立)하지 못할 것 같아 걱정스럽습니다. 지금 이홍장(李中堂)은 중국의 병권을 맡은 대신입니다. 다행히 우리나라를 담당하는 중임을 의연히 自任하여 이미 각국에 聲明하고 조약에 大書하였습니다. 훗날 우리나라에 일이 있을 때 힘을 다해 구해주지 못한다면 천하 사람들이 (청을) 반드시 비웃을 것입니다. 천하 사람들이 중국이 우리나라를 擔任하는 것을 보면 각국이 우리를 경시하는 마음도 또한 따라서 줄어들게 될 것입니다. 또 그 아래에 均得自主한다는 내용을 이으면 각국과 相交하는 데 해가 없고 平等之權도 행사할 수 있습니다. ‘권리를 잃을 염려도 없고 사대하는 뜻에도 어긋나지 않으니 가히 兩得이라고 할 수 있습

니다.²⁶

이른바 김윤식의 兩便兩得論을 보여주는 대표적 사료이다. 여기에서도 자주하며 相交하는 것은 평등한 권리를 행사하는 다른 나라들과의 관계에 해당하며, 청에 대한 事大와는 구별되고 있다²⁷. 조선이 처한 상황은 중국과 서양이 본격적으로 조우하고 공존하는 현상이다. 미국과의 조약체결도 역시 청의 권유를 통해 이루어졌던 만큼, 분명히 서양과 중국 두 문명은 이제 공존하고 있었다. 이에 대해 김윤식은 자신의 논리상 淸에 사대하고 다른 나라들과는 “서로 外交(=相交)하는 것”이 兩得하다고 판단하고 있다. 이를 『만국공법』에 입각하여 김윤식의 自主를 해석한 연구가 있지만 (유바다 2015, 52), 실제적 해명이 필요한 지점은 남아 있다고 생각된다.

우선, 과연 김윤식의 인식 속에서 사대

²⁶ 『陰晴史』, 1958, 57-58쪽. “我國之爲中國屬邦, 天下之所共知也. 常患中國無着實擔當之意. 以若我國孤弱之勢, 若無大邦之作保, 則實難特立. 今李中堂, 卽中國掌兵大臣也. 幸而擔去我國之重, 毅然自任, 既已聲明於各國, 大書於約條, 異日我國有事, 若不竭力救之, 必貽天下人之笑. 天下人, 見中國之擔任我國, 則各國輕我之心, 亦從而小阻. 且於其下, 以均得自主繼之, 是則與各國相交無害, 用平等之權矣. 不觸失權之忌, 不背事大之義, 可謂兩得(...).”

²⁷ 통념과 달리 베스트팔렌조약 이후 정립된 서구의 국제법질서 역시 경우에 따라 수직적 체제 반영하고 있었다. 이에 대해서는 유바다, 앞의 박사학위논문, 2017, 2-4쪽, 377쪽 등을 참조. 다만 김윤식이 ‘인식한’ 外交란 명시적이고 일반적인(요컨대 위차가 있는 청과 조선의 관계에는 적용될 수 없는) “평등한 관계”였던 것으로 보인다. 이에 대해서는 사료C, D 참조.

질서와 국제법질서가 과연 ‘충돌’하고 있었는가 하는 지점도 다시 검토해보아야 한다. 영선사행을 전후하여 드러나는 金允植의 문제의식은, 조선에서 국제관계의 확대가 전에 없었던 상황이고, 그것이 새롭다는 것일 뿐, 사대질서와 국제법질서 양자가 반드시 ‘충돌’한다는 논의는 나타나지 않는다²⁸. 요컨대 서양과 중국이 공존하는 새로운 국제관계가 출현하였지만, 그것이 반드시 기존질서에 위배되거나 충돌하는 것으로 받아들여졌던 것은 아니다. 이를테면 김윤식의 양편양득론 역시 두 가지를 관계를 모두 적절히 받아들이고 활용하겠다는 것에 가까웠다.


이를 그림으로 나타내면 다음과 같다.

양편양득론은 외교와 사대에 모두 대응해야 했던 조선의 입장에서 주요한 대외인식론/정책론일 수 있었다. 이는 실제로 영선사행을 통해 변화, 확대되어가는

국제관계의 양상을 관찰하고 예리한 시각으로 조선이 대응해야 할 방침을 합리적으로 제시한 것으로 볼 수 있다.

그러나, 이를 현실화하고자 할 때 해결해야 할 문제가 있었다. 새로운 대외관계의 핵심이 되는 ‘外交’라는 언명이 김윤식에게 중요한 청에 대한 사대를 포괄할 수 없으며, 여러 이유로 外交가 공식화되기도 어려웠다는 점이다.

일반적으로 국제법에 의거해서 이뤄지는 관계는 外交이지만 (金容九, 2011) 요컨대, 조선이 ‘上國’인 淸과의 관계도 모두 外交로 파악하거나, 청에 대하여 공개적으로 다른 나라와 外交를 한다고 언명하기에는 상당한 한계가 있었다. 이는 다음과 같은 판단에 근거한다. 첫째, 개항 이후 청이 조선에 外交를 권유한 것은



²⁸ 예를 들어 영선사행 당시의 또 다른 『음청사』 기록을 참조할 수 있다. 『陰晴史』 고종18년(1881년) 11월 28일의 기록이 참조가 된다(『陰晴史』, 1958, 27쪽). “답하여 말하길,

“(聯美의 일은 -인용자) 우리나라 습속에는 처음 있는 일이라 의논이 일치되지 못하였으나 임금께서는 누차 생각하고 계셨습니다.”

사실이지만²⁹, 그것은 淸과의 사대관계를 포함하지 않았다. 둘째, 조선 내에서 人臣無外交 관념과 관련하여, 外交에 관한 부정적인 관념이 잔존하였다 (閔會修 2018, 207).

즉 ‘外交’는 淸과의 관계를 포괄할 수 없었고, 설령 外交라는 표현을 서구와의 관계에서 한정적으로 쓰인다고 하더라도 淸을 의식할 때, ‘공식적으로’ 쓰이는 어려웠다. 요컨대 김윤식이 영선사행 당시 포착한 앞으로의 조선의 국제관계상의 난점은 자주국으로서 淸과의 事大, 일본, 서양과의 外交를 모두 포괄하면서도, 淸을 의식해서 공식적으로는 外交라는 표현을 피해야 한다는 것이었다.

위의 相交라는 표현이나, 양편양득론을 통해서도 알 수 있지만, 김윤식은 이러한 국제관계상의 난점에 대해서 당대 그 누구보다 민감하게 접근하였던 것으로 보인다. 주지하였듯이, 김윤식은 서구 국제법에 입각한 외교를 명확하게 인식하고 있었다(사료 D). 그런데 흥미롭게도 김윤식은 특히 청인을 상대로 발화할 때

는 ‘外交’라는 언명을 실로 다양한 표현을 통해 회피하고 있어서 주목된다.

예를 들어, 김윤식은 영선사행 당시인 1881년 겨울 서양과의 관계에 대해서 ‘遠交’라고 표현하였고³⁰, 임오군란 이후인 1882년 11월 주북에게 보낸 서한에서 “조선관리들은 교섭통상의 일(交涉通商之事)에 서투르다”라고 언급하며 ““邦交”가 점점 넓어지고 시사(時事)가 어려워지는 것을 보면서 근심할 일이 한 두가지가 아니다.”라고 적고 있다³¹.

이러한 표현들은 金允植이 분명 새로운 국제관계로서의 外交(diplomacy)를 인식했음을 뜻한다. 그렇지만 청인과의 대화에서 ‘外交’라는 언명은 교묘한 방식으로, 그러나 철저하게 회피되고 있었던 것이다.

그렇다면, 임오군란 이후 조선이 새로운 대외관계를 外交가 아닌 ‘交涉’이라는 사뭇 다른 명칭으로 공식화하였던 결과를 두고 金允植의 영향력을 생각할 수 있을 것이다. 다시 말해 위에서 보듯 청인과의 관계에서 다양한 방식으로 外

²⁹ 황준헌/김홍집 저, 윤현숙 역, 『조선책략·대흙청사필담』, 보고사, 2019, 40, 59쪽(原文).

³⁰ 『운양집』 권 11

「上北洋大臣李鴻章書」(口(校勘標點)雲養集』 3,

혜안, 2015, 227쪽). “羅有一二臣同，姑無鎮物之望。是以寤寐英賢，託情遠交 (...).”

³¹ 『김윤식전집』 2, 아세아문화사, 1980, 306-307쪽.

交라는 표현을 피했으며, 한편으로는 양편양득론을 제시하여 서양과의 관계와 청과의 관계를 모두 포괄하고자 했던 金允植의 의중이 반영된 결과라고 생각하는 것이 자연스럽다고 생각한다.

그런데, 위의 사료(사료B, C)가 보여주듯 金允植이 개인적으로 선호하는 표현은 ‘交際’였다 그럼에도 불구하고 통리고 섭통상사무아문이라는 명칭이 말해주듯 조선에서 새로운 국제관계의 총합은 결국 交涉으로 공식화되었다. 이에 대해서는 또 다른 분석이 필요한 것으로 생각된다.

3 ‘交涉’에 대한 문헌적 근거 검토

그렇다면 왜 ‘交涉’인가? 사실 ‘外交’라는 언명을 공식적으로 회피하면서 조선이 처한 새롭고 특수한 국제관계를 특정하고자 한다고 해도, 그것이 반드시 ‘交涉’이어야 할 당위성은 없었다. 게다가 金允植이 개인적으로 선호한 표현은 交際였다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 조선의 대외관계에 대한 명칭이 ‘交涉’으로 공식화 된 것에는 특정한 문헌적 근거가 있다고 보여진다. ‘交涉’은 그가 참고할

수 있었던 국제법 서적 『성초지장』과 양무서적 『이언』에 모두 근거가 있다는 점이 중요하다. 첫째, 金允植이 영선사행을 통해 들어온 『성초지장』의 서문에서는 다음과 같이 적고 있다.

通使의 例는 비록 번잡하나 그 이치(理)는 지극히 간단하여, 남의 사정을 들어주고 마땅함을 헤아리는 것에 다름없으며 그 주된 것은 交涉事務를 처리하는데 있다. (이를테면 이것은) 外交의 道이고, 사실에 의거하여 살펴보면 일을 논의하는 法이다. 그러나 각국이 왕래하는 업무는 때때로 변화하고 서로 변하는 것이 있어, 모두 나라의 盛衰와 일의 虛實, 세력이 나뉘고 합하는 것에 따를 뿐이다³².

이렇듯 『성초지장』은 교섭이 通使를 보내는 일 즉 外交(diplomacy)에 대응하는 사무를 통칭한다는 점을 밝히고 있다. 상주사절을 파견한다거나, 조약의 형식으로 국가 간의 약조를 체결한다는 것이 ‘外交’의 요체라고 할 수 있는데, 이에 수반되는 여러 공식적, 비공식적 행위를 생각할 때 이것은 분명 새로운 형식의 국제관계였다. 이때 외교에 대한 실무를 다루고 있는 『성초지장』은 金允

³² 『성초지장』序. “通使之例雖繁, 其理至簡, 要之不外准情度宜, 而主在辦理交涉事務. 推而言之, 爲外交之道. 實而按之, 爲議事之法.

然各國往來事宜, 時有變遷互易, 皆隨國之盛衰, 事之虛實, 勢之分合耳.”

식이 참고할 수 있는 거의 유일한 지침서였다³³. 또한, 성초지장은 교섭사무는 실제행동으로, 외교는 道의 영역으로 파악한다. 이는 실제 국제관계에서 外交라는 언명을 회피하면서, 交涉으로 포괄하여 적절하게 지칭할 수 있는 국제법상의 유력한 근거였다고 볼 수 있다.

또한, 거듭 강조했듯 김윤식이 풀어가 고자 했던, 서양과 중국의 조우라는 새로운 국제관계는 국제법서적 외의 요소도 고려해야 한다. 그 전모를 파악하는데 있어서는 1881년 국내에 들여온³⁴ 대표적인 양무서적 『이언』이 주효했으리라 생각된다. 그 내용에 대한 찬성과 반대³⁵를 떠나 『이언』은 조선에서 널리 읽혔던 것으로 보이고, 실제로 김윤식

역시 특히 외아문의 일과 관련되어 『이언』의 핵심인 ‘서양과 중국의 좋은 법을 모두 쓰는 일’을 언급한 적이 있다³⁶. 무엇보다 교섭을 별도로 하나의 목차로 다루고 있는 서적은 당시에 『이언』이 거의 유일하기도 하며, 조선에서 공식적으로 언해본이 발행되기까지 하였다.

요컨대 국내에 큰 논쟁을 불러일으키고, 조정에서도 언해본으로 만들어 배포할 정도의 서적에서 각국과의 관계를 공통적으로 ‘교섭’으로 풀어가고 있는바, 교섭이 조선이 임해야 할 새로운 국제관계로 널리 받아들여지고, 후일 통리아문을 통리‘교섭’통상사무아문으로 개칭함에 있어 『이언』이 참고되었을 가능성이 매우 높다. 『이언』에서는 서양과의

³³ 만국공법』 등 한역(漢譯)된 여타 국제법 서적들이 이론서에 가까웠다면, 『성초지장』은 외교에 관한 실무 지침서였다. 이러한 『성초지장』의 특징에 관해서는 다음의 논저에 잘 정리되어 있다. 정동연, 『淸의 駐韓公館과 韓淸 近代外交 研究』, 서울대학교 사회교육과 역사전공 박사학위논문, 2020.

³⁴ 이광린은 황현의 『매천야록』을 참고하여 1880년에 수신사 김홍집이 들여왔을 것으로 보았다(李光麟, 『韓國開化史研究』, 一潮閣, 1969, 32쪽). 그러나 애초에 『매천야록』은 풍문을 기록한 책인 데다 황현은 『이언』의 저자를 황준헌으로 잘못 전하고 있기도 하므로 그대로 신뢰하기는 어렵다. 그보다는 『일사집략』에 기록된 것을 취신하는 것이 보다 적절할

것이다. 『일사집략』에 따르면 황준헌이 이현영에게 1881년 7월 10일 편지에 동봉하여 전해주었다(□(국역)해행총재. 11: 속편), 민족문화추진회, 1977, 272쪽). 실제로 조선에서 『이언』이 두루 인용되는 것은 1882년인데, 1881년 8월 이현영이 돌아온 후 수개월 안에 전파되었던 것으로 보는 것이 보다 자연스럽다고 생각된다.

³⁵ 洋務論에 반대하는 입장에서도 『이언』을 읽고 비판했을 정도였다. 그 예시로는 이진상이 대표적이다. 權五榮, 「東道西器論의 構造와 展開」, 『한국사시민강좌』 7, 1990, 83쪽 참조.

³⁶ 『김윤식전집』 2, 1980, 304쪽. 본 발표문 4장에서 자세히 언급하도록 하겠다(사료 F).

조우를 인정하면서, 중국과 이적을 구태여 구별할 필요가 없고, 서양에 사신을 보낼 것과 서양의 공법과 중국의 법을 모두 쓰는 것을 제안하고 있다. 한편, 논교섭에서는 더욱 그 내용이 구체적으로 드러난다. 핵심내용은 다음과 같다.

대저 지구의 둥근 형태임에, 동서가 없으니 어찌 가운데와 가장자리가 있으며 천지 간에 한가지로 있으니 어찌 구태여 이적과 중화를 분간할 것인가. 만일 중국이 만국 중에 하나로 자처하면 저들의 공법 중에 홀로 중국을 빼서 쓸 길이 없고 우리 중국의 법이 또한 만국에 행할만 하니 (...)

중국이 마땅히 사신을 보내어 각국 사신과 회동한 후에 중국의 법을 만국공법과 합하여 부문을 나누어 분류하고 같은 것은 틀림없이(固) 피차 통행할 것이니 다른 것은 각각 옳은 일에만 행하여 각박히 서로 얹매이지 말며(...) ³⁷

만일 서양의 법률에 통달하고 청(淸)의

의 법식(例)에 익숙한 이가 있다면 그 사람의 인품과 학문이 본디 중국과 서양을 패복(佩服)한 자이면 대사(大史)가 조정에 주달하여 높은 벼슬을 주고 그 봉록을 후하게 하여 총리대신과 남양북양통상대신에게 파주(派往)하여 차견에 처한다(處差遣). 그 율법은 중국과 서양의 것을 참고하여 쓰고 서양의 관원과 더불어 상의(‘商’)하기를 온당하고 선함에 이르기 위해 힘쓰며, 만일(‘如’) 오히려 맞지 않으면, 서양의 법을 전용하여 다스린다³⁸.

「논공법」에서는 중국의 법과 서양의 공법이 상호 통행할 수 있음을 원론적인 수준에서 논하고 있다면, 「논교섭」에서는 구체적으로 두 양법(良法)을 쓰는 방법을 제시하고 있다.

이상의 ‘交渉’의 문헌적 근거를 정리해보면 다음과 같다, 『성초지장』에서는 통사의 예가 곧 교섭사무임을 명백하게 밝히고 있다면, 『이언』은 중국과 서양이

³⁷ 『이언』, 「논공법」, 552-554쪽.

“夫地球圓體既無東西一中邊同居覆載之中奚必強分夷夏如中國能自視烏萬國之一則彼公法中必不能獨缺中國而我中國之法亦可行於萬國(...)同者固彼此通行, 不必過為之虞, 異者亦各行其是, 無庸刻以相繩(...).”

³⁸ 『이언』, 「논교섭」, 663-664쪽. “倘有通西律, 嫻清例, 其人品學問, 素為中西所佩服者大吏得保奏於朝, 給以崇銜其俸祿派往總理衙門及南北洋大臣處差遣其律法參用中西, 與洋官互商, 務臻妥善, 如猶以為不合, 即專用洋法以治之.”

조우하고 서양과 중국의 두 법을 모두 쓰며 교류하는 상태를 ‘交渉’으로 보았다. 그 핵심은 중국과 서양의 좋은 법을 모두 시행하는 것이다. 이는 청과의 관계가 <수륙장정>으로 인해 근대적으로 변용되는 한편, 서구의 여러나라와도 국제관계를 맺게 된 당시 조선의 상황에 맞는 내용이었다고 할 수 있다. 즉 交際와 달리 ‘交渉’은 서양의 국제법적 근거와 함께, 양무서적에도 근거를 갖추고 있었던 것이다.

김윤식의 입장에서 보면, 이러한 ‘交渉’이야말로 淸에 그대로 사대하면서도 일본 및 서양과는 자주국으로서 外交할 수 있는 근거가 되는 것이었다. 즉 영선사행 당시 그가 제시한대로 ‘交渉’을 매개로 조선은 비로소 ‘兩得’을 취할 수 있게 된다. 조선에서 개항 이후 대외관계를 특별히 ‘交渉’으로 특정할 수 있는 이유는 이 때문이다. 즉 김윤식이 개인적으로 선호한 交際와 달리, 交渉은 서구의 국제법으로 해석해도, 또는 중국의 양무론적 관점에서 보아도 명확한 근거가 있었다.

요컨대 영선사행을 전후하여 김윤식이 인식하고 있었던, 兩便兩得論으로 제시되었던, 사대관계와 외교관계를 조선의 입장에서 적절히 포괄하는 난제는 『성

초지장』과 『이언』에서 모두 근거하고 있는 ‘交渉’을 통해 비로소 해소될 수 있었던 것이다.

주지하였듯이 金允植은 영선사행 이후 이홍장과 청의 양무관료들과 긴밀한 정치적 관계를 맺었다. 그리고 조미조약체결에서 보듯 새로운 국제관계를 정립해 가는 데 앞장서 있었으며, 스스로 그러한 관계에 대해 누구보다도 예민하게 인식했던 인물이다.

김윤식은 당시에 국제적으로 국가 간의 관계는 일반적으로 외교(diplomacy)로 통용됨에도 불구하고, 조선이 처한 국제관계에는 특수성이 있고, 일정한(혹은 명백한) 한계가 설정되고 있었던 것으로 보고 적절히 대응하고자 했던 것이다. 그러한 필요성은 이미 영선사행 당시에 개진한 양편양득론에 드러나 있으며(사료 D), 임오군란으로 귀국한 뒤에는 이를 현실화할 수 있는 기회를 얻었다. 그 결과 김윤식은 조선에서 새로운 국제관계를 ‘交渉’으로 공식화하는 데에 결정적인 역할을 하게 된다.

4. 朝鮮의 새로운 국제관계 ‘交渉’의 공식화 과정과 金允植의 역할

1881년 가을 청을 향해 떠났던 영선사 김윤식은 수도 한성에서 군란이 발생했

다는 소식을 전해 듣고 淸에 원병을 요청하여 임오군란을 진압하는데 중요한 역할을 했다. 이로 인해 조선에 대한 淸의 간섭은 심화되지만 (具仙姬 1999), 金允植 개인은 친청파로서 두각을 드러내게 된다. 김윤식은 청인들과 공조하면서 국왕이 임오군란의 책임을 스스로 자인하게 하는 윤음³⁹을 대찬(代撰)하여 고종을 정치적으로 견제하였다.

그러한 가운데 ‘交渉’의 당위성이 공식적으로 제기되었다는 점은 의미심장하다. 본 효유문은 시대의 변화상을 장황하게 설명하는 가운데 중국은 물론 서양과의 대외관계를 交渉으로 포착하고자 하는 당위성과 필요성을 논하고 있다. 이 역시도 김윤식이 대찬한 것이다. 이는 흔히 ‘개화윤음’으로 알려진 다소 긴 사료인데, 조선에서 공식화되는 ‘交渉’에 관하여 중요한 내용이므로 대부분의 내용을 인용하여 제시하면 다음과 같다⁴⁰.

사료 E 나라 안 대소 백성에게 효유함 (1882, 壬午年)⁴¹

³⁹ 『운양집』 권9.

「懲討後大赦布告」(『(국역)운양집』 4, 2013, 405-406쪽).

⁴⁰ ㉔는 시대가 변하였음을 논하는 부분이고, ㉕는 교섭의 당위성을 주장하는 부분이다. 논리가 반복되어 나타나므로 각각 순번을 매기기보다는

우리 동방은 바다 한구석에 치우쳐 있어서 일찍이 외국과 ㉔교섭해본 적이 없다. 때문에 좁은 건문으로 조심스럽게 스스로를 단속하여 지키면서 500년을 내려왔다. ㉔근년 이래로 천하의 대세는 전과 판이하게 달라졌다. 영국, 독일, 프랑스, 미국, 러시아 같은 구미의 여러 나라들은 정교하고 편리한 기계를 만들어내어 나라를 부강하게 만드는 사업에 최선을 다하고 있으며, (a) 배나 수레를 타고 지구를 두루 돌아다니며 만국과 조약을 체결하고 있다. 병력으로 서로 견제하고 공법으로 서로 대치하는 것이 춘추열국시대를 방불케 한다. 그러므로 대대로 온 나라가 주인으로 섬기던 중화조차도 오히려 평등한 입장에서 조약을 맺고, 척양에 엄격하던 일본도 결국 수호를 맺고 통상을 하고 있으니 어찌 까닭 없이 그렇게 하는 것이겠는가. 참으로 형편상 부득이하기 때문이다.

우리나라도 병자년(1876) 봄에 거듭 일본과 강화조약을 맺고 세 곳의 항구를 열 것을允허하였으며, 이번에는 다시 미국, 영국, 독일 등 여러 나라와 새롭게 화약을 맺었다. ㉔이것은 처음 있는 일이라 너희 사민들이 의심하고 비방하는 것도 이상할 것이 없다. ㉕그러나

같은 알파벳을 반복표기하여 논지별로 구분하였다.

⁴¹ 『고종실록』 권 19, 19년 8월 5일 戊午;

『운양집』 권 9,

「曉諭國內大小民人」(『(국역)운양집』 4, 2013, 407-410쪽).

의리로써 헤아려 볼 때, 이는 나라에 욕이 되는 거사가 아니며, 일의 형세로써 참작해보아도 백성을 병들게 할 단서가 없다. ㉠교제의 예는 모두 우호와 화목에 있으며, 군사를 주둔시키는 의도는 본래 상업 활동을 보호하는 데 있다. 내가 능히 충신과 독경의 도를 행할 수만 있다면 외환 따위는 일어나지 않을 것이다.

상대가 화의를 가지고 왔는데 우리 쪽에서 싸움으로 대한다면, 천하가 장차 우리를 어떤 나라라고 여기겠는가. 도움 받을 곳 없이 고립된 채 만국과 틈이 생겨 공격의 화살이 집중된다면 결국 패망하고 말 것임을 스스로도 잘 알고 있으면서 조금도 후회하지 않으니, 대체 의리에 있어 무슨 근거가 있다는 것인가. (...)

이번에 다행스럽게도 일처리가 대강 이루어져서 옛날의 우호관계를 다시금 펼치게 되었고, 영국과 미국 등 여러 나라가 뒤이어 찾아와 항구를 열고 도성에 주둔하게 되었다. 모든 것은 일본 사람에게 했던 전례대로 하였다. 항구를 열고 도성에 주둔케 하는 것은 ㉢**만국의 통제로 우리나라에서 처음 행해지는 것이 아니니, 결코 경악할 일이 아니다. 너희들은 각기 두려움 없이 편안히 지내도록 하라.** 선비들은 부지런히 공부하고 백성들은 편안히 농사를 지으면서, 다시는 ‘양’이니 ‘왜’니 하는 말로 근거 없는 소문을 퍼뜨려 인심을 소란하게 하지 말라. 각 항구와 가까운 곳에서는 비록 외국인이 한가로이 다니는 경우가 있을 터이나, 일상적인 일로 보아 넘기고 먼저 시비 거는 일이

없도록 하라. 만일 저들이 능멸하거나 학대하는 일이 있다면 응당 조약에 따라 처벌할 터, 결단코 우리 백성들을 억울하게 하면서 외국인을 보호하는 일은 없을 것이다.

(...) 그리고 이미 서양과 수호를 맺은 이상 도성과 지방에 세워놓은 척양에 관한 비문들은 지나치기도 하려니와

㉡시대도 변하였으니 모두 뽑아버리도록 하라. 너희 사민들은 각기 이 뜻을 잘 알라.

가장 먼저 효유문에서는 교제와 교섭은 동일한 의미로 쓰이고 있다는 점이 주목된다(㉠). 요컨대 『만국공법』의 교제와 『성초지장』 및 『이언』의 교섭이 하나의 글에서 공식적으로 동일선상에 놓이게 되었다는 점을 알 수 있다.

다음으로, 앞서 밝히었듯 본 발표문에서는 크게 시대의 변화상을 서술하는 부분(㉢)과 交渉의 당위성을 주장하는 부분으로 나누어보았다(㉢). 이렇듯 김윤식이 대찬한 윤음에는 고종의 목소리를 통해 새로운 국제관계, ‘**교섭(=교제의 예)**’에 대한 당위성이 잘 드러나고 있다.

한편, 더 이상 海防이나 斥邪로는 이러한 변화에 대응할 수 없다는 것도 공식적으로 천명되었다. 이미 세상이 이전과는 달라졌다는 것이다(㉢). 새로운 국제관계의 양상은 중화와 서양의 조우와 공존이 큰 틀을 이룬다, 그러므로 조선도 더 이상 서양을 두려워하거나 몰아내고자 할 것이 아니라(㉢), 조선도

이에 맞추어 청(중국), 일본, 서양의 여러나라와 입약통상을 맺고 교류해야 한다는 것이다. 이것이 새로운 국제관계양상 교섭의 특징과 당위성이다. 아울러, 비록 대찬한 것이기는 하나 새로운 국제관계를 ‘交涉’으로 천명하는 과정에서 金允植의 영향력을 간과하기는 어렵다고 판단된다. 실제로 (a)의 내용은 金允植이 썼던 상소(본 발표문의 **사료A**)와 같다. 이는, 새로운 국제관계를 교섭=교제로 특징하는 것 역시 김윤식이 만들어낸 논리일 가능성을 높여준다.

즉, 비록 그 형식은 국왕이 윤음을 내리는 형태였으나, 임오군란 이후 국왕의 입지가 줄어드는 정치적 역학관계나 **사료E**에 드러나 있는 논리가 김윤식이 기존에 개진하였던 논리와 일치하는 부분이 많다는 점을 두루 고려하면, 위 윤음에 나타난 ‘交涉’이란 사실상 김윤식의 ‘작품’이라고 볼 수 있다고 생각한다.

이러한 어제 효유문을 통한 ‘교섭’의 공식화는 이후의 관계개편과도 표리관계를 이룬다. 임오군란 이후 고종은 통리기무아문의 후신인 통리아문과 통리내무아문을 만들 것을 명하였다⁴². 해당 기록에서 고종은 통리아문이 ‘外務’를 담당하는 관청임을 분명히 하고 있다. 그렇다면 명확하게 통리‘외무’아문이라고 하면 될 일이다. 또한, 통리내무아

문에 대응하기 위해서도 그 명칭이 외무아문이 되는 것이 적절할 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 당초에 아문을 만들 것을 명할 때 그저 통리아문이라고 하였다가, 곧 통리‘교섭’통상사무아문으로 이름을 바꾸었다⁴³. 뒤이어 통리군국사무아문은 그 후신격인 내무부(‘內務府’)로 이어지지만⁴⁴, 통리교섭통상사무아문의 별칭으로 外衙門 내지 外署라고는 쓰더라도 外務, 外交 등의 표현은 쓰이지 않았다. 이는 조선이 의도를 가지고 공식적인 수준에서 ‘外交’라는 표현을 피하였다는 인상을 주는데, 외교라는 언명을 피하고자 했던 김윤식의 행보와 일치한다. 게다가 위에서 논한 바와 같이, 일부 자구는 김윤식이 썼던 상소와 일치하기까지 한다. 그러므로 이러한 交涉은 청과의 事大, 일본, 서양과의 外交를 모두 포괄하면서도, 청을 의식해서 공식적으로는 ‘交涉’으로 공식적으로 천명하는 것은 ‘外交’라는 표현을 피해야 한다는 김윤식의 발상이 반영된 결과일 가능성이 매우 높다. 그런 한편 이러한 ‘交涉’의 공식화 과정에서 김윤식이 관여하였음을 알 수 있는 기록이 있다. 위에서도 잠시 언급한, 주복에게 보낸 서한은 조선이 새로운 국제관계에 대해서 어떻게 대처(공식화)해나가고자 했는지 김윤식의 인식과 의중을 구체적으로 보여준다.

사료 F

⁴² 『고종실록』 권19, 11월 17일 己亥. “敎曰: 當此外務伊始, 不可無句管處所。設置統理衙門辦理, 一切事宜應行節目, 務從簡便事, 分付政府.”

⁴³ 『고종실록』 권19, 19년 12월 4일 丙辰.

⁴⁴ 『고종실록』 권22, 22년 5월 25일 癸亥.

근래 통리아문을 설치하여 조영하, 김홍집, 목인덕 등으로 그 일을 관할하게 하였습니다. 또 내무서를 설치하고 홍순목, 김병국, 등 두 재상과 민태호, 김병시 및 기무처의 여러 대신들이 관할하도록 하였는데 ㉔체제가 안정되지 않았습니니다. 마상백이 저술한 <통서장정>이 있다고 하는데 아직 얻어 보지 못하였습니다. ㉕상상하건대 중국과 서양의 좋은 법을 참조하였을 것이나, 다만 힘써 행하는 것이 어떠할지 모르겠습니다⁴⁵.

첫째 김윤식은 1882년 11월 당시 조선의 내/외아문체제가 아직 자리잡지 못했다고 평가했다(㉔). 이는 1882년 8월 ‘교섭’이 공식화되었음에도 불구하고 제대로 정비되지 않았다고 평가하는 것이다. 이는 동년 12월에 이르러 내, 외아문의 명칭을 다시 한번 바꾸는 것과 관련되는 것으로 보인다. 두 번째는 외아문을 정비하고자 하는 정황이다. 김윤식은 마건상이 저술한 <통서장정>을 보고 싶다고 하는데, 흥미로운 것은 <統署章程>에 대해서 상상하며 내용을 상정하는 부분이다. 우선 김윤식은 주복에게 마건상이 저술한 <統署章程>의 내용을 알 수는 없지만, “중국과 서양의 좋은 법을 참고 했을 것”이라고 예상

하고 있다. 계속 강조하는 바이지만, 서양의 법과 중국의 법을 모두 쓸 수 있다는 것은, 「논공법」과 「논교섭」등에서 거듭 강조되는 핵심내용이다.

또한, 위에서 언급되는 「統署章程」의 ‘統署’라는 명칭을 보아도 해당 장정을 참고하고자 하는 목적이 조선의 외아문을 정비하고자 한 것임을 알 수 있다⁴⁶. 이는 달리 말하면 외아문의 성격과 사무를 정착시키는 데 김윤식이 영향을 행사하고 있었음을 방증하는 것이다.

김윤식의 입장에서 보면, 이렇게 공식화된 ‘交涉’이라는 교묘한 기획/구상은 영선사행 당시 제시한 조선의 ‘兩便兩得論’을 어떻게 국제관계상에서 구현할 것인지의 문제와 맞닿아 있는 것이기도 했다. 당대 상황에서는 사대관계가 여전히 청산되지 않았고, 일본은 물론 서양과의 관계도 ‘自主’하며 슬기롭게 풀어나가야 할 조선의 입장에서, 주요한 고민일 수 있었다. 그리고 김윤식의 양편양득론은 비로소 ‘交涉’으로 현실화되었다. 이를 양편양득론과 함께 그림으로 나타내 보면 다음과 같다.

⁴⁵ 『운양집』 권 11,

「與津海關道周玉山」(□(국역)운양집』 5, 해안, 2013, 421-423 쪽; □(校勘標點)雲養集』 4, 해안, 2015, 231쪽).

“近者設置統理署。趙惠人, 金道園, 穆麟德管其事。又置內務署。

洪·金兩相·閔台鎬·金炳始及機務諸臣管之。

然規模尙未一定。馬相伯著有統署章程, 姑未得見。想參用中西良法, 而顧力行之何如耳。”

⁴⁶ 統署는 통리교섭통상사무아문의 별칭이기도 하다.




그림3-1 현실 속의 ‘交涉’구도: 조약·장정과 관련하여




그림2 김윤식의 양편양득론과 ‘交涉’ 구상

본디 김윤식이 제시한 양편양득론은 말 그대로 청과의 사대관계, 서양 및 일본과의 외교관계를 모두 취하기 위해 개진된 논리이자 개념이었다. 다시 말해 이를 현실화하기 위해서는 서구 국제법적 근거와 중국문헌의 근거가 모두 필요했다. 그러할 때, ‘交涉’은 국제법 서적 『성초지장』 및 양무서적 『이언』에 모두 근거가 있었던 점이 주목된다.

게다가, 『이언』에서는 구체적인 ‘交涉’의 내용 즉, 중국과 서양의 공존 및 교류 그리고 중국과 서양의 양법(良法)의 시행이라는, ‘兩得’을 위한 구체적 방법까지 제시하고 있다. 그러므로 양편양득론에 담긴 김윤식의 문제의식은 실제 국제관계-청에 대한 사대관계, 서

양, 일본과의 외교관계-를 ‘交涉’으로 포괄하여 명명함으로써 난관이 해소되며 비로소 현실화될 수 있었던 것이다. 달리 말해, 교섭의 공식화 과정은 영선사행 당시 구상되었던 김윤식의 ‘양편양득론’이 임오군란 이후 일정한 정치적 과정을 거친 결과 조선에서 ‘交涉’으로 현실화된 것으로 평가할 수 있다고 본다.

이렇듯, ‘交涉’은 김윤식의 兩便兩得을 달성하기 위해 구체화/공식화된 새롭고 독특한 대외교섭의 방식이며, 이는 『성초지장』과 『이언』 모두에 근거하고 있다. ‘交涉’을 새로운 국제관계의 명칭으로 공식화함으로써 조선은 중화질서와 서구 국제법질서를 모두 위반하지 않으면서 외교와 사대 모두를 포괄할 수 있게 되었다. 구체적으로, 이러한 ‘交涉’은 『이언』에서 거듭 강조하는 바와 같이 중국과 서양의 良法을 모두 참고하는 것으로 운영된다.

이홍장 막하 양무관료들에게 동조했던 金允植은 영선사행 당시 그 영향을 많이 받았다. 그리고 金允植이 인식한 조선의 현실에 맞추어 ‘交涉’을 창출하게 된 것이다. 金允植은 국제관계의 두 축으로부터의 兩得의 필요성을 강하게 인식하면서 ‘交涉’으로 조선의 새로운

대외관계를 특정하고 공식화하는 과정을 주도했던 것으로 보인다.

이렇게 현실화된 ‘交渉’은, 일단 현상적으로만 보면 유의미한 면이 있었다. 외아문은 1894년 폐지되기 전까지 하나의 아문에서 서양, 일본은 물론 淸과 관련된 국제관계 안건도 함께 취급할 수 있었던 것이다.

그렇다면 ‘交渉’이 김윤식의 의도대로 淸과 서양/일본과의 양 관계에서 조선이 兩便하도록 하고 실제로 兩得을 가져다주었는지 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 그런데 현실화된 ‘交渉’은 김윤식이 의도한대로 ‘兩便兩得’, 즉 조선이 중국과 서양(및 일본) 양쪽에서 모두 이득을 취하는 것이 아니라, 도리어 自繩自縛을 초래할 가능성이 높았다.

淸은 <수륙장정>에 의거하여 서구국가와의 조약과 구별하고 종주권을 행사하고자 했다. 그런가 하면 서양과 일본은 <수륙장정>에 규정된 淸의 특권을 균점하고자 했다. 또한, 서구열강에 의해 조선에 대한 청의 종주권을 명분으로 조선의 교섭권이 부정될 가능성도 있었다. 이러한 문제점에 대해 대략적으로 나타내면 다음과 같다.




그림3-2 현실 속의 ‘交渉’구도: 배제/우회의 위험성

이를 통해 볼 때, 새로운 대외관계의 일선에서 활동하였던 金允植의 입장에서 중화질서와 국제법질서를 ‘交渉’으로 모두 포괄하여 兩得을 취한다는 김윤식의 생각은 일종의 ‘기획’이나 ‘구상’의 수준에서는 적절할 수 있었지만, 현실에서 과연 ‘交渉’이라는 구도로 조선에 兩得을 취할 수 있을 것인지는 다른 문제였다.

첫째, 개항 이후 청과 서구열강 양쪽에서 압력을 받고 있었다. 양쪽에서 이득을 취하는 것이 아니라, 양측에서 이권을 요구받을 때, 조선이 과연 어떻게 대응할 것인지에 고려가 부족했다(그림 3-1). 둘째, 심지어는 서양국가들이 청의 宗主權을 명분으로 조선과 交渉하지 않을 가능성도 있었다. 그런 상황이 올 때, 양 질서에 모두 무리 없이 대응하고자 했던 交渉은 도리어 조선의 교섭권을 유명무실하게 만드는 상황을 초래할 수도 있었다(그림3-2). 김윤식은 실제로 교섭활동을 하면서 그러한 한계에 스스로 직면하게 되며, 그럴수록 점점 더 親淸으로 경도되게 된다.

어쨌든 김윤식이 대찬한 효유문을 통해 ‘交渉’은 새로운 국제관계의 방식으로 조선에서 공식화되었다. 이것은 지금까지 살펴보았듯, 이는 外交라는 언명을 피하면서 사대관계와 외교관계를 모두 포괄하고자 한 김윤식이 의도한 결과였다. ‘交渉’은 국제법 서적 『성초지장』, 양무서적 『이언』에 모두 근거가 있었으며, 兩便兩得을 주장하면서,

개념적으로 청에 대한 事大와 “평등한” 外交를 분리하여 파악했던 김윤식 개인의 견해와도 합치되는 것이었다. 또한, 交涉이 무리 없이 청과의 통상사무를 포함할 수 있는 개념이라는 점은 청인의 입을 통해 확인된다.

진 대인이 여기에 온 것은 중국인들의 商務에 힘쓰는 것에 그치는 것이 아니겠습니까? 여러 사람들이 마음속으로 당혹스럽고 실로 이해하기 어려워 우리 관청으로 하여금 조회해서 공평하게 법을 적용하도록 청하였습니다. 진 관찰의 회답에 근거하면 “양국의 교섭에서 ‘互控’은 다만 일의 이치와 장정에 따를 뿐 세력과 지위의 대소를 언급하는 것은 부당하다(...)”라고 하였습니다.⁴⁷

요컨대 外交를 직접 언명하게 되면 ‘外交’는 사대관계와의 관계가 난맥상에 빠질 소지가 있지만, 새로운 국제관계를 交涉이라고 칭하게 되면 외교와 사대관계를 모두 포괄할 수 있었던 것이다. 위의 청인이 스스로 “양국 간의 교섭”을 운운하는 사례는 그러한 실마리를 보여주는 것이다.

물론, 김윤식이 주도한 것처럼 ‘交涉’을 공식화하는 작업이 반드시 필연적인 귀결이었던 것은 아니었다. 당시 조선에서 ‘새로운 국제관계’에 대한 개념화는 제각각이었다. 예를 들어 김윤식보

다 앞서 이홍장과 외교를 논하였던 이유원은 조선의 ‘邦交’를 권하는 이홍장에게 “조선에 ‘外交’는 필요 없다.”라고 답했다⁴⁸. 그런가 하면, 조선의 새로운 국제관계가 ‘交涉’으로 공식화되어가던 바로 그 시점에, 金允植과 비슷한 논리구조를 갖추고도 ‘外交’라 칭하는 경우도 찾아볼 수 있었다. 위의 효유문이 발표된 지 얼마 지나지 않은 1882년 8월(陰) 말 지식영은 다음과 같은 상소문을 올렸다.

현재의 대정(大政)으로 민심을 안정시키는 것보다 더 우선할 것은 없습니다. 왜 그런가 하면 우리나라는 바다 한쪽에 치우쳐 있어서 이제까지 **외교(外交)**라곤 해본 적이 없기에 견문이 넓지 못하여 시국(時局)에 어둡습니다. 나아가서 교린(交隣)하거나 연약(聯約)하는 것이 모두 어떤 것인지도 모르고 있습니다. 조금이라도 **외무(外務)**에 마음을 쓰는 자를 보기만 하면 대뜸 사교(邪教)에 물들었다고 지목하며 비방하고 침을 뱉으며 욕합니다⁴⁹.

위의 상소문에도 “외교를 해본 적이 없다.”라는 표현을 통해 기존의 조선의 국제관계가 한정적이었으며, 이제는 더 이상 그럴 수 없다는 인식이 공통적으로 드러나고 있다. 다만 이를 ‘外交’로 과감히 호명하는 지식영의 사례는, ‘새로운 국제관계’를 포착하는 데

⁴⁷ 『운양집』 권11, 「與津海關道周玉山」(『(국역)운양집』 5, 431쪽).

⁴⁸ 이유원, 「이홍장에게 보낸 서한」, 장인성 편, 『근대한국 국제정치관 자료집』, 서울대학교 출판문화원, 2012, 47-51쪽.

⁴⁹ 『고종실록』 권19, 19년 8월 23일 丙子. “目下大政, 莫先於安民心. 何則, 我國僻在海左, 從來不曾外交. 故見聞不廣, 昧於時局. 交隣聯約, 俱不知爲何物. 見稍用意於外務者, 則動輒目之以染邪, 誹謗之唾辱之.”

있어서 조선에는 ‘交涉’만이 아닌, 다양한 가능성이 존재했다는 단서를 보여준다.

그럼에도 불구하고, 위의 상소가 제출된 몇 달 뒤 관계개편에서 통리·교섭·통상사무아문이 설치되면서 새로운 국제관계는 다시 한번 ‘交涉’으로 공식화 되었다. 대외관계를 담당하는 아문의 이름에 ‘교섭’이 들어간 것은 이를 상징적으로 보여준다. 결국 ‘조선의 대외관계=交涉’ 청일전쟁의 결과 조공-책봉관계가 부정되고, 외무아문이 생길 때까지 지속되었다⁵⁰.

이러한 交涉의 공식화 과정을 보면, 물론 『이언』과 『성초지장』 등 서적의 영향도 있겠으나, 결과적으로 특정 인물의 영향력을 상정할 수밖에 없다고 보여진다. 김윤식은 영선사행부터, 임오군란의 진압에 이르기까지 꾸준히 대외관계의 일선에서 활동하며, 새로운 국제관계에 대한 문제의식을 피력했고, 이후에는 외아문의 독관까지 지내게 된다.

김윤식은 영선사행을 전후하여 변화해가는 국제관계를 체험했으며, 또 이 사안에 가장 예민하게 포착한 인물이었다. 다만, 김윤식은 자주국 간의 평등한 국제관계라는 서양과의 外交의 요체로 인식하되 청과의 관계를 고려해서 ‘外交’라는 언명을 피하고자 했다. 그렇기 때문에 국제법 서적 『성초지

장』과 양무서적 『이언』에서 모두 그 근거를 찾아 국제관계의 두 축을 모두 포괄할 수 있는 개념으로서 ‘交涉’을 포착하고 일련의 과정을 거쳐서 공식화하는데 영향을 미쳤다.

그런가 하면 훗날 淸에서도 駐紮朝鮮總理‘交涉’通商事宜라는 직함으로 원세개를 파견하여 이러한 조선의 ‘공식화’에 대해 응답하였다⁵¹. 교섭은 다시 한번 공인받은 셈이다. 김윤식은 그 뒤로도 교섭의 책임자로서 오랜 기간 근무했고, 그만큼 조선에서 ‘交涉’은 공고화되어갔다.

주지하였듯이 개항 이후 조선의 새로운 국제관계를 포착하는 데 있어서는 다른 가능성도 있었다. 이유원과 지식영이 그 적절한 사례일 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 조선의 새로운 국제관계는 交涉으로 공식화 되었던 것은 임오군란이 발생하자 청과 제휴하여 임오군란의 해결에 ‘공헌’하고, 정치적으로 영향력을 확대하여 당시에 효유문을 대찬할 정도의 위치에 있었던 김윤식의 영향이었다고 평가할 수 있다고 본다.

결정적으로 유배중이던 때에 기록한 「천진봉사연기」에서, 회고하길 영선사행 당시 필담을 하며 기록해둔 것이 외국과의 ‘교섭’의 시작이었다고 스스로 밝히고 있다⁵². 물론 개항 이후 새로운 국제관계의 모색이 김윤식을 통해서만

⁵⁰ 실제로 통리내무아문이 여러차례 이름을 바꾸며 변화했던 것과 달리, 통리교섭통상사무아문은 갑오개혁 이전까지 이름을 바꾸지 않고 그대로 존속했다.

⁵¹ 『舊韓國外交文書: 淸案』 1, #450.

⁵² 『운양집』 권 14

「天津奉使緣起」(□(校勘標點)雲養集』 4, 55쪽).

“壬辰季夏, 論居無事, 屬印君東植移騰行曆中談草, 彙爲一冊, 命之日《天津談草》, 略述緣起於上。蓋識我國與外國交涉, 自此始也。”

이루어진 것은 아니다. 그렇지만 위의 기록에서 김윤식이 조선이 개항 이후 새로운 국제관계를 ‘交渉’으로 설정해 나가는 데 중요한 역할을 했다고 스스로 자부하고 있다는 점에서, 비록 후일 담 형식의 기록이기는 하나 새로운 국제관계가 ‘交渉’으로 자리 잡는 데에 김윤식이 영향과 역할은 상당하였던 것으로 보인다.

중국과 서양의 본격적인 조우와 공존(교류)이라는 전에 없던 사태에 직면하였을 때, 조선에는 이러한 국제관계 양상을 인식할 ‘다양한 가능성’이 존재했다. 그런데 결과적으로 조선정부는 이를 ‘交渉’으로 공식화하게 되었다. 그렇다면, ‘外交’라는 언명을 피하고자 했던 특정인물의 영향력을 상정할 수밖에 없다. 그러한 김윤식의 의도는 ‘交渉’이라는 이름으로 외아문의 공식 명칭에 반영되었다고 생각한다.

덧붙여, 조선정부에서 주해한 『이언언해』에서는 논교섭에 대해 “사귀어 통섭함을 의논함이라.”라고 명시적으로 밝혀두고 있기도 하다⁵³. 여기에서 조선이 의도했던 ‘교섭’이란 곧 국제관계 상의 두 질서(중화질서와 국제법질서), 혹은 구체적인 관계(사대관계와 외교관계)를 ‘통섭’하는 것이었음을 거듭 확인할 수 있는 것이다.

이렇듯 교섭이 공식화되기 이전

부터 영선사행을 통해 당시 국제관계의 현안을 인식하고 참여했던 김윤식이 조선이 ‘새로운 국제관계’를 ‘交渉’으로 공식화하는 데 주도적인 역할을 하였다. 또한, 김윤식은 임오군란⁵⁴과 갑신정변⁵⁵의 사후처리 과정에서, 국왕 고종의 처신 실패를 자인하도록 하여 정치적으로 견제했다. 이에 짝하듯 외아문이 통리‘교섭’통상사무아문의 이름을 얻게 되면서 ‘交渉’이 공식화되었다. 이후로도 김윤식은 청에 계속 동조하였는데, 대표적으로 對淸獨立을 과감히 시도한 ‘開化黨’의 반발도 물리쳤다. 이러한 일련의 정치적 사건을 거치면서 조선의 새로운 대외관계를 표상하는 ‘交渉’은 점점 공고화되었다.

이와 함께 김윤식은 승진을 거듭했다. 갑신정변 이후 통리교섭통상사무아문 협판, 병조판서, 강화부 유수를 겸직하여 “거의 무제한적인 권력을 가졌다.”⁵⁶고 평가되기도 했다. 그리고 마침내 통리교섭통상사무아문의 독판이 되어 스스로 구상했던 조선의 ‘交渉’의 책임자가 되었던 것이다.

그런데, 당시 조선이 처한 국제관계상의 문제는 淸에 대하여 外交를 ‘감히’ 언명하지 않으면서도 사대관계와 외교관계를 모두 ‘交渉’으로 묶는데 있는 것이 아니었다. 조선이 역사적으로 메여있던 질곡은 사대관계(중화질

⁵³ 『이언』, 271쪽. “론교섭: 사귀어통섭함、의논함이라.”

⁵⁴ 『운양집』 권 9. 「懲討後大赦布告」(□(국역)운양집』 4, 2013, 405-406쪽).

⁵⁵ 『운양집』 권9, 「常參綸音」(위의 책, 2013, 411-413쪽).

⁵⁶ H, N 알렌 저, 김원모 역, 『알렌의 일기』, 1991; 李相一, 앞의 박사학위논문, 1996, 128쪽에서 재인용

서)가 국제법적으로 다시금 재해석되면
서까지 (유바다 2017, 377-378) 자국을
여전히 제약하고 있는 상황 그 자체에
있었다. 임오군란 이후, 그러한 경향은
더욱 심화 되었고, 이를 ‘非常’한 방법
으로 극복하고자 한 ‘開化黨’의 시도
역시 바로 그 淸에 의해 좌절되었다.
김윤식은 애초 본인이 구상한 ‘交涉’을
넘어서는 것을 원하지 않았으며 불온
한 ‘開化’에는 더더욱 찬동하지 않았으
므로 ‘開化黨’의 반대편에 서서 그들을
진압하였다. 그 뒤 외아문 독판이 되어
조선을 대표해 ‘交涉’을 담당하게 된다.
이렇게 볼 때, 스스로 공식화한, 중국
의 담임을 전제하는 ‘交涉’에 김윤식이
충실하였던 것과, 갈수록 淸에 밀착하
여 간 것은 당연한 귀결이었다.

金允植은 결국 親淸이라는 혐의
에서 자유로울 수 없었었으며 1887년
을 넘기지 못하고 정치적으로 실각했
지만, 그가 구상한 ‘交涉’의 그림자는
더 길게 남았다. 흔히 고종의 ‘자주외
교’를 보여준다고 평가하는 주미공사와
견 당시 국서에도 박정양의 직무에 대
하여 “辦理交涉事宜”라고 적고 있는
것이다⁵⁷. 교섭의 그림자는 그만큼 길었
다.

金允植은 늦은 나이에 관직에 나아갔
음에도 불구하고 관료로서 빠르게 성
공하고 淸에 동조하여 2년이 넘는 긴
기간 동안 외아문 독판으로 재임할 수
있었다. 그러나 이를 달리 말하면 조선
을 제약하는 ‘交涉’이라는 기제가 현실
에서 오래도록 작동하며 고착되어갔다

는 의미이기도 하였다.

5. 맺음말

개항 이후 조선은 본격적으로 일본 및
서양의 여러 나라들과 조약을 맺고 새
로운 국제관계에 참여하게 되었다. 이를
기존 연구에서는 근대외교(diplomacy)의
시작으로 파악한 뒤, 淸의 간섭으로 인
해 부당하게 제한받았다고 평가하는 것
이 일반적이었다. 최근 일본 학계에서는
조선의 근대외교체제를 부정하고 교린
의 연장으로 파악하려는 경향을 보이기
도 한다. 두 연구 조류 모두 조선이 스
스로 명명한 ‘交涉’에 주목하지 않은 채
사후적 관점에서 조선이 처한 국제관계
를 평가하는 것이라는 점에서 일정한
한계가 노정됨을 논하였다.

조선에 있어 당시 중국과 서양이 본격
적으로 조우하고 공존하는 국제관계는
새로운 것이었다. 그 특징은 다음과 같
다. 첫째, 김윤식이 ‘복사동통’으로 통칭
했던 사대-교린관계 외의 세력들이 대거
등장했다. 바로 서양이었다. 둘째, 이러
한 서양은 해방론 단계만 하더라도 교
류해서는 안 되는 驅逐의 대상이었다.
그러나 세계정세는 점차 중국과 서양이
공존하고 교류하는 양상이 정착되어갔

⁵⁷ 『舊韓國外交文書: 美案』 1, #460.

으며, 조선도 조미통상조약을 체결하면서 서양과 공식적으로 통교하게 되었다. 즉 국제관계의 확대와 함께, 서양과 중국이 공존하게 된 상황, 이것이 조선이 처한 새로운 국제관계양상의 핵심이었다고 할 것이다.

통리‘교섭’통상사무아문의 존재는 조선이 공식적으로 그러한 새로운 국제관계를 ‘交渉’으로 인식하고 공식화하였음을 보여주는 것이다. ‘交渉’은 청과 연결된 사대관계와 새로운 조약관계를 모두 포괄할 수 있는 개념이었다. 그리고 그러한 새로운 국제관계=교섭의 공식화 과정에서 주도적인 역할을 한 인물이 바로 金允植이었다.

본래 金允植도 제2차 아편전쟁 전후로는 『해국도지』 「주해편」을 인용하는 등 서양에 대한 해방론적 인식을 드러내었던 인물이었다. 그런데 개항과 영선사행의 경험을 통해 김윤식의 태도는 점차 변화한다. 그는 개항 이후 대청관계에 정통하였고, 조미수호통상조약체결에서 보듯 새로운 국제관계를 정립해가는 데 앞장섰다. 그는 영선사행을 통해 새로운 국제관계 양상을 한발 앞서 경험하며 예민하게 인식할 수 있었다.

김윤식은 영선사행 당시 교류했던 청의 양무관료들에게 영향을 받았고 『이

언』등 양무서적에서 묘사하는 淸 중심의 국제판도를 무리 없이 받아들였다, 그 결과 淸의 擔任을 전제하는 ‘交渉’을 구상하고 이를 조선에서 공식화하는 데에 큰 영향을 미쳤다. 그러므로 그는 조선의 새로운 국제관계인 ‘交渉’을 구상한 인물이자, 스스로 조선의 국제관계를 ‘交渉’으로 한계지은 인물이기도 하다.

다만, 이러한 ‘交渉’을 공식화한 김윤식의 행보가 고루한 사대 관념이나 유교적 인식의 발로만은 아니었다. 김윤식은 국제법상의 국가 간의 관계를 『만국공법』에 따라 ‘交際’로 인식하는 등 새로이 등장한 국제법의 ‘원리’ 자체는 매우 정확하게 꿰뚫어 보고 있었다. 만약 기존 연구의 논의처럼 김윤식의 사고방식이 유교나 전통적 사고에만 매몰되어 있었다면 구태여 ‘交渉’이 등장할 이유가 없었을 것이다.

한편, 淸과의 사대관계를 청산하려고 했던 開化黨이나 기꺼이 ‘外交’를 언명한 지석영의 사례를 보았을 때, 개항 이후 조선의 국제관계의 진로에는 다른 ‘가능성’ 역시 상존했다. 그럼에도 불구하고 조선에서 이를 ‘交渉’으로 공식화하였다는 역사적 결과는 그 과정에서 김윤식의 상당한 영향력이 있었음을 암시하는 것이다.

구체적으로 金允植은 영선사행 당시에 ‘양편양득론’을 제시하고, 임오군란 이후로는 조선정부 내에서 ‘交渉’으로 공식화하는 데에 영향을 미쳤다. 1882년 본인이 대찬한 효유문에서 ‘交渉’을 부각시켰으며 그해 12월에는 외아문의 공식명칭이 변경되면서 ‘交渉’의 공식화를 이루어내었다.

그렇다면 김윤식은 왜 ‘交渉’을 구상했을까? 앞서 밝히었듯이, 여기에는 본인이 목도한 현실, 청의 양무관료들과의 교류, 『이언』과 『성초지장』 등의 서적이 두루 영향을 미쳤다고 판단된다. 본문에서 살펴보았듯, 金允植은 특히 청인들과 관계될 때 ‘외교’라는 언급은 피하기 위해 다양한 표현을 동원한 바 있다(遠交, 邦交). 김윤식의 입장에서 보면, 조선에서 ‘外交’는 ‘공식적으로’ 채택될 수 없었다. 그러면서도 조선은 조약을 맺어 국제법 질서에 참여하게 되었으므로, 외교는 이제 현실적으로 요구되는 일이었다. 이에, 사대관계와 외교관계 모두를 포괄할 수 있는 새로운 개념과 구상이 필요했다. 중국(淸)도 서양 열강도 국제관계상의 중요 구성국들이었기 때문이다.

김윤식은 섬세한 시각으로 청과 서양이 공존하는 독특한 ‘현실’을 적절하게

포착하고자 했다. 이는 그가 영선사행 당시에 제시한 양편양득론에서부터 읽어낼 수 있는 문제의식이며, 그것이 ‘交渉’이라는 구상으로 이어진 것이다.

김윤식은 자주국으로서 外交하면서도 한편으로 淸과의 사대관계를 유지하며 소위 ‘兩得’을 취해야 하는 조선의 독특한 입장을 반영하여 적절한 국제관계상의 구도를 구상하고자 했다. 또한, 이를 구상으로 그치지 않고 ‘실제로’ 현실에 안착시키기 위해 국제법 서적과 양무서적 양쪽에 모두 명확한 근거가 있는 ‘交渉’으로 공식화한 것으로 보인다.

이런 의도를 가지고 ‘交渉’을 새로운 국제관계의 형식으로 공식화함으로써 조선은 외교와 사대를 모두 포괄할 수 있게 되었다. 실제로도 통리‘교섭’통상사무아문은 1894년 폐지되기 전까지 하나의 아문에서 淸은 물론 서양 국가들과의 국제관계를 모두 취급할 수 있었다. 즉 조선은 ‘交渉’으로 중화질서와 서구 국제법질서에 모두 대응할 수 있게 된 것이다. 이는 중국과 서양에게서 모두 兩得하고자 했던, ‘交渉의 구상자’인 金允植의 의도와 합치하는 것이었다.

그렇다면 ‘交渉’이 김윤식의 의도대로 淸, 서양/일본과의 양 관계에서 실제로 조선이 兩便하도록 하고 兩得을 가져다



주었는지 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 사실 ‘交渉’은 김윤식의 의도대로 조선이 兩便하고 兩得하도록 하는 것이 아니라, 반대로 自繩自縛의 상황으로 몰고 갈 가능성이 높았다. 왜냐하면 ‘交渉’이란 당시 국제관계상에서, 종주국 淸을 제외하고 다른 나라들과는 조선이 ‘自主’함에도 불구하고, 명백한 ‘自主의 영역’마저 淸의 종주권에 의해 억압될 수 있는 대외관계 구조를 그대로 ‘공식화’한 것이기 때문이다.

요컨대 당시 조선이 처한 국제관계상의 문제는 淸에 대하여 外交를 ‘감히’ 언명하지 않으면서도 사대관계와 외교관계를 모두 ‘交渉’으로 묶는 데 있는 것이 아니었다. 조선이 역사적으로 메여 있던 질곡은 사대관계(중화질서)가 국제법적으로 다시금 재해석되면서까지 자국을 여전히 제약하고 있는 상황 자체에 있었다. 임오군란 이후, 그러한 경향은 더욱 심화되어갔고, 이를 ‘非常’한 방법으로 극복하고자 한 開化黨의 시도

도 바로 그 淸에 의해 좌절되었다.

김윤식은 애초 朝鮮이 ‘交渉’을 넘어서는 것을 원하지 않았으며 불온한 ‘開化’에는 더더욱 찬동하지 않았으므로 開化黨의 반대편에 서서 그들을 진압하였고, 그 뒤 외아문 독판이 되어 조선을 대표해 ‘交渉’을 책임지는 위치까지 올랐다. 스스로 공식화한, 중국의 담임을 전제하는 ‘交渉’에 그가 충실하였던 것, 그리고 갈수록 淸에 밀착하여 간 것은 당연한 귀결이었다.

조선이 ‘交渉’이라는 스스로의 굴레를 벗어던진 것은 청일전쟁으로 조선과 청간의 오랜 관계가 부정된 다음이었다. 그때 비로소 통리교섭통상사무아문은 외무아문으로 이름을 바꾸었다. 그런데 흥미롭게도 김윤식도 이때 다시 돌아오게 된다. 그는 이제 외무아문의 대신으로서, 10여 년 전 스스로 ‘交渉’이라는 굴레를 씌웠던, 조선의 外交를 다시 책임지게 된 것이다.






그림3-1 현실 속의 ‘交涉’구도: 조약·장정과 관련하여




그림3-2 현실 속의 ‘交涉’구도: 배제/우회의 위험성

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